# Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet; Restoring Internet Freedom > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2024-10674 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** May 22, 2024 - **Citation:** 89 FR 45404 ## Text FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 47 CFR Parts 8 and 20 [WC Docket Nos. 23-320, 17-108; FCC 24-52, FR ID 219926] Safeguarding and Securing the Open Internet; Restoring Internet Freedom AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopts a Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, Order, and Order on Reconsideration that reestablishes the Commission's authority over broadband internet access service (BIAS). The Declaratory Ruling classifies broadband internet access service as a telecommunications service under Title II of the Communications Act, providing the Commission with additional authority to safeguard national security, advance public safety, protect consumers, and facilitate broadband deployment. The Order establishes broad, tailored forbearance of the Commission's application of Title II to broadband providers while maintaining Title II provisions the Commission needs to fulfill its obligations and objectives. The Report and Order reinstates straightforward, clear rules that prohibit blocking, throttling, or engaging in paid or affiliated prioritization arrangements, adopts certain enhancements to the transparency rule, and reinstates a general conduct standard that prohibits unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage to consumers or edge providers. The Order on Reconsideration partially grants and otherwise dismisses as moot four petitions for reconsideration filed in response to the 2020 Restoring Internet Freedom Remand Order. DATES: Effective July 22, 2024, except for amendatory instruction 7 (revisions to 47 CFR 8.2(a) and (b)), which is delayed indefinitely. The FCC will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the effective date. As of September 19, 2024, China Mobile International (USA) Inc., China Telecom (Americas) Corporation, China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited, Pacific Networks Corp., and ComNet (USA) LLC, and their affiliates and subsidiaries as defined pursuant to 47 CFR 2.903(c), shall discontinue any and all provision of broadband internet access service. ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street SW, Washington, DC 20554. In addition to filing comments with the Office of the Secretary, a copy of any comments on the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained herein should be submitted to Nicole Ongele, Federal Communications Commission, 45 L Street SW, Washington, DC 20554, or send an email to PRA@fcc.gov . FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, contact Chris Laughlin, Wireline Competition Bureau at 202-418-2193. For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this document, send an email to PRA@fcc.gov or contact Nicole Ongele, Nicole.Ongele@fcc.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration in WC Docket Nos. 23-320 and 17-108, FCC 24-52, adopted on April 25, 2024, and released on May 7, 2024. The full text of the document is available on the Commission's website at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-52A1.pdf . To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities ( e.g., braille, large print, electronic files, audio format, etc.), send an email to FCC504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice). Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis This document contains new or modified information collection requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, will invite the general public to comment on the information collection requirements contained in the Report and Order as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. In addition, the Commission notes that pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific comment on how the Commission might further reduce the information collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees. In the Report and Order, we adopt the transparency rule originally adopted in 2010 and reaffirmed in 2015, which caters to a broader relevant audience of interested parties than the audience identified in the Restoring Internet Freedom (RIF) Order (83 FR 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018)). We reinstate enhancements to the transparency rule disclosures pertaining to network practices and performance characteristics. Specifically, with regard to network practices, we reaffirm that the transparency rule requires that BIAS providers disclose any practices applied to traffic associated with a particular user or user group (including any application-agnostic degradation of service to a particular end user), and requires that disclosures of user-based or application-based practices must include the purpose of the practice; which users or data plans may be affected; the triggers that activate the use of the practice; the types of traffic that are subject to the practice; and the practice's likely effects on end users' experiences. In addition, we require BIAS providers to disclose any zero-rating practices. We reinstate the enhanced performance characteristics disclosures eliminated in 2017 to require BIAS providers to disclose packet loss and to require that performance characteristics be reported with greater geographic granularity and be measured in terms of average performance over a reasonable period of time and during times of peak usage. We also require BIAS providers to directly notify end users if their individual use of a network will trigger a network practice, based on their demand prior to a period of congestion, that is likely to have a significant impact on the end user's use of the service. We temporarily exempt (with the potential to become permanent) BIAS providers that have 100,000 or fewer BIAS subscribers as per their most recent FCC Form 477, aggregated over all affiliates of the provider, from the requirements to disclose packet loss and report their performance characteristics with greater geographic granularity and in terms of average performance over a reasonable period of time and during times of peak usage, as well as from the direct notification requirement to provide them additional time to develop appropriate systems. We delegate to the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau (CGB) the authority to determine whether to maintain the exemption, and if so, the appropriate bounds of the exemption. We require providers to disclose all information required by the transparency rule on a publicly available, easily accessible website and that all transparency disclosures made pursuant to the transparency rule also be made available in machine-readable format. In addition, to provide upfront clarity, guidance, and predictability, we adopt an updated process for providers seeking an advisory opinion from Commission staff regarding the open internet rules, through which any BIAS provider may request an advisory opinion regarding the permissibility of its proposed policies and practices affecting access to BIAS. Congressional Review Act The Commission has determined, and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, concurs, that this rule is major under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Commission will send a copy of the Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). Synopsis I. Declaratory Ruling: Classification of Broadband Internet Access Services 1. We reinstate the telecommunications service classification of BIAS under Title II of the Act. Reclassification will enhance the Commission's ability to ensure internet openness, defend national security, promote cybersecurity, safeguard public safety, monitor network resiliency and reliability, protect consumer privacy and data security, support consumer access to BIAS, and improve disability access. We find that classification of BIAS as a telecommunications service represents the best reading of the text of the Act in light of how the service is offered and perceived today, as well as the factual and technical realities of how BIAS functions. Classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service also accords with Commission and court precedent and is fully and sufficiently justified under the Commission's longstanding authority and responsibility to classify services subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, as necessary. We also ensure that consumers receive the same protections when using fixed and mobile BIAS by reclassifying mobile BIAS as a commercial mobile service. A. Reclassification Enhances the Commission's Ability To Fulfill Key Public Interest Obligations and Objectives 2. As the record overwhelmingly demonstrates, BIAS connections are absolutely essential to modern day life, facilitating employment, education, healthcare, commerce, community-building, communication, and free expression. The “forced digitization” of the COVID-19 pandemic served to underscore the importance of BIAS connections in society as essential activities moved online, and the increased importance of BIAS connections has only persisted in the wake of the pandemic. It has therefore never been more important that the Commission have both the necessary authority to oversee this essential service to protect consumers, strengthen national security, and support public safety, and the full complement of tools to facilitate access to BIAS. 3. While our conclusion that classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service represents the best reading of the Act is itself sufficient grounds for our decision, we separately conclude that important policy considerations also support this determination. In particular, our reclassification decision will ensure the Commission can fulfill statutory obligations and policy objectives to ensure internet openness, defend national security, promote cybersecurity, safeguard public safety, monitor network resiliency and reliability, protect consumer privacy and data security, support consumer access to BIAS, and improve disability access. As such, these policy obligations and objectives, each independently and collectively, support the reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service. We therefore reject arguments that we should address other issues instead of reclassifying BIAS, particularly since reclassification will enhance the Commission's ability to address many of the issues commenters raise. 1. Ensuring Internet Openness 4. We find that reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service enables the Commission to more effectively safeguard the open internet. In addition to protecting free expression, an open internet encourages competition and innovation, and is critical to public safety. As we explain below, we find that a safe, secure, and open internet is too important to consumers and innovators to leave without the protection of Federal regulatory oversight. 5. Upon this document's reclassification of BIAS as a Title II telecommunications service, we rely on our authority in sections 201 and 202 of the Act, along with the related enforcement authorities of sections 206, 207, 208, 209, 216, and 217, for the open internet rules we adopt in the Declaratory Ruling, Order, Report and Order, and Order (Order) to address practices that are unjust, unreasonable, or unreasonably discriminatory. Specifically, we reinstate rules that prohibit BIAS providers from blocking or throttling the information transmitted over their networks or engaging in paid or affiliated prioritization arrangements, and reinstate a general conduct standard that prohibits practices that cause unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantage to consumers or edge providers. As discussed more fully below, these rules, in concert with strong transparency requirements, establish clear standards for BIAS providers to maintain internet openness and give the Commission a solid basis on which to take enforcement actions against conduct that prevents consumers from fully accessing all of the critical services available through the internet. The reclassification also enables the Commission to establish a nationwide framework of open internet rules for BIAS providers and thereby exercise our authority to preempt any state or local measures that interfere or are incompatible with the Federal regulatory framework we establish in the Order, while at the same time ensuring that all consumers are protected from conduct harmful to internet openness. 2. Defending National Security and Law Enforcement 6. The reclassification of BIAS enhances the Commission's ability to protect the Nation's communications networks from entities that pose threats to national security and law enforcement. The RIF Order' s classification of BIAS as an information service under Title I raised concerns about the Commission's authority to take certain regulatory actions to address risks to BIAS providers and vulnerabilities in broadband networks. As the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) highlights, “the Commission has encountered challenges that have hampered its ability to fully protect the public from serious national security threats.” For example, NTIA describes cases where the Commission identified such threats and revoked the authority of certain foreign-owned adversarial service providers to provide Title II telecommunications services (including “traditional telephony”) in the United States pursuant to its section 214 authority, but was not able to stop them from providing BIAS or other internet-based services that were then classified as Title I services. Classifying BIAS under Title II alleviates those concerns, restoring a broader range of regulatory tools and enhancing the Commission's jurisdiction to cover broadband services, providers, and networks. We also find that reclassification will enable the Commission to make more significant national security contributions as we continue our longstanding coordination with our Federal partners. 7. We find that reclassification will significantly bolster the Commission's ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities to safeguard national security and law enforcement. Congress created the Commission, among other reasons, “for the purpose of the national defense.” The Commission's national security responsibilities are well established. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21) describes the Commission's roles as including “identifying communications sector vulnerabilities and working with industry and other stakeholders to address those vulnerabilities . . . [and] to increase the security and resilience of critical infrastructure within the communications sector.” The President's recent National Security Memorandum, NSM-22, recognized the Commission's role in securing critical infrastructure: “The Federal Communications Commission will, to the extent permitted by law and in coordination with DHS and other Federal departments and agencies: (1) identify and prioritize communications infrastructure by collecting information regarding communications networks; (2) assess communications sector risks and work to mitigate those risks by requiring, as appropriate, regulated entities to take specific actions to protect communications networks and infrastructure; and (3) collaborate with communications sector industry members, foreign governments, international organizations, and other stakeholders to identify best practices and impose corresponding regulations.” 8. There can be no question about the importance to our national security of maintaining the integrity of our critical infrastructure, including communications networks. As PPD-21 explains: The Nation's critical infrastructure provides the essential services that underpin American society. Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure—including assets, networks, and systems—that are vital to public confidence and the Nation's safety, prosperity, and well-being . . . . The Federal Government also has a responsibility to strengthen the security and resilience of its own critical infrastructure, for the continuity of national essential functions, and to organize itself to partner effectively with and add value to the security and resilience efforts of critical infrastructure owners and operators . . . . It is the policy of the United States to strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats. Developments in recent years have only highlighted national security concerns arising in connection with the U.S. communications sector. These security threats also impact BIAS providers and broadband networks. PPD-21 recognizes that “communications systems [are] uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors,” which highlights the importance of protecting communications infrastructure—including broadband networks. Disruptions of communications can easily have significant cascading effects on other critical infrastructure sectors that rely on communications. The PPD-21 states, “U.S. efforts shall address the security and resilience of critical infrastructure in an integrated, holistic manner to reflect this infrastructure's interconnectedness and interdependency. This directive also identifies energy and communications systems as uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they provide across all critical infrastructure sectors.” We find that reclassification of BIAS under Title II will enable the Commission to more fully utilize its regulatory authority and rely on its subject matter expertise and operational capabilities to address these concerns and strengthen the security posture of the United States. As NTIA explains, the “lightning-fast evolutions of our communications technologies and our growing dependence on these offerings necessitate a whole-of-government approach to security that engages all available federal government resources.” 9. The Commission has on multiple occasions carried out its responsibilities to protect the Nation's communications networks from threats to national security and law enforcement by taking regulatory actions under Title II regarding the provision of traditional telecommunications services, including voice. For example, the Commission denied an application for international section 214 authority and revoked the section 214 authority of, certain entities that are majority-owned and controlled by the Chinese government, based on recommendations and comments from interested Executive Branch agencies regarding evolving national security and law enforcement concerns. In the China Mobile USA Order, China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, China Unicom Americas Order on Revocation, and Pacific Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission found that these entities are subject to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government, and that mitigation would not address the national security and law enforcement concerns. In the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, China Unicom Americas Order on Revocation, and Pacific Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission also found that the significant national security and law enforcement risks associated with those entities' retention of their section 214 authority “pose a clear and imminent threat to the security of the United States.” More recently, the Commission adopted the Evolving Risks Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (88 FR 50486 (Aug. 1, 2023)), which, among other things, proposed rules that would require carriers to renew, every 10 years, their international section 214 authority. In the alternative, the Commission sought comment on adopting rules that would require all international section 214 authorization holders to periodically update information enabling the Commission to review the public interest and national security implications of those authorizations based on that updated information. As stated in the Evolving Risks NPRM, the overarching objective of that proceeding is to adopt rule changes “that will enable the Commission, in close collaboration with relevant Executive Branch agencies, to better protect telecommunications services and infrastructure in the United States in light of evolving national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy risks.” 10. The reclassification of BIAS as a Title II service, and our decision below to decline to forbear from the entry certification requirements of section 214, will enable the Commission to exercise its section 214 authority with respect to BIAS providers, and will enhance the Commission's ability to protect the Nation's communications networks from entities that pose threats to national security and law enforcement. Section 214(a) of the Act prohibits any carrier from constructing, acquiring, or operating any line, and from engaging in transmission through any such line, without first obtaining a certificate from the Commission “that the present or future public convenience and necessity require or will require the construction, or operation, or construction and operation, of such . . . line . . . .” The Supreme Court has determined that the Commission has considerable discretion in deciding how to make its section 214 public interest findings. As we discuss elsewhere, while we grant blanket section 214 authority for the provision of BIAS to all current and future BIAS providers, with exceptions, this grant of blanket authority is subject to the Commission's reserved power to revoke such authority, consistent with established statutory directives and longstanding Commission determinations with respect to section 214 authorizations. The Commission has explained that it grants blanket section 214 authority, rather than forbearing from application or enforcement of section 214 entirely, in order to remove barriers to entry without relinquishing its ability to protect consumers and the public interest by withdrawing such grants on an individual basis. And we find that the Commission's determinations, based on thorough record development, in the denial and revocation actions discussed below, in which the Commission extensively evaluated national security and law enforcement considerations associated with those entities, support our decision to exclude from this blanket section 214 authority for the provision of BIAS those same entities whose application for international section 214 authority was previously denied or whose domestic and international section 214 authority was previously revoked by the Commission because of national security and law enforcement concerns. As discussed below, we find that excluding those entities and their current and future affiliates and subsidiaries from blanket section 214 authority for the provision of BIAS is warranted based on the Commission's determinations in those proceedings that the present and future public interest, convenience, and necessity would no longer be served by the retention of those entities' section 214 authority, or that the public interest would not be served by the grant of international section 214 authority. The Commission's actions in those proceedings were based on recommendations and comments regarding evolving national security and law enforcement concerns from Executive Branch agencies, including from Members of, or Advisors to, the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Sector (Committee) created pursuant to Executive Order 13913. Our action in the Order will enable the Commission to use its section 214 authority to address threats to communications networks, working cooperatively with our Federal partners and leveraging all investigative tools at our disposal. 11. Reclassification will also enhance the Commission's ability to obtain information from BIAS providers that will enable the Commission to assess national security risks, through reliance on section 214 of the Act, along with sections 201, 202, 218, 219, and 220. The Commission relies on sections 201 and 202 of the Act, and section 706 of the 1996 Act, for its authority to collect information. Additionally, section 218 of the Act authorizes the Commission to seek “full and complete information necessary to enable the Commission to perform the duties and carry out the objects for which it was created.” Section 219 of the Act provides that “[t]he Commission is authorized to require annual reports from all carriers subject to this chapter, and from persons directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by, or under direct or indirect common control with, any such carrier, to prescribe the manner in which such reports shall be made, and to require from such persons specific answers to all questions upon which the Commission may need information.” Section 220(c) of the Act provides that “[t]he Commission shall at all times have access to and the right of inspection and examination of all accounts, records, and memoranda, including all documents, papers, and correspondence now or hereafter existing, and kept or required to be kept by such carriers, and the provisions of this section.” As one example, in the Evolving Risks Order (88 FR 85514 (Dec. 8, 2023)), the Commission adopted a one-time collection of foreign ownership information from international section 214 authorization holders, pursuant to sections 218 and 219 of the Act, among other statutory provisions. Reclassification grants the Commission additional authority to develop information collection requirements pursuant to applicable provisions under Title II with regard to BIAS providers. 12. We anticipate as well that Title II authority, such as that provided in section 201 of the Act, will be important in addressing national security and law enforcement concerns involving internet Points of Presence (PoPs), which are usually located within data centers, as those relate to the provision of BIAS. Today, internet service providers (ISPs) provide BIAS through PoPs. There are serious national security and law enforcement risks associated with PoPs that are owned or operated by entities that present threats to national security and law enforcement interests and potential harms related to the services provided by such entities. For instance, in the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission addressed concerns that China Telecom (Americas) Corporation's (CTA) PoPs in the United States “are highly relevant to the national security and law enforcement risks associated with CTA” and that “CTA's PoPs in the United States provide CTA with the capability to misroute traffic and, in so doing, access and/or manipulate that traffic.” The Commission also stated that “CTA, like any similarly situated provider, can have both physical and remote access to its customers' equipment needed to provide such services,” and “[t]his physical access to customers' equipment would allow CTA to monitor and record sensitive information.” The Commission concluded that CTA's provision of services pursuant to its section 214 authority, “whether offered individually or as part of a suite of services—combined with CTA's physical presence in the United States, CTA's ultimate ownership and control by the Chinese government, and CTA's relationship with its indirect parent [China Telecommunications Corporation], which itself maintains a physical presence in the United States—present unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks to the United States,” and it reached similar conclusions in the other proceedings. In the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission stated that “[i]n cases where [China Telecom Americas' (CTA's)] PoPs reside in IX points, CTA can potentially access and/or manipulate data where it is on the preferred path for U.S. customer traffic, through its services provided pursuant to section 214 authority and those services not authorized under section 214 authority.” The Commission also noted that “[t]he Executive Branch agencies refer to public reports that CTA's network misrouted large amounts of information and communications traffic over long periods, often several months, sometimes involving U.S. government traffic.” Notably, CTA's website indicates that the company operates 23 PoPs in the United States and offers a number of services that may be available in the United States, including colocation, broadband, internet access, IP transit, and data center services. We conclude that the same national security and law enforcement concerns identified in that revocation proceeding are at least as likely to be present in the context of BIAS offerings when used to route or exchange BIAS traffic. In the China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, the Commission concluded that CTA's provision of services pursuant to its section 214 authority, “whether offered individually or as part of a suite of services—combined with CTA's physical presence in the United States, CTA's ultimate ownership and control by the Chinese government, and CTA's relationship with its indirect parent [China Telecommunications Corporation], which itself maintains a physical presence in the United States—present unacceptable national security and law enforcement risks to the United States.” We expect that reclassification of BIAS under Title II will enable the Commission to exercise authority when necessary to prohibit a BIAS provider from exchanging internet traffic with third parties that present threats to U.S. national security and law enforcement, such as CTA. 13. This document's reclassification decision also will provide the Commission with broader authority under Title II to safeguard BIAS providers, networks, and infrastructure from equipment and services that pose national security threats. The Commission has undertaken significant efforts to improve supply chain security pursuant to its universal service authority in section 254 of the Act, its authority to regulate equipment in sections 302 and 303 of the Act, and new mandates established by Congress through the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, as amended, and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021. In particular, the Commission has taken action to: prohibit the use of universal service fund (USF) support to purchase or obtain any equipment or services produced or provided by companies posing a national security threat; prohibit the use of Federal subsidies administered by the Commission and used for capital expenditures to provide advanced communications service to purchase, rent, lease, or otherwise obtain such equipment or services; create and maintain a list of communications equipment and services that pose an unacceptable risk to the national security (“covered equipment and services”); administer the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (Reimbursement Program) to reimburse the costs providers incur to remove, replace, and dispose of covered Huawei and ZTE equipment and services from their networks; and prohibit the authorization of equipment that poses a threat and the marketing and importation of such equipment in the United States. Reclassification furthers these efforts by enhancing the Commission's ability to address issues raised by the use in our networks of equipment and services that pose a threat to national security and law enforcement. Notably, the Commission stated that the definition of “provider of advanced communication services” for purposes of the Reimbursement Program did not limit program eligibility to providers who offer service to end users, and included intermediate providers that carry traffic for other carriers only and do not originate or terminate traffic. 14. We are unpersuaded by commenters who argue that Title II classification is unjustified for national security purposes because they question this policy rationale, argue that market forces are sufficient to address national security risks, or contend that potential national security regulations under Title II would be costly or burdensome for BIAS providers. The Commission's national security concerns are not new. As evidenced by the discussion above, the Commission has engaged in numerous and ongoing actions to address these risks. The Nation's communications networks are critical infrastructure, and therefore too important to leave entirely to market forces that may sometimes, but not always, align with necessary national security measures. Arguments regarding costs and burdens are unpersuasive given that, at this point, they represent only speculation about hypothetical costs and burdens. To the extent there are costs and burdens associated with any ultimate action the Commission may undertake, we anticipate that the benefits to national security will outweigh those costs. 15. We also disagree with those commenters that reject the national security justification for reclassification on the grounds that there are no gaps that need to be filled or problems that need to be solved by the Commission, that argue that the Commission has a marginal role in protecting national security, or that contend Commission action would undermine the existing whole-of-government national security approach. These commenters fail to recognize, as noted above, that Congress made clear, when creating the Commission, that one of its enumerated purposes was to further the “national defense.” Additionally, these commenters ignore the Commission's significant contributions to the whole-of-government approach to national security. In addition to the regulatory actions discussed above, the Commission is actively engaged in several Federal interagency working groups and policy committees that address a diverse range of national security topics, including cybersecurity, critical infrastructure resilience, emergency preparedness and response, supply chain risk management, and space systems cybersecurity. Commission staff receive classified briefings from the Intelligence Community on threats to the communications sector, exchange relevant information with Federal partners, and coordinate with law enforcement agencies to support various national security initiatives. The Commission also supports National Special Security Events (NSSE) and Security Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) 1 events and conducts investigations to determine if communications are being transmitted lawfully, if spectrum is being used appropriately, or if radio-frequency devices are authorized for operation. As a result of the Commission's collaborative efforts, we have learned that there are segments of the communications sector that are not subject to sufficient Federal regulatory oversight, including BIAS, due to the RIF Order' s misclassification of the service in 2017. This lack of sufficient oversight allows security vulnerabilities to go undiscovered—and unaddressed—which can produce negative consequences for the communications sector, as well as other critical infrastructure sectors. As articulated above, reclassification directly supports the Commission's role in cross-government efforts and helps fill gaps in oversight by enabling the Commission to take regulatory actions to address national security risks. 16. We are also unpersuaded by arguments that reclassification is unjustified because we can address certain harms without such change. Some commenters argue that it would be sufficient to prevent carriers already subject to Title II from interconnecting with any entities that pose national security risks, whether or not those entities are themselves subject to Title II. We find that merely taking this action would fall far short of what is necessary to address our national security concerns, especially given the vastly diminished role of Title II voice and other traditional telecommunications services in today's communications marketplace. A prohibition on only regulated carriers—meaning those currently subject to Title II—from interconnecting with entities that pose a national security threat would not reach providers of BIAS without reclassification. We find that it is instead necessary to directly address the national security risks associated with the provision of BIAS with the enhanced authorities available under Title II. The reclassification of BIAS is an important step toward closing the national security loopholes that exist within the communications sector, especially in broadband networks. 17. Finally, we reject arguments of commenters that oppose reclassification as unnecessary because the Commission's existing authority is sufficient to address national security concerns for which Congress has authorized the Commission to act; because the Commission does not have statutory authority to address national security concerns involving BIAS, broadband transmission services, or certain network infrastructure; or because Title II does not provide the Commission with authority to address national security. The Commission relies on multiple statutory provisions when taking action to protect national security, but Title II of the Communications Act includes some of the most important authorities and vests the Commission with a broad grant of rulemaking authority to “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” Indeed, we have articulated several sources of authority above. As we do not adopt any new national-security-focused rules in the Order, we need not articulate with specificity each Title II provision that would provide a source of authority for potential action that the Commission may take in the future. Similarly, we are not persuaded that using Title II authority for national security purposes would violate Article II of the Constitution. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held, the Commission's exercise of authority to address national security threats to communications networks does not violate the separation of powers or infringe upon the President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs. 3. Promoting Cybersecurity 18. As with national security, the Commission has an important role in addressing cybersecurity in communications networks that is inherent in its establishment “for the purpose of the national defense.” The National Cybersecurity Strategy highlights the importance of protecting critical infrastructure as more of our “essential systems” move online. The expanding cyber threat landscape is “making cyberattacks inherently more destructive and impactful to our daily lives.” This trend is especially problematic because “malicious cyber activity has evolved from nuisance defacement, to espionage and intellectual property theft, to damaging attacks against critical infrastructure, to ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled influence campaigns.” Further, “offensive hacking tools and services, including foreign commercial spyware, are now widely accessible . . . [to] organized criminal syndicates.” In addition, “China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other autocratic states . . . are aggressively using advanced cyber capabilities” to pursue economic and military objectives. These malicious cyber activities threaten “the national security, public safety, and economic prosperity of the United States and its allies and partners.” 19. The communications sector is squarely in the crosshairs of malicious cyber actors, who have targeted communications providers with ransomware attacks and have exploited vulnerabilities in communications networks to carry out cyberattacks against other critical infrastructure. For example, the 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community highlights the cyber threats to U.S. communications networks and states that “China's cyber espionage operations have included compromising telecommunications firms.” More recently, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray highlighted “China's increasing buildout of offensive weapons within our critical infrastructure,” which has enabled “persistent PRC access” to U.S. “critical telecommunications, energy, water, and other infrastructure.” 20. The Commission actively supports the U.S. Government's efforts to protect critical infrastructure by participating in cybersecurity planning, coordination, and response activities. However, the classification of BIAS as a Title I information service has limited the regulatory actions that the Commission could take to address cyber incidents impacting some aspects of the communications sector, as well as other critical infrastructure sectors. This is not a hypothetical concern. As NTIA states on behalf of the Executive Branch, “[r]eclassifying BIAS is necessary to ensure that the Commission has the authority it needs to advance national security objectives.” In recent years, Federal agencies have requested the Commission's assistance with mitigating specific risks and vulnerabilities in broadband networks that foreign adversaries could exploit to carry out cyberattacks against the United States. The lack of Title II authority over BIAS has essentially precluded the Commission from taking regulatory action to directly address these concerns. We note, by way of example, recent reports of efforts of China-based hackers to target Philippines government officials by carrying out cyberattacks over broadband networks in that country. We find that reclassifying BIAS as a Title II service will help to fill this gap by enhancing the Commission's ability to protect U.S. communications networks and infrastructure from cyberattacks and to ensure that communications devices and equipment do not pose security risks to other critical infrastructure sectors. 21. The reclassification of BIAS significantly bolsters the Commission's existing authority to take regulatory actions to address cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities in broadband networks. We agree with NTIA that reclassification will enable the Commission to better “protect our networks from malicious actors . . . [by] leverag[ing] the appropriate tools at its disposal, including the relevant Title II provisions.” We agree with commenters that reclassification “provides multiple new authorities for the Commission to engage on cybersecurity” and take regulatory actions to “study cybersecurity needs and impose minimum standards on BIAS providers.” For example, the Commission could build on existing efforts to require BIAS providers to implement cybersecurity plans and risk management plans to protect their networks from malicious cyber activity. This enhanced authority over BIAS could also allow the Commission to obtain greater situational awareness by working in coordination on cyber incident reporting with the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) as it implements the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA). It also provides the Commission with additional regulatory tools to ensure network and service reliability and better support effective 911 and emergency preparedness and response efforts. 22. Reclassification also places the Commission in a stronger position to address vulnerabilities threatening the security and integrity of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which impacts “the transmission of data from email, e-commerce, and bank transactions to interconnected Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) and 9-1-1 calls.” For example, the Commission could consider requiring service providers to deploy solutions to address BGP vulnerabilities, such as BGP hijacks. The agency could also consider establishing cybersecurity requirements for BGP, including “security features to ensure trust in the information that it is used to exchange,” which could prevent bad actors from “deliberately falsify[ing] BGP reachability information to redirect traffic to itself or through a specific third-party network, and prevent that traffic from reaching its intended recipient.” We note, however, that this filing does not oppose the reclassification of BIAS under Title II, the issue being addressed in the Order. Similarly, the Commission could more effectively address security threats related to the Domain Name System (DNS), which enables domain names to resolve to the correct IP addresses, and other naming protocols when used by BIAS providers to facilitate the operation of BIAS. 23. Some commenters argue that reclassification is unnecessary because the Commission's existing authority is sufficient to address cybersecurity risks in areas where Congress has authorized the Commission to act. Other commenters argue that the classification of BIAS is irrelevant because the Commission does not have statutory authority to address cybersecurity matters. But it is well established that the Commission may—indeed must—take security and public safety considerations into account in its public interest determinations under Title II. We disagree with these commenters because the classification of BIAS under Title I created a loophole that largely precluded the Commission from taking regulatory actions to address cyber risks to BIAS providers and vulnerabilities in broadband networks. For example, under the Title I classification, the Commission has limited authority to require providers of non-Title II services ( e.g., BIAS providers) to adopt cybersecurity standards or performance goals, report information about cyber incidents, or take defensive measures to protect communications networks and critical infrastructure. The reclassification of BIAS under Title II allows the Commission to use a broader range of regulatory tools by reestablishing the Commission's legal jurisdiction over broadband services, providers, and networks. This change is necessary to ensure the Commission can effectively address the cyber threats to the communications sector. 24. We also disagree with those commenters that argue that the Commission should not take action because it lacks the expertise and resources to implement a Title II regulatory regime in the area of cybersecurity and because other agencies are better equipped to address cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities. For example, Verizon points out that CISA is “the federal leader for cyber and physical infrastructure security” and claims that the Commission plays “only a supporting role.” NCTA—The Internet & Television Association (NCTA) agrees, based on the fact that CISA “issue[s] administrative subpoenas to critical infrastructure entities, which includes broadband providers, to obtain information necessary to identify and notify entities of vulnerabilities in their system.” We recognize and appreciate CISA's leadership in protecting critical infrastructure—including communications networks—from malicious cyber activity. The Commission works closely with CISA and other Federal agencies in a collaborative manner to address risks and vulnerabilities impacting the communications sector. Chairwoman Rosenworcel currently serves as Chair of the Cybersecurity Forum for Independent and Executive Branch Regulators, “a federal interagency group that shares information and expertise to enhance the cybersecurity of America's critical infrastructure.” Further, the Commission is the regulatory agency for communications and, as such, has access to regulatory authorities and investigative tools that Congress has not granted to other agencies. For example, the Commission recently adopted a cybersecurity labeling program for Internet of Things (IoT) devices and products, and proposed a pilot program to help schools and libraries improve their cybersecurity efforts through the USF. In addition, the Commission regularly investigates cyber intrusions and hacks related to the breach of regulatorily protected consumer data in the possession of common carriers, cable providers, and satellite providers. For example, cyber breaches may involve unauthorized access to personally identifiable information (PII) or customer proprietary network information (CPNI). Likewise, our data protection investigations frequently involve investigating and assessing whether the regulated entities had reasonable cybersecurity protections in place to protect the networks on which sensitive data are housed. The reclassification of BIAS will enable the Commission to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities, including those identified in PPD-21, within the existing frameworks that support the whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity. 25. Even though the Commission, under Title II, may not be able to address all significant cyber vulnerabilities, we find that the availability of that authority meaningfully enhances our ability to address significant cybersecurity threats. Given the interconnected nature of communications networks, any efforts to reduce the number of vulnerabilities and threat vectors that can be targeted by malicious cyber actors could provide substantial benefits to the larger communications sector. A recent cyberattack by Russian hackers against Kyivstar, Ukraine's largest telecommunications provider, “knocked out services” for 24 million users and “completely destroyed the core” of the company's network. This incident demonstrates how cyberattacks targeting communications service providers—including BIAS providers—can have disastrous impacts by damaging network infrastructure and causing widespread service outages. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) asserts that “immediate regulatory action must be taken to compel ISPs to shore up their cybersecurity practices to better protect consumers,” and argues that Title II reclassification of BIAS would empower the Commission to take further action. We agree with EPIC and conclude that reclassification enhances the Commission's ability to require BIAS providers to implement cybersecurity practices and take other actions to protect the confidentiality and integrity of information on the traffic that [each provider] stores or transmits. 26. Similar to certain arguments made opposing reclassification for national security purposes, commenters opposing reclassification for cybersecurity purposes argue that: the Commission has adequate authority to address cybersecurity issues under Title I; reclassification will be costly, burdensome, and too rigid for a dynamic threat landscape; and industry already addresses cybersecurity risks without regulatory mandates. We find that the Commission has an essential role in promoting measures that “currently seem to best protect consumers from breaches and other cyber incidents.” As described above, and consistent with our conclusions on national security matters generally, reclassification will provide additional authority to act when necessary and in coordination with our Federal partners to address cybersecurity in the communications sector. Although the adoption of specific cybersecurity requirements is beyond the scope of this proceeding, we intend for any future proposed action to provide regulatory flexibility, “leverage existing cybersecurity frameworks,” encourage “public-private collaboration,” and be designed to minimize the “cost of implementation.” 4. Safeguarding Public Safety 27. Reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service enables the Commission to advance several public safety initiatives. Congress created the Commission, among other reasons, “for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio communication,” and as the Commission recognized in the RIF Remand Order (86 FR 994 (Jan. 7, 2021)), “[a]dvancing public safety is one of our fundamental obligations.” The Mozilla court explained that when “`Congress has given an agency the responsibility to regulate a market such as the telecommunications industry that it has repeatedly deemed important to protecting public safety,' then the agency's decisions `must take into account its duty to protect the public.' ” The Commission's responsibility to address public safety is becoming increasingly important as the severity and frequency of natural disasters continue to rise. Reclassification enhances the Commission's jurisdiction over BIAS providers, which, in combination with our other statutory authority, will allow us to ensure BIAS meets the needs of public safety entities and individuals when they use those services for public safety purposes. 28. Reclassification will empower the Commission to more effectively support public safety officials' use of BIAS for public safety purposes. Public safety officials' reliance on broadband service has become integral to their essential functions and services, even aside from their use of enterprise-level broadband services, including how they communicate with each other and how they convey information to and receive information from the public. Public safety entities and first responders often rely on retail broadband services to communicate during emergency situations. Increasingly, public safety entities rely on BIAS to access various databases, share data with emergency responders, and stream video into 911 and emergency operations centers. Public safety officials also rely on BIAS outside the emergency context, including relying on individuals' residential security systems that use BIAS and programs that are alternatives to incarceration, which require individuals to check in with supervising officers remotely, wear electronic location monitoring devices, or use continuous alcohol monitoring devices. In addition, public safety officials use services accessible over the top (OTT) of broadband connections, such as social media, to communicate important and timely information to the public and to gain valuable information from the public and build on-the-ground situational awareness. For example, during the recent 911 outage that impacted several western states, public safety officials used social media “to inform the public of the issue and to provide alternate means of contacting emergency services.” Santa Clara describes the essential role BIAS also plays in public safety officials' ability to carry out their daily, non-emergency functions, including its importance in the functioning of its emergency communications and operations protocols. Santa Clara also describes the importance of redundancies in its emergency communications and operations systems, and that many of these systems rely on BIAS, outside of its enterprise systems. Public safety entities benefit as well when they rely on enterprise services, which often flow over the same facilities as mass-market retail services. For example, Emergency Services Internet (ESInet) is a managed UP network that is used for emergency services communications and which may be constructed from a mix of dedicated and shared facilities. ESInets can be realized in several ways with one example using the Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) standard used by many BIAS and transit providers' networks for traffic engineering and sharing facilities with other traffic. Reclassification gives the Commission additional jurisdiction to advance the existing uses of BIAS to support public safety operations and communications by, for example, taking regulatory actions to improve the effectiveness of emergency alerting and 911 communications. Given how crucial BIAS is to the protection of public safety and that reclassification provides the Commission with the ability to ensure that BIAS is reliable and secure during emergencies, we disagree with those commenters who argue that reclassification will not enhance public safety communications on the basis that public safety entities heavily rely on enterprise-level dedicated networks that fall outside of the scope of reclassification. 29. BIAS also plays an increasingly important role in allowing the public to communicate with first responders during emergency situations. In the RIF Remand Order, the Commission noted that retail broadband services are used to translate communications with 911 callers and patients in the field and to deliver critical information about 911 callers that is not delivered through the traditional 911 network. The Commission has undertaken various efforts in recent years to improve how the public reaches and shares information with emergency service providers. Title II classification of BIAS supports these current and future efforts. For example, reclassification enhances the Commission's jurisdiction to improve the flow of voice communications, photos, videos, text messages, real-time text (RTT), and other types of communications from the public to emergency service providers through Next Generation 911 or Wi-Fi calling. 30. The public relies on BIAS to easily access public safety resources and information. Commenters who support reclassification and petitioners for reconsideration of the RIF Remand Order note that social media is increasingly used as an important resource by the public to access information about emergencies and other public safety incidents. We therefore disagree with commenters who argue that there is no evidence that the Commission's lack of regulatory authority over BIAS poses public safety risks. Similar to the arguments made by commenters who argue that reclassification will not affect communications networks used by public safety officials, this argument ignores that both public safety officials and the public increasingly rely on BIAS. Indeed, BIAS has become for many individuals the primary way to access critical public safety services, without which there would be no other mode of communication. Reclassification enables the Commission to ensure that communications are secure and reliable in times of emergency. We agree with the Communications Workers of America (CWA) that “[w]hile many providers have made strides in improving service quality and reducing outages, voluntary commitments are clearly not enough.” Furthermore, the fact that many states have implemented their own laws to ensure public safety communications are safeguarded demonstrates the gap that has existed since the repeal of Title II classification of BIAS. We observe that the public also relies on BIAS for public safety communications that occur outside of emergencies, including for telemedicine; residential safety and security systems; and in-home monitoring of individuals who are elderly, disabled, or otherwise able to benefit from such services. 31. BIAS is essential when used by individuals with disabilities to communicate with public safety services, and the Commission has taken several steps to improve access to IP-enabled 911 communications for people with disabilities. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services recently announced that the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline will provide direct video calling ASL services for people who are deaf and hard of hearing, as part of ongoing efforts to expand accessibility to behavioral health care for underserved communities. This will allow an ASL user in crisis to communicate directly with a counselor in ASL. Reclassification enhances our existing authority to ensure these communications are not interrupted or degraded by, for example, giving the Commission the jurisdiction necessary to “develop minimum standards of service and enforcement mechanisms that affect people with disabilities.” Likewise, reclassification “provide[s] the FCC with the tools needed, for example, to promote broadband in rural areas lacking sufficient access to BIAS where there is no substitute for copper wires which carry 911, closed captioning, and TTY services.” 32. Reclassification will enhance the Commission's ability to better protect public safety communications. For example, Title II positions the Commission to more fully examine and investigate incidents involving BIAS providers that are alleged to have violated the Commission's rules, including those against throttling or blocking. In addition to holding any particular violative action to account, enforcement proceedings would also enable the Commission to prevent or mitigate future threats to BIAS by using data and information gathered as a result of those proceedings. Reclassification will also enable the Commission to make the Nation's alerting and warning capabilities more effective and resilient by, for example, adopting rules requiring BIAS providers to transmit emergency alerts to their subscribers. Further, given the expanding ways in which individuals and public safety officials rely on BIAS to keep themselves and their homes safe, Title II will enable the Commission to ensure that BIAS providers protect and securely transmit the sensitive information to which they are privy pursuant to section 222, which requires service providers to protect customer information. Thus, reclassification enables the Commission to take a wider range of regulatory actions to ensure the public can reliably and securely access life-saving public safety resources and information using BIAS. 33. We find that the ability of the Commission to adopt ex ante regulations will provide better public safety protections than the ex post enforcement framework established by the RIF Order. We agree with Santa Clara and INCOMPAS, which, in their Petitions for Reconsideration of the RIF Remand Order, criticize the RIF Remand Order' s analysis of the record at that time in light of these observations, including the RIF Remand Order' s minimization of the opportunity for harm to public safety in the absence of reclassification and the open internet conduct rules as well as its acceptance of industry's voluntary commitments to abide by the principles underlying the open internet rules. Reclassification and the conduct rules enable the Commission “to deal with public safety issues before a public safety situation arises—not afterwards, as the RIF Remand Order suggests,” and do not force the Commission to rely on voluntary industry commitments to protect public safety. 34. Some commenters assert that reclassification will stymie innovation and reduce incentives for investment, which in turn, does not serve public safety goals. Both INCOMPAS and Santa Clara petitioned for reconsideration of the RIF Remand Order in large part on this very notion, pointing out that the asserted benefits of increased investment and innovation under Title I was unsupported by the record and that there was evidence to the contrary. We agree with Public Knowledge in that “[n]owhere has the Commission ever found that the nebulous and unsubstantiated benefits of deregulation outweigh the specific benefits of ensuring that public safety responders can communicate reliably with each other and with the public in times of crisis.” Linking increases or decreases in investment and innovation with reclassification is not supported by the available evidence, as we discuss in more detail below. 5. Monitoring Network Resiliency and Reliability 35. The Commission also plays a critical role in monitoring the resiliency and reliability of the Nation's communications networks and helping to ensure that these networks are in fact resilient and reliable. PPD-21 defines “resilience” as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions . . . [it] includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” The Nation's networks are critical lifelines for those in need during disasters and other emergency situations. Recent events, including hurricanes, wildfires, tornadoes, earthquakes, and severe winter storms, demonstrate how communications infrastructure remains susceptible to disruption. As broadband services become more widespread, consumers increasingly rely on these connections. As of February 2021, Pew Research estimates that 77% of adults in the United States have high-speed broadband service at home. Smartphone ownership among adults in the US is now estimated to be at 85%. The Commission has taken actions consistent with its existing authority to improve the reliability and resiliency of the Nation's communications networks so that the public can communicate, especially during emergencies. However, those efforts have had to largely focus on the networks' provision of voice telephony under Title II. This document's action to reclassify BIAS under Title II will enable the Commission to build upon these efforts by taking more effective regulatory actions to protect the resiliency and reliability of our broadband networks and infrastructure. 36. In particular, the Commission plays a vital role in ensuring that the Nation's communications networks are resilient and reliable. For example, the Commission “monitors and analyzes communications network outages[,] . . . [takes actions] to help prevent and mitigate outages, and where necessary, assist[s] response and recovery activities.” During emergencies, the Commission “collects information on the operational status of communications infrastructure to support government disaster assistance efforts and to monitor restoration and recovery.” One of the principal benefits of reclassification is to enable all public safety officials to better assess the operational status of broadband networks for dissemination of emergency information and/or to better assess where support is needed. Under the Commission's Network Outage Reporting System (NORS), qualifying service providers are required to report to the Commission network outages that satisfy certain criteria. 37. As Free Press points out, “because NORS is limited to voice service outages, `the Commission has historically lacked reliable outage information for today's modern, essential broadband networks.' ” Reclassification also enhances the agency's ability to gain better visibility over the performance of broadband networks and also to completely and accurately determine the scope and causes of outages to these networks. Closing this reporting gap for outages could afford the Commission and public safety officials with more consistent and reliable data to better track changes in network reliability, identify trends, pinpoint possible improvements and best practices, and disseminate actionable information. New outage reporting requirements for BIAS providers could also provide the Commission with better situational awareness for major internet outages affecting first responders, 911 services, and impacted populations that are not currently captured by NORS data. Finally, reclassification supports the Commission's authority to expand the scope of NORS by requiring BIAS providers, like Title II-regulated voice service providers, to submit outage reports in response to service incidents that cause outages or the degradation of communications services, such as cybersecurity breaches, wire cuts, infrastructure damages from natural disaster, and operator errors or misconfigurations. 38. The Commission also “oversees and monitors industry efforts to strengthen network resiliency,” including through the recently adopted Mandatory Disaster Response Initiative. Moreover, the Commission adopted new rules, “to require enumerated service providers (cable communications, wireline, wireless, and interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) providers) . . . to report on their infrastructure status during emergencies and crises in the Disaster Information Reporting System (DIRS) when activated and to submit a final report to the Commission within 24 hours of DIRS deactivation.” Reclassification bolsters the Commission's authority to require BIAS providers to participate in DIRS. In addition, the Commission endeavors to “identify and reduce risks to the reliability of the nation's communications network[s],” including by working with the Communications Security Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC). 39. Reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service will significantly enhance the Commission's ability to protect critical infrastructure by taking actions to address threats and vulnerabilities to communications networks. Public Knowledge agrees that “[w]ithout Title II authority, the Commission cannot impose regulations to meet the need for resilience and reliability as more and more critical traffic passes through IP networks.” This change in policy will enable the Commission to set goals and objectives that foster resilience and to implement risk management directives on a wider basis in order to make our broadband networks more resilient and reliable, and thus more secure. We also disagree with those commenters who argue against reclassification by contending that outage reporting targeted to BIAS networks will not serve the public interest or that there are alternative sources of authority for outage reporting. The Commission is considering in a separate proceeding the extent to which outage reporting requirements should be placed on BIAS providers and we anticipate that having Title II as an additional source of authority will support that evaluation. 40. We also are not persuaded by other arguments that certain parties raise regarding network resilience and reliability that are consistent with their comments regarding national security. Some commenters argue reclassification is not necessary to ensure the resiliency and reliability of the Nation's communications networks, that market-driven incentives motivate broadband providers to make significant investments to increase the resiliency and reliability of their networks, or that the Commission has only a limited role to play on resilience and reliability issues. We agree with AARP and Next Century Cities, however, that reclassification is necessary to provide the Commission with sufficient authority to address network resiliency for critical infrastructure, which is too important for the Commission to be forced to rely upon mere voluntary measures and alleged market-driven incentives. As described above, and consistent with our conclusions on national security matters generally, we find that the Commission has an essential role on resilience and reliability issues, working in coordination with its Federal partners. Reclassification will allow for the direct network monitoring of the Nation's broadband internet networks and provide a robust regulatory platform so that all BIAS providers maintain the highest levels of business continuity when incidents occur. We find that reclassification will support the Commission's efforts to protect the public by ensuring that more reliable and resilient networks are in use, including by developing voluntary frameworks and policies when practical, and compelling enforceable compliance when needed. 41. Commenters opposing reclassification also argue that under Title I classification, broadband networks have provided robust internet service despite unprecedented levels of demand during the COVID-19 pandemic. We find these arguments unpersuasive. As more critical functions rely on BIAS, it is imperative for the Commission to have authority to address resiliency issues involving broadband networks to the same degree that it has for traditional voice networks. Further, we disagree with those commenters that contend that these types of reporting, monitoring, and regulatory requirements would likely impose significant new costs on BIAS providers and potentially stifle investment and broadband deployment. 42. In conclusion, the reclassification of BIAS will secure the Commission's authority to, as necessary, implement requirements for network upgrades and changes, adopt rules relating to recovery from network outages, and improve our incident investigation and enforcement authority to mitigate network threats and vulnerabilities. Reclassification also enables the Commission to create more stability and predictability on how providers should address disasters and emergency situations. Moreover, reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications service allows the Commission to address identified—and evolving—threats and vulnerabilities in the BIAS industry, as some BIAS providers may not have sufficient incentives to protect the traffic traversing their networks without such regulation. Thus, reclassification would allow the Commission, for example, to require BIAS providers to identify and reduce harmful activities occurring across their infrastructure. These measures will be taken in support of a whole-of-government approach by taking regulatory actions to enhance network reliability and resiliency in order to better protect all of our Nation's networks. 6. Protecting Consumers' Privacy and Data Security 43. We find that classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service will support the Commission's efforts to protect consumers' privacy and data security. Section 222 of the Act governs telecommunications carriers' use, disclosure, and provision of access to information obtained from their customers, other telecommunication carriers, and equipment manufacturers. It imposes a general duty on every telecommunications carrier to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information of its customers, other telecommunication carriers, and equipment manufacturers, and imposes heightened restrictions on carriers' use, disclosure, or provision of access to customers' customer proprietary network information (CPNI)—including customer location information—without consent. CPNI is defined as “(A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier.” 44. Returning BIAS to its telecommunications service classification will bring BIAS providers back under the section 222 privacy and data security framework, restoring those protections for consumers and yielding substantial public interest benefits. In her separate remarks on the 2021 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Staff Report, Chair Lina Khan noted that the FCC “has the clearest legal authority and expertise to fully oversee internet service providers,” a view supported by a number of commenters, who assert that the Commission's specific expertise to regulate privacy matters is needed. We observe that the Commission's privacy authority under Title II is not limited to CPNI. Section 222(a) also imposes obligations, which we enforce, on carriers' practices with regard to protection of non-CPNI customer proprietary information and personally identifiable information (PII), and section 201(b)'s prohibition on practices that are unjust or unreasonable also provides authority over privacy practices. We also find that because section 222 places an obligation on telecommunications carriers to protect the confidentiality of the proprietary information of and relating to other telecommunication carriers (including resellers) and equipment manufacturers, our classification of BIAS as a telecommunications service will protect information concerning entities that interact with BIAS providers. 7. Supporting Access to Broadband Internet Access Service 45. Reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service under Title II will support the Commission's multifaceted efforts to support access to BIAS in three ways. First, such authority will improve the Commission's ability to foster investment in and deployment of wireline and wireless infrastructure and to promote competition for, and access to, BIAS for consumers by restoring to BIAS-only providers statutory protections for pole attachments that providers of cable and telecommunications services receive. Second, reclassification facilitates our ability to ensure access to BIAS by enabling the Commission to regulate BIAS-only providers that serve multi-tenant environments to ensure they do not engage in unfair, unreasonable, and anticompetitive practices, such as exclusivity contracts. Finally, authority under Title II will put the Commission on the firmest legal ground to promote the universal service goals of the Act. 46. Wireline and Wireless Infrastructure. We find that reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service under Title II will support the Commission's mission to foster investment in and deployment of wireline and wireless infrastructure and to promote competition and access to BIAS for consumers. Specifically, we find that the application of sections 224, 253, and 332 of the Act to BIAS-only providers will provide equitable rights to those providers and the tools to enable the Commission to reach its goals, thereby promoting greater deployment, competition, and availability of both wireline and wireless BIAS. Furthermore, we find that the RIF Remand Order failed to adequately address the Mozilla court's concerns regarding the effects of reclassification on BIAS-only providers. 47. Reclassification of BIAS as a Title II service will ensure that BIAS-only providers receive the same statutory protections for pole attachments guaranteed by section 224 of the Act that providers of cable and telecommunications services receive. Section 224 defines pole attachments as “any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility.” It authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules to ensure that the rates, terms, and conditions of pole attachments are just and reasonable; requires utilities to provide nondiscriminatory access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way to telecommunications carriers and cable television systems (collectively, attachers); provides procedures for resolving pole attachment complaints; governs pole attachment rates for attachers; and allocates make-ready costs among attachers and utilities. The Act defines a utility as a “local exchange carrier or an electric, gas, water, steam, or other public utility, . . . who owns or controls poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” However, for purposes of pole attachments, a utility does not include any railroad, any cooperatively organized entity, or any entity owned by a Federal or State government. Section 224 excludes incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) from the meaning of the term “telecommunications carrier,” therefore these entities do not have a mandatory access right under section 224(f)(1). The Commission has held that when ILECs obtain access to poles, section 224 governs the rates, terms, and conditions of those attachments. The Act allows utilities that provide electric service to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way because of “insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes.” As the Commission noted in 2015, it “has recognized repeatedly the importance of pole attachments to the deployment of communications networks” and therefore has undertaken a series of reforms to improve access to poles under section 224. The National League of Cities urges us to revisit and overturn our 2018 Wireless Infrastructure Order (83 FR 51867 (Oct. 15, 2018)) and, until that time, forbear from application of sections 253 and 332(c) to reclassified BIAS. We agree with the Wireless Infrastructure Association that the former request is outside the scope of this proceeding. We decline to forbear from applying section 253 and 332(c) to BIAS for the reasons we discuss in section IV.B.9. To that end, the Commission continues to pursue solutions to improve pole access including, most recently in December 2023, by adopting new rules that, among other things, speed up the pole attachment dispute resolution process by establishing a new intra-agency rapid response team, set forth specific criteria for the response team to use when considering a complaint, and increase transparency for new broadband buildouts by requiring disclosure of pole inspection reports during the make-ready process. Under a Title I classification scheme, BIAS-only providers are not entitled to any of the current or future benefits the Commission may enact to facilitate access to broadband infrastructure. 48. Section 253 of the Act provides further protections to telecommunications companies that, through Title II reclassification, will apply to BIAS-only providers. Specifically, section 253 seeks to further facilitate deployment of communications services by enabling the Commission (or a court) to intervene when a State or local regulation or legal requirement “may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” Without reclassification, however, BIAS-only providers may not seek the Commission's intervention under section 253 when State or local regulations interfere with their network deployment. Moreover, State and local laws that are exclusively focused on, or exclusively implicate, the provision of BIAS, do not currently fall within the ambit of section 253 and thus cannot be the subject of Commission intervention when prohibiting or having the effect of prohibiting the provision of BIAS exclusively. 49. In the wireless context, section 332 of the Act protects regulated entities from State and local regulations that “unreasonably discriminate among providers or functionally equivalent services” or that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless service.” However, because mobile broadband is not currently classified as a “commercial mobile service,” mobile BIAS-only providers who do not offer additional regulated services are not covered by section 332. As INCOMPAS notes, it has “members who are solely focused on providing broadband services,” and “[t]he current classification of BIAS and mobile broadband as Title I services makes it difficult for these providers to argue that they are building the kinds of facilities capable of commingled operation that are covered by Sections 332 and 253.” As with sections 224 and 253, without reclassification, mobile BIAS-only providers would be disadvantaged compared to their competitors. 50. We find that reclassifying BIAS as a Title II service levels the playing field by ensuring that BIAS-only providers enjoy the same regulatory protections—those guaranteed by sections 224, 253, and 332—as their competitors who offered services already classified as telecommunications services in addition to BIAS prior to our classification decision in the Order. As the Commission found in 2015, “[a]ccess to poles and other infrastructure is crucial to the efficient deployment of communications networks including, and perhaps especially, new entrants.” INCOMPAS notes that BIAS providers face “significant barriers to deploy broadband network infrastructure—among them access to poles, ducts, and conduit.” The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) explains further that “[a]ccess to poles, conduits, and rights-of-way may affect cost, feasibility, and timing of constructing and offering broadband services.” Sections 224, 253, and 332 however, seek to remove these barriers by guaranteeing providers access to utility poles at just and reasonable rates and by ensuring that State and local laws do not prohibit deployment. Even WISPA—the Association for Broadband Without Boundaries (WISPA), which otherwise opposes our reclassification decision, highlights the benefits of extending section 224 rights to BIAS-only providers. 51. NCTA argues that restoring section 224 rights will only provide “illusory” benefits to BIAS-only providers. We disagree. Under Title II, BIAS-only providers will be guaranteed access to utility poles at just and reasonable rates. BIAS-only providers, therefore, will no longer be forced to negotiate for the right of pole access directly with each set of pole owners, which will not only ensure they pay the same rates as their competitors but will also ensure that deployment of their networks is not unnecessarily bogged down by the negotiation process. While such benefits may seem “illusory” to the competitors who already enjoy such privileges, we find that eliminating one of the “significant barriers to deploy[ment] [of] broadband network infrastructure,” is in fact a very real benefit for BIAS-only providers. Indeed, NCTA, who claims that the benefits of pole attachment rights will prove to be illusory, has consistently taken issue with the costs of pole attachments, even under the existing regime, and has regularly supported and championed the Commission's efforts to reduce the costs and burdens of obtaining pole access. 52. We find that in addition to guaranteed pole attachment rates and more efficient deployment, Title II reclassification will also ensure that BIAS-only providers are protected by section 253, which provides that “no [s]tate or local statute or regulation, or other [s]tate or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” Likewise, mobile BIAS-only providers will receive protection under section 332 which requires State and local governments to act on “any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed with such government or instrumentality, taking into account the nature and scope of such request.” As INCOMPAS notes, “a reclassification of BIAS . . . opens an avenue for additional protections for BIAS-only providers who may need Commission intervention to address state/local policies that restrict competitive deployment through its oversight for ensuring competitors can access new geographic markets.” Under Title I, BIAS-only providers cannot seek assistance from the Commission if State or local governments interfere with the deployment of BIAS-only networks—once again, leaving them worse off than their regulated competitors. For example, under a Title I regulatory regime, if State or local permitting processes effectively prohibit the deployment of BIAS networks, BIAS-only providers cannot raise the issue with the Commission. In areas where both BIAS-only and providers of comingled services operate, providers of comingled services may seek a resolution with the Commission that would resolve the issue for BIAS-only competitors as well, but BIAS-only providers would be reliant upon their competitors to bring the action to the Commission in the first place. But if a State or local legal requirement solely affects BIAS, even providers that currently offer commingled services lack the ability under section 253 to challenge it given that section 253 only applies to those State and local legal requirements that affect the provisioning of “telecommunications service.” Moreover, in any area where BIAS-only providers are the sole provider of service (or are seeking to be a provider of service), they would be left without recourse. We agree with INCOMPAS, which notes that “reclassification so that BIAS-only providers receive the same Title II protections as incumbent telecommunications providers is in the public interest as it will best ensure that the Communications Act's goal of the Commission enabling and promoting competition can be fulfilled and that consumers will benefit from additional choice in the marketplace.” Therefore, we find that restoring section 253 rights of BIAS-only providers is not only equitable, but will help ensure that BIAS-only providers are adequately protected by the Commission's authority to address State and local policies that restrict deployment. 53. In the RIF Remand Order, the Commission attempted to downplay its decision to strip section 224 rights from BIAS-only providers by claiming that “ISPs may gain the status of telecommunications providers, and thus become eligible for section 224 pole attachment rights.” Specifically, the Commission suggested that BIAS-only providers could either alter their business plans to offer other services that would then qualify them as telecommunications carriers or enter into partnerships with existing telecommunications carriers to attain section 224 rights. While it may be true that BIAS-only providers could alter the business plans or partner with other regulated entities to ensure they receive equitable pole access, our regulations should not be designed to stifle innovative offerings distinct from those currently offered in the marketplace. Furthermore, each year more and more Americans are opting to forgo these additional non-BIAS telecommunications services and instead are choosing to have only a fixed BIAS connection in their homes along with a mobile connection. INCOMPAS notes that because customers are opting to use over-the-top video or VoIP services, many of its fixed BIAS members were losing money on video and voice services and “have ceased offering voice and/or video options to their residential customers given that those customers can choose third-party over-the-top video or VoIP options for these services.” Thus, requiring BIAS-only providers to pursue declining lines of business just to receive the same legal protections as their competitors makes little sense. And in following the RIF Remand Order' s suggestion that BIAS-only providers could enter into partnerships with telecommunications carriers to gain pole access, BIAS-only providers would just swap one barrier to entry (negotiating directly with pole owners for access) for another (negotiating with a telecommunications carrier). As a result, the supposed solution the RIF Order offered up is in fact no solution at all and instead leaves BIAS-only providers with a different “competitive bottleneck.” Moreover, the RIF Remand Order failed to cite to even one instance of such a partnership or provide any evidence that such a partnership would even be economically or practically feasible, only mentioning the possibility that BIAS-only providers might be able to pursue one. Even assuming the possibility of such a partnership, unlike with section 224, which ensures pole owners provide access at just and reasonable rates, there are no legal safeguards to ensure that potential partners agree to reasonable terms with BIAS-only providers. 54. In addition, we find that the RIF Remand Order erred in concluding that the ability of states under section 224(c) to establish their own pole attachment rules in place of the Federal rules (often referred to as reverse-preemption) minimizes the impact of the loss of section 224 rights on BIAS-only providers. First, the majority of jurisdictions have not chosen to reverse-preempt the Commission and instead have opted to continue to allow the Commission to regulate pole attachments under section 224. Second, we disagree with the conclusion in the RIF Remand Order, as well as those commenters who agree with the conclusion, that “Title I classification does not impact the 22 states and the District of Columbia that have chosen to reverse-preempt our rules.” An additional state, Florida, has subsequently reverse preempted the Commission's jurisdiction since the issuance of the RIF Remand Order. As INCOMPAS notes, some of the jurisdictions that have reverse-preempted the Commission have simply mirrored the Commission's rules so that any changes implemented by the Commission are also directly implemented by the state. For example, Pennsylvania has reverse-preempted the Commission but chosen to adopt the “rates, terms and conditions of access to and use of utility poles, ducts, conduits and rights-of-way to the full extent provided for in 47 U.S.C. 224 and 47 CFR chapter I, subchapter A, part 1, subpart J (relating to pole attachment complaint procedures), inclusive of future changes as those regulations may be amended.” Therefore, because the Pennsylvania code reflects the “rates, terms, and conditions of access to” poles adopted by the Commission, reclassifying BIAS as a Title II service will provide pole access to BIAS-only providers in Pennsylvania even though Pennsylvania regulates its own poles. The same is true in West Virginia, another State that has reverse-preempted the Commission, where the West Virginia Public Service Commission, at the direction of the State legislature, adopted the FCC's pole attachment regulations in their entirety, including subsequent modifications, superseded existing pole attachment regulations that conflicted with Federal regulations, and otherwise rejected stakeholder requests to alter the Commission's regulations. Similarly, at least two other jurisdictions, the District of Columbia and Ohio, have reverse-preempted the Commission but continue to point to the Commission's regulations for reference. Three other states seemingly have only partially preempted the Commission's rules by opting to regulate only the attachments of other public utilities or cable television providers. In those states, the Commission's rules will continue to govern the attachments of telecommunications carriers. Thus, the Commission's pole attachment rules will continue to play a vital role in several jurisdictions that have elected to reverse-preempt, or partially reverse-preempt, the Commission. 55. The RIF Remand Order further posits that “if a state prefers to adopt a different regulatory approach, that state has the opportunity to exercise its authority to expand the reach of government oversight of pole attachments.” But, as the CPUC, the Public Utility Commission for a State which has reverse preempted the Commission, argues, it is not entirely clear states can grant BIAS-only providers pole access pursuant to their section 224 reverse-preemption authority if the Commission itself has specifically chosen to exclude BIAS-only providers from the purview of Title II, the very source of authority from which section 224 authority emanates. Thus, under Title I classification, the right of BIAS-only providers to access poles in those states that have chosen to self-regulate is subject to uncertainty; and in the majority of jurisdictions, which are governed by the Commission's rules, such providers have no right to pole access at all. 56. Furthermore, as the CPUC and other commenters note, the lack of clear legal authority to regulate BIAS-only providers presents public safety issues as states may not be able to enforce safety regulations on BIAS-only providers that do manage to attach to poles. The CPUC states, however, that “reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service would eliminate this potential argument and the commensurate delay in responding to safety violations.” We agree and find that, in addition to the economic benefits of affording section 224 rights to BIAS-only providers, reclassification will also ensure that the Commission and State utility commissions have the requisite legal authority to protect public safety concerns associated with the deployment of broadband-only infrastructure. 57. We also find to be without merit the arguments of commenters who echo the Commission's contention in the RIF Remand Order that the loss of section 224 rights is not a serious issue because the majority of BIAS providers offer comingled services. To be clear, we do not dispute the fact that the majority of BIAS providers offer at least one Title II-regulated service in addition to BIAS, as some commenters contend. We believe, however, that the small number of BIAS-only providers is not due just to the popularity of other regulated services, but also because BIAS-only providers, many of which are smaller competitive companies, do not enjoy the competitive advantages of larger enterprises like many of their competitors. As a result, competitive bottlenecks and obstacles to deployment, such as access to poles at just and reasonable rates, present significant challenges to BIAS-only providers that may make breaking into markets with large entrenched incumbents next to impossible. As the CPUC notes, “[a]ll forms of telecommunications, including broadband, require access to rights-of-way generally, and specifically to poles and conduits, which are controlled by incumbent local exchange carriers and other entities. Access to poles, conduits, and rights-of-way may affect cost, feasibility, and timing of constructing and offering broadband services.” Furthermore, we believe that the RIF Remand Order completely overlooked the future competitive realities for BIAS-only providers and the resulting harms that its decision will yield. As we discussed above, consumers are becoming more reliant on BIAS and are continually foregoing the purchase of services offered alongside BIAS ( i.e., cable and voice). As a result, there is no reason to doubt that more and more providers will begin offering only BIAS and without reclassification would have no rights pursuant to section 224. Therefore, we find that restoring the section 224 rights and easing the burdens of pole access is likely to ensure that the number of BIAS-only providers does not artificially shrink due to inequitable treatment under the law. 58. Furthermore, we find that equitable regulatory treatment of BIAS-only providers, particularly with regard to regulations designed to speed network deployment, will also increase competition, ultimately benefitting consumers and assisting the Commission's goal of achieving universal service. We agree with INCOMPAS which states that “[a]dditional competition is key to tackling our nation's internet challenges” and that the Commission must ensure that its policies do not further entrench large telecommunications carriers, reducing the viability of smaller, innovative alternative providers and also reducing the service options available to consumers. USTelecom states that “[t]he NPRM cites no evidence that there are broadband-only providers that could not receive those benefits today or that the availability of the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment funding is leading to the creation of such providers,” but INCOMPAS specifically notes that it “expect[s] that many entities that will be competing for BEAD dollars will be BIAS-only” and states that those entities “cannot exercise any rights afforded by Title II to speed their deployment.” USTelecom further contends that “there is no record evidence that Title I classification is preventing [BIAS-only providers] from obtaining just and reasonable pole attachment rates.” Even accepting USTelecom's statement as true, it still misses the mark. Even if BIAS-only providers are somehow able to negotiate directly with pole owners to ultimately achieve rates that are just and reasonable, BIAS-only providers must still suffer the costs of securing pole access through private negotiations, and without any leverage, with each set of pole owners, unlike their regulated peers who have guaranteed access rights under section 224. Clearly then, by failing to provide equal access to the Act's legal protections on a nondiscriminatory basis, the Title I regime favors large incumbents at the expense of BIAS-only providers. Because we opt to restore the Title II classification of BIAS, we find it unnecessary to address commenters who suggest the Commission can provide similar rights to BIAS-only providers through other sections of the Communications Act. 59. Multiple Tenant Environments (MTEs). In the 2023 Open Internet NPRM (88 FR 76048 (Nov. 3, 2023)), we sought comment on how reclassification of BIAS might impact the Commission's authority to regulate service providers in MTEs. Specifically, we asked how reclassification might provide the Commission additional authority to foster competition and promote consumer choice for those living and working in MTEs. We conclude now that reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service facilitates these goals by enabling the Commission to regulate broadband-only providers that serve MTEs and thereby to end unfair, unreasonable, and anticompetitive practices facing MTE residents. That is, reclassification would give the Commission authority to require BIAS-only providers to abide by the same kinds of rules—including those that prohibit exclusivity contracts that bar competition outright in MTEs—that other telecommunications and cable providers must currently follow. Such rules in turn would secure the same protections for all residents of MTEs, regardless of the kind of service offered by providers in their building; reduce regulatory asymmetry between broadband-only providers and other kinds of providers; and potentially improve competition in the MTE marketplace. 60. More than 100 million people in the United States live or work in MTEs, including a disproportionate number of lower-income residents and members of marginalized communities. The Commission's rules, which regulate the kinds of agreements service providers may enter into with MTE owners, currently extend to telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators and multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs). Developed pursuant to congressional direction to protect consumer choice in emerging communications technologies for residents of MTEs, these rules include, for example, a prohibition on exclusivity contracts that grant the provider the sole right to access and offer service in an MTE. 61. However, these rules do not govern broadband-only providers today. Although many BIAS providers offer telecommunications, video programming, and other commingled services that subject them to the Commission's MTE rules, a provider offering only BIAS exists outside the scope of its rules. This means that while the Commission can, for example, impose rules on an entity offering both broadband and traditional phone service in an MTE, there is uncertainty about whether and when it could regulate a provider offering only the former. Even if such a provider entered into an agreement with an MTE owner barring competitors from the building outright—a type of agreement that the Commission has long declared anathema to the public interest—the Commission's rules would not apply and the Commission is not currently aware of other authority it could rely on to prevent such an agreement. 62. We thus find that reclassification of BIAS as a Title II service, which would provide us authority to regulate broadband-only providers, enables the Commission to address these potential regulatory gaps and ensure that all MTE tenants may benefit from the pro-consumer MTE rules the Commission has adopted and may adopt in the future as part of its current open proceeding. We therefore agree with Public Knowledge that reclassification would have many benefits for MTE residents including, among others, greater competition and innovation in MTEs, lower costs for consumers, and improved customer service. Reclassification would also create the potential for parity between BIAS-only and other providers serving MTEs, as well as protections for BIAS-only providers unable to compete against those employing anticompetitive practices. 63. We disagree with CTIA—The Wireless Association's (CTIA) contention, citing the Commission's 2022 MTE Report and Order and Declaratory Ruling (87 FR 51267 (Aug. 22, 2022)), that reclassification and regulation of the “few” BIAS-only providers in MTEs would “disregard[ ] the Commission's `incremental approach' in this area,” and that the Commission offers “no significant evidence as to why the Commission should change course now.” The 2022 MTE Report and Order and Declaratory Ruling adopted new rules and targeted additional practices that reduce consumer choice in MTEs. We note that in that proceeding's record, some commenters urged the Commission to “subject broadband-only providers to our rules governing MTE access, citing . . . potential harms that could result from regulatory asymmetry if [it] did not.” The Commission declined to extend its rules to broadband-only providers at the time, citing its historically incremental approach to MTE regulation but noting explicitly that it would “continue to monitor competition in MTEs to determine whether we should alter the scope of [the] rules.” However, nothing in the 2022 MTE Report and Order and Declaratory Ruling belies commenters' claims about the harms arising out of the regulatory asymmetry, which we find remain valid today. Meanwhile, commenters in opposition to reclassification fail to raise arguments that justify failing to extend the benefits of the Commission's rules to MTE residents where a broadband-only provider offers service to a building. 64. We are also unpersuaded by CTIA's claims that broadband-only providers are so few in number that it justifies the Commission not taking any additional action to curb anticompetitive, unfair, and unreasonable practices by broadband-only providers in MTEs. Even assuming that CTIA is correct, or that the majority of service providers offer commingled services, it is unclear whether this will remain true in the future. And while some commenters claim that the Commission failed to identify widespread abuses by BIAS-only providers in the 2023 Open Internet NPRM, others, such as AARP, highlight that such abuses may indeed be ongoing, pointing to an alleged instance of a broadband-only provider exploiting its status to enter into an exclusivity contract. We therefore find that these abuses are not merely speculative or theoretical, and provide additional support for the Commission's decision to reclassify BIAS as a Title II service. 65. Some commenters contend that the Commission need not reclassify BIAS to protect tenants and can instead rely on its ancillary or other existing authority to address broadband-only providers. Such authority, however, does not provide the same firm legal footing as Title II and thus is less likely to offer enduring protections for residents of MTEs. WISPA, in its comments, expresses concern that reclassification of BIAS would result in rule protections for over-the-air reception devices (OTARDs) no longer being available to fixed wireless broadband-only providers and contends that this will discourage deployment of broadband in multi-tenant environments, neighborhoods lacking access to nearby towers, and similar environments. We acknowledge WISPA's concerns, and we will examine whether to revise § 1.4000(a)(5) in another proceeding. While classification of BIAS may affect the scope of services that are covered under the Commission's rules regarding over-the-air reception devices, classification of BIAS as telecommunications service may also qualify fixed wireless broadband services for the protections available under sections 332(c)(7) and 253. Although sections 253 and 332(c)(7) do not apply to restrictions by private landlords they do provide for Federal preemption of State and local zoning restrictions that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting” “the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service” and “the provision of personal wireless services.” 66. Finally, we disagree with WISPA that any purported benefits of applying our MTE rules would be outweighed by a slowdown in broadband investment in MTEs precipitated by the need for BIAS-only providers to “assess the impact [reclassification more broadly would have] on their business plans.” We find that to the extent our reclassification of BIAS as a Title II service would cause a BIAS-only provider to re-think an exclusive contract to serve an MTE or an otherwise anticompetitive arrangement in an MTE, that would be an additional benefit to consumers, not a drawback. Moreover, our ability to regulate BIAS-only providers in MTEs is but one reason moving us to reclassify BIAS as a Title II service. Thus, the benefits outlined elsewhere in addition to those detailed here must be considered in the aggregate. 67. Universal Service. Reclassifying BIAS as a telecommunications service will also promote the universal service goals of section 254 by enabling more efficient deployment of broadband networks and greater access to affordable broadband service. In the 2023 Open Internet NPRM, we asked how reclassification might better enable the Commission to steward our universal service programs in a way that is responsive to the communications needs of the modern economy. We specifically sought comment on how reclassification might strengthen the Commission's statutory authority to provide BIAS through the USF, eventually allow broadband-only providers to once again participate in the Lifeline program, and protect public investment in BIAS access and affordability. Reclassification enhances the Commission's ability and flexibility to address affordability and availability issues across the country, both immediately and in the future. So as to not unnecessarily disrupt the current marketplace without ample consideration, the Commission does not designate BIAS as a supported service or extend eligible telecommunications carrier (ETC) eligibility to BIAS-only providers at this time. Such action would best be considered in a future proceeding. 68. Universal Service is the principle that all Americans should have access to telecommunications services and advanced communications services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates in all regions of the Nation. The Commission administers four programs in furtherance of these principles using contributions from telecommunications carriers to the USF: the High Cost program, which helps eligible carriers recover some of the cost of providing access to modern communications networks to consumers in rural, insular, and high-cost areas; the Lifeline program, which provides discounted voice service and BIAS through eligible carriers to qualifying low-income subscribers; the E-Rate program, which provides discounts to eligible schools, school districts, and libraries to purchase affordable BIAS; and the Rural Health Care program, which provides funding to eligible health care providers to purchase telecommunications and broadband services necessary for the provision of health care. All four USF programs fund BIAS or infrastructure and are able to rely on statutory authority to do so regardless of BIAS's classification. Classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service, however, will put the Commission on the firmest legal ground to promote the universal service goals of section 254 by enabling the Commission and states to designate BIAS-only providers as ETCs. 69. The Commission has concluded that section 254(e) of the Act allows for the use of universal service funds to benefit both the facilities used to provide supported telecommunications service, and the supported telecommunications services themselves, which permits the Commission to provide High Cost and Lifeline program support for non-telecommunications services offered over networks that also provide telecommunications services. The Commission currently conditions receipt of support on the provision of broadband service in funded networks in 11 of the 15 High Cost program funds, and also supports broadband through the Lifeline program. 70. The Commission has distinct authority to provide support for BIAS and connections through the E-Rate and Rural Health Care programs. Section 254(c)(3) specifies that “the Commission may designate additional services for such support mechanisms for schools, libraries, and health care providers for the purposes of subsection (h).” Subsection (h) reads, in part: “[t]he Commission shall establish competitively neutral rules—to enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable, access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care providers, and libraries.” The Commission has acted pursuant to section 254(c)(3) to designate BIAS as eligible for support under both the E-Rate and Rural Health Care programs. The Commission concluded at the inception of the E-Rate program that it has the authority to support BIAS access and connections “provided by both telecommunications carriers and non-telecommunications carriers” through the E-Rate program because “such services enhance access to advanced telecommunications and information services for public and non-profit elementary and secondary school classrooms and libraries.” The Commission also determined that it could fund BIAS support through the Rural Health Care program under section 254(h). 71. However, section 214(e) limits providers receiving USF support to common carriers providing telecommunications services and designated as ETCs after undergoing Commission or State commission approval processes. Currently, only carriers that offer qualifying voice telephony services can be designated as ETCs and receive support from the two USF programs that provide funds directly to carriers, the High Cost and Lifeline programs. Reclassification will allow BIAS-only providers to act as common carriers providing telecommunications service and enable them to be designated as ETCs. Indeed, after the 2015 Open Internet Order (80 FR 19738 (Apr. 13, 2015)), the Wireline Competition Bureau designated ten such providers as “Lifeline Broadband Providers” (LBPs), and some of those providers began providing service that was subsidized by Lifeline support. But in 2017, the Bureau rescinded those designations, and since the RIF Order and the RIF Remand Order, standalone broadband providers have remained unable to receive critical Lifeline universal service support. 72. Allowing BIAS-only providers to participate in the High Cost and Lifeline programs would enhance both programs. Both programs are already oriented overwhelmingly toward BIAS over other service types. As discussed above, providers in most High Cost program funds are required to build BIAS-capable networks. Moreover, as of September 2023 approximately 96% of Lifeline customers subscribe to a plan that includes broadband service. Several commenters echo many of the anticipated benefits of allowing carriers that do not provide voice services to participate in the High Cost and Lifeline programs discussed in the 2023 Open Internet NPRM, including increased competition, program participation, consumer choice, rural coverage, and affordability. The Commission also has recognized that “encourag[ing] market entry and increased competition among Lifeline providers, which will result in better services for eligible consumers to choose from and more efficient usage of universal service funds.” One commenter stresses that allowing BIAS-only providers to become ETCs will particularly benefit consumers in areas where there are currently few or no ETCs that provide BIAS. The need to allow BIAS-only providers to become ETCs is more important and will provide more utility than it did when BIAS was last classified under Title II, as the 2015 classification allowed Lifeline subscribers to apply the benefit to a “new generation of ISPs that [did] not use their facilities to offer voice services,” and now there are even more ways to provide BIAS via innovative, affordable, and user-friendly technologies. 73. Thus, we adopt the 2023 Open Internet NPRM' s tentative conclusion “that classifying BIAS as a telecommunications service will strengthen our policy initiatives to support the availability and affordability of BIAS through USF programs.” The majority of commenters support this conclusion. Commenters state that, through the USF, the Federal government has made significant investments in networks to ensure BIAS is available to all consumers and in service subsidies to ensure BIAS is affordable for all consumers, and reclassification “will enable the Commission to protect these investments on an ongoing basis by ensuring that these connections benefit users.” Commenters further stated that “[t]he Commission needs clear authority over broadband-only services to implement and maintain an effective and efficient Lifeline policy.” 74. A minority of commenters disagree with the 2023 Open Internet NPRM' s tentative conclusion that we adopt in the Order. Several commenters argue that USF considerations are relatively unimportant because direct appropriations programs such as the Commission's Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and NTIA's Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) Program are viable alternatives to achieving USF goals. Some commenters further argue that reclassification will deter private sector participation in the BEAD program. We find these claims to be speculative and give them no weight. Given that there is no definitive evidence that reclassification adversely affects privately funded BIAS investment, if it has any effect at all, see infra section III.H, we find the claim that reclassification would adversely affect BIAS investment that is substantially publicly funded to not be credible. Furthermore, we find as a general matter that new obligations on BIAS providers are unlikely to be more onerous under Title II than is the case currently, and therefore find it unlikely that BIAS providers' decisions to participate in publicly funded programs would be meaningfully impacted as a result of reclassification. At least one commenter stressed the importance of funding the ACP or making the ACP part of the USF. Another party stressed both the need to renew ACP funding and the risks of making ACP part of the USF. These issues are the remit of Congress and the Commission is unable to accomplish either through this or any proceeding. We therefore decline to address them here. We do not believe that the strength of other programs dependent on different funding sources should prevent the Commission from strengthening the USF. Closing the digital divide is a large undertaking that benefits from multiple programs, and we note that some of these alternative programs are winding down given their lack of funding. Moreover, the Commission is statutorily required to preserve and advance the USF. One commenter contends that the benefits of reclassification to the Commission's universal service goals may not be realized because BIAS-only providers will be unwilling to assume increased oversight by State or Federal regulators to obtain ETC designation. This claim is not only speculative, it ignores the new opportunities that Title II offers to these providers to expand their networks and subscriber base through potential eligibility to participate in the High Cost and Lifeline programs. Moreover, as discussed above, the record shows significant consumer interest in allowing BIAS-only providers to become ETCs. We also make clear that reclass [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2024-10674. Public record. Not legal advice.