# Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z): General QM Loan Definition

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2020-27567

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Rule
- **Published:** December 29, 2020
- **Citation:** 85 FR 86308

## Text

BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
12 CFR Part 1026
[Docket No. CFPB-2020-0020]
RIN 3170-AA98
Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z): General QM Loan Definition

AGENCY:

Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.

ACTION:

Final rule; official interpretation.

SUMMARY:

With certain exceptions, Regulation Z requires creditors to make a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer's ability to repay any residential mortgage loan, and loans that meet Regulation Z's requirements for “qualified mortgages” (QMs) obtain certain protections from liability. One category of QMs is the General QM category. For General QMs, the ratio of the consumer's total monthly debt to total monthly income (DTI or DTI ratio) must not exceed 43 percent. This final rule amends the General QM loan definition in Regulation Z. Among other things, the final rule removes the General QM loan definition's 43 percent DTI limit and replaces it with price-based thresholds. Another category of QMs consists of loans that are eligible for purchase or guarantee by either the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) (government-sponsored enterprises or GSEs), while operating under the conservatorship or receivership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The GSEs are currently under Federal conservatorship. In 2013, the Bureau established this category of QMs (Temporary GSE QMs) as a temporary measure that would expire no later than January 10, 2021 or when the GSEs cease to operate under conservatorship. In a final rule released on October 20, 2020, the Bureau extended the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to expire on the mandatory compliance date of final amendments to the General QM loan definition in Regulation Z (or when the GSEs cease to operate under the conservatorship of the FHFA, if that happens earlier). In this final rule, the Bureau adopts the amendments to the General QM loan definition that are referenced in that separate final rule.

DATES:

This final rule is effective on March 1, 2021. However, the mandatory compliance date is July 1, 2021. For additional discussion of these dates, see part VII of the
Supplementary Information
section below.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Waeiz Syed, Counsel, or Ben Cady, Pedro De Oliveira, Sarita Frattaroli, David Friend, Mark Morelli, Marta Tanenhaus, Priscilla Walton-Fein, or Steve Wrone, Senior Counsels, Office of Regulations, at 202-435-7700. If you require this document in an alternative electronic format, please contact
CFPB_Accessibility@cfpb.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Summary of the Final Rule

The Ability-to-Repay/Qualified Mortgage Rule (ATR/QM Rule) requires a creditor to make a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer's ability to repay a residential mortgage loan according to its terms. Loans that meet the ATR/QM Rule's requirements for QMs obtain certain protections from liability. The ATR/QM Rule defines several categories of QMs.

One QM category defined in the ATR/QM Rule is the General QM category. General QMs must comply with the ATR/QM Rule's prohibitions on certain loan features, its points-and-fees limits, and its underwriting requirements. For General QMs, the consumer's DTI ratio must not exceed 43 percent. The ATR/QM Rule requires that creditors must calculate, consider, and verify debt and income for purposes of determining the consumer's DTI ratio using the standards contained in appendix Q of Regulation Z.

A second, temporary category of QMs defined in the ATR/QM Rule consists of mortgages that (1) comply with the same loan-feature prohibitions and points-and-fees limits as General QMs and (2) are eligible to be purchased or guaranteed by the GSEs while under the conservatorship of the FHFA. This final rule refers to these loans as Temporary GSE QMs, and the provision that created this loan category is commonly known as the GSE Patch. Unlike for General QMs, the ATR/QM Rule does not prescribe a DTI limit for Temporary GSE QMs. Thus, a loan can qualify as a Temporary GSE QM even if the consumer's DTI ratio exceeds 43 percent, as long as the loan is eligible to be purchased or guaranteed by either of the GSEs and satisfies the other Temporary GSE QM requirements. In addition, for Temporary GSE QMs, the ATR/QM Rule does not require creditors to use appendix Q to determine the consumer's income, debt, or DTI ratio.

In 2013, the Bureau provided in the ATR/QM Rule that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition would expire with respect to each GSE when that GSE ceases to operate under Federal conservatorship or on January 10, 2021, whichever comes first. The GSEs are currently under Federal conservatorship. Despite the Bureau's expectations when the ATR/QM Rule was published in 2013, Temporary GSE QM originations continue to represent a large and persistent share of the residential mortgage loan market. Without changes to the General QM loan definition, a significant number of Temporary GSE QMs would not be made or would be made at higher prices when the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires. The affected loans would include loans for which the consumer's DTI ratio is above 43 percent or the creditor's method of documenting and verifying income or debt is incompatible with appendix Q. Based on 2018 data, the Bureau estimates that, as a result of the General QM loan definition's 43 percent DTI limit, approximately 957,000 loans—16 percent of all closed-end first-lien residential mortgage originations in 2018—would be affected by the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. These loans are currently originated as QMs due to the Temporary GSE QM loan definition but would not be originated under the current General QM loan definition, and might not be originated at all, if the Temporary GSE QM loan definition were to expire.

On June 22, 2020, the Bureau released two proposed rules concerning the ATR/QM Rule; these proposed rules were published in the
Federal Register
on July 10, 2020. In one of the proposals—referred to in this final rule as the Extension Proposal—the Bureau proposed to extend the Temporary GSE QM loan definition until the effective date of a final rule issued by the Bureau amending the General QM loan definition.
1

The other proposal concerned the issues addressed in this final rule. In that proposal—referred to in this final rule as the General QM Proposal or as the proposal—the Bureau proposed amendments to the General QM loan definition.
2

In the General QM Proposal, the Bureau proposed, among other things, to remove the General QM loan definition's DTI limit and replace it with a limit based on the loan's pricing. The Bureau stated that it expected such amendments would allow most loans that currently could receive QM status under the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to receive QM status under the General QM loan definition if they are made after the

Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires. Based on 2018 data, the Bureau estimated in the General QM Proposal that 943,000 conventional loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent would fall outside the QM definitions if there are no changes to the General QM loan definition before the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition but would fall within the General QM loan definition if it were amended as the Bureau proposed. The Bureau stated that, as a result, the General QM Proposal would help to facilitate a smooth and orderly transition away from the Temporary GSE QM loan definition.

1
85 FR 41448 (July 10, 2020).

2
85 FR 41716 (July 10, 2020).

On August 18, 2020, the Bureau issued a third proposal concerning the ATR/QM Rule. In that proposal—referred to in this final rule as the Seasoned QM Proposal—the Bureau proposed to create a new category of QMs (Seasoned QMs) for first-lien, fixed-rate covered transactions that meet certain performance requirements over a 36-month seasoning period, are held in portfolio until the end of the seasoning period, comply with general restrictions on product features and points and fees, and meet certain underwriting requirements.
3

3
85 FR 53568 (Aug. 28, 2020).

In a final rule released on October 20, 2020 (the Extension Final Rule), the Bureau amended Regulation Z to replace the January 10, 2021 sunset date of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition with a provision stating that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition will be available only for covered transactions for which the creditor receives the consumer's application before the mandatory compliance date of final amendments to the General QM loan definition in Regulation Z. The Extension Final Rule did not amend the provision stating that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires with respect to a GSE when that GSE ceases to operate under conservatorship (the conservatorship clause). The Extension Final Rule did not affect the QM definitions that apply to Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or Rural Housing Service (RHS) loans.

In this final rule, the Bureau amends Regulation Z to replace the existing General QM loan definition with its 43 percent DTI limit with a price-based General QM loan definition. Under the final rule, a loan meets the General QM loan definition in § 1026.43(e)(2) only if the annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds the average prime offer rate (APOR) for a comparable transaction by less than 2.25 percentage points as of the date the interest rate is set. The final rule provides higher thresholds for loans with smaller loan amounts, for certain manufactured housing loans, and for subordinate-lien transactions. The final rule retains the existing product-feature and underwriting requirements and limits on points and fees. Although the final rule removes the 43 percent DTI limit from the General QM loan definition, the final rule requires that the creditor consider the consumer's current or reasonably expected income or assets other than the value of the dwelling (including any real property attached to the dwelling) that secures the loan, debt obligations, alimony, child support, and DTI ratio or residual income and verify the consumer's current or reasonably expected income or assets other than the value of the dwelling (including any real property attached to the dwelling) that secures the loan and the consumer's current debt obligations, alimony, and child support. The final rule removes appendix Q. To prevent uncertainty that may result from appendix Q's removal, the final rule clarifies the consider and verify requirements. The final rule preserves the current threshold separating safe harbor from rebuttable presumption QMs, under which a loan is a safe harbor QM if its APR does not exceed APOR for a comparable transaction by 1.5 percentage points or more as of the date the interest rate is set (or by 3.5 percentage points or more for subordinate-lien transactions).

The effective date of this final rule is March 1, 2021, and the mandatory compliance date is July 1, 2021. Creditors will have the option of complying with the revised General QM loan definition for covered transactions for which creditors receive an application on or after March 1, 2021, and before July 1, 2021. The revised regulations apply to covered transactions for which creditors receive an application on or after July 1, 2021.

II. Background

A.
Dodd-Frank Act Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act)
4

amended the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
5

to establish, among other things, ability-to-repay (ATR) requirements in connection with the origination of most residential mortgage loans.
6

The amendments were intended “to assure that consumers are offered and receive residential mortgage loans on terms that reasonably reflect their ability to repay the loans and that are understandable and not unfair, deceptive or abusive.”
7

As amended, TILA prohibits a creditor from making a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan.
8

4
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

5
15 U.S.C. 1601
et seq.

6
Dodd-Frank Act sections 1411-12, 1414, 124 Stat. 2142-48, 2149; 15 U.S.C. 1639c.

7
15 U.S.C. 1639b(a)(2).

8
15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(1). TILA section 103 defines “residential mortgage loan” to mean, with some exceptions including open-end credit plans, “any consumer credit transaction that is secured by a mortgage, deed of trust, or other equivalent consensual security interest on a dwelling or on residential real property that includes a dwelling.” 15 U.S.C. 1602(dd)(5). TILA section 129C also exempts certain residential mortgage loans from the ATR requirements.
See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(8) (exempting reverse mortgages and temporary or bridge loans with a term of 12 months or less).

TILA identifies the factors a creditor must consider in making a reasonable and good faith assessment of a consumer's ability to repay. These factors are the consumer's credit history, current and expected income, current obligations, DTI ratio or residual income after paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other financial resources other than equity in the dwelling or real property that secures repayment of the loan.
9

A creditor, however, may not be certain whether its ATR determination is reasonable in a particular case.

9
15 U.S.C. 1639c(a)(3).

TILA addresses this potential uncertainty by defining a category of loans—called QMs—for which a creditor “may presume that the loan has met” the ATR requirements.
10

The statute generally defines a QM to mean any residential mortgage loan for which:

10
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(1).

• The loan does not have negative amortization, interest-only payments, or balloon payments;

• The loan term does not exceed 30 years;

• The total points and fees generally do not exceed 3 percent of the loan amount;

• The income and assets relied upon for repayment are verified and documented;

• The underwriting uses a monthly payment based on the maximum rate during the first five years, uses a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the loan term, and takes

into account all mortgage-related obligations; and

• The loan complies with any guidelines or regulations established by the Bureau relating to the ratio of total monthly debt to monthly income or alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment of total monthly debt.
11

11
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(A).

B. The ATR/QM Rule

In January 2013, the Bureau issued a final rule amending Regulation Z to implement TILA's ATR requirements (January 2013 Final Rule).
12

The January 2013 Final Rule became effective on January 10, 2014, and the Bureau has amended it several times since January 2013.
13

This final rule refers to the January 2013 Final Rule and later amendments to it collectively as the ATR/QM Rule or the Rule. The ATR/QM Rule implements the statutory ATR provisions discussed above and defines several categories of QMs.
14

12
78 FR 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013).

13

See
78 FR 35429 (June 12, 2013); 78 FR 44686 (July 24, 2013); 78 FR 60382 (Oct. 1, 2013); 79 FR 65300 (Nov. 3, 2014); 80 FR 59944 (Oct. 2, 2015); 81 FR 16074 (Mar. 25, 2016); 85 FR 67938 (Oct. 26, 2020).

14
12 CFR 1026.43(c), (e).

1. General QMs

One category of QMs defined by the ATR/QM Rule consists of General QMs.
15

A loan is a General QM if:

15
The QM definition is related to the definition of Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM). Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, added by section 941(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, generally requires the securitizer of asset-backed securities (ABS) to retain not less than 5 percent of the credit risk of the assets collateralizing the ABS. 15 U.S.C. 78o-11. Six Federal agencies (not including the Bureau) are tasked with implementing this requirement. Those agencies are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Securities and Exchange Commission, the FHFA, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (collectively, the QRM agencies). Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that the credit risk retention requirements shall not apply to an issuance of ABS if all of the assets that collateralize the ABS are QRMs.
See
15 U.S.C. 78o-11(c)(1)(C)(iii), (4)(A) and (B). Section 15G requires the QRM agencies to jointly define what constitutes a QRM, taking into consideration underwriting and product features that historical loan performance data indicate result in a lower risk of default.
See
15 U.S.C. 78o-11(e)(4). Section 15G also provides that the definition of a QRM shall be “no broader than” the definition of a “qualified mortgage,” as the term is defined under TILA section 129C(b)(2), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, and regulations adopted thereunder. 15 U.S.C. 78o-11(e)(4)(C). In 2014, the QRM agencies issued a final rule adopting the risk retention requirements. 79 FR 77601 (Dec. 24, 2014). That final rule aligns the QRM definition with the QM definition defined by the Bureau in the ATR/QM Rule, effectively exempting securities comprised of loans that meet the QM definition from the risk retention requirement. That final rule also requires the agencies to review the definition of QRM no later than four years after the effective date of the final risk retention rules. In 2019, the QRM agencies initiated a review of certain provisions of the risk retention rule, including the QRM definition. 84 FR 70073 (Dec. 20, 2019). Among other things, the review allows the QRM agencies to consider the QRM definition in light of any changes to the QM definition adopted by the Bureau.

• The loan does not have negative-amortization, interest-only, or balloon-payment features, a term that exceeds 30 years, or points and fees that exceed specified limits;
16

16
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(i) through (iii).

• The creditor underwrites the loan based on a fully amortizing schedule using the maximum rate permitted during the first five years;
17

17
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(iv).

• The creditor considers and verifies the consumer's income and debt obligations in accordance with appendix Q;
18

and

18
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(v).

• The consumer's DTI ratio is no more than 43 percent, determined in accordance with appendix Q.
19

19
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).

Appendix Q contains standards for calculating and verifying debt and income for purposes of determining whether a mortgage satisfies the 43 percent DTI limit for General QMs. The standards in appendix Q were adapted from guidelines maintained by FHA when the January 2013 Final Rule was issued.
20

Appendix Q addresses how to determine a consumer's employment-related income (
e.g.,
income from wages, commissions, and retirement plans); non-employment related income (
e.g.,
income from alimony and child support payments, investments, and property rentals); and liabilities, including recurring and contingent liabilities and projected obligations.
21

20
78 FR 6408, 6527-28 (Jan. 30, 2013) (noting that appendix Q incorporates, with certain modifications, the definitions and standards in HUD Handbook 4155.1, Mortgage Credit Analysis for Mortgage Insurance on One-to-Four-Unit Mortgage Loans).

21
12 CFR 1026, appendix Q.

2. Temporary GSE QMs

A second, temporary category of QMs defined by the ATR/QM Rule, Temporary GSE QMs, consists of mortgages that (1) comply with the ATR/QM Rule's prohibitions on certain loan features and its limitations on points and fees
22

and (2) are eligible to be purchased or guaranteed by either GSE while under the conservatorship of the FHFA.
23

Unlike for General QMs, Regulation Z does not prescribe a DTI limit for Temporary GSE QMs. Thus, a loan can qualify as a Temporary GSE QM even if the DTI ratio exceeds 43 percent, as long as the DTI ratio meets the applicable GSE's DTI requirements and other underwriting criteria, and the loan satisfies the other Temporary GSE QM requirements. In addition, income, debt, and DTI ratios for such loans generally are verified and calculated using GSE standards, rather than appendix Q. The January 2013 Final Rule provided that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition—also known as the GSE Patch—would expire with respect to each GSE when that GSE ceases to operate under conservatorship or on January 10, 2021, whichever comes first.
24

22
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(2)(i) through (iii).

23
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4).

24
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B). The ATR/QM Rule created several additional categories of QMs. The first additional category consisted of mortgages eligible to be insured or guaranteed (as applicable) by HUD (FHA loans), the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA loans), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA loans), and the Rural Housing Service (RHS loans). 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B) through (E). This temporary category of QMs no longer exists because the relevant Federal agencies have since issued their own QM rules.
See, e.g.,
24 CFR 203.19 (HUD rule). Other categories of QMs provide more flexible standards for certain loans originated by certain small creditors. 12 CFR 1026.43(e)(5), (f);
cf.
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(6) (applicable only to covered transactions for which the application was received before Apr. 1, 2016).

In the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau explained why it created the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Bureau observed that it did not believe that a 43 percent DTI ratio “represents the outer boundary of responsible lending” and acknowledged that historically, and even after the financial crisis, over 20 percent of mortgages exceeded that threshold.
25

However, the Bureau stated that, as DTI ratios increase, the general ATR procedures, rather than the QM framework, are “better suited for consideration of all relevant factors that go to a consumer's ability to repay a mortgage loan” and that “[o]ver the long term . . . there will be a robust and sizable market for prudent loans beyond the 43 percent threshold even without the benefit of the presumption of compliance that applies to qualified mortgages.”
26

25
78 FR 6408, 6527 (Jan. 30, 2013).

26

Id.
at 6527-28.

At the same time, the Bureau noted that the mortgage market was especially fragile following the financial crisis, and GSE-eligible loans and federally insured or guaranteed loans made up a significant majority of the market.
27

The Bureau believed that it was appropriate to consider for a period of time, and while the GSEs were under Federal conservatorship, that GSE-eligible loans

were originated with an appropriate assessment of the consumer's ability to repay and therefore warranted being treated as QMs.
28

The Bureau believed in 2013 that this temporary category of QMs would, in the near term, help to ensure access to responsible, affordable credit for consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent, as well as facilitate compliance by creditors by promoting the use of widely recognized, federally related underwriting standards.
29

27

Id.
at 6533-34.

28

Id.
at 6534.

29

Id.
at 6533.

In making the Temporary GSE QM loan definition temporary, the Bureau sought to “provide an adequate period for economic, market, and regulatory conditions to stabilize” and “a reasonable transition period to the general qualified mortgage definition.”
30

The Bureau believed that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition would benefit consumers by preserving access to credit while the mortgage industry adjusted to the ATR/QM Rule.
31

The Bureau also explained that it structured the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to cover loans eligible to be purchased or guaranteed by either of the GSEs—regardless of whether the loans are actually purchased or guaranteed—to leave room for non-GSE private investors to return to the market and secure the same legal protections as the GSEs.
32

The Bureau believed that, as the market recovered, the GSEs and the Federal agencies would be able to reduce their market presence, the percentage of Temporary GSE QMs would decrease, and the market would shift toward General QMs and non-QM loans above a 43 percent DTI ratio.
33

The Bureau's view was that a shift towards non-QM loans could be supported by the non-GSE private market—
i.e.,
by institutions holding such loans in portfolio, selling them in whole, or securitizing them in a rejuvenated private-label securities (PLS) market. The Bureau noted that, pursuant to its statutory obligations under the Dodd-Frank Act, it would assess the impact of the ATR/QM Rule five years after the ATR/QM Rule's effective date, and the assessment would provide an opportunity to analyze the Temporary GSE QM loan definition.
34

30

Id.
at 6534.

31

Id.
at 6536.

32

Id.
at 6534.

33

Id.

34

Id.

3. Presumption of Compliance for QMs

In the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau considered whether QMs should receive a conclusive presumption (
i.e.,
a safe harbor) or a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the ATR requirements. The Bureau concluded that the statute is ambiguous as to whether a creditor originating a QM receives a safe harbor or a rebuttable presumption that it has complied with the ATR requirements.
35

The Bureau noted that its analysis of the statutory construction and policy implications demonstrated that there are sound reasons for adopting either interpretation.
36

The Bureau concluded that the statutory language does not mandate either interpretation and that the presumptions should be tailored to promote the policy goals of the statute.
37

The Bureau ultimately interpreted the statute to provide for a rebuttable presumption of compliance with the ATR requirements but used its adjustment authority to establish a conclusive presumption of compliance for loans that are not “higher-priced.”
38

35

Id.
at 6511.

36

Id.
at 6507.

37

Id.
at 6511.

38

Id.
at 6514.

Under the ATR/QM Rule, a creditor that makes a QM is protected from liability presumptively or conclusively, depending on whether the loan is “higher-priced.” The ATR/QM Rule generally defines a “higher-priced” loan to mean a first-lien mortgage with an APR that exceeded APOR for a comparable transaction as of the date the interest rate was set by 1.5 or more percentage points; or a subordinate-lien mortgage with an APR that exceeded APOR for a comparable transaction as of the date the interest rate was set by 3.5 or more percentage points.
39

A creditor that makes a QM that is not “higher-priced” is entitled to a conclusive presumption that it has complied with the ATR/QM Rule—
i.e.,
the creditor receives a safe harbor from liability.
40

A creditor that makes a loan that meets the standards for a QM but is “higher-priced” is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it has complied with the ATR/QM Rule.
41

39
12 CFR 1026.43(b)(4).

40
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(1)(i).

41
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(1)(ii).

The Bureau explained in the January 2013 Final Rule why it was adopting different presumptions of compliance based on the pricing of QMs.
42

The Bureau noted that the line it was drawing is one that has long been recognized as a rule of thumb to separate prime loans from subprime loans.
43

The Bureau noted that loan pricing is calibrated to the risk of the loan and that the historical performance of prime and subprime loans indicates greater risk for subprime loans.
44

The Bureau also noted that consumers taking out subprime loans tend to be less sophisticated and have fewer options and that the most abuses prior to the financial crisis occurred in the subprime market.
45

The Bureau concluded that these factors warrant imposing heightened standards for higher-priced loans.
46

For prime loans, however, the Bureau found that lower rates are indicative of ability to repay and noted that prime loans have performed significantly better than subprime loans.
47

The Bureau concluded that if a loan met the product and underwriting requirements for QMs and was not a higher-priced loan, there are sufficient grounds for concluding that the creditor satisfied the ATR requirements.
48

The Bureau noted that the conclusive presumption may reduce uncertainty and litigation risk and may promote enhanced competition in the prime market.
49

The Bureau also noted that the litigation risk for rebuttable presumption QMs likely would be quite modest and would have a limited impact on access to credit.
50

42
78 FR 6408 at 6506, 6510-14 (Jan. 30, 2013).

43

Id.
at 6408.

44

Id.
at 6511.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.
at 6511-12.

The Bureau also noted in the January 2013 Final Rule that policymakers have long relied on pricing to determine which loans should be subject to additional regulatory requirements.
51

That history of reliance on pricing continues to provide support for a price-based approach to the General QM loan definition. For example, in 1994 Congress amended TILA by enacting the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) as part of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994.
52

HOEPA was enacted as an amendment to TILA to address abusive practices in refinancing and home-equity mortgage loans with high interest rates or high fees.
53

The statute applied generally to closed-end mortgage credit but excluded

purchase money mortgage loans and reverse mortgages. Coverage was triggered if a loan's APR exceeded comparable Treasury securities by specified thresholds for particular loan types, or if points and fees exceeded 8 percent of the total loan amount or a dollar threshold.
54

For high-cost loans meeting either of those thresholds, HOEPA required creditors to provide special pre-closing disclosures, restricted prepayment penalties and certain other loan terms, and regulated various creditor practices, such as extending credit without regard to a consumer's ability to repay the loan. HOEPA also created special substantive protections for high-cost mortgages, such as prohibiting a creditor from engaging in a pattern or practice of extending a high-cost mortgage to a consumer based on the consumer's collateral without regard to the consumer's repayment ability, including the consumer's current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.
55

The Board implemented the HOEPA amendments at §§ 226.31, 226.32, and 226.33
56

of Regulation Z (12 CFR part 226).
57

51

Id.
at 6413-14, 6510-11.

52
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).

53
As originally enacted, HOEPA defined a class of “high-cost mortgages,” which were generally closed-end home-equity loans (excluding home-purchase loans) with APRs or total points and fees exceeding prescribed thresholds. Mortgages covered by HOEPA have been referred to as “HOEPA loans,” “Section 32 loans,” or “high-cost mortgages.”

54
The Dodd-Frank Act adjusted the baseline for the APR comparison, lowered the points-and-fees threshold, and added a prepayment trigger.

55
TILA section 129(h); 15 U.S.C. 1639(h). In addition to the disclosures and limitations specified in the statute, HOEPA expanded the Board's rulemaking authority, among other things, to prohibit acts or practices the Board found to be unfair and deceptive in connection with mortgage loans.

56
Subsequently renumbered as sections 1026.31, 1026.32, and 1026.33 of Regulation Z.

57

See
60 FR 15463 (Mar. 24, 1995).

In 2001, the Board issued rules expanding HOEPA's protections to more loans by revising the APR threshold for first-lien mortgage loans and revising the ATR provisions to provide for a presumption of a violation of the rule if the creditor engages in a pattern or practice of making high-cost mortgages without verifying and documenting the consumer's repayment ability.

In 2008, the Board exercised its authority under HOEPA to extend certain protections concerning a consumer's ability to repay and prepayment penalties to a new category of “higher-priced mortgage loans” (HPMLs)
58

with APRs that are lower than those prescribed for high-cost loans but that nevertheless exceed the APOR by prescribed amounts. This new category of loans was designed to include subprime credit, including subprime purchase money mortgage loans. Specifically, the Board exercised its authority to revise HOEPA's restrictions on high-cost loans based on its conclusion that the revisions were necessary to prevent unfair and deceptive acts or practices in connection with mortgage loans.
59

The Board concluded that a prohibition on making individual loans without regard to repayment ability was necessary to ensure a remedy for consumers who are given unaffordable loans and to deter irresponsible lending. The 2008 HOEPA Final Rule provided a presumption of compliance with the higher-priced mortgage ability-to-repay requirements if the creditor follows certain procedures regarding underwriting the loan payment, assessing the DTI ratio or residual income, and limiting the features of the loan, in addition to following certain procedures mandated for all creditors.
60

However, the 2008 HOEPA Final Rule made clear that even if the creditor follows the required and optional criteria, the creditor obtained a presumption (not a safe harbor) of compliance with the repayment ability requirement. The consumer therefore could still rebut or overcome that presumption by showing that, despite following the required and optional procedures, the creditor nonetheless disregarded the consumer's ability to repay the loan.

58
Under the Board's 2008 HOEPA Final Rule, an HPML is a consumer credit transaction secured by the consumer's principal dwelling with an APR that exceeds APOR for a comparable transaction, as of the date the interest rate is set, by 1.5 or more percentage points for loans secured by a first lien on the dwelling, or by 3.5 or more percentage points for loans secured by a subordinate lien on the dwelling. 73 FR 44522 (July 30, 2008) (2008 HOEPA Final Rule). The definition of an HPML includes practically all “high-cost mortgages” because the latter transactions are determined by higher loan pricing threshold tests.
See
12 CFR 226.35(a)(1).

59
73 FR 44522 (July 30, 2008).

60

See
12 CFR 1026.34(a)(4)(iii), (iv).

C. The Bureau's Assessment of the ATR/QM Rule

Section 1022(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the Bureau to assess each of its significant rules and orders and to publish a report of each assessment within five years of the effective date of the rule or order.
61

In June 2017, the Bureau published a request for information in connection with its assessment of the ATR/QM Rule (Assessment RFI).
62

These comments are summarized in general terms in part III below.

61
12 U.S.C. 5512(d).

62
82 FR 25246 (June 1, 2017).

In January 2019, the Bureau published its ATR/QM Rule Assessment Report.
63

The Assessment Report included findings about the effects of the ATR/QM Rule on the mortgage market generally, as well as specific findings about Temporary GSE QM originations.

63

See generally
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Assessment Report
(Jan. 2019),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ability-to-repay-qualified-mortgage_assessment-report.pdf
(Assessment Report).

The Assessment Report found that loans with higher DTI ratios have been associated with higher levels of “early delinquency” (
i.e.,
delinquency within two years of origination), which the Bureau used as a proxy for measuring consumer repayment ability at consummation across a wide pool of loans.
64

The Assessment Report also found that the ATR/QM Rule did not eliminate access to credit for consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent who qualify for Temporary GSE QMs.
65

On the other hand, based on application-level data obtained from nine large lenders, the Assessment Report found that the ATR/QM Rule eliminated between 63 and 70 percent of home purchase loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent that were not Temporary GSE QMs.
66

64

See, e.g., id.
at 83-84, 100-05.

65

See, e.g., id.
at 10, 194-96.

66

See, e.g., id.
at 10-11, 117, 131-47.

One main finding about Temporary GSE QMs was that such loans continued to represent a “large and persistent” share of originations in the conforming segment of the mortgage market.
67

As discussed, the GSEs' share of the conventional, conforming purchase-mortgage market was large before the ATR/QM Rule, and the Assessment found a small increase in that share since the ATR/QM Rule's effective date, reaching 71 percent in 2017.
68

The Assessment Report noted that, at least for loans intended for sale in the secondary market, creditors generally offer a Temporary GSE QM even if a General QM could be originated.
69

67

Id.
at 188. Because the Temporary GSE QM loan definition generally affects only loans that conform to the GSEs' guidelines, the Assessment Report's discussion of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition focused on the conforming segment of the market, not on non-conforming (
e.g.,
jumbo) loans.

68

Id.
at 191.

69

Id.
at 192.

The continued prevalence of Temporary GSE QM originations is contrary to the Bureau's expectation at the time it issued the ATR/QM Rule in 2013.
70

The Assessment Report discussed several possible reasons for the continued prevalence of Temporary GSE QM originations. The Assessment Report first highlighted commenters' concerns with the perceived lack of clarity in appendix Q and found that such concerns “may have contributed to investors'—and at least derivatively, creditors'—preference” for Temporary GSE QMs instead of originating loans

under the General QM loan definition.
71

In addition, the Bureau has not revised appendix Q since 2013, while other standards for calculating and verifying debt and income have been updated more frequently.
72

70

Id.
at 13, 190, 238.

71

Id.
at 193.

72

Id.
at 193-94.

The Assessment Report noted that a second possible reason for the continued prevalence of Temporary GSE QMs is that the GSEs were able to accommodate the demand for mortgages above the General QM loan definition's DTI limit of 43 percent as the DTI ratio distribution in the market shifted upward.
73

According to the Assessment Report, in the years since the ATR/QM Rule took effect, house prices have increased and consumers hold more mortgage and other debt (including student loan debt), all of which have caused the DTI ratio distribution to shift upward.
74

The Assessment Report noted that the share of GSE home purchase loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent has increased since the ATR/QM Rule took effect in 2014.
75

The available data suggest that the share of loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent has declined in the non-GSE market relative to the GSE market.
76

The non-GSE market has constricted even with respect to highly qualified consumers; those with higher incomes and higher credit scores represent a greater share of denials.
77

73

Id.
at 194.

74

Id.

75

Id.
at 194-95.

76

Id.
at 119-20.

77

Id.
at 153.

The Assessment Report found that a third possible reason for the persistence of Temporary GSE QMs is the structure of the secondary market.
78

If creditors adhere to the GSEs' guidelines, they gain access to a robust, highly liquid secondary market.
79

In contrast, the Assessment Report noted that while private market securitizations had grown somewhat in recent years, their volume was still a fraction of their pre-crisis levels.
80

There were less than $20 billion in new origination PLS issuances in 2017, compared with $1 trillion in 2005,
81

and only 21 percent of new origination PLS issuances in 2017 were non-QM issuances.
82

To the extent that private securitizations have occurred since the ATR/QM Rule took effect in 2014, the majority of new origination PLS issuances have consisted of prime jumbo loans made to consumers with strong credit characteristics, and these securities include a small share of non-QM loans.
83

The Assessment Report noted that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition may itself be inhibiting the growth of the non-QM market.
84

However, the Assessment Report also noted that it is possible that this market might not exist even with a narrower Temporary GSE QM loan definition, if consumers were unwilling to pay the premium charged to cover the potential litigation risk associated with non-QM loan (which do not have a presumption of compliance with the ATR requirements) or if creditors were unwilling or lack the funding to make the loans.
85

78

Id.
at 196.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Id.

82

Id.
at 197.

83

Id.
at 196.

84

Id.
at 205.

85

Id.

D. Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Mortgage Markets

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant effect on the U.S. economy. In the early months of the pandemic, economic activity contracted, millions of workers became unemployed, and mortgage markets were affected. In recent months, the unemployment rate has declined and there has been a significant rebound in mortgage-origination activity, buoyed by historically low interest rates and by an increasingly large share of government and GSE-backed loans. However, origination activity outside the government and GSE-backed origination channels has declined, and mortgage-credit availability for many consumers—including those who would be dependent on the non-QM market for financing—remains tight. The pandemic's impact on both the secondary market for new originations and on the servicing of existing mortgages is described below.

1. Secondary Market Impacts and Implications for Mortgage Origination Markets

The early economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic restricted the flow of credit in the U.S. economy, particularly as uncertainty rose in mid-March 2020, and investors moved rapidly towards cash and government securities.
86

The lack of investor demand to purchase mortgages, combined with a large supply of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) entering the market,
87

resulted in widening spreads between the rates on a 10-year Treasury note and mortgage interest rates.
88

This dynamic made it difficult for creditors to originate loans, as many creditors rely on the ability to profitably sell loans in the secondary market to generate the liquidity to originate new loans. This resulted in mortgages becoming more expensive for both homebuyers and homeowners looking to refinance. After the actions taken by the Board in March 2020 to purchase agency MBS “in the amounts needed to support smooth market functioning and effective transmission of monetary policy to broader financial conditions and the economy,”
89

market conditions have improved substantially.
90

This has helped to tighten interest rate spreads, which stabilizes mortgage rates, resulting in a decline in mortgage rates since the Board's intervention and in a significant increase in refinance activity.

86

The Quarterly CARES Act Report to Congress: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
116th Cong. 2-3 (2020) (statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).

87
Agency MBS are backed by loans guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae).

88
Laurie Goodman
et al.,
Urban Inst.,
Housing Finance at a Glance, Monthly Chartbook
(Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101926/housing-finance-at-a-glance-a-monthly-chartbook-march-2020.pdf.

89
Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Federal Reserve announces extensive new measures to support the economy
(Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200323b.htm.

90

The Quarterly CARES Act Report to Congress: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
116th Cong. 3 (2020) (statement of Jerome H. Powell, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).

However, non-agency MBS
91

are generally perceived by investors as riskier than agency MBS. As a result, private capital has remained tight and non-agency mortgage credit, including non-QM lending, has declined. Issuance of non-agency MBS declined by 8.2 percent in the first quarter of 2020, with nearly all the transactions completed in January and February before the COVID-19 pandemic began to affect the economy significantly.
92

Nearly all major non-QM creditors ceased making loans in March and April 2020. Beginning in May 2020, issuers of non-agency MBS began to test the market with deals collateralized by non-QM loans largely originated prior to the pandemic, and investor demand for these securitizations has begun to recover. However, no securitization has been completed that is predominantly collateralized by non-QM loans

originated since the pandemic began.
93

Many non-QM creditors—which largely depend on the ability to sell loans in the secondary market in order to fund new loans—have begun to resume originations, albeit with tighter underwriting requirements.
94

Prime jumbo financing also dropped nearly 22 percent in the first quarter of 2020.
95

Banks increased interest rates and narrowed the product offerings such that only consumers with pristine credit profiles were eligible, as these loans must be held in portfolio when the secondary market for non-agency MBS contracts, and volume remains flat.
96

91
Non-agency MBS are not backed by loans guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae. This includes securities collateralized by non-QM loans.

92
Brandon Ivey,
Non-Agency MBS Issuance Slowed in First Quarter,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/217623-non-agency-mbs-issuance-slowed-in-first-quarter.

93
Brandon Ivey,
Non-Agency MBS Issuance Slow in Mid-August,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Aug. 21, 2020),
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/218973-non-agency-mbs-issuance-slow-in-mid-august.

94
Brandon Ivey,
Expanded-Credit Lending Inches Up in Third Quarter,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/219861-expanded-credit-lending-ticks-up-in-3q-amid-slow-recovery.

95
Brandon Ivey,
Jumbo Originations Drop Nearly 22% in First Quarter,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (May 15, 2020)
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/218028-jumbo-originations-drop-nearly-22-in-first-quarter.

96
Brandon Ivey,
Jumbo Lending Flat in 3Q, Wide Variation Among Lenders,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Nov. 13, 2020)
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/219738-jumbo-lending-level-in-3q-wide-variation-among-lenders.

Despite the recent gains in both the agency and the non-agency mortgage sectors, the GSEs continue to play a dominant role in the market recovery, with the GSE share of first-lien mortgage originations at 61.9 percent in the third quarter of 2020, up from 45.3 percent in the third quarter of 2019. The FHA and VA share declined slightly to 17.4 percent from 19.5 percent a year prior, according to an analysis by the Urban Institute. Portfolio lending declined to 19.6 percent in the third quarter of 2020, down from 33.3 percent in the third quarter of 2019, and private label securitizations declined to 1 percent from 1.8 percent a year prior.
97

97
Laurie Goodman
et al.,
Urban Inst.,
Housing Finance at a Glance, Monthly Chartbook,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Nov. 24, 2020),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/103273/housing-finance-at-a-glance-a-monthly-chartbook-november-2020_0.pdf.

2. Servicing Market Impacts and Implications for Origination Markets

In addition to the direct impact on origination volume and composition, the pandemic's impact on the mortgage servicing market has downstream effects on mortgage originations as many of the same entities both originate and service mortgages. Anticipating that a number of homeowners would struggle to pay their mortgages due to the pandemic and related economic impacts, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act)
98

in March 2020. The CARES Act provides additional protections for borrowers with federally backed mortgages, such as those whose mortgages are purchased or securitized by a GSE or insured or guaranteed by the FHA, VA or USDA. The CARES Act mandated a 60-day foreclosure moratorium for such mortgages, which has since been extended by the agencies until the end of 2020 or January 31, 2021 in the case of the GSEs.
99

The CARES Act also allows borrowers with federally backed mortgages to request up to 180 days of forbearance due to a COVID-19-related financial hardship, with an option to extend the forbearance period for an additional 180 days.

98
Public Law 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020) (includes loans backed by HUD, USDA, VA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac).

99

See, e.g.,
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
FHFA Extends Foreclosure and REO Eviction Moratoriums
(Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Extends-Foreclosure-and-REO-Eviction-Moratoriums-12022020.aspx;
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
FHA Extends Foreclosure And Eviction Moratorium For Homeowners Through Year End
(Aug. 27, 2020),
https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/HUD_No_20_134;
Veterans Benefits Admin.,
Extended Foreclosure Moratorium for Borrowers Affected by COVID-19
(Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/documents/circulars/26-20-30.pdf;
Rural Dev., U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
Extension of Foreclosure and Eviction Moratorium for Single Family Housing Direct Loans
(Aug. 28, 2020),
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDARD/bulletins/29c3a9e.

Following the passage of the CARES Act, some mortgage servicers remain obligated to make some principal and interest payments to investors in GSE and Ginnie Mae securities, even if consumers are not making payments.
100

Servicers also remain obligated to make escrowed real estate tax and insurance payments to local taxing authorities and insurance companies. While servicers are required to hold liquid reserves to cover anticipated advances, early in the pandemic there were significant concerns that higher-than-expected forbearance rates over an extended period of time could lead to liquidity shortages, particularly among many non-bank servicers. However, while forbearance rates remain elevated at 5.54 percent for the week ending November 22, 2020, they have decreased since reaching their high of 8.55 percent on June 7, 2020.
101

100
The GSEs typically repurchase loans out of the trust after they fall 120 days delinquent, after which the servicer is no longer required to advance principal and interest, but Ginnie Mae requires servicers to advance principal and interest until the default is resolved. On April 21, 2020, the FHFA confirmed that servicers of GSE loans will only be required to advance four months of mortgage payments, regardless of whether the GSEs repurchase the loans from the trust after 120 days of delinquency. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
FHFA Addresses Servicer Liquidity Concerns, Announces Four Month Advance Obligation Limit for Loans in Forbearance
(Apr. 21, 2020),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Addresses-Servicer-Liquidity-Concerns-Announces-Four-Month-Advance-Obligation-Limit-for-Loans-in-Forbearance.aspx.

101
Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n,
Share of Mortgage Loans in Forbearance Increases to 5.54%
(Dec. 1, 2020),
https://www.mba.org/2020-press-releases/december/share-of-mortgage-loans-in-forbearance-increases-to-554-percent.

Because many mortgage servicers also originate the loans they service, many creditors, as well as several warehouse providers,
102

initially responded to the risk of elevated forbearances and higher-than-expected monthly advances by imposing credit overlays—
i.e.,
additional underwriting standards—for new originations. These new underwriting standards include more stringent requirements for non-QM, jumbo, and government loans.
103

An “adverse market fee” of 50 basis points on most refinances became effective for new originations delivered to the GSEs on or after December 1, 2020, to cover projected losses due to forbearances, the foreclosure moratoriums, and other default servicing expenses.
104

However, due to refinance origination profits resulting from historically low interest rates, the leveling off in forbearance rates, and actions taken at the Federal level to alleviate servicer liquidity pressure,
105

concerns over non-bank liquidity and related credit overlays have begun to ease, though Federal

regulators continue to monitor the situation.
106

While the non-QM market has begun to recover, it is unclear how quickly non-banks that originate non-QM loans will fully return to their pre-pandemic level of operations and loan production.

102
Warehouse providers are creditors that provide financing to mortgage originators and servicers to fund and service loans.

103
Maria Volkova,
FHA/VA Lenders Raise Credit Score Requirements,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/217636-fhava-lenders-raise-fico-credit-score-requirements.

104
Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency,
Adverse Market Refinance Fee Implementation now December 1
(Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Adverse-Market-Refinance-Fee-Implementation-Now-December-1.aspx.

105
On April 10, 2020, Ginnie Mae released guidance on a Pass-Through Assistance Program whereby Ginnie Mae will provide financial assistance at a fixed interest rate to servicers facing a principal and interest shortfall as a last resort. Ginnie Mae,
All Participant Memorandum (APM) 20-03: Availability of Pass-Through Assistance Program for Participants in Ginnie Mae's Single-Family MBS Program
(Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.ginniemae.gov/issuers/program_guidelines/Pages/mbsguideapmslibdisppage.aspx?ParamID=105.
On April 7, 2020, Ginnie Mae also announced approval of a servicing advance financing facility, whereby mortgage servicing rights are securitized and sold to private investors. Press Release,
Ginnie Mae, Ginnie Mae approves private market servicer liquidity facility
(Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.ginniemae.gov/newsroom/Pages/PressReleaseDispPage.aspx?ParamID=194.

106
Brandon Ivey,
Non-QM Lenders Regaining Footing,
Inside Mortg. Fin. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.insidemortgagefinance.com/articles/218696-non-qm-lenders-regaining-footing-with-a-positive-outlook
(on file).

III. Summary of the Rulemaking Process

The Bureau has solicited and received substantial public and stakeholder input on issues related to this final rule. In addition to the Bureau's discussions with and communications from industry stakeholders, consumer advocates, other Federal agencies,
107

and members of Congress, the Bureau issued requests for information (RFIs) in 2017 and 2018 and in July 2019 issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the ATR/QM Rule (ANPR). The Bureau released the Extension Proposal and the General QM Proposal on June 22, 2020, and the Seasoned QM Proposal on August 18, 2020. The Bureau issued the Extension Final Rule on October 20, 2020.

107
The Bureau has consulted with agencies including the FHFA, the Board, FHA, the FDIC, the OCC, the Federal Trade Commission, the National Credit Union Administration, HUD, and the Department of the Treasury.

A.
The Requests for Information

In June 2017, the Bureau published the Assessment RFI to gather information for its assessment of the ATR/QM Rule.
108

In response to the Assessment RFI, the Bureau received approximately 480 comments from creditors, industry groups, consumer advocates, and individuals.
109

The comments addressed a variety of topics, including the General QM loan definition and the 43 percent DTI limit; perceived problems with, and potential changes and alternatives to, appendix Q; and how the Bureau should address the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The comments expressed a range of ideas for addressing the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. Some commenters recommended making the definition permanent or extending it for various periods of time. Other comments stated that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition should be eliminated or permitted to expire.

108
82 FR 25246 (June 1, 2017).

109

See
Assessment Report,
supra
note 63, appendix B (summarizing comments received in response to the Assessment RFI).

Beginning in January 2018, the Bureau issued a general call for evidence seeking comment on its enforcement, supervision, rulemaking, market monitoring, and financial education activities.
110

As part of the call for evidence, the Bureau published requests for information relating to, among other things, the Bureau's rulemaking process,
111

the Bureau's adopted regulations and new rulemaking authorities,
112

and the Bureau's inherited regulations and inherited rulemaking authorities.
113

In response to the call for evidence, the Bureau received comments on the ATR/QM Rule from stakeholders, including consumer advocates and industry groups. The comments addressed a variety of topics, including the General QM loan definition, appendix Q, and the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The comments also raised concerns about, among other things, the risks of allowing the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to expire without any changes to the General QM loan definition or appendix Q. The concerns raised in these comments were similar to those raised in response to the Assessment RFI, discussed above.

110

See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Call for Evidence, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/notice-opportunities-comment/archive-closed/call-for-evidence
(last updated Apr. 17, 2018).

111
83 FR 10437 (Mar. 9, 2018).

112
83 FR 12286 (Mar. 21, 2018).

113
83 FR 12881 (Mar. 26, 2018).

B. The ANPR

On July 25, 2019, the Bureau issued the ANPR. The ANPR stated the Bureau's tentative plans to allow the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to expire in January 2021 or after a short extension, if necessary, to facilitate a smooth and orderly transition away from the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Bureau also stated that it was considering whether to propose revisions to the General QM loan definition in light of the potential expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition and requested comments on several topics related to the General QM loan definition, including whether and how the Bureau should revise the DTI limit in the General QM loan definition; whether the Bureau should supplement or replace the DTI limit with another method for directly measuring a consumer's personal finances; whether the Bureau should revise appendix Q or replace it with other standards for calculating and verifying a consumer's debt and income; and whether, instead of a DTI limit, the Bureau should adopt standards that do not directly measure a consumer's personal finances.
114

The Bureau requested comment on how much time industry would need to change its practices in response to any changes the Bureau might make to the General QM loan definition.
115

The Bureau received approximately 85 comments on the ANPR from businesses in the mortgage industry (including creditors), consumer advocates, elected officials, individuals, and research centers. The General QM Proposal provided a summary of these comments, and the Bureau considered these comments in developing the proposal.

114
84 FR 37155, 37160-62 (July 31, 2019).

115
The Bureau stated that if the amount of time industry would need to change its practices in response to the rule depends on how the Bureau revises the General QM loan definition, the Bureau requested time estimates based on alternative possible definitions.

C. The Extension Proposal, General QM Proposal, and Seasoned QM Proposal

The Bureau issued the Extension Proposal and the General QM Proposal on June 22, 2020, and those proposals were published in the
Federal Register
on July 10, 2020. In the Extension Proposal, the Bureau proposed to replace the January 10, 2021 sunset date of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition with a provision that extends the Temporary GSE QM loan definition until the effective date of final amendments to the General QM loan definition in Regulation Z (
i.e.,
a final rule relating to the General QM Proposal). The Bureau did not propose to amend the conservatorship clause. The comment period for the Extension Proposal ended on August 10, 2020.

In the General QM Proposal, the Bureau proposed, among other things, to remove the General QM loan definition's DTI limit and replace it with a limit based on the loan's pricing. Under the proposal, a loan would have met the General QM loan definition in § 1026.43(e)(2) only if the APR exceeds APOR for a comparable transaction by less than 2 percentage points as of the date the interest rate is set. The Bureau proposed higher thresholds for loans with smaller loan amounts and subordinate-lien transactions. The Bureau also proposed to retain the existing product-feature and underwriting requirements and limits on points and fees. Although the Bureau proposed to remove the 43 percent DTI limit from the General QM loan definition, the General QM Proposal would have required that the creditor consider the consumer's DTI ratio or

residual income, income or assets other than the value of the dwelling, and debts and verify the consumer's income or assets other than the value of the dwelling and the consumer's debts. The Bureau proposed to remove appendix Q. To mitigate the uncertainty that may result from appendix Q's removal, the General QM Proposal would have clarified the consider and verify requirements. The Bureau proposed to preserve the current threshold separating safe harbor from rebuttable presumption QMs, under which a loan is a safe harbor QM if its APR does not exceed APOR for a comparable transaction by 1.5 percentage points or more as of the date the interest rate is set (or by 3.5 percentage points or more for subordinate-lien transactions).

Although the Bureau proposed to remove the 43 percent DTI limit and adopt a price-based approach for the General QM loan definition, the Bureau also requested comment on two alternative approaches: (1) Retaining the DTI limit and increasing it to a Specific threshold between 45 percent and 48 percent or (2) using a hybrid approach involving both pricing and a DTI limit, such as applying a DTI limit to loans that are above specified rate spreads. Under these alternative approaches, creditors would not have been required to verify debt and income using appendix Q.

The Bureau stated in the General QM Proposal that the proposed amendments would allow most loans that currently could receive QM status under the Temporary GSE QM loan definition to receive QM status under the General QM loan definition.
116

The Bureau stated that, as a result, the General QM Proposal would help to facilitate a smooth and orderly transition away from the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Bureau proposed that the effective date of a final rule relating to the General QM Proposal would be six months after publication of the final rule in the
Federal Register
. The revised regulations would have applied to covered transactions for which creditors receive an application on or after this effective date. The comment period for the General QM Proposal ended on September 8, 2020. The Bureau received approximately 75 comments in response to the General QM Proposal from industry, consumer advocates, and others. The Bureau summarizes and responds to these comments in parts V through VIII below.

116
Based on 2018 data, the Bureau estimated in the General QM Proposal that 943,000 High-DTI conventional loans would fall outside the QM definitions if there are no changes to the General QM loan definition prior to the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition but would fall within the General QM loan definition if amended as the Bureau proposed.

On August 18, 2020, the Bureau issued the Seasoned QM Proposal, which was published in the
Federal Register
on August 28, 2020. The Bureau proposed to create a new category of QMs for first-lien, fixed-rate covered transactions that have met certain performance requirements over a 36-month seasoning period, are held in portfolio until the end of the seasoning period, comply with general restrictions on product features and points and fees, and meet certain underwriting requirements.
117

The Bureau stated that the primary objective of the Seasoned QM Proposal was to ensure access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit by adding a Seasoned QM definition to the existing QM definitions. The Bureau proposed that a final rule relating to the Seasoned QM Proposal would take effect on the same date as a final rule relating to the General QM Proposal. Under the Seasoned QM Proposal—as under the General QM Proposal—the revised regulations would apply to covered transactions for which creditors receive an application on or after this effective date. Thus, due to the 36-month seasoning period, no loan would be eligible to become a Seasoned QM until at least 36 months after the effective date of a final rule relating to the Seasoned QM Proposal. The comment period for the Seasoned QM Proposal ended on October 1, 2020.
118

The Bureau is issuing the Seasoned QM Final Rule concurrently with this final rule.

117
85 FR 53568 (Aug. 28, 2020).

118
85 FR 60096 (Sept. 24, 2020).

D. The Extension Final Rule

The Bureau issued the Extension Final Rule on October 20, 2020. It was published in the
Federal Register
on October 26, 2020. The Extension Final Rule amended Regulation Z to replace the January 10, 2021 sunset date of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition with a provision stating that the Temporary GSE QM loan definition will be available only for covered transactions for which the creditor receives the consumer's application before the mandatory compliance date of final amendments to the General QM loan definition in Regulation Z. The Extension Final Rule did not amend the conservatorship clause.
119

119
The Extension Final Rule also did not affect the QM definitions that apply to FHA, VA, USDA, or RHS loans.

IV. Legal Authority

The Bureau is issuing this final rule pursuant to its authority under TILA and the Dodd-Frank Act. Section 1061 of the Dodd-Frank Act transferred to the Bureau the “consumer financial protection functions” previously vested in certain other Federal agencies, including the Board. The Dodd-Frank Act defines the term “consumer financial protection function” to include “all authority to prescribe rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial law, including performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review such rules, orders, and guidelines.”
120

Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act (including section 1061), along with TILA and certain subtitles and provisions of title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, are Federal consumer financial laws.
121

120
12 U.S.C. 5581(a)(1)(A).

121
Dodd-Frank Act section 1002(14), 12 U.S.C. 5481(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law” to include the “enumerated consumer laws” and the provisions of title X of the Dodd-Frank Act), Dodd-Frank Act section 1002(12)(O), 12 U.S.C. 5481(12)(O) (defining “enumerated consumer laws” to include TILA).

A.
TILA

TILA section 105(a).
Section 105(a) of TILA directs the Bureau to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of TILA and states that such regulations may contain such additional requirements, classifications, differentiations, or other provisions and may further provide for such adjustments and exceptions for all or any class of transactions that the Bureau judges are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of TILA, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
122

A purpose of TILA is “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.”
123

Additionally, a purpose of TILA sections 129B and 129C is to assure that consumers are offered and receive residential mortgage loans on terms that reasonably reflect their ability to repay the loans and that are understandable and not unfair, deceptive, or abusive.
124

As discussed in the section-by-section analysis below, the Bureau is issuing certain provisions of this final rule pursuant to its rulemaking, adjustment,

and exception authority under TILA section 105(a).

122
15 U.S.C. 1604(a).

123
15 U.S.C. 1601(a).

124
15 U.S.C. 1639b(a)(2).

TILA section 129C(b)(2)(A).
TILA section 129C(b)(2)(A)(vi) provides the Bureau with authority to establish guidelines or regulations relating to ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income or alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment of total monthly debt, taking into account the income levels of the borrower and such other factors as the Bureau may determine relevant and consistent with the purposes described in TILA section 129C(b)(3)(B)(i).
125

As discussed in the section-by-section analysis below, the Bureau is issuing certain provisions of this final rule pursuant to its authority under TILA section 129C(b)(2)(A)(vi).

125
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(A).

TILA section 129C(b)(3)(A), (B)(i).
TILA section 129C(b)(3)(B)(i) authorizes the Bureau to prescribe regulations that revise, add to, or subtract from the criteria that define a QM upon a finding that such regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible, affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers in a manner consistent with the purposes of TILA section 129C; or are necessary and appropriate to effectuate the purposes of TILA sections 129B and 129C, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance with such sections.
126

In addition, TILA section 129C(b)(3)(A) directs the Bureau to prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of section 129C.
127

As discussed in the section-by-section analysis below, the Bureau is issuing certain provisions of this final rule pursuant to its authority under TILA section 129C(b)(3)(B)(i).

126
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(3)(B)(i).

127
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(3)(A).

B. Dodd-Frank Act

Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b).
Section 1022(b)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the Bureau to prescribe rules to enable the Bureau to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions thereof.
128

TILA and title X of the Dodd-Frank Act are Federal consumer financial laws. Accordingly, the Bureau is exercising its authority under Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b) to prescribe rules that carry out the purposes and objectives of TILA and title X and prevent evasion of those laws.

128
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).

V. Why the Bureau Is Issuing This Final Rule

The Bureau concludes that this final rule's bright-line pricing thresholds strike the best balance between ensuring consumers' ability to repay and ensuring access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit. The Bureau is amending the General QM loan definition because retaining the existing 43 percent DTI limit would reduce the size of the QM market and likely would lead to a significant reduction in access to responsible, affordable credit when the Temporary GSE QM definition expires. The Bureau continues to believe that General QM status should be determined by a simple, bright-line rule to provide certainty of QM status, and the Bureau concludes that pricing achieves this objective. Furthermore, the Bureau concludes that pricing, rather than a DTI limit, is a more appropriate standard for the General QM loan definition. While not a direct measure of financial capacity, loan pricing is strongly correlated with early delinquency rates, which the Bureau uses as a proxy for repayment ability. The Bureau concludes that conditioning QM status on a specific DTI limit would likely impair access to credit for some consumers for whom it is appropriate to presume their ability to repay their loans at consummation. Although a pricing limit that is set too low could also have this effect, compared to DTI, loan pricing is a more flexible metric because it can incorporate other factors that may also be relevant to determining ability to repay, including credit scores, cash reserves, or residual income. The Bureau concludes that a price-based General QM loan definition is better than the alternatives because a loan's price, as measured by comparing a loan's APR to APOR for a comparable transaction, is a strong indicator of a consumer's ability to repay and is a more holistic and flexible measure of a consumer's ability to repay than DTI alone.

A loan's price is not a direct measure of ability to repay, but the Bureau concludes that it is an effective indirect measure of ability to repay. The final rule amends Regulation Z to provide that a loan would meet the General QM loan definition in § 1026.43(e)(2) only if the APR exceeds APOR for a comparable transaction by less than 2.25 percentage points as of the date the interest rate is set. The Bureau is finalizing a threshold of 2.25 percentage points, an increase from the proposed threshold of 2 percentage points. The Bureau concludes that, for most first-lien covered transactions, a 2.25-percentage-point pricing threshold strikes the best balance between ensuring consumers' ability to repay and ensuring continued access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit. The final rule provides higher thresholds for loans with smaller loan amounts and for subordinate-lien transactions. As described below, the final rule provides an increase from the proposed thresholds for some small manufactured housing loans to ensure consumers have continued access to responsible, affordable credit.

Consistent with the proposal, the Bureau is not amending the existing General QM loan product-feature and underwriting requirements and limits on points and fees. Under the final rule, creditors are required to consider the consumer's DTI ratio or residual income, income or assets other than the value of the dwelling, and debts and verify the consumer's income or assets other than the value of the dwelling and the consumer's debts. The final rule removes the 43 percent DTI ratio limit and appendix Q and clarifies the consider and verify requirements for purposes of the General QM loan definition.

The Bureau is preserving the current threshold separating safe harbor from rebuttable presumption QMs, under which a loan is a safe harbor QM if its APR exceeds APOR for a comparable transaction by less than 1.5 percentage points as of the date the interest rate is set (or by less than 3.5 percentage points for subordinate-lien transactions).

A.
Overview of the Existing General QM Loan Definition and the DTI Requirement

TILA section 129C(b)(2) defines QM by limiting certain loan terms and features. The statute generally prohibits a QM from permitting an increase of the principal balance on the loan (negative amortization), interest-only payments, most balloon payments, a term greater than 30 years, and points and fees that exceed a specified threshold. In addition, the statute incorporates limited underwriting criteria that overlap with some elements of the general ATR standard, including prohibiting “no-doc” loans where the creditor does not verify income or assets. TILA does not require DTI ratios to be included in the definition of a QM. Rather, the statute authorizes, but does not require, the Bureau to establish additional criteria relating to monthly DTI ratios, or alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment of total monthly debt, taking into account the income levels of the consumer and other factors the Bureau

determines relevant and consistent with the purposes described in TILA section 129C(b)(3)(B)(i).

In 2011, the Board proposed two alternative approaches to the General QM loan definition to implement the statutory QM requirements.
129

Proposed Alternative 1 would have included only the statutory QM requirements and would not have incorporated the consumer's DTI ratio, residual income, or other factors from the general ATR standard.
130

Proposed Alternative 2 would have included the statutory QM requirements and additional factors from the general ATR standard, including a requirement to consider and verify the consumer's DTI ratio or residual income.
131

129
76 FR 27390, 27453 (May 11, 2011) (2011 ATR/QM Proposal).

130

Id.
at 27453.

131

Id.

In the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau adopted the General QM loan definition in § 1026.43(e)(2). The existing General QM loan definition includes the statutory QM factors and additional factors from the general ATR standard. The existing General QM loan definition also contains a DTI limit of 43 percent. In adopting this approach in the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau explained that it believed the General QM loan definition should include a standard for evaluating the consumer's ability to repay, in addition to the product feature restrictions and other requirements that are specified in TILA.
132

132
78 FR 6408, 6516 (Jan. 30, 2013).

With respect to DTI, the January 2013 Final Rule noted that DTI ratios are widely used for evaluating a consumer's ability to repay over time because, as the available data showed, DTI ratio correlates with loan performance as measured by delinquency rate.
133

The January 2013 Final Rule noted that, at a basic level, the lower the DTI ratio, the greater the consumer's ability to pay back a mortgage loan.
134

The Bureau believed this relationship between the DTI ratio and the consumer's ability to repay applied both under conditions as they exist at consummation and under future changed circumstances, such as increases in payments for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), future reductions in income, and unanticipated expenses and new debts.
135

133

Id.
at 6526-27.

134

Id.
at 6526.

135

Id.
at 6526-27.

To provide certainty for creditors regarding the loan's QM status, the January 2013 Final Rule contained a specific DTI limit of 43 percent as part of the General QM loan definition. The Bureau stated that a specific DTI limit also provides certainty to assignees and investors in the secondary market, which the Bureau believed would help reduce concerns regarding legal risk and promote credit availability.
136

The Bureau noted that numerous commenters had highlighted the value of providing objective requirements determined based on information contained in loan files.
137

To address concerns that creditors may not have adequate certainty about whether a particular loan satisfies the requirements of the General QM loan definition, the Bureau provided definitions of debt and income for purposes of the General QM loan definition in appendix Q.
138

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id.

The Bureau selected 43 percent as the DTI limit for the General QM loan definition. Based on analysis of data available at the time and comments, the Bureau believed that the 43 percent limit would advance TILA's goals of creditors not extending credit that consumers cannot repay while still preserving consumers' access to credit.
139

The Bureau acknowledged that there is no specific threshold that separates affordable from unaffordable mortgages; rather, there is a gradual increase in delinquency rates as DTI ratios increase.
140

Additionally, the Bureau noted that a 43 percent DTI ratio was within the range used by many creditors, generally comported with industry standards and practices for prudent underwriting, and was the threshold used by FHA as its general boundary at the time the Bureau issued the January 2013 Final Rule.
141

The Bureau noted concerns about setting a higher DTI limit, including concerns that it could allow QM status for mortgages for which there is not a sound reason to presume that the creditor had a reasonable belief in the consumer's ability to repay.
142

The Bureau was especially concerned about setting a DTI limit higher than 43 percent in the context of QMs that receive a safe harbor from the ATR requirements.
143

The Bureau was also concerned that a higher DTI limit would result in a QM boundary that substantially covered the entire mortgage market. If that were the case, creditors might be unwilling to make non-QM loans, and the Bureau was concerned that the QM rule would define the limit of credit availability.
144

The Bureau also suggested that a higher DTI limit might require a corresponding weakening of the strength of the presumption of compliance, which the Bureau believed would largely defeat the point of adopting a higher DTI limit.
145

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.
at 6528.

143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Id.

The January 2013 Final Rule also acknowledged concerns about imposing a DTI limit. The Bureau acknowledged that the Board, in issuing the 2011 ATR/QM Proposal, found that DTI ratios may not have significant predictive power, once the effects of credit history, loan type, and loan-to-value (LTV) ratio are considered.
146

Similarly, the Bureau noted that some commenters responding to the 2011 ATR/QM Proposal suggested that the Bureau should include compensating factors in addition to a specific DTI limit due to concerns about restricting access to credit.
147

The Bureau acknowledged that a standard that takes into account multiple factors may produce more accurate ability-to-repay determinations, at least in specific cases, but was concerned that incorporating a multi-factor test or compensating factors into the General QM loan definition would undermine the certainty for creditors and the secondary market of whether loans were eligible for QM status.
148

The Bureau also acknowledged arguments that residual income—generally defined as the monthly income that remains after a consumer pays all personal debts and obligations, including the prospective mortgage—may be a better measure of repayment ability.
149

However, the Bureau noted that it lacked sufficient data to mandate a bright-line rule based on residual income.
150

The Bureau anticipated further study of the issue as part of the five-year assessment of the Rule.
151

146

Id.
at 6527.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Id.
at 6528.

150

Id.

151

Id.

The Bureau acknowledged in the January 2013 Final Rule that the 43 percent DTI limit in the General QM loan definition could restrict access to credit based on market conditions. Among other things, the Bureau expressed concern that, as the mortgage market recovered from the financial crisis, there could be a limited non-QM market, which, in conjunction with the 43 percent DTI limit, could impair access to credit for consumers with DTI

ratios over 43 percent.
152

To preserve access to credit for such consumers while the market recovered, the Bureau adopted the Temporary GSE QM loan definition, which did not include a specific DTI limit. As discussed below, the Temporary GSE QM loan definition continues to play a significant role in ensuring access to credit for consumers.

152

Id.
at 6533.

B. Why the Bureau Is Adopting a Price-Based QM Definition To Replace the General QM Loan Definition's DTI Limit

The Bureau concludes that this final rule's price-based approach best balances consumers' ability to repay with ensuring access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit. The Bureau is amending the General QM definition because retaining the existing 43 percent DTI limit would reduce the size of the QM market and likely would lead to a significant reduction in access to responsible, affordable credit when the Temporary GSE QM definition expires. The Bureau continues to believe that General QM status should be determined by a simple, bright-line rule to provide certainty of QM status, and the Bureau concludes that pricing achieves this objective. The Bureau concludes that a price-based General QM loan definition is better than the alternatives because a loan's price, as measured by comparing a loan's APR to APOR for a comparable transaction, is a strong indicator of a consumer's ability to repay and is a more holistic and flexible measure of a consumer's ability to repay than DTI alone.

1. Considerations Related to the General QM Loan Definition's DTI Limit

The proposal described the Bureau's concerns about the 43 percent DTI limit and its potentially negative effect on access to credit. In particular, the Bureau is concerned that imposing a DTI limit under the General QM loan definition would deny QM status for loans to some consumers for whom it is appropriate to presume ability to repay at consummation and that denying QM status to such loans risks denying consumers access to responsible, affordable credit. The Bureau is concerned that the current approach to DTI ratios as part of the General QM loan definition is not the best approach because it would likely impair some consumers' ability to access responsible and affordable credit. These access-to-credit concerns are especially acute for lower-income and minority consumers.

The proposal noted that a DTI limit may unduly restrict access to credit because it provides an incomplete picture of the consumer's financial capacity. While the Bureau acknowledges that DTI ratios generally correlate with loan performance, as the Bureau found in the January 2013 Final Rule and as shown in recent Bureau analysis described below, the proposal noted that a consumer's DTI ratio is only one way to measure financial capacity and is not necessarily a holistic measure of the consumer's ability to repay. The proposal also noted that the Bureau's own experience and the feedback it has received from stakeholders since issuing the January 2013 Final Rule suggest that imposing a DTI limit as a condition for QM status under the General QM loan definition may be overly burdensome and complex in practice.

As described in the proposal, the Bureau's Assessment Report highlights the tradeoffs of conditioning the General QM loan definition on a DTI limit. The Assessment Report included specific findings about the General QM loan definition's DTI limit, including certain findings related to DTI ratios as probative of a consumer's ability to repay. The Assessment Report found that loans with higher DTI ratios have been associated with higher levels of “early delinquency” (
i.e.,
delinquency within two years of origination), which, as explained below, may serve as a proxy for measuring whether a consumer had a reasonable ability to repay at the time the loan was consummated.
153

For example, the Assessment Report notes that for all periods and samples studied, a positive relationship between DTI ratios and early delinquency is present and economically meaningful.
154

The Assessment Report states that higher DTI ratios independently increase expected early delinquency, regardless of other underwriting criteria.
155

153

See
Assessment Report,
supra
note 63, at 83-84, 100-05.

154

Id.
at 104-05.

155

Id.
at 105.

At the same time, findings from the Assessment Report indicate that the specific 43 percent DTI limit in the current rule has restricted access to credit, particularly in the absence of a robust non-QM market. The report found that, for consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent who qualify for loans eligible for purchase or guarantee by the GSEs, the Rule has not decreased access to credit.
156

However, the Assessment Report attributes the fact that the 43 percent DTI limit has not reduced access to credit for such consumers to the existence of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The findings in the Assessment Report indicate that there would be some reduction in access to credit for consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent when the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires, absent changes to the General QM loan definition. For example, based on application-level data obtained from nine large lenders, the Assessment Report found that the January 2013 Final Rule eliminated between 63 and 70 percent of non-GSE eligible home purchase loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent.
157

The proposal noted the Bureau's concern about a similar effect for loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent when the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires. The proposal acknowledged that the Assessment Report's finding, without other information, does not prove or disprove the effectiveness of the DTI limit in achieving the purposes of the January 2013 Final Rule in ensuring consumers' ability to repay the loan. If the denied applicants in fact lacked the ability to repay, then the reduction in approval rates is a consequence consistent with the purposes of the Rule. However, if the denied applicants did have the ability to repay, then these data suggest an unintended consequence of the Rule. This possibility is supported by the fact that other findings in the Assessment Report suggest that applicants for non-GSE eligible loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent are being denied, even though other compensating factors indicate that some of them may have the ability to repay their loans.
158

156

See, e.g., id.
at 10, 194-96.

157

See, e.g., id.
at 10-11, 117, 131-47.

158

See, e.g.,
Assessment Report
supra
note 63, at 150, 153, Table 20. Table 20 illustrates how the pool of denied non-GSE eligible applicants with DTI ratios above 43 percent has changed between 2013 and 2014. After the introduction of the Rule, the pool of denied applicants contains more consumers with higher incomes, higher FICO scores, and higher down payments.

The current condition of the non-QM market heightens the access-to-credit concerns related to the specific 43 percent DTI limit, particularly if such conditions persist after the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Bureau stated in the January 2013 Final Rule that it believed mortgages that could be responsibly originated with DTI ratios that exceed 43 percent, which historically includes over 20 percent of mortgages, would be made under the general ATR standard.
159

However, the Assessment Report found that a robust market for non-QM loans above the 43 percent DTI limit has not materialized as the Bureau had

predicted. Therefore, there is limited capacity in the non-QM market to provide access to credit after the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition.
160

As described above, the non-QM market has been further reduced by the recent economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, with most mortgage credit now available in the QM lending space. The Bureau acknowledges the slow development of the non-QM market since the January 2013 Final Rule took effect and further acknowledges that the recent economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic may significantly hinder its development in the near term.

159
78 FR 6408, 6527 (Jan. 30, 2013).

160
Assessment Report,
supra
note 63, at 198.

At the time of the January 2013 Final Rule, the Bureau adopted the Temporary GSE loan definition to provide a period for economic, market, and regulatory conditions to stabilize and for a reasonable transition period to the General QM loan definition and non-QM loans above a 43 percent DTI ratio. However, contrary to the Bureau's expectations, lending largely has remained in the Temporary GSE QM space, and a sizable market to support non-QM lending has not yet emerged.
161

As noted above, the Bureau acknowledges that the recent economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic may further hinder the development of the non-QM market, at least in the near term. As noted in the proposal, the Bureau expects that a significant number of Temporary GSE QMs would not qualify as General QMs under the current rule after the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires, either because they have DTI ratios above 43 percent or because their method of documenting and verifying income or debt is incompatible with appendix Q. Some alternative loan options would still be available to many consumers after the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The proposal, however, emphasized the Bureau's expectation that, with respect to loans that are currently Temporary GSE QMs and would not otherwise qualify as General QMs under the current definition, some would cost materially more for consumers and some would not be made at all.

161

Id.
at 198.

Based on 2018 data, the Bureau estimated in the proposal that, as a result of the General QM loan definition's 43 percent DTI limit, approximately 957,000 loans—16 percent of all closed-end first-lien residential mortgage originations in 2018—would be affected by the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition.
162

These loans are currently originated as QMs due to the Temporary GSE QM loan definition but would not be originated under the current General QM loan definition, and might not be originated at all, if the Temporary GSE QM loan definition were to expire. An additional, smaller number of loans that currently qualify as Temporary GSE QMs may not fall within the General QM loan definition after the expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition because the method used for verifying income or debt would not comply with appendix Q.
163

As explained in the Extension Final Rule, the Temporary GSE QM loan definition will expire on the mandatory compliance date of this final rule or when GSE conservatorship ends.

162
Proposed Rule's Dodd-Frank Act section 1022(b) analysis (citing the Bureau's prior estimate of affected loans in the ANPR);
see
84 FR 37155, 37159 (July 31, 2019).

163

Id.
at 37159 n.58.

As explained in the proposal, the Bureau believes that many loans currently originated under the Temporary GSE QM loan definition would cost materially more or may not be made at all, absent changes to the General QM loan definition. After the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires, the Bureau expects that many consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent who would have received a Temporary GSE QM would instead obtain FHA-insured loans since FHA currently insures loans with DTI ratios up to 57 percent.
164

The number of loans that move to FHA would depend on FHA's willingness and ability to insure such loans, whether FHA continues to treat all loans that it insures as QMs under its own QM rule, and how many loans that would have been originated as Temporary GSE QMs with DTI ratios above 43 percent exceed FHA's loan-amount limit.
165

For example, the Bureau estimated in the proposal that, in 2018, 11 percent of Temporary GSE QM loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent exceeded FHA's loan-amount limit.
166

Thus, the Bureau considers that at most 89 percent of loans that would have been Temporary GSE QMs with DTI ratios above 43 percent could move to FHA.
167

The Bureau expects that loans that would be originated as FHA loans instead of under the Temporary GSE QM loan definition generally would cost materially more for many consumers.
168

The Bureau expects that some consumers offered FHA loans might choose not to take out a mortgage because of these higher costs.

164
In fiscal year 2019, approximately 57 percent of FHA-insured purchase mortgages had a DTI ratio above 43 percent. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Annual Report to Congress Regarding the Financial Status of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, Fiscal Year 2019,
at 33 (using data from App. B Tbl. B9) (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Housing/documents/2019FHAAnnualReportMMIFund.pdf.

165
84 FR 37155, 37159 (July 31, 2019).

166

Id.
In 2018, FHA's county-level maximum loan limits ranged from $294,515 to $679,650 in the continental United States.
See
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
FHA Mortgage Limits, https://entp.hud.gov/idapp/html/hicostlook.cfm
(last visited Dec. 8, 2020).

167
84 FR 37155, 37159 (July 31, 2019).

168
Interest rates and insurance premiums on FHA loans generally feature less risk-based pricing than conventional loans, charging more similar rates and premiums to all consumers. As a result, they are likely to cost more than conventional loans for consumers with stronger credit scores and larger down payments. Consistent with this pricing differential, consumers with higher credit scores and larger down payments chose FHA loans relatively rarely in 2018 HMDA data on mortgage originations.
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Introducing New and Revised Data Points in HMDA
(Aug. 2019),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_new-revised-data-points-in-hmda_report.pdf.

The proposal explained that it is also possible that some consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent would be able to obtain loans in the private market.
169

The number of loans absorbed by the private market would likely depend, in part, on whether actors in the private market would be willing to assume the legal or credit risk associated with funding loans—as non-QM loans or small-creditor portfolio QMs—that would have been Temporary GSE QMs (with DTI ratios above 43 percent)
170

and, if so, whether actors in the private market would offer lower prices or better terms.
171

For example, the Bureau estimated that 55 percent of loans that would have been Temporary GSE QMs (with DTI ratios above 43 percent) in 2018 had credit scores at or above 680 and LTV ratios at or below 80 percent—credit characteristics traditionally considered attractive to actors in the private market.
172

At the same time, the Assessment Report found there has been limited momentum toward a greater role for private market non-QM loans. It is uncertain how great this role will be in the future,
173

particularly in the short term due to the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the proposal noted that some consumers

with DTI ratios above 43 percent who would have sought Temporary GSE QM loans may adapt to changing options and make different choices, such as adjusting their borrowing to result in a lower DTI ratio.
174

However, some consumers who would have sought Temporary GSE QMs (with DTI ratios above 43 percent) may not obtain loans at all.
175

For example, based on application-level data obtained from nine large lenders, the Assessment Report found that the January 2013 Final Rule eliminated between 63 and 70 percent of non-GSE-eligible home purchase loans with DTI ratios above 43 percent.
176

169
84 FR 37155, 37159 (July 31, 2019).

170

See
12 CFR 1026.43(e)(5) (extending QM status to certain portfolio loans originated by certain small creditors). In addition, section 101 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018), amended TILA to add a safe harbor for small creditor portfolio loans.
See
15 U.S.C. 1639c(b)(2)(F).

171
84 FR 37155, 37159 (July 31, 2019).

172

Id.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

See
Assessment Report,
supra
note 63, at 10-11, 117, 131-47.

As noted in the proposal, the Bureau also has particular concerns about the effects of the appendix Q definitions of debt and income on access to credit. The Bureau intended for appendix Q to provide creditors with certainty about the DTI ratio calculation to foster compliance with the General QM loan definition. However, based on extensive stakeholder feedback and the Bureau's own experience, the proposal recognized that appendix Q's definitions of debt and income are rigid and difficult to apply and do not provide the level of compliance certainty that the Bureau anticipated. Stakeholders have reported that these concerns are particularly acute for transactions involving self-employed consumers, consumers with part-time employment, and consumers with irregular or unusual income streams. The proposal expressed concern that the standards in appendix Q could negatively impact access to credit for these consumers, particularly after expiration of the Temporary GSE QM loan definition. The Assessment Report also noted concerns with the perceived lack of clarity in appendix Q and found that such concerns “may have contributed to investors'—and at least derivatively, creditors'—preference” for Temporary GSE QMs.
177

Appendix Q, unlike other standards for calculating and verifying debt and income, has not been revised since 2013.
178

The current definitions of debt and income in appendix Q have proven to be complex in practice. In the proposal, the Bureau expressed concerns about other potential approaches to defining debt and income in connection with conditioning QM status on a specific DTI limit.

177

Id.
at 193.

178

Id.
at 193-94.

The current approach to DTI ratios under the General QM loan definition may also stifle innovation in underwriting because it focuses on a single metric, with strict verification standards under appendix Q, which may constrain new approaches to assessing repayment ability. Such innovations include certain new uses of cash flow data and analytics to underwrite mortgage applicants. This emerging technology has the potential to accurately assess consumers' ability to repay using, for example, bank account data that can identify the source and frequency of recurring deposits and payments and identify remaining disposable income. Identifying the remaining disposable income could be a method of assessing the sufficiency of a consumer's residual income and could potentially satisfy a requirement to consider either DTI or residual income. This innovation could potentially expand access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit, particularly for applicants with non-traditional income and limited credit history. The proposal expressed concern that the potential negative effect of the current General QM loan definition on innovation in underwriting may be heightened while the market is largely concentrated in the QM lending space and may limit access to credit for some consumers with DTI ratios above 43 percent.

2. The Proposed Price-Based General QM Loan Definition

In light of these concerns, the Bureau proposed to remove the 43 percent DTI limit from the General QM loan definition in § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi) and replace it with a requirement based on the price of the loan. In issuing the proposal, the Bureau acknowledged the significant debate
179

over whether loan pricing, a consumer's DTI ratio, or another direct or indirect measure of a consumer's personal finances is a better predictor of loan performance, particularly when analyzed across various points in the economic cycle. In seeking comments on the proposal, the Bureau noted that it was not making a determination as to whether DTI ratios, a loan's price, or some other measure is the best predictor of loan performance. Rather, the analyses provided by stakeholders and the Bureau's own analysis show that pricing is strongly correlated with loan performance, based on early delinquency rates, across a variety of loans and economic conditions. The Bureau acknowledged that DTI is also predictive of loan performance and that other direct and indirect measures of consumer finances may also be predictive of loan performance. However, the Bureau weighed several policy considerations in selecting an approach for the proposal based on the purposes of the ATR/QM provisions of TILA.

179

See, e.g.,
Norbert Michel,
The Best Housing Finance Reform Options for the Trump Administration,
Forbes (July 15, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2019/07/15/the-best-housing-finance-reform-options-for-the-trump-administration/#4f5640de7d3f;
Eric Kaplan
et al.,
Milken Institute,
A Blueprint for Administrative Reform of the Housing Finance System,
at 17 (2019),
https://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/Blueprint-Admin-Reform-HF-System-1.7.2019-v2.pdf
(suggesting that the Bureau both (1) expand the 43 percent DTI limit to 45 percent to move market share of higher-DTI loans from the GSEs and FHA to the non-agency market, and (2) establish a residual income test to protect against the risk of higher DTI loans); Morris Davis
et al., A Quarter Century of Mortgage Risk
(FHFA, Working Paper 19-02, 2019),
https://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Research/Pages/wp1902.aspx
(examining various loan characteristics and a summary measure of risk—the stressed default rate—for predictiveness of loan performance).

In proposing a price-based General QM loan definition, the Bureau sought to balance considerations related to ensuring consumers' ability to repay and maintaining access to credit. As noted in the proposal, the Bureau views the relevant provisions of TILA as fundamentally about assuring that consumers receive mortgage credit that they can repay. However, the Bureau also stated its concern about maintaining access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit. The proposal noted the Bureau's concern that the current General QM loan definition, with a 43 percent DTI limit, would result in a significant reduction in the scope of the QM market and could reduce access to responsible, affordable mortgage credit after the Temporary GSE QM loan definition expires. The lack of a robust non-QM market enhances those concerns. Although it remains possible that, over time, a substantial market for non-QM loans will emerge, that market has developed slowly, and the recent economic disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic may significantly hinder its development, at least in the near term.

With respect to ability to repay, the proposal focused on analysis of early delinquency rates to evaluate whether a loan's price, as measured by the spread of APR over APOR (herein referred to as the loan's rate spread), is an appropriate measure of whether a loan should be presumed to comply with the ATR provisions. The proposal noted that, because the affordability of a given mortgage will vary from consumer to

consumer based upon a range of factors, there is no single recognized metric, or set of metrics, that can directly measure whether the terms of mortgage loans are reasonably within consumers' ability to repay. As such, consistent with the Bureau's prior analyses in the Assessment Report, the Bureau's analysis in the proposal used early distress as a proxy for the lack of the consumer's ability to repay at consummation across a wide pool of loans. Specifically, and consistent with the Assessment Report,
180

the proposal measured early distress as whether a consumer was ever 60 or more days past due within the first two years after origination (referred to herein as the early delinquency rate). The Bureau's analysis focused on early delinquency rates to capture consumers' difficulties in making payments soon after consummation of the loan (
i.e.,
within the first two years), even if these delinquencies do not lead to consumers potentially losing their homes (
i.e.,
60 or more days past due, as opposed to 90 or more days or in foreclosure), as early difficulties in making payments indicate a higher likelihood that the consumer may have lacked ability to repay at consummation. As in the Assessment Report, the Bureau assumed that the average early delinquency rate across a wide pool of mortgages—whether safe harbor QM, rebuttable presumption QM, or non-QM—is probative of whether such loans are reasonably within consumers' repayment ability. The Bureau acknowledged that alternative measures of delinquency, including those used in analyses submitted as comments on the ANPR, may also be probative of repayment ability.

180

See
Assessment Report,
supra
note 63, at 83.

In issuing the proposal, the Bureau reviewed available evidence to assess whether rate spreads can distinguish loans that are likely to have low early delinquency rates, and thus may be presumed to comply with the ATR requirements, from loans that are likely to have higher rates of early delinquency, for which a presumption of compliance with the ATR requirements would not be warranted. The proposal stated that the Bureau's own analysis and analyses published in response to the Bureau's ANPR and RFIs provide strong evidence of increasing early delinquency rates with higher rate spreads across a range of datasets, time periods, loan types, measures of rate spread, and measures of delinquency. The Bureau's delinquency analysis used data from the National Mortgage Database (NMDB),
181

including a matched sample of NMDB and HMDA loans.
182

As noted in the proposal, the analysis shows that delinquency rates rise with rate spread. The Bureau's delinquency analysis is described below. Table numbers in part V match those from the Bureau's proposal, except that Tables 7A and 8A in part V.B.5, below, did not appear in the proposal.

181
The NMDB, jointly developed by the FHFA and the Bureau, provides de-identified loan characteristics and performance information for a 5 percent sample of all mortgage originations from 1998 to the present, supplemented by de-identified loan and borrower characteristics from Federal administrative sources and credit reporting data.
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Sources and Uses of Data at the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,
at 55-56 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/6850/bcfp_sources-uses-of-data.pdf.

182
HMDA was originally enacted by Congress in 1975 and is implemented by Regulation C, 12 CFR part 1003.
See
Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot.,
Mortgage data (HMDA), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/hmda/
(last visited Dec. 8, 2020). HMDA requires many financial institutions to maintain, report, and publicly disclose loan-level information about mortgages. These data are housed here to help show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of their communities; they give public officials information that helps them make decisions and policies; and they shed light on lending patterns that could be discriminatory. The public data are modified to protect applicant and borrower privacy.

Table 1 shows early delinquency rates for 2002-2008 first-lien purchase originations in the NMDB, with loans categorized according to their approximate rate spread. The Bureau analyzed 2002 through 2008 origination years because the relatively fixed private mortgage insurance (PMI) pricing during these years allows for reliable approximation of this important component of rate spreads.
183

The sample is restricted to loans without product features that would make them non-QM loans under the current rule. Table 1 shows that early delinquency rates increase consistently with rate spreads, from a low of 2 percent among loans with rate spreads below or near zero, up to 14 percent for loans with rate spreads of 2.25 percentage points or more over APOR.
184

This sample includes loans originated during the peak of the housing boom and delinquencies that occurred during the ensuing recession, contributing to the high overall levels of early delinquency.

183

See
Neil Bhutta and Benjamin J. Keys,
Eyes Wide Shut? The Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers during the Housing Boom,
(NBER Working Paper No. 24844, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24844.pdf.
APOR is approximated with weekly Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) data, retrieved from Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Fed. Reserve Econ. Data,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
(Mar. 4, 2020). Each loan's APR is approximated by the sum of the interest rate in the NMDB data and an assumed PMI payment of 0.32, 0.52, or 0.78 percentage points for loans with LTVs above 80 but at or below 85, above 85 but at or below 90, and above 90, respectively. These PMI are based on standard industry rates during this time period. The 30-year Fixed Rate PMMS average is used for fixed-rate loans with terms over 15 years, and 15-year Fixed Rate PMMS is used for loans with terms of 15 years or less. The 5/1-year Adjustable-Rate PMMS average is used (for available years) for ARMs with a first interest rate reset occurring 5 or more years after origination, while the 1-year adjustable-rate PMMS average is used for all other ARMs.

184
Loans with rate spreads of 2.25 percentage points or more are grouped in Tables 1 and 5 to ensure sufficient sample size for reliable analysis of the 2002-2008 data. This grouping ensures that all cells shown in Table 5 contain at least 500 loans.

Table 1—2002-2008 Originations, Early Delinquency Rate by Rate Spread

Rate spread
(interest rate + PMI

approximation−PMMS
185
)

in percentage points

Early
delinquency rate
(%)

<0
2

0-0.24
2

0.25-0.49
4

0.50-0.74
5

0.75-0.99
6

1.00-1.24
8

1.25-1.49
10

1.50-1.74
12

1.75-1.99
13

2.00-2.24
14

2.25 and above
14

The proposal noted

that analysis of additional data, as reflected in Table 2, also shows early delinquency rates rising with rate spread. Table 2 shows early delinquency statistics for 2018 NMDB first-lien purchase originations that have been matched to 2018 HMDA data, enabling the Bureau to use actual rate spreads over APOR rather than approximated rate spreads in its analysis.
186

As with the data reflected in Table 1, loans with product features that would make them non-QM under the current rule are excluded from Table 2. However, only delinquencies occurring through December 2019 are observed in Table 2, meaning most loans are not observed for a full two years after origination. This more recent sample provides insight into early delinquency rates under post-crisis lending standards, and for an origination cohort that had not undergone (as of December 2019) a large economic downturn. The 2018 data are divided into wider bins (as compared to Table 1) to ensure

enough loans per bin. As with Table 1, the proposal noted that Table 2 shows that early delinquency rates increase consistently with rate spreads, from a low of 0.2 percent for loans with rate spreads near APOR or below APOR, up to 4.2 percent for loans with rate spreads of 2 percentage points or more over APOR.
187

185
Freddie Mac's PMMS is the source of data underlying APOR for most mortgages. See
supra
note 183 for additional details.

186
Where possible, the FHFA provided an anonymized match of HMDA loan identifiers for 2018 NMDB originations, allowing the Bureau to analyze more detailed HMDA loan characteristics (
e.g.,
rate spread over APOR) for approximately half of 2018 NMDB originations.

187
Loans with rate spreads of 2 percentage points or more are grouped in Tables 2 and 6 to ensure sufficient sample size for reliable analysis of the 2018 data. This grouping ensures that all cells shown in Table 6 contain at least 500 loans.

Table 2—2018 Originations, Early Delinquency Rate by Rate Spread

Rate spread over APOR in percentage points

Early
delinquency rate
(as of Dec. 2019)
(%)

<0
0.2

0-0.49
0.2

0.50-0.99
0.6

1.00-1.49
1.7

1.50-1.99
2.7

2.00 and above
4.2

Given the specific DTI limit under the current rule, the Bureau also analyzed the relationship between DTI ratios and early delinquency for the same samples of loans in Tables 3 and 4. As described in the proposal, the Bureau's analyses show that early delinquency rates increase consistently with DTI ratio in both samples. In the 2002-2008 sample, early delinquency rates increase from a low of 3 percent among loans with DTI ratios at or below 25 percent, up to 9 percent for loans with DTI ratios between 61 and 70 percent.
188

In the 2018 sample, early delinquency rates increase from 0.4 percent among loans with DTI ratios at or below 25 percent, up to 0.9 percent among loans with DTI ratios between 44 and 50.
189

The difference in early delinquency rates between loans with the highest and lowest DTI ratios is smaller than the difference in early delinquency rates between the highest and lowest rate spreads during both periods. The proposal explained that, for these samples and bins of rate spread and DTI ratios, this pattern is consistent with a stronger correlation between rate spread and early delinquency than between DTI ratios and early delinquency.

188
Fewer than 0.7 percent of loans have reported DTI ratios over 70 percent in the 2002-2008 data. These loans are excluded from Tables 3 and 5 due to reliability concerns (including outliers which may reflect reporting errors) and to ensure that all cells shown in Table 5 contain at least 500 loans.

189
Fewer than 0.5 percent of loans have reported DTI ratios over 50 percent in the 2018 data. These loans are excluded from Tables 4 and 6 due to reliability concerns (including outliers which may reflect reporting errors) and to ensure that all cells shown in Table 6 contain at least 500 loans.

Table 3—2002-2008 Originations, Early Delinquency Rate by DTI Ratio

DTI

Early
delinquency rate
(%)

0-20
3

21-25
3

26-30
4

31-35
5

36-40
6

41-43
6

44-45
7

46-48
7

49-50
8

51-60
8

61-70
9

Table 4—2018 Originations, Early Delinquency Rate by DTI

DTI

Early
delinquency rate
(as of Dec. 2019)
(%)

0-25
0.4

26-35
0.5

36-43
0.7

44-48
0.9

49-50
0.9

The proposal further analyzed the strengths of DTI ratios and pricing in predicting early delinquency rates in Tables 5 and 6, which show the early delinquency rates of these same samples categorized according to both their DTI ratios and their rate spreads. Table 5 shows early delinquency rates for 2002-2008 first-lien purchase originations in the NMDB, with loans categorized according to both their DTI ratio and their approximate rate spread. For loans within a given DTI ratio range, those with higher rate spreads consistently had higher early delinquency rates. Loans with low rate spreads had relatively low early delinquency rates even at high DTI ratio levels, as seen in the 2 percent early delinquency rate for loans priced below APOR but with DTI ratios of 46 to 48 percent, 51 to 60 percent, and 61 to 70 percent. However, the highest early delinquency rates occurred for loans with high rate spreads and high DTI ratios, reaching 26 percent for loans priced 2 to 2.24 percentage points above APOR with DTI ratios of 61 to 70 percent. Across DTI bins, loans priced significantly above APOR had early delinquency rates much higher than loans priced below APOR.

Table 5—2002-2008 Originations, Early Delinquency Rate by Rate Spread and DTI Ratio

Rate spread (interest rate + PMI approx.−PMMS) in percentage points

DTI
0-20 (%)

DTI 21-25 (%)
DTI 26-30 (%)
DTI 31-35 (%)
DTI 36-40 (%)
DTI 41-43 (%)
DTI 44-45 (%)
DTI 46-48 (%)

DTI
49-50 (%)

DTI 51-60 (%)
DTI 61-70 (%)

<0
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
2

0-0.24
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3

0.25-0.49
3
3
3
3
4
5
4
5
5
5
5

0.50-0.74
4
4
4
4
5
6
6
6
7
7
7

0.75-0.99
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
7
8
8
10

1.00-1.24
6
6
6
7
7
9
9
9
10
11
13

1.25-1.49
6
7
8
8
10
11
12
12
12
14
15

1.50-1.74
7
8
9
10
13
13
15
14
16
15
20

1.75-1.99
7
8
10
12
14
15
16
16
16
18
22

2.00-2.24
6
10
10
12
15
15
17
19
18
20
26

2.25 and above
7
9
10
13
15
16
16
18
19
20
25

Similarly, Table 6 shows average early delinquency statistics, with loans categorized according to both DTI and rate spread, for the sample of 2018 NMDB first-lien purchase originations that have been matched to 2018 HMDA data.
190

For Table 6, the higher early delinquency rate for loans with higher rate spreads over APOR matches the pattern shown in the data from Table 5. Overall early delinquency rates are substantially lower, reflecting the importance of

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2020-27567. Public record. Not legal advice.
