# Rights-of-Way on Indian Land > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2015-28548 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** November 19, 2015 - **Citation:** 80 FR 72492 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Indian Affairs 25 CFR Part 169 [156A2100DD/AAKC001030/A0A501010.999900 253G] RIN 1076-AF20 Rights-of-Way on Indian Land AGENCY: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Interior. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: This final rule comprehensively updates and streamlines the process for obtaining Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) grants of rights-of-way on Indian land, while supporting tribal self-determination and self-governance. This final rule further implements the policy decisions and approaches established in the leasing regulations, which BIA finalized in December 2012, by applying them to the rights-of-way context where applicable. The rule also applies to BIA land. DATES: This rule is effective on December 21, 2015. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth Appel, Director, Office of Regulatory Affairs & Collaborative Action, (202) 273-4680; elizabeth.appel@bia.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Executive Summary of Rule The Department of the Interior (Department) published a proposed rule in the Federal Register to comprehensively update and streamline the process for obtaining BIA grants of rights-of-way on Indian land (individually owned Indian land and/or tribal land) and BIA land (tracts owned and administered by BIA) on June 17, 2014 (79 FR 34455) with a comment deadline of August 18, 2014. The Department then extended the comment deadline to October 2, 2014, then to November 3, 2014, and finally to November 28, 2014. See 79 FR 47402, 60794, and 65360. The current regulations were promulgated in 1968, and last updated in 1980. In December 2012, the Department issued final regulations comprehensively reforming residential, business, and wind and solar leasing on Indian land and streamlining the leasing process. Given the supportive response to the leasing regulatory revisions, we are updating 25 CFR part 169 (Rights-of-Way) to mirror those revisions to the extent applicable in the rights-of-way context and otherwise modernize requirements for obtaining a right-of-way over or across Indian land and BIA land. The final rule reflects additional changes made in response to comments received during the public comment period. Highlights of this final rule include: • Simplifying requirements by relying on general statutory authority to grant rights-of-way and eliminating outdated requirements that apply to specific types of rights-of-way; • Clarifying processes for BIA review of right-of-way documents; • Streamlining the process for obtaining a right-of-way on Indian land by: ○ Eliminating the need to obtain BIA consent for surveying in preparation for applying for a right-of-way; ○ Establishing timelines for BIA review of rights-of-way requests; • Adding certainty to applicants by allowing BIA disapproval only where there is a stated compelling reason; • Providing Indian landowners with notice of actions affecting their land; • Deferring to individual Indian landowner decisions subject to an analysis of whether the decision is in their best interest; • Promoting tribal self-determination and self-governance by providing greater deference to Tribes on decisions affecting tribal land; • Clarifying tribal jurisdiction over lands subject to a right-of-way; and • Incorporating tribal land policies in processing a request for a right-of-way. The general approach to the final rule is to provide a uniform system for granting rights-of-way over Indian land by relying primarily on a single statutory authority, 25 U.S.C. 323-328, and to allow Indian landowners as much flexibility and control as possible over rights-of-way on their land. The rule requires that owners of a majority of the interests in a tract must consent to the right-of-way, in accordance with the statutory requirement in 25 U.S.C. 324, and specifies that tribes and individual Indian landowners may negotiate the terms of their consent, which ultimately become the terms of the grant. The rule clarifies that landowners may negotiate the terms to ensure the right-of-way is best suited to their needs. Landowners currently have this option, but are often presented with a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer by the potential grantee, and fail to negotiate. To provide efficiencies in standardization, the Department will develop a template grant form with placeholders for conditions and restrictions agreed to by landowners. The rule also affords landowners as much notice as possible regarding rights-of-way on their land, giving tribes and individual Indian landowners actual notice (as opposed to constructive notice) of every right-of-way affecting their land, including any land in which the tribe owns a fractional interest. The rule addresses tribally owned land differently than individually owned land because, although the U.S. has a trust responsibility to all beneficial owners, it has a government-to-government relationship with tribes and seeks to promote tribal self-governance. The final rule also provides tribes with as much deference as possible, within the bounds of the Department's trust responsibilities, to determine which rights-of-way to grant, for how much compensation, and with identified enforcement provisions. The rule also provides that the BIA will defer to individual Indian landowners in their determinations, to the extent it is possible to coordinate with multiple individual Indian landowners. Consistent with 25 U.S.C. 325, the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes and individual Indians, and deference to tribal sovereignty, the final rule requires that the compensation granted to Indian landowners is just. The final rule does not establish any ceiling on compensation; to do so would unduly restrict landowners' ability to get the maximum compensation for their land interest. The Department's role is to ensure that the compensation is “just” for the Indian landowners. Together, these revisions modernize the rights-of-way approval process while better supporting Tribal self-determination. This rule also updates the regulations to be in a question-and-answer format, in compliance with “plain language” requirements. II. Response to Comments The Department published a proposed rule with the above revisions on June 17, 2014. See 79 FR 34455. The Department extended the initial public comment deadline of August 18, 2014 to October 2, 2014, then November 3, 2014, and finally to November 28, 2014. See 79 FR 47402 (August 13, 2014), 79 FR 60794 (October 8, 2014); and 79 FR 65360 (November 4, 2014). We received 176 written comment submissions prior to the final deadline of November 28, 2014. Of these, 70 were from Indian tribes, 19 were from tribal associations and tribal members, 7 were from State government entities, and 5 were from county or city government entities. These submissions also included significant input from the energy sector, including 15 from electric cooperatives, and 25 from gas and oil companies and associations, pipeline companies, and power and water utilities combined. We also received 3 written submissions from telecommunications companies and 2 from railroad companies. In addition, we reviewed comments at tribal consultation sessions held in Bismarck, North Dakota; Phoenix, Arizona; Atlanta, Georgia; and by teleconference. The following is a summary of the substantive comments we received and our responses. The designation “PR” refers to the section from the proposed rule; the designation “FR” refers to the designation in the final rule. Table of Contents for Response to Comments A. General B. Subpart A—General Provisions 1. Purpose of Regulations (PR 169.001) 2. Definitions (PR 169.002) & Applicability (PR 169.003(a)) 3. Life Estates (PR 169.003(b)/FR 169.109, FR 169.112, FR 169.121, FR 169.122, FR 169.415) a. Life Estates—Protection of Land b. Life Estates—Consent c. Termination of Life Estates d. Life Estates—Other Comments 4. When a Right-of-Way Is Needed (PR 169.004) 5. Types of Uses for Rights-of-Way (PR 169.005) 6. Applicability to Existing Rights-of-Way and Applications (PR 169.006/FR 169.7) 7. Administration of Regulations by Tribes on BIA's Behalf (PR 169.007/FR 169.8) 8. Laws Applicable to Rights-of-Way Approved Under These Regulations (PR 169.008/FR 169.9) a. State Jurisdiction/State Law b. Tribal Law c. Tribal Jurisdiction 9. Taxes Applicable to Rights-of-Way Approved Under These Regulations (PR 169.009/FR 169.11) 10. Notice of Rights-of-Way (PR 169.010/FR 169.12) 11. Appeals of Right-of-Way Decisions (PR 169.011/FR 169.13) C. Subpart B—Obtaining Right of Way 1. Consent a. Consent To Survey b. “So Numerous” c. Non-Consenting Tribe (PR 169.107(d)) d. Who Is Authorized To Consent (PR 169.108/FR 169.108) 2. Compensation a. Compensation—Electric Cooperatives and Utilities b. Compensation/Fair Market Value for Rights-of-Way (PR 169.109/FR 169.110, PR 169.111/FR 169.112) c. Different Compensation Approaches for Tribal Land Than for Individually Owned Indian Land d. Valuation (PR 169.111/FR 169.114) e. Who Conducts Valuation f. Method of Valuation g. Alternative Compensation h. Compensation for Renewals 3. Payment (PR 169.112/FR 169.115) 4. Direct Pay (PR 169.113/FR 169.116) 5. Method of Payment (PR 169.114/FR 169.117) 6. Non-Monetary and Varying Types of Compensation (PR 169.115/FR 169.118) 7. Issuance of Invoices (PR 169.116/FR 169.119) 8. Compensation Reviews or Adjustments (PR 169.117/FR 169.111 and FR 169.113) 9. Other Payments Required (PR 169.118/FR 169.120) 10. Condemnation 11. Process for Grant of Right-of-Way a. Deadlines for BIA Decisions b. Process for Granting Right-of-Way (PR 169.119/FR 169.123) c. BIA Decision To Grant a Right-of-Way (PR 169.120/FR 169.124) d. Contents of the Grant (PR 169.121/FR 169.125) e. Preference for Employment of Tribal Members 12. Process for Rights of Way Applications Within or Overlapping Existing Rights of Way, or “Piggybacking” (PR 169.123/FR 169.127, 169.128) 13. Location in Application and Grant Differ From Construction Location (PR 169.124/FR 169.129) 14. Bonding (PR 169.103/FR 169.103) Subpart C—Terms, Renewals, Amendments, Assignments, Mortgages 1. Term (Duration) 2. Holdovers 3. Renewals (PR 169.201-169.202/FR 169.202) 4. Multiple Renewals (PR 169.203/FR 169.203) 5. Amendments 6. Assignments 7. Mortgages Subpart D—Effectiveness 1. Appeal Rights 2. Compelling BIA Action (PR 169.304/FR 169.304) 3. Appeal Bond Subpart E—Compliance and Enforcement 1. Abandonment 2. Negotiated Remedies (PR 169.403/FR 169.403) 3. BIA Enforcement (PR 169.404-169.405/FR 169.404-169.405) 4. Late Payment Charges (PR 169.407/FR 169.407) 5. Cancellation for Non-Use or Abandonment (PR 169.408/FR 169.408) 6. BIA Enforcement Against Holdovers (PR 169.410/FR 169.410) 7. Trespass (PR 169.412/FR 169.413) Subpart F—Service Line Agreements ((PR Subpart F (169.501-169.504)/Final Subpart B (169.51-169.57)) A. General Comment: Several commenters, such as the Northern Natural Gas Company, stated that the rule would have the opposite effect of streamlining the right-of-way process, creating a slower, less efficient, and “in many ways unfair” right-of-way process because they provide parties with the opportunity to negotiate with each other, which will slow the issuance of rights-of-way, particularly on individual Indian tracts. One energy company commenter stated that the right-of-way process is burdensome and often takes years to complete before it can provide service to the customer, but that the proposed rule offers a middle ground that accommodates tribal consent and allows utilities to provide service to customers in a timely manner. At least one commenter stated that the rule bolsters tribal self-governance by allowing tribes to dictate the extent of rights-of-way. Response: Although negotiations between the parties may slow down the process of obtaining landowner consent by giving the parties time to negotiate, this clarification is necessary to promote Indian landowner control over their trust or restricted land, and allows ordinary market forces to work. To provide efficiencies in standardization, BIA will develop a template grant form that provides flexibility by incorporating conditions and restrictions agreed to by landowners. Comment: Several commented on the proposed rule's statement that BIA will rely on the broad authority under the 1948 Act, rather than the limited authorities under specific statutes. Some commenters pointed out that Congress did not repeal, override, supersede, or alter the other statutes and that the specific statutory authorities and requirements are still applicable to the Department. One commenter stated that the 1948 Act was intended as “cleanup legislation” to address Indian land not already covered by the “hodge podge of statutes” and that the 1948 Act affirmed the earlier statutes by filling gaps in coverage by the other statutes. Several tribal commenters strongly supported consolidating approval of all rights-of-way in a single location under 25 U.S.C. 323-328, noting that the process of approving different types of rights-of-way under different authorities and standards was antiquated and increased the burden on tribes to manage rights-of-way. Response: The final rule consolidates approval of all types of rights-of-way across Indian land under one set of regulations, implementing the general statutory authority at 25 U.S.C. 323-328, just as was proposed. The Department is not attempting to repeal any limited authorities under specific statutes; rather, it is making the policy decision to review and approve rights-of-way under the 1948 Act (25 U.S.C. 323-328). The 1948 Act offers maximum flexibility in rights-of-way, whereas the limited authorities under specific statutes impose various non-uniform restrictions. Legislative history indicates that Congress intended a transition from grants under the specific statutory provisions to a uniform system based on 25 U.S.C. 323-328. See Senate Report No. 823 (80th Congress, 2d session) (Jan. 14, 1948), p. 4. The intent of Congress in enacting the broader 1948 statute, while leaving the others in place, was to afford tribes and the Department a choice and the Department does not exceed its authority by enacting regulations choosing one statutory scheme over the other. Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. Mont. 1988). The rule also lists the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), as amended by the American Indian Probate Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. 2201 et seq., as statutory authority because the rule relies on this statute as supplemental authority. Given the intent of Congress in the 1948 Act to facilitate right-of-way transactions, and the intent behind ILCA not to disturb specific standards for the percentage of ownership interest that must approve an agreement, we continue to apply the percentage requirements of the 1948 Act ( i.e., consent of a majority of interests) rather than the “sliding scale” consent requirements of 25 U.S.C. 2218 (which may require consent of owners of more than a majority interest, for example where there are five or fewer owners of the tract). See Senate Report No. 823 (80th Congress, 2d session) (Jan. 14, 1948), p. 4; 25 U.S.C. 2218(f). Comment: A commenter suggested including in the final rule the industry-specific standards and guidelines for oil and gas pipelines that have been in place for decades, at current section 169.25(f). Response: The final rule provides landowners and grantees the freedom to negotiate for whatever standards and guidelines are appropriate for incorporating into the right-of-way grant. The final rule does not prevent a grantee from following the industry-specific guidelines and standards for oil and gas pipelines. Comment: Several commenters pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Strate as establishing that a grant of right-of-way essentially transforms Indian land into fee land. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1997). Specifically, these commenters stated that when a landowner grants a right-of-way, they reserve no right to the exclusive dominion or control over the right-of-way, and the land underlying the right-of-way is removed from tribal jurisdiction. These commenters asserted that the Strate holding means there can be no “seamless consistency” between the right-of-way regulations and leasing regulations, because this precedent treats land subject to a right-of-way differently from leased land. Response: The circumstances in Strate are limited to the facts presented in that case. In Strate, neither the Federal Government nor the tribe expressly reserved jurisdiction over the land in the grant of the right-of-way. 520 U.S. at 455. This lack of reservation of a “gatekeeping right” led the Supreme Court to consider the right-of-way as aligned, for purposes of jurisdiction, with land alienated to non-Indians. Id. In these regulations, as grantor, the United States is preserving the tribes' jurisdictions in all right-of-way grants issued under these regulations and is requiring that such grants expressly reserve tribal jurisdiction. Therefore, grants of rights-of-way under these regulations, consistent with the Court's reasoning in Strate, would not be equivalent to fee land, but would retain the jurisdictional status of the underlying land. Comment: A few commenters stated that the regulation is a violation of the trust responsibility, claiming it subjects individual Indian landowners to an additional layer of bureaucracy without protections for Indian land rights. Response: The regulations retain protections for Indian land rights and promote landowners' control over and notification of rights-of-way over and across their land. Landowners are free to negotiate for terms acceptable to them in negotiating with right-of-way applicants, subject to BIA review and approval, as required by statute. Comment: Several commenters, including both tribal and industry representatives, submitted petitions and comments calling on BIA to cancel the rulemaking and start over. Some suggested gathering a workgroup of tribes and allottees to rewrite the regulations. Several tribal commenters requested additional consultation and others requested additional opportunity for public input. A few tribal commenters supported the regulatory efforts to add transparency and certainty to the right-of-way process. Response: The Department complied with the applicable Administrative Procedure Act requirements for public notice and comment and consulted with tribes in updating these regulations, consistent with the Executive Orders and Departmental policy on consultation with tribes. Both public and tribal input on the proposed rule was robust, touching upon nearly every section of the proposed rule. The Department considered each comment in drafting the final rule and has incorporated suggested changes, balancing the Department's trust responsibility to landowners, support for tribal self-determination and self-governance, and promotion of productive use of Indian land. Comment: A tribe requested that the rule better reflect that the tribe has ongoing sovereign interests in right-of-way lands, through consenting to renewals, consenting to changes to the right-of-way document after it is granted, and investigating activities and conditions on the land and its improvements to determine compliance with tribal laws or with the terms and conditions of the right-of-way document. Response: The final rule includes a new section FR 169.010 to clarify that the grant of a right-of-way has no effect on tribal jurisdiction. In response to this comment, the final rule also includes a provision (FR 169.402(b)) recognizing the right of the tribe to investigate compliance with the grant, and imposes other tribal approval and notification requirements throughout the right-of-way process. B. Subpart A—General Provisions 1. Purpose of Regulations (PR 169.001) Comment: We received suggestions for several line edits to PR 169.001. One commenter requested we clarify that the rules govern how BIA will consider a request for a right-of-way, and another suggested we add a statement regarding the applicability of tribal law. Another commenter requested that PR 169.001(d) be clarified to state that the special acts of Congress authorizing rights-of-way without BIA's approval are only those specifically authorizing rights-of-way across tribal land, to preclude the assertion of a right under general Federal statutes to obtain or condemn a right-of-way without BIA approval. Response: We incorporated these suggestions. Comment: One commenter suggested adding a separate subsection on the “interplay and application of tribal law and policy.” Response: A separate subsection on tribal law is unnecessary because other sections of the rule address the applicability of tribal law; however, the final rule adds a sentence to § 169.001(a) to clarify that the regulation is intended to support tribal self-determination and self-governance by acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies in processing requests for rights-of-way across tribal lands. Comment: One tribal commenter stated that the proposed rule appeared to grant the Secretary authority to grant rights-of-way under the Federal Power Act without the tribe's consent. This commenter stated that the rule should clarify whether it applies to Federal Power Act power lines and apply only to those Federal power projects that produce electricity from hydroelectric generators. Another commenter stated that the regulations should cover rights-of-way for Federal Power Act transmission lines. Response: The proposed and final rules both include the same language as the current rule on the Federal Power Act. This is governed by statute, and the rule does not affect it. The regulations do not cover rights-of-way for Federal Power Act transmission lines, but do cover other transmission lines. 2. Definitions (PR 169.002) & Applicability (PR 169.003(a)) Comment—Several definitions' reference to “surface estate”: Several commenters suggested that definitions such as “Government land, “Indian land,” “individually owned Indian land,” and “tribal land” should include the subsurface estate, as well as the surface estate. Response: The definitions refer to the surface estate only because these regulations address only the surface estate and BIA distinguishes only between the surface estate and the mineral estate. The surface estate includes everything other than mineral estate, such that any buried lines or other infrastructure affect the surface estate and require a right-of-way. As such, the surface estate includes what some of the commenters are calling the “subsurface estate,” which includes the soil and any other non-mineral material below the surface. To address these comments, the final rule includes an introductory sentence in PR 169.002, clarifying that these definitions apply only for the purposes of rights-of-way regulations. Comment—“Abandonment”: A few commenters supported the definition of the term “abandonment” as helpful to distinguish relinquishment of a right-of-way through non-use versus affirmative relinquishment. One commenter asked whether the grantee must file a document to affirmatively relinquish the right-of-way. Another commenter suggested criteria for “abandonment in fact” to establish when the grantee relinquished the right-of-way without a formal declaration of relinquishment. A few commenters suggested that the definition be expanded to include not just affirmative relinquishment by the grantee, but to also include an act that shows the grantee gave up its rights and does not intend to return to exercise the rights. Response: The proposed rule and final rule, at § 169.408, provide that enforcement may occur for “non-use,” which is what the commenter calls “abandonment in fact,” and establish the criteria for the non-use. The final rule expands the definition of “abandonment” as requested to include acts by the grantee to allow BIA to imply abandonment based on an analysis of the circumstances. See FR 169.2. To affirmatively relinquish a right-of-way, the grantee need not necessarily file a document. Because the definition cannot enumerate all of the ways in which a grantee could communicate relinquishment, BIA will determine on a case-by-case basis whether affirmative relinquishment has occurred. Comment—“BIA”: One commenter suggested defining “BIA” to include the United States generally, to address an issue with an interagency agreement being recorded. Some commenters expressed confusion about defining “BIA” to include tribes that contract or compact to carry out BIA services, saying that it would appear to be an unlawful delegation of authority. Response: The final rule retains the proposed definition of “BIA.” The definition of “trust or restricted status” already establishes that the United States rather than BIA specifically holds title in trust or imposes restricted status. Tribes are statutorily authorized to carry out BIA realty services that are not inherently Federal functions, as long as certain procedures are followed. Comment—“Cancellation”: A few tribal commenters requested definitions for “cancellation” and “termination.” Response: The final rule adds these definitions. Comment—“Compensation” and “Market Value”: A few commenters suggested revising definitions for “compensation” and “market value” to impose a requirement that the Secretary determine the amount is “just” under 25 U.S.C. 325, regardless of whether the amount meets fair market value. Response: The final rule does not incorporate these suggested changes because detailed provisions for determining compensation are addressed elsewhere in the regulations. Comment—“Consent”: Several commenters requested a definition for “consent.” Response: The final rule adds a definition for this term that is consistent with the definition in the leasing regulations (25 CFR part 162). Comment—“Constructive Notice” and “Notice”: A few commenters requested a definition of “notice, notify and notification” to mean informing the parties by certified or registered mail or commercial mail service that tracks delivery or email. Other commenters suggested adding more specifications for constructive notice on how long and where the notice will be posted. Response: With regard to notice generally, and the allowable forms of notice, PR 169.010 and FR 169.12 address these issues. See the discussion of comments on that section, below, for information about the forms of notice. Constructive notice is required only for notification to landowners of certain enforcement actions BIA takes against the grantee, so no definition has been added. Comment—“Easement”: One commenter stated that the definition of “easement” should reflect that title remains vested in the owner. Response: The final rule clarifies that an easement is simply a right to use, but that title remains vested with the owner. Comment—“Eminent domain”: One commenter requested a definition for “eminent domain.” Response: The final rule does not include the term “eminent domain” or address eminent domain, so this definition was not added. Statutory authority exists in 25 U.S.C. 357 for condemnation under certain circumstances, but these regulations do not address or implement that authority. Comment—“Fractional interest”: One commenter suggested a revision to exclude application to tribal land. Response: No change to the rule is necessary. Tribal land includes land in which the tribe and others own fractional interests. Comment—“Government land”: Some commenters suggested narrowing the definition to refer to land administered by the BIA, rather than all Federal Government lands because other Federal agencies are responsible for granting rights-of-of way on lands under their statutory and regulatory jurisdictions. Response: The final rule changes the term from “Government land” to “BIA land” and specifies that the BIA owns and administers the land. Comment—“Grantee”: One commenter suggested including assignees in the definition of “grantee.” Response: The final rule clarifies that once an assignment becomes effective, the assignee becomes the grantee. Comment—“Immediate family”: A commenter stated that the definition of “immediate family” should track the definition in 25 CFR part 152. Response: The final rule's definition of “immediate family” tracks the definition in the leasing regulations, and consistent with our support for tribal self-determination and self-governance, defers to the definition of “immediate family” under applicable tribal law. Comment—“Indian land”: A few commenters stated that the definition should better track the definition of “tribal land” to address that Indian land may be owned by more than one tribe, more than one individual Indian, or a combination of both. One commenter requested clarification that “Indian land” does not include anything beyond individually owned Indian land and tribal land. Several commenters stated that “trust and restricted land” should be used instead, to eliminate the need to cross-reference multiple other defined terms ( i.e., “tribal land,” “individually owned Indian land,” “trust or restricted status”). One commenter stated that the definition appeared to also apply to land owned in fee. Response: The final rule incorporates the clarification that the land may be owned by multiple landowners and that “Indian land” includes only individually owned Indian land and tribal land. The final rule does not make any revision in response to the comment that the definition appears to apply to fee land, because the definition already states that it includes only land held in trust or restricted status. Comment—“Indian landowner”: A commenter stated that the definition should clarify that “an interest in Indian land” means a trust or restricted interest. One commenter suggested excluding from the definition anyone who has only a right from the tribe to use land and the tribe has reserved the right to consent to easements or rights-of-way. Response: The final rule does not revise the definition to refer to trust or restricted interests because it refers to “Indian land” which is defined to mean trust or restricted interests. The final rule does not exclude tribal land assignments from the definition of “Indian landowner,” but in a case in which a person has only a tribal land assignment, the tribe would still be considered the “Indian landowner” under this definition. Comment—“Indian tribe”: One commenter suggested that the definition of “Indian tribe” should include only tribes organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), in accordance with a strict reading of the statutory authority for rights-of-way on Indian land. This change would require the consent only of IRA tribes for any rights-of-way and not for non-IRA tribes. Response: The final rule does not narrow the definition of “Indian tribe” as suggested because BIA has consistently required consent from all tribes, in furtherance of tribal self-determination. Comment—“Indian”: Several commented on this definition. Some questioned including individuals who are “eligible to become a member of any Indian tribe.” At least one commented that the statutory definition discriminates against co-owners of allotments outside of California. Response: As a result of the American Indian Probate Reform Act amendments to the Indian Land Consolidation Act, the definition of “Indian” includes those who are “eligible to become a member of any Indian tribe.” Comment—“Individually owned Indian land”: A commenter suggested this definition should exclude tribal land assignments. Another commenter suggested revising the definition to clarify that the tract may be owned by multiple individuals. One commenter asked whether a tract in which both a tribe and an individual own interests would be considered “individually owned Indian land” or “tribal land.” Response: The definition of individually owned Indian land does not include tribal land assignments; no change is necessary. The final rule clarifies that individually owned Indian land may be owned by multiple individuals, as suggested. A tract in which both a tribe and an individual own interests would be considered “tribal land” for the purposes of requirements applicable to tribal land and would be considered “individually owned Indian land” for the purposes of the interests owned by individuals. Comment—“Legal Description”: One commenter stated that the definition should not refer to a portion of the document. Response: BIA has deleted this definition in response to the comment because “legal description” is a generally understood term. Comment—“Life estate”: One commenter suggested adding a definition for “life estate.” Response: The final rule defines “life estate” consistent with the leasing regulations. Comment—“Map of definite location”: One commenter suggested adding that the boundaries of each right-of-way should be specified as precisely as possible. Others suggested additional requirements for the distance between the surveyed land and right-of-way and allowances for GPS and satellite technologies. Response: The proposed and final regulations at § 169.102(b)(1) refer to the statutory provisions governing maps of definite location, which are implemented by the Department's Manual of Surveying Instructions and other Departmental requirements. These require an accurate description of boundaries and impose distance requirements for references to public surveys, and allow for GPS and satellite technologies. Comment—“Market value”: A few commenters suggested using the term “fair market value” rather than “market value” to maintain consistency in terminology with the current regulations and because the term is more widely used in industry parlance. One commenter suggested adding that it should state that it is the most probable price the property would bring in a competitive and open market “under all conditions requisite to a fair sale.” Another suggested clarifying that the market value should be based on the use of the limited portion for the right-of-way, rather than sale of the land. Response: The final rule uses the term “fair market value” in lieu of the proposed “market value” in response to these comments. The final rule does not add “under all conditions requisite to a fair sale” because this concept is already captured in “competitive and open market.” The final rule does not add that the market value is based on the limited portion for the right-of-way because this is understood. Comment—“Nonprofit rural utility”: One commenter suggested adding a definition for this term to mean “a member-owned cooperative nonprofit corporation organized under State law for the primary purpose of supplying electric power and energy and promoting and extending the use of electricity in rural areas and Indian lands.” Response: The final rule adds a definition for “utility cooperatives” to include member-owned utility cooperatives. Later provisions of the rule provide for waivers of compensation requirements and bonding requirements for utility cooperatives and tribal utilities under certain conditions. Comment—“Parties”: A few commenters suggested a definition of “parties.” Response: The final rule does not include a definition for “parties” because it is clear from context where this term is used who it includes. Comment—“Right-of-Way”: A few commenters suggested edits to this definition to clarify that easements are a type of right-of-way. Other commenters suggested adding “in, over, under, through, on, or to” to capture all possible types of rights-of-way. Some commenters stated that a right-of-way should reflect that they are transfers of real property interests to grantees; others stated that the right-of-way should reflect they are not transfers, and that title remains vested in the landowner. Some commenters suggested clarifying in the definition that rights-of-way do not include service lines. Response: The final rule clarifies that rights-of-way include easements and uses the statutory language “over and across” rather than “cross.” The final rule also establishes that right-of-way grants are not transfers of real property interests (see discussion below), but rather that the landowner retains title to the property. The final rule clarifies that rights-of-way do not include service lines. Comment—“Service Lines”: See the discussion of service lines, below. Comment—“Secretary”: A commenter suggested clarifying who is an “authorized representative” of the Secretary. Response: Authorized representatives are those acting within their scope of duties through delegated authority by the Secretary. Comment—“Section 17 corporation”: A commenter noted that this term is defined but not used in the regulation. Response: The final rule deletes this definition. Comment—“Trespass”: One commenter requested narrowing the definition of “trespass” to exclude unintentional instances of trespass and encompass only those instances of willful, purposeful, reckless, or negligent trespass. Another commenter suggested expanding the definition to include listed examples of trespass. The commenter also stated that trespass to airspace and subsoil should be included. Response: The final rule does not add any requirement for intent to trespass because the unauthorized occupancy is a trespass under Federal law regardless of intent (see discussion of trespass, below). The final rule does not list examples of trespass; examples listed by the commenter would meet the definition of “trespass” including, but not limited to, holdover occupancy without consent, affixing unauthorized improvements, adding uses or areas, entry without authorization. The definition does not specify trespasses to airspace and subsoil because these regulations address only the surface estate. Comment—“Tribal authorization”: One commenter requested further specification of when a tribal authorization is “duly adopted.” Another commenter suggested adding a tribal government division to the definition. Response: The regulations do not add further specification of what constitutes a duly adopted tribal authorization because the procedures vary with each individual tribe. The definition of “tribal authorization” includes a document duly adopted by a tribal government division which reflect that the document is an “appropriate tribal document authorizing the specified action.” Comment—“Tribal Land”: A tribal commenter asked whether a tract is considered tribal land, even if fractional interests are owned by both the tribe and individual Indians. Another commenter suggested defining “tribal land” to include only land that is not individually owned. A commenter suggested limiting tribal land to those tracts in which the tribe holds a majority interest. Response: Under the proposed definition and final definition, a tract is considered “tribal land” if any interest, fractional or whole, is owned by the tribe. A tract in which both a tribe and individual Indians own fractional interest is considered tribal land for the purposes of regulations applicable to tribal land. If the tribe owns any interest in a tract, it is considered “tribal land” and the tribe's consent for rights-of-way on the tract is required under 25 U.S.C. 323 and 324. Comment—“Trust or restricted status”: One commenter suggested revising the definition to reflect that individual tracts may be owned by a combination of both tribal and individual owners. Response: The final rule clarifies that land may be owned by a combination of both tribal and individual owners by changing “or” to “and/or.” Comment: New definition of “utility”: One commenter suggested adding definitions distinguishing between “commercial” and “public” utilities, such that later provisions can provide more lenient requirements to public utilities. Response: The final rule defines “utility cooperatives” and “tribal utilities” because the regulations provide more lenient requirements for these categories of utilities. “Utility cooperatives” are defined to be those cooperatives that are member-owned, while “tribal utility” is defined to be those utilities that are tribally owned and controlled ( i.e., in which tribes own at least 51 percent, receive a majority of the earnings, and control the management and daily operations). The more lenient requirements (nominal compensation, no bonding requirements) are appropriate for utility cooperatives because cooperatives are established for the purpose of providing service to their members and benefiting their members rather than making a profit. The more lenient requirements are appropriate for tribal utilities, whether for profit or not for profit, because such utilities have a governmental interest in providing service to those within their jurisdictions. The final rule holds other not-for-profit and for-profit utilities to the standard requirements for compensation and bonding because an independent analysis of whether the right-of-way is in the best interest of the landowners is appropriate in those circumstances. Comment—Other definitions: A few commenters suggested defining terms such as “allotted land.” Response: The term “allotted land” is not defined because it is not used in the regulation. Comment: A few commenters had questions about or expressed confusion about PR 169.003(a), specifying that BIA will not condition its grant of a right-of-way on the applicant having obtained a right-of-way from the owners of any fee interests, and that BIA will not take any action on a right-of-way across fee, State or Federal land not under BIA's jurisdiction. Response: BIA grants rights-of-way only with respect to trust or restricted interests and examines only the trust or restricted interests when determining whether the owners of the majority of the interests consent. It is the applicant's responsibility to obtain the permission of the owners of the fee interests; BIA is not involved in that process. BIA will not condition its grant of a right-of-way on the applicant having obtained a right-of-way from the owners of any fee interests. The rule requires notice to and consent from owners of trust or restricted interests, as opposed to fee interests. The final definition of “BIA land” clarifies that land not under BIA's jurisdiction is not included. 3. Life Estates (PR 169.003(b)/FR 169.109, FR 169.112, FR 169.121, FR 169.122, FR 169.415) Comment: A commenter stated that the provisions on life estates are “extremely confusing” and should be rewritten. Another commenter stated that the provisions on life estates should be in their own section, rather than as a part of § 169.3. Response: The final rule addresses these comments by redrafting life estate provisions and placing them in new, separate sections addressing only life estates. Comment: One commenter asserted that the entire section should be deleted because it violates the rules of co-tenancy. This commenter also stated that title vests in the remaindermen under a will as of the date of the death, title passes from the decedent to the remaindermen at that time, and the remaindermen take ownership subject to the life estate. This commenter stated that the estates are concurrent, and that the perspective that there is first a life estate and then a remainder is legally incorrect and would create a hole in the chain of title, rendering it unmarketable. The commenter further stated that the proposed provision stating that BIA will not join in a right-of-way granted by life tenants is an announcement that the Department intends to violate 25 U.S.C. 348, which requires Secretarial approval of all contracts affecting allotted land. Response: This comment is based on a provision in the proposed rule that would have allowed a life tenant to grant a right-of-way without consent of the remaindermen or approval of the BIA. That provision has been deleted in the final rule. Comment: Several commenters, including tribal commenters, stated that the life estate provisions should distinguish between Indian and non-Indian life tenants to provide protection to Indian life tenants. The commenters stated that the rule does not explain how BIA will balance the interests of an Indian life tenant and Indian remaindermen. One commenter stated that BIA owes a trust responsibility to everyone with an interest in trust property, including a life tenant. These commenters assert that the rule establishes that BIA will actively breach its trust responsibility to Indian life tenants. For example, the provision saying that BIA will not enforce or consent to a right-of-way where the life tenant holds all the trust or restricted interests in the tract, assumes the life tenant is non-Indian when, in fact, most are Indians to which BIA owes a trust responsibility. Response: The final rule does not distinguish between Indian and non-Indian life tenants because BIA's trust responsibility is not based on whether someone is Indian, but rather stems from the interest in trust or restricted (Indian) land. BIA is responsible for enforcing the terms of the right-of-way only on behalf of the remaindermen because BIA's trust responsibility is to the remaindermen because they are the beneficial owners of the Indian land, rather than the life tenants. a. Life Estates—Protection of Land Comment: A tribal commenter stated that the rule should clarify whether BIA owes a trust responsibility to the co-owners of the holder of the life estate, because it states that it does not owe rights to other parties but leaves this category of parties vague. Response: Where the life estate covers only a fractional interest in the property, the other co-owners are owners of the trust or restricted property to which BIA owes any trust responsibility. Comment: A tribal commenter stated that BIA approval should be required regardless of whether the life estate is over the entire parcel of Indian land or not, because BIA's approval is required to protect the remainder interests and ensure no permanent injury to the Indian land, in either case. Response: The final rule requires BIA approval regardless of whether the life estate covers the entire parcel of Indian land or not. Comment: A tribal commenter stated that provisions saying that the BIA “may monitor the use of the land” should instead provide that the BIA “shall monitor the use of the land.” Response: The final rule continues to provide that BIA “may” monitor use of the land to account for any situations in which BIA determines monitoring is not necessary. Comment: A tribal commenter stated that the rule does not provide for a process for the landowner to appeal to BIA for intervention as trustee to prevent “permanent injury” to the land that may occur through the life tenant granting the right-of-way. Another commenter stated that the term “permanent injury” should be explained, to avoid cases where a pipeline abandoned in place is considered a “permanent injury.” Response: Owners may contact BIA to express concerns regarding the potential for permanent injury either formally or informally. In order to maintain flexibility, the final rule does not establish a specific process for this communication. The determination of whether a “permanent injury” has occurred is made on a case-by-case basis. b. Life Estates—Consent Comment: A commenter requested clarification that the life tenant “consent” to, rather than “grant,” the right-of-way. Response: The final rule clarifies that the life tenant “consents” to the right-of-way. Comment: A few commenters requested clarification that consent is required from the owners of a majority interest, rather than from a majority of the owners. Response: The final rule clarifies that consent is required from the owners of a majority interest. Comment: One commenter stated that the provisions are consistent with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) decision in Adakai v. Acting Navajo Regional Director, BIA, 56 IBIA 104 (2013), requiring a consent of the majority of the remaindermen, but recommended the intent be clarified by adding after the first sentence of paragraph (b): “Except as provided in clauses 1(v) and (3), we will not grant or approve a right-of-way for land subject to a life estate. A life tenant, however, may grant a right-of-way as provided in this paragraph (b).” Response: The final rule requires the consent of both the life tenants and remaindermen, in order to ensure protection of the Indian land for the remaindermen. Comment: A few commenters suggested, as a simpler approach, allowing the life tenant to consent for the full term of the right-of-way, regardless of the duration of the life estate or number of future, unknown remaindermen, and requiring the grantee to pay full compensation for the right-of-way to the life tenant. These commenters asserted that no consent of the remaindermen is required and that the life tenants should have the ability to consent and bind the remaindermen, although one commenter stated that this approach presents “enormous administrative hurdles” when a tract of land held by a life tenant is part of a right-of-way project encompassing other tracts where consent, monitoring, and enforcement are required. In contrast, a tribal commenter stated that the Indian landowner should be required to consent, regardless of whether there is a life estate on the land. One commenter stated that the IBIA's previous determination that rights-of-way must be consented to by both life tenants and remaindermen was based on the silence in the current regulations, and asserted that the new regulations should allow life tenants to consent to issuance of a right-of-way that may exceed the duration of the life estate. Response: BIA may not, by regulation, allow a life tenant to grant an interest that is greater than what the life tenant holds ( i.e., an interest for longer than the duration of the life tenant's life); therefore, the life tenant may not consent to the full term of the right-of-way, and may consent only to the term of his or her life. The final rule simplifies the approach by requiring the consent of the remaindermen as well, for the full term of the right-of-way. Comment: One commenter stated that the rule allows life tenants to encumber land with a right-of-way that may be permanent and impossible to undo. Response: The final rule requires the consent of remaindermen identifiable at the time of the application; with this consent, the right-of-way grant continues even when the life estate ends (assuming the overall term of the life estate has not expired). Comment: A tribal commenter requested clarification in paragraph (b)(2) as to whether the applicant must obtain the consent of a majority of the co-owners including or excluding the life tenant's consent in the calculation. The commenter suggested that the life tenant's consent should be included in the calculation. Response: The life tenant's consent is required in addition to the consent of the owners of a majority of the remainder interests. Comment: A commenter stated that if the life tenant's consent was not needed to meet the majority consent, then the right-of-way should not terminate upon the end of the life estate. Response: Because the final rule requires consent of both the life tenant and remaindermen, this comment is no longer applicable. c. Termination of Life Estates Comment: Several commenters noted the administrative difficulties, uncertainties, and increased costs caused by a right-of-way ending when the life estate ends. Several commenters suggested providing that upon the end of the life estate, the right-of-way continues and the remaindermen receive compensation established for allottees in the original grant, but prorated for the remainder of the right-of-way term. Response: The final rule requires the consent of remaindermen identifiable at the time of the application; with this consent, the right-of-way grant continues even when the life estate ends (assuming the overall term of the life estate has not expired). The final rule addresses the allocation of compensation between the life tenant and remaindermen in § 169.121. Generally this section provides that if a will established the life estate, the terms of the will establishing the allocation will govern. If there is no will provision that controls the allocation, the life tenant and remaindermen may enter into an agreement regarding the allocation. Otherwise, the terms of 25 CFR part 179 apply. Comment: A commenter noted that there may be instances in which the life tenant has rights to encumber the property beyond his or her life, such as when a landowner conveys the property to a third party but retains a life estate and the ability to encumber the property beyond his or her life. In that case, the granting instrument's terms would control and the life tenant may consent to a term beyond his or her life. Response: The final rule covers the overwhelming majority of life estates. If such a situation arises, the BIA will address it on a case-by-case basis, using, if necessary the flexibility in 25 CFR 1.2 to waive the regulations in this Chapter. d. Life Estates—Other Comments Comment: A commenter expressed confusion that the rule requires direct payments to life tenants, but otherwise limits direct payments to landowners, and requested clarification on whether this is intended to apply where the life tenant is non-Indian. Other commenters stated that life tenants should have the option of having the funds deposited in their IIM accounts, if they have one, because otherwise the funds could be subject to levies or garnishment. Response: The final rule requires direct payment to life tenants regardless of whether they are Indian. Comment: A few commenters suggested stating “will or other conveyance document” or “legal instrument” creating the life estate because sometimes a deed creates a life estate. Response: No change is made to the final rule because a deed is considered a conveyance document. 4. When a Right-of-Way Is Needed (PR 169.004) Comment: A few tribal commenters requested clarification that a tribe owning all the interests in a tract need not obtain a right-of-way for that tract. Response: The proposed and final § 169.4(b)(1) state that an Indian landowner that owns 100 percent of the interests in a tract need not obtain a right-of-way grant. No clarification to the rule is necessary, as the definition of “Indian landowner” encompasses tribes. Comment: A tribal commenter requested clarification that an Indian tribe or tribally owned entity that does not own a majority of interests in the tract must obtain a right-of-way with consent of the owners of a majority interest for the tract. Response: The final rule incorporates this clarification. If the tribe already owns the majority of the interests, it need not obtain the consent of the other fractional owners, but it must notify them of the right-of-way. Comment: A few tribal commenters stated that if a tribe owns a separate legal entity, then the entity should not have to obtain a right-of-way across tribal land under the regulations. These commenters suggested adding an exemption for such legal entities or recognizing the authority of the tribe's governing body to adopt a resolution or other appropriate enactment to allow the tribe and tribally owned and controlled entities to use tribal land without a BIA-approved right-of-way. Response: The final rule allows an entity that is wholly owned and operated by the tribe to use the tribe's tribal land without BIA approval where the tribe submits a resolution authorizing the right-of-way and describing the land across which the right-of-way will cross. This submission is necessary for the Bureau to keep track of authorized users of the Indian land. The Bureau will maintain a copy of the resolution and description in our records. Comment: A tribal commenter requested more specificity as to what “an independent legal entity owned and operated by a tribe” is, noting that it has several enterprises and entities organized through different legal instruments and asking whether these entities must comply with part 169. Response: Whether an enterprise or entity qualifies as “an independent legal entity owned and operated by a tribe” will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Comment: One commenter requested adding tribally approved land use agreements, such as tribal land assignments, to the list of those exempted from the regulations. Another commenter requested clarification on what the term “land use agreements” includes. Response: The final rule clarifies at FR 169.4(b) that land use agreements that are exempted from these regulations include tribal land assignments. Such land use agreements may also include permits granted by the Indian landowner for a revocable, non-possessory right of access for a very short term, for limited use of the land. Comment: A tribal commenter stated that, to encourage development, the rule should allow permitting for utility service to homesites without BIA approval. Response: Generally, a right-of-way or filing of a service line agreement would be required to provide utility service to homesites. Nevertheless, Indian landowners may grant permits to allow a revocable, non-possessory right of access for a very short term, for limited use, where there will be no ground disturbance or risk of environmental damage. Examples include allowing a right of access for a cultural ceremony. BIA approval is not necessary for such permits and BIA will not administer or enforce permits on Indian land; the rule does not address permits because permits are appropriate only in very limited circumstances for a very limited term. Any use that requires more certainty in term ( i.e., not unilaterally revocable by the landowner) or requires a longer term, as utility infrastructure would, requires a right-of-way or service line agreement or other authorization under § 169.4. BIA may grant permits for use of BIA land, and part 169 will apply to those permits as appropriate. See Section C for more on terms. Comment: Some tribal commenters expressed support for the proposed rule's provision that the right-of-way regulations do not apply to other authorizations to cross Indian land, such as a federally approved lease. The commenter stated that this provision protects a tribe's choice to use the leasing statutes for energy, telecommunication and transportation corridors. Response: The final rule retains these provisions. Comment: One commenter stated that the regulation should exempt anyone travelling on an established State or county road across Indian land from obtaining a right-of-way. Response: A person travelling across Indian land on a road is not obtaining a legal interest in the property, and therefore does not need a right-of-way grant. To the extent the commenter means to ask whether a State or county needs a right-of-way to place a road across Indian land, the road would require the transfer of a legal interest, thus requiring a right-of-way grant. Comment: Several tribal commenters noted that the provision regarding compliance with statute, judicial order, or common law, where access is allowed by such statute, judicial order, or common law, could be misinterpreted to allow for prescriptive easements. Another tribal commenter requested clarification that prescriptive easements or adverse possession through common law, or otherwise, are not permitted on trust land. Response: The final rule replaces “statute, judicial order, or common law” with “law” to address the commenter's concern. No interest in trust land may be acquired by adverse possession. See Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law section 15.09[4], at 1604 (2012 ed.). Except as required for access to a mineral estate or specific authorization from Congress, prescriptive easements are not available on trust land, because trust land generally cannot be divested. See e.g., Del Rio Drilling Programs v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 186 (1996) (mineral estate remains dominant, and a subsurface owner has a right of reasonable access to the minerals below). This is not specified in the final rule because it does not directly relate to rights-of-way. Comment: One commenter asked whether a right-of-way grant is required for general ingress and egress by a lessee. Response: A right-of-way grant is generally needed if an interest in the Indian land is being transferred. The leasing regulations provide that a lease may address access to the leased premises by roads or other infrastructure, and such roads and infrastructure must comply with 25 CFR part 169, unless otherwise stated in the lease. Roads and other infrastructure within the leased premises are covered by the lease. See 25 CFR 162.019. Comment: A commenter requested clarification on whether “as-built” rights-of-way to correct unauthorized uses of Indian lands could be issued without a land use agreement authorizing use of the Indian land. Response: The intent of the exemption for land use agreements is not to allow what would otherwise require BIA approval to bypass 25 CFR part 169 requirements by calling it a “land use agreement.” The intent is to allow for land use agreements such as those authorized by 25 CFR part 84. “As built” rights-of-way would be authorized under 25 CFR part 169. Comment: A tribal commenter suggested the regulations include a provision under which a tribe could elect to dedicate a portion of tribal land for the construction, operation, and maintenance of tribally owned public transportation facilities, such as roads, bridges, and highways, and record that dedication in the appropriate land title and records office. A few tribal commenters suggested adding a new section recognizing that tribes may dedicate their own trust or restricted lands for public transportation, without having to obtain rights-of-way. Response: These regulations do not affect a tribe's ability to dedicate tribal land for certain uses but granting interests in Indian land to third parties would require a right-of-way. Comment: One commenter expressed concern that, by deleting the various types of rights-of-way listed in current § 169.23 (railroad station buildings, depots, machine shops, side tracks, etc.), one could argue that such uses are no longer covered by the regulation. Response: The final rule covers all uses that fall within final § 169.5, whether listed or not. Comment: A commenter requested excluding “customary and traditional dirt roads” used to access homesites from the need to obtain a right-of-way grant. Response: Customary and traditional dirt roads to access homesites may be addressed in the homesite lease, rather than requiring a separate right-of-way grant. 5. Types of Uses for Rights-of-Way (PR 169.005) Comment: A commenter requested clarification of whether the provision in PR 169.005(a)(4) for “service roads and trails essential to any other right-of-way purpose” is intended to address access across only the same allotment or access across adjacent or nearby Indian land. Another commenter requested that “appurtenant to” replace “essential to” to avoid disputes over what types of service roads and trails are “essential.” Response: The question of whether a right-of-way is required for service roads and trails is required is determined on a case-by-case basis. The final rule replaces “essential to” with “appurtenant to” as requested by the commenter. Comment: Commenters requested additions to the list of rights-of-way types part 169 is intended to cover, including: oil and gas facilities such as well pads and associated service roads; pump stations, meter stations and other appurtenant facilities to oil and gas pipelines; and power projects (power plants, substations and receiving stations). A commenter also requested specifying that “oil and gas” includes hydrocarbons, refined products, natural gas liquids and other oil and gas products. One commenter stated that radio, television, and other communication facilities should be added to the list of examples. Response: The final rule adds pump stations, meter stations and other appurtenant facilities to the oil and gas pipeline item. Appurtenant facilities may also include well pads. Whether such facilities will be addressed in the grant depends upon the specific circumstances. The facilities may be included in the overall mineral lease, and therefore addressed in separate mineral leasing regulations. If the facilities are associated with a mineral lease on a split estate (in which the mineral estate and the surface estate are not owned by the same person or entity), then it may be appropriate for the grant of right-of-way to address the facilities. The final rule does not add examples of oil and gas products because the term “oil and gas” is broad enough to encompass each of the examples. The final rule does not add power plants, substations and receiving stations to the list of examples because these items may be more appropriately governed by the leasing regulations at 25 CFR part 162 than these rights-of-way regulations. The list of examples includes “telecommunications” lines, which is intended to cover computer, television, radio, and other types of lines for technology used for communication over distances. Comment: One commenter requested an exception from part 169 for temporary access for mineral exploration. Response: The mineral regulations, rather than part 169, address temporary access for mineral exploration and geological and geophysical permits. See 25 CFR parts 211 and 212. Comment: One commenter requested a catch-all provision for the list of examples of rights-of-way such as “any other right-of-way that comes to be recognized as such” to capture any new types of rights-of-way that will arise in the future. Response: The final rule adds a catch-all provision as requested at FR 169.5(a)(13). Comment: One commenter requested that the final rule delete the examples of right-of-way uses and instead stated that the part covers rights-of-way for all linear and non-linear surface uses. Response: The final rule retains the list of examples for guidance. Comment: One power administration commenter requested clarification that a right-of-way includes the right to manage vegetation and conduct emergency and routine maintenance as necessary to maintain safe and reliable electric transmission service. The commenter also requested an appendix to the rule setting out specifically which equipment is included in a transmission system right-of-way and allow for inspection, maintenance, repair, operations, upgrade and replacement of the equipment. The commenter also asked that the description be more specific with regard to electric transmission systems. Response: The final rule adds a new paragraph (b) to § 169.5 to clarify that a right-of-way includes access necessary to manage vegetation and maintain and repair equipment. The final rule does not include an appendix, because the text of the rule specifies that poles, towers, and appurtenant facilities are included in a transmission right-of-way use, and the new paragraph (b) specifies that inspection, maintenance, and repair are included in the use. With regard to operations, upgrade, and replacement of the equipment, generally these activities would be allowed, but if they expand or change the use of the right-of-way then an amendment to the existing grant or a new right-of-way grant would be required. The final rule adds more specificity to § 169.5(a)'s description of electric transmission, as requested by the commenter. Comment: One commenter stated that any questions as to a right-of-way's validity should be decided in tribal court. Response: Because the rights-of-way are issued by the Federal Government, the proper forum for disputes related to their validity is the Federal administrative agency (Bureau of Indian Affairs, with the possibility for appeal to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals). Appeals from federal administrative decisions are heard in the United States District Courts. Comment: A few commenters read proposed 169.005(b) (now FR 169.6) as allowing prior unperfected and unapproved rights-of-way to be recognized as valid and legal rights-of-way. Response: This provision does not validate or approve existing, unapproved rights-of-way. Any unauthorized use remains unauthorized. Comment: A commenter asked that proposed 169.005(b) (now FR 169.6) state that BIA will act on requests, rather than “grant,” to clarify that the grant of a right-of-way is not automatic. Response: The final rule clarifies at final § 169.6 that BIA will act on requests. 6. Applicability to Existing Rights-of-Way and Applications (PR 169.006/FR 169.7) Comment: A commenter requested that the new regulations not apply to any applications that are pending BIA approval, because applying the new regulations would create legal uncertainty as to the enforceability and effectiveness of those applications. This commenter was particularly concerned that the applicant would be penalized for BIA's delay in approval by being forced to obtain new consents from landowners and resubmit information. Response: Applicants who have already submitted a right-of-way application under the pre-existing regulations, prior to the effective date of the new regulation, would not have to obtain any new consents or resubmit materials for the application as a result of the new regulations. BIA will review the application under the regulations existing at the time of submission, unless the applicant chooses to have the new regulations apply by withdrawing and resubmitting the application. Comment: Several commenters requested that the rule expressly state that it does not and will not impose any new burdens, limitations, restrictions, or responsibilities on preexisting right-of-way grants issued through other statutory authorities. A commenter requested clarification that the regulations do not apply to railroad rights-of-way granted in perpetuity under specific statues enacted by Congress in the late 19th century. Response: Rights-of-way under statutes other than 25 U.S.C. 323 exist. Only new grants of rights-of-way must comply with part 169's new provisions for obtaining a right-of-way. Existing approved rights-of-way remain valid under the new regulations. The new provisions of part 169 do not affect the authority of those specific railroad statutes; however, the procedural requirements of the new part 169 will apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the authorizing statute or explicit provisions in the grant. For rights-of-way granted under specific statutory provisions, rather than the general authority in 25 U.S.C. 323, BIA will read the existing statutory requirements and grant provisions in a manner that promotes consistency with the new regulations. Comment: Many commenters opposed the proposed provision stating that the new regulations apply retroactively to existing right-of-way grants except where they “conflict” with the express terms of those grants, and stated that rights-of-way approved prior to the new rule's effective date should not be subject to the new rule. These commenters pointed out that most pre-existing grants are silent on the requirements imposed by the new regulations. For example, a right-of-way grant without a specific provision waiving BIA approval or consent, as was the common practice (because express language was never before required), would now require BIA approval and landowner consent for certain actions (assignments, e.g. ). A few commenters asserted that existing rights-of-way grants are property rights. Commenters also stated that BIA cannot legally modify or insert new material terms into existing grants, but must honor the terms as written and the parties' expectations as of the time the grant was issued. These commenters stated that exempting the existing rights-of-way would preserve the integrity of existing contracts and avoid legal issues for breach of contract, breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealings, or takings. With regard to assignments, specifically, several tribal commenters requested that consent and approval always be required because there have been numerous instances in which a right-of-way was assigned with no notification to, or consent of, the tribe, meaning that neither the landowner nor BIA may have record of the authorized user of the Indian land. Response: The new regulations are not intended to replace the original grant or statutory provisions, but the procedural requirements of these new regulations apply to the extent they do not conflict with the original grant or statutory provisions. In addition, in response to tribal commenters' concerns that, in the past, rights-of-way were assigned without any notification to BIA or the tribe, the final rule establishes a new requirement for the assignee to notify BIA of past assignments to ensure BIA is aware of the identity of the legal occupant of the Indian land in furtherance of meeting its trust responsibilities to protect the Indian land from, for example, trespass. From the perspective of the assignee, this recordation requirement is simply a good business practice to ensure the Department has documentation of the assignee's right to occupy Indian land. The final rule establishes a target deadline of 120 days after the effective date of the regulations for assignees to either provide BIA with documentation of their assignment, or to request an extension of time to provide BIA with such documentation. This requirement is not included in the previous version of the regulations but is imperative to BIA's ability to fulfill its trust responsibilities. For any right-of-way grant application submitted but not yet approved by the effective date of the regulations, the grantee may withdraw the application and resubmit under the new rule. Otherwise, BIA will review the application under the regulations in existence at the time of submission, but once the right-of-way is granted, procedural provisions of the new rule apply. For example, if the grantee or assignee wants to assign, amend, or mortgage the right-of-way after the effective date of these regulations, the grantee or assignee will have to follow the procedures in this regulation, to the extent that such new processes and requirements do not change the terms of the pre-existing grant or statutory authority. In other words, if the preexisting grant or statutory authority is silent on a particular procedural requirement, such as an assignment or amendment, the new regulatory provisions concerning that procedure would apply. Examples of procedural provisions that apply include procedures for obtaining amendments, assignments, mortgages, renewals, and complying with and enforcing rights-of-way grants. However, many current grants include language granting to the grantee and the grantee's assignees; in that case, the grant would contain explicit language allowing the grant to be freely assigned without landowner consent or BIA approval, and that explicit grant language would govern. An example of a non-procedural provision is a regulatory statement of what jurisdiction applies. The question of whether tribal law or taxes apply to preexisting right-of-way grants after the effective date of the new regulations is not before the Department at this point, but to the extent any preexisting right-of-way is assigned or amended, the provisions of the new regulations govern. Comment: A few commenters stated that the rule should allow for renewals of rights-of-way grants existing prior to these regulations without the need to obtain consent because those older grants may not have addressed the possibility of renewal. Commenters further stated that this new requirement should not be applied retroactively, and that otherwise, this rule will effectively prevent renewal of existing rights-of-way, even when there is no change in use, requiring a survey and full application process. Response: If the original right-of-way was granted prior to the effective date of these regulations and is silent on whether renewals are permitted and under what conditions, then these regulations apply, and the grantee must follow the procedural requirements of these new regulations to obtain a renewal. See Section C for more on renewals. Comment: A few commenters stated that the review and adjustment requirements should not be applied retroactively. The commenters note that the current regulations provide no requirement for review or adjustment. Response: The review and adjustment requirements do not apply retroactively to grants that pre-date these regulations because they are non-procedural ( i.e., substantive) provisions that would affect compensation, a core term of the grant; those grants were issued based on the compensation established when they were negotiated and approved. 7. Administration of Regulations by Tribes on BIA's Behalf (PR 169.007/FR 169.8) Comment: One tribal commenter requested that, throughout the regulations, “BIA,” “BIA office,” and “we” should be revised to clarify that it refers to the tribe in those cases in which the tribe administers real estate services under a Public Law 93-638 contract. Response: The term “BIA” is defined to include tribes acting on behalf of the Secretary or BIA under Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act contracts or compacts. Comment: One commenter stated that tribes do not gain any substantive authority to administer rights-of-way under the new rules because the new rules do not allow tribes to grant, approve, or disapprove a right-of-way document or waiver, cancellation or appeal. Response; The new rules make no change to the scope of functions a tribe may compact or contract for, but does specify which functions may not be contracted or compacted because they are “inherently Federal.” Comment: One commenter asked that this section specify that a tribe may require that the applicant negotiate with it as a condition of obtaining tribal consent for the right-of-way. Response: When tribal consent for a right-of-way provision is required, the tribe may require that the applicant negotiate the terms of consent. Comment: One commenter stated that the rule should be clearer on whether BIA or the tribe administers the functions. Response: The final rule clarifies that applicants may check with either the BIA office or the tribal office to determine whether the tribe has compacted or contracted to administer realty functions. Comment: One commenter asserted that tribes are not authorized to compact or contract to administer BIA functions with regard to pipeline rights-of-way because the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) does not specify that program. Response: Realty functions, including administration of rights-of-way, may be compacted or contracted under the ISDEAA. See 25 U.S.C. 450f(a)(1)(A)-(E). Comment: A commenter stated that the term “tribal organization” in this section is unclear as to whether it includes entities such as the telephone authority. Another commenter requested clarification on which officer or entity in the tribe is authorized to make decisions in administering the compacted or contracted functions. Response: The ISDEAA governs the meaning of “tribal organization” in this section. Tribal law governs which officer or entity is authorized to make decisions on behalf of a tribe. 8. Laws Applicable to Rights-of-Way Approved Under These Regulations (PR 169.008/FR 169.9) Comment: A commenter stated that the rule should specify that a right-of-way “use” is interpreted consistently with general common law principles of easements and rights-of-way, and that Federal common law applies except that State law may apply where it is not hostile or aberrant to Federal policy or otherwise frustrates Federal policy. Response: Final § 169.9 clarifies that rights-of-way are generally subject to Federal and tribal law, but not State law. Comment: A commenter noted that the structure of the proposed section is disjointed and causes confusion. Other commenters stated that the section should be deleted because of the risk that the regulations could cause confusion regarding what the law is and is unnecessary. Response: The final rule redrafts this section to address concerns as to its disjointed and confusing nature and also divides the section into two separate sections, one addressing law (FR 169.9), and one addressing jurisdiction (FR 169.10). a. State Jurisdiction/State Law Comment: Several commenters opposed the proposed provision allowing parties to consent to the applicability of State law, stating that it is a waiver of sovereign immunity and that landowners may inadvertently choose State law by signing a document without full knowledge of the consequences. Response: Proposed paragraph (c) was a choice of law provision that was intended to clarify that where a vacuum of applicable Federal and tribal law exists, the landowners may choose to apply State law. The final rule deletes this provision due to commenters' opposition. Comment: Several commenters opposed the proposed provision indicating that State law applies if the tribe, Congress, or a Federal court has made it expressly applicable. Several commenters stated that this provision invites a broad reading, allowing State law to apply in nearly every circumstance. One commenter stated that the Kennerly case forecloses the application of State jurisdiction over Indian land subject to a right-of-way, whether by a tribal member or a tribe absent a statute conferring jurisdiction. One commenter suggested the provision instead state that rights-of-way are not subject to State law “except to the extent allowable under Federal law and consistent with Indian treaty rights and tribal sovereignty.” Response: To address the comments, the final rule deletes the specifics on when State or local law may apply and instead provides that “generally” State and local law do not apply. The provision allowing landowners to agree to the application of State law was intended for situations in which neither the tribe nor Federal law address a specific topic, and the tribe chooses State law to fill the vacancy ( e.g., if a tribe chooses to apply State law regarding cable access). The proposed provision regarding Congress was included because there are Federal statutes conferring jurisdiction over Indian land subject to a right-of-way ( e.g., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Agreement of 1980 or Pub. L. 83-280). If State law is made applicable by Federal or tribal law, these instances are covered by the other provisions establishing the applicability of Federal and tribal law. Comment: Some commenters stated that the new regulation conflicts with established law (in Strate ) because tribal law and jurisdiction does not presently apply to lands subject to a right-of-way. Response: The new regulation provides that future rights-of-way will explicitly state that the grant does not diminish the tribe's jurisdiction. Commenter: Some commenters stated that this section truncates State jurisdiction over Indian lands, violating the Federalism executive order. Response: The Federalism executive order addresses the balance of authority between the Federal government and States; it is inapplicable here because this rule addresses the balance of authority between tribal and State law. b. Tribal Law Comment: A few commenters stated that proposed paragraph (a) is erroneous in stating that rights-of-way are subject to tribal law because Congress preempted any application of tribal law to transportation by rail and State laws apply to utility service on tribal lands. A commenter also noted that some tribes have relinquished jurisdiction by treaty. Response: Paragraph (a), as well as other paragraphs in this section, do not expand the applicability of tribal law; rather it clarifies that the grant of a right-of-way will not limit any existing applicability in any way. Comment: Several tribal commenters stated that the proposed paragraph (a)(2) should simply say that rights-of-way are subject to tribal law “except to the extent that tribal law is inconsistent with applicable Federal laws” and delete the provisions in proposed paragraph (b) allowing for tribal law to modify the regulations under certain circumstances. Tribal commenters stated that the provisions are too restrictive and disrespect tribal sovereignty. Additionally, non-tribal commenters expressed concerns that tribal regulations may change without any notice or consent of the right-of-way grantee. Another stated that if the provision is not removed, it should at least clarify that the tribal law will not be effective if it conflicts with other binding Federal laws. One tribal commenter stated that allowing the tribal law to supersede unless the tribe's law would “conflict with our general trust responsibility” provides no guidance. Some tribal commenters stated that the regulation should provide that tribal law “presumptively applies.” A few commenters stated that tribal laws should apply to all land within the reservation (both tribal and allotted); otherwise, an individual could consent to a right-of-way that is in violation of tribal law. Some commenters opposed the applicability of tribal law under any circumstance because a grantee that needs to obtain rights-of-way across several tribes' lands could be subjected to multiple, and possibly conflicting requirements, undermining the purpose of the rule to streamline the process. A tribal commenter also suggested deleting the requirement that the tribe provide BIA with notice that the law supersedes because this could become a technical glitch that would hinder application of tribal laws that would otherwise be applicable. Response: In response to these comments regarding the uncertainty of whether tribal law would supersede or modify Federal law, the final rule simplifies this provision to state that rights-of-way are subject to tribal law except to the extent that the tribal law is inconsistent with applicable Federal law. Tribes are sovereigns with the inherent power to make laws. It is the responsibility of anyone doing business within a particular jurisdiction to know the law of that jurisdiction. Comment: One commenter stated that the phrase “except to the extent that those tribal laws are inconsistent with these regulations or other applicable Federal law” should be deleted because it is too confusing, and is unnecessary given that it has already been established that Federal law applies. Response: The final rule retains this necessary provision because there may be circumstances in which tribal law would apply but for the fact that the tribal law is inconsistent with Federal law. c. Tribal Jurisdiction Comment: A few tribal commenters suggested line edits to this section to clarify that the tribe has jurisdiction over persons, as well as activities, and to change “not inconsistent with” to “within” the right-of-way. Commenters also stated that people and activities should be included in the scope of things over which the tribe's jurisdiction remains unaffected. A few other commenters requested the rule instead expressly describe circumstances in which the tribe's jurisdiction does not extend to lands subject to a right-of-way, such as taxation of non-tribal members on fee land within a reservation. Another commenter stated that the rule should reflect that tribes have “virtually no authority over non-member conduct.” Response: The final rule does not grant or add any jurisdiction to tribes, but establishes that the grant of right-of-way does not diminish the tribe's jurisdiction. The final rule also clarifies that the grant of right-of-way does not affect the tribe's jurisdiction over people and activities, in addition to land. A grant of right-of-way is merely a grant of a specific use of the land for a specified period of time within the confines of the grant document. The grant does not in any way diminish tribal sovereignty over those lands. Comment: A commenter suggested deleting the introduction to proposed paragraph (e) because it suggested a tribe might cede tribal jurisdiction in its consent to a right-of-way, while Kennerly established that this can be done only through an Act of Congress. Response: The final rule deletes the identified provision because, as the commenter points out, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a tribe may not cede jurisdiction without an Act of Congress. See Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Comment: One tribal commenter stated that the regulations should remind the public of the basic principle of Indian law that tribes may negotiate a right-of-way without including State regulatory bodies. Response: While the commenter is correct, it is not necessary to state so in the regulation. Comment: A commenter stated that proposed paragraph (e)'s language that the tribe has jurisdiction over those “who enter into consensual relationships” does not apply in the context of right-of-way grants because case law has established that grantees are not in a “consensual relationship” with the tribe by virtue of the right-of-way grant. Other commenters suggested that the provision stating that the regulation does not limit the tribe's inherent sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members “who enter into consensual relationships” with the tribes improperly limits the tribes' sovereign power by implying that the Montana analysis extends beyond fee land. Response: The proposed language regarding a consensual relationship was derived from the decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). As commenters pointed out, Montana' s general rule limiting tribal authority over nonmembers' activities and its two exceptions, including the consensual relationship exception, is limited to non-Indian fee land. 450 U.S. at 557. See also Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. at 453 (describing Montana' s “main-rule and exceptions” as “[r]egarding activity on non-Indian fee land”); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 654 (2001) (referring to “ Montana's general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land”); Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that “ Montana ordinarily applies only to non-Indian Land”). The Montana court recognized that a tribe may regulate nonmembers' activities “on land belonging to the [t]ribe or held by the United States in trust for the [t]ribe.” 450 U.S. at 557. For this reason, the final rule eliminates the “consensual relationship” language and instead states simply that the regulations do not limit the tribe's inherent sovereign power to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-members on Indian land. Plains Commerce Bank v. Loving Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 327-28 (2008). This statement confirms that the grant of right-of-way preserves any pre-existing tribal authority. Even if Montana's rule and exceptions do apply, we disagree with the commenters that a tribe is not in a consensual relationship with a right-of-way grantee on tribal trust or restricted land. Under Montana, an Indian tribe “may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” 450 U.S. at 565. As explained above, and required by the 1948 Act, tribal consent is required for the right-of-way. Therefore, the consensual relationship exception applies. Comment: Several commenters asserted that the tribe has no jurisdiction over right-of-way land or over non-Indians, pointing to the decision in Strate for the premise that land subject to a right-of-way is the equivalent of fee land. Response: As described above, the fact pattern, and, therefore, the cited holding, in Strate does not apply to rights-of-way granted under these regulations because the regulations and grants establish continued tribal jurisdiction over the granted land. Strate does confirm, however that “where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.” 520 U.S., at 453 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Commenter: One commenter suggested that proposed paragraph (e)(5), regarding the character of the land as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151, should add “as interpreted and supplemented by Federal case law.” Response: The final rule does not add this modifier because it is unnecessary. Whether land is “Indian country” is a legal question. Comment: One commenter stated their opposition to the tribe regulating allotted lands, and asserted that, under Strate, allotted or other land subject to a right-of-way grant is not subject to the tribe's jurisdiction. Response: The right-of-way grant does not affect the tribe's jurisdiction over the land. If the land is within the boundaries of the tribe's reservation, then the tribe has jurisdiction, regardless of whether a right-of-way has been granted. See Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law section 4.01[2][c], at 216-218 (2012 ed.). Comment: A few commenters noted that proposed paragraph (e)(2) seems to assert that the tribe has the power to tax trust land, and instead should be limited to allowing the tribe to tax improvements and activities. Response: This section is simply clarifying that the regulations do not affect any pre-existing jurisdiction that the tribe may have. See Merrion v. Jicarilla, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Cohen's Handbook on Federal Indian Law section 8.01[1], at 676 (2012 ed.) (“Indian tribes have the power to law and collect taxes, subject to certain exceptions with respect to non-Indians”). 9. Taxes Applicable to Rights-of-Way Approved Under These Regulations (PR 169.9/FR 169.11) Comment: Several commenters supported the proposed rule's affirmation of tribes' exclusive and continuing sovereign authority to tax improvements and activities on lands subject to rights-of-way. These commenters suggested the final rule require that the right-of-way applications and documents include references to this section and describe the basis for this section to reinforce the Department's position. One commenter recommended that the regulations prohibit State taxation of any compensation the tribe receives for its right-of-way and any pass-through to the tribe or tribal members. This commenter noted that if a State requires a tribe to pay back any of the compensation it receives for a right-of-way, the State is effectively circumventing the compensation requirement, benefitting, for example, a rural electric cooperative at the expense of the tribal beneficiaries. One commenter stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that certain State taxes may apply to utilities that operate within Indian rights-of-way, pointing to Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005). Response: The final rule at § 169.125(c) adds requirements for the right-of-way documents to include references to the regulatory section on taxation. Tribes have inherent plenary and exclusive power over their citizens and territory, which has been subject to limitations imposed by Federal law, including but not limited to Supreme Court decisions, but otherwise may not be transferred except by the tribe affirmatively granting such power. See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Edition, section 4.01[1][b]. The U.S. Constitution, as well as treaties between the United States and Indian tribes, executive orders, statutes, and other Federal laws recognize tribes' inherent authority and power of self-government. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (“[T]he treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not granted.”); Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2012 Edition, section 4.01[1][c] (“Illustrative statutes . . . include [but are not limited to] the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Indian Financing Act of 1974, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 . . . [and] the Tribe Self-Governance Act . . . In addition, congressional recognition of tribal authority is [also] reflected in statutes requiring that various administrative acts of . . . the Department of the Interior be carried out only with the consent of the Indian tribe, its head of government, or its council.”); Id. (“Every recent president has affirmed the governmental status of Indian nations and their special relationship to the United States”). Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. 465, preempts State and local taxation of permanent improvements on trust land. See Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County, 724 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 158 (1973) (“use of permanent improvements upon the land is so intimately connected with use of the land itself that an explicit provision relieving the latter of state tax burdens [25 U.S.C. 465] must be construed to encompass an exemption for the former”). Similarly, section 465 preempts state taxation of rent payments by a lessee for leased trust lands, because “tax on the payment of rent is indistinguishable from an impermissible tax on the land.” See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, No. 14-14524, *13-*17, n.8 (11th Cir. 2015). In addition, with a backdrop of “traditional notions of Indian self-government,” Federal courts have applied a balancing test to determine whether State taxation of non-Indians engaging in activity or owning property on the reservation is preempted. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). The Bracker balancing test requires a particularized examination of the relevant State, Federal, and tribal interests. In the case of rights-of-way on Indian lands, the Federal and tribal interests are very strong. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Thurston County, 724 F.3d at 1157; see also Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2043 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (determining that “[a] key goal of the Federal Government is to render Tribes more self-sufficient, and better positioned to fund their own sovereign functions, rather than relying on Federal funding”). The Federal statutes and regulations governing rights-of-way on Indian lands occupy and preempt the field of Indian rights-of-way. The Federal statutory scheme for rights-of-way on Indian land is comprehensive, and accordingly precludes State taxation. State taxation would undermine careful work of Federal actors analyzing the best interests of tribal beneficiaries under the trust responsibility. The Federal regulatory scheme is pervasive and leaves no room for State law. Federal regulations cover all aspects of rights-of-way: Whether a party needs a right-of-way grant to authorize possession of Indian land; how to obtain a right-of-way grant; how a prospective grantee identifies and contacts Indian landowners to survey and negotiate for a right-of-way grant; consent requirements for a right-of-way and who is authorized to consent; what laws apply to rights-of-way; employment preference for tribal members; combining tracts with different Indian landowners in a single right-of-way grant; trespass; emergency action by us if Indian land is threatened; appeals; documentation required in approving, administering, and enforcing rights-of-way; right-of-way grant duration; mandatory grant provisions; construction, ownership, and removal of permanent improvements, and plans of development; legal descriptions of the land subject to a right-of-way; amount, time, form, and recipient of compensation (including non-monetary rent) for rights-of-way; valuations; bond and insurance requirements; Secretarial approval process, including timelines, and criteria for granting rights-of-way; recordation; consent requirements, Secretarial approval process, criteria for approval, and effective date for grant amendments, assignments, subleases, and mortgages; investigation of compliance with the terms of a right-of-way grant; negotiated remedies; late payment charges or special fees for delinquent payments; allocation of insurance and other payment rights; Secretarial cancellation of a grant for violations; and abandonment of the premises subject to a right-of-way grant. Right-of-way grants allow Indian landowners to use their land profitably for economic development, ultimately contributing to tribal well-being and self-government. Assessment of State and local taxes would obstruct Federal policies supporting tribal economic development, self-determination, and strong tribal governments. State and local taxation also threatens substantial tribal interests in effective tribal government, economic self-sufficiency, and territorial autonomy. It is unequivocally the policy of the United States to attract economic development to Indian lands. State taxation can undermine the economic attractiveness of a right-of-way across Indian land. It can also effectively undermine the ability of a tribe, as a practical matter, to impose its own taxation. Consenting to rights-of-way on trust or restricted land is one of several tools, including entering into leases, that animate “the traditional notions of sovereignty and [ ] the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.” Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145 (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973)). The granting of rights-of-way on trust or restricted lands facilitates the implementation of the policy objectives of tribal governments through vital residential, economic, and governmental services. Tribal sovereignty and self-government are substantially promoted by rights-of-way under these regulations, which require significant deference, to the maximum extent possible, to tribal determinations that a grant provision or requirement is in its best interest. See Joseph P. Kalt and Joseph William Singer, The Native Nations Institute for Leadership, Management, and Policy & The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule, No. 2004-03 (2004) (“economically and culturally, sovereignty is a key lever that provides American Indian communities with institutions and practices that can protect and promote their citizens interests and well-being [and] [w]ithout that lever, the social, cultural, and economic viability of American Indian communities and, perhaps, even identities is untenable over the long run”). Another important aspect of tribal sovereignty and self-governance is taxation. Permanent improvements and activities on the premises subject to a right-of-way and the interest itself may be subject to taxation by the Indian tribe with jurisdiction over the leased property. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.” Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). State and local taxation of grantee-owned improvements, activities conducted by the grantee, and the right-of-way interest also has the potential to increase project costs for the grantee and decrease the funds available to the grantee to compensate the Indian landowner. Increased project costs can impede a tribe's ability to attract non-Indian investment to Indian lands where such investment and participation are critical to the vitality of tribal economies. An increase in project costs is especially damaging to economic development on Indian lands given the difficulty Indian tribes and individuals face in securing access to capital. A 2001 study by the U.S. Department of the Treasury found that Indians' lack of access to capital and financial services is a key barrier to economic advancement. U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Community Development and Financial Institutions Fund, The Report of the Native American Lending Study at 2 (Nov. 2001). According to the report, 66 percent of survey respondents stated that private equity is difficult or impossible to obtain for Indian business owners. Id. Tribes may contractually agree to reimburse the non-Indian grantee for the expense of the tax, resulting in the economic burden of the tax ultimately being borne directly by the tribe. Accordingly, the very possibility of an additional State or local tax has a chilling effect on potential grantees as well as the tribe that, as a result, might refrain from exercising its own sovereign right to impose a tribal tax to support its infrastructure needs. Such dual taxation can make some projects less economically attractive, further discouraging development in Indian country. Economic development on Indian lands is critical to improving the dire economic conditions faced by American Indians and Alaska Natives. The U.S. Census Report entitled We the People: American Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States, issued February 2006, documented that a higher ratio of American Indians and Alaska Natives live in poverty compared to the total population, that participation in the labor force by American Indians and Alaska Natives was lower than the total population, and that those who worked full-time earned less than the general population. See also U.S. Census American Community Survey Brief: Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011 (Issued February 2013). In addition, Congress specifically allowed for State taxation of rights-of-way on Indian land in other instances, such as at 25 U.S.C. 319. The fact that Congress did not specifically authorize State taxation at 25 U.S.C. 323 evidences that it did not intend for rights-of-way granted under that authority to be taxable by the State. Indeed, to the extent that the lack of a specific authorization for State taxation creates an ambiguity, the Department expressly determines, for all the reasons stated above, that State taxation is not authorized under 25 U.S.C. 323 and would substantially undermine the statutory scheme. Comment: One State commenter stated that it addresses the dual taxation issue by entering into intergovernmental agreements with the tribes, whereby the State collects the tax and shares the revenue with the tribes. The State expressed its concern that if the rule removes State jurisdiction to tax projects in rights-of-way, then tribes will have to undertake the expensive auditing and tax collection functions, and the uniformity of intergovernmental agreements would be lost. Response: Nothing in these regulations precludes tribes, States, and local governments from entering into cooperative agreements to address taxation and regulatory issues. The Department encourages such cooperative agreements. Comment: One commenter requested clarification that State or local governments may not assess a tax, fee, assessment, etc., on materials used or services performed in constructing improvements in rights-of-way. Response: The final rule's term “activities” is intended to include, among other things, materials used or services performed in constructing improvements in the right-of-way. Comment: A few commenters stated that certain individuals or entities should not be subject to taxation, such as when a State, county, city, other tax-exempt entity, or allottee is making the improvements, participating in the activities, or holding the possessory interest. Response: The final rule does not change the scope of individuals and entities that a tribe may tax, but merely recognizes explicitly this authority where it exists. Comment: One commenter noted that “possessory interest” should instead be “right-of-way interest.” Response: The final rule replaces “possessory interest” with “right-of-way interest” in response to this comment. Comment: One commenter stated that by prohibiting State taxation on rights-of-way on Indian land, the rule does not guarantee that tribes commensurately gain taxing authority, but rather opens a jurisdictional vacuum. The commenter stated that a vacuum would be detrimental to the public as a whole and tribal members who live near rights-of-way. Response: The rule does not create a jurisdictional vacuum, as tribes may tax within their jurisdiction; it is up to the tribe whether to exercise that taxing jurisdiction. Comment: A few commenters stated that the proposed provisions regarding improvements being subject to taxation by tribes are unnecessary and should be deleted, because they could be read to expand tribes' taxing authority rather than just preserve taxing authority where it already exists. Response: The final rule combines the proposed provisions into one comprehensive provision at paragraph (b) addressing tribal taxation of improvements. The final rule does not change the substance of the proposed rule. The commenters are correct that this provision is intended to preserve tribal taxation authority. The Department has determined that no change is necessary to the proposed language, that improvements “may be subject to taxation by the Indian tribe,” because this language states that such authority may exist without providing independent authority for taxation. Comment: A few commenters stated that proposed § 169.009's use of the phrase “subject only to Federal law” is ambiguous. One said it could be read to exclude tribal law. Another commenter asked specifically whether any “fee, tax, assessment” under this section would include State and local income taxes, gross receipt taxes, payroll taxes, and personal property taxes. A few commenters stated that there are Federal court decisions upholding State taxes on interests or activities in a right-of-way, including Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside County, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971) and Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernardino County, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976). One commenter stated that the rule should clarify that Federal court decisions' precedential weight should be limited to rights-of-way granted before the effective date of the revised regulations. Response: To clarify, the phrase “subject to” in final rule § 169.11 (and PR 169.009) means that State or political subdivisions of States may not propose fees, taxes, assessments, etc., unless Federal law provides otherwise. Federal law includes, but is not limited to, Federal statutes, Federal regulations, treaty provisions, Executive orders, or Federal case law. Each fee, tax, and assessment is subject to an analysis under Federal law, including any applicable Federal case law precedent. The Department agrees that Federal case law issued prior to these regulations may have limited precedential weight because they did not have the benefit of the Department's analysis under Bracker. Comment: One commenter stated that there is already extensive Federal regulation over the national power grid, and to the extent the rule's provisions could authorize new taxes on electric transmission services, it could interfere with national energy policy by adding costs to ratepayers. Another commenter stated that the rule extends beyond the Department' authority by unnecessarily complicating jurisdictional issues on Indian land. These and other commenters stated that the rule is contrary to current practices in which utilities pay county property taxes for facilities located on Indian lands. One commenter asked whether the county would be subject to enforcement under this rule for imposing taxes. Response: The final rule does not authorize taxation by tribes, States or political subdivisions of States, but preserves the tribe's ability to tax and states the Federal position in the Bracker balancing test on State taxation. While electric transmission may be subject to taxation by the tribe, a utility need not pay county property taxes for facilities that are outside the county's jurisdiction ( i.e., on Indian land). A county that imposes taxes on a utility within a right-of-way on Indian land is not subject to enforcement under this rule because it is not a party to the right-of-way. Comment: A few commenters stated that a tribe's imposition of taxes upon non-members' interests or activities in a right-of-way is presumptively invalid, citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659 (2001). Response: The case cited by the commenter for this proposition related to fee land. As described above, trust or restricted land that is subject to a right-of-way remains trust or restricted land and it does not become fee land if the tribe reserves its jurisdiction over the land. Comment: One commenter suggested revising this section to state simply that taxes may be assessed if permitted by applicable law on land, improvements, and activities. Response: The final rule retains the substance of the proposed provisions on taxation, rather than taking the commenter's suggestion, in order to explain the strong Federal and tribal interests against State and local taxation. Comment: One commenter stated that, if the rule intends to alter the balance under the Bracker test, then it will impact the abilities of State and tribal governments to impose taxes, which is contrary to the statement in the Federalism section stating that the rule has no substantial direct effect on the States, the relationship between the national government and the States, or distribution of power. Another commenter stated that the Department should notify and consult with affected States before issuing a final regulation if it preempts State taxing authority. Response: The Federalism analysis addresses the balance of power between the Federal government and States. The balance of power between tribal governments and States is outside the scope of Federalism. As noted above, States commented on the proposed rule, including on this provision. Comment: One commenter questioned how any structure within a right-of-way for a term less than an indefinite term could be considered a “permanent improvement.” Response: The final rule adds a definition for permanent improvement to clarify its meaning; it is not necessary that the improvement be actually permanent, but that it be attached to (or in) the land. Comment: One commenter stated that the tribe cannot tax the land because trust and restricted lands are not subject to taxation. Response: The regulation addresses taxation of activities and interests, rather than taxation of the land itself. 10. Notice of Rights-of-Way (PR 169.010/FR 169.12) Comment: One commenter stated that the term “affecting” for Indian land is ambiguous and could be interpreted in an overly broad manner in this section to require notice of actions on non-Indian lands. Response: The final rule changes “affecting” to “over or across” to clarify that the notice to Indian landowners is triggered for rights-of-way actions on or across their Indian land. The final rule also replaces the term “affecting” and “on or across” in other sections throughout the rule in response to this comment. Comment: Several commenters opposed notifying individual Indian landowners by constructive notice. These commenters stated that every landowner is entitled to actual notice of actions involving their land, no matter how numerous the landowners are. A few commenters stated that the Department should provide direct notification by certified letter to individual Indian landowners of any determination. Other commenters stated that providing notice to every individual owner is too expensive and supported constructive notice and one suggested providing no notice to landowners. Response: The final rule deletes the allowance for “constructive notice” for grants of rights-of-way and instead requires the Department to provide actual notice to the individual Indian landowners by mail or, upon the landowner's request, by email. This approach ensures that each beneficial owner receives written notice of a right-of-way on his or her land. The final rule does not require certified letters because of the additional expense associated with such letters. The rule provides for constructive notice of certain enforcement actions. Comment: A commenter suggested that applicants should also be permitted to provide constructive notice to individual Indian landowners. Response: Applicants must directly contact individual Indian landowners, and may not use constructive notice, both to ensure that the landowners are aware of the potential application for a right-of-way and to obtain the consent of the individual owners of the requisite majority interests. Comment: A few commenters suggested allowing the Department to notify the applicant and tribe by email. Response: The final rule allows the Department to notify the applicant and tribe by email of any status updates or determinations where the applicant or tribe requests. The final rule also allows individual Indian landowners to request to receive their notices by email. Comment: Several tribes requested that they be notified of rights-of-way on land within their jurisdiction, even if the tribe is not an owner of the land. The commenters note that such notice would allow the tribe to better plan for development within the tribe's jurisdiction. Response: The final rule incorporates a provision to notify the tribe of rights-of-way in its jurisdiction. Comment: A few commenters stated that the rules increase the Department's ability to make decisions on behalf of tribes and individual on actions impacting their lands. Response: The rule does not increase the Department's ability to make decisions on behalf of Indian landowners without notice. In fact, the rule provides that the Department will defer to the tribe's decision for tribal land. The rule increases the notice that is provided to the tribe to include notice of right-of-way decisions on any land within its jurisdiction, and formalizes notice requirements for individual Indian landowners. 11. Appeals of Right-of-Way Decisions (PR 169.011/FR 169.13) Comment: A few commenters suggested that the proposed rule could be construed broadly to allow any Indian landowner to appeal a right-of-way denial, regardless of whether the landowner owns land over which the right-of-way would cross. Response: The final rule clarifies that an Indian landowner may appeal a denial of a right-of-way under 25 CFR part 2 only if the right-of-way would have been over or across land owned by that Indian landowner. Comment: Several commenters objected to limiting the right of appeal to Indian landowners if BIA disapproves a right-of-way application. These commenters reasoned that anyone with a “legitimate interest” should have the right to administrative appeal and the applicant is uniquely situated because it invested time and money applying for the right-of-way. These commenters als [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2015-28548. Public record. Not legal advice.