# Updating Competitive Bidding Rules > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2015-21950 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** September 18, 2015 - **Citation:** 80 FR 56764 ## Text FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 47 CFR Parts 1 and 27 [GN Docket No. 12-268, WT Docket Nos. 14-170, 05-211, RM-11395; FCC 15-80] Updating Competitive Bidding Rules AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: In this document, the Commission modernizes and reforms its competitive bidding rules to provide greater flexibility to small businesses and rural service providers and bring greater choices to consumers. DATES: Effective November 17, 2015, except for §§ 1.2105(a)(2), 1.2105(a)(2)(iii) through (vi), (viii) through (x), and (xii), 1.2105(c)(3) through (4), 1.2110(j), 1.2110(n), 1.2112(b)(1)(iii) through (vi), 1.2112(b)(2)(iii), (v), and (vii) through (viii), 1.2114(a)(1), and 1.9020(e) which contain new or modified information collection requirements that require approval by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Commission will publish a document in the Federal Register announcing the effective date of those sections. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: Leslie Barnes at (202) 418-0660. For further information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this document, contact Cathy Williams at (202) 418-2918, or via the Internet at PRA@fcc.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Report and Order; Order on Reconsideration of the First Report and Order; Third Order on Reconsideration of the Second Report and Order; Third Report and Order ( Part 1 Report & Order ), RM-11395, GN Docket No. 12-268, WT Docket Nos. 05-211 and 14-170, FCC 15-80, adopted on July 16, 2015 and released on July 21, 2015. This summary also reflects the Commission's Erratum, DA 15-959, released on August 25, 2015, to correct typographical errors in the text of the decision and make ministerial conforming amendments to the rules attached as APPENDIX A to the Part 1 Report and Order that correct typographical errors and update cross-references within the part 1 rules and cross-references to those part 1 rules in other service-specific rule parts. The complete text of this document is available for public inspection and copying from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) Monday through Thursday or from 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET on Fridays in the FCC Reference Information Center, 445 12th Street SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. The complete text is available on the Commission's Web site at http://wireless.fcc.gov, or by using the search function on the ECFS Web page at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. Alternative formats are available to persons with disabilities by sending an email to FCC504@fcc.gov or by calling the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530 (voice), (202) 418-0432 (TTY). Regulatory Flexibility Analysis As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) of the possible significant economic impact on small entities of the policies and rules adopted in this document. The FRFA is set forth in Appendix B of the Part 1 Report and Order. The Commission's Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, will send a copy of this Part 1 Report and Order, including the FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA). Paperwork Reduction Act The Part 1 Report and Order contains new and modified information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13. They will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under section 3507(d) of the PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be invited to comment on the new and modified information collection requirements contained in this proceeding. Congressional Review Act The Commission will send a copy of this Part 1 Report and Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act (CRA), see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A). I. Introduction and Background 1. The Part 1 Report and Order modernizes and reforms the Commission's part 1 competitive bidding rules to reflect profound changes in the wireless industry over the last decade. In modernizing the part 1 rules, the Commission provides greater flexibility to smaller companies to build wireless businesses that can spur additional investment in businesses and bring greater choices to consumers. The Commission also provides—for the first time—a bidding credit to eligible rural service providers to help them compete for spectrum licenses more effectively and to provide consumers in rural areas with competitive offerings. Through these changes, and in furtherance of its statutory obligations, the Commission recommits and refocuses its efforts to providing meaningful opportunities to bona fide small businesses and rural service providers, including businesses owned by members of minority groups and women (collectively designated entities, or DEs) to participate in auctions and in the provision of spectrum-based services, and in providing such opportunities, to prevent unjust enrichment. 2. The reforms the Commission adopts reflect that the wireless market is vastly different than when its rules were first adopted nearly two decades ago—and since they were last comprehensively revised in 2006. Consumer demand is exploding, data usage is growing exponentially, and faster 4G networks enable ever more data services. Although this kind of growth should naturally lead to greater opportunities for businesses of all sizes and types, small businesses and rural service providers have faced significant challenges to entering the market and competing against larger carriers. The Commission's rules have not kept pace with the dynamic changes in the market. 3. When the DE rules were first adopted, the wireless industry was in its infancy. The rules governing a nascent industry, and even rules adopted ten years ago, could not have envisioned the changes that have occurred in the industry. The wireless market has matured significantly since that time, and today more than 98 percent of mobile subscribers are served by the top four national providers. In recent years, even new large-scale wireless providers, backed by well-capitalized corporations have struggled to develop successful business models to compete in today's wireless marketplace. If major corporations cannot enter the market as new providers and deploy facilities-based services to consumers, it is wholly unrealistic to expect small businesses to do so. 4. Therefore, the rules the Commission adopts provide greater flexibility for small businesses to gain an on-ramp into the wireless industry by leveraging leasing and other spectrum use agreements to gain access to capital and operational experience. The Commission anticipates that, with experience in operations and investment, smaller companies may ultimately engage in more robust competition, including as facilities-based providers in certain markets, which has been—and remains—a goal of the Commission. Likewise, the Commission expects that a new bidding credit targeted toward eligible rural service providers will both encourage their greater participation in future auctions, and increase their provision of wireless broadband services to unserved and underserved communities, including persistent poverty areas. Ensuring that multiple rural service providers have the ability to compete effectively to acquire spectrum licenses is crucial to promoting consumer choice and competition throughout rural America, as well as to fostering innovation in the marketplace. 5. The Commission undertakes these rule revisions with an understanding that the opportunity to acquire low-band spectrum licenses in the upcoming Broadcast Television Spectrum Incentive Auction (Incentive Auction) will not be replicated in the foreseeable future. The growth in consumer demand for mobile broadband has led to a growing need for spectrum. But not all spectrum is created equal. Low-band spectrum has distinct propagation advantages for network deployment over long distances and is likely to be necessary for existing providers that wish to expand their coverage in rural areas, as well as for new providers that wish to provide service in a rural market. The rule changes the Commission adopts specifically address the difficulties that small businesses and rural service providers confront in today's marketplace, including raising capital to compete in an auction, securing the far greater financial resources necessary to support the construction and operation of a wireless broadband network, and developing a successful business model based on current market structures and consumer needs. The Commission anticipates that these changes will allow bona fide small businesses and eligible rural service providers a greater opportunity to participate in spectrum auctions and in the provision of wireless services. 6. At the same time, the Commission adopts common sense reforms that recognize that with increased flexibility comes additional responsibility. The Commission remains mindful of its obligation to ensure that the benefits it provides through DE bidding credits flow only to those intended by Congress. The Part 1 Report and Order establishes a cap on the total value of bidding credits that the Commission will award to an eligible applicant in a Commission auction. The Commission also adopts targeted measures to ensure that bona fide small businesses and eligible rural service providers are “calling the shots,” by limiting the amount of spectrum capacity that a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee may use on a license-by-license basis during the unjust enrichment period and by clarifying the types of agreements that will require particularly close scrutiny during its evaluation of DE eligibility. Taken together, and based on experience gained by administering the Commission's auctions program, the Commission believes these measures will ensure that benefits are provided only to eligible DEs. This rulemaking therefore marks another chapter in the Commission's more than twenty-year effort to achieve a proper balance between the parallel goals of affording DEs reasonable flexibility to obtain the necessary resources to participate in auctions and in the wireless industry while also effectively preventing the unjust enrichment of entities that would be ineligible to receive DE benefits in their own right. 7. In the Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission also modifies its competitive bidding processes and compliance rules to increase transparency and efficiency, as well as to protect the integrity of the Commission auction process. Chief among these modifications is its prohibition of joint bidding, with limited exceptions, and related changes the Commission makes to its rules regarding multiple applications by commonly controlled entities and prohibited communications. These changes will still afford opportunities for non-nationwide providers and DEs to pool their resources but will update the Commission's rules to promote more robust competition in future auctions and in today's evolving mobile wireless marketplace, especially when anonymous bidding is utilized. The Commission also amends its rules governing former defaulters to simplify the auction process and minimize administrative and implementation costs for bidders. Taken together, the Commission expects that these rule changes will improve the competitive bidding process for all participants. 8. Accordingly, in the Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission: (1) modifies its eligibility requirements for small business benefits, and updates the standardized schedule of small business sizes, including the gross revenues thresholds used to determine eligibility; (2) establishes a new bidding credit for eligible rural service providers; (3) implements a cap on the overall amount of bidding credits available for eligible entities in any one auction; (4) strengthens and targets attribution rules to prevent the unjust enrichment of ineligible entities; (5) retains and clarifies DE reporting requirements; (6) revises the former defaulter rule, consistent with the waiver the Commission granted in Auction 97; (7) adopts rules prohibiting joint bidding arrangements with limited exceptions, and makes related updates to its rules on prohibited communications; and (8) adopts rules prohibiting the same individual or entity as well as entities that have controlling interests in common from becoming qualified to bid on the basis of more than one short-form application in a specific auction, with a limited exception for certain rural wireless partnerships and individual members of such partnerships. II. Eligibility for Bidding Credits A. Attribution Rules and Small Business Policies 9. Background. The Commission revisits its DE eligibility rules in an effort to address the difficulties that small businesses and rural service providers confront in a dynamic, rapidly evolving wireless marketplace. In establishing the Commission's auction authority, Congress vested the Commission with broad discretion to balance a number of competing objectives. Among these are special provisions to ensure that DEs, including small businesses and rural service providers, have the opportunity to participate in competitive bidding and in the provision of spectrum-based services. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(B), 309(j)(4)(D). For such purposes, Congress granted the Commission the ability to consider the use of bidding preferences. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)-(4). At the same time, the Congress directed the Commission to prevent unjust enrichment as a result of the methods it employs to issue licenses. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(C), (4)(E). Congress also directed the Commission, through its auction design, to seek to promote several other objectives, including the following: The development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services without administrative delays; economic opportunity and competition through the dissemination of licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including DEs; recovery for the public of a portion of the value of the public spectrum resource made available for commercial use; and efficient and intensive use of the electromagnetic spectrum. 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(A)-(D). Over the course of the auctions program, the Commission has periodically re-evaluated its rules to strike the right balance among these competing statutory objectives. 10. As the Commission's principal means of fulfilling its statutory objectives for DEs, it offers auction bidding credits to eligible small businesses whose gross revenues, in combination with those of its “attributable” interest holders, fall below applicable service-specific size limits. 47 CFR 1.2110. (A bidding credit operates as a percentage discount on the winning bid amount of a qualifying small business. See 47 CFR 1.2110(f)(1)). Since 2000, the Commission has applied a “controlling interest” standard in all services when making these attribution determinations for small business eligibility. Under this standard, the Commission measures an applicant's size by attributing to it the gross revenues of the applicant, its controlling interests, its affiliates, and the affiliates of the applicant's controlling interests. In 2006, the Commission added a bright-line test to require a small business applicant or licensee to automatically attribute to itself the gross revenues of any entity with which it has an “attributable material relationship” (AMR). An applicant or licensee has an AMR when it has one or more agreements with any individual entity for the lease (under either spectrum manager or de facto transfer leasing arrangements) or resale (including wholesale arrangements) of, on a cumulative basis, more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity of any individual license held by the applicant or licensee. 47 CFR 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A). 11. Since the adoption of the AMR rule, small businesses have asserted that it impedes their ability to compete successfully in the wireless industry. In the Part 1 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Part 1 NPRM or NPRM), 79 FR 68172, November 14, 2014, the Commission discussed the significant industry changes that have occurred over the past two decades and in particular during the ten years since it last undertook a major update of the DE eligibility requirements. During this time, the marketplace for mobile wireless services has evolved significantly, both in terms of consumer demand for services and in market structure. According to UBS Investment Research, the total estimated number of wireless customer connections in the United States reached 376.2 million at the end of 1Q 2015, up from 352.5 million at the end of 2014, an increase of 23.7 million connections. The deployment of next generation networks has contributed to an increase of more than 200,000 percent in the number of long-term evolution (LTE) subscribers alone, from approximately 70,000 in 2010 to over 140 million in 2014. Consumers today expect to be able to use mobile wireless services—especially mobile broadband—at home, at work, and while on the go. The marketplace has seen the rapid and widespread adoption of smartphones and tablet computers and an increase in the use of mobile applications, as well as in the deployment of high-speed 3G and 4G technologies, the combination of which has led to more intensive use of mobile networks. For instance, according to providers responding to the most recent CTIA survey, active smartphones topped 208 million in 2014, up 19 percent from 175 million in 2013, and 35.4 million active wireless-enabled tablets and laptops were reported (up 40.5 percent year-over-year) in the same time period. Consequently, mobile data traffic has grown dramatically, increasing from 388 billion MB in 2010 to 4.06 trillion megabytes (MB) at the end of 2014, which represents a greater than ten times increase in the volume of data that was reported just four years ago. Despite technological improvements that have led to more efficient use of existing spectrum and increased investment in infrastructure, this skyrocketing consumer demand for high-speed data has increased providers' need for spectrum at an unprecedented rate. 12. Additionally, the wireless market structure continues to evolve. While the mobile wireless marketplace once consisted of six near-nationwide providers and a substantial number of regional and small providers, over the last ten years there has been consolidation, leaving four nationwide providers and fewer small and regional mobile wireless service providers. More than 98 percent of mobile subscribers are served by the top four providers, which combined serve more than 375 million consumers. This concentration of mobile service providers contributes to the difficulties experienced by small businesses in the wireless marketplace. Moreover, the costs of spectrum and network deployment—especially for small businesses—have increased in the last 20 years. These market realities require DEs to have increased flexibility to gain access to capital in order to acquire licenses and benefit from the different opportunities available to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. Interested parties therefore urged the Commission to re-examine its rules and policies to provide small businesses with more operational flexibility to enable them to grow their operations and to develop new and innovative products and services. As noted in the NPRM, the SBA's Office of Advocacy raised similar concerns. 13. To address these concerns and changing conditions, the Commission sought comment in the Part 1 NPRM on whether to eliminate the AMR rule and revisit the policy that has required that small businesses seeking bidding credits to directly provide facilities-based service for the benefit of the public with each of their licenses. The Commission also sought comment on standards for evaluating small business eligibility, and on revising the rules for spectrum manager leasing by DE licensees. During the initial comment cycle, several parties suggested alternate approaches to its proposals, others offered additional suggestions, and some raised questions beyond those covered in the NPRM. Accordingly, to assure a more complete record, the Commission released a public notice in April 2015 seeking additional comment on these proposals, suggestions, and questions, as well as on other associated issues. 14. In the Part 1 Public Notice ( Part 1 PN ), 80 FR 22690, April 23, 2015, the Commission acknowledged that it had received comments both in favor of and against the Commission's proposed repeal of the AMR rule, and it sought further comment on various methods of modifying its DE eligibility rules. The Commission asked, for example, whether, instead of repealing the AMR rule, the Commission should retain it, in either its existing or a modified form. The Commission sought additional comment on whether it should continue to require DE lessors to provide primarily facilities-based service. The Commission asked whether it should distinguish between types of secondary market arrangements (such as wholesale and resale agreements) entered into by DEs. The Commission sought comment on whether the rules that it applies to secondary market arrangements between DEs and nationwide wireless providers should be different from the ones that it applies to arrangements between DEs and other lessees. The Commission solicited input on whether to have any limit on the amount of spectrum that a DE would be permitted to lease to another DE or a rural carrier. And, among other possibilities, the Commission sought comment on whether it should reconsider a bright-line test for determining who is considered a controlling investor in a DE. 15. Based on the entirety of the record, including the comments filed both in the initial comment cycle and in response to the Part 1 PN, the Commission believes that the revised rules it adopts will increase the ability of small businesses to become spectrum licensees. Together, these changes update its eligibility rules to take into account current market realities, namely that DEs need increased flexibility to gain access to capital and, in turn, have greater opportunities to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. The Part 1 Report and Order addresses the specific obstacles these participants face, including raising the capital necessary to compete in an auction; finding sufficient financial resources to support network construction and business operations; and developing a business model based on market needs. It responds to concerns voiced by licensees and potential licensees that the Commission's DE rules have not kept pace with today's environment. And, of equal importance, it updates its rules to ensure that only bona fide small businesses qualify for and benefit from the designated entity program. With these rules, the Commission allows small businesses to take advantage of opportunities available under its rules to utilize their spectrum capacity and gain access to capital similar to those afforded to larger licensees. 16. The record demonstrates that, while commenters are divided on the best approach to implement its DE program, they are nonetheless in agreement that it is time for the Commission to recalibrate its rules to achieve an improved statutory balance. The fundamental changes in the market coupled with the evolution of DE participation in the Commission's auctions since 2006, have led it to conclude that it is time to revise its rules and revisit their statutory underpinnings. First, the Commission eliminates the AMR rule. Second, the Commission adopts a two-pronged test to determine eligibility for the award and retention of small business benefits, largely as proposed in the NPRM. This test retains the foundation of the controlling interest standard, including the attribution and affiliation requirements of 47 CFR 1.2110, but applies these requirements in a more precise manner, based upon a careful review of all of a DE's relevant relationships and agreements. Under this test, the Commission will apply existing rules requiring attribution of the controlling interests in, and the affiliates of, a small business venture to determine whether the applicant: (1) Meets the applicable small business size standard, and (2) retains control over the spectrum associated with the individual licenses for which it seeks benefits. Pursuant to this more tailored review, eligibility for small business benefits will be determined, as the Commission proposed in the NPRM, on a license-by-license basis to ensure that the small business makes independent decisions about its business operations. 17. To better ensure that only eligible entities enjoy the valuable bidding credits that the Commission awards DEs, it adopts an additional attribution requirement under which during the five-year unjust enrichment period, the gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural service provider) of a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee will become attributable, on a license-by-license basis, for any license acquired with a bidding credit and still subject to unjust enrichment requirements of which the disclosable interest holder uses (or has an agreement to use) more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity. Lastly, the Commission relies on the language of section 309(j), as opposed to the Commission's prior interpretation of its legislative history, to conclude that there is no statutory requirement for DEs to provide facilities-based service directly to the public with each license they hold. Together, these changes will permit DEs the same flexibility as other licensees under its rules to avail themselves of a wider range of the opportunities to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. For these same reasons, the Commission modifies the language of 47 CFR 1.9020 as it proposed doing to make clear that DE lessors may fully engage in spectrum manager leasing under the same de facto control standard as non-DE lessors. i. AMR Rule 18. The Commission eliminates the AMR rule, which required a per se bright-line attribution of revenues to a DE applicant, even in circumstances where there may have been no control of the DE's overall operations or the DE's spectrum by the spectrum user. Instead, the Commission employs a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to evaluate an entity's eligibility for, and retention of, small business benefits. Further, the Commission adds a more targeted, license-by-license rule, to ensure that DE benefits do not flow to ineligible entities. 19. Throughout the course of this proceeding, the Commission has received comments that variously advocate keeping, eliminating, or modifying the AMR rule. Many commenters, however, agree with the Commission's proposal to repeal the AMR rule, stating that repeal of the rule will afford small businesses the flexibility needed to obtain the capital necessary to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services. These commenters note that the proposal to adopt a two-pronged standard for evaluating the eligibility for small business benefits relies on well-established Commission standards for evaluating de jure and de facto control and can be coupled with stronger unjust enrichment provisions to better prevent the abuse of small business benefits. In asking the Commission to eliminate the AMR rule, ARC, for example, indicates that a return to a case-by-case analysis of eligibility using the Commission's control and affiliation standards will align the Commission's policy with marketplace realities. ARC notes that by allowing relationships between DEs and “large, successful entities, including mobile wireless incumbents,” DEs will be able to acquire the capital needed to win licenses and “participate in the provision of spectrum-based services.” According to ARC, DEs can have such relationships without relinquishing control of their businesses. Similarly, Tristar maintains that the Commission should “allow DEs to engage in any activities with its licenses that are available to non-DEs, without limit,” suggesting that a limitation is contrary to the “plain language” of section 309(j). CCA also supports eliminating the AMR rule in favor of de jure and de facto control standards but cautions that repeal of the rule must be accompanied by safeguards to protect against abuse. In addition, USCC argues that setting any absolute limit on the amount of spectrum that a DE may lease or resell will continue to have negative consequences. 20. Other parties oppose the repeal of the AMR rule. T-Mobile argues that doing so will increase the likelihood that DE benefits could flow to ineligible entities or spectrum “speculators” in contravention of Congressional intent, and others express similar concerns. Further, some commenters argue that the AMR rule should not only be retained but strengthened. For example, T-Mobile and C Spire advocate that the Commission prohibit a DE from leasing more than 25 percent of its spectrum in the aggregate across one or more licenses. C Spire also argues that, if the AMR rule is retained, a DE should not be allowed to lease more than 25 percent of its total spectrum to any one wireless operator. 21. Although the Commission acknowledges the concerns of parties who urge the Commission to retain or strengthen the AMR rule, the Commission concludes that its collective rule revisions, including the adoption of a more targeted attribution rule that limits the ability of a disclosable interest holder in a DE to use spectrum awarded with a bidding credit decreases the likelihood that DE benefits will flow to ineligible entities in contravention of Congress's intent. Moreover, because the Commission's revised approach utilizes its existing controlling interest and affiliation standards to determine what revenues are attributable to an applicant based upon a rigorous review of all relevant relationships and agreements on a license-by-license basis, the Commission concludes that it no longer needs a bright-line, across-the-board, attribution rule to ensure that a small business makes independent decisions about its business operations. Based on the Commission's auction experience, and in light of the totality of the record in this proceeding, it is persuaded that the AMR rule is overbroad. 22. Eliminating the AMR rule, and replacing it with a more targeted license-by-license attribution rule, will allow small businesses greater flexibility to engage in business ventures that include increased forms of leasing and other spectrum use arrangements, while still having the ability to attract capital investment, even from large providers. DEs, like other licensees, will enjoy greater flexibility to adopt more individualized business models for each license they hold—some that include DE benefits and potentially some that do not. The Commission anticipates that small businesses will, as a result, gain greater access to capital, and in turn, increase their likelihood of participating in auctions and in the provision of spectrum-based services. Under the license-by-license approach for a DE's acquisition and retention of bidding credits that the Commission adopts, a DE will not necessarily lose its eligibility for all current and future small business benefits solely because of a decision associated with any particular license. 23. Although the Commission agrees that its rules must prevent ineligible entities from thwarting the spirit of the DE program and benefitting from bidding credits intended for small businesses, it disagrees that the continuation of the AMR rule achieves that goal. Rather than employing the overly broad attribution standard that has been applied since the adoption of the AMR rule, the Commission concludes that it can balance its competing statutory objectives more effectively and at the same time better empower small businesses to acquire spectrum and operate in today's wireless marketplace. The Commission adopted the AMR rule in 2006 with the goal of preventing unjust enrichment to ineligible entities and ensuring that DEs had opportunities to become independent, facilities-based service providers with each of their licenses. Thus, the AMR rule, in contrast with the other provisions of the Commission's DE eligibility rules, established a bright-line test for triggering the attribution of revenues where a lease was for more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity of any individual license, regardless of whether the DE retained control of its overall operations or its spectrum. The Commission was concerned about a lessee's “potential to significantly influence” the DE applicant. It also noted “the potential” for the relationship to impede a DE's “ability to become a facilities-based provider,” and sought to avoid a relationship that was “ripe for abuse.” The bright-line application of the AMR rule was therefore a tool that the Commission chose to implement in its effort to balance its statutory objectives. Yet commenters in this proceeding have argued that, based on experience, the Commission's current rules, which include the AMR rule, may not be effective in limiting the award of bidding credits to bona fide small businesses. 24. The Commission further notes that the adoption of the AMR rule was a departure from its earlier, more comprehensive analysis of how a DE's relationships might lead to attribution of gross revenues, as well as its initial approach to evaluating how much leasing was permissible for DEs at the outset of its secondary market policies. Over the last ten years, industry developments have demonstrated that this regulatory adjustment to prevent unjust enrichment, may have operated to the detriment of the Commission's other equally important statutory objectives, and may not be achieving the goals for which it was adopted. By re-examining the statutory underpinnings of its rules and policies and refining its eligibility rules to reflect current market realities, including the niche roles DEs may play in a mature wireless industry, the Commission can better promote the statutory goal of disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small businesses, while also following its competing statutory obligations. Moreover, the revised rules the Commission adopts here refocuses its efforts to thwart speculation by narrowly tailoring the attribution of revenues of those that control the DE's business, control the DE's spectrum, or have an interest in the DE and an agreement to use a spectrum license. 25. Based on the Commission's most recent auction experience, the changes in the wireless marketplace, and the comments and other submissions filed in the record, the Commission agrees with those commenters that contend that the Commission cannot realistically continue to expect DEs to compete successfully at auction or in the marketplace against their larger counterparts while, unlike those competitors, being subject to an across the board, all or nothing rule that limits their ability to make rational, business-based decisions on how best to utilize their licensed spectrum capacity. Absent additional flexibility to gain access to capital through increased secondary market opportunities, on terms similar to their better-financed and more-experienced competitors, it is the Commission's predictive judgment that DEs will not be able to build viable, competitive wireless businesses. The decisions the Commission reaches collectively recognize that permitting DEs to make independent business judgments on how to best provide service—either on their own, directly or indirectly, or in connection with others—will better ensure that DEs themselves are the driving forces of their business operations. Thus, provided that a DE remains fully in control of its primary business and complies with all of the provisions of 47 CFR 1.2110, as amended, the Commission concludes that the degree to which a small business engages in a spectrum use agreement on any particular license need not, without more, presumptively require the bright-line attribution of revenues of the user to the DE in all circumstances. 26. In addition, the Commission relies on the express language of section 309(j) to conclude that there is no statutory requirement for DEs to directly provide facilities-based service to the public with each license they hold. As the Commission noted in the NPRM, that policy arose from the Commission's analysis of a part of the legislative history of section 309(j) that explained that anti-trafficking restrictions and unjust enrichment payment obligations were needed to deter “participation in the licensing process by those who have no intention of offering service to the public.” As the Commission recognized in the NPRM, there are other more narrowly tailored methods that it can adopt, and do in fact implement, to prevent unjust enrichment and accomplish that same goal. More important, as the Commission also noted in the NPRM, “[i]n interpreting statutes, “[a]nalysis of the statutory text, aided by established principles of interpretation, controls.” Section 309(j) does not refer to any requirement of “offering service to the public,” much less the provision of facilities-based telecommunications services directly to the public. Nor does it specify what measures the Commission must implement to address unjust enrichment concerns. Rather, it leaves to the Commission the design of auction rules to include those “as may be necessary.” Pursuant to the specific language of section 309(j), the Commission has broad discretion to balance many factors. 27. In this regard, the Commission disagrees with the concerns of CAGW and others regarding the retention of the prior policy of direct facilities-based service to the public by licensees that were awarded bidding credits. Specifically, CAGW argues that by “allowing non-facilities-based entities to qualify for the DE discounts, smaller facilities-based carriers will find it more difficult to obtain the necessary spectrum required to expand their coverage and service.” To the contrary, the Commission finds that in light of the combined rule modifications it adopted, a singular focus on requiring DEs to provide primarily facilities-based service directly to the public with each and every license they hold is not necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, operates as an impediment to the competing statutory goals, and hinders the ability of small businesses to participate effectively in the provision of spectrum-based services. 28. As the Commission explains, although it eliminates the AMR rule, it emphasizes that it fully preserves its ability to assess whether the terms of any particular spectrum use agreement with a DE, or any other aspect of a relationship between a DE and another party, requires the attribution of that party's gross revenues to the DE generally or on a license-by-license basis under 47 CFR 1.2110, as amended. Contrary to a bright-line application of the AMR rule, this approach should better reflect the nature of the relationship between DEs and the parties with which they are securing financing and/or engaging in spectrum use agreements. The AMR rule was overly broad insofar as it foreclosed DEs from the business flexibility afforded to other licensees and yet was also overly narrow insofar as it did not foreclose other possible misuses of the bidding credits awarded DEs. Accordingly, the Commission revises its rules to determine more precisely what entities have the ability to dictate the DE's business and spectrum use decisions such that their gross revenues should be attributed to the DE applicant for purposes of determining its eligibility for and retention of small business benefits. 29. Two-Pronged Standard for Evaluating Eligibility for Small Business Benefits. To assess more accurately an applicant's size for determining eligibility for DE benefits, the Commission adopts a two-pronged standard. Under this test, the Commission will use its existing controlling interest and affiliation rules to determine whether an applicant (or licensee): (1) Meets the applicable small business size standard, and (2) retains control over the spectrum associated with the licenses for which it seeks small business benefits. 30. Under the first prong of the standard, the Commission will apply its existing controlling interest and affiliation rules to determine the gross revenues attributable to a DE. This analysis must determine those that have de jure or de facto control of, or are affiliated with, the applicant's overall business venture. 47 CFR 1.2110. De jure control is typically evidenced by the holding of greater than 50 percent of the voting stock of a corporation or, in the case of a partnership, general partnership interests. 47 CFR 1.2110(c). De facto control is assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the licensee has actual control over its business. 47 CFR 1.2110(c). Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2110, control and affiliation may also arise through, among other things, ownership interests, voting interests, management and other operating agreements, or the terms of any other types of agreements—including spectrum lease agreements—that independently or together create a controlling, or potentially controlling, interest in the DE's business as a whole. See, e.g., 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5)(vii) through (x). (As discussed below, except under the limited provisions provided for spectrum manager lessors, the decision to discontinue the Commission's policy requiring DE licensees to operate as primarily facilities-based providers of service directly to the public does not alter the rules that require the Commission to consider whether facilities sharing and other agreements confer control of or create affiliation with the applicant). By separating the issue of who controls, or has the potential to control, the DE in regard to its overall business from the inquiry into who uses or controls the license(s) acquired with DE benefits for any particular license, the Commission can more accurately determine the extent to which these benefits are unjustly enriching an ineligible entity. In this way, the Commission can continue to fulfill its statutory objectives by facilitating the ability of small businesses to acquire licenses and participate in the provision of spectrum-based services to the public, while also promoting its competing statutory objectives. 31. This reformed approach received the endorsement of most commenters specifically addressing the two-pronged standard. Under this approach, the Commission will rely on its existing controlling interest and affiliation standards to determine which revenues are attributable to an applicant based upon a careful review of all of its relevant relationships and agreements to ensure that small businesses make independent decisions about their business operations. See, e.g., 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5)(vii) through (x). (The Commission notes, for example, that standard passive investor protections generally do not give cause for concern but that provisions that limit the DE's use, deployment, operation, or transfer of its spectrum license(s) or business may warrant closer scrutiny). The Commission's existing attribution rules examine the extent to which a small business may combine its efforts, property, money, skill, and knowledge with another party. Further, where there is an agreement to share profits and losses in proportion to each party's contribution to the business operation, the existing rules allow it to consider this in determining whether to attribute the revenues of parties to that agreement to the applicant. The rules the Commission adopts, taken together, will continue to apply a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to allow it to evaluate where an agreement or relationship warrants the attribution of revenues for the purposes of evaluating eligibility. This approach will better enable the Commission to evaluate the various investors in a DE, both controlling and non-controlling, to ensure that a DE remains in command of its business. The Commission emphasizes that this review process will therefore provide it the ability to determine, pursuant to its existing rules, whether an entity with a non-controlling interest in more than one DE has created a relationship of affiliation between applicants for bidding credits such that the revenues of one need to be attributable to the other. The Commission will also evaluate whether participation of a non-controlling interest holder in more than one applicant renders it an affiliate of both (or multiple) applicants such that the revenues of the non-controlling interest holder (as well as those of its controlling interests, its affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests) should be considered attributable, with respect to either, both, or multiple applicants for purposes of determining eligibility for bidding credits on any particular license or as a general matter. See, e.g., 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5)(vii)-(x). For instance, where a party has a non-controlling interest in more than one DE applicant or licensee, the Commission will carefully review its investments in, and agreements with, the applicants to evaluate overlapping interests with respect to issues like the use of licensed spectrum capacity, jointly used facilities, shared office space, managerial authority, operational contracts, as well as how the parties may generally be combining their efforts, capital, skill and knowledge. Thus, whether DEs are affiliated with each other or with a common investor, for example, could be informed by the nature of their relationships with that common investor. 32. As in the past, the Commission will carefully review an applicant's claim of eligibility for bidding credits on a case-by-case basis. In so doing, the Commission will examine the facts in the context of both the specific eligibility standards set forth in its rules, and the totality of the circumstances and facts presented by the applicant. While no two cases are the same and each case must be judged on its own facts, the Commission emphasizes that some management, loan, and organizational documents, such as limited liability company agreements, and other types of operational agreements could raise concerns that warrant particular scrutiny as part of its application review. These include agreements and arrangements in which a disclosable interest holder, lender, spectrum lessee, or other interest holder has a role in the day-to-day operations and business of a DE applicant or licensee, as well as provisions that would, taken together or separately, limit the DE's use, deployment, operation, or transfer of its license(s) or business, extending the role of these entities beyond the standard and typical role of a passive investor. While the Commission will look at the totality of the circumstances in each particular case, the Commission also continues to “emphasize that its concerns are greatly increased when a single entity provides most of the capital and management services and is the beneficiary of the investor protections.” 33. If an entity qualifies as a DE under the first prong, the Commission will evaluate whether it is eligible for benefits on a license-by-license basis under the second prong. Under the second prong, the Commission will evaluate whether a small business is entitled to benefits based on whether it will maintain de jure and de facto control of the particular license at issue under the terms of any use agreements for each license. For instance, if a DE has a network sharing agreement on a particular license that calls into question whether, under affiliation rules, the user's revenues should be attributed to the DE for that particular license, rather than for its overall business operations, the Commission may conclude that the DE is ineligible to acquire or retain benefits with respect to that particular license. Under this more targeted review, an entity will not necessarily lose its eligibility for all current and future small business benefits, as it did under the application of the AMR rule, solely because of a decision associated with any particular license. Instead, while a small business will lose DE eligibility (and possibly incur unjust enrichment obligations) if it relinquishes de jure or de facto control of any particular license for which it claimed benefits, the DE could maintain its eligibility for benefits on its other existing and future licenses so long as the DE continues to meet the relevant small business size standard. Thus, an applicant need not be eligible for small business benefits on each of the spectrum licenses it holds in order to demonstrate its overall eligibility for such benefits. 34. As the Commission emphasized in the NPRM, under the new standard, small businesses, like all Commission licensees, will remain subject to section 310(d) of the Communications Act, as well as its rules prohibiting unauthorized transfers of control of license authorizations. Accordingly, if a DE executes a spectrum use agreement that does not comply with the Commission's relevant standard of de facto control, it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the benefits associated with that particular license, as well as the penalties associated with any violation of section 310(d) of the Communications Act and related regulations. See 47 CFR 1.9010 ( de facto control for spectrum leasing arrangements); see also Intermountain Microwave, 12 FCC 2d 559, 559-60 (1963) ( Intermountain Microwave ) ( de facto control for non-leasing situations); 47 CFR 1.2110(c) ( de facto control for DEs); Part 1 Fifth Report and Order, 65 FR 52323, August 29, 2000 (incorporating the Intermountain Microwave principles of control into 47 CFR 1.2110 of the Commission's rules. If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in combination with the DE controlling interest and attribution rules), goes so far as to confer control of the DE's overall business, the gross revenues of the additional interest holders will be attributed to the DE, which could render the DE ineligible for all current and future small business benefits on all licenses. Except where the leasing standard of de facto control applies under 47 CFR 1.9010 and 1.9020 of the secondary market rules, the criteria of Intermountain Microwave and Ellis Thompson continue to apply to every Commission licensee for purposes of assessing whether it can demonstrate that it retains de facto control of its business venture and spectrum license. 35. Standard for Evaluating DE Leasing. For the same policy reasons the Commission also adopts its proposal to apply to DE spectrum manager lessors the same de facto control standard that it applies to non-DE spectrum manager lessors, and modifies 47 CFR 1.9020 of its rules accordingly. 36. The limited comment the Commission received on this issue was generally supportive of adopting the rule modifications proposed in the NPRM. The DE Coalition, USCC, and WISPA all support the proposed modifications of the rules to clarify that DE lessors may fully engage in spectrum leasing under the same de facto control standard and to the same extent as non-DE lessors under a spectrum manager lease. WISPA further states that a uniform standard makes the application process for spectrum leases more predictable, eliminates the need for special filings, and reduces administrative burdens. WISPA also maintains that the proposal will enable small businesses to enter into leasing arrangements that are well understood and utilized within the marketplace, and will ensure that small business licensees retain control over certain obligations, preventing any sham arrangements or unjust enrichment for non-small business entities. Blooston Rural, however, argues that, while some relaxation of the leasing restrictions is in order, its NPRM proposals will invite abuse of the bidding credit program by allowing the largest carriers to invest in a DE, and then use spectrum leases to gain full access to spectrum obtained with the small business benefits. 37. In order to allow DEs the ability to make independent business judgments about how to best utilize the spectrum capacity of each of their licenses, the Commission revises 47 CFR 1.9020(d)(4) of its rules to remove the conflicting reference to the control standard of 47 CFR 1.2110, as it proposed to do in the NPRM. The Commission agrees with WISPA that this modification will enable small businesses to enter into leasing arrangements that are well understood and utilized within the marketplace, and ensure that small business licensees retain sufficient control of their overall operations and regulatory obligations to safeguard the award of bidding credits. 38. Pursuant to this modification, a DE will, like any other spectrum manager lessor, be considered to have de facto control over the portion of a spectrum license for which it, as lessor, has a spectrum manager lease provided that it: (1) Maintains an active, ongoing oversight role in ensuring that the lessee complies with Commission rules and policies; (2) retains responsibility for all interactions with the Commission required under the license related to the use of the leased spectrum; and (3) remains primarily and directly accountable to the Commission for any lessee violation of these policies and rules. (A DE's ongoing control over any non-leased portion of a license for which it has benefits is evaluated according to 47 CFR 1.2110 and the criteria set forth in Intermountain Microwave and Ellis Thompson ). The Commission stresses however, that it will not allow spectrum manager leases of licenses subject to DE benefits to automatically go into effect under the Commission's 21-day processing period. Instead, staff will carefully review DEs' requests to engage in spectrum manager leasing, and review such requests as necessary to determine whether the terms of the spectrum management lease agreement include provisions that confer de jure or de facto control of the DE lessor's business venture. These rule modifications will allow a DE to participate in the secondary market under the same control standard as other wireless licensees. 39. The Commission nonetheless recognizes Blooston Rural's concerns and agrees that in relaxing its rules with respect to leasing generally, the Commission must counterbalance such modifications to ensure that ineligible entities cannot invest in a DE and then use spectrum leases to gain full access to spectrum obtained with the small business benefits. Accordingly, to address the scenario raised by Blooston Rural, the Commission adopts a specific attribution rule that will serve to limit the amount of spectrum capacity a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee will be able to utilize during the five-year unjust enrichment period under any use agreement. ii. Attribution Rules 40. In the Part 1 PN, the Commission sought comment on various recommendations from commenters for modifying its attribution rules to better ensure that only bona fide small businesses qualify for bidding credits. These recommendations include, among other things, modifications to the applicable attribution, controlling interest or affiliation rule to alter the types of equity arrangements available to a DE applicant by (a) attributing to a DE the revenues and spectrum of any entity holding certain interests of more than ten percent, (b) restricting certain large carriers or companies from providing a certain amount of capital or otherwise exercising control over a DE, and (c) adopting a rebuttable presumption that equity interest of 50 percent or more represents de facto control of the DE. The Commission also invited comment on other suggestions by commenters regarding DE eligibility for benefits, such as: (1) Adopting a 25 percent minimum equity requirement for DEs; (2) limiting the total dollar amount of DE benefits that any DE (or group of affiliated DEs) may claim during any given auction, based on particular criteria; (3) limiting the overall amount that a small business can bid based on a revenues or population-based metric; (4) narrowing the scope of the affiliation rules to exclude individuals and entities whose revenues are currently attributable to a DE, such as directors and certain family members; and (5) clarifying the affiliation rules to prevent rural telephone companies from losing DE status because they hold a fractional interest in a cellular partnership if the rural telephone company has no ability to control the partnership's day-to-day operations and/or strategy. 41. After review of the comments submitted in response to its inquiry, the Commission adopts a new attribution rule to establish a limit on how much spectrum capacity a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee (which for the purposes of this rule the Commission defines as any party holding ten percent or greater interest of any kind in the DE, including but not limited to, a ten percent or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, options or debt securities in the applicant or licensee) can use in any particular license awarded with DE benefits, and reject the remaining suggestions. 42. Limitation on Spectrum Use by a Disclosable Interest Holder in a DE. To ensure that DE benefits are awarded to only eligible, bona fide small businesses, the Commission adopts a new attribution rule that will serve as an additional safeguard to prevent the circumvention of the Commission's rules during the unjust enrichment period for any license awarded with bidding credits. Specifically, the Commission adopts an additional attribution requirement under which, during the five-year unjust enrichment period, the gross revenues (or the subscribers in the case of a rural service provider) of a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee will become attributable, on a license-by-license basis, for any license in which the disclosable interest holder uses, in any manner, more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity of a DE's license awarded with bidding credits. 43. A number of commenters suggested that the Commission restrict larger nationwide and regional carriers, entities with a certain number of end-user customers, and/or other large companies from providing a material portion of the total capitalization of DE applicants or otherwise exercising control over such applicants as part of the definition of material relationship. In responding to its inquiry on this matter, several commenters offer various suggestions on whether and to what extent the Commission should implement such a restriction. Blooston Rural, for instance, supports a restriction on leasing spectrum to nationwide carriers that have invested in the applicant/licensee, along with large regional carriers and other large companies. Tristar argues that some restriction on DE financing arrangements involving other participants and incumbent service providers is merited. In support of a new restriction, AT&T reasons that, given the capital costs for deploying a service, the cost of the licenses should be a small fraction of a DE's operational fund; thus, if a DE has the financial wherewithal to compete in urban markets and fulfill the Commission's performance benchmarks, “it seems unlikely that the [DE] is the type of business that any rational small business program is meant to assist.” At the same time, AT&T/Rural Carriers caution that any new restrictions should include an exception for arms-length commercial loans to bidding entities. 44. Other commenters also opine that a restriction should also be imposed on entities utilizing the rural service provider bidding credit. Among these commenters, Blooston Rural supports the adoption of some restriction that would limit the ability of a DE to lease spectrum that is acquired with the rural service provider bidding credit to an investor, provided that the Commission carve out an exception for an investor that is “a rural telephone company or rural telco subsidiary/affiliate with wireless or wireline presence in the original license area (as established by its existing ETC designation), or to an independent wireless ETC that is certif[ied] in the original license area and that has fewer than 100,000 subscribers.” RWA/NTCA agrees with Blooston Rural's restriction, including the exception, but would also apply the restriction to nationwide wireless carriers who are not investors of the DE and impose the restriction for the initial license term. 45. Based on the common theme in commenters' proposals, the Commission incorporates into 47 CFR 1.2110 a new attribution rule under which, during the five-year unjust enrichment period, the gross revenues (or the subscribers in the case of a rural service provider) of a disclosable interest holder in a DE applicant or licensee will become attributable, on a license-by-license basis, for any license in which the disclosable interest holder uses, in any manner, more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity of a DE's license awarded with bidding credits. For the purposes of this rule, the Commission defines a disclosable interest holder as any party holding a ten percent or greater interest of any kind in the DE, including, but not limited to, a ten percent or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee. Despite receiving a number of the alternative proposals from commenters, the Commission declines to specifically restrict financing or agreements with large or regional carriers, because doing so may impede a DE's ability to raise capital and gain operational experience. Instead, the rule the Commission adopts should safeguard the award of valuable bidding credits by carefully targeting the concerns of commenters, which generally seek to ensure ineligible entities don't improperly benefit from DE bidding credits by gaining full unrestricted access to use the spectrum license. 46. For DEs that acquire licenses with the new rural service provider bidding credit, however, the Commission will include an exception to this new attribution rule, similar to that suggested by Blooston Rural, to apply to any disclosable interest holder that would independently qualify for a rural service provider bidding credit. Pursuant to this exception, a rural service provider may have spectrum license use agreements with a disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the disclosable interest holder's subscribers, so long as (a) the disclosable interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service provider credit and (b) the use agreement is otherwise permissible under its existing rules. This exception should ensure that rural service providers can work in concert to provide service to rural areas. 47. In adopting this new attribution rule, the Commission disagrees with commenters who oppose the adoption of limitations on the ability for an investor to engage in certain transactions with a designated entity concerning licenses acquired with bidding credits. Specifically, Council Tree argues that such restrictions would contravene Congressional intent and impede the ability of DEs to acquire the necessary capital to compete with incumbents who already have a distinct operational advantage in the wireless marketplace. Council Tree also maintains that “the adoption of any of these [ Part 1 PN ] proposals to restrict the size and impact of DEs in spectrum auctions [serves] the private financial interests of the largest, most entrenched incumbents.” CCA voices concern that the limitations would be too restrictive and create significant disincentives to investment. USCC asserts generally that most of the proposals violate the principles of simplicity and avoiding different classes of licenses—and begs the question of why the Commission does not use Intermountain Microwave —as the ultimate test. Moreover, USCC opines that “when individual, properly constituted DEs win auctions, that is not an abuse of the rules; [r]ather, it carries their intent.” 48. While the Commission recognizes the concerns echoed by various commenters that investor use limitations could restrict the ability for DEs raise capital, the Commission concludes that this carefully targeted rule, applied on a license-by-license basis during the five-year unjust enrichment period, is necessary to fulfill its responsibility of ensuring that DE benefits flow only to those intended by Congress. The Commission therefore adopts this rule to balance the increased flexibility the Commission has granted to DEs to raise capital against its obligation to prevent investors from benefitting from bidding credits indirectly through their use of a DE's discounted license. The rule is also consistent with its two-pronged analysis of small business eligibility, allowing a DE to monetize individual licenses without losing its overall eligibility, while ensuring that the DE remains independent and in control of its business as a whole. Moreover, the Commission disagrees with USCC that such a rule is unnecessary because the application of the criteria in Intermountain Microwave sufficiently mitigates the additional risks of unjust enrichment and undue influence that may arise after the elimination of the AMR rule and relaxation of the Commission's facilities-based service requirements. Rather, by establishing this targeted rule to focus only on the intersection of a disclosable interest in a DE and the disclosable interest holder's use of 25 percent or more of the spectrum capacity of a license awarded with DE benefits, the Commission can alleviate commenters' concerns regarding unjust enrichment and, at the same time, provide DEs with more transparency and predictability in the auctions and licensing process. 49. Because the Commission is implementing this 25 percent use limit for disclosable interest holders in a DE, the Commission will not incorporate into its rules any of the alternative attribution restrictions for which it sought comment. For instance, the Commission will not modify its rules to require a DE to attribute the revenues and spectrum of any entity that holds more than a ten percent interest in any type of DE and will instead adopt the more targeted rule, evaluating on a license-by-license basis. Most commenters generally oppose the proposal that would attribute to a DE the revenues and spectrum of any spectrum holding entity that holds an interest, direct or indirect, equity or non-equity of more than ten percent. Some of these commenters assert that the proposal is too restrictive and impedes the ability of a DE to raise capital to compete successfully in spectrum auctions. NTCH further opposes the notion that non-equity debt financing should be considered for determining DE eligibility because it would disadvantage small businesses who must often rely on non-institutional sources of debt financing. The Commission agrees with these commenters, and declines to accept the positions of those like C Spire that support a more restrictive proposal. The Commission also agrees with T-Mobile, which suggests that the ten-percent proposal, while a “step in the right direction, may be too restrictive.” Accordingly, the Commission concludes that its more targeted attribution rule achieves the proper balance of its numerous policy goals. 50. Nor will the Commission adopt a rebuttable presumption that equity interests of 50 percent or more represent de facto control of a DE, which would run counter to its overall policy goal of providing additional sources of access to capital. The Commission notes that commenters are divided in response to the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that equity interests of 50 percent or more represent de facto control of a DE. Some commenters, including Blooston Rural and Tristar, support this proposal, with some changes. Blooston Rural would support the rebuttable presumption, provided that “properly insulated passive investors” are not “lumped together to determine a 50% or greater interest.” Tristar would also establish a rebuttable presumption that any provider of financial support of 25 percent or more, direct or indirect, should be considered a controlling interest of the DE. T-Mobile argues that this proposal is a compromise position and is consistent with the Commission's existing standards for evaluating de jure control. Opponents of the rebuttable presumption argue that such a provision may not withstand judicial scrutiny and would create a “logistical nightmare” for small businesses and Commission staff. Additionally, USCC argues that, like the minimum equity requirement, this policy would limit DEs' flexibility to attract financing and undercut the underlying policies of the DE program. The Commission agrees with commenters that this type of restriction would impede a DE's access to capital without any counter-balancing benefits that cannot otherwise be achieved by its new targeted rule. Moreover, for similar reasons the Commission believes that the attribution rule it adopted will address the concerns underpinning this type of proposal in a directed, practical, and effective way. 51. The Commission also rejects the suggestion to adopt a rule that would require a DE to provide, without outside investment, a minimum of 25 percent of the equity of its business, as such a requirement could be unachievable for many small businesses and rural service providers, particularly in capital intensive auctions. For instance, in opposing this suggestion, KSW contends that “very few entities have 25 percent or more held by a single entity,” and that “the result would be less DE funding, and far fewer and much smaller DEs.” Also rejecting this suggestion, USCC notes that the Commission previously declined to adopt a minimum equity requirement because “it would subject DEs to unnecessary competitive harms and conflict with the Commission's goal of providing DEs with `maximum flexibility' in attracting financing.” CCA, however, reasons that a minimum equity requirement could be reasonable but that the suggested 25 percent requirement is too high. The Commission has historically declined to adopt a minimum equity requirement for the controlling interests of a DE applicant, and it continues to do so here because it concluded it would be counter-productive to its efforts to afford DE applicants greater flexibility to gain access to capital. 52. The Commission notes that each of the proposals it declines to adopt attempts to limit the ability of ineligible entities to circumvent its rules and reap the benefits of DE discounts through their investments in, and business involvements with, DEs. After reviewing the record in this proceeding, and taking into account the Commission's experience in administering the bidding credits program, it concludes that the rule it adopts will best achieve the ends these commenters seek without the associated drawbacks in furtherance of its statutory obligation to balance dual directives. 53. Implementation of the New Eligibility Test and Attribution Rule. The Commission will implement its new eligibility test and attribution rule on a prospective basis, including for licenses in the 600 MHz band. Additionally, the Commission will apply this rule prospectively, so as to apply to all determinations of eligibility for designated entity benefits with respect to: Any application filed to participate in auctions in which bidding begins after the effective date of the rules; all applications for a license authorization, assignment, or transfer of control; and any spectrum leases or reports of events affecting a designated entity's ongoing eligibility filed on or after the release date of the Part 1 Report and Order. In light of the changes that the Commission is making to its eligibility and attribution rules, it will require additional information from applicants and licensees in order to ensure compliance with the policies and adopted rules. The Commission will therefore modify its FCC forms and the Universal Licensing System (ULS) to implement these new rule changes. 54. Attribution of Revenues Where the Applicant Holds an Interest in a Cellular General Partnership. In the Part 1 PN, the Commission invited comment on whether it should modify its affiliation rules to prevent an applicant from losing eligibility for small business bidding credits because it holds an interest in a cellular partnership that was established as part of the cellular B Block settlement process that applied to wireline companies in the mid to late 1980s. Commenters have noted that despite being a partner, a rural telephone company typically holds only a fractional ownership interest in these partnerships and thus has no ability to control the partnership's day-to-day operations. Commenters therefore request that the Commission not attribute the revenues of the partnership to such an applicant when it is seeking eligibility for a small business bidding credit. 55. While the Commission understands that some rural telephone companies may not be eligible for a small business bidding credit because they hold an attributable interest in a cellular general partnership, the Commission must make every effort to ensure that its DE benefits inure only bona fide eligible entities. Accordingly, the Commission declines to adopt a rule that would exempt an applicant that is a controlling interest, or an affiliate of a cellular partnership, from attributing the revenues of the partnership for the purposes of complying with the size standards for eligibility for small business bidding credits. However, the Commission has adopted a bidding credit for eligible rural service providers based upon the number of subscribers of the applicant (as well as its controlling interests, affiliates and the affiliates of its controlling interest), and for that bidding credit the Commission has created an exception to its attribution rules for existing rural partnerships. 56. Attribution of Immediate Family Members and of Officers and Directors. The Commission also declines to adopt changes to two of its other attribution rules. In the Part 1 PN, the Commission sought comment on whether it should narrow the scope of two of its attribution requirements where an immediate family member or a particular officer or director is unlikely to exercise control over the applicant. Under the kinship affiliation requirement, immediate family members are rebuttably presumed to “own or control or have the power to control interests owned or controlled by other immediate family members.” 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5)(iii)(B). Under the officer/director attribution requirement, officers and directors of an applicant (or of an entity that controls an applicant or licensee) are considered to have a controlling interest in the applicant (or licensee). 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F). 57. Both NTCH and Tristar propose relaxing the kinship affiliation requirement, arguing that the existing rule is too broad and requires attribution of the revenues of family members who are unlikely to have involvement with the applicant. NTCH also contends that the Commission must narrow the officer/director attribution requirement, claiming that it encompasses officers “who have no executive authority whatsoever.” Blooston Rural, on the other hand, advises caution before the Commission narrows either rule, noting that officers and directors of privately held companies often have significant control and pointing out that the kinship affiliation presumption is, by its terms, rebuttable. 58. The Commission finds its current rules help ensure that only bona fide small businesses receive small business bidding credits. Accordingly, the Commission will leave both rules intact. There is minimal record support for eliminating or modifying these rules, particularly the officer/director attribution requirement. Moreover, the Commission has found the kinship affiliation rule to be effective in forcing the attribution of revenues of close relatives who are likely to exercise control over an applicant. Thus, the rule continues to serve the purpose for which the Commission first adopted it in 1994 for broadband PCS. The Commission explained then that the reason for the rule is twofold, to ensure that entities receiving DE benefits are actually in need of special financial assistance and to prevent otherwise ineligible entities from circumventing the rules by funding family members who purport to be eligible applicants. The Commission further explained that it was adopting bright-line tests for determining when the financial interests of spouses and other family members should be attributed, because, as a practical matter, it would not be able to resolve all questions pertaining to the individual circumstances of particular applicants for an auction before bidding began. 59. At the same time, the Commission acknowledged that a non-spousal family relationship may not carry the same potential for abuse that a relationship between spouses does. Accordingly, while the Commission adopted spousal attribution of revenues as a non-rebuttable standard (unless the spouses are legally separated) ( see 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(5)(iii)(A)), it implemented the kinship rule as a rebuttable presumption. Now, as then, a winning bidder may rebut the presumption by showing that close family members cannot exercise control over the business, i.e., that “the family members are estranged, the family ties are remote, or the family members are not closely involved with each other in business matters.” The Commission therefore concludes that the rule is not overly broad and continues to serve a specific necessary purpose. 60. Likewise, the Commission believes that defining officers and directors as controlling interests of a DE applicant or licensee similarly helps ensure that “only those entities truly meriting small business status qualify for its small business provisions.” NTCH argues that the attribution rule discourages individuals from taking seats on an applicant's board of directors, because their “private revenue information” would have to be disclosed. Contrary to NTCH's concerns, personal net worth, including personal income, of the officers and directors need not be disclosed. 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F). More important, the revenue information of officers and directors need be disclosed only if their company is seeking a substantial public benefit by applying for a bidding credit. Finally, NTCH has provided no specific examples of instances where it thinks that the rule should not have been applied and has therefore not convinced the Commission that changing the rule is in the public interest. The Commission reminds NTCH and all interested parties that if an applicant considers a waiver of the rule to be warranted in its case, it may seek one under 47 CFR 1.925. 61. Tribal Exclusion from affiliation coverage. In the Part 1 PN, the Commission sought comment on a request that it “eliminate the preferential treatment for [Alaska Native Corporations (“ANCs”)] that do not meet the standard definition of small business under its attribution rules.” Under the Commission's small business attribution rules, applicants or licensees affiliated with Indian tribes or ANCs are not required to include revenues of those tribes or ANCs, other than gaming revenues, in their gross revenues for purposes of determining their eligibility for bidding credits. When the Commission adopted this exclusion from the affiliation requirements in 1994, it sought to ensure that its rules remained consistent with other federal laws, policies, and regulations, most notably the affiliation rules of the Small Business Administration (SBA). The Commission asked in the Part 1 PN whether it should now eliminate the exclusion, whether the rules concerning Indian tribes or ANCs remain consistent with other federal policies, and whether these rules increase the risk of unjust enrichment. The Commission also asked commenters to tell it whether and how it should amend the rules. 62. The Commission has received no record support for this proposal. Fourteen commenters, all tribes or tribal organizations, oppose elimination of the affiliation exclusion. NCAI emphasizes “the unique legal relationship that exists between the federal government and Indian Tribal governments, as reflected in the Constitution of the United States, treaties, federal statutes, Executive orders, and numerous court decisions,” amounting to a fiduciary trust relationship. NCAI also explains that the Commission's preservation of the tribal attribution exclusion is essential because of the economic disparities that exist on tribal lands and the well-documented challenges of deploying communications infrastructure there. Several of the tribal entities explain that they still lack high-speed and dependable telecommunications services and face daunting barriers to obtaining spectrum licenses for the provision of commercial mobile wireless services on tribal lands. Under these circumstances, the commenters tell the Commission, access to capital is crucial. As one commenter asserts, any adverse modification of the affiliation exclusion will effectively nullify the Commission goal that telecommunications services be deployed to tribal communities. 63. Native Public observes that “[t]he Commission has repeatedly found that Native Americans have had less access to telecommunications services than any other segment of the population[,]” adding that the Commission's DE tribal policies “advance the interests of an underserved minority population group, those of the Tribal governments which have a sovereign right to set their own communications policies and goals for the welfare of their members.” And Nez Perce encourages the Commission to retain its “well established and rooted policies to bolster a tribe's resources to deploy wireless services on their land to serve the communication needs of their population.” Other commenters all express similar views. 64. When the Commission decided to include this exclusion under its definition of the term “affiliate,” it concluded that the exclusion would ensure that Indian tribes and Alaska Regional or Village Corporations have a meaningful opportunity to participate in spectrum-based services from which they would otherwise be precluded, and that such an exclusion for these specified entities would not entitle them to an unfair advantage over entities that are otherwise eligible for small business status. The affiliation exclusion for ANCs is based on their “unique legal constraints” imposed by statute that are inapplicable to other businesses. These constraints preclude ANCs from “utilizing two important means of raising capital: (1) The ability to pledge the stock of the company against ordinary borrowings, and (2) the ability to issue new stock or debt securities.” In addition, land holdings held by Indian tribes cannot be used as collateral for purposes of raising capital, “because the land holdings are owned in trust by the federal government or are subject to a restraint on alienation in the government's favor.” The exception was carefully tailored so as not to extend it to gaming revenues, which are not subject to the same constraints. The Commission has also not been presented with any evidence that its rule is no longer consistent with other federal laws, policies, and regulations, most notably the affiliation rules of the SBA such that the Commission should revisit the exclusion. In light of commenters' significant opposition and the absence of a record supporting the elimination or modification of this attribution exclusion, the Commission retains the exclusion in its current form. B. Bidding Credits 65. In the NPRM, the Commission took a fresh look at its bidding credit program to ensure that it remains a viable avenue for DEs to meaningfully participate in auctions and thereby create additional competition and investment in the wireless marketplace. The Commission's bidding credit program was adopted in 1994 and is the primary way it facilitates participation by designated entities in auctions. Section 309(j)(4)(D) of the Act states that the Commission must consider using bidding preferences when prescribing regulations for acquiring service-specific licenses through competitive bidding. A bidding credit provides a percentage discount on winning bids for eligible DEs. The Commission defines bidding credit eligibility requirements for DEs on a service-specific basis, taking into account the capital requirements and other characteristics of each particular service. 66. After reviewing the record, the Commission revises its rules for its bidding credit program. Specifically, the Commission updates its small business eligibility requirements to better reflect the capital-intensive nature of the wireless industry, while retaining its overall three-tiered approach that links the percentage of the small business bidding credit to the size of the business. The Commission also adopts a new bidding credit for eligible rural service providers to increase their participation in auctions and provide greater opportunities for bringing crucial wireless voice and broadband services to rural areas, including underserved and unserved areas and areas of persistent poverty. By adopting this new bidding credit, the Commission facilitates greater access by multiple entities to valuable, low-band spectrum, thereby fulfilling its statutory goals of promoting competition and ensuring the efficient use of spectrum. As a further step to ensure these benefits continue to flow only those intended beneficiaries, the Commission also adopts a reasonable limitation or cap on the total amount of benefits that a small business or rural service provider can receive in any particular auction. 67. The Commission adopts these rule changes specifically for the 600 MHz service, for which licenses will be offered in the Incentive Auction, to provide eligible small businesses and rural service providers with additional tools to compete meaningfully for low-band spectrum and to promote overall competition in auctions and in the wireless marketplace. On a prospective basis, the Commission will determine the award of bidding credits for small businesses and rural service providers on a service-specific basis taking into account the capital requirements and other characteristics of each particular service, as the Commission currently does. 68. The Commission declines to adopt at this time specific bidding preferences for other types of entities, including those that serve unserved/underserved areas or areas with persistent poverty, as well as those that have overcome disadvantages. The Commission expects, however, that such parties should benefit from the changes it makes to its bidding credit program for small businesses and rural service providers. Finally, the Commission declines to consider any modification of the tribal lands bidding credit because the record does not support revisions to its current policies for the award of this benefit. i. Small Business Bidding Credit 69. Background. The Commission's small business bidding credit program consists of a three-tiered schedule of bidding credits corresponding to small business size definitions that are based on an applicant's average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years. Applicants with average gross revenues not exceeding $3 million are potentially eligible for a 35 percent bidding credit; applicants with average gross revenues not exceeding $15 million are potentially eligible for a 25 percent bidding credit; and applicants with average gross revenues not exceeding $40 million are potentially eligible for a 15 percent bidding credit. In order to qualify for a small business bidding credit, an applicant must demonstrate that its average annual gross revenues, in combination with those of its “attributable” interest holders, fall below the applicable financial thresholds. The Commission takes into account the capital requirements and other characteristics of a particular service in establishing which small business definitions to apply to a specific service. 70. In the Part 1 NPRM, the Commission sought comment on whether its small business bidding credit program continues to align with the operational demands of small businesses that acquire spectrum and build out services in a formidable wireless marketplace. The Commission invited comment on whether to increase the gross revenue thresholds for defining the small business sizes for bidding credits, using the price index for the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP price index) as the standard for measuring the increase of the thresholds. Specifically, the Commission proposed to increase the average annual gross revenues thresholds from $3 million to $4 million for applicants potentially eligible for a 35 percent bidding credit; from $15 million to $20 million for applicants potentially eligible for a 25 percent bidding credit; and from $40 million to $55 million for applicants potentially eligible for a 15 percent bidding credit. The Commission also sought comment on alternative indices, criteria, or methods that may better reflect the development and relevant range of economic activity in the wireless industry. 71. The Commission invited comment on whether to modify the current bidding credit percentages and whether to add additional tiers of bidding credits. The Commission also asked whether the Commission should continue to evaluate the definition of a small business on a service-by-service basis. Moreover, the Commission sought comment on whether any adopted changes to its part 1 rules should be incorporated into the 600 MHz service rules. In addition, the Commission asked whether it should apply its revised Part 1 rules to re-auctioned licenses for existing services. Based on comments received in response to the Part 1 NPRM, the Commission sought additional comment in the Part 1 PN on alternative proposals that would increase the gross revenue thresholds based on other standards, increase the small business bidding credit percentages for all or some of the tiers, and decline to make any changes to the small business bidding credit program until the Commission addressed perceived DE eligibility issues stemming from Auction 97. 72. Discussion. The Commission adopts its proposal in the Part 1 NPRM to increase the gross revenues thresholds that define the three tiers of small business bidding credits and to retain the existing percentage levels of the small business bidding credits. See Part 1 NPRM, 79 FR at 68181-82. Consistent with past practice, the Commission will select, on a service-by-service basis, the small business bidding credits and corresponding definitions that will be available for the applicable auction based on the capital requirements of a particular service. For the Incentive Auction, the Commission will continue to utilize the 25 percent and 15 percent bidding credits, but the Commission will apply the increased gross revenue thresholds that it adopts to the small business size definitions for those bidding credits. The Commission expects that these measures will advance its statutory goals by providing small businesses with an opportunity to remain competitive in an evolving wireless marketplace by facilitating participation in auctions and in the provision of spectrum-based services. 73. Updating the Standardized Schedule of Small Business Sizes. The Commission retains its existing three-tiered schedule for determining eligibility for bidding credits, but updates the gross revenues thresholds to reflect the capital challenges small business face in the current wireless industry. The Commission has previously found that robust competition depends critically upon the availability of spectrum for provisioning services. Given the ever-increasing competitive nature of the wireless marketplace, several commenters advocate for modifications to its bidding credit program in order to facilitate a higher rate of participation in auctions by small businesses that might otherwise find it difficult to acquire sufficient capital to compete in spectrum auctions. In this regard, many commenters favor increasing the gross revenue thresholds, with some advocating for higher increases than those proposed in the Part 1 NPRM. RWA, for instance, supports the Commission's proposal but also urges it to increase the threshold for the lowest tier from $40 million to $100 million. Council Tree and Blooston Rural also favor using annual gross revenues as the basis for defining the small business sizes for bidding credits. 74. The Commission finds that its three-tiered system for providing small business bidding credits, when properly tailored and implemented, serves the underlying policy interests of its bidding credit program. Therefore, the Commission modifies 47 CFR 1.2110(f) to increase the three tiers of gross revenue thresholds defining eligibility for each small business bidding credit to the following: (1) Businesses with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $4 million would be eligible for a 35 percent bidding credit; (2) Businesses with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $20 million would be eligible for a 25 percent bidding credit; and (3) Businesses with average annual gross revenues for the preceding three years not exceeding $55 million would be eligible for a 15 percent bidding credit. 75. In considering how much to adjust the gross revenues thresholds in the small business definitions, the Commission proposed to use as a guide the price index for the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP price index”) published by the U.S. Department of Commerce on a quarterly basis as part of its National Income and Product Accounts. See generally BEA, Interactive Data, http://www.bea.gov/itable . The Commission adjusted the current gross revenues thresholds with the percentage change in the GDP price index between 1997 and 2013. The Commission determined that the GDP price index increased by 36.4 percent from 1997 to 2013. Based on this 36.4 percent increase, the Commission proposed new gross revenues thresholds that were obtained by multiplying the current thresholds by 1.364 and rounding to the nearest million. 76. Consistent with the Commission's statutory objectives, it finds that increasing the gross revenue thresholds will enhance the ability of small businesses to acquire and retain capital thereby facilitating their ability to compete meaningfully in today's auctions. At the same time, the Commission avoids setting the small business size thresholds at a level that may be over inclusive and result in DE benefits flowing to entities for which such credits are not necessary. In so doing, the Commission agrees with commenters in favor of using the GDP price index as the basis for calculating the increase for each tier defining the small business size for purposes of the bidding credit. As noted in the Part 1 NPRM, the currently available wireless industry price indices do not reflect the dramatic shift from a voice-centric to a data-centric wireless industry, along with the tremendous growth of mobile broadband data services. Moreover, the SBA recently used the GDP price index to adjust its receipts-based industry size standards as part of its size standards review. 77. In adopting this methodology for increasing the gross revenue thresholds for defining small business eligibility for bidding credits, the Commission declines to adopt alternative proposals for adjusting the small business size definitions. For example, ARC would adjust the small business size definition to the cost of auctioned spectrum on a MHz per pop basis. CCA opposes ARC's proposal, noting that it would create uncertainty for DEs as the value of spectrum varies by band and market conditions. The Commission agrees with CCA's assessment and further finds that ARC's proposal would be administratively burdensome to implement without providing a meaningful corresponding benefit. Rather, by using the GDP price index, the Commission establishes a simple bright-line standard to improve the efficiency of the auction process, serve the public interest, and avoid additional implementation costs for small businesses. 78. Additionally, the Commission will not disturb its earlier decision declining to adopt SBA's employee-based business size standard for adjusting its small business size definitions. Council Tree states that the SBA's standard is too inclusive for purposes of establishing DE eligibility. However, CCA promotes the use of SBA's employee-based standard because “expanding eligibility, rather than shrinking it, may be warranted given the increasing disparity between the largest carriers . . . and all other carriers.” As noted in the Part 1 NPRM, the Commission previously concluded that by adopting the SBA's standard, the Commission would allow many large carriers to take advantage of DE benefits not intended for them. See Part 1 NPRM, 71 FR at 68182. Additionally, the Commission notes that there is no data in the record to support reconsideration of its previous conclusion. The Commission will therefore rely on the GDP price index for establishing the small business size definitions to reflect the increased operational costs for small businesses and the need to foster competition in spectrum auctions and in the wireless marketplace. 79. The Commission also declines to adopt proposals favoring a single bidding credit in lieu of the current three-tiered system. AT&T/Rural Carriers, for instance, advocate for the creation of a new 25 percent single bidding credit for small businesses with average gross revenues of less than $55 million. AT&T also notes that this proposal would fulfill the DE program's original vision and safeguard against gamesmanship. Opponents of the single bidding credit argue that the proposal is too limiting and is inconsistent with the Commission's statutory mandates. The Commission finds that AT&T/Rural Carriers' proposal ignores the various sizes and types of small businesses that participate in Commission auctions. Because not all small businesses are alike in the wireless marketplace, the Commission adopted its three-tiered bidding credit system in 1997 so that as a small business grew, it would receive reduced benefits from its DE program. In doing so, its graduated approach allows for other new small businesses to gain a foothold in the marketplace using additional DE benefits. The Commission finds that this approach continues to be relevant and complements its policy for defining bidding credits on a service-by-service basis in order to tailor small business bidding preferences to the capital requirements of a particular service. Thus, the Commission refrains from disturbing its long-standing policy. 80. With respect to the percentage levels of the small business bidding credits, the Commission declines to increase any of the current percentages as proposed by some commenters. These commenters, including ARC, WISPA, KSW, and the DE Coalition, assert that it should increase the bidding credit percentages across all or specific tiers. ARC, for instance, would increase the percentages of all three bidding credit tiers, from the largest to the smallest tier, to 25 percent, 35 percent, and 40 percent respectively. WISPA recommends adjusting the maximum bidding credit up to 45 percent and increasing the other tiers proportionately. Moreover, KSW seeks to change the bidding credit percentages to 40 percent for applicants below the $15 million threshold and 25 percent for applicants below the $40 million threshold. 81. The Commission believes that its decision to eliminate the AMR rule and to increase the gross revenues thresholds for its small business size definitions will sufficiently enhance the benefits of the DE program by helping small businesses obtain access to capital and thereby increase participation and competition in auctions. The Commission is, however, concerned about expanding the scope of DE benefits to a level that may incentivize gamesmanship of the program in the current wireless marketplace. Rather, in light of all the other changes the Commission is making to its rules, it will proceed with care, so that it may assess the impact of its changes to the rules. In this regard, the Commission will revisit these rules as may be necessary in light of its future auction experience. In declining to adopt those proposals to increase the bidding credit percentages, the Commission concludes that the use of the small business size standards and credits set forth in its updated part 1 schedule, when coupled with its other changes, align with its statutory objectives. They also provide a simple, consistent, and predictable avenue for facilitating small business participation in auctions and in today's wireless marketplace. 82. The Commission also declines to adopt PK's proposal for a new entrant bidding credit. Under PK's suggested policy, a new entrant bidding credit would be explicitly designed to attract “new and innovative technologies,” noting that “nothing in the [Act] precludes the use of bidding credits to large businesses to achieve [the Commission's] statutory goals.” Thus, PK's proposal could provide a bidding preference to well-financed entities that would not otherwise qualify for a bidding credit under its adopted small business size definitions. Tristar submits that well-financed new entrants, among others, should be entitled to some benefits in the upcoming Incentive Auction, but not the same benefits that are available to DEs. CCA opposes this proposal, arguing that “[it] would be complicated to administer and could lead to unintended consequences and possible gaming.” The Rural-26 Coalition submits that large, well-financed companies, like an Apple or a Google, “do not need a helping hand from the American taxpayer” to be competitive in spectrum auctions. The Commission agrees with commenters that the proposal would conflict with its principles against the unjust enrichment of ineligible entities. Deciding the eligibility criteria for a new entrant would also be difficult to administer and may undercut the underlying policies of the DE program by exacerbating the challenges current DEs face to compete meaningfully in spectrum auctions. The Commission also notes that PK did not offer any details regarding how such a proposal could be implemented. Although the Commission declines to adopt PK's proposal it expects that its new rules for the small business bidding credit program will also help new entrants face the capital challenges of entering the wireless marketplace, provided that they meet the eligibility standards for the bidding credit. 83. Finally, the revisions the Commission has made to modernize and improve its part 1 competitive bidding rules generally respond to the calls by commenters urging it to avoid implementing any bidding credit increases until there is surety that ineligible entities will not benefit from its bidding credit program. The Commission anticipates that the collective rule changes it has made will provide such safeguards. The Commission therefore concludes that the time is ripe to update its standardized Part 1 bidding credit schedule prior to the Incentive Auction. The Commission's actions reflect the current nature of the wireless marketplace and renews its commitment to providing DEs with the opportunity to participate meaningfully in Commission auctions. Further, the Commission adopts targeted measures to ensure that valuable bidding credits are available only to those Congress intended. 84. Implementation of the Revised Standardized Schedule of Small Business Sizes. The Commission's rule changes to the Part 1 schedule for small business bidding credits will be available to any particular auction prospectively, including for 600 MHz licenses in the Incentive Auction. See Incentive Auction Report and Order (Incentive Auction R&O), 79 FR 48441, 48504-06, August 15, 2014. Specifically, these rules changes will apply to all Commission auctions in which the short-form deadline falls on or after the release date of the Part 1 Report and Order. Moreover, applicants claiming any small business bidding credits will continue to be subject to the Commission's DE rules under 47 CFR 1.2110, as amended herein. 85. NTCH supports the incorporation of its rule changes to the Incentive Auction, with Council Tree and WISPA arguing for the adoption of a 35 percent bidding credit (the lowest tier) for the Incentive Auction as well. The Commission declines to reconsider its previous decision in the Incentive Auction R&O not to adopt a 35 percent bidding credit for the Incentive Auction. Because of the similarities between the 600 MHz and 700 MHz bands, in the Incentive Auction proceeding, the Commission determined that licensees utilizing the 600 MHz band may face challenges similar to licensees utilizing the 700 MHz, including issues and costs related to developing markets, technologies, and services. In light of the similar characteristics and capital requirements for both services, the Commission affirms its prior conclusion that it is appropriate to offer the same two bidding credit percentages in the Incentive Auction proceeding as in the 700 MHz auction. Additionally, by increasing the gross revenue thresholds for this schedule, entities that previously exceeded the legacy thresholds may now fall within the new thresholds, and thus become eligible for small business bidding credits. Similarly, the Commission notes that bidders that previously exceeded the legacy thresholds as a result of the AMR rule may now be eligible for a bidding credit under the current thresholds. By adopting its revised three-tiered schedule, the Commission aims to better reflect the potential capitalization costs for new entrants and small businesses in the wireless marketplace and encourage a greater level of participation and competition by small businesses in an auction that offers a significant opportunity for interested applicants to acquire licenses for below-1-GHz spectrum. 86. Consistent with the Commission's current practices it will continue evaluating the definition of small business on a service-by-service basis, determined by the associated characteristics and capital requirements of each service. See 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(1). Thus, the Commission will resolve, on a service-by-service basis, the DEs eligible for bidding credits, the licenses for which bidding credits are available, the amount of the bidding credits, and other procedures. Moreover, the Commission will apply the small business size definitions and associated bidding credits to any spectrum licenses in that service assigned through subsequent auctions, absent further action by the Commission. The Commission did not receive any comments squarely addressing these matters, except that WISPA would apply all three tiers of bidding credits to every spectrum auction, including the Incentive Auction. However, WISPA fails to provide data detailing the benefit of a blanket application of the rule in comparison to using a tailored, service-by-service approach. The Commission concludes that a service-specific proceeding is the appropriate avenue for evaluating the capital costs and technical challenges associated with the deployment of a service which will, in turn, drive the selection of the appropriate small business size definition and bidding credit. In taking a service-by-service approach, the Commission will better serve the public interest by promoting the rapid deployment of wireless services. The Commission also intends to review its small business definitions on a more regular basis in the future to ensure that the DE program continues to align with the strategic and operational demands of small businesses in the wireless marketplace. ii. Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit 87. Background. Under section 309(j), Congress mandated that the Commission design auctions to “include safeguards to protect the public interest in the use of the spectrum,” including the objectives to disseminate licenses “among a wide variety of applicants,” including rural telephone companies, and to promote the deployment of new technologies, products, and services to “those residing in rural areas.” Section 309(j)(4) also directs the Commission to “ensure” that various entities—again, specifically including rural telephone companies—“are given the opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services.” To this end, it requires the Commission to “consider the use of . . . bidding preferences” and other procedures. Historically, the Commission has concluded that section 309(j)(4)(D) does not warrant adoption of an independent bidding credit for rural telephone companies because such entities had not demonstrated that they had experienced significant barriers to raising capital, particularly when compared to other DEs, like small businesses. In the Incentive Auction R&O, the Commission found that the record in that proceeding did not provide a sufficient basis to revisit those prior determinations nor sufficient support for adoption of a rural bidding credit. 88. The Commission recognized in the Part 1 NPRM that the marketplace for wireless services has evolved significantly since it last comprehensively updated its DE eligibility rules in 2006. Based on this industry-wide evolution, the Part 1 NPRM asked commenters to provide data demonstrating whether rural telephone companies lack access to capital or face barriers to formation similar to those faced by other DEs. In response to the Part 1 NPRM, several commenters highlighted the fact that rural service providers had difficulty obtaining licenses in Auction 97 and urged the Commission to adopt a bidding credit for rural telephone companies for future auctions. The Part 1 PN then sought comment on a number of issues related to whether it should establish a bidding credit for rural telephone companies, including whether a bidding credit would better enable rural telephone companies to compete more successfully at auction. Subsequently, in response to the Part 1 PN, AT&T/Rural Carriers submitted a joint proposal that urged adoption of a rural service provider bidding credit. Other stakeholders also offered alternative suggestions for structuring the credit. 89. Discussion. The Commission adopts a 15 percent bidding credit for eligible rural service providers that provide commercial communications services to a customer base of fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers and serve primarily rural areas. The Commission agrees with commenters that a targeted bidding credit will better enable rural service providers to compete for spectrum licenses at auction, thereby speeding the availability of wireless voice and broadband services in rural areas. Based on the record established in this proceeding, the Commission anticipates that providing eligible rural service providers with a meaningful opportunity to compete for spectrum licenses will be particularly important in the upcoming Incentive Auction, which will offer multiple blocks of licenses for low-band spectrum. The Commission's action is thereby consistent with other efforts it took in the Incentive Auction R&O to facilitate competition in rural areas. The Commission will only permit an eligible small and rural entity to claim one bidding credit though, rather than benefit from both a small business and a rural service provider bidding credit. The Commission believes that the rural service provider bidding credit it adopts will allow a diversity of service providers to compete more effectively for spectrum licenses in rural areas, in furtherance of statutory objectives, while also preventing unjust enrichment of ineligible entities. 90. The Commission's decision today incorporates many of the suggestions offered by commenters, though it declines to adopt in full any single proposal offered by stakeholders for establishing a rural service provider bidding credit. For instance, the AT&T/Rural Carriers Joint Proposal recommended that in order to be eligible for the credit, an applicant must be in the business of providing commercial communications services to a customer base of fewer than 250,000 combined wireless and wireline customers. Under their particular proposal, however, eligible auction applicants would be permitted to claim a credit of 25 percent, but the credit would be capped at $10 million per bidding entity. Other commenters support the adoption of a rural bidding credit, but under different terms. For example, RWA/NTCA jointly propose a “Rural Telco Bidding Credit” of 25 percent that is capped at $10 million and is “available only to rural telephone companies (or their affiliates/subsidiaries) that seek spectrum in an area in which they are designated as an eligible telecommunications carrier.” Under the RWA/NTCA proposal, the bidding credit would be separate from, and in addition to, any small business bidding credit for which an applicant would qualify. The Commission notes that this proposal is also supported by other rural stakeholders, such as the Blooston Rural Carriers and the Rural Carrier Coalition. Cerberus proposes a 35 percent bidding credit for rural telephone companies, in addition to any small business bidding credit for which an applicant would qualify. 91. Council Tree, however, claims that rural telephone companies do not have “the same access to capital issues as other DEs, especially New Entrant DEs.” Accordingly, Council Tree urges that the Commission not “elevate” rural providers “to a special class of DEs superior to any other DE class.” CCA “does not support proposals for the establishment of a separate rural telephone company bidding credit,” because of “administrative complexity.” Accordingly, it urges the Commission to keep a “simple and straightforward approach of maintaining small business as the touchstone of any bidding credit mechanism.” 92. The Need for a Rural Service Provider Bidding Credit. Based upon the record established in this proceeding and its experience garnered over the history of the auctions program, including Auction 97, the Commission now concludes that creating a 15 percent rural service provider bidding credit will better enable eligible rural service providers to compete for spectrum licenses at auction and speed the availability of wireless voice and broadband services to rural areas, consistent with its statutory objectives. See 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(A)-(B). In the past, the Commission has noted that due to certain traditional financing programs, rural providers “may have greater ability than other designated entities to attract capital.” While the Commission does not believe that rural service providers warrant as great a bidding credit as other DEs, several factors demonstrate that they face obstacles to wireless deployment that are more challenging in their service areas. First, the evidence confirms these difficulties, which are reflected in their inability to provide service that competes with larger providers in rural areas. See 17th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, 29 FCC Rcd at 15334 para. 48, 15335 para. 51. Second, the Commission observes that the wireless industry has undergone significant consolidation during the past decade and that concentration in the market share of the major providers has also increased during that time period. Additionally, many rural service providers, although relatively small, are not eligible for small business bidding credits under its size standards to assist them in competing against larger carriers at auction. The record also demonstrates that rural service providers have encountered challenges in their efforts to obtain financing because the rural areas they seek to serve are not as profitable as more densely-populated markets. In a recent NTCA survey, for example, sixty-two percent of survey respondents characterize the process of obtaining financing for wireless projects as “somewhat difficult” or “very difficult,” and roughly half reported that their ability to obtain spectrum at auction was a concern. 93. Furthermore, commenters have argued that the challenges that rural service providers face in competing for spectrum were reflected in the results of Auction 97, which postdated the Commission's review of this question in the Incentive Auction R&O. In Auction 97, 38 qualified bidders were rural telephone companies, or rural telephone company affiliates, and only 28.9 percent of those entities won licenses. Contrary to Council Tree's assertion that the reason many rural telephone companies were unsuccessful in Auction 97 was due to their reduced interest in spectrum and unwillingness to bid competitively in the auction, rural service providers have asserted that they did not bid more aggressively in the auction because many were unable to qualify as DEs under its rules and thus competed against DEs and well-funded national carriers without the benefit of bidding credits. 94. Based on the Commission's review of the record, along with the results of Auction 97, it concludes that a rural service provider bidding credit may have assisted such entities to acquire spectrum suitable for mobile broadband services had a bidding credit been available. Rural service provider commenters have provided evidence illustrating recent increased challenges in securing traditional financing which has resulted in difficulties in competing successfully in auctions. In view of the record and the Commission's experience in running its competitive bidding program, it is convinced that a bidding credit for eligible rural service providers is warranted to ensure that designated entities of all types have the opportunity to acquire spectrum and participate in spectrum based services. The Commission therefore adopts a rural service provider credit for the first time. 95. Under the rules the Commission adopts today, rural service providers will be able to demonstrate eligibility for a 15 percent bidding credit if they serve fewer than 250,000 subscribers and serve predominantly rural areas. The Commission declines to adopt a specific threshold for the proportion of an applicant's customers who are located in rural areas, but puts prospective applicants on notice that it is the Commission's intent that in order for an applicant to be eligible for a rural service provider bidding credit, the primary focus of its business activity must be the provision of services to rural areas. Accordingly, this rule change will provide an incentive for rural service providers to participate more vigorously in upcoming spectrum auctions, including the Incentive Auction. Further, as the Rural-26 Coalition notes, the Commission anticipates that “more rural companies, including Rural-26 members, likely will participate in the upcoming Incentive Aucti [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2015-21950. Public record. Not legal advice.