# Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High Cant Deficiency Operations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2013-04679 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** March 13, 2013 - **Citation:** 78 FR 16052 ## Text DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Railroad Administration 49 CFR Parts 213 and 238 [Docket No. FRA-2009-0036, Notice No. 2] RIN 2130-AC09 Vehicle/Track Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High Cant Deficiency Operations AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: FRA is amending the Track Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of rail vehicles with the track over which they operate under a variety of conditions at speeds up to 220 m.p.h. The final rule revises standards for track geometry and safety limits for vehicle response to track conditions, enhances vehicle/track qualification procedures, and adds flexibility for permitting high cant deficiency train operations through curves at conventional speeds. The rule accounts for a range of vehicle types that are currently in operation, as well as vehicle types that may likely be used in future high-speed or high cant deficiency rail operations, or both. The rule is based on the results of simulation studies designed to identify track geometry irregularities associated with unsafe wheel/rail forces and accelerations, thorough reviews of vehicle qualification and revenue service test data, and consideration of international practices. DATES: This final rule is effective July 11, 2013. The incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the rule is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of July 11, 2013. Petitions for reconsideration must be received on or before May 13, 2013. Comments in response to petitions for reconsideration must be received on or before June 26, 2013. ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration and comments on petitions for reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration or comments on petitions for reconsideration related to Docket No. FRA-2009-0036, Notice No. 2, may be submitted by any of the following methods: • Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, www.regulations.gov . Follow the Web site's online instructions for submitting comments. • Fax: 202-493-2251. • Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590. • Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this rulemaking. Note that all petitions and comments received will be posted without change to www.regulations.gov, including any personal information. Please see the Privacy Act heading in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted petitions, comments, or materials. Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents, petitions for reconsideration, or comments received, go to www.regulations.gov anytime or visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John J. Mardente, Engineer, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-1335); Ken Rusk, Staff Director, Track Division, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6236); Ali Tajaddini, Program Manager for Vehicle/Track Interaction, Office of Railroad Policy and Development, Mail Stop 20, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6438); or Daniel L. Alpert, Supervisory Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6026). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Table of Contents for SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION I. Executive Summary II. Statutory Background A. Track Safety Standards B. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards III. Proceedings to Date A. Proceedings to Carry Out the 1992/1994 Track Safety Standards Rulemaking Mandates B. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Rulemaking Mandate C. Identification of Key Issues for Future Rulemaking D. RSAC Overview E. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group F. Establishment of the Task Force G. Development of the NPRM H. Development of the Final Rule IV. Technical Background A. Lessons Learned and Operational Experience B. Research and Computer Modeling V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions A. EU and SNCF Comments on Track Geometry Standards B. Wheel Unloading Ffrom Wind on Superelevated Curves VI. Section-by-Section Analysis VII. Regulatory Impact and Notices A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272 C. Paperwork Reduction Act D. Federalism Implications E. Environmental Impact F. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 G. Energy Impact H. Trade Impact I. Privacy Act I. Executive Summary Having considered the public comments in response to FRA's May 10, 2010, proposed rule on vehicle/track interaction safety, see 75 FR 25928, FRA issues this final rule amending the Track Safety Standards, 49 CFR part 213, and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, 49 CFR part 238, applicable to high-speed and high cant deficiency train operations. (As explained more fully in the preamble, below, train operations at cant deficiency involve traveling through curves faster than the balance speed; the higher the train speed is above the balance speed, the higher the cant deficiency.) Since FRA's high-speed track safety standards and passenger equipment safety standards were issued in the late 1990s, FRA and interested industry members have identified various issues for possible future rulemaking. Some of these issues resulted from the gathering of operational experience in applying the safety standards to Amtrak's high-speed, Acela Express (Acela) trainsets, as well as to higher-speed commuter railroad operations. Other issues arose from research conducted, allowing FRA to gather new information with which to evaluate the safety of high-speed and high cant deficiency rail operations. FRA has addressed these issues with the assistance of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which unanimously recommended the requirements contained in this final rule. Among the final rule's main accomplishments, the rule: • Revises performance standards and specifications for track geometry for the higher-speed track classes, track Classes 6 through 9 (speeds greater than 80 miles per hour (m.p.h.) for freight and 90 m.p.h. for passenger operations). FRA has reviewed the performance standards in light of advanced simulations that were developed to support the rulemaking effort, as discussed in Section IV, below, and is refining those standards to focus on identified safety concerns and remove any unnecessary costs. • Adds flexibility through procedures for safely permitting high cant deficiency operations on the lower-speed track classes, track Classes 1 through 5, without the need for obtaining a waiver. In order to take advantage of high cant deficiency operations and the resultant savings in travel time, the equipment must be qualified and the track must be maintained to more stringent standards to permit the higher speeds through curves. • Institutes more cost-effective equipment qualification and in-service monitoring requirements. Railroads can discontinue annual use of instrumented wheelsets for in-service validation as a general requirement and avoid some tests that have not provided useful data. Further, the final rule makes it easier to qualify vehicles on additional segments of track once they are qualified on any track, extending territories in which qualified equipment may operate. • Clarifies that individuals qualified to inspect track need only understand the portions of the regulation relevant to the inspections they conduct and the work they perform, given, in particular, the provisions added for high cant deficiency operations in lower-speed track classes. In analyzing the economic impacts of the final rule, FRA does not find that any existing operation will be adversely affected by these changes, nor does FRA find that the changes will induce any net costs. FRA expects three types of benefits: Benefits related to equipment procurement for passenger trains at speeds exceeding 90 m.p.h., benefits from operations at high cant deficiency for passenger trains at speeds up to 90 m.p.h, and benefits from streamlined testing requirements. Under the rules existing before this final rule, a railroad could insist that a carbuilder provide trainsets that could meet acceleration requirements on track at the maximum allowable deviations. FRA is unaware of any such trainsets that are available that would have complied with the former rule under all permitted conditions and also meet other requirements for service in the United States. This final rule makes it more likely that railroads will specify equipment that is currently produced, and thus could reduce the costs of procurements, although Amtrak disagrees in its comments (and FRA believes that, even without procurement benefits, the costs of the rule are still justified by the benefits). Operations at high cant deficiency allow trains to operate more rapidly around curves. This can dramatically reduce the time required for any given trip. Streamlined testing requirements make it much easier to qualify a trainset on additional track once it has been qualified on any track, and provide more flexibility for monitoring trainset performance in service. Nothing in the rule will increase the overall costs of procuring equipment or of testing that equipment to validate compliance with the rule. In fact, the rule will reduce those costs. Although the provisions for high cant deficiency operations on all track classes are permissive in nature and create no additional net costs, railroads that avail themselves of these provisions will incur some costs. The first will be the one-time cost of programming the software of automated track inspection vehicles to include the new standards required by the rule, and the second will be the cost of maintaining the track in curves to tighter geometric standards. FRA conservatively estimates that it will cost $292,000 as a one-time expense to update track inspection software to reflect the changes in this rule. However, FRA is not certain whether overall maintenance costs will be higher or lower with high cant deficiency operations, as trains otherwise would have more frequently slowed down from the line speed before entering curves and then accelerated back to the line speed after exiting the curves, adding wear and tear to both equipment and track. In any case, the difference in maintenance costs is not included as a factor in the analysis. The rule creates net benefits and will facilitate the expansion of passenger rail service. II. Statutory Background A. Track Safety Standards The first Federal Track Safety Standards were published on October 20, 1971, following the enactment of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, Public Law 91-458, 84 Stat. 971 (October 16, 1970), in which Congress granted to FRA comprehensive authority over “all areas of railroad safety.” See 36 FR 20336. FRA envisioned the new Standards to be an evolving set of safety requirements subject to continuous revision allowing the regulations to keep pace with industry innovations and agency research and development. The most comprehensive revision of the Standards resulted from the Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, Public Law 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (Sept. 3, 1992), later amended by the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4615 (November 2, 1994). The amended statute is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20142 and required the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to review and then revise the Track Safety Standards, which are contained in 49 CFR part 213. The Secretary has delegated such statutory responsibilities to the Administrator of FRA (see 49 CFR 1.89), which as discussed below, carried out the review and the rulemaking proceedings. B. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards In September 1994, the Secretary convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would develop safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a 5-year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994. Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of this Act is codified at 49 U.S.C. 20133. III. Proceedings to Date A. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1992/1994 Track Safety Standards Rulemaking Mandates To help fulfill the statutory mandates described in Section II.A, FRA decided that the proceeding to revise part 213 should advance under RSAC, which was established on March 11, 1996. (A fuller discussion of RSAC is provided below.) In turn, RSAC formed the Track Working Group, comprised of approximately 30 representatives from railroads, rail labor organizations, trade associations, State government, track equipment manufacturers, and FRA, to develop and draft a proposed rule for revising part 213. The Track Working Group identified issues for discussion from several sources, in addition to the statutory mandates issued by Congress in 1992 and in 1994. Ultimately, the Track Working Group recommended a proposed rule to the full RSAC body, which in turn formally recommended to the Administrator of FRA that FRA issue the proposed rule as it was drafted. On July 3, 1997, FRA published an NPRM that included substantially the same rule text and preamble as that developed by the Track Working Group. The NPRM generated comment, and following consideration of the comments received, FRA published a final rule in the Federal Register on June 22, 1998, see 63 FR 33992, which, effective September 21, 1998, revised the Track Safety Standards in their entirety. To address the modern railroad operating environment, the final rule included standards specifically applicable to high-speed train operations in a new subpart G. Prior to the 1998 final rule, the Track Safety Standards had addressed six classes of track, Classes 1 through 6, that permitted passenger and freight trains to travel at speeds up to 110 m.p.h.; passenger trains had been allowed to operate at speeds over 110 m.p.h. under conditional waiver granted by FRA. FRA revised the requirements for Class 6 track, included them in new subpart G, and also added in it three new classes of track, track Classes 7 through 9, designating standards for track over which trains may travel at speeds up to 200 m.p.h. The new subpart G was intended to function as a set of “stand alone” regulations governing any track identified as belonging to one of these high-speed track classes. B. Proceedings To Carry Out the 1994 Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Rulemaking Mandate FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group to provide FRA with advice in developing the regulations mandated by Congress. On June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM provided background information on the need for such standards, offered preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule, which was published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540. After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the following subject areas: Structural design; fire safety; training; inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective equipment. On July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by publishing a response to those petitions concerning the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232. C. Identification of Key Issues for Future Rulemaking While FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA and interested industry members began identifying various issues for possible future rulemaking. Some of these issues resulted from the gathering of operational experience in applying the new safety standards to Amtrak's Acela trainsets, as well as to higher-speed commuter railroad operations. These included concerns raised by railroads and rail equipment manufacturers as to the application of the new safety standards and the consistency between the requirements contained in part 213 and those in part 238. Other issues arose from research conducted, allowing FRA to gather new information with which to evaluate the safety of high-speed and high cant deficiency rail operations. FRA decided to address these issues with the assistance of RSAC. FRA notes that train operation at cant deficiency involves traveling through a curve faster than the balance speed. Balance speed for any given curve is the speed at which the lateral component of centrifugal force will be exactly compensated (or balanced) by the corresponding component of the gravitational force. When operating above the balance speed, there is a net lateral force to the outside of the curve. Cant deficiency is measured in inches and is the amount of superelevation that would need to be added to the existing track to balance this centrifugal force with this gravitational force to realize no net lateral force measured in the plane of the rails. For every curve, there is a balance speed at which the cant deficiency is zero based on the actual superelevation built into the track. The higher the train speed is above the balance speed, the higher the cant deficiency. D. RSAC Overview As mentioned above, in March 1996, FRA established RSAC as a forum for developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes representation from all of the agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties. A list of member groups follows: • American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); • American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); • American Chemistry Council; • American Petroleum Institute; • American Public Transportation Association (APTA); • American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA); • American Train Dispatchers Association; • Association of American Railroads (AAR); • Association of Railway Museums; • Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM); • Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET); • Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED); • Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); • Chlorine Institute; • Federal Transit Administration (FTA); * • Fertilizer Institute; • High Speed Ground Transportation Association; • Institute of Makers of Explosives; • International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; • International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; • Labor Council for Latin American Advancement; * • League of Railway Industry Women; * • National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP); • National Association of Railway Business Women; * • National Conference of Firemen & Oilers; • National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association; • National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak); • National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); * • Railway Supply Institute (RSI); • Safe Travel America (STA); • Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte; * • Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA); • Tourist Railway Association, Inc.; • Transport Canada; * • Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); • Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); • Transportation Security Administration (TSA); * and • United Transportation Union (UTU). * Indicates associate, non-voting membership. When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a given task. The individual task force then provides that information to the working group for consideration. When a working group comes to unanimous consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff members play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such variations would be noted and explained in the rulemaking document issued by FRA. However, to the maximum extent practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action. E. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following: • AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company; • AAPRCO; • AASHTO; • Amtrak; • APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc. (Interfleet, formerly LDK Engineering, Inc.), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland Transit Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company, Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, Southern California Regional Rail Authority, and Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA); • ASLRRA; • BLET; • BRS; • FTA; • NARP; • RSI; • SMWIA; • STA; • TCIU/BRC; • TSA; • TWU; and • UTU. Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical discussions. Staff from the NTSB also participated in the Working Group's meetings. The Working Group has held 14 meetings on the following dates and in the following locations: • September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC; • November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA; • May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL; • October 26-27, 2004, in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD; • March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL; • September 7, 2005, in Chicago, IL; • March 21-22, 2006, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL; • September 12-13, 2006, in Orlando, FL; • April 17-18, 2007, in Orlando, FL; • December 11, 2007, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL; • June 18, 2008, in Baltimore, MD; • November 13, 2008, in Washington, DC; • June 8, 2009, in Washington, DC; and • September 16, 2010, in Chicago, IL. F. Establishment of the Task Force Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting the Working Group established four task forces—smaller groups to develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include various representatives from the respective organizations that are part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned to identify and develop issues and recommendations specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was published on December 8, 2005 ( see 70 FR 73069), and a final rule was published on October 19, 2006 ( see 71 FR 61835). Another of these task forces was assigned to develop recommendations related to window glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. The work of this task force led to the publication of an NPRM focused on enhancing the front end strength of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) locomotives on August 1, 2007 ( see 72 FR 42016), and the publication of a final rule on January 8, 2010 ( see 75 FR 1180). Another task force, the Emergency Preparedness Task Force, was established to identify issues and develop recommendations related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment. An NPRM on these topics was published on August 24, 2006 ( see 71 FR 50276), and a final rule was published on February 1, 2008 ( see 73 FR 6370). The fourth task force, the Track/Vehicle Interaction Task Force (also identified as the Vehicle/Track Interaction Task Force, or Task Force), was established to identify issues and develop recommendations related to the safety of vehicle/track interactions. Initially, the Task Force was charged with considering a number of issues, including vehicle-centered issues involving wheel flange angle, tread conicity, and truck equalization; the necessity for instrumented wheelset tests for operations at speeds from 90 to 125 m.p.h.; consolidation of vehicle trackworthiness criteria in parts 213 and 238; and revisions of the track geometry standards. The Task Force was given the responsibility of addressing other vehicle/track interaction safety issues and to recommend any research necessary to facilitate their resolution. Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the following: • AAR; • AASHTO; • Amtrak; • APTA, including members from Bombardier, Interfleet, LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, Port Authority Trans-Hudson, and STV Inc.; • BMWED; and • BRS. Staff from the Volpe Center attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical discussions through their comments and presentations. In addition, staff from ENSCO, Inc., attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical discussions, as a contractor to FRA. Both the Volpe Center and ENSCO, Inc., have supported FRA throughout this rulemaking. The Task Force has held 32 meetings on the following dates and in the following locations: • April 20-21, 2004, in Washington, DC; • May 24, 2004, in Springfield, VA (technical subgroup only); • June 24-25, 2004, in Washington, DC; • July 6, 2004, in Washington, DC (technical subgroup only); • July 22, 2004, in Washington, DC (technical subgroup only); • August 24-25, 2004, in Washington, DC; • October 12-14, 2004, in Washington, DC; • December 9, 2004, in Washington, DC; • February 10, 2005, in Washington, DC; • April 7, 2005, in Washington, DC; • August 24, 2005, in Washington, DC; • November 3-4, 2005, in Washington, DC; • January 12-13, 2006, in Washington, DC; • March 7-8, 2006, in Washington, DC; • April 25, 2006, in Washington, DC; • May 23, 2006, in Washington, DC; • July 25-26, 2006, in Cambridge, MA; • September 7-8, 2006, in Washington, DC; • November 14-15, 2006, in Washington, DC; • January 24-25, 2007, in Washington, DC; • March 29-30, 2007, in Cambridge, MA; • April 26, 2007, in Springfield, VA; • May 17-18, 2007, in Cambridge, MA; • June 25-26, 2007, in Arlington, VA; • August 8-9, 2007, in Cambridge, MA; • October 9-11, 2007 in Washington, DC; • November 19-20, 2007, in Washington, DC; • February 27-28, 2008, in Cambridge, MA; • August 5-6, 2010, in Rockville, MD; • August 23, 2010, in Washington, DC (via teleconference); • September 7, 2010, in Washington, DC (via teleconference); and • June 29, 2011, in Washington, DC (via teleconference). This list includes meetings of a technical subgroup comprised of representatives of the larger Task Force. These subgroup meetings were often convened the day before the larger Task Force meetings to focus on more advanced, technical issues. The results of these meetings were then presented at the larger Task Force meetings and, in turn, included in the minutes of those Task Force meetings. Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the public docket in this proceeding and are available for inspection. G. Development of the NPRM The NPRM was developed to address a number of the concerns raised and issues discussed during Task Force and Working Group meetings. The Task Force recognized that the high-speed track safety standards are based on the principle that, to ensure safety, the interaction of the vehicles and the tracks over which they operate must be considered within a systems approach that provides for specific limits for vehicle response to track perturbation(s). From the outset, the Task Force strove to develop revisions that would: Serve as practical standards with sound physical and mathematical bases; account for a range of vehicle types that are currently used and may likely be used on future high-speed or high cant deficiency rail operations, or both; and not present an undue burden on railroads. The Task Force first identified key issues requiring attention based on experience applying the Track Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, and defined the following work efforts: • Revise— ○ Qualification requirements for high-speed and high cant deficiency operations; ○ Acceleration and wheel/rail force safety limits; ○ Inspection, monitoring, and maintenance requirements; and ○ Track geometry limits for high-speed operations. • Establish— ○ Necessary safety limits for wheel profile and truck equalization; ○ Consistent requirements for high cant deficiency operations covering all track classes; and ○ Additional track geometry requirements for cant deficiencies greater than 5 inches. • Resolve and reconcile inconsistencies between the Track Safety Standards and Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, and between the lower- and higher-speed Track Safety Standards. Through the close examination of these issues, the Task Force developed proposals intended to result in improved public safety while reducing the burden on the railroad industry where possible. The proposals were arrived at through the results of computer simulations of vehicle/track dynamics, consideration of international practices, and thorough reviews of qualification and revenue service test data. Nonetheless, in the NPRM published in the Federal Register on May 10, 2010, see 75 FR 25928, FRA made clear that the Task Force did not seek to revise comprehensively the high-speed Track Safety Standards in subpart G of part 213, and the NPRM did not propose to do so. For example, there was no consensus within the Task Force to consider revisions to the requirements for crossties, as members of the Task Force believed it was outside of their assigned tasks. Nor was there any real discussion about revisions to the requirements for ballast or other sections in subpart G that currently do not distinguish requirements by class of track. (See § 213.307 in the Section-by-Section Analysis, below, for further discussion on this point.) FRA therefore made clear that by not proposing revisions to these sections in the NPRM, FRA did not mean to imply that these other sections may not be subject to revision in the future, such as through a separate RSAC effort. Further, FRA invited comment on the need and rationale for changes to other sections of subpart G not specifically proposed to be revised through the NPRM, noting that based upon the comments received and their significance to the changes specifically proposed, FRA may consider whether revisions to additional requirements in subpart G are necessary in this final rule. H. Development of the Final Rule FRA notified the public of its options to submit written comments on the NPRM and to request a public, oral hearing on the NPRM as well. No request for a public hearing was received. However, a number of interested parties did submit written comments to the docket in this proceeding, and FRA considered all of these comments in preparing the final rule. Specifically, written comments were received from AAR, Amtrak, Bombardier, the European Union (EU), Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), New Jersey Transit Corporation (NJ Transit), North Carolina Department of Transportation (NCDOT), SEPTA, Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français (French National Railway Company, shortened as SNCF), and a private citizen. As discussed below, FRA sought clarification from SNCF on SNCF's initial written comments to the docket, and SNCF supplemented its comments in response to FRA's request. FRA's request and SNCF's response have been made part of the public docket in this proceeding. FRA convened the Task Force to discuss the comments received on the NPRM and to help achieve consensus on recommendations concerning their incorporation into this final rule. After four meetings and subsequent electronic communications, the Task Force reached consensus on recommendations for the text of the final rule. The recommendations were accepted by the Working Group and unanimously approved by the full RSAC as the Committee's recommendations to the FRA Administrator. Finding that the recommendations help fulfill the agency's regulatory goals, are soundly supported, and in accordance with policy and legal requirements, FRA has adopted these recommendations in this final rule. FRA notes that throughout the preamble discussion of this final rule, FRA refers to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of the Task Force, Working Group, or full RSAC, as they are identified or contained in meeting minutes or other materials in the public docket. FRA does so to show the origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA believes this serves to illuminate factors it has weighed in making its regulatory decisions, as well as the rationale for those decisions. IV. Technical Background A. Lessons Learned and Operational Experience Since the issuance of both the high-speed Track Safety Standards in 1998 and the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in 1999, experience has been gained in qualifying a number of vehicles for high-speed and high cant deficiency operations and in monitoring subsequent performance in revenue service operation. These vehicles include Amtrak's Acela trainset; MTA's MARC-III multi-level passenger car; and NJ Transit's ALP-46 locomotive, Comet V car, PL-42AC locomotive, and multi-level passenger car. Considerable data was gathered by testing these vehicles at speed over their intended service routes using instrumented wheelsets to measure forces directly between the wheel and rail and using accelerometers to record vehicle motions. During the course of these qualification tests, some uncertainties, inconsistencies, and potentially restrictive values were identified in the interpretation and application of the vehicle/track interaction (VTI) safety limits then specified in § 213.333 and § 213.345 for excessive vehicle motions based on measured accelerations and in the requirements of § 213.57 and § 213.329 for high cant deficiency operation. The information and experience in applying these requirements helped lay the foundation for a number of the changes made in this rulemaking, examples of which are provided below. Differentiate Between Sustained Oscillatory and Transient Carbody Acceleration Events During route testing of the MARC-III multi-level car at speeds up to 125 m.p.h. and at curving speeds producing up to 5 inches of cant deficiency, several short-duration, peak-to-peak carbody lateral accelerations were recorded that exceeded regulatory thresholds but did not represent unsafe guidance forces simultaneously measured at the wheel-to-rail interface. However, repeated (sustained) carbody lateral oscillatory accelerations and significant motions were measured on occasion at higher speeds in curves even though peak-to-peak amplitudes did not exceed the thresholds. A truck component issue was identified as a cause of the excessive accelerations and thereafter corrected. To recognize and account for wider variations in vehicle design, this final rule divides the VTI acceleration limits into separate limits for passenger cars from those for other vehicles, such as conventional locomotives. In addition, new limits for sustained, carbody oscillatory accelerations have been added to differentiate between single (transient) events and repeated (sustained) oscillations. As a result, the carbody transient acceleration limits for single events, previously set conservatively to control for both single and repeated oscillations, are now more specific and, as appropriate, relaxed. FRA believes that this added specificity in the rule will reduce or eliminate altogether the need for railroads to provide clarification or perform additional analysis, or both, to distinguish between transient and sustained oscillations following a qualification test run. Based on the small energy content associated with high-frequency acceleration events of the carbody, transient acceleration peaks lasting less than 50 milliseconds are excluded from the carbody acceleration limits. Other clarifying changes include the addition of minimum requirements for sampling and filtering of the acceleration data. These changes followed considerable research into the performance of existing vehicles during qualification testing and revenue operation. Overall, it was found that the carbody oscillatory acceleration limits need not be as stringent to protect against events leading to vehicle or passenger safety issues. Establish Consistent Requirements for High Cant Deficiency Operations for All Track Classes Several issues related to operation at higher cant deficiencies (higher speeds in curves) have also been addressed, based particularly on route testing of the Acela trainsets on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. In sharper curves, for which cant deficiency was high but vehicle speeds were reflective of a lower track class, it was found that stricter track geometry limits were necessary, for the same track class, in order to provide an equivalent margin of safety for operations at higher cant deficiency. These stricter limits have been adopted in this final rule. Second, although the Track Safety Standards have prescribed limits on geometry variations existing in isolation, it was recognized that a combination of track alinement (also spelled “alignment” and literally meant to indicate “a line”) and surface variations, none of which individually amounts to a deviation from the Standards, may nonetheless result in undesirable response as defined by the VTI limits. This finding was significant because trains operating at high cant deficiency increase the lateral force exerted on track during curving and, in many cases, may correspondingly reduce the margin of safety associated with vehicle response to combined track variations. Sections 213.65 and 213.332 have been added to the rule, as a result. Qualification of Amtrak's conventional passenger equipment to operate at cant deficiencies up to 5 inches also highlighted the need to ensure compatibility between the requirements for low- (§ 213.57) and high-speed (§ 213.329) cant deficiency operations; these requirements have been modified, accordingly. Streamline Testing Requirements for Similar Vehicles This final rule provides that vehicles with minor variations in their physical properties (such as suspension, mass, interior arrangements, or dimensions) that do not result in significant changes to their dynamic performance (i.e., are dynamically similar) be considered of the same vehicle type for vehicle qualification purposes. Provided that this similarity can be established to FRA's satisfaction, these vehicles are not required to repeat full qualification testing of the vehicle type to which they belong, thereby saving the costs associated with full testing. In other cases, however, the variations between car parameters may warrant partial or full dynamic testing. For example, the approval process for NJ Transit's Comet V car to operate at speeds up to 100 m.p.h. exemplified the need for clarification of whether vehicles similar (but not identical) to vehicles that have undergone full qualification testing should be subjected to full qualification testing themselves. NJ Transit had sought relief from the instrumented wheelset testing required in § 213.345 by stating that the Comet V car was similar to the Comet IV car. The Comet V car was represented to FRA to have truck and suspension components nearly identical to the Comet IV car already in service and operating at 100-m.p.h. speeds for many years. However, examination by FRA revealed enough differences between the vehicles to at least warrant dynamic testing using accelerometers on representative routes. Results of the testing showed distinct behaviors between the cars and provided additional data that was necessary for qualifying the Comet V. Refine Criteria for Detecting Truck Hunting During route testing of Acela trainsets, high-frequency lateral acceleration oscillations of the coach truck frame were detected by the test instrumentation in a mild curve at high speed. However, the onboard sensors, installed per specification on every truck, did not respond to these events. Based on these experiences, the truck lateral acceleration safety limit, used for the detection of truck hunting, has been tightened from 0.4g to 0.3g and provides that the 0.3g value must be exceeded for more than 2 seconds for there to be an exceedance. Analyses conducted by FRA have shown that this change will better help to identify the occurrences of excessive truck hunting, while excluding high-frequency, low-amplitude oscillations that do not require immediate attention. In addition, to improve the process for analyzing data while vehicles are negotiating spiral track segments, the limit now requires that the RMSt (root mean squared with linear trend removed) value be used rather than the RMSm (root mean squared with mean removed) value. Finally, placement of the truck frame lateral accelerometer to detect truck hunting has been more rigorously specified to be as near an axle as is practicable. Analyses conducted by FRA have shown that when hunting motion (which is typically a combination of truck lateral motion and yaw) has a large truck yaw component, hunting is best detected by placing an accelerometer on the truck frame located above an axle. FRA has found that an accelerometer placed in the middle of the truck frame will not always provide early detection of truck hunting when yaw motion of the truck is large. Revise Periodic Monitoring Requirements for Class 8 and 9 Track Based on collected data, and so that the required inspection frequency better reflects experienced degradation rates, the periodic vehicle/track interaction monitoring frequency contained in § 213.333 for operations at track Class 8 and 9 speeds has been reduced from once per day to four times per week for carbody accelerations, and twice within 60 days for truck accelerations. In addition, a clause has been added to allow the track owner or railroad operating the vehicle type subject to the monitoring to petition FRA, after a specified amount of time or mileage, to eliminate the truck accelerometer monitoring requirement. Data gathered has shown that these monitoring requirements could be adjusted without materially diminishing operational safety. In this regard, FRA notes that safety is also provided pursuant to § 238.427 in that truck acceleration continues to be constantly monitored on each Tier II vehicle under the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in order to determine if hunting oscillations of the vehicle are occurring during revenue operation. B. Research and Computer Modeling As a result of advancements made over the last few decades, computer models of rail vehicles interacting with track have become practical and reliable tools for predicting the behavior and safety of these vehicles under a variety of conditions. These models can serve as reliable substitutes for performing actual, on-track testing, which otherwise may be more difficult—and likely more costly—to perform than to model. Models for such behavior typically represent the vehicle body, wheelsets, truck frames, and other major vehicle components as rigid bodies connected with elastic and damping elements and include detailed representation of the non-linear wheel/rail contact mechanics (i.e., non-linear frictional contact forces between the wheels and rails modeled as functions of the relative velocities between the wheel and rail contacts, i.e., creepages). The primary dynamic input to these models is track irregularities, which can be created analytically (such as versines, cusps, etc.) or based on actual measurements. There are a number of industry codes available with generally accepted approaches for solving the equations of motion describing the dynamic behavior of rail vehicles. These models require accurate knowledge of vehicle parameters, including the inertia properties of each of the bodies as well as the characteristics of the main suspension components and connections. To obtain reliable predictions, the models must also consider the effects of suspension non-linearities within the vehicles and in the wheel/rail contact mechanics, as well as incorporate detailed characterization of the track as input, including the range of parameters and non-linearities encountered in service. In order to develop revisions to the track geometry limits in the Track Safety Standards, several computer models of rail vehicles have been used to assess the response of vehicle designs to a wide range of track conditions corresponding to limiting conditions allowed for each class of track. Simulation studies have been performed using computer models of Amtrak's AEM-7 locomotive, Acela power car, Acela coach car, and Amfleet coach equipment. In the time since the 1998 revisions to the track geometry limits, which were largely based on models of hypothetical, high-speed vehicles, models of the subsequently-introduced Acela power car and coach car have been developed. In the case of the Acela power car, the model has proven capable of reproducing a wide range of vehicle responses observed during acceptance testing, including examples of potential safety concerns. For purposes of this rulemaking, an extensive matrix of simulation studies involving all four vehicle types was used to determine the amplitude of track geometry alinement anomalies, surface anomalies, and combined surface and alinement anomalies that result in undesirable response. These simulations were performed using two coefficients of friction (0.1 and 0.5), two analytical anomaly shapes (bump and ramp), and combinations of speed, curvature, and superelevation to cover a range of cant deficiency. The results provided the basis for establishing the revisions to the geometry limits adopted in this final rule. For illustration purposes, two examples are provided of results from simulation studies that were performed for determining safe amplitudes of track geometry: One illustrates the effect of combined track alinement and profile defects; the other illustrates isolated track alinement defects. Figure 1 depicts an example summarizing the modeling results of the Acela power car at 130 m.p.h. and 9 inches of cant deficiency over combined, 62-foot-wavelength defects. The darker-shaded squares represent a combination of track alinement and surface perturbations where at least one of the VTI safety criteria adopted in this final rule is exceeded, and the solid, black-lined polygon represents the track geometry limits that have been adopted in the final rule. Similar results for other vehicles, speeds and cant deficiencies, and defect wavelengths were created and reviewed. The track geometry limits for the combined perturbations (solid line) were developed following consideration of all of these results. Figure 1 displays how one example case compares with these track geometry limits. As shown, the combined perturbation limits address the most severe combination conditions, though for computational simplicity and implementation purposes, they do not attempt to control all possible combinations. The figure shows that without the addition of the combined defect limits in the upper right and lower left quadrants, which effectively limit track geometry in the up-and-in and down-and-out cases, the single-defect limits would otherwise permit conditions that could cause the VTI safety criteria to be exceeded. For many of these high-speed and high cant deficiency conditions, the net axle lateral force safety criterion was found to be the limiting safety condition. Figure 2 depicts an example summarizing the modeling results of the Acela power car on Class 7 track at 130 m.p.h. and 9 inches of cant deficiency over isolated track alinement defects having 124-foot wavelengths. Each vertical bar represents the amplitude of the largest alinement perturbation that will not cause an exceedance of one of the VTI safety criteria. Similar results for other vehicles, speeds and cant deficiencies, and defect wavelengths were created and reviewed. In addition, similar results for this range of analysis parameters (vehicles, speeds and cant deficiencies, and defect wavelengths) were created and reviewed using isolated, surface geometry defects. These example results show that, with two exceptions, the geometry limits in the 1998 Track Safety Standards have sufficiently protected against such exceedances under the modeled conditions. Specifically, the VTI limits for net axle lateral force and peak-to-peak carbody lateral acceleration were exceeded on track at the 124-foot, mid-chord offset (MCO) limit for alinement. The modeling showed this limit to be set too permissively for high cant deficiency operations. Consequently, FRA proposed to tighten this alinement limit from 1.25 inches to 1.0 inch for Class 7 track operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency to prevent unsafe vehicle dynamic response. FRA has adopted this proposal in this final rule. BILLING CODE 4910-06-P ER13MR13.004 ER13MR13.005 As specified in this final rule, simulations using computer models are now required during the vehicle qualification process as an important tool for the assessment of vehicle performance. These simulations are intended not only to augment on-track, instrumented performance assessments but also to provide a means for identifying vehicle dynamic performance issues prior to service to validate the suitability of a vehicle design for operation over its intended route. In order to evaluate safety performance as part of the vehicle qualification process, simulations are required using both a measured track geometry segment representative of the full route, and an analytically defined track segment containing geometry perturbations representative of minimally compliant track conditions for the respective track class—Minimally Compliant Analytical Track (or MCAT). MCAT is intended to be used to qualify both new vehicles for operation and vehicles previously qualified (on other routes) for operation over new routes. MCAT consists of nine sections; each section is designed to test a vehicle's performance in response to a specific type of perturbation (hunting perturbation, gage narrowing, gage widening, repeated and single surface perturbations, repeated and single alinement perturbations, short warp, and combined down-and-out perturbations). Typical simulation parameters (that vary) include: Speed, cant deficiency, gage, and wheel profile. Figure 3 depicts time traces of the percent of wheel unloading for the Acela coach in a simulated run over MCAT segments for analyzing high cant deficiency curving performance at 160 m.p.h. In this example the most severe response occurs over the warp segment of track. At 9 inches of cant deficiency and a speed of 160 m.p.h., vehicle response exceeds the permitted limit for a wheel to unload to less than 15 percent of its static vertical wheel load for 5 or more continuous feet, as provided in table of VTI safety limits in § 213.333. Please see the Section-by-Section Analysis for a further discussion of MCAT. ER13MR13.006 V. Discussion of Specific Comments and Conclusions As noted above, FRA received written comments in response to the NPRM from a number of interested parties. Most of the comments are discussed in the Section-by-Section Analysis or in the Regulatory Impact and Notices portion of this final rule directly with the provisions and statements to which they specifically relate. Other comments apply more generally to the final rule as a whole, and FRA is discussing them here. Please note that the order in which the comments are discussed in this document, whether by issue or by commenter, is not intended to reflect the significance of the comment raised or the standing of the commenter. A. EU and SNCF Comments on Track Geometry Standards FRA received comments from both the EU and SNCF expressing concerns that, in general, the proposed revisions to the Track Safety Standards would permit significantly larger track geometry variations than equivalent European limits. According to these commenters, such larger track geometry variations could compromise the safety of high-speed operations or have an impact on the achievable comfort values in high-speed service, or both. FRA's track geometry standards are safety standards and specify minimum safety requirements (i.e., maximum allowable track geometry variations that do not compromise safety). The standards do not address ride comfort, except to the extent that they inherently provide a level of ride comfort as well. However, FRA encourages and expects railroads to adopt their own internal, stricter track maintenance policies to address other concerns such as ride comfort. Thus, FRA expects that a high-speed rail system should normally operate well within the maximum allowable track geometry safety limits. As discussed above, to establish the safety limits proposed in the NPRM, FRA conducted a set of engineering and vehicle/track dynamic interaction simulation studies, using a range of representative vehicles (i.e., not developed for a particular vehicle type) to identify specific track geometry limits that would provide for safety in the envisioned speed ranges. These studies modeled the effects of specific track geometry variations (consisting of a full range of wavelengths likely to affect vehicle dynamics) on the safe response of the candidate vehicles. In addition, comparisons were made between the proposed limits derived from these modeling results and the track geometry limits used by SNCF, to assess their validity. These comparisons were made for track Classes 6 through 9. FRA sought clarification from SNCF on its comments on the NPRM, as noted above. FRA prepared a brief presentation outlining the general approach it followed in proposing the NPRM's safety limits, using the Class 9 limits as a specific example. This presentation was sent to SNCF along with three questions related to track geometry and safety criteria currently in use in the French high-speed rail network. These questions were intended to clarify FRA's understanding of SNCF's practices (recognizing that both the track geometry standards used by SNCF, as well as the measurements and calculations used to evaluate compliance with its standards, are implemented in a manner different from FRA's standards) and gather any specific information SNCF has to indicate the need for track geometry limits stricter than those proposed in the NPRM. Having considered the comments and supplemental response, FRA continues to believe that the approach taken in this rulemaking sets appropriate track geometry limits and safely accounts for vehicle behavior in response to track geometry conditions. Based on the information available to FRA, FRA does not find that more stringent track geometry limits are necessary for the purposes of safety. In this regard, SNCF's supplemental response noted inconsistencies with FRA's initial understanding of SNCF limits which, when taken into account, indicate that FRA's geometry limits actually provide tighter controls on alignment variations. Moreover, SNCF stated that it was about to start research to integrate vehicle dynamics more fully into its own track geometry limits, and expressed interest in SNCF and FRA combining their experience to share information and examine issues together. FRA welcomes the opportunity for such cooperation and a dialogue with SCNF is ongoing. B. Wheel Unloading From Wind on Superelevated Curves Several comments were raised on FRA's proposal in §§ 213.57(b) and 213.329(b) of the NPRM that all vehicles requiring qualification of the vehicle/track system under § 213.345 demonstrate that when stopped on a curve having a maximum uniform elevation of 7 inches, no wheel unloads to a value less than 50 percent of its static weight on level track. This proposed modification to the 1998 Track Safety Standards was intended to address potential vehicle rollover and passenger safety issues from side-wind loading should a vehicle be stopped or traveling at very low speeds on highly superelevated curves, helping to prevent complete unloading of the wheels on the high (elevated) rail and incipient rollover. In commenting on this proposal, Bombardier raised concern that only vehicles seeking qualification under § 213.345 would be subject to the proposed requirement, even though the underlying safety issue relates to all vehicle types operating at any speed and any cant deficiency—not just vehicles seeking qualification under § 213.345. Bombardier stated that a similar provision then contained in §§ 213.57 and 213.329 had been proposed to be removed for this reason. Bombardier also raised concern as to the effect the proposal would have on existing, qualified multi-level passenger equipment. Amtrak commented that only high-speed equipment would in effect be subject to the proposal, and yet the proposal had not been justified for any equipment, be it high-speed, conventional, or freight. NCDOT also commented that if rollover from side-wind loading when stopped on a superelevated curve is a safety issue, then the proposal should apply to either all vehicles, regardless of operating speed or cant deficiency, or none. Like Bombardier, NCDOT noted concern that the proposal could affect the procurement and qualification of bi-level passenger equipment. After extensive discussion within the Task Force in response to these comments, FRA has decided not to adopt the proposal. The proposal would have effectively superseded the requirements in §§ 213.57 and 213.329 for vehicles seeking qualification under § 213.345, in that, for a vehicle stopped or traveling at very low speeds on a highly superelevated curve, it would have lowered the 60-percent unloading limit to 50 percent, since dynamic effects on wheel unloading would not be a factor, and would have eliminated the 8.6-degree roll requirement for this stationary condition. However, FRA is not aware of passenger rail equipment currently in service in the United States that would not have met the proposal, and the proposal was therefore principally intended to ensure that new passenger rail equipment designs for high-speed or high cant deficiency operation would continue to address this wheel unloading concern. In this regard, FRA had suggested in the Task Force to limit the proposal only to new passenger cars—focusing the provisions on new passenger cars (or new passenger car types), particularly those with higher centers of gravity, to ensure that they do not excessively unload from wind when stationary on highly superelevated curves. Nevertheless, the Task Force could not reach agreement on criteria by which to evaluate such excessive unloading. FRA understood from the Task Force that the same criteria may not be appropriate for all railroads and would depend on specific operating characteristics and the operating environment (e.g, the criteria should account for the fact that the risk is higher in high-wind regions). Ultimately, the Task Force did not believe it necessary to specify a general FRA standard by which to determine whether the equipment poses a rollover-risk due to wind loading when stationary on a superelevated curve. FRA does make clear in this final rule that for all equipment operating at cant deficiencies above 3 inches, §§ 213.57(d) and 213.329(d) continue to require that when positioned on track with a uniform superelevation equal to the proposed cant deficiency, no wheel of the vehicle may unload to a value less than 60 percent of its static value on perfectly level track. This 60-percent limit retains an allowance for the effects of wind loading on the risk of equipment rollover at the proposed cant deficiency. Please see the discussion of §§ 213.57(d) and 213.329(d) in the Section-by-Section Analysis, below. Nonetheless, FRA notes that the underlying safety issue of equipment rollover from wind loading when stationary on a superelevated curve is not otherwise addressed in the regulations. Consequently, in the absence of a specific Federal standard, FRA expects that each railroad will identify appropriate safety criteria by which to evaluate the risk of equipment rollover from wind loading when stationary on a superelevated curve, and then make the determination that the risk has been safely addressed using those criteria. VI. Section-by-Section Analysis Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 213, Track Safety Standards Subpart A—General Section 213.1 Scope of Part This section was amended in the 1998 Track Safety Standards final rule to distinguish the applicability of subpart G from that of subparts A through F, as a result of subpart G's addition to this part by that final rule. Subpart G applies to track over which trains operate at speeds exceeding those permitted for Class 5 track, which supports maximum speeds of 80 m.p.h. for freight trains and 90 m.p.h. for passenger trains. Subpart G was intended to be comprehensive, so that a railroad operating at speeds above Class 5 maximum speeds may refer to subpart G for all of the substantive track safety requirements for high-speed rail and need refer to the sections of the Track Safety Standards applicable to lower-speed operations only for general provisions, i.e., § 213.1 (Scope), § 213.3 (Application), and § 213.15 (Penalties). At the same time, railroads that do not operate at speeds in excess of the maximum Class 5 speeds need not directly refer to subpart G at all. FRA is maintaining this general structure of part 213 for ease of use, and the requirements of subpart G continue not to apply directly to operations at Class 1 through 5 track speeds. However, in adding new requirements governing high cant deficiency operations for track Classes 1 through 5, certain sections of subparts C and D refer railroads operating at those high cant deficiencies to specific sections of subpart G. In such circumstances, only the specifically-referenced section(s) of subpart G apply, and only as provided. As discussed in this Section-by-Section Analysis, below, the addition of requirements for high cant deficiency operations over lower-speed track classes in this final rule permits railroads to operate at higher cant deficiencies over these track classes without requiring a waiver. Prior to this change in the regulation, railroads had to petition FRA for approval by waiver to operate at the higher cant deficiencies over the lower-speed track classes. FRA believes that the approach in this rulemaking minimizes the addition of detailed requirements for high cant deficiency operations in subparts C and D. Moreover, with one exception noted below, FRA has not found it necessary to amend this section on the scope of this part, because only certain requirements of subpart G apply to lower-speed track classes and only indirectly for high cant deficiency operations by cross-referencing the requirements. FRA believes that this approach is consistent with the organization of this part; for example, the 1998 Track Safety Standards final rule revised § 213.57 to reference subpart G for when a track owner or railroad operating above Class 5 track speeds requests approval to operate at greater than 4 inches of cant deficiency on curves in Class 1 through 5 track contiguous to the high-speed track. See 63 FR 33992, 34033. In the NPRM, FRA invited both comment on the proposal and suggestions for any alternative approach for maintaining the ease of use of this part, including whether the subpart headings should be modified to make their application clearer to the rail operations they address, and, if so, in what way(s). FRA did receive a comment from the AAR suggesting that the phrase “Except as provided in section 213.65,” be added at the beginning of the second sentence in paragraph (a) of this section. The AAR noted that the second sentence in paragraph (a) provided that the requirements in part 213 apply to specific track conditions “in isolation,” while this rulemaking is adding new § 213.65 to address “combined” track alinement and surface deviations. Therefore, the AAR recommended adding the introductory text to make § 213.1 consistent with new § 213.65. This final rule adopts the AAR's recommendation to make this section consistent with the changes to this part. Yet, in this regard, more than § 213.65 is being added that addresses conditions existing in combination. For example, § 213.332 is also being added in subpart G to address combined track alinement and surface deviations for the higher-speed track classes, and the MCAT qualification requirements in new Appendix D address “combined perturbation.” As a result, the final rule modifies paragraph (a) by adding the introductory words “In general” at the beginning of the second sentence. While the requirements in this part do apply, in general, to track conditions existing in isolation, the provisions discussed above are not focused exclusively on track conditions in isolation, and this modification preserves flexibility for encompassing these and other similar provisions without specifically enumerating them. The Task Force, including the AAR, concurred with this modification to the final rule. As a separate matter, FRA noted that it was not proposing to revise and re-issue the Track Safety Standards in full, as was done in the 1998 final rule. Instead, FRA is amending only certain portions of the Track Safety Standards. Therefore, FRA explained in the NPRM that this final rule needs to ensure that both the new and revised sections appropriately integrate with those sections of this part that are not amended, and that appropriate time is provided to phase-in the new and amended sections. FRA noted that, in general, the Task Force recommended that both new and revised sections become applicable one year after the date the final rule is published, to allow the track owner or operating railroad, or both, sufficient time to prepare for and adjust to meeting the new requirements. Examples of such adjustments may include changes to operating, inspection, or maintenance practices, such as for compliance with §§ 213.57, 213.329, 213.332, 213.333 and 213.345, as amended. FRA also explained that it was considering providing the track owner or operating railroad the option of electing to comply sooner with the new and amended requirements, upon written notification to FRA. FRA noted that such a request for earlier application of the new and amended requirements would indicate the track owner's or railroad's readiness and ability to comply with all of the new and amended requirements—not just certain of those requirements. Because of the interrelationship of the amendments, FRA believes that virtually all of them need to apply simultaneously to maintain their integrity. FRA invited comment on formalizing this approach for this final rule; however, no specific comment was received. In preparing the final rule, FRA decided that the more appropriate way to implement the rule's requirements is to make the rule effective 120 days after its publication, rather than generally make the revisions applicable one year after publication. While FRA did note in the NPRM that it intended the final rule to become effective 60 days after its publication, FRA also explained that since there cannot be two different sections of the same CFR unit in effect under the same section heading, a temporary appendix was being considered to separate revised sections from their former provisions to allow for continued compliance with those former sections for a track owner or railroad not electing to comply sooner with all of the revised sections of part 213. By lengthening the effective date of the final rule so that all of the changes go into effect simultaneously but at a later time, the rule is clearer and provides additional time in which to make preparations for complying with the new requirements. FRA has further considered the preparations that may be necessary, including changes to operating, inspection, and maintenance practices, and believes that they can be completed (and implemented) within this period. In particular, FRA believes that it should take no more than a month of labor hours to prepare all of a railroad's automated, vehicle-based inspection systems and software to measure and process the necessary parameters to determine compliance with this rule, based on the relatively limited changes to the existing safety limits and the number of new parameters that must be calculated. FRA also notes that the 1998 Track Safety Standards final rule took effect 90 days after its publication, see 63 FR 33991-33992, although certain provisions were made applicable at a later date. Section 213.7 Designation of Qualified Persons to Supervise Certain Renewals and Inspect Track This section recognizes that work on or about a track structure supporting heavy freight trains or passenger operations, or both, demands the highest awareness of employees of the need to perform their work properly. At the same time, the wording of this section has literally required that each individual designated to perform such work know and understand the requirements of this part, detect deviations from those requirements, and prescribe appropriate remedial action to correct or safely compensate for those deviations, regardless whether that knowledge, understanding, and ability with respect to all of this part were necessary for that individual to perform his or her duties. While qualified persons designated under this section have not been directly required to know, understand, or apply requirements applicable only to higher-speed track classes in subpart G (pursuant to § 213.1(b)), the addition of vehicle qualification and testing requirements for high cant deficiency operations in lower-speed track classes, in particular, adds a level of complexity that may be outside the purview of track foremen and inspectors in fulfilling their duties. As a result, the Task Force recommended and FRA agrees that this rule add text clarifying that the requirements for a person to be qualified under this section concern those portions of this part necessary for the performance of that person's duties. This section continues to require that a person designated under it possess the knowledge, understanding, and ability necessary to supervise the restoration and renewal of track, or to perform inspections of track, or both, for which he or she is responsible. Yet, adding the text makes clear that the person is not required to know or understand specific requirements of this part not necessary to the fulfillment of that person's duties. In this regard, the AAR commented that these changes are particularly needed in light of the adoption of high cant deficiency requirements in this final rule. FRA does not believe that safety will be in any way diminished by these changes, and they were supported by the Task Force. Section 213.14 Application of Requirements to Curved Track This is a new section that is being added to help define the application of requirements for curved track, following publication of and comment on the NPRM. Rather than define what is meant by curved track in each section where requirements for curved track appear, FRA believes it more appropriate to provide the definition here for all of part 213. This new section states that, unless otherwise provided in this part, requirements specified for curved track apply only to track having a curvature greater than 0.25 degree. This definition is intended to apply in all sections where limits for curved track are specified, unless otherwise provided. As further explanation, in its comments on the NPRM Bombardier observed that the track geometry alinement limits proposed in § 213.55(b) were those recommended by the Task Force, except for what was proposed as footnote 5—i.e., that curved track limits be applied only when track curvature is greater than 0.25 degree. See 75 FR 25957. Bombardier stated that this proposed footnote was not included in the rule text recommended by the Task Force and that FRA did not provide a technical justification for its inclusion in the proposed rule. Bombardier believed that this proposed footnote would only be applicable at very high speeds and would therefore be irrelevant. Consequently, Bombardier recommended the proposed footnote's deletion in § 213.55(b), as well as in the following sections regarding application of curved track limits: §§ 213.63(b), 213.327(b) and (c), and 213.331(a) and (b). In discussing the proposed footnote with the Task Force, the Task Force recognized that the primary intent was to provide a definitive demarcation of curved track from tangent track so that track inspectors and automated track geometry measurement systems can properly apply the more stringent track geometry limits required for high cant deficiency operation in track Classes 1 through 5. Continuing with the example of § 213.55, should track curvature be no greater than 0.25 degree, the limits in § 213.55(a) for tangent track apply. For practical consideration in the way curvature is determined, and based on dynamic simulations of VTI performance by and experience with Acela trainsets on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor, a 0.25-degree (15-minute) curvature was chosen as this demarcation. This same reasoning applies to the inclusion of this provision for the proper application of track geometry limits not only in § 213.55, but also in §§ 213.63, 213.327 and 213.331, as specifically cited by Bombardier. Therefore, the Task Force recommended applying this provision to each of these sections. Additionally, in preparing the final rule FRA noted that since curved track limits apply elsewhere in this part, whether or not high cant deficiency operations are conducted over the track, this provision for determining when to apply curved track limits could apply to those sections as well. FRA examined all of part 213 and found it appropriate to apply this provision generally throughout the entirety of the part, unless otherwise specified. The Task Force concurred with this addition, but nevertheless recommended that FRA restate this section in subpart G to make clear that it applies together with the other provisions governing the high-speed track classes. FRA has therefore added an identical provision in subpart G; please see the discussion of § 213.313. FRA believes that these new sections will help to ensure that curved track limits are applied in a uniform and proper manner. Subpart C—Track Geometry Section 213.55—Track Alinement This section specifies the maximum alinement deviations allowed for tangent and curved track in Classes 1 through 5. Alinement is the localized variation in curvature of each rail. On tangent track, the intended curvature is zero, and thus the alinement is measured as the variation or deviation from zero. In a curve, the alinement is measured as the variation or deviation from the “uniform” alinement over a specified distance. As proposed, the section heading has been modified so that it reads “Track alinement,” instead of “Alinement,” for clarity. The former track alinement limits in this section have been redesignated as paragraph (a) and remain unchanged. Paragraph (b) has been added as a new provision containing tighter, single-deviation geometry limits for operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency on curved track, and includes both 31-foot and 62-foot MCO limits. These limits are based on the results of simulation studies to determine the safe amplitudes of track geometry alinement variations. See Technical Background, Section IV.B, above. FRA believes that adding the track geometry limits in paragraph (b) is necessary to provide an equivalent margin of safety for operations at higher cant deficiency. FRA also notes that, as proposed, the requirements for track Classes 1 and 2 in paragraph (b) reference footnote 2 of paragraph (b), which provides that restraining rails or other systems may be required for derailment prevention. As provided in § 213.14, limits for curved track in paragraph (b) apply only to track having a curvature greater than 0.25 degree. Consequently, it is unnecessary to add proposed footnote 5, which would have contained the same instruction. Please see § 213.14 for a full discussion of the application of curved track limits. Section 213.57 Curves; Elevation and Speed Limitations This final rule makes substantial changes to this section, which specifies the requirements for safe curving speeds in track Classes 1 through 5. Notably, changes have been made to the qualification requirements and approval procedures for vehicles intended to operate at more than 3 inches of cant deficiency. For consistency with the higher speed standards in subpart G, cant deficiency is no longer limited to a maximum of 4 inches in track Classes 1 through 5. Prior to this change, this section specified qualification requirements for vehicles intended to operate only up to 4 inches of cant deficiency on track Classes 1 through 5 unless the track was contiguous to a higher-speed track. Consequently, vehicles intended to operate at more than 4 inches of cant deficiency on routes not contiguous to a higher-speed track were only permitted to operate under a waiver in accordance with part 211 of this chapter. This section now includes procedures for such vehicles to operate safely at higher cant deficiencies without the necessity of obtaining a waiver. Both portions of paragraph (a) are revised; the first portion is revised as proposed without any comment. The maximum elevation of the outside rail of a curve may not be more than 8 inches on track Classes 1 and 2, and 7 inches on track Classes 3 through 5. Formerly, the provision had been stated in terms of the maximum crosslevel of the outside rail, with the same limits. As crosslevel is a function of elevation differences between two rails, and is specifically addressed by other provisions of this rule, specifically § 213.63, this clarification is intended to focus the provision on the maximum allowable elevation of a single rail. Numerous comments were received on FRA's proposal concerning the second portion of paragraph (a), however, to restrict configuring track so that the outside rail of a curve is designed to be lower than the inside rail while allowing for a deviation up to the limits provided in § 213.63. In issuing the NPRM, FRA noted that the Task Force had recommended removing this portion of paragraph (a), which formerly stated that “[e]xcept as provided in § 213.63, the outside rail of a curve may not be lower than the inside rail.” Concern had been raised in the Task Force that this statement potentially conflicted with the limits in § 213.63 for “the deviation from * * * reverse crosslevel elevation on curves.” Nonetheless, FRA had believed that these provisions complemented each other—rather than conflict—addressing both the designed layout of a curve and deviations from that layout through actual use. In the NPRM, FRA stated that the requirement in paragraph (a) was intended to be a design restriction against configuring track so that the outside rail of a curve is lower than the inside rail, while the limits at issue in § 213.63 were to govern local deviations from uniform elevation—i.e., from the designed elevation—that occur as a result of changes in conditions. However, as discussed below, FRA recognizes that its proposal should have been more complete, and FRA is modifying the final rule based on the comments received. In commenting on the NPRM, SEPTA noted that there are at least two situations when it is desirable to incorporate minimal reverse elevation by design: (1) In grade crossings in which the roadway profile is opposed to the desired track elevation; and (2) in special trackwork where a turnout may be located in a slight curve which is opposite the turnout curve. SEPTA stated that in these situations incorporating reverse elevation may be desired to minimize the potential highway hazard in a grade crossing and properly accommodate connections to sidings and other facilities. Accordingly, SEPTA believed that criteria should be developed to permit a minimal amount of reverse superelevation by design. NJ Transit also commented that the proposal would impact a significant number of switches in its system where reverse elevation has been designed into curves. Specifically, NJ Transit cited switches in interlockings at several junctions such as its Roseville Avenue Interlocking, potentially impacting 65 daily trains destined to and from the Montclair Line; Amtrak's Hunter Interlocking, potentially impacting 53 daily NJ Transit trains destined to and from the Raritan Valley Line; its Far Hills Interlocking, potentially impacting 49 daily NJ Transit Gladstone Line trains; and other possible locations at junctions on the Northeast Corridor that would be potentially impacted. NJ Transit believed that future interlocking reconfigurations could also be affected if the physical characteristics preclude even the temporary location of a turnout in a curve that might involve reverse elevation, and therefore requested that the proposal not be adopted. Likewise, Amtrak objected to the proposal, believing that it would represent a fundamental restructuring of basic track design and geometry tenets and that implementation of the proposed language would have enormous consequences for rail service (both passenger and freight) on the Northeast Corridor. Amtrak noted that there are more than 77 locations on the Northeast Corridor between Washington, Boston, and Harrisburg where reverse elevation exists in track by design. According to Amtrak, in the majority of these locations, the design has been in service for more than 100 years without causing any safety issues. Amtrak raised concern that compliance with the rule as proposed would engender myriad problems, such as forcing it to take large sections of the Northeast Corridor out of service that contain curves with reverse elevation by design. Amtrak cited the example of the River Interlocking north of Baltimore that would need to be taken out of service, inhibiting the Norfolk Southern Railway Company's access to the Port of Baltimore. Amtrak stated that reconstructing some or all of the existing reverse-elevated curves would be a massive, time-consuming and prohibitively expensive undertaking that would take years to implement and cost in excess of $200 million. The AAR also objected to the proposal, believing that it resulted from a misunderstanding as to when it is appropriate for the outside rail to be lower than the inside rail (for track Classes 5 and below). The AAR noted that there are times when, by design, the outside rail must be lower than the inside rail. For example, the AAR cited that at thousands of mainline locations the outside rail is lower than the inside rail where turnouts come off the outsides of superelevated curves. According to the AAR, there is no realistic alternative to such designs, and they have been used for over a century. The AAR also cited the use of reverse superelevation on industrial or other tracks where there is a hard pull around sharp curves and reverse elevation is used to prevent “stringlining” derailments. The AAR maintained that FRA incorrectly asserted in the NPRM that § 213.63 is intended to address only those changes that occur “through actual use,” stating that § 213.63 clearly is intended to address situations, as discussed above, that occur at the design stage as well. Nor did the AAR believe there to be a conflict between §§ 213.57(a) and 213.63. The AAR stated that § 213.57(a) addresses the general rule that the outside of the rail may not be lower than the inside of the rail, while § 213.63 addresses situations where the general rule does not apply. Noting that the proposed change was not part of the Task Force's consensus on the proposed rule, the AAR recommended that FRA either delete the second sentence in paragraph (a) or retain the original wording in the regulation. After considering the comments on the proposal and discussing them with the Task Force, FRA is modifying the rule to state that the outside rail of a curve may not be lower than the inside rail by design, except when engineered to address specific track or operating conditions, and that the limits in § 213.63 apply in all cases. FRA continues to believe that the former rule text could give the mistaken impression that it is appropriate to design reverse elevation into curves as the nominal condition for all curves. Nonetheless, FRA appreciates the comments raised, noting that reverse elevation is designed into certain curves both out of necessity and for safety reasons. FRA did not intend its proposal to nullify such engineering design. As modified, the rule text addresses both the concerns raised by FRA and those raised by the commenters, and the Task Force concurred with the revision. As explained in the discussion of specific comments and conclusions section of the preamble, above, what was proposed as paragraph (b) is not included in this final rule. Please see Wheel Unloading from Wind on Superelevated Curves, Section V.B., for an explanation of FRA's treatment of that proposal, as well as of paragraph (d), below. Instead, what was proposed as paragraph (c) is designated as paragraph (b) in this final rule. As proposed, the V max formula in paragraph (b) determines the maximum allowable posted timetable operating speed for curved track based on the qualified cant deficiency (inches of unbalance), E u , for the vehicle type. This final rule also amends paragraph (b) to reference a new footnote 2 to permit the vehicle type to operate at the cant deficiency for which it is approved, E u , plus 1 inch, if the actual elevation of the outside rail, E a , and the degree of track curvature, D, change as a result of track degradation. As modified, this paragraph is intended to provide a tolerance to account for the effects of local crosslevel or curvature conditions on V max that may result in the actual cant deficiency exceeding the cant deficiency approved for the equipment, i.e., the actual operating speed may exceed the maximum allowable posted timetable operating speed. Without this tolerance, these track conditions could generate a limiting speed exception, and some railroads have adopted the approach of reducing the cant deficiency of the vehicle in order to avoid these exceptions. FRA believes that this 1-inch tolerance is supported by operational experience and complemented by related standards acting to mitigate safety concerns. For instance, the V max formula is not intended to replace FRA's track geometry limits, which more clearly focus on individual track irregularities with shorter wavelengths. These track geometry limits apply independently and act independently to limit the maximum allowable speed for a track segment based on the condition of the track. FRA noted in the NPRM that it was the consensus of the Task Force to clarify footnote 1 to state, in part, that actual elevation, E a , for each 155-foot track segment in the body of a curve is determined by averaging the elevation for 11 points through the segment at 15.5-foot spacing—instead of for 10 points, as was stated in the original footnote. FRA explained that the Track Safety Standards Compliance Manual (Compliance Manual) provides that the “actual elevation and curvature to be used in the [V max ] formula are determined by averaging the elevation and curvature for 10 points, including the point of concern for a total of 11, through the segment at 15.5-[foot] station spacing.” See the guidance on § 213.57 provided in Chapter 5 of the Manual, which is available on FRA's Web site ( www.fra.dot.gov ). FRA therefore believes that this clarification to footnote 1 makes the footnote more consistent with the manner in which the rule is intended to be applied. In its comments on the NPRM, the AAR believed that FRA departed from the RSAC consensus in proposing to change the way elevation is calculated. Further, the AAR did not find persuasive FRA's reliance on the Compliance Manual as a justification for changing the requirement, stating that the Compliance Manual is inconsistent with the rule text. In discussing these comments with the Task Force, the Task Force agreed that the proposed footnote be adopted in the final rule. While FRA stated in the NPRM that it was the consensus of the Task Force to clarify footnote 1, FRA recognizes that there was no such explicit consensus, as the AAR noted. Nevertheless, FRA believes that this clarification to footnote 1 does make the footnote more consistent with the manner in which the rule is intended to be applied, and it is not intended to add any requirement. In calculating elevation, 10 measurements are taken from the point of concern—5 on each side—so that 11 points are actually averaged, given that the point of concern is included in the calculated average. The AAR did not oppose adoption of this clarification after the Task Force discussion. Former footnote 2 has been redesignated as footnote 3 without substantive change. Paragraph (c), proposed as paragraph (d) in the NPRM, provides that all vehicle types are considered qualified for up to 3 inches of cant deficiency, as allowed by the former rule. Paragraph (d), proposed as paragraph (e) in the NPRM, is being modified to specify the requirements for vehicle qualification over track with more than 3 inches of cant deficiency. Prior to this modification, “static lean” qualification requirements were specified for vehicles intended to operate up to an allowable 4 inches of cant deficiency on track Classes 1 through 5. These requirements limited the carbody roll to 5.7 degrees with respect to the horizontal when the vehicle was standing on track with 4 inches of superelevation, and limited the vertical wheel load remaining on the raised wheels to no less than 60 percent of their static level values and carbody roll to no more than 8.6 degrees with respect to the horizontal when the vehicle was standing (stationary) on track with 6 inches of superelevation. In the final rule, cant deficiency is no longer limited to a maximum of 4 inches in track Classes 1 through 5. The revised requirements, consistent with the higher-speed standards in § 213.329, limit the vertical wheel load remaining on the raised wheels to no less than 60 percent of their static level values and limit carbody roll for passenger cars to no more than 8.6 degrees with respect to the horizontal when the vehicle is standing (stationary) on track with a uniform superelevation equal to the proposed cant deficiency. Consequently, the rule no longer imposes a 6-inch superelevation static lean requirement generally; rather, the amount of superelevation is dependent on the proposed cant deficiency. For example, if the proposed cant deficiency is 5 inches, the superelevation used for demonstrating compliance with this paragraph is also 5 inches. The requirements in paragraph (d) may be met by either static or dynamic testing. In either case, the vehicle type must be tested in a ready-for-service condition. In consultation with the Task Force, FRA is clarifying that the vehicle type be tested in a ready-for-service condition, i.e., in the same vehicle/track performance condition in which it would be in passenger service. At the same time, FRA is clarifying paragraph (e), below, so that the load condition under which testing is performed is included in the description of the test procedure. For example, the vehicle type may or may not be loaded to simulate passengers on board, and this information would be necessary for a complete evaluation of the vehicle's performance. As noted, the static lean test limits the vertical wheel load remaining on the raised wheels to no less than 60 percent of their static level values and limits the roll of a passenger carbody to 8.6 degrees with respect to the horizontal, when the vehicle is standing on track with superelevation equal to the proposed cant deficiency. The dynamic test limits the steady-state vertical wheel load remaining on the low rail wheels to no less than 60 percent of their static level values and limits the lateral acceleration in a passenger car to 0.15g steady-state, when the vehicle operates through a curve at the proposed cant deficiency. (Please note that steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration, i.e., the tangential force pulling passengers to one side of the carbody when traveling through a curve at higher than the balance speed, should not be confused with sustained, carbody lateral oscillatory accelerations, i.e., continuous side-to-side oscillations of the carbody in response to track conditions, whether on curved or tangent track.) This 0.15g steady-state lateral acceleration limit in the dynamic test is intended to provide consistency with the 8.6-degree roll limit in the static lean test, in that it corresponds to the lateral acceleration a passenger would experience in a standing vehicle whose carbody is at a roll angle of 8.6 degrees with respect to the horizontal. The former 5.7-degree roll limit, which limited steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration to 0.1g, has been removed. Measurements and supplemental research have indicated that a steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g is considered to be the maximum, steady-state lateral acceleration above which jolts from vehicle dynamic response to track deviations can present a hazard to passenger safety. While other FRA vehicle/track interaction safety criteria principally address external safety hazards that may cause a derailment, such as damage to track structure and other conditions at the wheel/rail interface, the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit specifically addresses the safety of the interior occupant environment. For comparison purposes, it is notable that the International Union of Railways (UIC) Code 518, Testing and Approval of Railway Vehicles from the Point of View of Their Dynamic Behaviour—Safety—Track Fatigue—Ride Quality, Ed. 4 (2009), has adopted a steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g. FRA does recognize that making a comparison with such a specific limit in another body of standards needs to take into account what related limits are provided in the compared standards and what the nature of the operating environment is to which the compared standards apply. FRA therefore invited comment whether such a comparison is appropriate here—whether, for example, there are enhanced or additional vehicle/track safety limits that apply to European operations, either through industry practice or governing standards, or both. In their comments on the NPRM, SNCF responded that, concerning curves and cant deficiency design, the limit of 0.15g for steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration is justified. SNCF stated that this value is usually considered a comfort limit for curve design and is the limit value accepted for passenger cars. SNCF further noted that for freight cars the accepted limit is 0.13g, and that, in European rules, the 0.15g value corresponds to an exceptional value of cant deficiency, while the recommended value is about 0.14g. FRA notes that increasing the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit from 0.1g to 0.15g allows for operations at higher cant deficiency on the basis of acceleration before tilt compensation is necessary. This increase in cant deficiency without requiring tilt compensation is larger for a vehicle design whose carbody is less disposed to roll on its suspension when subjected to an unbalance force, since carbody roll on curved track has a direct effect on steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration. For example, a vehicle having a completely rigid suspension system (S = 0) would have no carbody roll and could operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency as high as 9 inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration would be 0.15g, which would correlate to an 8.6-degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with 9 inches of superelevation. The suspension coefficient “S” is the ratio of the roll angle of the carbody on its suspension (measured relative to the inclination of the track) to the cant angle of the track (measured relative to the horizontal) for a stationary vehicle standing on a track with superelevation. A suspension coefficient of 0 is theoretical but neither practical nor desirable, because of the need for flexibility in the suspension system to handle track conditions and provide for occupant comfort and safety. Assuming that a car has some flexibility in its suspension system, say S = 0.3, the car could operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency as high as approximately 7 inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration would be 0.15g, which would correlate to an 8.6-degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with 7 inches of superelevation. To operate at higher cant deficiencies and not exceed the limits, the vehicle would need to be equipped with a tilt system so that the floor actively tilts to compensate for the forces that would otherwise cause the limits to be exceeded. Under the former FRA requirements, using the above examples, a vehicle having a completely rigid suspension system (S = 0) could operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency no higher than 6 inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration would be 0.1g, which would correlate to a 5.7-degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with 6 inches of superelevation. Assuming that a vehicle has some flexibility in its suspension system, again say S = 0.3, the vehicle could operate without a tilt system at a cant deficiency no higher than approximately 4.7 inches, at which point the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration would be 0.1g, which would correlate to a 5.7-degree roll angle between the floor and the horizontal when the vehicle is standing on track with 4.7 inches of superelevation. FRA notes that the less stringent steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit and carbody roll angle limit adopted in this final rule will minimize both the need to equip vehicles with tilt systems at higher cant deficiencies and the costs associated with such features, as well. Moreover, by facilitating higher cant deficiency operations, savings may also result from shortened trip times. These savings may be particularly beneficial to passenger operations in emerging high-speed rail corridors, enabling faster operations through curves. Of course, any such savings should not come at the expense of safety, and FRA has adopted additional track geometry requirements for operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency, whether or not the vehicles are equipped with tilt systems. These additional track geometry requirements were developed to control for undesirable vehicle response to track conditions that could pose derailment concerns. Nonetheless, the VTI limits on transient accelerations may need to be stricter when combined with higher steady-state lateral acceleration, to address passenger ride safety concerns. Additional research regarding passenger response to vibration is needed to establish this relationship and model this effect. While the tighter geometry limits at high cant deficiency that have been added in this final rule were not specifically developed to address such concerns, they may help to control transient, carbody acceleration events that could pose ride safety concerns for passengers subjected to higher steady-state lateral accelerations. These additional track geometry requirements apply only to operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency, where steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration may approach 0.15g for typical vehicle designs. In this regard, during Task Force discussions, Amtrak stated that Amfleet equipment has been operating at up to 5 inches of cant deficiency (with approximately 0.13g steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration levels) without resulting in passenger ride safety issues. FRA is also not aware of any general safety issue involving passengers losing their balance and falling due specifically to excessive steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration levels in current operations. Nonetheless, a transient carbody acceleration event that poses no derailment safety concern could very well cause a standing passenger to lose his or her balance and fall. Although FRA is not aware of much published data on the effect that transient, carbody acceleration events have on passenger ride safety, it is recognized that the presence of steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration will generally reduce the margin of safety for standing passengers to withstand transient, lateral acceleration events and not lose their balance. If such passenger ride safety issues were more clearly identified, additional track geometry or other limits could potentially be proposed to address them. However, based on the information available to the Task Force, the Task Force did not recommend additional limits to address potential passenger ride safety concerns that may result from transient, carbody acceleration events either alone or when combined with steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration. The Task Force also took into account that, as one of several modes of transportation offered to the general public, rail travel need provide a level of passenger comfort to both attract and retain riders. As a result, the riding characteristics of passenger rail vehicles should by railroad practice be subject to acceptable criteria for passenger ride comfort, and such criteria for passenger ride comfort should be more stringent than those for passenger ride safety. Nonetheless, to fully inform FRA's decisions in preparing the final rule, FRA specifically invited public comment on this discussion in the NPRM and the proposal to set the steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit at 0.15g. FRA requested specific comment on whether the proposed rule appropriately provided for passenger ride safety, and if not, requested that the commenters state what additional requirement(s) should be imposed, if any. As noted above, in commenting on the NPRM, SNCF agreed that the limit of 0.15g for steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration is justified in that this value is usually considered a comfort limit for curve design and is the limit value accepted for passenger cars. SNCF specifically commented that, in European rules, the 0.15g value corresponds to an exceptional value of cant deficiency, while the recommended value is about 0.14g. FRA sees no conflict with these comments; measurements and supplemental research have indicated that a steady-state, carbody lateral acceleration limit of 0.15g is considered to be the maximum, steady-state lateral acceleration above which jolts from vehicle dynamic response to track deviations can present a hazard to passenger safety. For the foregoing reasons, FRA has therefore adopted the proposal in the final rule. The changes to this section also separate and clarify the submittal requirements to FRA to obtain approval for the qualifying cant deficiency of a vehicle type (paragraph (e)) and to notify FRA prior to the implementation of the approved higher curving speeds (paragraph (f)). As discussed above, FRA is clarifying paragraph (e) so that the load condition under which the testing is performed is included in the description of the test procedure. Additional clarification in paragraph (e) has been included for submitting suspension system maintenance information. The requirement for submitting suspension system maintenance information applies to vehicle types not subject to parts 238 or 229 of this chapter, such as a freight car operated in a freight train, and then only to safety-critical components. Paragraph (f) also clarifies that in approving the request made pursuant to paragraph (e), FRA may impose conditions necessary for safely operating at the higher curving speeds. Former footnote 3 is being redesignated as footnote 4 and modified in conformance with the changes in this final rule. Former footnote 3 reflected that this section previously allowed a maximum of 4 inches of cant deficiency; hence, the static lean test requirement to raise and lower the car on one side by 4 inches. Former footnote 3 also specified a cant excess requirement to raise and lower the car on one side by 6 inches. As proposed, FRA is removing the 4-inch limit on cant deficiency, and the cant-excess requirement has been addressed, as explained above. Thus, this footnote, now footnote 4, refers to “the proposed cant deficiency” instead of 4 inches of cant deficiency. FRA also notes that, as proposed, it has removed the statement in the former footnote that the “test procedure may be conducted in a test facility.” Testing may of course be conducted in a test facility, but the statement could cause confusion that testing may be conducted only in a test facility. No such limitation is intended. Separately, FRA has slightly modified the footnote from that proposed in the NPRM based on a concern raised during the Task Force's consideration of the draft final rule. The test procedure's testing sequence could be wrongly construed to indicate that the roll angle is measured after the wheels are lowered; FRA agrees and has corrected this ambiguity. Former paragraph (e) is being moved to new paragraph (g), which was proposed as paragraph (h) in the NPRM. As revised, this paragraph (g) is identical to two other provisions in this final rule: § 213.329(g)—the subpart G counterpart to this section—and § 213.345(i). Please see the discussion of § 213.345(i), below. The Task Force agreed that the purpose of these provisions is the same and therefore recommended that the same text be included. FRA agrees and has modified the rule accordingly. Paragraph (h) was proposed as paragraph (j) in the NPRM to clarify that vehicle types that have been permitted by FRA to operate at cant deficiencies, E u , greater than 3 inches prior to the date of publication of the final rule in the Federal Register would be considered qualified under this section to operate at those permitted cant deficiencies over the previously operated track segments(s). Consequently, before the vehicle type could operate over another track segment at such cant deficiencies, FRA proposed that the vehicle be qualified as provided in this section. FRA made a similar proposal in § 213.329(i) (now § 213.329(h)). In commenting on the NPRM, Amtrak stated the tests proposed in this section and in § 213.329 for the higher-speed track classes would be wasteful to repeat because, unlike the tests proposed for § 213.345, the tests proposed here would not have been conducted under “local” conditions but rather in a static testing facility having no connection to the location of the proposed service. Amtrak therefore wondered what types of conditions FRA believed would be uncovered during this testing process before permitting the vehicle types to operate at the same cant deficiencies on other track segments. Amtrak believed that it would be simply repeating the exact same test on the exact same car at the exact same test facility, and therefore found it difficult to find any justification for the proposed limitation. FRA discussed the proposal and the comments received with the Task Force. The Task Force recommended that vehicle types that have been permitted by FRA to operate at cant deficiencies, E u , greater than 3 inches but not exceeding 5 inches be considered qualified under this section to operate at those permitted cant deficiencies over all track segments—not only over previously operated segments. FRA agrees that extending the nature of the qualification in this way is appropriate given that the requirements of this section are static or steady-state and do not directly reflect the “local” interaction of the vehicle and the track. Paragraph (h)(1) adopts this recommendation, and FRA makes clear that it applies not only to previous permission by FRA to operate at these cant deficiencies, but also prospectively to vehicle types when they are approved by FRA to operate at these cant deficiencies. Nonetheless, a requirement has been included in paragraph (h)(1) that written notice be provided to FRA no less than 30 calendar days prior to the proposed implementation of such curving speeds on another track segment in accordance with paragraph (f) of this section. This notice is intended to identify the new track segment(s) so that FRA is aware of the proposed operation, can ensure that appropriate permission has been provided for it, and otherwise administer the requirements of this rule. FRA notes that pursuant to paragraph (i) of this section and § 213.345, Vehicle/track system qualification, dynamic testing is required when moving a vehicle type to a new track segment for operation at cant deficiencies exceeding 5 inches. Accordingly, paragraph (h)(2) makes clear that vehicle types that have been permitted by FRA to operate at cant deficiencies, E u , greater than 5 inches shall be considered qualified under this section to operate at those permitted cant deficiencies only for the previously operated or identified track segments(s). Please also see the discussion regarding § 213.329(h). As proposed, paragraph (i) is being added to reference pertinent sections of subpart G—namely, §§ 213.333 and 213.345—that contain requirements related to operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency. These sections include requirements for periodic track geometry measurements, monitoring of carbody acceleration, and vehicle/track system qualification. Specifically, in § 213.333(c)(1), FRA has added periodic inspection requirements using a Track Geometry Measurement System (TGMS) to determine compliance with § 213.53, Track gage; § 213.55(b), Track alinement; § 213.57, Curves; elevation and speed limitations; § 213.63, Track surface; and § 213.65, Combined track alinement and surface deviations. In sharper curves, for which cant deficiency was high but vehicle speeds were reflective of a lower track class, it was found that stricter track geometry limits were necessary, for the same track class, in order to provide an equivalent margin of safety for operations at higher cant deficiency. As proposed in the NPRM, FRA has also added periodic monitoring requirements for cardbody accelerations, to determine compliance with the VTI safety limits in § 213.333. Moreover, the vehicle/track system qualification requirements in § 213.345 apply to vehicle types intended to operate at any curving speed producing more than 5 inches of cant deficiency, and include, as appropriate, a combination of computer simulations, carbody acceleration testing, truck acceleration testing, and wheel/rail force measurements. FRA believes that these requirements are necessary to apply to operations at high cant deficiency on lower-speed track classes. Section 213.369(f) is also referenced, to make clear that inspection records be kept in accordance with the requirements of § 213.333, as appropriate. Paragraph (j), which was proposed as paragraph (k) in the NPRM, is being added as a new paragraph to define “vehicle” and “vehicle type,” as used in this section. As the term “vehicle” is used elsewhere in this part and has a different meaning than the term “vehicle type,” both terms are defined here for the purposes of this section so that this section's requirements may be properly understood and applied. Section 213.59 Elevation of Curved Track; Runoff This final rule makes a conforming change to this section's reference to § 213.57(b), to reflect the changes adopted in that section. The need for this conforming change had been overlooked in the proposed rule. However, the AAR notified FRA and other Task Force members of the omission and suggested change during RSAC consideration of the final rule, and no objection was raised. FRA agrees that the language should conform so as to avoid confusion, and has modified paragraph (a) of this section accordingly. No other change is intended. Section 213.63 Track Surface Track surface is the evenness or uniformity of track in short distances measured along the running surface of the rails. Under load, the track structure gradually deteriorates due to dynamic and mechanical wear effects of passing trains. Improper drainage, unstable roadbed, inadequate tamping, and deferred maintenance can create surface irregularities, which can lead to serious consequences if ignored. As proposed in the NPRM, this section is divided into two paragraphs. What was formerly the entirety of this section (the introductory text, table, and footnotes) is re-designated as paragraph (a). Paragraph (a) generally mirrors the former section but substitutes the date “June 22, 1998” for the words “prior to the promulgation of this rule” in the asterisked portion of the table concerning the variation in crosslevel on spirals due to physical restrictions on spiral length and operating practices and experience as determined by prior engineering decisions. The asterisk was included in the 1998 final rule and refers to that final rule, which was promulgated on June 22, 1998, to address the practice on some railroads to design a greater runoff of elevation in spirals due to physical restrictions on the length of spirals. Spiral runoff in construction after the promulgation of that final rule must be designed and maintained within the generally-applicable limits identified in the table for the difference in crosslevel. Consequently, FRA has clarified this section so that the asterisked text effectively continues to refer to the 1998 final rule—not this very final rule. The primary substantive change to this section is the addition of new paragraph (b), which contains tighter, single-deviation geometry limits for operations above 5 inches of cant deficiency on curved track. These limits include both 31-foot and 62-foot MCO limits and a new limit for the difference in crosslevel between any two points less than 10 feet apart. FRA believes that adding these track geometry limits is necessary to provide an equivalent margin of safety for operations at higher cant deficiency. These limits are based on the results of simulation studies to determine the safe amplitudes of track geometry surface variations. See Technical Background, Section IV.B, above. FRA did not receive any comment on this section, other than the comment raised by Bombardier and discussed in § 213.14 as to the inclusion of proposed footnote 4 specifying that curved track surface limits apply only when track curvature is greater than 0.25 degree. As noted in the discussion of § 213.14, the text of the proposed footnote has been adopted as § 213.14 primarily to [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2013-04679. Public record. Not legal advice.