# Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Compliance Obligations

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2012-3390

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Rule
- **Published:** February 24, 2012
- **Citation:** 77 FR 11252

## Text

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 4, 145, and 147
RIN 3038-AD30
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors: Compliance Obligations

AGENCY:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is adopting amendments to its existing part 4 regulations and promulgating one new regulation regarding Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors. The Commission is also adopting new data collections for CPOs and CTAs that are consistent with a data collection required under the Dodd-Frank Act for entities registered with both the Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission. The adopted amendments rescind the exemption from registration; rescind relief from the certification requirement for annual reports provided to operators of certain pools offered only to qualified eligible persons (QEPs; modify the criteria for claiming relief); and require the annual filing of notices claiming exemptive relief under several sections of the Commission's regulations. Finally, the adopted amendments include new risk disclosure requirements for CPOs and CTAs regarding swap transactions.

DATES:

Effective dates:
This final rule is effective on April 24, 2012, except for the amendments to § 4.27, which shall become effective on July 2, 2012.

Compliance dates:
Compliance with § 4.27 shall be required by not later than September 15, 2012, for a CPO having at least $5 billion in assets under management, and by not later than December 14, 2012, for all other registered CPOs and all CTAs. Compliance with § 4.5 for registration purposes only shall be required not later than the later of December 31, 2012, or 60 days after the effective date of the final rulemaking further defining the term “swap,” which the Commission will publish in the
Federal Register
at a future date. Entities required to register due to the amendments to § 4.5 shall be subject to the Commission's recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements pursuant to part 4 of the Commission's regulations within 60 days following the effectiveness of a final rule implementing the Commission's proposed harmonization effort pursuant to the concurrent proposed rulemaking. CPOs claiming exemption under § 4.13(a)(4) shall be required to comply with the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) by December 31, 2012; however, compliance shall be required for all other CPOs on April 24, 2012. Compliance with all other amendments, not otherwise specified above, shall be required by December 31, 2012.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Kevin P. Walek, Assistant Director, Telephone: (202) 418-5463, Email:
kwalek@cftc.gov,
or Amanda Lesher Olear, Special Counsel, Telephone: (202) 418-5283, Email:
aolear@cftc.gov,
Michael Ehrstein, Attorney-Advisor, Telephone: 202-418-5957, Email:
mehrstein@cftc.gov,
Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background on the Proposal To Amend the Registration and Compliance Obligations for CPOs and CTAs

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”).
1

The legislation was enacted to reduce risk, increase transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system by, inter alia, enhancing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (the “Commission” or “CFTC”) rulemaking and enforcement authorities with respect to all registered entities and intermediaries subject to the Commission's oversight.

1

See
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The text of the Dodd-Frank Act may be accessed at
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/OTCDERIVATIVES/index.htm
.

The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly states that the purpose of the legislation is:

To promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end `too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other

purposes.
2

2

Id.

Pursuant to this stated objective, the Dodd-Frank Act has expanded the scope of federal financial regulation to include instruments such as swaps, enhanced the rulemaking authorities of existing federal financial regulatory agencies including the Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and created new financial regulatory entities.

In addition to the expansion of the Commission's jurisdiction to include swaps under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”).
3

The FSOC is composed of the leaders of various state and federal financial regulators and is charged with identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States, promoting market discipline, and responding to emerging threats to the stability of the country's financial system.
4

The Dodd-Frank Act anticipates that the FSOC will be supported in these responsibilities by the federal financial regulatory agencies.
5

The Commission is among those agencies that could be asked to provide information necessary for the FSOC to perform its statutorily mandated duties.
6

3

See
section 111 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

4

See
section 112(a)(1)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

5

See
sections 112(a)(2)(A) and 112(d)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

6

See
section 112(d)(1) of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act requires advisers to large private funds
7

to register with the SEC.
8

Through this registration requirement, Congress

sought to make available to the SEC “information regarding [the] size, strategies and positions” of large private funds, which Congress believed “could be crucial to regulatory attempts to deal with a future crisis.”
9

In section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress amended section 204(b) of the Investment Advisers Act to direct the SEC to require private fund advisers registered solely with the SEC
10

to file reports containing such information as is deemed necessary and appropriate in the public interest and for investor protection or for the assessment of systemic risk. These reports and records must include a description of certain prescribed information, such as the amount of assets under management, use of leverage, counterparty credit risk exposure, and trading and investment positions for each private fund advised by the adviser.
11

Section 406 of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires that the rules establishing the form and content of reports filed by private fund advisers that are dually registered with the SEC and the CFTC be issued jointly by both agencies after consultation with the FSOC.
12

7
Section 202(a)(29) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Investment Advisers Act”) defines the term “private fund” as “an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act.” 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7). Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act provides an exclusion from the definition of “investment company” for any “issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.” 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1). Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act provides an exclusion from the definition of “investment company” for any “issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities.” 15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(7). The term “qualified purchaser” is defined in section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act.
See
15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(51).

8
The Dodd-Frank Act requires private fund adviser registration by amending section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act to repeal the exemption from registration for any adviser that during the course of the preceding 12 months had fewer than 15 clients and neither held itself out to the public as an investment adviser nor advised any registered investment company or business development company.
See
section 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act. There are exemptions from this registration requirement for advisers to venture capital funds and advisers to private funds with less than $150 million in assets under management in the United States. There also is an exemption for foreign advisers with less than $25 million in assets under management from the United States and fewer than 15 U.S. clients and private fund investors.
See
sections 402, 407 and 408 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

9

See
S. Conf. Rep. No. 111-176, at 38 (2010).

10
In this release, the term “private fund adviser” means any investment adviser that is (i) registered or required to be registered with the SEC (including any investment adviser that is also registered or required to be registered with the CFTC as a CPO or CTA) and (ii) advises one or more private funds (including any commodity pools that satisfy the definition of “private fund”).

11

See
section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

12

See
section 406 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)
13

authorizes the Commission to register Commodity Pool Operators (“CPOs”) and Commodity Trading Advisors (“CTAs”),
14

exclude any entity from registration as a CPO or CTA,
15

and require “[e]very commodity trading advisor and commodity pool operator registered under [the CEA to] maintain books and records and file such reports in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Commission.”
16

The Commission also has the authority to include within or exclude from the definitions of “commodity pool,” “commodity pool operator,” and “commodity trading advisor” any entity “if the Commission determines that the rule or regulation will effectuate the purposes of the CEA.”
17

In addition, the Commission has the authority to “make and promulgate such rules and regulations as, in the judgment of the Commission, are reasonably necessary to effectuate the provisions or to accomplish any of the purposes of [the CEA].”
18

The Commission's discretionary authority to exclude or exempt persons from registration was intended to be exercised “to exempt from registration those persons who otherwise meet the criteria for registration * * * if, in the opinion of the Commission, there is no substantial public interest to be served by the registration.”
19

It is pursuant to this authority that the Commission has promulgated the various exemptions from registration as a CPO that are enumerated in § 4.13 of its regulations as well as the exclusions from the definition of CPO that are delineated in

§ 4.5.
20

13
7 U.S.C. 1, et seq.

14
7 U.S.C. 6m.

15
7 U.S.C. 1a(11) and 1a(12).

16
7 U.S.C. 6n(3)(A). Under part 4 of the Commission's regulations, entities registered as CPOs have reporting obligations with respect to their operated pools.
See
17 CFR. 4.22. Although CTAs have recordkeeping obligations under part 4, the Commission has not required reporting by CTAs,
See generally,
17 CFR. part 4.

17
7 U.S.C. 1a(10), 1a(11), 1a(12).

18
7 U.S.C. 12a(5).

19

See
H.R. Rep. No. 93-975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), p. 20.

20

See
68 FR 47231 (Aug. 8, 2003).

As stated previously in this release, and in the Proposal, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act in response to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008.
21

That Act requires the reporting of certain information by investment advisers to private funds related to potential systemic risk including, but not limited to, the amount of assets under management, use of leverage, counterparty credit risk exposure, and trading and investment positions for each private fund under the reporting entity's advisement.
22

This information facilitates oversight of the investment activities of funds within the context of the rest of a discrete market or the economy as a whole.

21

See
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

22

See
section 404 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

The sources of risk delineated in the Dodd-Frank Act with respect to private funds are also presented by commodity pools. To provide the Commission with similar information to address these risks, the Commission has determined to require registration of certain previously exempt CPOs and to further require reporting of information comparable to that required in Form PF, which the Commission has previously adopted jointly with the SEC. To implement this enhanced oversight, the Commission proposed, and has now determined to adopt, the revision and rescission of certain discretionary exemptions that it previously granted.

B. The Proposal

Following the recent economic turmoil, and consistent with the tenor of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission reconsidered the level of regulation that it believes is appropriate with respect to entities participating in the commodity futures and derivatives markets. Therefore, on January 26, 2011, the Commission proposed amendments and additions to its existing regulatory regime for CPOs and CTAs and the creation of two new data collection instruments, Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR (“Proposal”).
23

In a concurrent joint proposal with the SEC, the Commission also proposed § 4.27(d) and sections 1 and 2 of Form PF.
24

23

See
76 FR 7976 (Feb. 11, 2011).

24

See
76 FR 8068 (Feb. 11, 2011). Because the Commission did not adopt the remainder of proposed § 4.27 at the same time as it adopted the subsection of § 4.27 implementing Form PF, the Commission modified the designation of § 4.27(d) to be the sole text of that section. Additionally, the Commission made some revisions to the text of § 4.27 to: (1) clarify that the filing of Form PF with the SEC will be considered substitute compliance with certain Commission reporting obligations and (2) allow CPOs and CTAs who are otherwise required to file Form PF the option of submitting on Form PF data regarding commodity pools that are not private funds as substitute compliance with certain CFTC reporting obligations.

In the Proposal, the Commission specifically proposed the following amendments: (A) to require the periodic reporting of data by CPOs and CTAs regarding their direction of commodity pool assets; (B) to identify certain proposed filings with the Commission as being afforded confidential treatment; (C) to revise the requirements for determining which persons should be required to register as a CPO under § 4.5; (D) to require the filing of certified annual reports by all registered CPOs; (E) to rescind the exemptions from registration under §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4); (F) to require annual affirmation of claimed exemptive relief for both CPOs and CTAs; (G) to require an additional risk disclosure statement from CPOs and CTAs that engage in swaps transactions; and (H) to make certain conforming amendments to the Commission's regulations in light of the proposed amendments.

In describing the rationale for the Proposal, the Commission stated:

[T]o ensure that necessary data is collected from CPOs and CTAs that are not operators or advisors of private funds, the Commission is proposing a new § 4.27, which would require quarterly reports from all CPOs and CTAs to be electronically filed with NFA. The Commission is promulgating proposed § 4.27 pursuant to the Commission's authority to require the filing of reports by registered CPOs and CTAs under section 4n

of the CEA. In an effort to eliminate duplicative filings, proposed § 4.27(d) would allow certain CPOs and/or CTAs that are also registered as private fund advisers with the SEC pursuant to the securities laws to satisfy certain of the Commission's systemic reporting requirements by completing and filing the appropriate sections of Form PF with the SEC with respect to advised private funds.

In order to ensure that the Commission can adequately oversee the commodities and derivatives markets and assess market risk associated with pooled investment vehicles under its jurisdiction, the Commission is re-evaluating its regulation of CPOs and CTAs. Additionally, the Commission does not want its registration and reporting regime for pooled investment vehicles and their operators and/or advisors to be incongruent with the registration and reporting regimes of other regulators, such as that of the SEC for investment advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. (Footnotes

omitted).
25

25
76 FR 7976, 7977-78 (Feb. 11, 2011).

C. Comments on the Proposal

The Commission received 61 comment letters in response to the Proposal. The commenters represented a diversity of market participants. Seven commenters were registered investment companies or registered investment advisers; five commenters were registered or exempt CPOs; and three commenters were registered investment companies or registered investment advisers that also claimed exemption from registration as a CPO under § 4.13. The Commission also received 20 comments from law firms; 14 comments from trade organizations; two comments from individual interested parties; a comment from a compliance service provider; and a comment from a registered futures association.
26

The majority of the comments received opposed the adoption of the proposed amendments to § 4.5 and the rescission of §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4).

26
Additionally, the Commission received six comments that were not pertinent to the substance of the Proposal. Three concerned position limits in silver, one consisted of a web address; one was an advertisement; and one simply said “nice.”

Having considered these comments, the Commission has decided to adopt most of the amendments to part 4 that it proposed, with some modifications. In addition, the Commission has decided not to rescind the exemption in § 4.13(a)(3) for entities engaged in a de minimis amount of derivatives trading. The Commission's amendments to part 4, and the modifications to its Proposal are discussed below.

The scope of this
Federal Register
release generally is restricted to the comments received in response to the Proposal and to the changes to, and the clarifications of, the Proposal that the Commission is making in response thereto. The Commission encourages interested persons to read the Proposal for a fuller discussion of the purpose of each of the amendments contained in the Proposal.

D. Significant Changes From the Proposal

The significant changes from the Proposal that the Commission is making in the rules it is adopting today are as follows: (1) The marketing restriction in § 4.5 no longer contains the clause “(or otherwise seeking investment exposure to)”; (2) § 4.5 will be amended to include an alternative trading threshold test based on the net notional value of a registered investment company's derivatives positions; (3) annual notices for exemptions and exclusions will be filed on an annual calendar year end basis rather than on the anniversary of the filing date; and (4) changes have been made to the substance of Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR and the filing timelines for both forms.

II. Responses to Comments on the Proposal

A. Comments Regarding Proposed Amendments to § 4.5

As part of the Proposal, the Commission proposed amendments to § 4.5(c)(2)(iii), reinstating a trading threshold and marketing restriction for registered investment companies claiming exclusion from the definition of CPO under that section. In support of the Proposal, the Commission stated that it became aware that certain registered investment companies were offering interests in de facto commodity pools while claiming exclusion under § 4.5.
27

The Commission further stated that it believed that registered investment companies should not engage in such activities without Commission oversight and that such oversight was necessary to ensure consistent treatment of CPOs regardless of their status with respect to other regulators.
28

The Commission also recognized that operational issues may exist regarding the ability of registered investment companies to comply with the Commission's compliance regime.
29

27
76 FR 7976, 7983 (Feb. 12, 2011). The Commission determined to propose amendments to § 4.5 following the submission of a petition for rulemaking by the National Futures Association, to which the Commission has delegated much of its direct oversight activities relating to CPOs, CTAs, and commodity pools.
See,
75 FR 56997 (Sept. 17, 2010).

28

Id.
at 7984.

29

Id.

The Commission received numerous comments regarding the proposed amendments to § 4.5. The comments can be broadly categorized into eight categories: (1) General comments as to the advisability of making such a change and the Commission's justification for doing so; (2) the trading threshold; (3) the inclusion of swaps within the trading threshold; (4) the proposed marketing restriction; (5) harmonization of compliance obligations with those of the SEC; (6) the appropriate entity to register as the registered investment company's CPO; (7) the use and permissibility of controlled foreign corporations by registered investment companies; and (8) the timeline for implementation.

1. General Comments on Proposed Amendments to § 4.5

Certain comments argued against the adoption of any change to § 4.5 and questioned the Commission's justification for doing so.
30

Most commenters generally opposed the change because they claimed that requiring registration and compliance with the Commission's regulatory regime would provide no tangible benefit to the Commission or investors because registered investment companies are already subject to comprehensive regulation by the SEC.

30
Comment letter from the Investment Company Institute (April 12, 2011) (“ICI Letter”); comment letter from the Mutual Fund Directors Forum (April 12, 2011) (“MFDF Letter”).

The Commission believes that registration with the Commission provides two significant benefits. First, registration allows the Commission to ensure that all entities operating collective investment vehicles participating in the derivatives markets meet minimum standards of fitness and competency.
31

Second, registration provides the Commission and members of the public with a clear means of addressing wrongful conduct by individuals and entities participating in the derivatives markets. The Commission has clear authority to take punitive and/or remedial action against registered entities for violations of the CEA or of the Commission's regulations. Moreover, the Commission has the ability to deny or revoke registration, thereby expelling an individual or entity from serving as an intermediary in the industry. Members of the public also may access the Commission's reparations program or National Futures Association's (“NFA”) arbitration program to seek redress for wrongful conduct by a Commission registrant

and/or NFA member. Therefore, the Commission continues to believe that its registration requirements further critical regulatory objectives and serve important public policy goals.

31

See
H.R. Rep. No. 565 (Part 1), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1982), S. Rep. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1982).
See also,
48 FR 14933 (Apr. 6, 1983).

A number of commenters who expressed general opposition also acknowledged that if the Commission determined to proceed with its proposed changes to § 4.5, certain areas of harmonization with SEC requirements should be addressed. To that end, concurrently with the issuance of this rule, the Commission plans to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking detailing its proposed modifications to part 4 of its regulations to harmonize the compliance obligations that apply to dually registered investment companies. Commenters did not question, however, that the Commission has a regulatory interest in overseeing entities engaging in derivatives trading. Rather, they argued that the SEC currently provides adequate oversight of their activities.

The Commission disagrees with the arguments presented by those commenters who argued against the adoption of any change to § 4.5. The Commission continues to believe that entities operating collective investment vehicles that engage in more than a de minimis amount of derivatives trading should be required to register with the Commission. The Commission believes that because Congress empowered the Commission to oversee the derivatives market, the Commission is in the best position to oversee entities engaged in more than a limited amount of non-hedging derivatives trading.

Several commenters also asserted that modifying § 4.5 would result in a significant burden to entities required to register with the Commission without any meaningful benefit to the Commission.
32

The Commission believes, as discussed throughout this release, that entities that are offering services substantially identical to those of a registered CPO should be subject to substantially identical regulatory obligations. The Commission also recognizes that modification to § 4.5 may result in costs for registered investment companies. For that reason, as stated above, in conjunction with finalizing the proposed amendments to § 4.5, the Commission has proposed to adopt a harmonized compliance regime for registered investment companies whose activities require oversight by the Commission. Although the Commission believes the modifications to § 4.5 enhance the Commission's ability to effectively oversee derivatives markets, it is not the Commission's intention to burden registered investment companies beyond what is required to provide the Commission with adequate information it finds necessary to effectively oversee the registered investment company's derivatives trading activities. Through this harmonization, the Commission intends to minimize the burden of the amendments to § 4.5.

32

See
ICI Letter; comment letter from Vanguard (April 12, 2011) (“Vanguard Letter”); comment letter from Reed Smith LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Reed Smith Letter”); comment letter from AllianceBernstein Mutual Funds (April 12, 2011) (“AllianceBernstein Letter”); comment letter from United States Automobile Association (April 12, 2011) (“USAA Letter”); comment letter from Principal Management Corporation (April 12, 2011) (“PMC Letter”); comment letter from Investment Adviser Association (April 12, 2011) (“IAA Letter”); comment letter from Dechert LLP and clients (April 12, 2011) (“Dechert II Letter”); comment letter from Janus Capital Management LLC (April 12, 2011) (“Janus Letter”); comment letter from Security Traders Association (April 12, 2011) (“STA Letter”); comment letter from Invesco Advisers, Inc. (April 12, 2011) (“Invesco Letter”); and comment letter from Equinox Fund Management, LLC (July 28, 2011) (“Equinox Letter”).

Second, the Commission disagrees with the commenters' assertion that the Commission would not receive any meaningful benefit from a modification to § 4.5. As stated above, the Commission disagrees that such registration and oversight is redundant, and emphasizes that it is in the best position to adequately oversee the derivatives trading activities of entities in which the Commission has a regulatory interest. As discussed above, the Commission is charged with administering the Commodity Exchange Act to protect market users and the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices and systemic risk related to derivatives that are subject to the Act, and to foster open, competitive, and financially sound markets. The Commission's programs are structured and its resources deployed in service of that mission.

One commenter questioned the Commission's reasoning for choosing to impose additional requirements on registered investment companies but not proposing to impose such requirements on other categories of entities.
33

This commenter also stated that the Commission was required to detail its reasoning under the Administrative Procedure Act.
34

As stated in the Proposal, the Commission remains concerned that registered investment companies are offering managed futures strategies, either in whole or in part, without Commission oversight and without making the disclosures to both the Commission and investors regarding the pertinent facts associated with the investment in the registered investment company. The Commission is focused on registered investment companies because it is aware of increased trading activity in the derivatives area by such entities that may not be appropriately addressed in the existing regulatory protections, including risk management and recordkeeping and reporting requirements. The SEC has also noted this increased trading activity and is reviewing the use of derivatives by investment companies.
35

In its recent concept release regarding the use of derivatives by registered investment companies, the SEC noted that although its staff had addressed issues related to derivatives on a case-by-case basis, it had not developed a “comprehensive and systematic approach to derivatives related issues.”
36

As aptly noted by the Chairman of the SEC, “The controls in place to address fund management in traditional securities can lose their effectiveness when applied to derivatives. This is particularly the case because a relatively small investment in a derivative instrument can expose a fund to potentially substantial gain or loss—or outsized exposure to an individual counterparty.”
37

Despite the commenter's assertion, the Commission is unaware of other classes of entities that are excluded from the definition of CPO engaging in significant derivatives trading. Of course, if the Commission becomes aware of any other categories of excluded entities engaging in similar levels of derivatives trading, it will consider appropriate action to ensure that such entities and their derivatives

trading activities are brought under the Commission's regulatory oversight. As stated previously, the Commission continues to believe that entities that are offering services substantially identical to those of a registered CPO should be subject to substantially identical regulatory obligations.

33

See
ICI Letter.

34

Id.

35
For example, the SEC recently issued a concept release seeking comment on use of derivatives by investment companies, noting: “The dramatic growth in the volume and complexity of derivatives investments over the past two decades, and funds' increased use of derivatives, have led the [Securities and Exchange] Commission and its staff to initiate a review of funds' use of derivatives under the Investment Company Act. (footnotes omitted)” 76 FR 55237, 55238 (Sep. 7, 2011).

36
76 FR 55237, 55239 (Sept. 7, 2011). See, Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Seeks Public Comment on Use of Derivatives by Mutual Funds and Other Investment Companies (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-175.htm
(“ `The derivatives markets have undergone significant changes in recent years, and the Commission is taking this opportunity to seek public comment and ensure that our regulatory approach and interpretations under the Investment Company Act remain current, relevant, and consistent with investor protection,' ” said SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro.”).

37
Chairman Mary Shapiro, Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting Item 1—Use of Derivatives by Funds (Aug. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch083111mls-item1.htm
(“The current derivatives review gives us the opportunity to re-think our approach to regulating funds' use of derivatives. We are engaging in this review with a holistic perspective, in the wake of the financial crisis, and in light of the new comprehensive regulatory regime for swaps being developed under the Dodd-Frank Act.”).

2. Comments on the Proposed Trading Threshold

The Commission also received numerous comments on the proposed addition of a trading threshold to the exclusion under § 4.5.
38

The proposed trading threshold provided that derivatives trading could not exceed five percent of the liquidation value of an entity's portfolio, without registration with the Commission. The Proposal excluded activity conducted for “bona fide hedging” purposes.
39

Most commenters stated that a five percent threshold was far too low in light of the Commission's determination to include swaps within the measured activities and the limited scope of the Commission's bona fide hedging definition, but no data was provided to support this assertion. The Commission, in its adoption of the exemption under § 4.13(a)(3),
40

previously determined that five percent is an appropriate threshold to determine whether an entity warrants oversight by the Commission.
41

38

See
Invesco Letter; ICI Letter; Vanguard Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; AII Letter; STA Letter; Janus Letter; PMC Letter; USAA Letter; comment letter from Fidelity Management and Research Co. (April 12, 2011) (“Fidelity Letter”); comment letter from Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (April 12, 2011) (“SIFMA Letter”); comment letter from Dechert LLP (July 26, 2011) (“Dechert III Letter”); comment letter from Rydex/SGI Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Rydex Letter”); comment letter from the United States Chamber of Commerce (April 12, 2011) (“USCC Letter”); comment letter from Sidley Austin LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Sidley Letter”); comment letter from the National Futures Association (April 12, 2011) (“NFA Letter”); comment letter from Campbell & Company, Inc. (April 12, 2011) (“Campbell Letter”); comment letter from AQR Capital Management, LLC (April 12, 2011) (“AQR Letter”); comment letter from Steben & Company, Inc. (April 12, 2011) (“Steben Letter”); comment letter from the Investment Company Institute (July 28, 2011) (“ICI II Letter”); and comment from the Association of Institutional Investors (April 12, 2011) (“AII Letter”).

39
76 FR 7976, 7989 (Feb. 11, 2011).

40
17 CFR 4.13(a)(3).

41
68 FR 47221, 47225 (Aug. 8, 2003).

Despite the views of some commenters, the Commission believes that the five percent threshold continues to be the appropriate percentage for exemption or exclusion based upon an entity's limited derivatives trading. Five percent remains the average required for futures margins, although the Commission acknowledges that margin levels for securities product futures are significantly higher and the levels for swaps margining may be as well. The Commission believes, however, that trading exceeding five percent of the liquidation value of a portfolio evidences a significant exposure to the derivatives markets. The Commission believes that such exposure should subject an entity to the Commission's oversight. Moreover, the Commission believes that its adoption of an alternative net notional test to determine eligibility for exclusion from the definition of CPO, as discussed infra, provides flexibility to registered investment companies in consideration of the fact that initial margin for certain commodity interest products may not permit compliance with the five percent threshold.

Commenters also recommended that the Commission exclude from the threshold calculation various instruments including broad-based stock index futures, security futures generally, or financial futures contracts as a whole.
42

The Commission does not believe that exempting any of these instruments from the threshold calculation is appropriate. The Commission does not believe that there is a meaningful distinction between those security or financial futures and other categories of futures. The Commission believes that its oversight of the use of security or financial futures is just as essential as its oversight of physical commodity futures. Congress granted the Commission authority over all futures in § 2 of the CEA.
43

The Commission believes that it is in the best position to assess investor and market risks posed by entities trading in derivatives regardless of type. Therefore, the Commission has decided not to modify the scope of the threshold from what was proposed in order to exclude security futures or financial futures from the trading threshold.

42

See
Rydex Letter; Invesco Letter; ICI Letter.

43
7 U.S.C. 2.

Commenters requested that the Commission expand its definition of bona fide hedging as it appears in § 1.3(z) to include risk management as a recognized bona fide hedging activity for purposes of § 4.5.
44

The Proposal excluded activity conducted for “bona fide hedging” purposes as that term was defined in § 1.3 as it existed at the time of the proposal.
45

Further, the Proposal noted that the Commission anticipated that the definition of “bona fide hedging” would be modified through future rulemakings,
46

which were open for comments from the public.

44

See
Invesco Letter; ICI Letter; Vanguard Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; IAA Letter; Janus Letter; and STA Letter.

45
76 FR 7976, 7989 (Feb. 11, 2011).

46
76 FR 7976, 7984 (Feb. 11, 2011).

The Commission recently adopted final rules regarding position limits and, through that rulemaking, implemented a new statutory definition of bona fide hedging transactions for exempt and excluded commodity transactions as part of new § 151.5.
47

This statutory definition limits the scope of bona fide hedging transactions for exempt and agricultural commodities, and does not provide for a risk management exemption for position limits purposes.
48

With regard to position limits and bona fide hedging transactions for excluded commodities, the Commission amended the pre-Dodd-Frank definition of bona fide hedging in § 1.3(z) to only apply to excluded commodities. Further, the Commission allowed DCMs and SEFs that are trading facilities to provide for a risk management exemption from position limits for excluded commodity transactions.

47
7 U.S.C. 6a(c); 76 FR 71626, 71643 (Nov. 18, 2011).

48
76 FR 71626, 71644 (Nov. 18, 2011).

The Commission does not believe that it is appropriate to exclude risk management transactions from the trading threshold. The Commission believes that an important distinction between bona fide hedging transactions and those undertaken for risk management purposes is that bona fide hedging transactions are unlikely to present the same level of market risk as they are offset by exposure in the physical markets. Additionally, the Commission is concerned that in the context of exclusion under § 4.5, a risk management exclusion would permit registered investment companies to engage in a greater volume of derivatives trading than other entities which are engaged in similar activities, but which are otherwise required to register as CPOs. This could result in disparate treatment among similarly situated entities. Moreover, there was no consensus among the commenters as to the appropriate definition of risk management transactions. Thus, the Commission believes that it may be difficult in this context to properly limit the scope of such exclusion as objective criteria are not universally recognized, which would make such exclusion onerous to enforce.
49

49
The Commission notes that § 4.5 references the definition of bona fide hedging for exempt and agricultural commodities under § 151.5 as well as the definition of bona fide hedging for excluded commodities under § 1.3(z). Market participants should not construe either § 151.5 or § 1.3(z) as

permitting a risk management exemption for purposes of determining compliance with the trading threshold in § 4.5.

During numerous meetings with commenters, the commenters noted that most registered investment companies use derivatives for risk management purposes, namely to offset the risk inherent in positions taken in the securities or bond markets, or to equitize cash efficiently. Although the Commission recognizes the importance of the use of derivatives for risk management purposes, it does not believe that transactions that are not within the bona fide hedging definition should be excluded from the determination of whether an entity meets the trading threshold for registration and oversight. Therefore, the Commission has decided not to exclude risk management activities by registered investment companies from the trading threshold for purposes of § 4.5.

Several panelists at the Commission's staff roundtable held on July 6, 2011
50

(“Roundtable”) suggested that, instead of a trading threshold that is based on a percentage of margin, the Commission should focus solely on entities that offer “actively managed futures” strategies.
51

The panelist defined “actively managed futures” strategies as those in which the entity or its investment adviser made its own decisions as to which derivatives to take positions in, as compared to the “passive” use of an index, wherein the entity's investments simply track those held by an index.
52

50

See
Notice of CFTC Staff Roundtable Discussion on Proposed Changes to Registration and Compliance Regime for Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/opaevent_cftcstaff070611
.

51

See
Transcript of CFTC Staff Roundtable Discussion on Proposed Changes to Registration and Compliance Regime for Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors (“Roundtable Transcript”), at 19, 25, 30, 76-77, 87-90, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission27_070611-trans.pdf
.

52

Id.

The Commission does not believe that it is proper to exclude from the Commission's oversight those entities that are using an index or other so-called “passive” means to track the value of other derivatives. Establishing “active” versus “passive” use of derivatives as a criterion for entitlement to the exclusion would introduce an element of subjectivity to an otherwise objective standard and make the threshold more difficult to interpret, apply, and enforce. It also could have the undesirable effect of encouraging funds to structure their investment activities to avoid regulation. Moreover, the use of an index or other passive investment vehicle by a large number of investment companies can amplify the market assumptions built into an index or other vehicle. Thus, the Commission has decided not to adopt the panelist's suggestion that the Commission focus on whether an entity offers an actively managed futures strategy.

One commenter suggested that the Commission should consider the adoption of an alternative test that would be identical to the aggregate net notional value test that is currently available under § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B).
53

Section 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B) provides that an entity can claim exemption from registration if the net notional value of its fund's derivatives trading does not exceed one hundred percent of the liquidation value of the fund's portfolio.
54

53
Dechert III Letter.

54
17 CFR 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B).

Conversely, several panelists at the Roundtable opposed such a test, stating that it was not a reliable means to measure an entity's exposure in the market.
55

Specifically, certain panelists asserted that the net notional value of positions may not provide a reliable measure of the risk posed by certain entities in the market.
56

55

See
Roundtable Transcript at 69-71.

56

See
Roundtable Transcript at 70.

The Commission first considered the addition of an alternative net notional trading threshold when it proposed to amend § 4.5 in 2002.
57

In support of its proposal, the Commission stated that the alternative test provided otherwise regulated entities that use certain classes of futures with higher initial margin requirements with an opportunity to also receive exclusionary relief from the definition of CPO.
58

The Commission further stated that the inclusion of an alternative test enabled entities seeking exclusion to rely on whichever test was less restrictive based on their futures positions.
59

In 2003, the Commission proposed and adopted final rules amending § 4.5, which eliminated the five percent trading threshold and did not adopt the alternative net notional test.
60

In stating its rationale for rescinding the five percent threshold test and declining to adopt the alternative net notional test, the Commission stated that because it was simultaneously proposing, and ultimately adopting, an exemption from registration in § 4.13(a)(4), which did not impose any trading restriction, the Commission would remove the trading restrictions from § 4.5 as well to provide consistent treatment.
61

57
67 FR 65743 (Oct. 28, 2002).

58
67 FR 65743, 65744-45.

59
67 FR 65743, 65745.

60
68 FR 12622 (Mar. 17, 2003); 68 FR 47221 (Aug. 8, 2003).

61
68 FR 12622, 12625-26 (noting that although entities excluded under § 4.5 could solicit retail participants, as compared to those entities exempt under § 4.13(a)(4), which may only offer to certain high net worth entities and individuals, the Commission stated that the fact that the § 4.5 entities were otherwise regulated supported consistent criteria for relief).

The Commission no longer believes that its prior justification for abandoning the alternative net notional test is persuasive. By the adoption of this final rule, the Commission will reinstate the five percent trading threshold in § 4.5 for registered investment companies and rescind the exemption in § 4.13(a)(4), which reverses the regulatory conditions in existence in 2003. The Commission believes that the appropriate criteria for exclusion through the use of a net notional test is delineated in § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B),
62

commonly known as the “de minimis exemption,” albeit with the addition of allowing unlimited use of futures, options, or swaps for bona fide hedging purposes, which is not permitted under § 4.13(a)(3).

62
The net notional test as it appears in § 4.13(a)(3) will be amended by this rulemaking to provide guidance regarding the ability to net cleared swaps.

As stated previously, the net notional test, as set forth under § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B), permits entities to claim relief if the aggregate net notional value of the entity's commodity interest positions does not exceed 100 percent of the liquidation value of the pool's portfolio.
63

Notional value is defined by asset class. For example, the notional value of futures contracts is derived by multiplying the number of contracts by the size of the contract, in contract units, and then multiplying by the current market price for the contract.
64

The notional value of a cleared swap, however, will be determined consistent with the provisions of part 45 of the Commission's regulations. The ability to net positions is also determined by asset class, with entities being able to net futures contracts across designated contract markets or foreign boards of trade, whereas swaps may only be netted if cleared by the same designated clearing organization (“DCO”) and it is otherwise appropriate.
65

63
17 CFR 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B).

64

Id.

65

See
discussion of amendments to § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B) infra.

The Commission believes that the adoption of an alternative net notional test will provide consistent standards for relief from registration as a CPO for entities whose portfolios only contain a

limited amount of derivatives positions and will afford registered investment companies with additional flexibility in determining eligibility for exclusion. Therefore, the Commission will adopt an alternative net notional test, consistent with that set forth in § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B) as amended herein, for registered investment companies claiming exclusion from the definition of CPO under § 4.5.

The Commission also received several comments supporting both the imposition of a trading threshold in general and the five percent threshold specifically.
66

At least one commenter suggested, however, that the Commission consider requiring registered investment companies that exceed the threshold to register, but not subjecting them to the Commission's compliance regime beyond requiring them to be subject to the examination of their books and records, and examination by the National Futures Association.
67

In effect, this commenter requested that the Commission subject such registrant to “notice registration.” The Commission believes that adopting the commenter's approach would not materially change the information that the Commission would receive regarding the activities of registered investment companies in the derivatives markets, which is one of the Commission's purposes in amending § 4.5. Moreover, a type of notice registration would not provide the Commission with any real means for engaging in consistent ongoing oversight. Notwithstanding such notice registration, the Commission would still be deemed to have regulatory responsibility for the activities of these registrants. In the Commission's view, notice registration does not equate to an appropriate level of oversight. For that reason, the Commission has determined not to adopt the notice registration system proposed by the commenter. The Commission is adopting the amendment to § 4.5 regarding the trading threshold with the addition of an alternative net notional test for the reasons stated herein and those previously discussed in the Proposal.

66

See
NFA Letter, Campbell Letter, AQR Letter, Steben Letter.

67

See
AQR Letter.

3. Comments on the Inclusion of Swaps in the Trading Threshold

The Commission also received numerous comments opposing its decision to include swaps within the threshold test discussed above.
68

Several commenters expressed concern that the Commission would require inclusion of swaps within the threshold prior to its adoption of final rules further defining the term “swap” and explaining the margining requirements for such instruments. The Commission agrees that it should not implement the inclusion of swaps within the threshold test prior to the effective date of such final rules. Therefore, it is the Commission's intention to establish the compliance date of the inclusion of swaps within the threshold calculation as 60 days after the final rules regarding the definition of “swap” and the delineation of the margin requirement for such instruments are effective.
69

The Commission believes that such compliance date will provide entities with sufficient time to assess the impact of such rules on their portfolios and to make the determination as to whether registration with the Commission is required.

68

See
Janus Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; ICI Letter; PMC Letter; Invesco Letter; IAA Letter; Dechert II Letter; AII Letter; and SIFMA Letter.

69
Effective Date for Swap Regulation, 76 FR 42508 (issued and made effective by the Commission on July 14, 2011; published in
Federal Register
on July 19, 2011).

The Commission also received a comment asking for additional clarification regarding its decision to include swaps within the threshold.
70

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the statutory definition of the terms “commodity pool operator” and “commodity pool” to include those entities that trade swaps.
71

If the Commission were to adopt the trading threshold and only include futures and options as the basis for calculating compliance with the threshold, the swaps activities of the registered investment companies would still trigger the registration requirement notwithstanding the exclusion of swaps from the calculus. That is, the purpose of the threshold test is to define a de minimis amount of trading activity that would not trigger the registration requirement. If swaps were excluded, any swaps activities undertaken by a registered investment company would result in that entity being required to register because there would be no de minimis exclusion. As a result, one swap contract would be enough to trigger the registration requirement. For that reason, if the Commission wants to permit some de minimis level of swaps activity by registered investment companies without registration with the Commission, it must do so explicitly in the exclusion.
72

Because the Commission has determined that de minimis activity by registered investment companies does not implicate the Commission's regulatory concerns, the Commission has decided to include swaps as a component of the trading threshold.

70

See
Janus Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; ICI Letter; PMC Letter; Invesco Letter; IAA Letter; Dechert II Letter; AII Letter; and SIFMA Letter.

71
7 U.S.C. 1a(10); 1a(11).

72
Any reference to a de minimis level of swaps activities by registered investment companies only applies in the context of CPO registration by registered investment companies.

4. Comments on the Proposed Marketing Restriction

The marketing restriction, as proposed by the Commission, prohibits the marketing of interests in the registered investment company “as a vehicle for trading in (or otherwise seeking investment exposure to) the commodity futures, commodity options, or swaps markets.”
73

Again, as with the other aspects of the proposed amendments to § 4.5, the Commission received numerous comments on this prohibition.
74

73
76 FR 7976, 7989 (Feb. 12, 2011).

74

See
Rydex Letter; Fidelity Letter; SIFMA Letter; AII Letter; ICI Letter; Vanguard Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; PMC Letter; Invesco Letter; Janus Letter; STA Letter; comment letter from the Managed Futures Association regarding proposed amendments to § 4.5 (April 12, 2011) (“MFA II Letter”); Dechert II Letter; NFA Letter; comment letter from Alston & Bird, LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Alston Letter”); Campbell Letter; AQR Letter; Steben Letter; and Dechert III Letter.

The vast majority of comments urged the Commission to remove the clause “or otherwise seeking investment exposure to” as introducing an unacceptable level of ambiguity into the marketing restriction.
75

The Commission agrees with these comments and believes that the removal of this clause is appropriate as the clause does not meaningfully add to the marketing restriction and only creates uncertainty. Thus, the Commission will adopt the marketing restriction without the clause “or otherwise seeking investment exposure to * * *”

75

See, e.g.,
ICI Letter; Alston Letter; Rydex Letter; and Vanguard Letter.

The Commission also received many comments asking that the Commission provide some clarification regarding the factors that it would consider in making the determination whether an entity violated the marketing restriction.
76

The Commission agrees that providing factors to further explain the plain language of the marketing restriction would be helpful to those who plan to market registered investment companies

to investors. The Commission has determined, however, that such factors should be instructive and that no single factor is dispositive. The Commission will determine whether a violation of the marketing restriction exists on a case by case basis through an examination of the relevant facts. The Commission seeks to discourage entities from designing creative marketing with the intent to avoid the marketing restriction.

76

See
ICI Letter; MFA II Letter; Dechert II Letter; Invesco Letter; NFA Letter; Campbell Letter; Steben Letter; and AQR Letter.

To address commenters' requests for guidance, the Commission believes that the following factors are indicative of marketing a registered investment company as a vehicle for investing in commodity futures, commodity options, or swaps:

• The name of the fund;

• Whether the fund's primary investment objective is tied to a commodity index;

• Whether the fund makes use of a controlled foreign corporation for its derivatives trading;

• Whether the fund's marketing materials, including its prospectus or disclosure document, refer to the benefits of the use of derivatives in a portfolio or make comparisons to a derivatives index;

• Whether, during the course of its normal trading activities, the fund or entity on its behalf has a net short speculative exposure to any commodity through a direct or indirect investment in other derivatives;

• Whether the futures/options/swaps transactions engaged in by the fund or on behalf of the fund will directly or indirectly be its primary source of potential gains and losses; and

• Whether the fund is explicitly offering a managed futures strategy.
77

77
These factors are derived in substantial part from the Steben Letter and AQR Letter.

The Commission will give more weight to the final factor in the list when determining whether a registered investment company is operating as a de facto commodity pool. In contrast, a registered investment company that does not explicitly offer a managed futures strategy could still be found to have violated the marketing restriction based on whether its conduct satisfied any number of the other factors enumerated above. Put differently, if a registered investment company offers a strategy with several indicia of a managed futures strategy, yet avoids explicitly describing the strategy as such in its offering materials, that registered investment company may still be found to have violated the marketing restriction.

The Commission also notes that whether the name of the fund includes the terms “futures” or “derivatives,” or otherwise indicates a possible focus on futures or derivatives, will not be considered a dispositive factor, but rather one of many that the Commission will consider in making its determination. Moreover, the Commission will not consider the mere disclosure to investors or potential investors that the registered investment company may engage in derivatives trading incidental to its main investment strategy and the risks associated therewith as being violative of the marketing restriction.

At the Roundtable, several panelists questioned the Commission's reasoning for deeming the use of a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) to be an appropriate factor in determining whether the registered investment company violates the marketing restriction. Based on comments received at the Roundtable and during the comment period, the Commission believes that registered investment companies use controlled foreign corporations as a mechanism to invest up to 25 percent of the registered investment company's portfolio in derivatives.
78

The Commission, therefore, believes that a registered investment company's use of a CFC may indicate that the company is engaging in derivatives trading in excess of the trading threshold. Again, the Commission will consider this factor in the context of the registered investment company's other conduct and will not view this factor as being dispositive of a violation of the marketing restriction.

78

See
Roundtable Transcript at 152-53.

For these reasons, and those stated in the Proposal, the Commission adopts the marketing restriction in § 4.5 with the modifications discussed herein.

5. Comments on the Harmonization of Compliance Obligations

Many commenters raised concerns about the potential conflicts between the Commission's regulatory regime and that imposed by the SEC if the Commission were to adopt the proposed amendments as final rules.
79

As noted above, in an effort to obtain further information from interested parties, Commission staff held the Roundtable, and invited staff from the SEC, the IRS, and members of various trade organizations. The roundtable focused predominantly on harmonization of the Commission's compliance regime with that of the SEC. Upon consideration of the comments and the discussions held as a result of the Roundtable relating to registered investment companies that will be required to register under amended § 4.5, the Commission agrees that it is necessary to harmonize the Commission's compliance obligations under part 4 of the Commission's regulations with the requirements of the SEC for registered investment companies. To that end, concurrently with the issuance of this rule, the Commission is issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking detailing its proposed modifications to part 4 of its regulations to harmonize the compliance obligations that apply to dually registered investment companies. The Commission will not require entities that must register due to the amendments to § 4.5 to comply with the Commission's compliance regime until the adoption of final rules governing the compliance framework for registered investment companies subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.

79

See
Vanguard Letter; ICI Letter; Dechert III Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; PMC Letter; Invesco Letter; IAA Letter; Dechert II Letter; Fidelity Letter; Janus Letter; SIFMA Letter; STA Letter; AQR Letter; NFA Letter; MFA II Letter; Alston Letter; Rydex Letter; and ICI II Letter.

6. Comments Regarding the Entity Required to Register as the CPO

The Commission received a number of comments requesting clarification as to which entity would be required to register as a CPO if a registered investment company would not qualify for exclusion under § 4.5, as amended.
80

The commenters consistently proposed that the registered investment company's investment adviser is the appropriate entity to register in the capacity of the investment company's CPO. The Commission agrees that the investment adviser is the most logical entity to serve as the registered investment company's CPO. To require a member or members of the registered investment company's board of directors to register would raise operational concerns for the registered investment company as it would result in piercing the limitation on liability for actions undertaken in the capacity of director.
81

Thus, the Commission concludes that the investment adviser for the registered investment company is the entity required to register as the CPO.

80

See
ICI Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; Rydex Letter; Fidelity Letter; USAA Letter; PMC Letter; IAA Letter; Janus Letter; SIFMA Letter; STA Letter; comment letter from AlphaSimplex Group (April 12, 2011) (“ASG Letter”); NFA Letter; MFDF Letter; and Campbell Letter.

81

See
MFDF Letter.

7. Comments Regarding the Use of Controlled Foreign Corporations

The Commission received many comments regarding the use of CFCs by registered investment companies for purposes of engaging in commodities trading. As stated previously, it is the Commission's understanding that registered investment companies invest up to 25 percent of their assets in the CFC, which then engages in actively managed derivatives strategies, either on its own or under the direction of one or more CTAs. Operators of CFCs have been exempt from Commission registration by claiming relief under § 4.13(a)(4) of the Commission's regulations because the sole participant in the CFC is the registered investment company. Additionally, at the Roundtable, panelists informed Commission staff that several registered investment companies that operated CFCs did not claim relief under § 4.13(a)(4) because it was their opinion that the CFC was merely a subdivision of the registered investment company and was not a separate commodity pool.
82

82

See
Roundtable Transcript at 165.

Commenters urged the Commission to continue to permit registered investment companies to use CFCs and to allow such CFCs to be exempt from registration with the Commission under § 4.13 or exclude them under § 4.5 by reason of their sole investor being excluded as well. Commenters proposed various mechanisms by which the Commission could obtain information regarding the activities of CFCs, including requiring disclosure of CFC fees and expenses at the registered investment company level, requiring a representation that the CFC will comply with key provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”),
83

and requiring the registered investment company to make its CFC's books and records available to the Commission and NFA for inspection.

83
15 U.S.C. 80a-1,
et seq.

The Commission does not oppose the continued use of CFCs by registered investment companies, but it believes that CFCs that fall within the statutory definition of “commodity pool” should be subject to regulation as a commodity pool.
84

The Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to define a commodity pool as “any investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise operated for the purpose of trading in commodity interests, including any * * * commodity for future delivery, security futures product, or swap.”
85

Based on a plain language reading of the statutory definition, CFCs wholly owned by registered investment companies and used for trading commodity interests are properly considered commodity pools. These entities also satisfy the definition of “pool” delineated in § 4.10(d)(1) of the Commission's regulations, which is substantively identical to the statutory definition. There is no meaningful basis for concluding otherwise. Moreover, the Commission believes that each separate legally cognizable entity must be assessed on its own characteristics and that a CFC should not be entitled to exclusion simply because its parent company is a registered investment company that may be entitled to exclusion under § 4.5. Therefore, the Commission does not oppose the use of CFCs for trading in commodity interests by registered investment companies, but such CFCs will be required to have their CPOs register with the Commission unless they may claim exemption or exclusion therefrom on their own merits.

84
7 U.S.C. 1a(10).

85
7 U.S.C. 1a(10).

8. Comments Regarding Implementation of Amendments

The Commission received several comments with suggestions regarding implementation of the proposed amendments to § 4.5, if the Commission decided to adopt the proposed provisions as final rules.
86

Several commenters recommended that the Commission provide for an undefined “substantial transition period for compliance.”
87

Conversely, one commenter suggested that the Commission should only provide a short period of time for compliance.
88

Another commenter suggested that at least 12-months would be required for registered investment companies to come into registration and compliance with Commission requirements.
89

Finally, a commenter suggested that the Commission delay implementation until all mandatory Dodd-Frank Act rules are implemented.
90

86

See
Steben Letter; ICI Letter; NFA Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; PMC Letter; IAA Letter; Janus Letter; STA Letter; Rydex Letter; Alston Letter; and comment letter from the Association of Institutional Investors (July 1, 2011) (“AII II Letter”).

87

See
ICI Letter; NFA Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; USAA Letter; PMC Letter; IAA Letter; Janus Letter; and STA Letter.

88

See
Steben Letter.

89

See
Rydex Letter.

90

See
AII II Letter.

In light of the Commission's proposed harmonization effort with respect to the compliance obligations for dually registered investment companies and the ongoing efforts to further define the term “swap” and the margin requirements for swaps positions, the Commission recognizes that a short implementation period is not practicable. The Commission believes that 11 months is an adequate amount of time to enable compliance by existing registered investment companies. Recognizing that the definition of swap is not yet finalized, the Commission has decided that compliance with the amendments to § 4.5 for purposes of registration only will occur on the later of either December 31, 2012 or within 60-days following the adoption of final rules defining the term “swap,” and establishing margin requirements for such instruments.
91

Entities required to register due to the amendments to § 4.5 shall be subject to the Commission's recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements set forth in part 4 of the Commission's regulations within 60 days following the effectiveness of a final rule implementing the Commission's proposed harmonization effort pursuant to the concurrent proposed rulemaking.

91
Effective Date for Swap Regulation, 76 FR 42508.

Several commenters also suggested that the Commission exempt from compliance those registered investment companies that have already claimed relief under § 4.5.
92

The Commission does not believe that “grandfathering” is appropriate in this context. As the Commission stated in its Proposal, and reaffirms in this preamble, part of the purpose of amending § 4.5 is to ensure that entities that are engaged in a certain level of derivatives trading are subject to the registration and compliance obligations and oversight by the Commission.
93

Grandfathering is inconsistent with the goals of the Commission's amendments. The Commission, however, believes that harmonization of the Commission's compliance regime with that of the SEC will minimize the regulatory burden of existing registered investment companies. In addition, the Commission is permitting a sufficient amount of time for existing entities to come into compliance before the compliance dates set forth above. Therefore, the Commission believes that it is addressing the commenters' concerns through harmonization while still ensuring that the Commission has the

information necessary to oversee all participants in the derivatives markets.

92

See
ICI Letter; Reed Smith Letter; AllianceBernstein Letter; Invesco Letter; IAA Letter; Janus Letter; AII Letter; SIFMA Letter; and STA Letter.

93
76 FR 7976, 7983-84 (Feb. 12, 2011).

B. Comments Regarding Proposed Amendment to § 4.7

The Commission proposed two amendments to § 4.7. The first proposed to amend §§ 4.7(a)(3)(ix) and (a)(3)(x) to incorporate by reference the accredited investor standard from the SEC's Regulation D
94

under the Securities Act of 1933,
95

rather than by direct inclusion of its specific terms. The Commission stated that this amendment would “permit the Commission's definition of QEP to continue to include the specific terms of the accredited investor standard in the event that it is later modified by the SEC without requiring the Commission to amend § 4.7 each time to maintain parity.”
96

94
17 CFR 230.501(a)(5), (a)(6) (2011).

95
15 U.S.C. 77a, et seq.

96
76 FR 7976, 7985 (Feb. 12, 2011).

The Commission received one comment supporting this proposed amendment. Specifically, the commenter stated its belief that this amendment would “facilitate consistency amongst federal standards for financial sophistication and reduce investor confusion.”
97

The Commission agrees and, accordingly, is adopting the amendments to §§ 4.7(a)(3)(ix) and (a)(3)(x) as proposed.

97

See
MFA II Letter.

The second proposed amendment to § 4.7 would rescind the relief provided in § 4.7(b)(3)
98

from the certification requirement of § 4.22(c)
99

for financial statements contained in commodity pool annual reports. In support of the Proposal, the Commission noted that approximately 85 percent of all pools operated under § 4.7 in fiscal year 2009 filed financial statements that were certified by certified public accountants, “despite being eligible to claim relief from certification under § 4.7(b)(3).”
100

The number of uncertified financial statements has continued to decline and, for fiscal year 2010, approximately 91 percent of all reports filed for pools operated under § 4.7 included financial statements that were certified by certified public accountants.
101

In the Proposal, the Commission stated its belief that “requiring certification of financial information by an independent accountant in accordance with established accounting standards will ensure the accuracy of the financial information submitted by its registrants,” and will further the stated purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act.
102

98
17 CFR 4.7(b)(3) (2011).

99

Id.
4.22(c).

100
76 FR 7967, 7984-85 (Feb. 12, 2011).

101
In 2010, 951 pools were operated pursuant to § 4.7 and 84 of those pools filed uncertified financial statements for fiscal year 2010.

102

Id.
at 7985.

The Commission received two comments regarding this proposed amendment. One commenter supported the proposed rescission and the Commission's stated justification for doing so.
103

The other commenter recommended that the Commission retain an exemption from certification of financial statements for entities where the pool's participants are limited to the principals of its CPO(s) and CTA(s) and other categories of employees listed in § 4.7(a)(2)(viii).
104

It is unclear how many of the pools operated under § 4.7 would qualify for such relief if adopted. The Commission believes that rather than adopt an exemption for such entities without data regarding the scope of the exemption's applicability, it is more appropriate to rescind the exemption from certification for all pools operated under § 4.7(b)(3) generally and permit entities to write to the Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight to request exemptive relief from the certification requirement on a case by case basis under § 140.99.
105

By requiring entities to request relief from the Commission, the Commission can better determine whether such an exemption should be adopted in the future. Therefore, the Commission is adopting the amendments to § 4.7 as proposed.

103

See
NFA Letter.

104

See
MFA II Letter.

105
17 CFR § 140.99.

C. Comments Regarding the Proposed Rescission of §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4)

As stated previously, the Commission proposed to rescind §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4). After considering the comments received, which are detailed herein, the Commission has determined to retain the de minimis exemption in § 4.13(a)(3). The Commission concluded that overseeing entities with less than five percent exposure to commodity interests is not the best use of the Commission's limited resources. Moreover, the Commission believes that the retention of the de minimis exemption in § 4.13(a)(3) provides for consistent treatment of entities engaging in de minimis levels of trading due to the addition of a five percent trading threshold in § 4.5 as well. The Commission received several comments requesting that the Commission modify § 4.13(a)(3) in various respects. The Commission has determined, however, that it is appropriate to retain § 4.13(a)(3) in its current form, for the reasons detailed below.

1. General Comments

In addition to the comments that the Commission received regarding the specific parts of the Proposal rescinding §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4), the Commission received numerous comments regarding the proposed rescissions generally.
106

Broadly, the comments opposed the rescission of both provisions.

106

See
comment letter from the New York State Bar Association (April 12, 2011) (“NYSBA Letter”); comment letter from Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Skadden Letter”); MFA Letter; comment letter from Katten, Muchin Rosenman LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Katten Letter”); Fidelity Letter; Dechert Letter; comment letter from the Alternative Investment Management Association, Ltd. (April 12, 2011) (“AIMA Letter”); comment letter from the Alternative Investment Management Association, Ltd. (July 1, 2011) (“AIMA II Letter”); IAA Letter; SIFMA Letter; comment letter from HedgeOp Compliance, LLC (July 28, 2011) (“HedgeOp Letter”); comment letter from the Private Investor Coalition; Inc. (April 12, 2011) (“PIC Letter”); and comment letter Seward & Kissel, LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Seward Letter”).

Several commenters asserted that rescission was not necessary because the Commission has the means to obtain any needed information from exempt CPOs through its large trader reporting requirements and its special call authority.
107

Although the Commission has the means to obtain certain information through the mechanisms delineated by the commenters, neither of those mechanisms provide the type of data requested on Forms CPO-PQR or CTA-PR with the kind of regularity proposed under § 4.27. For example, large trader reporting may provide detailed trading information for a particular market participant, but it does not provide the Commission with information regarding trends across funds that are not large enough to trigger the reporting obligation, but that may nevertheless impact the market. Also, with respect to the Commission's special call authority under § 21.03, the collection of data under that section is generally reactive in nature. That is, the Commission would be in a position to collect data under § 21.03 after it became aware of an issue. Conversely, it is anticipated that collecting data using Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR will enable the Commission to be more proactive in assessing possible threats to market stability and in carrying out its duties in overseeing market participants generally.

107

See
Skadden Letter; Katten Letter; and MFA Letter.

Some commenters suggested that the Commission adopt a limited exemption for SEC-registered entities that are not “primarily engaged” in trading commodity interests.
108

Pursuant to the

terms of § 4m(3) of the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, CTAs that are registered with the SEC and whose business does not consist primarily of acting as a CTA, and that do not act as a CTA to any pool engaged primarily in the trading of commodity interests, are exempt from registration with the Commission.
109

The Commission believes that that statutory exemption for CTAs is explicit as to Congress's limited intentions regarding exempting entities from registration with the Commission. By the plain language of § 4m(3), this section creates an exemption from the CTA registration requirements of the CEA; commodity pools are discussed in that provision only to the extent that the characteristics of the pool enable the CTA to claim relief. The registration category of CPO is not implicated. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the provisions of § 4m(3) do not mandate any exemption from the registration requirements for CPOs. Moreover, the Commission disagrees with the commenter who asserted that rescission is inconsistent with Congress's asserted intention to avoid dual registration. The Commission does not believe it is accurate to state that Congress intended to avoid oversight by both agencies, and indeed Congress clearly anticipated some overlap when, in the Dodd-Frank Act, it required the Commission to work with the SEC to adopt a data collection instrument for dual registrants. Section 406 of the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly mandated that the Commission and the SEC jointly promulgate a reporting form for dually registered entities.
110

The Commission does not believe that this requirement could be consistent with any asserted Congressional intention to absolutely avoid dual registration with the commissions. Therefore, the Commission concludes that dual registration of certain entities is not irreconcilable with the Congressional intent underlying the Dodd-Frank Act.

108

See
Dechert Letter; and Katten Letter.

109
7 U.S.C. 6m(3).

110

See
Section 406 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Other commenters asserted that the compliance and regulatory obligations under the Commission's rules are burdensome and costly for private businesses and would unnecessarily distract entities from their primary focus of managing client assets.
111

The Commission disagrees with this assertion, which in any event was not fully detailed by any commenter. The Commission believes that regulation is necessary to ensure a well functioning market and to provide investor protection. The Commission further believes that the compliance regime that the Commission has adopted strikes the appropriate balance between limiting the burden placed on registrants and enabling the Commission to carry out its duties under the CEA. Moreover, the compliance and regulatory obligations imposed on these CPO registrants will be no different from those imposed on other registered CPOs. Such compliance and regulatory obligations have not been unduly burdensome for these other registrants.

111

See
MFA Letter; Seward Letter; and Katten Letter.

2. Comments Regarding the Proposed Rescission of § 4.13(a)(3)

In the Proposal, the Commission proposed rescinding the “de minimis” exemption in § 4.13(a)(3). The Commission stated its belief that “it is possible for a commodity pool to have a portfolio that is sizeable enough that even if just five percent of the pool's portfolio were committed to margin for futures, the pool's portfolio could be so significant that the commodity pool would constitute a major participant in the futures market.”
112

Moreover, the Commission stated that it believed that this rescission was consistent with the purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act, with specific regard to increased transparency and accountability of participants in the financial markets. The Commission did, however, solicit comment as to whether some form of de minimis exemption should be maintained.

112
76 FR 7976, 7985 (Feb. 12, 2011).

The Commission received ten comments specifically on its proposed rescission of the “de minimis” exemption in § 4.13(a)(3).
113

The commenters consistently urged the Commission to retain a de minimis exemption. Some commenters cited to the amendment to § 4m(3) of the CEA by the Dodd Frank Act, which provides an exemption from registration for CTAs that are registered with the SEC and whose business does not consist primarily of acting as a CTA and that does not act as a CTA to any pool engaged primarily in the trading of commodity interests.
114

One commenter stated that the effect of § 4m(3) was to exempt such CTAs from registration as a CPO or CTA;
115

whereas another commenter asserted that the amendment of § 4m(3) is evidence that Congress did not intend to have the operator of a commodity pool register as a CPO if its pool is not primarily engaged in trading commodity interests.
116

The Commission notes that under the tenets of statutory interpretation, where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
117

By the plain language of § 4m(3), this section creates an exemption from the CTA registration requirements of the CEA; commodity pools are discussed only to the extent that the characteristics of the pool enable the CTA to claim relief. The registration category of CPO is not referenced. Therefore, the Commission concludes that the provisions of § 4m(3) do not mandate any exemptions from registration for CPOs. The Commission notes, however, that it has determined to retain the de minimis exemption set forth in § 4.13(a)(3).

113

See
MFA Letter; NYSBA Letter; comment letter from Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Schulte Letter”); Dechert III Letter; Skadden Letter; Seward Letter; IAA Letter; NFA Letter; SIFMA Letter; and comment letter from McGuireWoods LLC (April 12, 2011) (“McGuireWoods Letter”).

114
7 U.S.C. 6m(3).

115

See
Skadden Letter.

116

See
MFA Letter.

117

See Andrus
v.
Glover Construction Co.,
446 U.S. 608 (1980).

Several commenters suggested adding as a prerequisite for exemptive relief under § 4.13(a)(3), registration with the SEC as an investment adviser.
118

The Commission is declining to add SEC registration as part of the criteria for relief under § 4.13(a)(3) because the basis for providing relief is the limited nature of the pool's trading activity rather than its operator's registration status with the SEC. To require the CPO of an exempt pool to be regulated by the SEC would limit the applicability of § 4.13(a)(3), which is not the Commission's intention at this time.

118

See
MFA Letter; NFA Letter; Skadden Letter; Schulte Letter; NYSBA Letter; Dechert III Letter; IAA Letter; and Seward Letter.

Most commenters suggesting the additional requirement of SEC registration also proposed an increase in the trading threshold, ranging from 20 percent to 50 percent of the pool's liquidation value due to the inclusion of the pool's swaps activity within the trading threshold.
119

As discussed earlier in this release in the context of § 4.5, the Commission believes that a five percent threshold continues to be the appropriate level for exemption or exclusion due to limited derivatives trading. Moreover, the Commission would again note that the inclusion of an alternative net notional test provides CPOs with another, perhaps less restrictive means, of qualifying for the exemption. The Commission believes

that trading exceeding five percent of the liquidation value of a portfolio, or a net notional value of commodity interest positions exceeding 100 percent of the liquidation value of a portfolio, evidences a significant exposure to the derivatives markets, and that such exposure should subject an entity to the Commission's oversight.

119

See
MFA Letter; Skadden Letter; NYSBA Letter; Dechert III Letter.

With respect to the issue of the inclusion of swaps making it more difficult to satisfy the trading threshold, the Commission believes that it would be premature to increase the threshold at this time. Additionally, as stated previously, the inclusion of an alternative net notional test may provides entities with another mechanism for qualifying for the exemption in § 4.13(a)(3). The Commission believes that it may be more appropriate to reassess the trading threshold after collecting data from registered CPOs through Form CPO-PQR. Therefore, the Commission has decided not to increase the trading threshold under § 4.13(a)(3).

Additionally, the Commission believes that it must include swaps within the threshold to enable the most entities to claim relief under § 4.13(a)(3). As stated previously with respect to the amendments to § 4.5, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the statutory definition of the terms “commodity pool operator” and “commodity pool” to include those entities that trade swaps.
120

If the Commission were to keep the de minimis test in § 4.13(a)(3) and only include futures and options as the basis for calculating compliance with the threshold, the swaps activities of the CPOs would still trigger the registration requirement notwithstanding the exclusion of swaps from the calculus. That is, the purpose of the threshold test is to define a de minimis amount of trading activity that would not trigger the registration requirement. If swaps were excluded, any swaps activities undertaken by a CPO would result in that entity being required to register because there would be no de minimis exclusion for such activity. As a result, one swap contract would be enough to trigger the registration requirement. For that reason, if the Commission wants to permit some de minimis level of swaps activity by CPOs without registration with the Commission, it must do so explicitly in the exemption.
121

Because the Commission has determined that de minimis activity by CPOs does not implicate the Commission's regulatory concerns, the Commission has decided that it is appropriate to include swaps within the trading threshold under § 4.13(a)(3).
122

120
7 U.S.C. 1a(10); 1a(11).

121
Any reference to a de minimis level of swaps activities by registered investment companies only applies in the context of CPO registration by registered investment companies.

122
The Commission has proposed to amend the definition of “commodity interest” as it appears in § 1.3 to include swaps, consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act.
See,
76 FR 33066 (June 7, 2011).

Additionally, to enable CPOs to fully exercise the alternative net notional test, the Commission is amending § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B) to provide guidance as to the notional value of cleared swaps positions and the ability to net swaps cleared by the same DCO. The Commission believes that this amendment will serve to provide equal ability to claim relief under § 4.13(a)(3) to all CPOs regardless of the types of commodity interests held by their operated pools. Therefore, the Commission is amending § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B)(
1
) to provide that the notional value of a cleared swap is determined consistent with the provisions of part 45 of the Commission's regulations and § 4.13(a)(3)(ii)(B)(
2
) to provide that swaps cleared by the same DCO may be netted where appropriate.

After consideration of the comments and the Commission's stated rationale for proposing to rescind the exemption in § 4.13(a)(3), the Commission has determined to retain the de minimis exemption currently set forth in that section without modification.
123

123
The Commission does not need to amend the language of § 4.13(a)(3) to include swaps within the trading threshold as this section determines eligibility based on the amount of “commodity interests” traded. In a separate rulemaking, the Commission has proposed to amend the definition of the term “commodity interest” to include swaps.
See
76 FR 11701 (March 3, 2011).

3. Comments Regarding a Family Offices Exemption

In response to the Commission's proposed rescission of §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4), the Commission received numerous comments asking that the Commission adopt an exemption from registration for family offices that is akin to the exemption adopted by the SEC.
124

The commenters noted that prior to the adoption of §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4), the Commission staff granted relief to family offices on an ad hoc basis, but that when §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4) were adopted, most family offices availed themselves of those exemptions from registration. The commenters argued that the Commission should have less regulatory concern about family offices because their clientele is necessarily limited to family members and the family offices do not solicit outside of the family unit.

124

See
17 CFR 250.202(a)(11)(G)-1.

Due to the exemptions previously granted by Commission staff, and the resulting lack of information regarding the activities of CPOs claiming relief thereunder, the Commission does not yet have a comprehensive view of the positions taken and interests held by currently exempt entities. The Commission, therefore, believes that it is prudent to withhold consideration of a family offices exemption until the Commission has developed a comprehensive view regarding such firms to enable the Commission to better assess the universe of firms that may be appropriate to include within the exemption, should the Commission decide to adopt one. Therefore, the Commission is directing staff to look into the possibility of adopting a family offices exemption in the future.

The Commission notes that family offices previously relying on the exemption under Regulation § 4.13(a)(3) will not be affected by the rules adopted herein, as the Commission is not rescinding the § 4.13(a)(3) exemption and it will remain available to entities meeting its criteria. The Commission further notes that family offices continue to be permitted to write in on a firm by firm basis to request interpretative relief from the registration and compliance obligations under the Commission's rules and to rely on those interpretative letters already issued to the extent permissible under the Commission's regulations.
125

Therefore, the Commission does not believe an exemption for family offices is necessary at this time.

125
See 17 CFR 140.99(a)(3) (“An interpretative letter may be relied upon by persons in addition to the Beneficiary.”). The most recent letter (CFTC letter 10-25) issued affirming the Division's interpretation that a “family office” is not a pool under § 4.10(d) is available at the Commission's Web site at:
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/documents/letter/10-25.pdf.

See,
CFTC Interpretative Letter 00-100 [2000-2002 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,420 (Nov. 1, 2000); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 96-24, [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,653 (March 4, 1996); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 97-29, [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,039 (March 21, 1997); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 95-35, [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,376 (Nov. 23, 1994).

4. Comments Regarding a Foreign Advisor Exemption

Several commenters suggested that if the Commission determines to adopt the proposed rescissions, it should adopt a foreign advisor exemption similar to that set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act under the Investment Adviser Act of

1940.
126

The commenters expressed concern that the rescission of the exemptions under §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (a)(4) would result in nearly all non-US based CPOs operating a pool with at least one U.S. investor being required to register with the Commission. Commenters also expressed concern that foreign CPOs would have to report the entirety of their derivatives activities to the Commission even if foreign regulators also oversee such activities.

126

See
Section 403 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Due to the exemptions previously adopted by the Commission, and the resulting lack of information regarding the activities of CPOs claiming relief thereunder, the Commission does not yet have a comprehensive view of the positions taken and interests held by currently exempt entities. The Commission, therefore, believes that it is prudent to withhold consideration of a foreign advisor exemption until the Commission has received data regarding such firms on Forms CPO-PQR and/or CTA-PR, as applicable, to enable the Commission to better assess the universe of firms that may be appropriate to include within the exemption, should the Commission decide to adopt one. Foreign advisors to pools that meet the criteria of § 4.13(a)(3) will be able to continue to operate pursuant to that exemption, if previously claimed, or file notice of claim of exemption under § 4.13(a)(3). Therefore, the Commission is not providing an exemption for foreign advisors at this time.

5. Comments Regarding the Proposed Rescission of § 4.13(a)(4)

In the Proposal, the Commission proposed to rescind the exemption in § 4.13(a)(4) for operators of pools that are offered only to individuals and entities that satisfy the qualified eligible person standard in § 4.7 or the accredited investor standard under the SEC's Regulation D.
127

In the Proposal, the Commission stated that it

127

See
17 CFR 4.13(a)(4).

[S]eeks to eliminate the exemptions under §§ 4.13(a)(3) and (4) for operators of pools that are similarly situated to private funds that previously relied on the exemptions under §§ 3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Company Act and § 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act. It is the Commission's view that the operators of these pools should be subject to similar regulatory obligations, including proposed form CPO-PQR, in order to provide improved transparency and increased accountability with respect to these pools. The Commission has determined that it is appropriate to limit regulatory arbitrage through harmonization of the scope of its data collection with respect to pools that are similarly situated to private funds so that operators of such pools will not be able to avoid oversight by either the Commission or the SEC through claims of exemption under the Commission's regulations.
128

128
76 FR 7976, 7986 (Feb 12, 2011).

The Commission received several comments regarding its proposed rescission.
129

Several commenters argued that the Commission should consider retaining the exemption in § 4.13(a)(4) for funds that do not directly invest in commodity interests, but do so through a fund of funds structure, and who are advised by an SEC registered investment adviser. Due to the exemptions previously adopted by the Commission, and the resulting lack of information regarding the activities of CPOs claiming relief thereunder, the Commission does not yet have a comprehensive view of the positions taken and interests held by currently exempt entities. The Commission, therefore, believes that it is prudent to withhold consideration of a fund of fund exemption until the Commission has received data regarding such firms on Forms CPO-PQR and/or CTA-PR, as applicable, to enable the Commission to better assess the universe of firms that may be appropriate to include within the exemption, should the Commission decide to adopt one. Therefore, the Commission is not providing an exemption for funds of funds at this time. The Commission notes, however, that staff will consider requests for exemptive relief for funds of funds on a case by case basis.

129

See
comment letter from Sidley Austin LLP (April 12, 2011) (“Sidley Letter”); MFA Letter; NYSBA Letter; comment letter from Cranwood Capital Management (April 12, 20110 (“Cranwood Letter”); Dechert III Letter; and comment letter from Nantucket Multi Managers, LLC (April 12, 2011) (“Nantucket Letter”).

The Commission received two comments that argued that the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) is inconsistent with the private offering framework under the SEC's Regulation D and that the rescission would result in the end of private offerings.
130

The Commission believes that this analysis is flawed and is the result of a mistaken conflation of the private fund structure under the Commission's rules and privately-offered ownership interests under the SEC's rules. The Commission notes that the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) does not preclude CPOs from utilizing Regulation D with respect to the offering of pool interests because the availability of relief from the registration of an offering under Regulation D does not require that the entity involved be exempt from regulation. Therefore, the Commission continues to believe that rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) is appropriate for the reasons stated in the Proposing Release and that it is consistent with the registration of investment advisers of such exempt funds with the SEC.

130

See
MFA Letter; and NYSBA Letter.

One commenter expressed concerns about the fact that the class of eligible participants in a pool operated pursuant to § 4.13(a)(4) is broader than that for a pool qualifying under § 4.7.
131

Specifically, this commenter noted that under § 4.13(a)(4), participants may include non-natural participants that are QEPs under § 4.7 or accredited investors under § 230.501(a)(1)-(3), (a)(7) or (a)(8),
132

whereas § 4.7 does not include such participants as QEPs.
133

The Commission recognizes that this discrepancy may result in certain entities being unable to claim relief under § 4.7; however, due to the exemptions previously adopted by the Commission, and the resulting lack of information regarding the activities of CPOs claiming relief thereunder, the Commission does not yet have a comprehensive view of the positions taken and interests held by currently exempt entities and until the Commission has more information regarding the universe of entities affected, the Commission does not believe that it is appropriate to amend § 4.7 to reflect the nature of participants in funds previously entitled to relief under § 4.13(a)(4). After the Commission has collected data from such entities through Form CPO-PQR, the Commission may reconsider this issue. The Commission also notes that staff will consider requests for exemptive relief from the limitations of § 4.7 on a case-by-case basis.

131
MFA raised this concern during several meetings with Commission staff, although it did not provide any detail regarding the scope of its concerns and the topic was not discussed in the written comments submitted regarding this rulemaking.

132
17 CFR § 4.13(a)(4)(ii)(B).

133
17 CFR § 4.7(a).

One commenter argued that rescission is not necessary because any fund that seeks to attract qualified eligible purchasers is already required to maintain oversight and controls that exceed those mandated by part 4 of the Commission's regulations such that any regulation imposed would be duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome.
134

That commenter further stated that:

134

See
Cranwood Letter.

We are accustomed to intense scrutiny from potential investors that frequently includes independent background checks of our key employees, onsite visits that include

interviews with our traders and other key personnel, interviews of our third-party administrator and our auditors, interviews of officials of our clearing broker, interviews of officers at our custodial bank, and bulk delivery of transactional data for independent analysis. To say that such information-gathering goes far beyond the contents of a mandated disclosure document is a gross understatement.
135

135

See
Cranwood Letter.

The commenter primarily focused on the significant level of controls that the fund operator implements independent of regulation. The Commission believes that, contrary to the commenter's arguments as to the import of that fact, such controls and internal oversight should facilitate compliance with the Commission's regulatory regime. Moreover, the Commission continues to believe that registration serves important regulatory purposes as stated previously in this release in the context of the amendments to § 4.5.

The Commission has determined to eliminate the exemption in § 4.13(a)(4) because, as stated in the proposal, there are no limits on the amount of commodity interest trading in which pools operating under this regulation can engage. That is, it is possible that a commodity pool that is exempted from registration under § 4.13(a)(4) could be invested solely in commodities, which, in the Commission's view, necessitates Commission oversight to ensure adequate customer protection and market oversight. Therefore, the Commission adopts the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) as proposed.

The Commission received several comments regarding the timing of the implementation of the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4).
136

Two commenters suggested that 18 months is the appropriate time period to permit entities to prepare for compliance with the Commission's registration and compliance regime.
137

One commenter suggested that the Commission provide “sufficient time,” but provided no proposed specific period of time.
138

Several commenters asserted that currently exempt entities should be grandfathered.
139

136

See
NYSBA Letter; AIMA Letter; Schulte Letter; comment letter from Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P. (April 12, 2011) (“Fulbright Letter”); SIFMA Letter; Seward Letter; Katten Letter; and comment letter from TIF Fund Management LLC (May 19, 2011) (“TIF Letter”); NFA Letter; IAA Letter; and Dechert Letter.

137

See
Schulte Letter; and Fulbright Letter.

138

See
NFA Letter.
See also,
IAA Letter.

139

See
NYSBA Letter; AIMA Letter; Schulte Letter; Fulbright Letter; SIFMA Letter; Seward Letter; and Katten Letter.

The Commission recognizes that entities will need time to come into compliance with the Commission's regulations. The Commission does not, however, believe that the process of preparing for Commission oversight necessitates an 18 month time period. Based on the comments received indicating that a certain portion of entities currently claiming relief under § 4.13(a)(4) already have robust controls in place independent of Commission oversight, the Commission believes that entities currently claiming relief under § 4.13(a)(4) should be capable of becoming registered and complying with the Commission's regulations within 12 months following the issuance of the final rule. For entities that are formed after the effective date of the rescission, the Commission expects the CPOs of such entities to comply with the Commission's regulations upon formation and commencement of operations.

The Commission does not believe that “grandfathering” is appropriate in this context. As the Commission stated in its Proposal, part of the purpose of rescinding § 4.13(a)(4) is to ensure that entities that are engaged in derivatives trading are subject to substantively identical registration and compliance obligations and oversight by the Commission.
140

Grandfathering is not consistent with the stated goals of the Commission's rescission and would result in disparate treatment of similarly situated entities.

140
76 FR 7976, 7986 (Feb. 12, 2011).

Therefore, the Commission will implement the rescission of § 4.13(a)(4) for all entities currently claiming exemptive relief thereunder on December 31, 2012, but the rescission will be implemented for all other CPOs upon the effective date of this final rulemaking.

D. Comments Regarding the Proposed Annual Notices for Continued Exemptive or Exclusionary Relief

In the Proposal, the Commission proposed to require annual reaffirmance of a claim of exemption or exclusion from registration as a CPO or CTA. In the Proposal, the Commission stated its position that an annual notice requirement would promote improved transparency regarding the number of entities either exempt or excluded from the Commission's registration and compliance programs, which is consistent with one of the primary purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act. Moreover, the Commission stated its belief that an annual notice requirement would enable the Commission to determine whether exemptions and exclusions should be modified, repealed, or maintained as part of the Commission's ongoing assessment of its regulatory scheme.

The Commission received three comments on this provision in the Proposal.
141

One commenter supported the adoption of an annual notice requirement, but suggested that the due date of the notice be changed from the exemption's original filing date to a calendar-year end for all filers.
142

The Commission agrees that moving the due date for the annual notice requirement to the calendar-year end for all filers may be more operationally efficient. Therefore, the Commission will adopt the annual notice requirement mandating that the notice be filed at the calendar year-end rather than the anniversary of the original filing.

141

See
NFA Letter; AII Letter; and SIFMA Letter.

142

See
NFA Letter.

Two commenters suggested that the 30-day time period for filing was not adequate to enable firms to comply.
143

One commenter proposed a 60-day time period,
144

whereas the other commenter proposed 90 days as the necessary amount of time.
145

The Commission recognizes that the proposed 30-day filing period may not be adequate due to the ramifications of an entity's failure to file its annual notice in a timely manner, which would result in the exemption or exclusion being deemed withdrawn. This issue is particularly important because of the NFA's Bylaw 1101, which prohibits NFA members from conducting business with non-members. Should an entity fail to file its annual notice within the requisite time frame, its NFA membership could be deemed withdrawn, which could potentially impact numerous other NFA members. The Commission believes that extending the filing period from 30 days to 60 days will provide NFA with adequate time to follow up with filing entities to ensure that a filing is not omitted inadvertently and to limit the adverse consequences for other NFA members. The Commission does not, however, believe that 90 days is necessary as it intends for such notice to be filed electronically with NFA and for NFA's filing system to pre-populate the notice with the names and NFA IDs of all exempt pools operated by the CPO with an option to choose to reaffirm the exemptions for all exempt pools. The Commission believes that this minimizes both the time and expense burdens on the CPO and should enable

all entities to comply with the requirement within 60 days.

143

See
NFA Letter; and SIFMA Letter.

144

See
NFA Letter.

145

See
SIFMA Letter.

E. Comments Regarding the Proposed Risk Disclosure Statement for Swaps in § 4.24 and § 4.34

The Commission also proposed adding standard risk disclosure statements for CPOs and CTAs regarding their use of swaps to §§ 4.24(b) and 4.34(b), respectively.
146

146
76 FR 7976, 7986 (Feb. 12, 2011).

The Commission received three comments with respect to the proposed standard risk disclosure statement for swaps.
147

Two argued that a standard risk disclosure statement is not the appropriate way to disclose the risks inherent in swaps activity to participants or clients.
148

Specifically, those commenters argued that the use of swaps by CPOs and CTAs varies and depending on the reason for using swaps, different risks may be implicated. Furthermore, those commenters also noted that the proposed risk disclosure statement is inconsistent with recent SEC guidance to registered investment companies to avoid generic disclosures. The Commission respectfully disagrees with the assertions of those commenters who believe that a standard risk disclosure statement is not appropriate. The Commission believes that a standardized risk disclosure statement addressing certain risks associated with the use of swaps is necessary due to the revisions to the statutory definitions of CPO, CTA, and commodity pool enacted by the Dodd-Frank Act.
149

Moreover, it is the Commission's position that concerns about “one-size-fits-all” disclosure of risks are addressed through additional disclosures required under §§ 4.24(g) and 4.34(g), which govern disclosures regarding the risks associated with participating in the offered commodity pool or program.

147

See
SIFMA Letter; Fidelity Letter; and comment letter from Chris Barnard (Feb. 26, 2011) (“Barnard Letter”).

148

See
SIFMA Letter; and Fidelity Letter.

149

See
7 U.S.C. 1a(10), 1a(11), and 1a(12).

With respect to the comments submitted regarding the conflicting requirements imposed on registered investment companies whose advisers are required to register as CPOs pursuant to amended § 4.5,
150

such concerns will be addressed through the proposed modifications to the Commission's compliance regime that will be applicable to registered investment companies overseen by both the SEC and the Commission.

150

See
SIFMA Letter; and Fidelity Letter.

Additionally, the Commission received one comment that supported the adoption of the standard risk disclosure statement for swaps, but suggested that the Commission consider whether the wording needed to be modified depending on whether the swaps were cleared or uncleared.
151

Based on the language proposed, the Commission does not believe that different language must be adopted to account for the differences between cleared and uncleared swaps. In particular, the Commission notes that the proposed risk disclosure statement is not intended to address all risks that may be associated with the use of swaps, but that the CPO or CTA is required to make additional disclosures of any other risks in its disclosure document pursuant to §§ 4.24(g) and 4.34(g) of the Commission's regulations. Moreover, the language of the proposed risk disclosure statement is conditional and does not purport to assert that all of the risks discussed are applicable in all circumstances. For the reasons discussed above and those stated in the Proposal, the Commission adopts the proposed risk disclosure statements for CPOs and CTAs regarding swaps.
152

These additional risk disclosure statements will be required for all new disclosure documents and all updates filed after the effective date of this final rulemaking.

151

See
Barnard Letter.

152
These risk disclosure statements do not affect the swap disclosure requirements mandated in CEA Section 4s(h)(3)(B) and rules relating to that statutory provision. See proposed § 23.431 Disclosure of Material Information, Business Conduct Standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants with Counterparties, 75 FR 80638 (Dec. 22, 2010). In addition, managed accounts that do not convey discretionary authority to the CTA will require the pass through of the swap disclosures in any final rule promulgated pursuant to 4s(h)(3)(B).

F. Section 4.27 and Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR

1. General Comments

The Commission received numerous comments in response to proposed § 4.27, which requires CPOs and CTAs to report certain information to the Commission on Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR, respectively. Several commenters questioned whether the data collection was necessary for the Commission's oversight of its registrants.
153

Others asserted that certain groups, such as registered investment companies or family offices, should be exempted from completing the data collection.
154

153

See
Fidelity Letter; and AIMA Letter.

154

See
ICI Letter; AIMA Letter; and comment letter from K&L Gates LLP (Feb. 12, 2011) (“K&L Letter”).

The Commission's new reporting requirements supplement SEC reporting requirements for dual registrants that must file Form PF with the SEC by virtue of their dual registration status. Information about CTAs and CPOs that are non-dual registrants is necessary for the Commission to identify significant risk to the stability of the derivatives market and the financial market as a whole. Following the recent economic turmoil, the Commission has reconsidered the level of regulation that it believes is appropriate for entities participating in the commodity futures and derivatives markets. With respect to the assertion that registered investment companies should not be required to file Form CPO-PQR, the Commission believes that it is important to collect the data in Form CPO-PQR from registered investment companies whose activities require CPO registration to assess the risk posed by such investment vehicles to derivatives markets and the broader financial system. Consequently, the Commission intends to require from registered investment companies that are also registered as CPOs the same information that it is requiring from entities solely registered as CPOs. Additionally, the Commission notes that to the extent that the entity registered as the CPO for the registered investment company is registered as an investment adviser and is required to file Form PF with the SEC, the activities of the registered investment company may be reported on Form PF as well.

The Commission further believes that the same reasoning applies with respect to the collection of data from family offices. To enable the Commission to evaluate a potential family offices exemption following the collection and analysis of data regarding their activities, the Commission believes that it is essential that family offices remain subject to the data collection requirements to the extent that such entities are not entitled to claim relief pursuant to the Commission's interpretative guidance regarding family offices.

One commenter recommended that the Commission clarify the filing obligations for CPOs and CTAs that are required to file Form PF with the SEC and to streamline the reporting obligations.
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Another commenter argued that a very large private fund that has a limited amount of derivatives trading should not be subject to Schedule C of Form CPO-PQR.
156

As

stated in the Proposal, CPOs that are dually registered with the SEC and that file Form PF must still file Schedule A with the Commission, and CTAs must still file Form CTA-PR. The Commission intends to adopt § 4.27 as proposed and permit dual registrants to file Form PF with the SEC in lieu of completing Schedules B and/or C of Form CPO-PQR. The Commission never intended to require very large dual registrants to file anything more than the general identifying information required on Schedule A with the Commission, and neither § 4.27 nor the forms require dual registrants to file Schedules B or C if they are filing Form PF.

155

See
Fidelity Letter.

156

See
AIMA Letter; SIFMA Letter; and Fidelity Letter.

The Commission has modified both Schedule A of Form CPO-PQR and Form CTA-PR so that both documents are only soliciting general demographic data. The Commission has moved Question 12, which asked for information regarding position information, from proposed Schedule A to Schedule B of Form CPO-PQR in an effort to avoid collecting redundant information from dual registrants. Additionally, the Commission is not adopting Schedule B from Form CTA-PR, and therefore, will be limiting the information collected from registered CTAs to demographic data and the names of the pools advised by the CTA.

One commenter questioned whether the information collected on Forms CTA-PR and CPO-PQR will provide the Commission with real-time data that will enable it to have an accurate and timely picture of a CTA's activities and operating status.
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The Commission recognizes the limitations of the data collection instruments with respect to the timeliness of the information requested. The Commission believes, however, that the forms strike the appropriate balance between the time needed to compile complex data and the Commission's need for timely information. Moreover, the Commission believes that the information required on Form CPO-PQR and CTA-PR will be useful because it will allow the Commission to better deploy its enforcement and examination resources.

157

See
Barnard Letter.

Another commenter questioned whether the Commission possessed the staffing and financial resources necessary to meaningfully use such data as part of its oversight.
158

The Commission recognizes that the resources available to it are limited. To that end, the Commission, as stated in the Proposal, intends to coordinate with the NFA to accomplish the analysis necessary to make full use of the data collected from Commission registrants.

158

See
Dechert Letter.

In addition, the Commission intends for the data to be collected from registrants in an electronic format, which will enable the Commission to leverage its technology and to require less intensive staff time to achieve the desired results. The use of an electronic format will enable the FSOC to conduct additional analysis of the data collected in the event that the FSOC requests such information from the Commission, without significant consumption of Commission resources. For these reasons, the Commission believes that it has the tools necessary to make full use of the data that it intends to collect on Forms CPO-PQR and CTA-PR, notwithstanding the Commission's current staffing and financial resources.

2. Comments Regarding the Reporting Thresholds

The Commission received several comments regarding the appropriate reporting thresholds for the various schedules of Form CPO-PQR.
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The commenters stated that $150 million in assets under management was too low of a threshold for entities to be categorized as mid-sized and required to file Schedule B. Rather, the commenters urged the Commission to increase the threshold to $500 million in assets under management.
160

The Commission believes that $150 million in assets under management is still the appropriate threshold for mid-sized CPOs. The Commission will retain this threshold because it is consistent with the threshold for advisers filing Section 1 of Form PF, which is substantively similar to Schedule B of Form CPO-PQR, and it will ensure comparable treatment of entities of similar magnitude.

159

See
AIMA Letter; MFA II Letter; Seward Letter.
See also,
AIMA II Letter.

160

See
AIMA Letter.

These commenters also suggested that the Commission increase the threshold for large CPOs from $1 billion to $5 billion in assets under management.
161

The Commission has decided not to increase the large CPO threshold to $5 billion. The Commission has decided, however, to increase the threshold from $1 bi

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2012-3390. Public record. Not legal advice.
