# Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2011-1971 ## Record - **Collection:** Federal Register - **Document type:** Rule - **Published:** February 2, 2011 - **Citation:** 76 FR 6010 ## Text SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 17 CFR Parts 229, 240 and 249 [Release Nos. 33-9178; 34-63768; File No. S7-31-10] RIN 3235-AK68 Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission. ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: We are adopting amendments to our rules to implement the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act relating to shareholder approval of executive compensation and “golden parachute” compensation arrangements. Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding Section 14A, which requires companies to conduct a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K or any successor to Item 402. Section 14A also requires companies to conduct a separate shareholder advisory vote to determine how often an issuer will conduct a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation. In addition, Section 14A requires companies soliciting votes to approve merger or acquisition transactions to provide disclosure of certain “golden parachute” compensation arrangements and, in certain circumstances, to conduct a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the golden parachute compensation arrangements. DATES: Effective Date: April 4, 2011. Compliance Date: April 4, 2011, except that issuers must comply with Exchange Act Section 14A(b) and Rule 14a-21(c) and the amendments to Item 5 of Schedule 14A, Item 3 of Schedule 14C, Item 1011 of Regulation M-A, Item 11 of Schedule TO, Item 15 of Schedule 13E-3, and Item 8 of Schedule 14D-9 for initial preliminary proxy and information statements, Schedules TO, 13E-3, and 14D-9 and Forms S-4 and F-4 filed on or after April 25, 2011. Companies that qualify as “smaller reporting companies” (as defined in 17 CFR 240.12b-2) as of January 21, 2011, including newly public companies that qualify as smaller reporting companies after January 21, 2011, will not be subject to Exchange Act Section 14A(a) and Rule 14a-21(a) and (b) until the first annual or other meeting of shareholders at which directors will be elected and for which the rules of the Commission require executive compensation disclosure pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.402) occurring on or after January 21, 2013. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott Hodgdon, Attorney-Adviser, at (202) 551-3430, Anne Krauskopf, Senior Special Counsel, at (202) 551-3500, or Perry Hindin, Special Counsel, at (202) 551-3440, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-3628. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We are adopting new Rule 14a-21 and amendments to Rules 14a-4, 1 14a-6, 2 14a-8 3 and a new Item 24 and amendments to Item 5 of Schedule 14A 4 and amendments to Item 3 of Schedule 14C 5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). 6 We are also adopting amendments to Item 402 7 of Regulation S-K, 8 Item 1011 9 of Regulation M-A, 10 Item 15 of Schedule 13E-3, 11 Item 8 of Schedule 14D-9, 12 Item 11 of Schedule TO, 13 and amendments to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K. 14 1 17 CFR 240.14a-4. 2 17 CFR 240.14a-6. 3 17 CFR 240.14a-8. 4 17 CFR 240.14a-101. 5 17 CFR 240.14c-101. 6 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. 7 17 CFR 229.402. 8 17 CFR 229.10 et seq. 9 17 CFR 229.1011. 10 17 CFR 229.1000 et seq. 11 17 CFR 240.13e-100. 12 17 CFR 240.14d-101. 13 17 CFR 240.14d-100. 14 17 CFR 249.308. Table of Contents I. Background and Summary II. Discussion of the Amendments A. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation 1. Rule 14a-21(a) a. Proposed Rule b. Comments on the Proposed Rule c. Final Rule 2. Item 24 of Schedule 14A a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 3. Amendments to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule B. Shareholder Approval of the Frequency of Shareholder Votes on Executive Compensation 1. Rule 14a-21(b) a. Proposed Rule b. Comments on the Proposed Rule c. Final Rule 2. Item 24 of Schedule 14A a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 3. Amendment to Rule 14a-4 a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 4. Amendment to Rule 14a-8 a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 5. Amendment to Form 8-K a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 6. Effect of Shareholder Vote C. Issues Relating to Both Shareholder Votes Required by Section 14A(a) 1. Amendments to Rule 14a-6 a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 2. Broker Discretionary Voting 3. Relationship to Shareholder Votes on Executive Compensation for TARP Companies D. Disclosure of Golden Parachute Arrangements and Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachute Arrangements 1. General 2. Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments i. General Comments on the Proposed Item 402(t) Table ii. Comments on the Elements of Compensation and Presentation of the Proposed Item 402(t) Table iii. Comments on Individuals Subject to Item 402(t) Disclosure iv. Comments on Item 402(t) Disclosure in Annual Meeting Proxy Statements c. Final Rule i. Item 402(t) Table and Narrative Requirements ii. Elements of Compensation and Presentation of Item 402(t) Table iii. Individuals Subject to Item 402(t) Disclosure iv. Item 402(t) Disclosure in Annual Meeting Proxy Statements 3. Amendments to Schedule 14A, Schedule 14C, Schedule 14D-9, Schedule 13E-3, Schedule TO, and Item 1011 of Regulation M-A a. Proposed Amendments b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments c. Final Rule 4. Rule 14a-21(c) a. Proposed Rule b. Comments on the Proposed Rule c. Final Rule i. Scope of Rule 14a-21(c) Shareholder Advisory Vote ii. Exceptions to Rule 14a-21(c) Shareholder Advisory Vote E. Treatment of Smaller Reporting Companies F. Transition Matters III. Paperwork Reduction Act A. Background B. Summary of the Final Rules C. Summary of Comment Letters and Revisions to Proposals D. Revisions to PRA Reporting and Cost Burden Estimates IV. Cost-Benefit Analysis A. Introduction B. Comments on the Cost-Benefit Analysis C. Benefits D. Costs V. Consideration of Impact on the Economy, Burden on Competition, and Promotion of Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation VI. Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Action B. Legal Basis C. Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments D. Small Entities Subject to the Final Amendments E. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements F. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules G. Significant Alternatives VII. Statutory Authority and Text of the Amendments I. Background and Summary On October 18, 2010, we proposed a number of amendments to our rules relating to the shareholder approval of executive compensation and golden parachute compensation. 15 We proposed these rules to implement Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Act”). 16 As discussed in detail below, we have taken into consideration the comments received on the proposed amendments and are adopting several amendments to our rules. 17 15 See Release No. 33-9153 (October 18, 2010) [75 FR 66590] (the “Proposing Release”). 16 Public Law 111-203 (July 21, 2010). 17 The public comments we received on the Proposing Release are available on our Web site at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-31-10/s73110.shtml. In addition, to facilitate public input on the Act, the Commission provided a series of e-mail links, organized by topic, on its Web site at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/regreformcomments.shtml. The public comments we received on Section 951 of the Act are available on our Web s ite at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executive-compensation.shtml. The Act amends the Exchange Act by adding new Section 14A. New Section 14A(a)(1) requires that “[n]ot less frequently than once every 3 years, a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives,” 18 as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, or any successor to Item 402 (a “say-on-pay vote”). The shareholder vote to approve executive compensation required by Section 14A(a)(1) “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer.” 19 18 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(1). Section 951 of the Act includes the language “or other meeting of the shareholders,” which is similar to corresponding language in Section 111(e)(1) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or EESA, 12 U.S.C. 5221. As noted in the Proposing Release, we have previously considered this language in connection with companies required to provide a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation so long as the company has outstanding obligations under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation of TARP Recipients, Release No. 34-61335 (Jan. 12, 2010) [75 FR 2789] (hereinafter, the “TARP Adopting Release”). We continue to view this provision to require a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation only with respect to an annual meeting of shareholders for which proxies will be solicited for the election of directors, or a special meeting in lieu of such annual meeting. Similarly, Rules 14a-21(a) and (b) are intended to result in issuers conducting the required advisory votes in connection with the election of directors, the proxy materials for which are required to include disclosure of executive compensation. 19 Exchange Act Section 14A(c). Section 951 of the Act also adds new Section 14A(a)(2) to the Exchange Act, requiring that, “[n]ot less frequently than once every 6 years, a proxy or consent or authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to determine whether [the say-on-pay vote] will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.” 20 As discussed below, this shareholder vote “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer.” 21 20 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2). 21 Exchange Act Section 14A(c). In addition, Section 951 of the Act amends the Exchange Act by adding new Section 14A(b)(1), which requires that, in any proxy or consent solicitation material for a meeting of shareholders “at which shareholders are asked to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation, or proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all the assets of an issuer, the person making such solicitation shall disclose in the proxy or consent solicitation material, in a clear and simple form in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission, any agreements or understandings that such person has with any named executive officers of such issuer (or of the acquiring issuer, if such issuer is not the acquiring issuer) concerning any type of compensation (whether present, deferred, or contingent) that is based on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the issuer[* * *].” 22 These compensation arrangements are often referred to as “golden parachute” compensation. Such disclosure must include the aggregate total of all such compensation that may be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such named executive officer, and the conditions upon which it may be paid or become payable. 23 Under Section 14A(b)(2), “unless such agreements or understandings have been subject to [the periodic shareholder vote described in Section 14A(a)(1)],” 24 a separate shareholder vote to approve such agreements or understandings and compensation as disclosed is also required. 25 As with the say-on-pay vote and the shareholder vote on the frequency of such votes, this shareholder vote “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer.” 26 22 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1). 23 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1). 24 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(2). 25 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(2). 26 Exchange Act Section 14A(c). In addition to their non-binding status, none of the shareholder votes required pursuant to Section 14A is to be construed “as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors.” 27 These shareholder votes also do not “create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of directors” 28 nor do they “create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors.” 29 Further, these votes will not be construed “to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.” 30 Section 14A also provides that “the Commission may, by rule or order, exempt an issuer or class of issuers” from the shareholder advisory votes required by Section 14A. 31 In determining whether to make an exemption, the Commission is directed to take into account, among other considerations, whether the requirements of Section 14A(a) and (b) disproportionately burden small issuers. 32 27 Exchange Act Section 14A(c)(1). 28 Exchange Act Section 14A(c)(2). 29 Exchange Act Section 14A(c)(3). 30 Exchange Act Section 14A(c)(4). In addition, Exchange Act Section 14A(d) provides that every institutional manager subject to Exchange Act Section 13(f) [15 U.S.C. 78m(f)] shall report at least annually how it voted on any shareholder vote required by Section 951 of the Act, including the shareholder vote on executive compensation, the shareholder vote on the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation, and the golden parachute compensation vote, unless such vote is otherwise required to be reported publicly by rule or regulation of the Commission. Amendments to our rules to implement this requirement were proposed in a separate rulemaking. See Reporting of Proxy Votes on Executive Compensation and Other Matters, Release No. 34-63123 (Oct. 18, 2010) [75 FR 66622]. 31 Exchange Act Section 14A(e). 32 Exchange Act Section 14A(e). Section 14A(a)(3) requires that both the initial shareholder vote on executive compensation and the initial vote on the frequency of votes on executive compensation be included in proxy statements “for the first annual or other meeting of the shareholders occurring after the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of enactment” of the Act. 33 Thus, the statute requires separate resolutions subject to shareholder vote to approve executive compensation and to approve the frequency of say-on-pay votes for proxy statements relating to an issuer's first annual or other meeting of the shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011, whether or not the Commission has adopted rules to implement Section 14A(a). Because Section 14A(a) applies to shareholder meetings taking place on or after January 21, 2011, any proxy statement that is required to include executive compensation disclosure pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, whether in preliminary or definitive form, even if filed prior to this date, for meetings taking place on or after January 21, 2011, must include the separate resolutions for shareholders to approve executive compensation and the frequency of say-on-pay votes required by Section 14A(a) without regard to whether the amendments in this release are in effect by that time. 34 33 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(3). 34 See Section II.E below for a discussion of a temporary exemption for smaller reporting companies. With respect to the disclosure of golden parachute arrangements in accordance with Commission regulations in merger proxy statements required by Section 14A(b)(1), we note that the statute similarly references a 6-month period beginning on the date of enactment of the Act. However, because the statute requires such disclosure to be “in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission,” 35 the golden parachute compensation arrangements disclosure under proposed new Item 402(t) and a separate resolution to approve golden parachute compensation arrangements pursuant to Rule 14a-21(c) will not be required for merger proxy statements relating to a meeting of shareholders until the effective date of our rules implementing Section 14A(b)(1). The rule amendments we adopt today with respect to new Rule 14a-21(c) and the amendments to the disclosure requirements in Item 5 of Schedule 14A, Item 3 of Schedule 14C, Item 1011 of Regulation M-A, Item 11 of Schedule TO, Item 15 of Schedule 13E-3, and Item 8 of Schedule 14D-9, are effective for initial filings on or after April 25, 2011. 35 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1). We received over 60 comment letters in response to the proposed amendments. In addition, we received over a dozen letters relating to Section 951 of the Act. 36 These letters came from corporations, pension funds, professional associations, trade unions, law firms, consultants, academics, individual investors, and other interested parties. In general, the commentators supported the proposed amendments that would implement Section 951 of the Act. Some commentators, however, opposed some of the proposed amendments and suggested modifications or alternatives to the proposals. 36 These comment letters were received prior to publication of the Proposing Release. See note 17 above. We have reviewed and considered all of the comments that we received relating to the proposed amendments. The adopted rules reflect changes made in response to many of these comments. We discuss our revisions with respect to each proposed rule amendment in more detail throughout this release. We are adopting Rule 14a-21 to provide a separate shareholder vote to approve executive compensation, to approve the frequency of such votes on executive compensation and to approve golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain extraordinary business transactions. We are also adopting a new Item 24 of Schedule 14A to provide disclosure regarding the effect of the shareholder votes required by Rule 14a-21, such as whether each vote is non-binding. In addition, our amendments to Item 5 of Schedule 14A, Item 3 of Schedule 14C, Item 1011 of Regulation M-A, Item 8 of Schedule 14D-9, and Item 15 of Schedule 13E-3 will require additional disclosure regarding golden parachute arrangements in connection with certain extraordinary business transactions, Rule 13e-3 37 going-private transactions and tender offers. 37 17 CFR 240.13e-3. We are also adopting amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of an issuer's consideration of the say-on-pay vote in its Compensation Discussion and Analysis, and to prescribe disclosure about golden parachute compensation arrangements in new Item 402(t). In addition, we are adopting an instruction to Rule 14a-8 to clarify the treatment of shareholder proposals relating to the shareholder advisory votes required by Rule 14a-21. Finally, we are adopting amendments to Form 8-K to facilitate disclosure of the results of the shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, and to require disclosure about whether and how the issuer will implement the results of the shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. II. Discussion of the Amendments A. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation 1. Rule 14a-21(a) Proposed Rule 14a-21(a) would require issuers, 38 not less frequently than once every three years, to include in their proxy statements a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of executives. We are adopting the rule substantially as proposed with some changes in response to comments. 38 Our rules as adopted apply to issuers who have a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 [15 U.S.C. 78 l ] of the Exchange Act and are subject to our proxy rules. Foreign private issuers, as defined in Rule 3b-4(c) [17 CFR 240.3b-4(c)], are not required under Section 14A or the rules we are adopting today to conduct a shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation nor a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of such votes. a. Proposed Rule Under our proposed rule, an issuer would be required, not less frequently than once every three years, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote in proxy statements to approve the compensation of its named executive officers, as defined in Item 402(a)(3) 39 of Regulation S-K. Rule 14a-21(a), as proposed, would specify that the separate shareholder vote on executive compensation is required only when proxies are solicited for an annual or other meeting of security holders for which our rules require the disclosure of executive compensation pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. Proposed Rule 14a-21(a) would require a separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives for the first annual or other such meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011, the first day after the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of enactment of the Act. 39 17 CFR 229.402(a)(3). In accordance with Section 14A(a)(1), shareholders would vote to approve the compensation of the issuer's named executive officers, as such compensation is disclosed pursuant to Item 402 40 of Regulation S-K, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (“CD&A”), the compensation tables and other narrative executive compensation disclosures required by Item 402. We also proposed an instruction to Rule 14a-21 to specify that the rule does not change the scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies and that smaller reporting companies would not be required to provide a CD&A in order to comply with Rule 14a-21. 40 We proposed that if disclosure of golden parachute compensation arrangements pursuant to proposed Item 402(t) is included in an annual meeting proxy statement, such disclosure would be included in the disclosure subject to the shareholder advisory vote under Rule 14a-21(a). Such disclosure under Item 402(t), however, would not be required to be included in annual meeting proxy statements. b. Comments on the Proposed Rule Commentators were generally supportive of the proposal. Many commentators agreed with the approach, as proposed, not to designate specific language to be used or require issuers to frame the shareholder vote to approve executive compensation in the form of a standard resolution. 41 Some commentators indicated that issuers should have flexibility in drafting the resolution. 42 Commentators noted that flexibility would permit issuers to tailor the resolution to the issuer's individual circumstances. 43 Others stated that we should designate specific language for the resolution 44 or at least establish clear, minimum guidelines, 45 principles-based guidelines, 46 or model language, 47 while other commentators suggested we include language for a resolution in the form of non-exclusive examples 48 or a safe harbor. 49 Commentators indicated that it would be helpful to have an example of resolution language that would comply with the rule 50 and that sample language would simplify the drafting process for issuers and promote efficiency. 51 41 See, e.g., letters from American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), Center on Executive Compensation (“Center on Exec. Comp.”), Compensia (“Compensia”), Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (“Davis Polk”), the Financial Services Roundtable (“FSR”), Pfizer Inc. (“Pfizer”), Protective Life Corporation (“Protective Life”), and United Brotherhood of Carpenters (“UBC”). 42 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable (“Business Roundtable”) and Towers Watson (“Towers Watson”). 43 See letter from Business Roundtable. 44 See, e.g., letters from National Association of Corporate Directors (“NACD”), PGGM Investments (“PGGM”), Public Citizen (“Public Citizen”), and WorldatWork (“WorldatWork”). 45 See, e.g., letters from Boston Common Asset Management (“Boston Common”), First Affirmative Financial Network, LLC (“First Affirmative”), Glass Lewis & Co. (“Glass Lewis”), Social Investment Forum (“Social Investment”), and Walden Asset Management (“Walden”). 46 See, e.g., letters from International Corporate Governance Network (“ICGN”) and Teachers Insurance and Annuities Association of America and College Retirement Equities Fund (“TIAA-CREF”). 47 See, e.g., letter from Calvert Group, Ltd. (“Calvert”). 48 See, e.g., letters from Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (“Society of Corp. Sec.”) and Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (“Sullivan”). 49 See, e.g., letters from The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) and Pearl Meyer & Partners (“PM&P”). 50 See letter from Society of Corp. Sec. 51 See letter from Sullivan. Many commentators agreed with our proposed approach not to exempt smaller reporting companies from Rule 14a-21(a) and Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(1). 52 Some commentators did suggest that smaller reporting companies should be exempt from the say-on-pay vote 53 or required to conduct a say-on-pay vote on a triennial basis beginning in 2013. 54 52 See, e.g., letters from California Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”), Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”), Glass Lewis, ICGN, PGGM, and the State Board of Administration of Florida (“SBA of Florida”). 53 See, e.g., letters from NACD and UBC. 54 See letter from the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association (“ABA”). Some commentators suggested that we clarify the relationship between the federally created right and state law voting rights. 55 Most commentators, however, indicated there was no need for the Commission to adopt rules as to which shares are entitled to vote. 56 One commentator asserted that the issue as to which shares are entitled to vote is traditionally a state law matter that we do not need to address in our rulemaking. 57 55 See, e.g., letter from the ABA. 56 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable, FSR, Pfizer, PGGM, and Protective Life. 57 See letter from Business Roundtable. c. Final Rule After considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 14a-21(a) substantially as proposed with some modifications. Under the final rule, issuers will be required, not less frequently than once every three years, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote in proxy statements to approve the compensation of their named executive officers, as defined in Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K. Rule 14a-21(a) specifies that the separate shareholder vote on executive compensation is required only when proxies are solicited for an annual or other meeting of security holders for which our rules require the disclosure of executive compensation pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. We have modified the proposal to clarify in the rule that the shareholder vote on executive compensation required by Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(1) and Rule 14a-21(a) is required with respect to an annual meeting of shareholders at which proxies will be solicited for the election of directors, or a special meeting in lieu of such annual meeting. 58 In addition, we have modified the rule to clarify that a say-on-pay vote is required at least once every three calendar years. Commentators expressed the view that as proposed, the rule would have required a say-on-pay vote within three years of the date of the most recent say-on-pay vote, which in some cases could have required a say-on-pay vote more frequently than once every three calendar years. 59 58 See the discussion in Note 18 above. 59 See letter from ABA. As adopted, Rule 14a-21(a) requires a separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives for the first annual or other meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011, the first day after the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of enactment of the Act. In accordance with Section 14A(a)(1), shareholders would vote to approve the compensation of the issuer's named executive officers, as such compensation is disclosed pursuant to Item 402 60 of Regulation S-K, including the CD&A, the compensation tables and other narrative executive compensation disclosures required by Item 402. 61 We have included an instruction to Rule 14a-21 to specify that Rule 14a-21 does not change the scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies and that smaller reporting companies will not be required to provide a CD&A in order to comply with Rule 14a-21. We understand that smaller reporting companies may wish to include supplemental disclosure to facilitate shareholder understanding of their compensation arrangements in connection with say-on-pay votes. 62 We do not believe, however, that this possibility supports exempting smaller reporting companies from the say-on-pay votes. As more fully discussed in Section II.E below, in order to ease compliance burdens for smaller reporting companies, we are adopting a two-year temporary exemption before these companies are required to conduct a shareholder advisory vote to approve executive compensation to permit these companies additional time to prepare for the new shareholder advisory votes. 60 If disclosure of golden parachute compensation arrangements pursuant to Item 402(t) is included in an annual meeting proxy statement, such disclosure would be included in the disclosure subject to the shareholder advisory vote under Rule 14a-21(a). Such disclosure under Item 402(t), however, is not required to be included in all annual meeting proxy statements. 61 While not required, our rules “would not preclude an issuer from seeking more specific shareholder opinion through separate votes on cash compensation, golden parachute policy, severance or other aspects of compensation.” See Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs regarding The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. Rep. No. 111-176 at 133 (2010). 62 See letter from Society of Corp. Sec., which notes that smaller reporting companies may “feel compelled to include CD&A to provide additional disclosure so as to reduce the potential for an unfavorable shareholder vote.” As noted in the Proposing Release, consistent with Section 14A, the compensation of directors, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402(k) 63 or Item 402(r) 64 is not subject to the shareholder advisory vote. In addition, if an issuer includes disclosure pursuant to Item 402(s) 65 of Regulation S-K about the issuer's compensation policies and practices as they relate to risk management and risk-taking incentives, these policies and practices will not be subject to the shareholder advisory vote required by Section 14A(a)(1) as they relate to the issuer's compensation for employees generally. We note, however, that to the extent that risk considerations are a material aspect of the issuer's compensation policies or decisions for named executive officers, the issuer is required to discuss them as part of its CD&A, 66 and therefore such disclosure would be considered by shareholders when voting on executive compensation. 63 17 CFR 229.402(k). 64 17 CFR 229.402(r). 65 17 CFR 229.402(s). 66 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Release No. 33-9089 (Dec. 16, 2009) [74 FR 68334] at note 38. Though we have considered the views of commentators that prescribed language would be helpful, the final rule does not require issuers to use any specific language or form of resolution to be voted on by shareholders. This is consistent with the approach taken by the Commission in adopting Rule 14a-20 to implement the shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation for companies subject to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or EESA. We believe that issuers should retain flexibility to craft the resolution language. As we noted in the Proposing Release, however, the shareholder advisory vote must relate to all executive compensation disclosure disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. Section 14A(a)(1) of the Exchange Act requires that the shareholder advisory vote must be “to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed pursuant to [Item 402 of Regulation S-K] or any successor thereto.” 67 We have added an instruction to Rule 14a-21(a) to indicate that this language from Section 14A(a)(1) should be included in an issuer's resolution for the say-on-pay vote and to provide a non-exclusive example of a resolution that would satisfy the applicable requirements. 68 A vote to approve a proposal on a different subject matter, such as a vote to approve only compensation policies and procedures, would not satisfy the requirement of Section 14A(a)(1) or final Rule 14a-21(a). We note that issuers are not limited to the required shareholder advisory vote under Rule 14a-21(a) and may solicit shareholder votes on a range of compensation matters to obtain more specific feedback on the issuer's compensation policies and programs. 67 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(1). 68 Instruction to Rule 14a-21(a) provides the following non-exclusive example that would satisfy Rule 14a-21(a): “RESOLVED, that the compensation paid to the company's named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, compensation tables and narrative discussion, is hereby APPROVED.” 2. Item 24 to Schedule 14A We proposed a new Item 24 to Schedule 14A, to require disclosure in any proxy statement in which an issuer is providing a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation to briefly explain the general effect of the vote, such as whether the vote is non-binding. We are adopting this amendment to Schedule 14A as proposed with some modifications. a. Proposed Amendments Pursuant to proposed new Item 24 of Schedule 14A, issuers would be required to disclose in a proxy statement for an annual meeting (or other meeting of shareholders for which our rules require executive compensation disclosure) that they are providing a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation and to briefly explain the general effect of the vote, such as whether the vote is non-binding. 69 This was similar to the approach taken by the Commission in connection with disclosure requirements about the shareholder vote on executive compensation for companies subject to the EESA. 70 69 Section 14A(a) does not require additional disclosure with respect to the non-binding nature of the vote. We proposed to require additional disclosure so that information about the advisory nature of the vote is available to shareholders before they vote. We continue to believe this information should be available to shareholders. 70 See Item 20 of Schedule 14A; TARP Adopting Release, supra note 18, at 75 FR 2790. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Commentators were generally supportive of proposed Item 24 of Schedule 14A. We requested comment regarding whether any additional disclosures should be provided by issuers that would be useful to shareholders. Two commentators indicated that we should amend the proposal to require disclosure of the results of previous votes on executive compensation. 71 Another commentator suggested that we should remove the reference to the “general effect” of the vote as it would lead to boilerplate disclosure and remove the word “whether” from the rule given the non-binding nature of the vote. 72 71 See letters from ICGN and PGGM. 72 See letter from ABA. c. Final Rule After considering the comments, we are adopting Item 24 to Schedule 14A as proposed with some modifications. 73 Though we agree that the disclosure of previous results would be useful to shareholders, these results are required to be disclosed pursuant to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K immediately following the votes. Consequently, we do not believe it is necessary to mandate such disclosure in Item 24 of Schedule 14A. As discussed below, we have modified the proposal to require disclosure of the current frequency of say-on-pay votes and to require disclosure of when the next say-on-pay vote will occur. 73 See discussion of the modification to the proposed Item 24 relating to the frequency of say-on-pay votes below at Section II.B.2.c. Item 24 is consistent with the approach taken by the Commission in Item 20 of Schedule 14A in connection with disclosure requirements about the shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation for companies subject to EESA. Based on our experience with these votes, we believe that such requirements will lead to disclosure of useful information about the nature and effect of the vote for shareholders to consider, such as whether the vote is non-binding. We note that although not required, issuers may choose to provide additional disclosure in their proxy materials. 3. Amendments to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K Item 402 requires the disclosure of executive compensation and includes requirements prescribing narrative and tabular disclosure, as well as separate scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies. 74 Item 402(b) 75 contains the requirement for CD&A, which is intended to be a narrative overview that puts into context the executive compensation disclosure provided elsewhere in response to the requirements of Item 402. The CD&A disclosure requirement is principles-based, in that it identifies the disclosure concept and provides several non-exclusive examples. Under Item 402(b)(1), issuers must explain all material elements of their named executive officers' compensation by addressing mandatory principles-based topics in their CD&A. 76 Item 402(b)(2) of Regulation S-K sets forth certain non-exclusive examples of the kind of information that an issuer should address in its CD&A, depending upon the facts and circumstances. 74 Item 402 also includes requirements to disclose director compensation (Items 402(k) and 402(r)) and the issuer's compensation policies as they relate to risk management (Item 402(s)). 75 17 CFR 229.402(b). 76 These mandatory principles-based topics require the company to disclose the objectives of the company's compensation programs; what the compensation program is designed to reward; each element of compensation; why the company chooses to pay each element; how the company determines the amount (and, where applicable, the formula) for each element; and how each element and the company's decisions regarding that element fit into the company's overall compensation objectives and affect decisions regarding other elements. In connection with our implementation of Section 14A(a)(1), we proposed amendments to require disclosure in CD&A regarding how issuers have considered the results of previous say-on-pay votes required by Section 14A and Rule 14a-20. 77 After reviewing comments on this proposal, we are adopting amendments to Item 402(b)(1) as proposed, with some modifications in response to concerns raised by commentators. 77 17 CFR 240.14a-20. Pursuant to the EESA, issuers that have received financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, are required to conduct a separate annual shareholder vote to approve executive compensation during the period in which any obligation arising from the financial assistance provided under the TARP remains outstanding. a. Proposed Amendments We proposed to amend Item 402(b)(1) to add to the mandatory CD&A topics whether, and if so, how an issuer has considered the results of previous shareholder votes on executive compensation required by Section 14A or Rule 14a-20 in determining compensation policies and decisions and, if so, how that consideration has affected its compensation policies and decisions. We did not propose to add a specific requirement for smaller reporting companies to provide disclosure about how previous votes pursuant to Section 14A or Rule 14a-20 affected compensation policies and decisions because in our view such information would not be as valuable outside the context of a complete CD&A covering the full range of matters required to be addressed by Item 402(b), which smaller reporting companies are not required to provide. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were mixed. Several commentators expressed support for an amendment to Item 402(b)(1) to require that issuers discuss the results of the shareholder vote and its effect, if any, on executive compensation decisions and policies. 78 Many of these commentators agreed with the proposal that discussion of say-on-pay vote results in CD&A should be mandatory, 79 in some cases noting that this would provide shareholders a better understanding of how the board of directors considered the results of shareholder advisory votes 80 and encourage a dialogue between issuers and shareholders on the topic of compensation. 81 Commentators also indicated that a mandatory discussion of the consideration of say-on-pay votes will aid transparency of issuers' disclosures on compensation 82 and will help investors better understand compensation decisions made by issuers. 83 78 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, Calvert, CII, Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association (“COPERA”), ICGN, Meridian Compensation Partners (“Meridian”), PGGM, Pensions Investment Research Consultants (“PIRC”), SBA of Florida, Sullivan, and TIAA-CREF. 79 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, Calvert, CII, PGGM, PIRC, SBA of Florida, and TIAA-CREF. 80 See letter from CalPERS. 81 See letter from TIAA-CREF. 82 See letter from PIRC. 83 See letter from SBA of Florida. A number of commentators stated that it would be more appropriate instead to include consideration of say-on-pay votes among the non-exclusive examples of the kind of information that should be addressed in CD&A, only if material given the issuer's individual facts and circumstances 84 because this approach would avoid boilerplate disclosure and require discussion only when material, 85 and that discussion on a mandatory basis may lead to awkward and non-substantive disclosure if the issuer has not made changes to its compensation program in response to the shareholder vote. 86 84 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Boeing, Business Roundtable, Eaton Corporation (“Eaton”), FSR, PM&P, Sullivan, and UnitedHealth Group (“UnitedHealth”). 85 See, e.g., letter from UnitedHealth. 86 See letter from PM&P. Other commentators stated that no amendment to CD&A is required 87 because the Act does not require additional CD&A disclosure and it should not be required by rule, 88 the proposed amendment would add length to CD&A without providing meaningful information to shareholders, 89 and the amendment would deem the consideration of say-on-pay votes material whether such consideration is material or not. 90 Similarly a number of commentators who asserted that amending Item 402(b) is not required also expressed the view that if the Commission does adopt an amendment, such CD&A disclosure should be required only if material under the issuer's individual facts and circumstances. 91 87 See, e.g., letters from Center on Exec. Comp., Compensia, Davis Polk, Pfizer, Society of Corp. Sec., and UBC. 88 See, e.g., letter from Center on Exec. Comp. 89 See letter from Davis Polk. 90 See, e.g., letter from Society of Corp. Sec. 91 See, e.g., letters from Compensia, Davis Polk, and Society of Corp. Sec. Commentators also disagreed with respect to which say-on-pay votes should be covered by the CD&A discussion. Some favored only the most recent say-on-pay vote, 92 indicating that mandating discussion of prior votes would result in extraneous discussion 93 and little benefit. 94 Other commentators indicated that prior votes should also be required to be addressed. 95 These commentators noted that such disclosure of prior votes is appropriate given the long-term process of determining compensation 96 and that it would permit investors to evaluate any trends in the results of say-on-pay votes. 97 One commentator stated that if CD&A disclosure with respect to say-on-pay votes is mandatory, it should be limited to the most recent vote, but if not mandatory should not be so limited. 98 Although there was little response to our request for comment regarding whether smaller reporting companies should be required to disclose their consideration of shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation, one commentator stated that our existing disclosure requirements for these companies are sufficient. 99 92 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Boeing, Eaton, FSR, McGuireWoods (“McGuireWoods”), Meridian, NACD, Pfizer, Protective Life, and Sullivan. 93 See letter from Sullivan. 94 See letter from McGuireWoods. 95 See, e.g., letters from Chris Barnard (“Barnard”), Calvert, PGGM, PIRC, PM&P, and SBA of Florida. 96 See, e.g., letter from PGGM. 97 See, e.g., letter from SBA of Florida. 98 See letter from Boeing. 99 See letter from ICGN. c. Final Rule After considering the comments, we are adopting amendments to the disclosure requirements of Item 402(b)(1) substantially as proposed, with a modification to clarify that this mandatory topic relates to the issuer's consideration of the most recent say-on-pay vote. As discussed below, issuers should address their consideration of the results of earlier say-on-pay votes, to the extent material. The final rule amends Item 402(b)(1) to require issuers to address in CD&A whether and, if so, how their compensation policies and decisions have taken into account the results of the most recent shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation. Although it is not mandated by Section 951 of the Act, we continue to believe that including this mandatory topic in CD&A will facilitate better investor understanding of issuers' compensation decisions. Because the shareholder advisory vote will apply to all issuers, we view information about how issuers have responded to such votes as more in the nature of a mandatory principles-based topic than an example. The manner in which individual issuers may respond to such votes in determining executive compensation policies and decisions will likely vary depending upon facts and circumstances. We expect that this variation will be reflected in the CD&A disclosures. Following consideration of the comments received, we have decided to limit the mandatory topic to whether, and if so, how the issuer has considered the results of the most recent say-on-pay vote in determining compensation policies and decisions, and if so, how that consideration has affected the issuer's executive compensation policies and decisions. 100 This modification reflects that, in making voting and investment decisions, shareholders will benefit from understanding what consideration the issuer has given to the most recent say-on-pay vote. Limiting the mandatory topic to the most recent shareholder vote should also focus the disclosure so there should not be lengthy boilerplate discussions of all previous votes. Although we have added issuer consideration of the most recent say-on-pay vote to the mandatory topics, we believe that, consistent with the principles-based nature of CD&A, issuers should address their consideration of the results of earlier say-on-pay votes to the extent such consideration is material to the compensation policies and decisions discussed. 100 Reporting companies are currently required to disclose, pursuant to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K [17 CFR 249.208a], the preliminary results of a shareholder vote within four business days after the end of the meeting at which the vote is held and final voting results within four business days after the final voting results are known. We are adopting amendments to require additional disclosure on Form 8-K regarding the company's determination of the frequency of say-on-pay votes. See Section II.B.5 below. Because companies with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP will continue to have an annual say-on-pay vote until they repay all such indebtedness, these votes should be addressed by issuers in CD&A as well. To reflect our treatment of companies subject to EESA with outstanding obligations under TARP, we have also modified the amendment to Item 402(b)(1) as adopted to address issuer consideration of the results of the most recent shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation required by Section 14A or Rule 14a-20. This reflects that the vote required pursuant to the EESA and 14a-20 is effectively the same vote that would be required under Section 14A(a)(1). 101 101 The treatment of companies subject to EESA with outstanding obligations under TARP is discussed in Section II.C.3 below. Smaller reporting companies are subject to scaled disclosure requirements in Item 402 of Regulation S-K and are not required to include a CD&A. We are not adding a specific requirement for smaller reporting companies to provide disclosure about how previous votes pursuant to Section 14A affected compensation policies and decisions because we believe such information would not be as valuable outside the context of a complete CD&A covering the full range of matters required to be addressed by Item 402(b). However, we note that pursuant to Item 402(o) of Regulation S-K, 102 smaller reporting companies are required to provide a narrative description of any material factors necessary to an understanding of the information disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table. If consideration of prior say-on-pay votes is such a factor for a particular issuer, disclosure would be required pursuant to Item 402(o). 102 17 CFR 229.402(o). B. Shareholder Approval of the Frequency of Shareholder Votes on Executive Compensation 1. Rule 14a-21(b) We proposed Rule 14a-21(b) pursuant to which issuers would be required, not less frequently than once every six years, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote in proxy statements to determine the frequency of the shareholder vote on the compensation of executives required by Section 14A(a)(1). We are adopting this amendment substantially as proposed with slight modifications in response to comments. a. Proposed Rule Under proposed Rule 14a-21(b), issuers would be required, not less frequently than once every six years, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote in proxy statements for annual meetings to determine whether the shareholder vote on the compensation of executives required by Section 14A(a)(1) “will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.” 103 As proposed, Rule 14a-21(b) would also clarify that the separate shareholder vote on the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation would be required only in a proxy statement for an annual or other meeting of shareholders for which our rules require compensation disclosure. Consistent with Section 14A, issuers would be required to provide the separate shareholder vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote for the first annual or other such meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011. 103 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2). b. Comments on the Proposed Rule Comments on the proposal were generally favorable. Many commentators agreed that the rule did not need to specify the required language to be used for the shareholder vote on the frequency of shareholder votes to approve executive compensation. 104 Some commentators, however, recommended that the Commission should specify language or provide non-exclusive examples of resolutions so issuers would know how the requirement may be satisfied. 105 A number of commentators also requested that the Commission clarify whether the vote should be presented in the form of a resolution given that shareholders will have a choice among three frequencies or abstaining from the frequency vote. 106 Although some commentators suggested that we specify which shares are entitled to vote in the shareholder vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, 107 most commentators indicated there was no need for the Commission to address this question. 108 104 See, e.g., letters from AFSCME, Business Roundtable, FSR, Protective Life, and Towers Watson. 105 See, e.g., letters from Boeing, Pfizer, PGGM, Society of Corp. Sec., and Sullivan. 106 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Pfizer, Society of Corp. Sec., and Sullivan. 107 See, e.g., letter from the ABA. 108 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable, FSR, Pfizer, PGGM, and Protective Life. We also requested comment regarding whether a new issuer should be permitted to disclose the frequency of its say-on-pay votes in the registration statement for its initial public offering and be exempted from conducting say-on-pay votes and frequency votes at its annual meetings until the annual meeting for the year disclosed in its registration statement. Most commentators indicated that newly public companies should not be exempt from the say-on-pay and frequency votes and should be required to conduct say-on-pay and frequency votes at their first annual shareholders meeting after the initial public offering. 109 However, some commentators expressed support for such an exemption as it would provide these issuers additional time to formulate their compensation policies as a public company before conducting the shareholder votes required by Section 14A. 110 109 See, e.g., letters from AFSCME, CII, CalPERS, ICGN, Georg Merkl (“Merkl”), Public Citizen, and RAILPEN Investments and Universities Superannuation Scheme (“RAILPEN & USS”). 110 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Compensia, Davis Polk, NACD, and Sullivan. c. Final Rule After reviewing and considering the comments, we are adopting Rule 14a-21(b) as proposed with slight modifications to clarify that the frequency vote is required at least once during the six calendar years following the prior frequency vote. 111 Under Rule 14a-21(b), issuers will be required, not less frequently than once every six calendar years, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote in proxy statements for annual meetings to determine whether the shareholder vote on the compensation of executives required by Section 14A(a)(1) “will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.” 112 After considering and reviewing comments on the proposed rule, we do not believe it is necessary to provide a form of resolution for the vote required by Rule 14a-21(b). In response to concerns raised by commentators and discussed below, we are also adopting a temporary exemption under which smaller reporting companies will not be required to conduct a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes until meetings on or after January 21, 2013. 113 111 As proposed, Rule 14a-21(b) would have required a frequency vote within the six-year period from the date of the most recent frequency vote. 112 Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2). 113 See discussion in Section II.E below. Rule 14a-21(b) will also clarify that the separate shareholder vote on the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation will be required only in a proxy statement for an annual or other meeting of shareholders at which directors will be elected and that such vote is required only once every six calendar years. Under Rule 14a-21(b), issuers will be required to provide the separate shareholder vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote for the first annual or other such meeting of shareholders occurring on or after January 21, 2011. After reviewing the comment letters, we continue to believe that the say-on-pay vote and the frequency vote should be required of newly public companies in the proxy statement for such company's first annual meeting after the initial public offering. This will give shareholders the opportunity to express a view on these matters while the company is in the process of establishing policies that will apply as a public company and could benefit from understanding its shareholders' point of view. 2. Item 24 of Schedule 14A In order to implement the requirements of Section 14A(a), we proposed new Item 24 to Schedule 14A, to briefly explain the general effect of the frequency vote, such as whether the vote is non-binding. We are adopting this amendment to Schedule 14A as proposed with a modification. a. Proposed Amendments In addition to disclosure regarding the vote on executive compensation, we proposed that issuers would be required to disclose in the proxy statement that they are providing a separate shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of the shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation. Proposed Item 24 of Schedule 14A would also require issuers to briefly explain the general effect of this vote, such as whether the vote is non-binding. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Commentators generally supported proposed Item 24 of Schedule 14A as it relates to the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 114 One commentator expressed the view that the proposed amendment is not needed as it will lead to boilerplate disclosure. 115 Some commentators also suggested that issuers should be required to disclose the current frequency of say-on-pay votes. 116 114 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, ICGN, PGGM, and Protective Life. 115 See letter from Society of Corp. Sec. 116 See, e.g., letters from ICGN and TIAA-CREF. c. Final Rule After reviewing and considering the comments, we are adopting Item 24 of Schedule 14A as proposed with a modification. Issuers will be required to disclose in the proxy statement that they are providing a separate shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. Item 24 of Schedule 14A will also require issuers to briefly explain the general effect of this vote, such as whether the vote is non-binding. 117 As noted above, this is similar to the approach taken by the Commission in connection with disclosure requirements about the shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation for companies subject to EESA. 118 Based on our experience with these votes, we believe that such requirements will lead to useful disclosure of information about the nature and effect of the vote for shareholders to consider, such as whether the vote is non-binding. 117 As discussed in Section II.A.2.a, Section 14A(a) does not require additional disclosure with respect to the non-binding nature of the vote. We are requiring additional disclosure so that information about the advisory nature of the vote is available to shareholders before they vote. 118 See Section II.A.2.a, above. After reviewing comments, we are also adding a requirement to Item 24 for issuers to provide disclosure of the current frequency of say-on-pay votes and when the next scheduled say-on-pay vote will occur, 119 in their proxy materials. We believe this will provide useful information to shareholders about upcoming say-on-pay and frequency shareholder advisory votes. 119 Issuers should disclose the current frequency as determined by the board following a shareholder advisory vote. We would not expect disclosure of either the current frequency or when the next scheduled say-on-pay vote will occur in proxy materials for the meeting where an issuer initially conducts the say-on-pay and frequency votes. 3. Amendment to Rule 14a-4 In order to implement the requirements of Section 14A(a)(2), we also proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4. After considering comments, we are adopting the amendments to Rule 14a-4 as proposed, with slight modification. a. Proposed Amendments As noted in the Proposing Release, Section 14A(a)(2) requires a shareholder advisory vote on whether say-on-pay votes will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years. Thus, shareholders must be given four choices: Whether the shareholder vote on executive compensation will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years, or to abstain from voting on the matter. In our view, Section 14A(a)(2) does not allow for alternative formulations of the shareholder vote, such as proposals that would provide shareholders with two substantive choices ( e.g., to hold a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation every year or less frequently), or only one choice ( e.g., a company proposal to hold shareholder votes every two years). We noted in the Proposing Release that we would expect that the board of directors will include a recommendation as to how shareholders should vote on the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation. 120 However, the issuer must make clear in these circumstances that the proxy card provides for four choices (every 1, 2, or 3 years, or abstain) and that shareholders are not voting to approve or disapprove the issuer's recommendation. Accordingly, we proposed amendments to our proxy rules to reflect the statutory requirement that shareholders must be provided the opportunity to cast an advisory vote on whether the shareholder vote on executive compensation required by Section 14A(a)(1) of the Exchange Act will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years, or to abstain from voting on the matter. 121 120 See Section II.B.3 of the Proposing Release. 121 Because the shareholder vote on the frequency of voting on executive compensation is advisory, we do not believe that it is necessary to prescribe a standard for determining which frequency has been “adopted” by the shareholders. Specifically, we proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 under the Exchange Act, which provides requirements as to the form of proxy that issuers are required to include with their proxy materials, to require that issuers present four choices to their shareholders. Absent amendment, Rule 14a-4 requires the form of proxy to provide means whereby the person solicited is afforded an opportunity to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval of, or abstention with respect to each separate matter to be acted upon, other than elections to office. 122 We proposed amendments to revise this standard to permit proxy cards to reflect the choice of 1, 2, or 3 years, or abstain, for these votes. 122 Rule 14a-4(b)(1). b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were generally favorable. Many commentators expressed support for the proposed approach where shareholders are given four choices on the frequency vote. 123 Some commentators suggested alternative approaches including a vote where shareholders would rank each choice of frequency or vote separately for each of 1, 2, and 3 years, 124 a vote where management would choose 1, 2, or 3 years as the frequency and ask shareholders to approve or disapprove its choice, 125 and a two-step approach whereby shareholders would first vote whether or not they have a preference as to the frequency of say-on-pay votes and, if they do have a preference, subsequently vote on whether such votes should be conducted every 1, 2, or 3 years. 126 123 See, e.g., letters from Calvert, COPERA, ICGN, Meridian, Merkl, PGGM, and Protective Life. 124 See letter from Keith P. Bishop (“Bishop”). 125 See letter from UBC. 126 See letter from Society of Corp. Sec. In addition, we requested comment in the Proposing Release as to whether issuers, brokers, transfer agents, and data processing firms would be able to accommodate the four choices for a single line item on the proxy card. Commentators indicated that they would be ready for the vote with four choices on the proxy card by January 21, 2011. 127 One commentator recommended that we clarify that issuers may vote uninstructed shares in accordance with management's recommendations so long as they follow the requirements of Rule 14a-4, 128 while another suggested that the Commission extend the transition guidance permitting the presentation of three choices for the frequency vote for the entire 2011 proxy season and perhaps require the three-choice approach for all issuers for 2011 to allow for uniformity among different issuers. 129 127 See, e.g., letters from Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) and Proxytrust (“Proxytrust”). 128 See letter from Sullivan. 129 See letter from ABA. For a discussion of transition matters, see Section II.F below. c. Final Rule After considering the comments, we are adopting the rule substantially as proposed with some modifications. Specifically, we are adopting amendments to Rule 14a-4 under the Exchange Act, which provides requirements as to the form of proxy that issuers are required to include with their proxy materials, to require that issuers present four choices to their shareholders. Under existing Rule 14a-4, the form of proxy is required to provide means whereby the person solicited is afforded an opportunity to specify by boxes a choice between approval or disapproval of, or abstention with respect to each separate matter to be acted upon, other than elections to office. Absent an amendment, Rule 14a-4 would not permit proxy cards to reflect the choice of 1, 2, or 3 years, or abstain. The amendments revise the rule to permit proxy cards to reflect the choice of 1, 2, or 3 years, or abstain, for the frequency vote. In response to comment, we note that issuers may vote uninstructed proxy cards in accordance with management's recommendation for the frequency vote only if the issuer follows the existing requirements of Rule 14a-4 to (1) include a recommendation for the frequency of say-on-pay votes in the proxy statement, (2) permit abstention on the proxy card, and (3) include language regarding how uninstructed shares will be voted in bold on the proxy card. 4. Amendment to Rule 14a-8 In connection with implementing the requirements of Section 14A(a)(2), we also proposed a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) relating to shareholder proposals. After considering the comments, we are adopting the amendment to Rule 14a-8 with some modifications. a. Proposed Amendments Our proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act would add a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) to clarify the status of shareholder proposals that seek an advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation or that relate to the frequency of shareholder votes approving executive compensation. Rule 14a-8 provides eligible shareholders with an opportunity to include a proposal in an issuer's proxy materials for a vote at an annual or special meeting of shareholders. An issuer generally is required to include the proposal unless the shareholder has not complied with the rule's procedural requirements or the proposal falls within one of the rule's 13 substantive bases for exclusion. 130 One of the substantive bases for exclusion, Rule 14a-8(i)(10), provides that an issuer may exclude a shareholder proposal that has already been substantially implemented. 130 These substantive bases for exclusion are set forth in Rule 14a-8(i). We proposed adding a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) to permit the exclusion of a shareholder proposal that would provide a say-on-pay vote or seeks future say-on-pay votes or that relates to the frequency of say-on-pay votes, provided the issuer has adopted a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that is consistent with the plurality of votes cast in the most recent vote in accordance with Rule 14a-21(b). As noted in Section I above, a “say-on-pay” vote is defined as a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K, or any successor to Item 402. As proposed, an issuer would be permitted to exclude shareholder proposals that propose a vote on the approval of executive compensation as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K or on the frequency of such votes, including those drafted as requests to amend the issuer's governing documents, so long as the issuer has adopted a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that is consistent with the plurality of votes cast in the most recent vote required by Rule 14a-21(b) and provides a vote on frequency at least as often as required by Section 14A(a)(2). b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were mixed. Many commentators supported the proposed amendment to permit exclusion of shareholder proposals on frequency and say-on-pay, 131 stating that the amendment would eliminate redundancy and reduce administrative burdens and costs. 132 Other commentators disagreed with the general approach, 133 stating that they believe it would be unwise as a matter of public policy and would inappropriately interpret substantial implementation because the note would permit exclusion of proposals requesting a frequency that the issuer has not implemented. 134 Other commentators asserted that an amendment is not required because issuers should be permitted to exclude any shareholder proposals on frequency as long as the issuer complies with Section 14A(a)(2). 135 Some commentators suggested that we should also permit issuers to exclude shareholder proposals on the frequency of say-on-pay votes when they adopt a policy to hold say-on-pay votes more frequently than the frequency that is consistent with the plurality of votes cast in the most recent shareholder vote 136 to prevent issuers being penalized for providing shareholders with more frequent say-on-pay votes. 137 Other commentators felt that issuers should not be required to adopt a particular policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes in order to be permitted to exclude shareholder proposals on executive compensation, 138 noting that an issuer should be permitted to exclude shareholder proposals on frequency so long as the issuer provides a reasonable basis for the frequency chosen to prevent an annual re-visiting of the frequency vote by shareholders. 139 131 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Business Roundtable, Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“CCMC”), Eaton, FSR, ICGN, Pfizer, PGGM, and Protective Life. 132 See, e.g., letter from Business Roundtable. 133 See, e.g., letters from AFSCME, Calvert, Center on Exec. Comp., CII, Public Citizen, and UBC. 134 See, e.g., letter from AFSCME. 135 See letter from UBC. 136 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Davis Polk, Meridian, Society of Corp. Sec., and Sullivan. 137 See letter from Sullivan. 138 See, e.g., letters from Boeing and Center on Exec. Comp. 139 See letter from Boeing. In addition, some commentators stated that the proposed note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) should incorporate a majority standard rather than the proposed plurality standard, so that issuers would need to adopt a policy consistent with the majority of votes cast in order to exclude a shareholder proposal as substantially implemented, 140 noting that the majority standard would be consistent with policies that boards should implement actions recommended by majority shareholder vote. 141 Some commentators also recommended that issuers should be permitted to exclude shareholder proposals for votes on executive compensation that are narrower in scope 142 than the say-on-pay vote required under Rule 14a-21(a). 143 These commentators expressed the concern that shareholders could undermine the non-binding nature of the frequency vote through more specific vote proposals. 144 140 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, CII, and SBA of Florida. 141 See letter from CII. 142 An example would be a shareholder proposal for an advisory vote on the Chief Executive Officer's compensation as disclosed under Item 402 of Regulation S-K. 143 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable, Boeing, CCMC, Davis Polk, Pfizer, and Society of Corp. Sec. 144 See letter from Boeing. Finally, some commentators indicated that it would be inappropriate to permit companies to exclude shareholder proposals on frequency if there have been material changes in the company's compensation program since the prior frequency vote 145 because shareholders should be permitted the opportunity to revisit their decision on the frequency vote under such circumstances. 146 Other commentators noted that material changes to an issuer's compensation program should not limit the availability of Rule 14a-8(i)(10) because shareholders will understand that a company's compensation program is dynamic and factor this into their frequency voting decisions. 147 These commentators noted that the difficulty in determining whether changes are material would erode the benefit of the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10), create uncertainty as to a company's ability to exclude shareholder proposals on frequency, 148 and burden the staff with analyzing materiality on a case-by-case basis. 149 145 See, e.g., letters from Boston Common, Calvert, First Affirmative, ICGN, PIRC, PGGM, RAILPEN & USS, Social Investment, and Walden. 146 See letter from RAILPEN & USS. 147 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Boeing, Frederic W. Cook & Co., Inc. (“Frederic Cook”), McGuireWoods, Pfizer, PM&P, and Protective Life. 148 See letter from McGuireWoods. 149 See letter from Frederic Cook. c. Final Rule After reviewing the comments, we are adopting the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) with some modifications. We continue to believe that under certain conditions, an issuer should be permitted to exclude subsequent shareholder proposals that seek a vote on the same matters as the shareholder advisory votes on say-on-pay and frequency required by Section 14A(a). Consequently, consistent with the proposal, we are adding a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) to permit the exclusion of a shareholder proposal that would provide a say-on-pay vote, seeks future say-on-pay votes, or relates to the frequency of say-on-pay votes in certain circumstances; however, in response to comments, 150 we are changing the threshold for exclusion from a plurality to a majority. Specifically, as adopted, the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) will permit exclusion of such a shareholder proposal if, in the most recent shareholder vote on frequency of say-on-pay votes, a single frequency ( i.e., one, two or three years) received the support of a majority of the votes cast and the issuer has adopted a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that is consistent with that choice. 151 150 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, CII, and SBA of Florida. 151 For purposes of this analysis, an abstention would not count as a vote cast. We are prescribing this voting standard solely for purposes of determining the scope of the exclusion under the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10), and not for the purpose of determining whether a particular voting frequency should be considered to have been adopted or approved by shareholder vote as a matter of state law. In light of the nature of the vote—with three substantive choices—it is possible that no single choice will receive a majority of votes and that, as a result, there may be issuers that may not be able to exclude subsequent shareholder proposals regarding say-on-pay matters even if they adopt a policy on frequency that is consistent with plurality of votes cast. We also recognize, however, that if no single frequency choice receives the support of a majority of votes cast, the choice preferred by the plurality may not represent the choice preferred by most of the company's shareholders. For example, if 30% of votes support annual voting, 30% support biennial voting, and 40% favor triennial voting, no frequency would have received a majority of votes cast; therefore, it is not clear that implementing the plurality choice would be favored by most of the company's shareholders. In that situation, if the company implemented triennial voting and the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) allowed exclusion of shareholder proposals seeking a different frequency, this could prevent shareholders from putting forth proposals that seek to request that the company implement a frequency that would be preferred by a majority of shareholders. After considering commentators' views, we are concerned that this approach would inappropriately restrict shareholder proposals on this topic, particularly in light of Section 14A(c)(4)'s directive that the shareholder advisory votes required by Sections 14A(a) and (b) may not be construed “to restrict or limit the ability of shareholders to make proposals for inclusion in proxy materials related to executive compensation.” On the other hand, if a majority of votes cast favors a given frequency and the issuer adopts a policy on frequency that is consistent with the choice of the majority of votes, then in our view, as a matter of policy it is appropriate for Rule 14a-8 to provide for exclusion of subsequent shareholder proposals that would provide a say-on-pay vote, seek future say-on-pay votes, or relate to the frequency of say-on-pay votes. We believe that, in these circumstances, additional shareholder proposals on frequency generally would unnecessarily burden the company and its shareholders given the company's adherence to the view favored by a majority of shareholder votes regarding the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 152 As described above, an issuer would not be permitted to exclude such shareholder proposals under the note if no frequency choice received a majority of the votes cast. 152 We recognize that this approach is different from the traditional “substantially implemented” standard in Rule 14a-8(i)(10) since the frequency sought by a shareholder would be different from the frequency the issuer has implemented. We have revised the note to avoid confusion in that regard. A shareholder proposal seeking a frequency that is the same as that provided by the company would be excludable under the traditional “substantially implemented” standards in Rule 14a-8(i)(10) without regard to the new note, assuming there are no other differences that would lead to a different result. As a result of this amendment, an issuer will be permitted to exclude shareholder proposals that propose a vote on the frequency of such votes, 153 including those drafted as requests to amend the issuer's governing documents. For example, if in the first vote under Rule 14a-21(b) a majority of votes were cast for a two-year frequency for future shareholder votes on executive compensation, and the issuer adopts a policy to hold the vote every two years, a shareholder proposal seeking a different frequency could be excluded so long as the issuer seeks votes on executive compensation every two years. 154 153 No-action requests to exclude shareholder proposals that seek shareholder advisory votes on different aspects of executive compensation will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the staff. 154 Issuers seeking to exclude a shareholder proposal under the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) are required to follow the same shareholder proposal process with the staff of the Commission as would be required if the issuer intended to rely on any other substantive basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8. We also believe that a shareholder proposal that would provide an advisory vote or seek future advisory votes on executive compensation with substantially the same scope as the say-on-pay vote required by Rule 14a-21(a)—the approval of executive compensation as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K—should also be subject to exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(10) if the issuer adopts a policy on frequency that is consistent with the majority of votes cast. This is consistent with the proposal, although like additional frequency votes, the note to Rule 14a-8(i)(10) would condition exclusion on the company implementing the frequency favored by a majority of shareholders. In this circumstance, shareholders would be provided the opportunity to provide say-on-pay votes on the frequency preferred by a majority of shareholders when last polled, and we believe additional proposals on the same matter would impose unnecessary burdens on companies and shareholders. We are also modifying the note slightly. To avoid confusion, we are removing the requirement that an issuer must provide “a vote on frequency at least as often as required by Section 14A(a)(2).” We believe this language is not necessary as issuers are already required to comply with Section 14A(a)(2) in any event. In addition, we are removing the language “as substantially implemented” from the note to avoid confusion. 5. Amendment to Form 8-K We also proposed amendments to Form 10-Q and Form 10-K to require additional disclosure regarding the issuer's decision to adopt a policy on the frequency of say-on-pay votes following a shareholder advisory vote on frequency. After considering the comments, we are not adopting amendments to Form 10-Q and Form 10-K. Instead, we are adopting a new Form 8-K Item to require disclosure of the issuer's decision on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. a. Proposed Amendments Issuers are currently required to disclose the preliminary results of shareholder votes pursuant to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K within four business days following the day the shareholder meeting ends and final voting results within four business days of when they are known. This item will require issuers to report how shareholders voted in the say-on-pay vote and the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation. We proposed amendments to Form 10-K and Form 10-Q to require additional disclosure regarding the issuer's decision in light of such vote as to how frequently the company will include those say-on-pay votes for the six subsequent years. Our proposed amendments to Item 9B of Form 10-K and new Item 5(c) of Part II of Form 10-Q would have required an issuer to disclose this decision in the Form 10-Q covering the quarterly period during which the shareholder advisory vote occurs, or in the Form 10-K if the shareholder advisory vote occurs during the issuer's fourth quarter. In light of the relevance of this decision to potential shareholder proposals on the topic, we proposed this disclosure to notify shareholders on a timely basis about the issuer's decision on how frequently it will provide the say-on-pay vote to shareholders. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were mixed. A number of commentators supported the amendments as proposed that would require disclosure of an issuer's decision as to the frequency of say-on-pay votes in the Form 10-Q or Form 10-K for the period during which the advisory vote occurs 155 as the requirement would allow shareholders to readily obtain an issuer's decision on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 156 Some commentators questioned whether the Commission should require such disclosure of an issuer's determination regarding frequency following the results of a shareholder advisory vote at all, 157 given that the shareholder vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes is only advisory. 158 Other commentators suggested that we should allow issuers additional time to consider the results of the shareholder vote 159 and to contact shareholders for additional feedback, 160 particularly if the shareholders do not express a clear preference on frequency. These commentators recommended that we instead require that disclosure about the issuer's decision be included in a later Form 10-Q or Form 10-K filing, 161 Form 8-K filing, 162 or on the issuer's Web site. 163 These commentators indicated that a requirement for a later filing would still permit shareholders adequate time to submit a shareholder proposal on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 164 155 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, ICGN, Meridian, PGGM, and SBA of Florida. 156 See letter from SBA of Florida. 157 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable, Boeing, Center on Exec. Comp., CCMC, FSR, and Society of Corp. Sec. 158 See, e.g., letter from Society of Corp. Sec. 159 See, e.g., letters from Compensia, Davis Polk, Eaton, Frederic Cook, PM&P, and Protective Life. 160 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Boeing, TIAA-CREF, and Time Warner Inc. (“Time Warner”). 161 See, e.g., letters from Eaton, Frederic Cook, Compensia, and PM&P. 162 See, e.g., letters from ABA and Davis Polk. 163 See letter from Business Roundtable. 164 See letter from ABA. Commentators also noted that Item 5.07 of Form 8-K currently requires disclosure of the number of votes cast “for, against or withheld” on matters submitted to a vote of shareholders, but that the item would not permit disclosure of the results of the frequency vote for “1 year, 2 years, 3 years, or abstain.” 165 These commentators suggested that we amend Item 5.07 of Form 8-K to facilitate reporting the results of the frequency vote. 166 165 See, e.g., letter from Davis Polk. 166 See letter from PIRC. c. Final Rule After reviewing the comments on this issue, we have concluded that disclosure of the issuer's determination regarding frequency of say-on-pay votes should be required, but we are adopting the disclosure requirement through an amendment to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K in lieu of amendments to Form 10-Q and Form 10-K. We have considered the position of commentators who were concerned that the required timing of disclosure under our proposal would not permit sufficient time for issuers to fully consider the results of the vote, including through board deliberations and consultation with shareholders as described above, before the disclosure of the decision is required. 167 In light of this concern, we are adopting this disclosure requirement as a Form 8-K requirement due at a later date, in lieu of amending Form 10-Q and Form 10-K, to give issuers additional time to make their decisions. 167 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Boeing, Compensia, Davis Polk, Eaton, Frederic Cook, PM&P, Protective Life, TIAA-CREF, and Time Warner. Under our final rule, Item 5.07 of Form 8-K requires an issuer to disclose its decision regarding how frequently it will conduct shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation following each shareholder vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes. To comply, an issuer will file an amendment to its prior Form 8-K filings under Item 5.07 that disclose the preliminary and final results of the shareholder vote on frequency. This amended Form 8-K will be due no later than 150 calendar days after the date of the end of the annual or other meeting in which the vote required by Rule 14a-21(b) took place, but in no event later than 60 calendar days prior to the deadline for the submission of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 for the subsequent annual meeting, as disclosed in the issuer's proxy materials for the meeting at which the frequency vote occurred. 168 In the amended Item 5.07 Form 8-K, the issuer must disclose its determination regarding the frequency of say-on-pay votes. 169 168 Item 5.07 is not among the list of items subject to the safe harbor from liability in Rules 13a-11 [17 CFR 240.13a-11] and 15d-11 [17 CFR 240.15d-11] under the Exchange Act. In addition, companies that fail to file a timely report required by Item 5.07 will lose their eligibility to file Form S-3 registration statements. We are not making a change to this as a result of our amendments to Item 5.07. We continue to believe that Item 5.07 does not require management to make rapid materiality and similar judgments within the compressed Form 8-K timeframe. See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date , Release No. 33-8400 (Mar. 16, 2004) [69 FR 15594] at Section II.E and Proxy Disclosure Enhancements , Release No. 33-9089 (Dec. 16, 2009) [74 FR 68334] at Section II.E. 169 Item 5.07(d) of Form 8-K. We believe the time period specified for filing the amended Item 5.07 Form 8-K should address commentators' requests that we revise the proposal to allow companies additional time to carefully consider the results of the frequency vote, including through board and committee deliberations and discussions with shareholders, before disclosure of the decision is required. 170 It also should provide enough time for shareholders to consider whether to submit a shareholder proposal on say-on-pay votes or on the frequency of say-on-pay votes once the disclosure is provided. 170 In this regard, we note the recent guidance provided by the Division of Corporation Finance that Regulation FD [17 CFR 243.100 et seq. ] does not prohibit directors from speaking privately with a shareholder or group of shareholders as described in that guidance. See Regulation FD CDIs, Question 101.11. In addition, in response to comment, 171 we are adopting a technical amendment to Item 5.07(b) of Form 8-K to facilitate reporting of shareholder votes on frequency. Item 5.07 of Form 8-K generally requires an issuer to “state the number of votes cast for, against, or withheld, as well as the number of abstentions and broker non-votes as to each such matter * * *.” The amendments we adopt today will clarify that, with respect to the vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, the issuer will be required to disclose the number of votes cast for each of 1 year, 2, years, and 3 years, as well as the number of abstentions. 172 171 See, e.g., letters from Davis Polk and PIRC. 172 We are adopting a conforming technical change to Instruction 1 to Item 5.07 to carve out Item 5.07(d) from the four-business day period for reporting the event. See Instruction 1 to Item 5.07 of Form 8-K. 6. Effect of Shareholder Vote Although the language in Section 951 of the Act indicates that the separate resolution subject to shareholder vote is “to determine” the frequency of the shareholder vote on executive compensation, in light of new Section 14A(c) of the Exchange Act, we continue to believe this shareholder vote, and all shareholder votes required by Section 951 of the Act, are intended to be non-binding on the issuer or the issuer's board of directors. New Section 14A(c) states that the shareholder votes referred to in Section 14A(a) and Section 14A(b) (which includes all votes under Section 951 of the Act) “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer.” 173 Though we received a comment letter asserting that the shareholder vote on frequency is binding, 174 in our view the plain language of Exchange Act Section 14A(c) indicates that this vote is advisory. Accordingly, we are adopting new Item 24 of Schedule 14A to include language to require disclosure regarding the general effect of the shareholder advisory votes, such as whether the vote is non-binding. 175 173 Exchange Act Section 14A(c). 174 See letter from Merkl. 175 Even though each of the shareholder advisory votes required by Section 14A is non-binding pursuant to the rule of construction in Section 14A(c), as we noted in Note 69 of the Proposing Release, we believe these votes could play a role in an issuer's executive compensation decisions. C. Issues Relating to Both Shareholder Votes Required by Section 14A(a) 1. Amendments to Rule 14a-6 We proposed amendments to Rule 14a-6 to add the say-on-pay and frequency of say-on-pay votes to the list of items that do not require the filing of proxy materials in preliminary form. After considering comments, we are adopting the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-6, with some modification. a. Proposed Amendments Rule 14a-6(a) generally requires issuers to file proxy statements in preliminary form at least ten calendar days before definitive proxy materials are first sent to shareholders, unless the items included for a shareholder vote in the proxy statement are limited to specified matters. During the time before final proxy materials are filed, our staff has the opportunity to comment on the disclosures and issuers are able to incorporate the staff's comments in their final proxy materials. Absent an amendment to Rule 14a-6(a), a proxy statement that includes a solicitation for either the shareholder vote on the approval of executive compensation or the approval of the frequency of the votes approving executive compensation required by Sections 14A(a)(1) and 14A(a)(2) would need to be filed in preliminary form. Because the shareholder vote on executive compensation and the shareholder vote on the frequency of such shareholder votes are required for all issuers, we view them as similar to the other items specified in Rule 14a-6(a) that do not require a preliminary filing. In the Proposing Release, we noted our view that a preliminary filing requirement for the shareholder votes on executive compensation and the frequency of such votes would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and preparation and processing costs associated with the filing and processing of proxy material that would unlikely be selected for review in preliminary form. 176 176 See Section II.C.1 of the Proposing Release. See also, Proxy Rules—Amendments to Eliminate Filing Requirements for Certain Preliminary Proxy Material; Amendments With Regard to Rule 14a-8, Shareholder Proposals , Release No. 34-25217 (Dec. 21, 1987) [52 FR 48982]. We proposed amendments to Rule 14a-6(a) to add the shareholder votes on executive compensation and the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation required by Section 14A(a) to the list of items that do not trigger a preliminary filing. 177 As proposed, a proxy statement that includes a solicitation with respect to either of these shareholder votes would not trigger a requirement that the issuer file the proxy statement in preliminary form, so long as a preliminary filing would not otherwise be required under Rule 14a-6(a). 177 In the recent release relating to the similar shareholder votes for companies subject to EESA with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP program, we received comments regarding whether a preliminary proxy statement should be required for shareholder votes on executive compensation for TARP companies. While some commentators argued that a preliminary proxy statement should be required, other commentators argued persuasively that the burdens of such an approach outweighed the costs. As a result, we decided to eliminate the requirement for a preliminary proxy statement for shareholder votes on executive compensation for TARP companies. See TARP Adopting Release, supra note 18, at 75 FR 2791. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were favorable. While one commentator stated that say-on-pay votes and votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes should trigger the requirement to file in preliminary form to provide the market and investors additional time to consider the executive compensation disclosures, 178 the preponderance of commentators agreed that no preliminary proxy should be required. 179 These commentators noted the similarity in proposals for all issuers and the likelihood that the administrative burdens would outweigh any benefits from a preliminary filing. 180 In addition, one commentator asserted that we should not require a preliminary proxy statement for shareholder advisory votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes that are not required by Section 14A so that issuers would not be required to file in preliminary form as a result of including a frequency vote in their proxy materials voluntarily. 181 Other commentators suggested that no preliminary proxy statement should be required for any separate shareholder vote on executive compensation, 182 noting that it would be inappropriate to require a preliminary filing for proposals on more narrow aspects of compensation if a preliminary filing is not required for broader proposals. 183 178 See letter from Brian Foley (“Foley”). 179 See, e.g., letters from Ameriprise Financial (“Ameriprise”), ABA, Business Roundtable, CalPERS, Center on Exec. Comp., Compensia, Davis Polk, FSR, ICGN, Pfizer, PGGM, PM&P, Protective Life, and Society of Corp. Sec. 180 See, e.g., letter from Compensia. 181 See letter from Business Roundtable. 182 See letters from ABA and ICGN. 183 See letter from ABA. c. Final Rule After considering the comments, we are adopting the amendments to Rule 14a-6(a) as proposed, with slight modifications. We are adopting amendments to Rule 14a-6(a) to add any shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation, including shareholder votes to approve executive compensation and the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation required by Section 14A(a), to the list of items that do not trigger a preliminary filing. As adopted, a proxy statement that includes a solicitation with respect to any advisory vote on executive compensation, including a say-on-pay vote or a vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, would not trigger a requirement that the issuer file the proxy statement in preliminary form, so long as any other matters to which the solicitation relates include only the other matters specified by Rule 14a-6(a). Finally, in a revision from the proposal, this amendment will also encompass an advisory vote on executive compensation, including a vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes, that is not required by Section 14A. Upon review of the comments, we are persuaded by commentators' arguments that our preliminary proxy filing requirements should not differentiate between say-on-pay votes simply because, in one case, the issuer is required to include the proposal, and, in the other, the issuer chooses to do so. 2. Broker Discretionary Voting As noted in the Proposing Release, 184 Section 957 of the Act amends Section 6(b) of the Exchange Act 185 to direct the national securities exchanges to change their rules to prohibit broker discretionary voting of uninstructed shares in certain matters, including shareholder votes on executive compensation. The national securities exchanges have made substantial progress in amending their rules regarding broker discretionary voting on executive compensation matters to implement this requirement. 186 Under these amended exchange rules, for issuers with a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange, broker discretionary voting of uninstructed shares is not permitted for a shareholder vote on executive compensation or a shareholder vote on the frequency of the shareholder vote on executive compensation. 187 184 See Section II.C.2 of the Proposing Release. 185 15 U.S.C. 78f(b). 186 See, e.g., Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change to Amend NYSE Rule 452 and Listed Company Manual Section 402.08 to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting on Executive Compensation Matters, Release No. 34-62874, SR-NYSE-2010-59 (Sept. 9, 2010); Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change to Prohibit Members from Voting Uninstructed Shares on Certain Matters, Release No. 34-62992, SR-NASDAQ-2010-114 (Sept. 24, 2010). 187 Broker discretionary voting in connection with merger or acquisition transactions also is not permitted under rules of the national securities exchanges. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 452. 3. Relationship to Shareholder Votes on Executive Compensation for TARP Companies Issuers that have received financial assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, are required to conduct a separate annual shareholder vote to approve executive compensation during the period in which any obligation arising from the financial assistance provided under the TARP remains outstanding. 188 188 Section 111(e) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. 5221. See also Rule 14a-20. Because the vote required to approve executive compensation pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, or EESA, is effectively the same vote that would be required under Section 14A(a)(1), as we indicated in the Proposing Release, 189 we believe that a shareholder vote to approve executive compensation under Rule 14a-20 for issuers with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP would satisfy Rule 14a-21(a). Consequently, we noted in the Proposing Release that we would not require an issuer that conducts an annual shareholder advisory vote to approve executive compensation pursuant to EESA to conduct a separate shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation under Section 14A(a)(1) until that issuer has repaid all indebtedness under the TARP. Such an issuer would be required to include a separate shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation pursuant to Section 14A(a)(1) and Rule 14a-21(a) for the first annual meeting of shareholders after the issuer has repaid all outstanding indebtedness under the TARP. Commentators on this issue generally expressed support for our proposed approach to companies with outstanding indebtedness under TARP, 190 and we have determined to implement this approach under the rules as adopted. 189 See Section II.C.3 of the Proposing Release. 190 See, e.g., letters from ABA, CalPERS, COPERA, Davis Polk, FSR, PGGM, and RAILPEN & USS. Even though issuers with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP have a separate statutory requirement to provide an annual shareholder vote on executive compensation so long as they are indebted under the TARP, absent exemptive relief these issuers would be required, pursuant to Section 14A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of shareholder votes on executive compensation for the first annual or other such meeting of shareholders on or after January 21, 2011. In our view, however, because such issuers have a requirement to conduct an annual shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation so long as they are indebted under the TARP, a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of such votes while the issuer remains subject to a requirement to conduct such votes on an annual basis would not serve a useful purpose. We expressed these views in the Proposing Release 191 and, as noted above, commentators supported our views on this point. 191 See Section II.C.3 of the Proposing Release. We have considered, therefore, whether issuers with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP should be subject to the requirements of Section 14A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. We do not believe it is necessary or appropriate in the public interest or consistent with the protection of investors to require an issuer to conduct a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of the shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation when the issuer already is required to conduct advisory votes on executive compensation annually regardless of the outcome of such frequency vote. Because Section 14A(a)(2) would burden TARP issuers and their shareholders with an additional vote while providing little benefit to either the issuer or its shareholders, we continue to believe an exemption by rule is appropriate, pursuant to both the exemptive authority granted by Section 14A(e) of the Exchange Act 192 and the Commission's general exemptive authority pursuant to Section 36(a)(1) of the Exchange Act. 193 As a result, Rule 14a-21(b), as we are adopting it, exempts an issuer with outstanding indebtedness under the TARP from the requirements of Rule 14a-21(b) and Section 14A(a)(2) until the issuer has repaid all outstanding indebtedness under the TARP. Similar to the approach for shareholder advisory votes under Rule 14a-21(a), such an issuer would be required to include a separate shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation pursuant to Section 14A(a)(2) and Rule 14a-21(b) for the first annual meeting of shareholders after the issuer has repaid all outstanding indebtedness under the TARP. 192 Exchange Act Section 14A(e) provides that “the Commission may, by rule or order, exempt an issuer or class of issuers from the requirement” under Sections 14A(a) or 14A(b). Section 14A(e) further provides that “in determining whether to make an exemption under this subsection, the Commission shall take into account, among other considerations, whether the requirements under [Section 14A(a) and 14A(b)] disproportionately burdens small issuers.” In adopting this exemption, the Commission considered whether the requirements of Section 14A(a) and (b) as applied to TARP recipients to conduct a shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes could disproportionately burden small issuers. As described further in Section II.E below, we have also considered whether the provision as a whole disproportionately burdens small issuers. We note, in addition, that to the extent a TARP recipient is a small issuer, it will be subject to the exemption. 193 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)(1). Exchange Act Section 36(a)(1) provides that “the Commission, by rule, regulation, or order, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class of persons, securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.” D. Disclosure of Golden Parachute Arrangements and Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachute Arrangements 1. General Section 14A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act requires all persons making a proxy or consent solicitation seeking shareholder approval of an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or disposition of all or substantially all of an issuer's assets to provide disclosure, in accordance with rules we promulgate, of any agreements or understandings that the soliciting person has with its named executive officers (or that it has with the named executive officers of the acquiring issuer) concerning compensation that is based on or otherwise relates to the merger transaction. In addition, Section 14A(b)(1) requires disclosure of any agreements or understandings that an acquiring issuer has with its named executive officers and that it has with the named executive officers of the target company in transactions in which the acquiring issuer is making a proxy or consent solicitation seeking shareholder approval of an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or disposition of all or substantially all of an issuer's assets. Section 14A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act requires the disclosure to be in a “clear and simple form in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission” and to include “the aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.” 194 194 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1). Under existing Commission rules, a target issuer soliciting shareholder approval of a merger is required to describe briefly any substantial interest, direct or indirect, by security holdings or otherwise, of any person who has been an executive officer or director since the beginning of the last fiscal year in any matter to be acted upon. 195 In response to this requirement, target issuers often include disclosure in their proxy statements about compensation arrangements that may be payable to a target issuer's executive officers and directors in connection with the transaction. In addition, under our existing rules, issuers are required to include in annual reports and annual meeting proxy statements detailed information in accordance with Item 402(j) of Regulation S-K about payments that may be made to named executive officers upon termination of employment or in connection with a change in control. 196 The Item 402(j) disclosure is provided based on year-end information and various assumptions, and generally does not reflect any actual termination or termination event. 197 195 Item 5 of Schedule 14A. 196 See Item 402(j) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.402(j)], Item 8 of Schedule 14A, and Item 11 of Form 10-K. Item 402(j) disclosure is required in both Annual Reports on Form 10-K and in annual meeting proxy statements, though such disclosure is typically provided in annual meeting proxy statements and incorporated into the Form 10-K by reference pursuant to General Instruction G(3) of Form 10-K. References to “annual meeting proxy statements” in this context are meant to encompass both locations for the disclosure. 197 See Instruction 1 to Item 402(j), which requires quantitative disclosure applying the assumptions that the triggering event took place on the last business day of the issuer's last completed fiscal year, and the price per share of the issuer's securities is the closing market price as of that date. Where a triggering event has actually occurred for a named executive officer who was no longer serving as a named executive officer of the issuer at the end of the last completed fiscal year, Instruction 4 to Item 402(j) requires Item 402(j) disclosure for that named executive officer only for that triggering event. 2. Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K We proposed Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of named executive officers' golden parachute arrangements in both tabular and narrative formats. This disclosure will be required in merger proxies and other disclosure documents for similar transactions as described in Section II.D.3 below. After considering the comments on this proposal, we are adopting Item 402(t) as proposed, with some modifications. a. Proposed Amendments We proposed Item 402(t) of Regulation S-K to require disclosure of named executive officers' golden parachute arrangements in both tabular and narrative formats. We based our proposals on Section 14A(b)(1)'s requirement that disclosure of the golden parachute compensation in any proxy or consent solicitation to approve an acquisition, merger, consolidation or proposed sale or disposition of all or substantially all assets be “in a clear and simple form in accordance with regulations to be promulgated by the Commission” and include “the aggregate total of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.” 198 198 Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1). Consistent with Section 14A(b)(1) of the Exchange Act, agreements or understandings between a target issuer conducting a solicitation and its named executive officers would be subject to disclosure under proposed Item 402(t). In addition, because golden parachute compensation arrangements also may involve agreements or understandings between the acquiring issuer and the named executive officers of the target issuer, we proposed that Item 402(t) require disclosure of this compensation in addition to the disclosure mandated by Section 14A(b)(1). Specifically, to cover the full scope of potential golden parachute compensation applicable to the transaction, we proposed that Item 402(t) require disclosure of all golden parachute compensation relating to the merger among the target and acquiring issuers and the named executive officers of each. 199 199 However, because any agreements between a soliciting target company's named executive officers and the acquiring company are beyond the scope of the disclosure required by Section 14A(b)(1), we did not propose to subject such agreements to the Rule 14a-21(c) shareholder advisory vote required by Section 14A(b)(2) and Rule 14a-21(c). See discussion of Rule 14a-21(c) in Section II.D.4 below. We did not propose to amend the requirements for golden parachutes disclosure in annual meeting proxy statements, although, under our proposal companies would be permitted to provide disclosure in annual meeting proxies in accordance with the new requirement. 200 200 See Sections II.D.2 and II.D.4 below. b. Comments on the Proposed Amendments Comments on the proposal were generally favorable. We requested comment on a number of aspects of proposed Item 402(t), which we describe in more detail below. i. General Comments on the Proposed Item 402(t) Table We proposed that the Item 402(t) table would present quantitative disclosure of the individual elements of compensation that a named executive officer would receive that are based on or otherwise relate to the merger, acquisition, or similar transaction, and the total for each named executive officer. Many commentators agreed that Item 402(t) as proposed would elicit disclosure of all elements of golden parachute compensation “in a clear and simple form” as required by Section 14A(b)(1). 201 In addition, some commentators suggested that Item 402(t) should be clarified to require disclosure of only compensation triggered by the subject transaction so that issuers are not required to disclose any golden parachute compensation that would not be triggered by the subject transaction. 202 201 See, e.g., letters from Davis Polk, PGGM, and WorldatWork. 202 See, e.g., letters from Davis Polk, Society of Corp. Sec., and Wachtell. 203 See, e.g., letters from Compensia, Davis Polk, McGuireWoods, PM&P, and Sullivan. ii. Comments on the Elements of Compensation and Presentation of the Proposed Item 402(t) Table As proposed, Item 402(t) would not have any de minimis exceptions for compensation below a certain dollar threshold and would not require disclosure of previously vested equity and pension benefits. Some commentators urged that Item 402(t) should have de minimis exceptions, like Item 402(j), 203 because, in their view, the exclusion of such immaterial amounts would not be inconsistent with Section 14A(b)(1)'s requirement to disclose the total amount of golden parachute compensation. 204 In addition, some commentators asserted that we should amend Item 402(j) rather than propose a new Item 402(t). 205 204 See letter from Compensia. 205 See, e.g., letters from Business Roundtable and Meridian. Most commentators agreed with the proposed approach to omit previously vested equity and pension benefits from the table, 206 as including such amounts in the table could lead to confusion by overstating the total compensation. 207 Other commentators, however, recommended that such compensation be disclosed in the table 208 to make the compensation disclosure more comprehensive. 209 206 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Center on Exec. Comp., Davis Polk, FSR, ICGN, NACD, Pfizer, PM&P, Protective Life, and WorldatWork. 207 See letter from ABA. 208 See, e.g., letters from Barnard, Glass Lewis, PGGM, and Senator Levin. 209 See, e.g., letter from Glass Lewis. A number of commentators also requested various other changes to the proposed table. Some commentators argued that issuers should have more flexibility in drafting the table to fit their individual circumstances, 210 or that issuers should be permitted to differentiate between cash severance compensation and cash amounts for outstanding awards that have been accelerated. 211 With respect to employment agreements, most commentators supported our proposed approach to exclude disclosure of employment agreements from the Item 402(t) table, 212 though some commentators argued that such employment agreements should be quantified and included in the tabular disclosure to provide more comprehensive disclosure. 213 A number of commentators supported the footnote identification of amounts of “single-trigger” and “double-trigger” 214 compensation elements, 215 with some commentators recommending that the disclosure be included in the main text rather than in footnotes if an issuer believes it would be useful to the presentation. 216 One commentator, however, indicated that identification of single-trigger and double-trigger elements should not be required as it believed this disclosure would not be useful to investors. 217 210 See letter from ABA. 211 See letter from Towers Watson. 212 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Center on Exec. Comp., Compensia, Davis Polk, Frederic Cook, FSR, Hermes, and PGGM. 213 See, e.g., letters from Glass Lewis, NACD, and PIRC. 214 A “double-trigger” arrangement requires that the executive's employment be terminated without cause or that the executive resign for good reason within a limited period of time after the change-in-control to trigger payment. A “single-trigger” arrangement does not require such a termination or resignation after the change-in-control to trigger payment. 215 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, CII, FSR, Hermes, ICGN, and PGGM. 216 See, e.g., letters from ABA and NACD. 217 See letter from Protective Life. We also requested comment with respect to the appropriate measurement for issuer stock price for tabular disclosure in proxy statements for mergers or similar transactions. A number of commentators agreed with our proposed approach to calculate such amounts based on the issuer's share price as of the latest practicable date, 218 though many other commentators suggested that the share price contemplated by the deal should be used, if available, 219 with an alternative to use the average closing price over the first five business days following public announcement of the transaction. 220 One commentator expressed a concern that the share price as of the latest practicable date could lead to potential gaming of the price by issuers. 221 218 See, e.g., letters from ABA, Center on Exec. Comp., and ICGN. 219 See, e.g., letters from Davis Polk, PM&P, and Sullivan. 220 See letter from PGGM. 221 See letter from PGGM. iii. Comments on Individuals Subject to Item 402(t) Disclosure Some commentators indicated that requiring disclosure under Item 402(t) of a broader group of individuals than is required by Exchange Act Section 14A(b)(1) would be potentially confusing to investors 222 as such disclosure goes beyond the requirements of Section 14A and could lead to as many as three separate tables. 223 Different commentators supported disclosure of the broader group of individuals 224 in order to provide the full picture of compensation being received in connection with the transaction. 225 222 See, e.g., letters from Center on Exec. Comp., Davis Polk, FSR, NACD, Pfizer, PGGM, Protective Life, Towers Watson, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (“Wachtell”), and WorldatWork. 223 See letter from Davis Polk. 224 See, e.g., letters from CalPERS, ICGN, PIRC, and Senator Carl Levin (“Senator Levin”). 225 See letter from PIRC. Most commentators supported the proposal that issuers would not be required to include Item 402(t) information with respect to individuals who would have been among the most highly compensated executive officers but for the fact that they were not serving as an executive officer at the end of the last completed fiscal year. 226 One commentator, however, argued that issuers should be permitted to include disclosure of the compensation of such individuals to conform to the presentation of compensation in prior filings and that we should clarify that the named executive officers subject to Item 402(t) is determined in the same manner as under Item 5.02(e) of Form 8-K. 227 226 See, e.g., letters from Davis Polk, ICGN, PGGM, and PM&P. 227 See letter from ABA. iv. Comments on Item 402(t) Disclosure in Annual Meeting Proxy Statements In the Proposing Release, we did not propose requiring Item 402(t) disclosure in annual meeting proxy statements. Most commentators agreed that the proposed Item 402(t) narrative and tabular disclosure should not be required in annual meeting proxy [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A2011-1971. Public record. Not legal advice.