# Certification of Screening Companies

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A00-16

## Record

- **Collection:** Federal Register
- **Document type:** Proposed Rule
- **Published:** January 5, 2000
- **Citation:** 65 FR 560

## Text

SUMMARY: This document proposes to require that all companies that
perform aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet
enhanced requirements. This proposal is in response to a recommendation
by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a
Congressional mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of
1996. The proposal is intended to improve the screening of passengers,
accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo and to provide
standards for consistent high performance and increased screening
company accountability.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 4, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in
duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No.
FAA-1999-6673, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC
20590. Comments may be filed and examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10
a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except Federal holidays. Comments also may be
sent electronically to the Dockets Management System (DMS) at the
following Internet address: http://dms.dot.gov/ at any time. Commenters
who wish to file comments electronically should follow the instructions
on the DMS web site.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Shrum, Manager, Civil Aviation
Security Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and
Planning (ACP-100), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202)267-3946.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the
proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as
they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy,
federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the
proposals in this document are also invited. Substantive comments
should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the
regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the
DOT Rules Docket address specified above.
All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed
rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for
public inspection before and after the comment closing date. All
comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by
the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking.
Comments filed late will be considered as far as possible without
incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this document may be
changed in light of the comments received.
Comments received on this proposal will be available both before
and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Docket for
examination by interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator
for Civil Aviation Security has determined that the security programs
required by parts 108, 109, and 129 contain sensitive security
information. As such, the availability of information pertaining to
these security programs is governed by 14 CFR part 191. Carriers,
screening companies, and others who wish to comment on this document
should be cautious not to include in their comments any information
contained in any security program.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments
submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement
is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-6673.'' The postcard will be
date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
To give the public an additional opportunity to comment on the
NPRM, the FAA anticipates planning public meetings. If the FAA
determines that it is appropriate to hold such meetings, a separate
notice announcing the times, locations, and procedures for public
meetings will be published in the Federal Register.

Availability of NPRMs

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem
and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section
of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (703)
321-3339) or the Government Printing Office (GPO)'s electronic bulletin
board service (telephone: (202) 512-1661).
Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/
avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm, or the GPO's web page at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking
documents.
Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a
request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by
calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number
or docket number of this NPRM.
Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future
rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of
Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution
System, which describes the application procedure.

Outline of Preamble

I. Introduction

A. Current Requirements.
B. History.
C. Aviation Security Screening.
D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).
E. Related Rulemakings.

II. The Proposal: Overview

A. Summary.
B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening.
C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies.
D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues.
E. New Part 111.
F. Screening of Cargo.
G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP).
H. Screener Qualifications.
I. Performance Measurements and Standards.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

Subpart A--General

A. 111.1 Applicability.
B. 111.3 Definitions.
C. 111.5 Inspection authority.
D. 111.7 Falsification.
E. 111.9 Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

F. 111.101 Performance of screening.
G. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security programs.
H. 111.109 Screening company certificate.
I. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications
J. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or
indirect air carriers.
K. 111.119 Business office.

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Subpart C--Operations

L. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of
cargo.
M. 111.203 Use of screening equipment.
N. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel.
O. 111.207 Disclosure of sensitive security information.
P. 111.209 Screening company management.
Q. 111.211 Screening company instructor qualifications.
R. 111.213 Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related
duties.
S. 111.215 Training tests: requirements.
T. 111.217 Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized conduct.
U. 111.219 Screener letter of completion of training.
V. 111.221 Screener and supervisor training records.
W. 111.223 Automated performance measurement and standards.

IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129

A. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k) Certification requirement.
B. 108.5 and 109.5 Inspection authority.
C. 108.103(b); 109.103(b); and 129.25(c) Security program form,
content, and availability.
D. 109.105 and 129.25(e) Approvals and amendments of security
programs.
E. 108.201(i), (j), and (k); 109.203(b), (c), and (d); and
129.25(l), (m), and (n) Responsibilities of carriers and screening
companies.
F. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o) Public notification regarding
additional security measures.
G. 108.205; 109.207; and 129.26 Use of X-ray systems.
H. 108.207 and 129.28 Use of explosives detection systems.
I. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p) Monitoring of screener training
tests.
J. Additional proposed requirements to parts 108, 109, and 129.

V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191

A. Protection of sensitive security information (SSI).
B. 191.1 Applicability and definitions.
C. 191.5 Records and information protected by others.
D. 191.7 Description of SSI.

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

VII. Compatibility With ICAO Standards

VIII. Regulatory Analyses

A. Regulatory evaluation summary.
B. Initial regulatory flexibility determination.
C. International trade impact statement.
D. Unfunded mandates.
E. Federalism implications.

I. Introduction

I.A. Current Requirements

The Administrator is required to prescribe regulations to protect
passengers and property on aircraft operating in air transportation or
intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal violence or
aircraft piracy. Such protections include searches of persons and
property that will be carried aboard an aircraft to ensure that they
have no unlawful dangerous weapons, explosives, or other destructive
substances (49 U.S.C. 44901-44903). Screening of all passengers and
property that will be carried in a cabin of an aircraft in air
transportation or intrastate air transportation must be done before the
aircraft is boarded, using weapon-detecting facilities or procedures
used or operated by employees or agents of the air carriers, intrastate
air carriers, or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C. 44901).
Part 108 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules
in Secs. 108.9, 108.17, and 108.20 for air carrier screening
operations. These rules, which are available to the general public,
provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to
be used. In addition, each air carrier required to conduct screening
has a nonpublic security program (required under current Secs. 108.5
and 108.7) that contains detailed requirements for screening of
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All air
carriers subject to part 108 have adopted the Air Carrier Standard
Security Program (ACSSP). The ACSSP provides identical measures for air
carriers. Individual air carriers may request alternate procedures in
specific situations if the required level of security can be
maintained.
Part 109 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR),
contains rules in Sec. 109.3 for conducting security procedures by
indirect air carriers. An indirect air carrier is any person or entity
within the United States, not in possession of an FAA air carrier
operating certificate, that undertakes to engage indirectly in the air
transportation of property, and uses, for all or any part of such
transportation, the services of a passenger air carrier. This does not
include the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or its representative while
acting on behalf of the USPS. This definition does include freight
forwarders and air couriers. Each indirect air carrier has a nonpublic
security program (Sec. 109.5) that contains detailed requirements for
screening cargo. All indirect air carriers adopt the Indirect Air
Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP). The IACSSP provides
identical measures for indirect air carriers. IACSSP requirements are
essentially the same as the requirements in the ACSSP for screening
cargo.
Part 129 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules
in Secs. 129.25, 129.26, and 129.27 for foreign air carrier screening.
Each foreign air carrier conducting screening has a nonpublic security
program (Sec. 129.25) that contains detailed requirements for screening
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All foreign
air carriers conducting operations in the United States are subject to
part 129 and have adopted the Model Security Program (MSP) for their
security programs in the United States. The MSP provides identical
measures for foreign air carriers. MSP requirements applicable within
the United States are essentially the same as the requirements in the
ACSSP.
Throughout this notice, air carriers, indirect air carriers, and
foreign air carriers are collectively referred to as ``carriers.''
There are several means by which a carrier can conduct screening.
It can use its own employees. It can contract with another company to
conduct the screening in accordance with the carrier's security
program. It can contract with another carrier to conduct screening. In
each case, the carrier is required to provide oversight to ensure that
all FAA requirements are met.

I.B. History

Since 1985, at least 10 major international terrorist incidents
involving aviation have occurred worldwide, including the bombing of
Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which killed 243 passengers, 16
crewmembers, and 11 people on the ground. While all of the attacks
against U.S. civil aviation in this period have taken place abroad, the
link between the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the
January 1995 plot to bomb several U.S. airliners in the Far East
suggests that civil aviation in the United States may have become a
more attractive target for terrorist attacks. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was
convicted (along with different sets of co-conspirators) for his roles
in both plots as well as for the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight
434 in December 1994. Had Yousef's plot to bomb U.S. airliners
succeeded, hundreds if not thousands of passengers would almost
certainly have been killed.
These incidents have demonstrated the capabilities and intentions
of international terrorists to attack the United States and its
citizens as well as the ability of such terrorists to operate in the
United States. The threat posed by foreign terrorists in the United
States remains a serious concern, and the FAA believes that the threat
will continue for the foreseeable future.
The threat of terrorist acts against aircraft has led to several
actions by the United States Government to strengthen

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aviation security. These actions include two Presidential commissions,
the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996, and several FAA rulemakings to improve
security measures at airports. The action proposed in this notice
therefore is part of a broad, continuing effort to increase aviation
security.
Following the tragic crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, the
President created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (the White House Commission). The White House Commission
issued an initial report on September 9, 1996, with 20 specific
recommendations for improving security. One recommendation was for the
development of uniform performance standards for the selection,
training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and
their employees. The final report, issued on February 12, 1997,
reiterated this recommendation.
Before the crash of TWA flight 800, the FAA had become concerned as
well that there was a need to reevaluate the overall level of civil
aviation security. The FAA asked the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) to review the threat assessment of foreign terrorism
within the United States, consider the warning and interdiction
capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement, examine the
vulnerabilities of the domestic civil aviation system, and consider the
potential consequences of a successful attack. The ASAC, which consists
of representatives from the FAA and other Federal agencies, the
aviation industry, and public interest groups, formed a subgroup called
the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996, to evaluate the
domestic aviation security ``baseline'' in light of the new threat
environment. The BWG released its Domestic Security Baseline Final
Report on December 12, 1996. The report presented multiple
recommendations for improving aviation security through certifications
of screeners and screening companies, rapid deployments of available
technologies, and institutional and procedural changes in the U.S.
aviation security system.
On October 9, 1996, the President signed the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264. Section 302 (49 U.S.C.
44935 note) states:

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is
directed to certify companies providing security screening and to
improve the training and testing of security screeners through
development of uniform performance standards for providing security
screening services.

I.C. Aviation Security Screening

Effective aviation security screening is critical to protecting
passengers in air transportation against acts of criminal violence and
aircraft piracy. It is the front line of defense against potential acts
of aviation terrorism. It is therefore imperative that airports,
carriers, screening companies, and the FAA work together to strengthen
continually the aviation security screening system.
The FAA first required domestic passenger screening in 1973 in
response to increasing numbers of hijackings. The focus at that time
was to detect weapons, such as handguns and knives, through the use of
X-ray and metal detector technologies at security checkpoints. The
introduction of screening greatly reduced hijackings in the United
States. Since then, the greater challenge to security has been the
prevention of aircraft bombings, a challenge that became particularly
urgent in the 1980's as various terrorist elements succeeded in
bringing down aircraft and causing mass casualties by means of on-board
bombs. Some of the bombs used against aircraft have been crude devices,
easily detectable by screeners utilizing X-ray machines, but the trend
has been toward smaller improvised explosive devices (IED's) and
plastic explosives that are more difficult to detect without explosives
detection systems (EDS). The threat of IED's has also expanded the
initial scope of screening from passengers and carry-on baggage only to
include checked baggage and cargo.
The FAA has conducted extensive research regarding how the United
States can best counter these evolving threats. The research has
centered around both technologies and human factors issues; each is
important to thorough, effective screening and poses unique challenges.
The traditional X-ray and metal detector technologies have been
supplemented since the mid-1990's with several new advanced screening
technologies. An advanced screening technology, as that term is used
here, is any technology that is capable of automatic threat
identification. These advanced screening technologies include
explosives detection systems, explosive trace detectors (ETD), and
advanced technology (AT) X-ray-based machines for automatic bulk
explosives detection, some of which employ screener assist
technologies. At this time EDS-type technologies certified by the FAA
apply medical computed axial tomography (CAT) scan technology, but
other types of technologies also may meet EDS criteria in the future.
The EDS are used to screen checked baggage and have the ability to
automatically detect threat types and quantities of bulk explosives at
FAA-specified detection and false alarm rates, up to the initial system
alarm and without human intervention. The AT systems also focus on
detecting bulk explosives in checked baggage and have automatic alarm
capabilities; however, AT systems do not meet the full EDS standards
required by the FAA for all categories of explosives, amounts,
detection rates, and false alarm rates. The AT's still have more
sophisticated detection capabilities than the standard X-ray systems
used for imaging only. The ETD's also detect explosives, but differ in
that they are used to analyze and detect minute amounts of explosive
residues or vapors, are much smaller in size and less costly than the
EDS's and AT's, and are primarily used at screening checkpoints to
screen items entering sterile areas.
The FAA currently is deploying several types of advanced screening
technologies in the Nation's airports. Each advanced screening
technology is capable of detecting specific items. The FAA believes
that the most effective approach to screening at this time is to use a
combination of these technologies at screening locations.
Some of the technologies being developed focus on the human element
of screening. The FAA currently is developing and deploying computer
based training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP) systems that
provide initial and recurrent training and monitor screener
performance. The potential benefits of CBT are self-paced learning,
enhanced opportunities for realistic practice, combined training and
performance testing, and instruction that is uniform throughout the
country. CBT currently is being used to train screeners in many of the
Nation's busiest airports, and the FAA is evaluating its effectiveness
at these locations. The FAA anticipates making CBT available for use by
all of the carriers but does not anticipate requiring its use at this
time. Some private companies also are developing CBT systems that may
earn FAA acceptance and the FAA encourages this development.
TIP also has significant potential benefits and is a critical
component of this proposed rule. TIP systems currently are being
deployed and tested on both X-ray and explosives detection systems. The
TIP systems use two different methods of projection--fictional threat
image (FTI) and

[[Page 563]]

combined technology image (CTI). FTI superimposes a threat image from
an extensive library of images onto the X-ray image of actual passenger
baggage being screened. The image appears on the monitor as if a threat
object actually exists within the passenger's bag. The screener can
check whether the image is an actual threat image before requesting
that the bag be screened further. The CTI is a prefabricated image of
an entire threat bag and also can be electronically inserted onto a
display monitor. For both types of images, screeners are immediately
provided with feedback on their ability to detect each threat. TIP
exposes screeners to threats on a regular basis to train them to become
more adept at detecting threats and to enhance their vigilance. TIP
allows the FAA to expose screeners to the latest potential threats and
should allow the FAA and the industry to determine what elements make a
screener more effective, such as training methods and experience
levels. Future TIP data may affect requirements proposed in the
security programs.
The FAA also is validating a series of screener selection tests to
help screening companies identify applicants who may have natural
aptitudes to be effective screeners. Currently, the cognitive skills
and processes for optimal detection of threat objects are poorly
understood. The FAA sees an immediate need to identify valid tests to
select job applicants who should be able to become successful
screeners. The FAA currently is administering several screener
selection tests to groups of screener trainees as part of their CBT and
then measuring their subsequent job performance using TIP. If valid
selection tests are developed, the FAA may offer them to carriers and
screening companies for optional use but does not anticipate requiring
their use at this time.
The FAA will continue its human factors research. Although the new
technologies described are highly effective in detecting explosives,
the FAA realizes that each one is ultimately dependent on the human
operator. Screeners are critical to the screening process. Future human
factors research will focus on the attributes, skills, and abilities
that make for an effective screener. Such elements may include an
individual's cognitive ability, learned skills, education level,
quality and amount of training, and experience (i.e., time on the job).
Screener pay levels and the quality of supervision may also affect
screener performance (i.e., threat detection rates). Analyzing TIP data
will help the FAA to explore and confirm or refute many hypotheses
regarding the factors that affect screener performance.
What is known currently is that each type of screening and
screening technology is unique and requires different skills and
abilities. For example, monitoring a walk-through metal detector
requires a limited understanding of the technology involved and does
not involve image interpretations. Conversely, operating an EDS is much
more complex and requires operators to exercise independent judgment as
they interpret and make decisions regarding images that are all
distinctly different. The screening tasks described in these examples
require different types of skills and abilities and require training
designed to optimize performance for those particular tasks. The FAA's
human factors research will attempt to isolate these skills and
abilities and determine how they can best be recognized and developed.
With regard to compensation, wages for screeners in the United States
currently average $5.75 per hour and some screeners do not receive
fringe benefits. Average annual screener turnover rates exceed 100
percent in many locations. Screeners repeatedly state that low wages
and minimal benefits, along with infrequent supervisor feedback and
frustrating working conditions, cause them to seek employment
elsewhere.
Experience in other countries seems to indicate that higher
compensation, more training, and frequent testing of their screeners
may result in lower turnover rates and more effective screener
performance. The FAA has reports from many sources that screening,
particularly screening of checked baggage, is conducted more
effectively in many other countries than it is in the United States.
U.S. citizens traveling abroad also have expressed concern that
screening in the United States appears to be less thorough than it is
in other countries. While the FAA until recently did not have actual
performance data from other countries to substantiate these views, it
now has test results that are strongly indicative of better screener
performance by some European authorities than by some U.S. screening
operators. The test results were derived from joint testing of
screeners that the FAA conducted with a European country. FAA special
agents and government personnel from the European country tested
screeners in each country using the same methods. On average, screeners
in the European country were able to detect more than twice as many
test objects as screeners in the United States. Screeners in the
European country receive significantly more training and higher
salaries than screeners in the United States and receive comprehensive
benefits. Screeners in the European country also have more screening
experience on average than their United States counterparts. U.S. air
carriers and screening companies may want to pursue any and all of
these factors to achieve higher performance. The FAA will continue to
conduct research and examine operational data to determine how these
factors affect screener performance and retention, both domestically
and in conjunction with foreign governments.
It is clear that the United States can improve upon practices in
many of these human factors areas making its aviation screening
operations as strong and effective as its other aviation operations and
endeavors. Several issues related to human factors in screening, such
as performance and the environment in which screeners work, are
addressed in this NPRM. The FAA invites comments and supporting data
regarding human factors issues such as the potential affects of
increased wages, benefits, experience, and training on screener
performance.

I.D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

In response to the Congressional mandate and to the White House
Commission report, the FAA published an ANPRM on March 17, 1997 (62 FR
12724), requesting comments on certification of companies providing
security screening. The FAA received 20 comments from the public on the
ANPRM, all of which were substantive.
Subsequent to the publication of the ANPRM, the FAA began field
testing threat image projection systems and evaluating their potential
for measuring screener performance. The FAA determined that the TIP
systems would be integral to proposing requirements for performance
measurements and standards. Therefore, the FAA published an ANPRM
withdrawal notice on May 13, 1998 (63 FR 26706), to allow TIP to be
adequately field tested and validated before the FAA proceeded with the
rulemaking. Although the ANPRM was withdrawn, the FAA considered and
incorporated many of the commenters' suggestions in this proposal. The
following is a brief summary of the overall comments.
While commenters disagreed on several issues, including the level
of oversight responsibility that air carriers should have over
certificated screening companies, commenters generally agreed that
national standards for security screening operations are

[[Page 564]]

needed. Approximately one-third of the commenters stated that
certificating individual screeners would have a greater impact on
improving security than certificating screening companies. Most of
these commenters also stated that certificating individual screeners
would improve screener professionalism and performance.
Approximately half of the commenters agreed that air carriers
conducting screening operations should be subject to the same standards
as certificated screening companies. A majority of commenters stated
that the same screening operation requirements that apply to U.S.
carriers should apply to foreign carriers providing services in this
country. Several commenters disagreed with any proposal by the FAA to
regulate joint-use checkpoints and checkpoint operational
configurations. More detailed discussions of the issues raised by
commenters are provided throughout the proposed rule section of this
preamble.

I.E. Related Rulemakings

On August 1, 1997, the FAA published two NPRM's. Notice No. 97-12
(62 FR 41730) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 108 to update the overall
regulatory structure for air carrier security. Notice No. 97-13 (62 FR
41760) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 107 to update the overall
regulatory structure for airport security. Notice No. 97-12 and notice
No. 97-13 are the result of several years of work by the FAA, airports
and air carriers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC),
a committee formed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.,
appendix II) in April 1989 by the Secretary of Transportation.
This document proposes to amend the proposed rule language of part
108 in Notice No. 97-12 rather than the current part 108. The numbering
system for part 108 of this NPRM is based on the numbering system for
Notice No. 97-12. The numbering systems for proposed part 111 and
revised part 109 are also closely aligned with the Notice No. 97-12
numbering system for clarity and consistency.

II. The Proposal: Overview

This document has two objectives: to propose procedures for
certification of screening companies; and to propose other requirements
to improve screening, such as performance measurements and new training
and FAA testing requirements for screeners. The FAA believes that this
proposal would improve performance, improve the consistency and quality
of screening, and meet the congressional mandate stated in the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the intent of the White House
Commission recommendations.
This overview contains a summary of the basic framework of the
proposed rule for certification of screening companies. It also
contains more detailed discussions of some of the approaches to
regulating screening that are implemented in the proposals and the
FAA's reasons for using these approaches.

II.A. Summary

The major proposals contained in part 111 and the changes and
additions proposed to parts 108, 109, and 129 are as follows:
(1) The proposed rule would require certification of all screening
companies that inspect persons or property for the presence of any
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon in
the United States on behalf of air carriers, indirect air carriers, or
foreign air carriers required to adopt and carry out FAA-approved
security programs (proposed Secs. 111.1 and 111.109(a)).
(2) The certification requirement would include all persons
conducting screening within the United States under parts 108, 109, and
129. An air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier that
performs screening for itself or for other carriers would have to
obtain a screening company certificate (proposed Secs. 108.201(h),
109.203(a), and 129.25(k)).
(3) The proposed rule would provide for provisional certificates
for new screening companies and screening companies already performing
screening at the time of publication of the final rule. Before the end
of the provisional period, screening companies would apply for
screening company certificates, that would be valid for 5 years
(proposed Sec. 111.109(d) and (e)).
(4) Responsibility for the performance of a screening company would
be borne by the screening company and the relevant air carrier(s),
indirect air carrier(s), or foreign air carrier(s). Carrier oversight
would be required (proposed Secs. 111.117; 108.103(b); 108.201(i) and
(j); 109.103(b); 109.203(b) and (c); and 129.25(c), (l), and (m)).
(5) The proposed rule would require approvals of operations
specifications that would include locations of screening sites; types
of screening; equipment and methods used to screen; and screener
training curricula (proposed Secs. 111.113 and 111.115).
(6) The proposed rule would require that screening companies adopt
and implement FAA-approved screening company security programs that
would include procedures to perform screening functions, including
operating equipment; screener testing standards and test administration
requirements; threat image projection standards, operating
requirements, and data collection methods; and performance standards
(proposed Secs. 111.103, 111.105, and 111.107).
(7) The proposed rule would set forth requirements for screening
companies regarding the screening of persons and property and the use
of screening equipment (proposed Secs. 111.201 and 111.203).
(8) The proposed rule would add requirements for the use of X-ray
systems to part 109 and for the use of explosives detection systems to
part 129 (proposed Secs. 109.207 and 129.28).
(9) The proposed rule would provide consolidated employment
standards for all screening company personnel, including new training
requirements for screeners regarding courteous and efficient screening
and U.S. civil rights laws and for supervisors regarding leadership and
management subjects (proposed Sec. 111.205).
(10) The proposed rule would require that screening companies have
qualified management and technical personnel (proposed Sec. 111.209).
(11) The proposed rule would require that screening instructors
meet minimum experience and training standards (proposed Sec. 111.211).
(12) The proposed rule would specify training requirements for
screening companies regarding training programs and knowledge of
subject areas and would require that the training programs be submitted
to the FAA for approval (proposed Sec. 111.213).
(13) The proposed rule would require that all screening personnel
pass computerized FAA knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests
before and after their on-the-job training and at the conclusion of
their recurrent training and that the tests be monitored by carrier
personnel in accordance with the carriers' security programs. The
proposed rule would also describe and prohibit specific instances of
cheating and other unauthorized conduct (proposed Secs. 111.215,
111.217, 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p)).
(14) The proposed rule would require that all carriers install
threat image projection (TIP) systems on their X-ray systems and that
all air carriers and foreign air carriers install TIP systems on their
explosives detection systems unless otherwise authorized by the
Administrator. Screening companies would be required to use the TIP
systems as specified in their security

[[Page 565]]

programs, including collecting and analyzing the TIP data, and to meet
the performance measurements and standards set forth in their security
programs (proposed Secs. 108.205 and 108.207; 129.26 and 129.28;
109.207; and 111.223).
(15) The proposed rule would prohibit interference with screening
personnel in the course of their screening duties (proposed
Sec. 111.9).
In addition to the above proposed changes, the proposal would amend
part 191 to extend SSI requirements to certificated screening companies
and their employees.
The FAA is not proposing to require certifications for individual
screeners, as some commenters to the ANPRM recommended. The FAA does
not have the statutory authority under Title 49 or the Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 to require such certification. Other
requirements in this proposal would help to improve the professionalism
of screeners; e.g., by providing for mobility of screener records
(proposed Sec. 111.221) and by requiring letters of completion to be
issued to screeners and screener supervisors upon their successful
completion of initial, recurrent, and specialized courses of training
(proposed Sec. 111.219).
The FAA has also decided not to specifically address joint-use
screening locations in this rulemaking, although comments were invited
with respect to this issue in the ANPRM. A joint-use screening location
is a security location that is screening for multiple carriers. The FAA
received several comments to the ANPRM that stated that an agreement
should be required for all air carriers to sign with the managing air
carrier of a screening location. However, other commenters stated that
the concept of joint-use screening locations is an internal management
tool of the air carriers that allows flexibility. These commenters
believe that it is not appropriate for the FAA to place undue
restraints on the management process for joint-use screening locations.
After considering the ANPRM comments and reviewing representative
samples of joint-use screening location agreements, the FAA has
determined that rulemaking is not the best way to address these issues.
They would be better addressed in future security program amendments
and/or compliance and enforcement policies.

II.B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening

This proposal would require that all companies that perform
screening be certificated under part 111, even if they are air
carriers, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. This approach
is consistent with several comments to the ANPRM that stated that air
carriers conducting screening should be subject to the same standards
as certificated screening companies.
Certifying all screening companies, including carriers that perform
screening, would:
Provide uniform standards for all companies that intend to
provide screening.
Ensure that all companies that conduct screening benefit
from the enhanced requirements imposed upon screening companies in part
111.
Clearly differentiate between the roles of the air
carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers as carriers
and as certificated screening companies.
Clarify the relationships among air carriers, indirect air
carriers, and foreign air carriers that contract with each other for
screening services.
Some commenters to the ANPRM questioned the need to certificate air
carriers for the purpose of screening since they are already
certificated by the FAA. Air carriers currently are certificated to
operate as air carriers under part 119. However, the certification
process in part 119 does not include an evaluation of whether an
applicant can adequately perform screening functions. The FAA has
determined that to fulfill the congressional mandate, all who perform
screening shall establish their ability to do so by qualifying for
screening company certificates. Any air carrier, indirect air carrier,
or foreign air carrier that does not choose to hold a screening company
certificate could contract with a certificated screening company to
perform its screening.

II.C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies

Currently, carriers have statutory and regulatory responsibilities
to conduct screening properly. The FAA cannot propose to relieve
carriers of these responsibilities. The responsibility of air carriers
and foreign air carriers to ensure that screening is conducted on
persons and property to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft is in
the statute (49 U.S.C. 44901(a)) and cannot be changed by the FAA. As
discussed previously, the requirement to certificate screening
companies also is in the statute. Issues arise, then, concerning the
relationships between the carriers and the screening companies and the
proper roles for each. The FAA interprets these statutory provisions as
leaving the ultimate responsibility for screening with the carriers and
providing for concurrent carrier and screening company responsibilities
for some tasks. This relationship is not unlike that between repair
stations and air carriers. Repair stations are certificated under part
145 and are responsible for performing maintenance in accordance with
regulations; however, the air carriers remain ultimately responsible
for the airworthiness of their aircraft. The FAA recognizes that this
relationship may be difficult to define, but proposes the following
general guidance.
The FAA envisions that the carriers would continue to be
responsible for providing proper screening equipment, such as X-ray
machines and metal detectors. The carriers would also have primary
responsibility to deal with the airport operators on issues regarding
the locations of screening equipment in the airports. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the carriers would be responsible for
overseeing the performance of the screening companies to ensure that
they carry out their duties.
The screening companies would be responsible for inspecting persons
and property for unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or
dangerous weapons. They would be responsible for ensuring that they use
the equipment properly, staff the screening locations adequately, train
their screeners properly, and otherwise manage the screening locations
so as to enable them to meet the standards for screening in their
security programs.

II.D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues

As discussed previously, this proposed rule would not shift the
responsibility for screening from air carriers, indirect air carriers,
and foreign air carriers to screening companies. Rather, certificating
screening companies is a way to assist carriers in ensuring that those
who conduct screening are fully qualified to do so. Certification also
would make screening companies directly accountable to the FAA for
failures to carry out their screening duties. This rule would increase
the level of responsibility required of screening companies while
improving screening oversight by air carriers, indirect air carriers,
and foreign air carriers.
The FAA envisions that screening companies would be primarily
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the screening locations.
Screening companies generally would be held accountable for screening
location failures. The FAA intends to look to screening companies to
maintain the

[[Page 566]]

highest standards and to continuously monitor and improve their
capabilities.
The full range of actions would be available for use against
screening companies that failed to comply with the regulations, their
operations specifications, and their security program. These include
counseling, administrative action (warning notices and letters of
correction), civil penalties, and certificate actions (suspension or
revocation of a certificate). In addition, if the screening company was
unable to carry out its duties at a specific screening location, the
FAA could amend its operations specifications (see Sec. 111.111) to
withdraw its authority to screen at that location.
If a company was removed from a location because of its failure to
screen properly, the FAA would continue to monitor closely that
location as another company came in to conduct screening. The FAA is
concerned about situations in which incoming companies use the same
equipment and hire the same employees from the unsatisfactory companies
and make no real changes in the quality of screening. The FAA would
consider requiring incoming companies to take additional corrective
measures to ensure that the problems that affected the performance of
the previous companies do not recur.
Carriers would continue to be responsible for the overall proper
screening of persons and property. They would be directly accountable
for failing to carry out duties specifically assigned to them, such as
providing the proper screening equipment and carrying out specific
oversight functions (such as Ground Security Coordinator duties and
auditing functions). In addition, when a screening company failed to
screen properly or otherwise failed to carry out its duties, the FAA
would carefully evaluate all facts and circumstances to determine
whether the carrier should be the subject of enforcement action. In
general, repeated or systemic failures of a screening company to comply
with the regulations or fundamental failures of the screeners to comply
with security requirements might lead to the conclusion that the
carrier has failed to conduct screening properly or to oversee the
screening company's operations, even if the carrier had conducted the
required audits and did not discover problems. The audits would be one
tool for the carrier to use but would not limit its responsibility to
ensure proper screening. Carriers would be expected to identify
problems with the screening company and take corrective action in a
timely manner.
If the FAA determines that a screening company is performing
poorly, whether at a particular location or in its overall operations,
the FAA could require the screening company and/or the responsible air
carriers to implement additional security measures under this proposal
to maintain system performance. Such additional measures would vary
depending on the circumstances and might involve, for example,
additional training for screeners, redundant screening of property, or
increased management oversight. The measures could slow screening
operations at affected locations but would help ensure that thorough,
effective screening was being performed. If the additional measures
proved ineffective or if the circumstances were extreme, amendments of
the screening companies' operations specifications or suspensions or
revocations of certificates could result.
The proposal would require that each air carrier or foreign air
carrier required by the FAA to implement additional security measures
to maintain system performance notify the public of the increased
measures by posting signs at affected screening locations (see section
IV.F.). The signs would be required to state that the additional
security measures being implemented by the air carriers could slow
screening operations at those locations, but that the measures are
necessary to ensure the safety and security of flights. The proposal is
intended to ensure that the traveling public is informed and to
increase screening company and air carrier accountability for their
operations. The specific language and specifications to be required for
the signs would be included in the security programs.

II.E. New Part 111

The FAA proposes to create a new part 111, which would contain all
the requirements for screening companies. Part 111 would require
certification of all screening companies that perform screening for air
carriers under part 108, indirect air carriers under part 109, and
foreign air carriers under part 129.
The proposal would affect only the screening that is done by
inspecting persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized
explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under
parts 108, 109, and 129. These inspections currently are performed by a
variety of methods such as manual searches, metal detectors, X-ray
machines, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection
systems, and advanced technology devices. The proposal would also amend
certain requirements in parts 108, 109, and 129 to accommodate the
proposed new part 111.
Forms of screening other than inspection, such as determining that
a person is a law enforcement officer with authority to carry a weapon
on board aircraft, would not be covered in part 111. These other forms
of screening would not have to be done by a certificated screening
company. These types of screening would continue to be the
responsibility of the carriers. They could be performed, as they are
now, by such methods as ticket agents checking the documentation of law
enforcement officers flying armed, local law enforcement officers at
the checkpoint checking the credentials of law enforcement officers
entering the sterile area, or checkpoint security supervisors checking
the law enforcement officer's credentials. The checkpoint security
supervisors checking these credentials would be doing so as
representatives of the carriers, rather than as part of their duties
for the certificated screening companies.

II.F. Screening of Cargo

Certain cargo carried on passenger air carriers must be screened.
The FAA considered whether this screening should be done only by
certificated screening companies and has decided to propose that it
should be. If unauthorized explosives or incendiaries are introduced
aboard passenger aircraft in cargo, it would be just as devastating as
if introduced in checked or carry-on baggage or on passengers. The FAA
believes that cargo also must be subjected to rigorous screening
controls to avoid such a result.
Accordingly, the FAA proposes that inspections of cargo for
unauthorized explosives and incendiaries be done only by certificated
screening companies, similar to the proposal for persons, accessible
property, and checked baggage. Under this proposal, air carriers and
foreign air carriers carrying passengers would be required to ensure
that cargo screening is conducted by certificated screening companies.
Indirect air carriers that elect to perform required screening (instead
of referring their cargo to air carriers or foreign air carriers for
required screening) also would be required to hold screening company
certificates or contract with certificated screening companies to
perform the screening. The FAA believes that a comprehensive approach
to certificating all screening companies, including companies that
screen cargo, is vital to having a safe, secure, and effective aviation
security system. The FAA requests public comments on the issues

[[Page 567]]

relating to certificating indirect air carriers in this NPRM.

II.G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP)

In addition to the regulatory requirements, the proposed rule would
establish a separate security program for screening companies that
would accompany the requirements in proposed part 111. The Screening
Standard Security Program (SSSP) would contain detailed and sensitive
requirements relating to screening that currently are contained in the
carrier security programs, as well as additional requirements related
to proposals in part 111. The carriers as well as the screening
companies would be required to ensure that their screening companies'
security programs are carried out.
The FAA considered proposing that screening companies be required
to comply with the standardized security programs for air carriers,
foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Requiring screening
companies to comply with the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP would emphasize
that the carriers are primarily responsible for ensuring that screening
is properly carried out. It would also prevent having to relocate the
screening-related language from the carrier security programs to the
screening standard security program. However, the FAA recognizes that
this system could result in confusion in some cases where screening
companies might have to observe portions of three different security
programs--the ACSSP, the MSP, and the IACSSP. Having a separate
security program for screening companies would also more clearly
delineate the responsibilities of screening companies and those of the
carriers, which would continue to be responsible for proper screening.
Both part 111 and the Screening Standard Security Program would state
that the requirements also are applicable to carriers that conduct
screening.
The FAA requests comments on consolidating all screening-related
program requirements into one screening standard security program. The
FAA has prepared a draft SSSP proposal to accompany the release of this
NPRM. Commenters with a need to know, as specified in 14 CFR part 191,
may request copies of the draft proposed SSSP from the Office of Civil
Aviation Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

II.H. Screener Qualifications

As discussed in section I.C., it is critical that screeners be
highly qualified in order to counter the increasing sophistication of
the threats. This proposal contains a number of provisions to promote
improved qualifications of screeners. Most notable are the proposed
requirements to include FAA testing standards for screening personnel,
test administration requirements for carriers, and additional
monitoring of screener performance made possible by TIP as discussed in
section II.I.
Under this proposal, screeners would be required to pass knowledge-
based and X-ray interpretation tests developed by the FAA before
beginning on-the-job training. This would help to ensure that all
screeners have uniform understanding of their tasks and a consistent
high level of achievement. The FAA would provide the tests by amending
the screening companies' security programs through notice and comment
procedures and would expect the screening companies to train their
personnel to pass those tests. Screening companies would have
flexibility in designing their training programs and would submit them
to the FAA for approval. The FAA is not proposing that training
programs be designed in a specific manner, only that they thoroughly
and effectively address all of the testing standard subjects. The
proposal also would require that the carriers administer and monitor
the tests to promote carrier involvement in the training process and to
establish closer accountability for the administration of the training
tests.

II.I. Performance Measurements and Standards

For the FAA, carriers, and screening companies to monitor the
performance of screening companies and to track their level of
performance, a consistent means of regularly measuring performance is
needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies need to be able to
monitor how well screeners are detecting threat objects and must be
able to determine whether performance is decreasing and whether
corrective measures are needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening
companies need to be able to measure performance of a screening
location to determine what factors lead to better or worse detection
and what corrective measures are effective.
Factors that may lead to better or worse detection include the
amount of passenger traffic, the type of training that the screeners
receive, how often screener functions are rotated, and the conditions
under which screeners are working. The FAA, carriers, and screening
companies also need to determine which types of threat objects the
screeners can readily detect and which types they have difficulty
detecting. All of these factors can be analyzed along with other
elements that may affect screening ability, such as education level,
screening experience, and screener compensation levels. The analyses
would be used by the FAA to work more effectively with screening
companies and carriers to improve screening continuously. Further, it
appears that regular testing of screeners promotes vigilance. Frequent
testing can increase screeners' ability to recognize threats that they
rarely, if ever, encounter in reality but must be ready to detect
should the unlikely event occur.
In order to monitor screening performance and to examine the
effects of all of these factors, the means of measuring performance
must be consistent, reliable, cost effective, and frequent. The two
options for conducting testing are anonymous testing by individuals and
computer testing. The FAA and the carriers now rely on testing
conducted by individuals. Carriers currently are required to test each
screener periodically, as set forth in their security programs.
The FAA uses FAA employees to submit for screening items of baggage
that contain test objects that will appear on the X-ray screens to be
weapons or explosives. There are a number of limitations involved with
this method, however. For instance, the FAA tests cannot be conducted
frequently at many screening locations due to the large number of
airports in the United States and their diverse locations. The FAA must
arrange for different employees to travel to airports and have them
change their appearance after each test to prevent the screeners from
recognizing them as FAA testers. It is therefore very difficult,
costly, and labor-intensive to obtain a large number of tests that
accurately measure screeners' success rates and that provide a
continuous measure of the success of screening locations, either
overall or under specific conditions. Further, when screening personnel
realize that the FAA is conducting tests, they sometimes alert other
nearby screening locations to expect testing, which can skew the
testing results. Because FAA testing is infrequent at many locations,
it also can limit the number and variety of test objects that the
screeners are exposed to. Also, because the tests are

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conducted by individuals, there is the possibility that different FAA
employees will apply the test protocols differently, which also could
skew the testing results.
To deal with these problems, the FAA has developed TIP, discussed
previously in section I.C. This computer-based system is capable of
introducing test objects to screeners on the X-ray and EDS systems at
various rates set on the computers. The TIP program can be set to run
the entire time that a screening location is in use. Test items can be
easily added to or changed by simply loading new images or parameters
into the computers, providing an efficient means to regularly expose
screeners to the most recent and sophisticated threats. The success
rates can easily be recorded and later analyzed by the FAA, carriers,
and screening companies to monitor continuously how well the screening
locations are operating.
The FAA has conducted validation testing of TIP. In addition, at
one location one screening company conducted extensive testing of TIP
and provided its data to the FAA for analysis. The FAA determined that
the detailed results of the FAA and screening company testing should
not be made available to the general public because they could be used
to attempt to discover ways to defeat the screening system; therefore,
the FAA has determined that this information is sensitive security
information under 14 CFR part 191. Air carriers, foreign air carriers,
and indirect air carriers that have security programs under parts 108,
129, and 109, respectively, may obtain further information on these
tests and the FAA's analysis by contacting the Office of Civil Aviation
Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Screening companies that are screening for
carriers may obtain copies of the testing results through their
carriers. Comments on the data and analyses should be submitted to the
Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, rather than to
the public docket, because of the sensitivity of the information.
Based on all of the data gathered to date, the FAA has determined
that TIP is an effective and reliable means to measure screener
performance. Accordingly, the proposed rule would require the use of
threat image projection systems on all X-ray and explosives detection
systems. TIP would be installed over a period of time as specified in
the security programs. The specific TIP equipment requirements
acceptable to the Administrator would be set forth in the carriers'
security programs. The screening companies and carriers would be
required to download the data or allow the FAA to download the data in
accordance with standards that would be adopted in the security
programs through notice and comment procedures. The screening companies
and carriers would be able to download the data at any time to monitor
their own performance.
The results of TIP would be used to monitor the performance of
screening locations, screening companies, and individual screeners. TIP
operational data would be analyzed to focus resources on most
effectively improving screening to detect threats. TIP data can be used
to determine such things as what working conditions lead to better
performance, on which topics the screeners need further instruction,
and what corrective action or training programs prove to be most
successful. The FAA would look at the success rates of screeners
detecting various kinds of test objects, the success rates at different
times of day and during different traffic levels, and the other factors
that may affect screening effectiveness.
TIP also serves as a continuous means of on-the-job training for
screeners. Screeners report that being exposed to TIP images keeps them
alert and interested, supplements their classroom training, and fosters
healthy competition among them to continuously improve their detection
rates. The use of TIP provides screeners with immediate feedback
regarding their performance and indicates specific areas for
improvement.
The FAA anticipates that in the future, TIP data may provide a
basis not only to monitor the performance of screening locations but
also to establish performance standards. Under such a system, the
screening companies and carriers could be required to meet the
standards set forth in their security programs for the detection of
various threat objects. For instance, the FAA anticipates that it would
analyze TIP data to determine the range of screening company detection
rates in the United States. It might then set minimum detection
percentages that each screening company would have to meet based on the
higher detection rates within the range. The minimum detection
percentages could be incrementally raised as overall screener
performance in the United States rises. The performance standards might
vary depending on such factors as the screening system being used and
the type of threat object. Initially, however, the FAA could implement
overall performance measurement requirements whereby the FAA would
collect performance data from all TIP systems installed in the United
States and then require corrective action of the screening companies
with the lowest performance. These performance standards would be
developed based on extensive additional data from TIP systems.
The FAA would propose to add these performance measurement and
performance standard requirements as amendments to the security
programs through notice and comment procedures. Including these
requirements in the security programs would protect them as sensitive
security information and allow for flexibility in changing the
standards as screening company performance improves in the United
States. The use of TIP systems to establish performance measurements
and ultimately performance standards would allow the FAA to monitor
closely the performance of screening companies.
If performance standards were adopted in the security programs,
screening companies and carriers that the FAA determined were not
performing to specified standards could be held accountable in any
number of ways, as discussed in section II.D.
The FAA currently tests other forms of screening, such as walk-
through metal detectors and handwands, similar to the way it currently
tests X-ray screening. The FAA may in the future develop performance
standards for other screening equipment and proposed amendments to the
security programs would be issued.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

Proposed part 111 would prescribe the requirements for screening
company certifications and operations. Part 111 would apply to all
screening companies, whether they are performing screening under part
108, 109, or 129. Carriers would be required to ensure that their
screening operations, whether conducted by the carriers themselves or
by screening companies with which the carriers contract, are conducted
in accordance with part 111 requirements.
Subpart A would contain general information relating to
applicability, definitions, inspection authority, falsification, and
prohibition against interference with screening personnel and is
described in paragraphs III.A. through III.E. Subpart B would prescribe
requirements for security programs, screening company certificates,
operations specifications, and carrier oversight and is described in
paragraphs

[[Page 569]]

III.F. through III.K. Subpart C would prescribe requirements relating
to screening operations such as the screening of persons and property,
the use of screening equipment, employment standards, screening company
manager and instructor qualifications, training and testing, and
performance measurement and standards among others and is described in
paragraphs III.L. through III.W. The following discussion provides
details on each part 111 requirement.

Subpart A--General

III.A. Sec. 111.1 Applicability

Proposed Sec. 111.1 states that the part would prescribe the
requirements for the certification and operation of screening
companies. The requirements in proposed part 111 would apply to each
screening company that screens for an air carrier under part 108, for
an indirect air carrier under part 109, or for a foreign air carrier
under part 129. The proposed requirements would also apply to the air
carriers (including those air carriers voluntarily adopting aviation
security programs), indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers
that are responsible for conducting, and therefore overseeing,
screening operations. Portions of proposed part 111 would also apply to
two groups of individuals: all persons conducting screening within the
United States under parts 111, 108, 109 and 129 and all persons who
interact with screening personnel during screening. ``Person'' as
defined in 14 CFR 1.1 means ``an individual, firm, partnership,
corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or
governmental entity.''
The certification requirements in the proposed rule would apply
only to screening companies performing screening in the United States.
The FAA does not propose at this time to certify screening companies
that perform screening for air carriers at foreign airports. Screening
in other countries is performed either by the host governments or by
private sector screening companies, but under the authority and
operational control of the host governments. However, where air
carriers have operational control over screening outside of the United
States they would be required under this proposal to carry out and
comply with all relevant sections of part 111 to the extent allowable
by local law, with the exception of those requirements related to
screening company certification.

III.B. Sec. 111.3 Definitions

Proposed Sec. 111.3 would define for the purpose of part 111
``carrier,'' ``screening company,'' ``screening company security
program,'' and ``screening location.'' The proposed definitions are
needed to clarify the use of these terms in the proposed rule language.
The term ``carrier'' would be defined for the purposes of parts
108, 109, 111, and 129 to refer to an air carrier, an indirect air
carrier, or a foreign air carrier.
The term ``screening company'' would be defined to mean an air
carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other entity
that inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized
explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under
part 111 and 108, 109, or 129, before their entry into a sterile area
or carriage aboard an aircraft.
The term ``screening company security program'' would be defined to
mean the security program approved by the Administrator under this
part.
The term ``screening location'' would be defined to mean any site
at which persons or property are inspected for the presence of any
unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon.
Examples of screening locations are checkpoints where persons and
accessible property are screened, ticket counters and baggage makeup
rooms where checked bags may be screened, and cargo areas where cargo
may be screened.
Additional terms to be defined in the part 108 final rule would
also apply to part 111, as would any other definitions contained in
parts 109 and 129 of the chapter. Of particular relevance to this rule
are the definitions for ``cargo'' and ``checked baggage.''
The term ``cargo'' would be defined in part 108 to mean property
tendered for air transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All
accompanied commercial courier consignments, whether or not accounted
for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Security programs
further define the term cargo.
The term ``checked baggage'' would be defined in part 108 to mean
property tendered by or on behalf of a passenger and accepted by an air
carrier for transport, which will be inaccessible to passengers during
flight. Accompanied commercial courier consignments are not classified
as checked baggage.

III.C. Sec. 111.5 Inspection Authority

This proposed section would clarify that a screening company shall
allow FAA inspections and tests to determine its compliance with part
111, its security program, and its operations specifications. The
screening company shall also allow FAA inspections and tests of
equipment and procedures at screening locations that relate to carrier
compliance with their regulations. This proposed section would also
require screening companies to provide the FAA with evidence of
compliance. Both of these proposed requirements are similar to those in
proposed Sec. 108.5 of Notice No. 97-12.

III.D. Sec. 111.7 Falsification

This proposed section would apply falsification requirements to
screening companies that are similar to those that apply under current
Sec. 108.4. While the provisions of Sec. 108.4 apply to matters
involving screening, the inclusion of a falsification rule in part 111
would serve to emphasize the requirements. Under this rule, no person
would be permitted to make or cause to be made any fraudulent or
intentionally false statement in any application for any security
program, certificate, or operations specifications or any amendment
thereto under part 111. No person would be permitted to make or cause
to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or
report that would be kept, made, or used to show compliance with part
111 or to exercise any privileges under part 111. Also, any
reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any report,
record, security program, certificate, or operations specifications
issued under part 111 would be subject to civil penalties under this
proposed rule. There are also criminal statutes that might apply to
such activities.

III.E. Sec. 111.9 Prohibition Against Interference with Screening
Personnel

The proposed rule would include new requirements prohibiting any
person from interfering with, assaulting, threatening, or intimidating
screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties. The
proposed rule is intended to prohibit interference that might distract
or inhibit a screener from effectively performing his or her duties.
This rule is necessary to emphasize the importance to safety and
security of protecting screeners from undue distractions or attempts to
intimidate. Previous instances of such distractions have included
excessive verbal abuse of screeners by passengers and certain air
carrier employees. Screeners encountering these situations are taken
away from their normal duties to deal with the disruptive people, which
may affect the screening of other people. The

[[Page 570]]

disruptive persons may be attempting to discourage the screeners from
being as thorough as required. Screeners may also need to summon
checkpoint screening supervisors and law enforcement officers, taking
them away from other duties. Checkpoint disruptions can be potentially
dangerous in these situations. This proposal would help support
screeners' efforts to be thorough and would help prevent persons from
unduly interfering with the screening process. This proposed rule is
similar to 14 CFR Sec. 91.11, which prohibits interference with
crewmembers aboard aircraft and which also is essential to passenger
safety and security. Note that this proposed rule is not intended to
prevent good-faith questions from persons seeking to understand the
screening of their persons or property. But abusive, distractive
behavior and attempts to prevent screeners from performing required
screening would be subject to civil penalties under this proposed rule.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

III.F. Sec. 111.101 Performance of Screening

Proposed Sec. 111.101 states that each screening company shall
conduct screening and screener training in compliance with the
requirements of part 111, its approved screening company security
program (see section III.G.), its approved operations specifications,
and applicable portions of security directives (SD) and emergency
amendments (EA) to security programs. When a response to an imminent
threat is required, the FAA issues SD's to air carriers under current
Sec. 108.18, and EA's to foreign air carriers and indirect air carriers
under Secs. 129.25 and 109.5, to require immediate action and response
to the threat.
SD's and EA's may be issued to carriers to help them respond to
threats that require quick responses. SD's and EA's typically involve a
range of differing requirements, only a portion of which may pertain to
how the screening companies shall perform their duties. Currently,
carriers are required to provide to their screening companies any
screening-related information from SD's and EA's and any other
applicable information pertaining to threats. Carriers extract the
screening-related requirements from the SD's and EA's and forward them
to the screening companies.
It appears that the most efficient means for the FAA to issue the
SD and EA requirements to screening companies would be to continue the
practice of issuing them to the carriers, who then provide appropriate
information to their screening companies. It would be inefficient for
the FAA to attempt to issue two different SD or EA documents, one with
the requirements solely applicable to screening companies and one with
all of the requirements for the carriers. Moreover, this emphasizes the
ultimate statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the carriers to
perform aviation security screening and to ensure that screening
companies carry out the requirements in the SD's and EA's.

III.G. Secs. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security Programs

As discussed in II.G., the FAA is proposing to establish a separate
security program to accompany proposed part 111. The Screening Standard
Security Program (SSSP) would contain requirements for screening
persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo for air
carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. This would
consolidate all of the screening-related requirements into a single
source that screening companies could use to carry out their duties.
The ACSSP would continue to contain the nonpublic details regarding the
air carriers' responsibility to conduct screening under part 108, as
would the MSP for foreign air carriers and the IACSSP for indirect air
carriers. However, much of the screening information to be contained in
the Screening Standard Security Program would be relocated from the
ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP.
Under the proposal, screening companies would be directly
responsible for compliance with their security programs and might be
subject to enforcement actions if they fail to comply. Screening
companies would therefore have a strong interest in complying with the
program requirements. Carriers would continue to have an interest in
the screening requirements in the security programs, because they would
remain responsible for their implementation and oversight by statute
and in the case of air carriers and foreign air carriers would be
transporting the persons and property being screened. As part of their
oversight responsibilities, carriers would be required to have access
to, understand, and make available to the FAA upon request copies of
the security programs of the companies with which they contract.
Under the proposal, the sections pertaining to security program
requirements are organized in the same format that is used in Notice
No. 97-12 for part 108. Proposed Sec. 111.103 would be titled
``Security program: adoption and implementation'' and would require
that each screening company adopt and carry out an FAA-approved
screening company security program that meets the requirements of
proposed Sec. 111.105. Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be titled ``Security
program: form, content, and availability'' and would provide specific
requirements for security programs. Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be
titled ``Security program: approval and amendments'' and would describe
the procedures for approvals of and amendments to security programs.
Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be divided into three paragraphs.
Paragraph (a) would state that a security program shall provide for the
safety of persons and property traveling on flights provided by the air
carriers and/or foreign air carriers for which a screening company
screens against acts of criminal violence and air piracy and the
introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous
weapons. This same wording appears under proposed Sec. 108.103 of
Notice No. 97-12 for air carriers, as both parties are responsible for
passenger safety. Paragraph (a) would also require that screening
company screening performance coordinators (see section III.P.)
acknowledge receipt of amendments to their programs in signed, written
statements to the FAA within 72 hours. The security programs would have
to contain the items listed under paragraph (b) of Sec. 111.105 and be
approved by the Administrator.
Proposed Sec. 111.105(b) would list three items that a screening
company's security program shall include at a minimum. The security
program shall include the following: the procedures used to perform the
screening functions specified in proposed Sec. 111.201; the testing
standards and training guidelines for screening personnel and
instructors; and the performance standards and operating requirements
for threat image projection systems. These requirements are further
explained in the detailed discussions of the sections.
Proposed Sec. 111.105(c) would describe logistical and availability
requirements related to a security program. A screening company would
be required to maintain at least one complete copy of its security
program at its principal business office and at each airport served and
to make a copy of the program available for inspection upon the request
of an FAA special agent. All screening companies and applicants for
screening company certificates,

[[Page 571]]

regardless of type, would be required to restrict the availability of
information in their security programs to those persons with an
operational need to know in accordance with Sec. 191.5 and refer
requests for such information by other persons to the Administrator.
All of these requirements are similar to the requirements for air
carriers under proposed Sec. 108.105.
Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be divided into four sections:
``Approval of security program,'' ``Amendment requested by a screening
company,'' Amendment by the FAA,'' and ``Emergency amendments.'' The
proposed language is based on the language in proposed Sec. 108.105
(Notice No. 97-12) with the exception of the following changes unique
to screening companies.
Proposed Sec. 111.107(a) would differ from proposed Sec. 108.105
(Notice No. 97-12) in several ways due to the proposed application
process for screening company certifications. The language would state
that unless otherwise authorized by the Assistant Administrator, each
screening company required to have a security program under this part
would be required to submit a signed, written statement to the
Assistant Administrator within 30 days of receiving the SSSP from the
FAA indicating what its intentions are for adopting and carrying out a
security program. A screening company could choose to adopt the SSSP as
is or adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it. If a screening
company chooses to adopt the SSSP without changing it, the granting of
a screening company certificate by the Assistant Administrator would
serve as FAA approval of the SSSP. If the screening company chooses to
adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it, the Assistant
Administrator would either approve the proposed security program within
30 days or give the screening company written notice to modify its
program to comply with the applicable security program requirements.
The remaining procedures for accepting a notice to modify or petition
the notice would be the same as the procedures in proposed Sec. 108.105
of Notice No. 97-12. In this case as well, the Assistant
Administrator's granting a screening company certificate to the
screening company would serve as FAA approval of the screening
company's security program.
Under proposed Sec. 111.107(b), once a screening company is
employed by one or more carriers, it would be required to include in
any application for amendment to its security program a statement that
all carriers for which it screens have been advised of the proposed
amendment and have no objection to it. The screening company would also
be required to include the name and phone number for each individual
who was advised at each carrier. This would ensure that screening
companies would have the opportunity to apply to amend their security
programs, and also would ensure that carriers would be aware of the
applications and have no objections to them. Because carriers would
retain primary responsibility for screening, it would be essential that
they concur with any changes requested by screening companies that
screen on their behalf.
Under proposed Sec. 111.107(c) and (d), if the FAA were to seek to
amend a portion of a security program that covers the activities of
screening companies, it would provide to screening companies notice and
opportunity to comment. Carriers would also be notified and provided
opportunities to comment regarding proposed changes to the SSSP that
apply to their operations. In the case of an emergency, there would be
no prior notice or opportunity to comment.

III.H. Sec. 111.109 Screening Company Certificate

Certificate required. Proposed Sec. 111.109(a) states that a
screening company may not perform required screening except under the
authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a screening
company certificate.
Section 302 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
(Public Law 104-264, 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) requires the Administrator
to certificate companies providing security screening. The FAA proposes
to certificate screening companies under 49 U.S.C. 44707, which
provides for examinations and ratings of air agencies. Under that
section, certain pilot schools (14 CFR part 141) and repair stations
(14 CFR part 145) hold air agency certificates. That section also
permits certifications of ``other air agencies the Administrator
decides are necessary in the public interest'' (49 U.S.C. 44707(3)).
By certificating screening companies under section 44707 as air
agencies, the companies would be under the requirements of 49 U.S.C.
44709. That section makes clear that the Administrator may re-inspect
an air agency at any time. Section 44709 also contains the procedure by
which the Administrator may amend, modify, suspend, or revoke a
certificate. This procedure includes an air agency's right to appeal to
the National Transportation Safety Board an order amending, modifying,
suspending, or revoking its certificate. The Board's procedure for
hearing such appeals, found at 49 CFR part 821, includes a hearing
before an administrative law judge and an appeal to the full Board. A
party may petition the U.S. Court of Appeals to review a decision of
the Board. In this way, a screening company would receive full due
process if the FAA were to take action against its certificate.
Application for a screening company certificate. Under proposed
Sec. 111.109(b), an application for a screening company certificate
shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator. The
FAA anticipates a two-phase application process as follows. A company
interested in applying for certification as a screening company would
write to the FAA to request application instructions. The application
instructions would require the applicant to submit several items in
writing in a standard format. This same application package would
eventually become the screening company's operations specifications if
the company is approved for certification. (See next preamble section
for discussion of operations specifications.) The completed application
package would be submitted to the FAA as part of phase one and would
contain the following items: the name of the applicant's company; the
company's address; incorporation and tax identification information; a
letter of intent; an organization chart; a description of the company's
ability to perform and comply with regulations; the name of the
company's chief executive officer; the names, titles, qualifications,
and references for the screening performance coordinators; and the
company's procedures for safeguarding and distributing sensitive
security information under part 191.
Upon receiving an application package, the FAA would review and
verify all relevant information. This review might include verifying
past employment and training references for the company's screening
performance coordinator. Once the FAA completes its review, it would
notify the applicant and provide the applicant with a copy of the
Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP). The applicant would need
the security program to complete phase two of the application process.
After obtaining a copy of the SSSP, the applicant would review it
to determine whether the company wants to adopt the SSSP as is or amend
it to incorporate additional company-specific information. The
applicant would be instructed to inform the FAA of its decision
regarding the SSSP in writing within 30 days of receipt of the SSSP. At
that time or soon thereafter the

[[Page 572]]

applicant would prepare and submit to the FAA a copy of its training
curriculum and any FAA-requested changes to its original application.
(See later discussions regarding these requirements in this notice.)
The FAA would provide guidance to the applicant in preparing these
documents, as needed. The applicant would submit the documents as part
of phase two, and the FAA would review them. If the FAA finds that the
documents from phase two meet all requirements, they would be combined
with the phase one documents and signed by the Administrator as the
company's operations specifications. The Administrator would then issue
the company a screening company certificate. If changes are needed, the
FAA would request that the applicant make the specific amendments and
resubmit them before the Administrator would issue a certificate.
Issuance and renewal-general. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c), an
applicant would be entitled to a certificate if the applicant applies
not less than 90 days before the applicant intends to begin screening
or the applicant's certificate expires; the Administrator determines
that the applicant has met the requirements of this part for the type
of screening certificate requested; the issuance would not be contrary
to public safety and security; and, unless otherwise authorized by the
Administrator, the applicant has not had a screening company
certificate revoked within the past 12 months.
Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2), the applicant would have to be
able to meet the requirements of this part, to include adopting and
carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations
specifications for it to be issued a provisional screening company
certificate. Proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3) would describe the
requirements that a screening company would have to meet for issuance
or renewal of its 5-year screening company certificate. Failure to meet
the performance standards set forth in its security program would be
grounds for denial of the screening company certificate. Under proposed
Sec. 111.109(c)(5), if the FAA revokes a screening company's
certificate, the company would have to wait 1 year before a new
certificate could be issued unless otherwise authorized by the FAA.
This would ensure that the company that had proven unqualified to hold
its certificate could not immediately seek a new certificate. This
provision is similar to a provision in 49 U.S.C. 44703(c), which
relates to airmen certificates.
Provisional Certificates. Under proposed paragraph (d), companies
that do not hold screening company certificates would be able to apply
for provisional screening company certificates. The FAA would issue a
provisional certificate to an applicant if the Administrator finds that
the applicant is able to meet the requirements of this part, to include
adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved
operations specifications (proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2)). The applicant
for the provisional screening certificate would be subject to FAA
investigation and required to show that it has met the requirements of
this part. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(g)(1), a provisional screening
company certificate would expire at the end of the 12th month after the
month in which it was issued.
The purpose of the proposed provisional certificate would be to
provide a probationary period for the FAA to monitor a company's
screening performance. During that year, a new screening company would
undergo rigorous scrutiny by the FAA, during which time the company
would have to demonstrate that it has met the requirements for FAA
certification. If before the end of the 12-month period the new
screening company has met the requirements of this part, and had
adopted and carried out an FAA-approved security program and approved
operations specifications, the company would be able to apply for and
may be granted a certificate. In accordance with Sec. 111.109(c)(1),
the screening company would be required to apply for a screening
certificate not less than 60 days before the expiration of the
provisional certificate. Companies that cannot demonstrate that they
are qualified during the year or that do not meet the performance
standards specified in the security program would be denied
certification.
The proposed requirements for using a provisional certificate are
consistent with several comments to the Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that stated that new companies should have to operate in a
provisional status during which time the FAA would perform compliance
and records audits.
Under proposed Sec. 111.109(d)(2), the holder of a provisional
certificate would not begin screening at a screening location without
first giving the Administrator 7 days' notice, unless otherwise
authorized by the Administrator. This notice would allow the FAA to
monitor the startup of new company operations at each location. The FAA
anticipates that this requirement for 7 days' notice would not result
in any start-up delays should a new company replace a company whose
operations are decertified at a location. The FAA anticipates that it
usually would notify the responsible carriers in advance that they must
replace their existing screening company with a different company if
performance does not improve within a certain amount of time. This
advance notification to the carriers would allow them ample time to
make arrangements with a new company, if necessary, and to provide the
required 7 days' notice to the FAA. If for some reason the FAA was
unable to notify carriers in advance, it would have the authority to
waive the 7 days' notice to keep the screening location in operation.
Screening company certificate. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(e), the
holder of a provisional screening company certificate could be issued a
screening company certificate. The certificate would expire at the end
of the 60th month after the month in which it is issued (proposed
Sec. 111.109(g)(2)). To issue or renew a screening company certificate,
the Administrator would have to determine that the applicant has met
the requirements of part 111, to include adopting and carrying out an
FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications,
and has implemented applicable portions of the security directives
(proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3)).
As part of its renewal procedures, the FAA would consider the
company's performance under the performance standards that could be
added to the company's security program. As discussed in section II.I.,
the FAA anticipates using threat image projection (TIP) data to measure
a screening company's overall performance for X-ray and EDS machines
and eventually amending the SSSP to include performance standards. This
data would then be used to help evaluate whether a screening company
certificate should be issued or renewed.
The FAA is proposing that a certificate be valid for 60 months. The
screening company would be required to apply for a renewal at least 60
days before the expiration date in order to continue screening
operations. The 60-month (5-year) renewal would allow the benefits of
renewal without creating an undue burden on the screening company. As
with carriers, the FAA would inspect screening companies regularly and
would continually monitor operations and tests to determine that each
screening company is in compliance with the regulations, its security
program, and its operations

[[Page 573]]

specifications. This would result in consistent and close monitoring of
screening operations. If significant deficiencies are found during the
5-year period, the FAA would take appropriate action to require
correction of those deficiencies or if necessary would revoke the
screening company's certificate. In addition, requiring a 5-year
renewal of a screening company's certificate would create a more in-
depth review than that conducted during periodic inspections. Before
the FAA would renew a certificate, it would review the company's
operations specifications (including the training curriculum), required
records, the results of FAA inspections and any enforcement actions
that were taken, performance data, and any other relevant information.
There are several precedents in the FAA regulations for periodic
renewals of certificates and approvals. For example, exemptions from
certain Federal Aviation Regulations are typically issued for 3 years,
and Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) rarely are issued for
longer than 5 years. The duration of pilot school certificates in part
145 is 24 months. Having a specific duration encourages a thorough
review of any changes in the environment of a company, such as the
addition of new equipment or an increase in the size of operations, as
well as a review of past performance and an evaluation of what should
be done to improve performance if necessary.
The FAA considered proposing a shorter duration for the screening
company certificates but decided to propose the 60-month duration as a
reasonable option for obtaining the most benefits with the least
burden. The FAA invites comments on the costs and benefits of the
proposed duration and of a shorter duration such as 2 or 3 years.
Certificate contents. Proposed paragraph Sec. 111.109(f) lists the
information that would be contained on a certificate, such as the name
of a company and a certificate number, certificate issuance date, and
expiration date.
Proposed compliance. The FAA is considering how much time after the
publication of the final rule should be given for carriers and
screening companies to come into compliance. The FAA proposes in
paragraph Sec. 111.109(k) that the effective date for the final rule be
60 days after its publication in the Federal Register. As of that date,
no company could begin screening under part 108, 109, or 129 unless it
holds a screening company certificate.
The FAA also proposes, however, to provide some accommodation for
existing screening companies. There are many companies that have been
providing required screening services for years. The FAA has observed
their operations and is familiar with these companies. The FAA proposes
in Sec. 111.109(k) that companies actively screening at any time during
the year before the date of publication of the final rule be able to
continue screening after the effective date if they submit applications
for provisional certificates within 60 days after publication of the
final rule. The FAA would review the applications and issue provisional
certificates to those qualified. A company that applied on time and
that submitted complete and accurate documentation as required would be
able to continue screening unless and until it is issued a denial of
its application.
After an existing screening company receives its provisional
certificate, it would be subject to a rigorous application process to
achieve certification. The company would be required to achieve
certification before the expiration of its provisional certificate in
order to continue screening. Existing screening companies could apply
for certificates any time after they receive provisional certificates
but not later than 60 days before the expiration of their provisional
certificates.
Duration. In addition to establishing a 12-month provisional
certificate and a 60-month certificate (discussed previously), proposed
Sec. 111.109(g)(3) would provide that a certificate would expire if a
screening company has not provided required screening during the
previous 12 months. Under this provision, a company not actively
screening and maintaining its proficiency could lose its authority to
screen. If the company intends to screen again, it would need to apply
for a provisional certificate.
A screening company would have the responsibility for keeping track
of its compliance with this requirement and for returning its
certificate, as required in Sec. 111.109(h), if it has automatically
expired. During the FAA's yearly inspections of screening locations, it
intends to compare its list of screening companies with those companies
that are performing screening at locations. If a screening company does
not appear to have a screening location, the FAA would check with the
company to determine when it last conducted screening for a carrier.
Proposed paragraph (h) would require the holder of a screening
company certificate that is expired, suspended, or revoked to return
the certificate to the Administrator within 7 days. Suspension or
revocation of a certificate would follow established procedures for
certificates issued by the FAA such as airport, air carrier, and airmen
certificates (see earlier discussion of this issue in ``Certificate
required'').
Amendment. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(i), a screening company
would be required to apply for an amendment to its certificate to
change any of the information listed on the certificate, such as the
name of the screening company, and/or any names under which it would do
business.
Inspection. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(j), screening company
certificates would be made available for inspection upon request of the
Administrator.

III.I. Secs. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications

Under proposed Sec. 111.111, screening companies would be required
to have approved operations specifications before they could perform
screening. Screening companies would prepare operations specifications
with FAA guidance. Under proposed Sec. 111.115, during the application
process for a provisional certificate, a company would submit its
operations specifications to the FAA for approval. Once the operations
specifications have been approved, the screening company would not need
to obtain subsequent approval when it applies for a certificate or
renews its certificate. However, the FAA would review the operations
specifications to consider whether changes are needed. Further FAA
approval of operations specifications would only be necessary if the
screening company seeks to amend its operations specifications. The
proposed requirements for approvals and amendments of operations
specifications would follow the same process as is currently provided
for air carrier security programs.
Under proposed Sec. 111.113, operations specifications would list
the following items: the locations at which a company may conduct
screening; the types of screening that the company is authorized to
perform (persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo); the
equipment and methods of screening that the company may employ; the
name of the company's screening performance coordinator (SPC) (see
discussion in the next section of this preamble); the procedures for
notifying the Administrator and any carrier for which the company is
performing screening if an equipment or

[[Page 574]]

facility failure makes the performance of adequate screening
impracticable; and the curriculum used to train persons performing
screening functions. The operations specifications would also be
required to contain a statement signed by the person required by
Sec. 111.209(b) on behalf of the company, confirming that the
information is true and correct. The operations specifications would
also contain any other information that the Administrator would deem
necessary. Portions of the above items and the format may be provided
by the Administrator as standard operations specifications.
Screening companies in most cases would be authorized to screen at
all locations in the United States. However, where a special
circumstance occurs, the FAA would have the ability to amend a
screening company's operations specifications to limit the company's
authority to screen at a particular location in accordance with the
procedure in Sec. 108.105(c). One example would be where the FAA is
deploying new technology that required a high degree of oversight, such
as the recent deployments of explosives detection systems. In such a
case, the FAA might limit the locations at which a screening company
could operate the new technology. Another example would be where a
company demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to comply with
required procedures at one location, but at other locations is in
compliance. The FAA could amend the company's operations specifications
to remove the company's authority to operate at the one location. If
the company later comes into compliance at that location the operations
specifications could be amended to restore its authority to screen
there.
Operations specifications would list the types of screening that
companies are authorized to perform. This requirement would emphasize
the different capabilities and needs of the various companies that
perform screening. For instance, cargo screening involves procedures
different from those for screening persons. A company's required
operations specifications, including its training program, would
reflect the type(s) of screening that it would be authorized to
perform.
The operations specifications would include the equipment and
methods of screening that the Administrator has authorized the company
to operate and carry out. Examples include manual searches of items,
metal detector inspections of persons, and X-ray inspections. The
operations specifications would also include procedures for notifying
the Administrator and the carrier(s) for which the company is
performing screening in the event that the procedures, facilities, or
equipment that the company is using are not adequate for it to perform
screening. Each company's operations specifications, including its
training program, would specify the methods and equipment on which it
was authorized. There shall be a training curriculum for each type of
equipment that a company operates in performing screening. The training
program curriculum would have to be approved as part of the operations
specifications before the company would be certificated as a screening
company.
Proposed Sec. 111.113(c) would require a screening company to
maintain a complete copy of its operations specifications at its
principal business office and at each airport where it conducts
security screening. The screening company would also have to ensure
that the operations specifications are amended to remain current and
made available to the Administrator upon request. The screening company
would be required to provide a current copy of its operations
specifications to the carrier(s) for which it screens. The screening
company would also be required to restrict the availability of
information in its operations specifications to those persons with an
operational need to know. Persons with an operational need to know are
specified in Sec. 191.5(b). The screening company would be required to
direct to the Administrator requests for information that is in
operations specifications if the requests are from persons other than
persons with an operational need to know. These proposed requirements
would be necessary to ensure that operations specifications are
available to persons who need to know them and at the same time to
protect security sensitive information in the operations
specifications. Furthermore, these requirements would ensure that
carriers have current copies of screening companies' operations
specifications for monitoring and auditing purposes.

III.J. Sec. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers,
or indirect air carriers

Proposed Sec. 111.117(a) would make clear that each screening
company holding a certificate under part 111 would be required to allow
any air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier for which
it performs screening to inspect its facilities, equipment, and records
to determine its compliance with part 111, its security program, and
operations specifications. The proposed regulation would also require
that a screening company allow any carrier for which the company is
performing screening to test the screening company's screening
personnel using the procedures specified in the applicable security
program. This is a natural consequence of the fact that carriers are
ultimately responsible for proper screening and must be able to ensure
that their screening companies are in compliance and that screening
personnel are performing adequately.
Because the carriers are ultimately responsible for screening and
contract with screening companies to perform the service on their
behalf, the FAA does not consider it essential from a legal standpoint
to include proposed Sec. 111.117. However, it appears that inclusion of
this section may avoid confusion concerning the roles of the carriers
and screening companies. The FAA requests comments on whether to
include this section in the final rule.
If a carrier chooses to hold a screening company certificate and to
conduct screening at a particular location on its own behalf, it would
still have to perform oversight functions. In its capacity as a
screening company, it would be responsible for day-to-day operations;
in its capacity as a carrier, it would have to audit and test the
performance of its screening functions. Any other carrier using that
screening location also would be responsible for auditing and testing
the carrier in its capacity as a screening company.
In performing oversight responsibilities, the carriers need to know
when the FAA discovers significant compliance problems with the
screening companies. Currently, when the FAA discovers an alleged
violation, it typically brings it to the attention of the appropriate
carrier(s) to initiate corrective action as soon as possible. This
often is done in a discussion with the station manager or other carrier
official at the time of the inspection. Depending on the circumstances,
enforcement action may be taken later. The FAA envisions that if it
finds an alleged violation committed by a screening company, it would
discuss the matter not only with the screening company, but also with
the relevant carrier(s).
The FAA also proposes in Sec. 111.117(b) that each screening
company shall provide a copy of each letter of investigation and final
enforcement action to each carrier using the screening location where
the alleged violation occurred. Final enforcement actions include
warning letters, letters

[[Page 575]]

of correction, orders assessing civil penalties, and orders of
suspension and revocation. The screening company would be required to
provide a copy to each applicable carrier's corporate security officer
within 3 business days of receipt of the letter of correction or final
enforcement action. This proposed requirement would assist the
carriers(s) in evaluating the performance of the screening company.
Such enforcement actions could include warning notices and letters of
correction, civil penalty actions, suspensions or revocations of
certificates, cease and desist orders, or other actions. The FAA
proposes that a screening company would have to provide copies of these
documents to only those carriers for which it conducted screening at
the location of an alleged violation, rather than to all carriers for
which it conducted screening nationwide. The proposed requirement to
provide the copies within 3 business days of receipt would ensure that
the carrier(s) receive(s) timely notice.
The FAA considered proposing that the FAA would provide copies
directly to the carriers involved. However, the FAA believes that this
responsibility more correctly belongs with the screening companies. A
screening company should keep the carriers for which it is performing
screening informed of the company's compliance status. During its
regular inspections of screening companies, the FAA would check to make
certain that the screening companies are keeping carriers informed. The
FAA requests comments on any alternative means for keeping the carriers
informed of their screening companies' compliance.

III.K. Sec. 111.119 Business office

Under the proposal, each certificated security screening company
would be required to have a principal business office with mailing
address and would be required to notify the Administrator of any
address changes. The FAA would not expect all files to be maintained at
the business office. Most files would be retained onsite and be
available for inspection.

Subpart C--Operations

III.L. Sec. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance
of cargo

The language in proposed Sec. 111.201 is similar to the proposed
language contained in Sec. 108.201 for air carriers (Notice No. 97-12).
The FAA is not proposing to remove any of the language from proposed
Sec. 108.201 or from similar language in Sec. 129.25, because the
carriers will remain responsible under statute for screening persons
and property. This proposal does, however, include similar provisions
under proposed Sec. 111.201, because screening companies are the
primary screeners of persons and property in most situations, and they
must be aware of and be held accountable for their screening
responsibilities.
Under proposed Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would be
required to use the procedures included in its approved screening
company security program to inspect each person and his or her
accessible property entering a sterile area. Under proposed
Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would also be required to deter
and prevent the introduction into a sterile area of any explosive,
incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each person or
the person's accessible property.
Note that this NPRM also proposes to change the wording in
Sec. 108.201(a) and (b) to indicate that the screening procedures,
facilities, and equipment may also be described in the screening
companies' approved security programs as well as in the air carriers'
approved security programs. The FAA expects that differing requirements
would appear in one or the other of the programs, depending on the
requirement. Similar requirements also appear in proposed Sec. 109.201
for indirect air carriers and in existing Sec. 129.25 for foreign air
carriers. These changes are further explained in the detailed proposed
rule discussion for parts 108, 109, and 129.
Under proposed Sec. 111.201(b), each screening company would be
required to deny entry into a sterile area at a checkpoint to the
following: any person who does not consent to a search of his or her
person in accordance with the screening system prescribed in paragraph
(a) of this section; and any property of any person who does not
consent to a search or inspection of that property in accordance with
the screening system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.
Proposed Sec. 111.201(c) would state that the provisions of
paragraph (a) of Sec. 111.201, with respect to firearms and weapons,
would not apply to law enforcement personnel required to carry firearms
or other weapons while in the performance of their duties at the
airport; persons authorized to carry firearms in accordance with
Sec. 108.213, 108.215, 108.217, or 129.27 of the chapter; and persons
authorized to carry firearms in sterile areas under FAA-approved or
FAA-accepted security programs.
Under proposed Sec. 111.201(d), each screening company would be
required to staff the screening locations that it operates with
supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel in accordance with the
standards specified in its security program. This language is similar
to the language contained in proposed Sec. 108.201(g) of Notice No. 97-
12; however, it would be relocated to part 111 because screening
companies are responsible for their own staffing. Also, the words
``security screening checkpoints'' would be replaced with the words
``screening locations'' to include screening that is conducted at
checkpoints and at other locations.
Under proposed Sec. 111.201(e), each screening company would be
required to use the procedures included in its approved security
program to inspect checked baggage, or cargo presented for inspection
by a carrier, and therefore prevent or deter the carriage of explosives
or incendiaries in checked baggage or cargo onboard passenger aircraft.
This language is similar to the language contained in proposed
Sec. 108.201(h) of Notice No. 97-12; however, it has been amended to
more clearly indicate this requirement's applicability to checked
baggage and cargo.

III.M. Sec. 111.203 Use of screening equipment

Under proposed Sec. 111.203(a), each screening company would be
required to operate all screening equipment in accordance with its
approved security program. This equipment would include metal
detectors, X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives
trace detectors, and any other screening equipment that is approved for
use by the FAA. In most cases, the carriers that contract with the
screening companies for their screening services own and maintain the
equipment and provide it to the screening companies for their use.
While screening companies would be responsible for the day-to-day
operational testing and operation of the equipment, the carriers would
still retain responsibility for the calibration and maintenance of the
equipment.
Proposed Sec. 111.203(b)-(d) would contain several X-ray-related
requirements that were originally included as part of Sec. 108.205 (see
Notice No. 97-12) but which the FAA is proposing to relocate to
proposed part 111, because they are functions that screening companies
typically carry out. Specifically, some of the language from proposed
Sec. 108.205 would be repeated in Sec. 111.203 and amended to apply to
screening companies. Proposed Sec. 111.203(b) would state that the

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Administrator authorizes certificated screening companies to use X-ray
systems for inspecting property under approved screening company
security programs if several items are met. A screening company would
be required to show that it has established a mandatory program for the
initial and recurrent training of operators of the X-ray systems, which
includes training in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray
systems, and the identification of unauthorized weapons, explosives,
incendiaries, and other dangerous articles. The screening company also
would be required to show that the X-ray systems that it operates meet
the imaging requirements set forth in its approved security program.
These requirements are currently contained in the carrier standard
security programs but would be relocated to the screening standard
security program to accompany the relocation of these requirements.
Under proposed Sec. 111.203(c), screening companies would be
required to inspect individuals' photographic equipment and film
packages without exposure to X-ray or explosives detection systems if
requested by the individuals. Proposed Sec. 111.203(d) would require
that each screening company comply with any X-ray operator duty time
limitations specified in its approved security program.
As will be explained in the detailed proposed rule discussion for
parts 108, 109, and 129, all requirements related to the use of X-ray
systems would also be extended to indirect air carriers and their
screening companies. The proposed Sec. 111.203 requirements above would
also apply to indirect air carriers. All remaining requirements related
to the use of X-ray systems would remain in parts 108 and 129 and be
included in part 109 as carrier responsibilities. These requirements
involve conducting radiation surveys, meeting imaging requirements,
meeting Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards and compliance
standards regarding FDA defect notices or modification orders, and
meeting other equipment-related requirements.

III.N. Sec. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel

Under existing regulations, employment standards for screening
personnel are provided as requirements for air carriers under
Sec. 108.31 (proposed Sec. 108.209), for foreign air carriers under
their model security program (MSP), and for indirect air carriers under
their security program. Since these requirements include standards
regarding the screening personnel to be hired by screening companies,
the FAA proposes to relocate them from part 108, the MSP, and the
IACSSP to part 111, and assign responsibility for them to screening
companies. This would establish one consolidated list of employment
standards for all screeners performing screening in the United States.
The consolidation of all employment standards would impose some
additional requirements on screeners performing screening for air
carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Under
proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2), two additional requirements would be added
for screeners performing screening for air carriers and foreign air
carriers, which were incorporated in recent cargo-related security
program amendments. First, under proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(i),
screeners would have to be able to identify the components that might

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/fr%3A00-16. Public record. Not legal advice.