# The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession: Issues for Congress

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARS22398

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 4, 2013
- **Citation:** RS22398

## Text

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and
Candidate Countries for WTO Accession:
Issues for Congress
/name redacted/
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
January 4, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RS22398

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

Summary
Unconditional most-favored-nation (MFN) status, or in U.S. statutory parlance, normal trade
relations (NTR) status, is a fundamental principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Under
this principle, WTO members are required unconditionally to treat imports of goods and services
from any WTO member no less favorably than they treat the imports of like goods and services
from any other WTO member country. Under Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, most
communist or nonmarket-economy countries were denied MFN status unless they fulfilled
freedom-of-emigration conditions as contained in Section 402, the so-called Jackson-Vanik
amendment, or were granted a presidential waiver of the conditions, subject to congressional
disapproval. The statute still applies to some of these countries, even though most have replaced
their communist governments. The majority of these countries have joined the WTO or are
candidates for accession. Several countries are close to completing the accession process, and
Congress could soon face the issue of what to do about their NTR status to ensure that the United
States benefits from those accession agreements.
During the 112th Congress, Members faced the issue of whether to extend permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR) status to Russia and Moldova. On November 16, 2012, the House passed (36543), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R. 6156, which did just that, among
other things. The legislation also included provisions—the Magnitsky Rule of Law
Accountability Act of 2012—that impose sanctions on individuals linked to the incarceration and
death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky. President Obama signed the legislation into law (P.L.
112-208) on December 14, 2012.
The 113th Congress may face the issue of extending PNTR to at least two other countries. On
December 10, 2012, WTO members invited Tajikistan to join, subject to that country’s ratification
of its accession package. In addition, Kazakhstan may accede to the WTO in 2013. Both countries
are currently subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.

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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

Contents
MFN/NTR and the GATT/WTO...................................................................................................... 1
Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Communist and Former Communist Country
GATT/WTO Members .................................................................................................................. 2
The Case of China ........................................................................................................................... 3
Prospective WTO Accessions .......................................................................................................... 3

Contacts
Author Contact Information............................................................................................................. 5

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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

D

uring the 112th Congress, Members faced the issue of whether to extend permanent
normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Russia and Moldova. On November 16, 2012,
the House passed (365-43), and on December 6, 2012, the Senate passed (92-4) H.R.
6156, which did just that, among other things. President Obama signed the legislation into law
(P.L. 112-208) on December 14, 2012. The 113th Congress may face the issue of authorizing
PNTR for at least two other countries—Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.

MFN/NTR and the GATT/WTO
Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is a fundamental principle of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), which governs trade in goods; of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS); and of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). In essence, the principle requires that each WTO member treat the
product of another member no less favorably than it treats a like product from any other member.
If a member country lowers a tariff or nontariff barrier in its trade with another member that
“concession” must apply to its trade with all other member countries.1
The United States grants all but a few countries, namely Cuba and North Korea, normal trade
relations (NTR), or MFN, status.2 In practice, duties on the imports from a country that has not
been granted NTR status are set at much higher levels—rates that are several times higher than
those from countries that receive such treatment. Thus, imports from a non-NTR country can be
at a significant price disadvantage compared with imports from NTR-status countries.
The WTO agreements also require that MFN treatment be applied “unconditionally.” However,
when a WTO member determines that it cannot, for political or other reasons, accede to this or
any other GATT/WTO principle toward a newly acceding member, it can “opt-out” of its
obligations toward that member by invoking the non-application provision (Article XIII of the
WTO or Article XXXV of the GATT). In so doing, the WTO member is declaring that the WTO
obligations and mechanisms (e.g., the dispute settlement mechanism) are not applicable in its
trade with the new member in question.
Invoking the non-application clause is a double-edged sword. Although it relieves the member
invoking the provision of applying MFN or any other obligations toward the new member, it also
denies the benefits and protections that the WTO would provide to the former in its trade with the
latter.

1
Some exceptions are permitted. For example, the GATT 1994 and the GATS allow members to form free-trade areas
and customs unions that extend preferential treatment to trade among the members of the free-trade area and customs
union but not to countries outside the arrangement. They also permit developed countries to extend unilateral
preferential treatment to developing countries under generalized system of preference (GSP) or similar programs.
These exceptions are allowed under specified conditions. A member country may also seek a special waiver in its
application of MFN to another member, subject to the approval of at least three-fourths of the WTO membership. The
GATS and TRIPs also provide for some MFN exceptions.
2
The terms normal trade relations (NTR) status and most-favored-nation (MFN) status are used interchangeably. MFN
was replaced by NTR in U.S. law in 1998 to dispel the notion that MFN conveyed a preferential benefit. However, the
term MFN is still widely used in the WTO and international trade agreements.

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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Communist and
Former Communist Country GATT/WTO Members
In 1951, the United States suspended MFN status to all communist countries (except Yugoslavia)
under Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act. That provision was superseded by Title
IV of the Trade Act of 1974.
Section 401 of Title IV requires the President to continue to deny nondiscriminatory status to any
country that was not receiving such treatment at the time of the law’s enactment on January 3,
1975. In effect, this meant all communist countries, except Poland and Yugoslavia. Section 402 of
Title IV, the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, denies the countries eligibility for NTR status
as long as the country denies its citizens the right of freedom of emigration. These restrictions can
be removed if the President determines that the country is in full compliance with the freedom-ofemigration conditions set out under the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The Jackson-Vanik
amendment also permits the President to waive full compliance with the freedom-of-emigration
requirements if he determines that such a waiver would promote the objectives of the amendment,
that is, encourage freedom of emigration.3 While Title IV addresses only freedom of emigration,
Congress has used the law to press the subject countries on a number of economic and political
issues. Removal of a country from Jackson-Vanik restrictions requires Congress to pass
legislation.
Czechoslovakia was an original signatory to the GATT in 1947. In 1951, the United States
suspended MFN treatment because it had become communist. Because Czechoslovakia was an
original signatory to the GATT and not a newly acceding member, the non-application provision
did not apply. Instead, the United States sought and obtained from the other GATT signatories
approval for the suspension of MFN treatment.4
The United States invoked the non-application provision when Romania and Hungary became
GATT signatories in 1971 and 1973, respectively. These restrictions no longer applied after the
United States, through legislation, extended unconditional MFN, or permanent normal trade
relations (PNTR), status to Czechoslovakia (later the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Hungary,
and Romania after the fall of the communist governments in those countries.
The United States granted PNTR to Albania, Bulgaria, and Cambodia before these countries
acceded to the WTO, making it unnecessary to invoke the non-application provision. This was
also the case for the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Mongolia joined the WTO on January 29, 1997, more than two years before the United States
granted it PNTR. During that time, the United States invoked the non-application provision. It
3

For more information on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, see CRS Report 98-545, The Jackson-Vanik Amendment: A
Survey, by (name redacted). (Out of print; available on request from the author.)
4
Pregelj, Vladimir N. Normalization of U.S. Commercial Relations with East Europe. In U.S. Joint Economic
Committee. East European Economic Assessment. A Compendium of Papers. July 10, 1981, p. 671. Cuba was also an
original signatory to the GATT. When the United States suspended MFN as part of a total trade embargo on Cuba in
1962, it did not seek such approval, but Cuba has never challenged the suspension of MFN. Pregelj, Vladimir N. CRS
Report 75-192. United States-Cuban Trade Relations: Their Present Legal Status and Action Required For Their
Normalization. August 27, 1975. (Out of print; available on request from the author.)

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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

also invoked the provision with Armenia when it joined the WTO on February 5, 2003, and
received PNTR on January 7, 2005, and with Kyrgyzstan when it joined the WTO on December
20, 1998, before receiving PNTR on June 29, 2000. Each bill authorizing PNTR for Mongolia,
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Georgia contained a “finding” that extending PNTR would enable the
United States to avail itself of all rights within the WTO regarding that country. The United States
invoked Article XIII also in its trade relations with Vietnam on November 7, 2006, before PNTR
for Vietnam went into effect, but had granted Ukraine PNTR status in 2006 prior to that country’s
accession to the WTO. It invoked non-application regarding Moldova and Russia prior to thsoe
countries receiving PNTR status.

The Case of China
As with the other communist countries, China was subject to the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik
amendment. The United States denied China MFN status until October 1979, when it was granted
conditional MFN under the statute’s presidential waiver authority. China acceded to the WTO on
December 11, 2001. Congress passed legislation (P.L. 106-286) removing the Jackson-Vanik
requirement from U.S. trade with China and authorizing the President to grant PNTR to China,
which he did on January 1, 2002. However, in the legislation, Congress linked the granting of
PNTR to U.S. acceptance of conditions for accession to the WTO. It states that prior to making a
determination on granting PNTR, “the President shall transmit to Congress a report certifying that
the terms and conditions for the accession” of China to the WTO “are at least equivalent to those
agreed to” in the bilateral agreement the United States and China reached as part of the accession
process.5
China’s bilateral agreement with the United States, which is contained in the final accession
agreement, contains provisions for special safeguard procedures (codified in U.S. law as Sections
421-423 of the Trade Act of 1974) to be used when imports cause or threaten to cause market
disruption in the United States. It also provides for a separate safeguard procedure in the case of
surges in imports of textiles and wearing apparel from China, as well as special antidumping and
countervailing duty procedures. All of these provisions have time limits. The legislation
authorizing PNTR for China also provided for the establishment of a congressional-executive
commission to monitor human rights protection in China to replace Congress’s focus on this issue
that occurred during the annual NTR renewal debate.6

Prospective WTO Accessions
Countries that are still subject to the restrictions have also applied for membership to the WTO
and are at various stages of the accession process: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan. Congress usually has no legislative role in the accession of countries to the
WTO. However, the legislative requirement for repeal of Title IV provides a role, albeit

5
As part of the WTO accession process, candidate countries must complete bilateral negotiations with any WTO
member that wishes to do so. The agreement obligates the acceding country to change laws or practices to meet the
needs of the specific WTO member. All of the bilateral agreements plus the agreement with a WTO Working Party are
combined into a protocol of accession laying down the conditions for the country to enter the WTO.
6
For more information, see CRS Report RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues, by (name redacted).

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The Jackson-Vanik Amendment and Candidate Countries for WTO Accession

indirectly, in the cases of the above-mentioned affected countries by giving Congress leverage on
the negotiation of conditions for WTO accession.
Congress has several options. It could repeal the restrictions before the country(ies) actually
enter(s) the WTO, completely separating the issues of Title IV repeal and WTO accession. This is
the course that Congress has followed in most cases to date and would allow the United States to
fulfill the unconditional MFN requirement prior to the country acceding to the WTO. Many of the
countries in question, view the Jackson-Vanik requirements and the rest of the Title IV
restrictions as Cold War relics that have no applicability to their current emigration policies and,
more generally, to the types of governments they now have. They assert that their countries
should be treated as normal trade partners and, therefore, that the restrictions should be removed
unconditionally.
A second option would be for Congress to link the granting of PNTR with the country’s accession
to the WTO. For example, Congress could follow the model established with PNTR for China by
requiring the President to certify that the conditions under which the country is entering the WTO
are at least equivalent to the conditions that the United States agreed to under its bilateral
accession agreement with the country. It can be argued that in this way, Congress helped define,
at least indirectly, the conditions under which China entered the WTO. However, the candidate
countries would probably bridle at such treatment, asserting that they would be asked to
overcome hurdles that are not applied to most of the other acceding countries, especially
countries not subject to Jackson-Vanik.
During the debate on PNTR for Russia, some Members of Congress raised concerns about
Russia’s fulfillment of commitments in certain areas and wanted some assurances. H.R. 6156,
which authorized PNTR for Russia, contained provisions that required
•

the USTR report annually to the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways
and Means Committee on Russia’s implementation of its WTO commitments,
including sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards and IPR protection and on
acceding to the WTO plurilateral agreements on government procurement and
information technology;

•

the USTR report to the two committees within 180 days and annually thereafter
on USTR actions to enforce Russia’s compliance with its WTO commitments;

•

the USTR and the Secretary of State report annually on measures that they have
taken and results they have achieved to promote the rule of law in Russia and to
support U.S. trade and investment by strengthening investor protections in
Russia;

•

the Secretary of Commerce to take specific measures against bribery and
corruption in Russia, including establishing a hotline and website for U.S.
investors to report instances of bribery and corruption; a description of Russian
government policies, practices, and laws that adversely affect U.S. digital trade
be included in the USTR’s annual trade barriers report (required under section
181 of the Trade Act of 1974); and

•

the negotiation of a bilateral agreement with Russia on equivalency of SPS
measures.

A third option would be for Congress to not repeal Title IV at all. This option would send a strong
message to the partner country of congressional concerns or discontent with its policies or

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practices without preventing the country’s entrance into the WTO. At the same time, the United
States would have to invoke the non-applicability provision (Article XIII) in its trade relations
with that country. The United States would not benefit from the concessions that the partner
country made in order to accede to the WTO. The United States would not be bound by WTO
rules in its trade relations with the country, nor would that country be so bound in its trade with
the United States. For example, the WTO dispute settlement body mechanism would not be
available to the two countries in their bilateral trade relationship.
In determining which option to exercise, Congress faces the balance of costs and benefits of each.
In addition, how Congress treats each of the countries relative to the others could have
implications for U.S. relations with them.
The 113th Congress may face the issue of extending PNTR to at least two r countries. On
December 10, 2012, WTO members invited Tajikistan to join, subject to that country’s ratification
of its accession package. In addition, Kazakhstan may accede to the WTO in 2013. Both countries
are currently subject to Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARS22398. Public record. Not legal advice.
