# Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARS21238

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** August 21, 2013
- **Citation:** RS21238

## Text

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests
-name redactedSpecialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
August 21, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RS21238

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Summary
Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The
landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the
largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of
regional trade and transport networks. The existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his post
following the country’s independence, and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has pursued a
policy of caution in economic and political reforms, and many observers have criticized
Uzbekistan’s human rights record.
The United States pursued close ties with Uzbekistan following its independence. After the
terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Uzbekistan offered over-flight and
basing rights to U.S. and coalition forces. However, U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad were
terminated in 2005 following U.S. criticism and other actions related to the Karimov
government’s allegedly violent crackdown on unrest in the southern city of Andijon. Since then,
the United States has attempted to improve relations, particularly in support of operations in
Afghanistan. In 2009, Uzbekistan began to participate in the Northern Distribution Network of
land, sea, and air transit routes from Europe through Eurasia for U.S. and NATO military supplies
entering and exiting Afghanistan.
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all
agencies and programs). Of this aid, about two-fifths was budgeted for combating weapons of
mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing,
counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and anti-crime support. Food, health, and other social
welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for nearly one-fourth, and democratization aid accounted
for nearly one-fifth. Budgeted assistance was $11.3 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in
FY2012, and the Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (these latter amounts
include foreign assistance listed in the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funding; country data for FY2013 are
not yet available).
In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 108-7) and thereafter, Congress prohibited
foreign assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and
reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect
human rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of
expression, and the independence of the media. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking
Uzbek government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been
responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights. Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) provides for the Secretary of State to waive conditions
on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months and every six months
thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as necessary to facilitate
U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. Such waivers have been issued.

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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Contents
Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1
Human Rights ............................................................................................................................ 4
Economic Developments ................................................................................................................. 8
Oil and Gas .............................................................................................................................. 10
Foreign Policy and Defense ........................................................................................................... 11
Terrorism and Unrest ..................................................................................................................... 15
The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan ............................................................................. 16
U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 17
Contributions to Counter-Terrorism .............................................................................................. 21

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................... 26

Tables
Table 1. U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY1992FY2001 ....................................................................................................................................... 24
Table 2. US Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY2002-FY2010
(and Totals, FY1992-FY2010).................................................................................................... 25

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26

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Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Political Background
Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of
1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The landlocked country is the largest in
Central Asia in terms of population and the
third-largest in territory (behind Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan; see box and Figure 1). The
existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his
post following the country’s independence,
and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has
pursued a policy of cautiously opening the
country to global economic and other
influences.
In January 2002, Karimov orchestrated a
referendum on a new constitution that created
a bicameral legislature. A constitutional
provision extended the presidential term to
seven years. The legislature (termed the Oliy
Majlis or Supreme Assembly) consists of a
120-member (later expanded, see below),
directly elected lower chamber, the Legislative
Chamber, and a 100-member upper chamber,
the Senate. The Senate is composed of 16
members appointed by the president, with the
rest selected by local legislatures. The
Legislative Chamber has formal responsibility
for drafting laws. Constitutional amendments
approved in April 2003 established that—after
the presidential election at the end of 2007—
the prime minister would exercise greater
power. In January 2005, Karimov explained
that he aimed to create three powerful
branches of government, to correct a situation
where “everything now depends on me.”

Uzbekistan Basic Facts
Area and Population: Land area is 172,742 sq. mi.,
slightly larger than California. The population is 28.7
million (World Factbook, July 2013 est.). Administrative
subdivisions include the Karakalpak Republic.
Ethnicity and Religion: 80% are Uzbek, 5.5% Russian,
5% Tajik, 3% Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak, 1.5% Tatar, and
others (World Factbook, 1996 est.). More than 1.2
million Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan, 1 million in
Tajikistan, and 500,000 in Kyrgyzstan. Most Uzbeks
follow Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school, although Sufiism
is influential.
Gross Domestic Product: $106.4 billion; per capita
GDP is about $3,600 (World Factbook, 2012 est.,
purchasing power parity).
Political Leaders: President: Islam Karimov; Prime
Minister: Shavkat Mirziyoyev; Speaker of the Legislative
Chamber: Diloram Tashmukhamedova; Speaker of the
Senate: Ilgizar Sobirov; Foreign Minister: Abdulaziz
Komilov; Defense Minister: Major-General Qobil
Berdiyev.
Biography: Karimov, born in 1938, worked in Uzbek
state planning and finance for much of his early career. In
1989, he became First Secretary of the Uzbek
Communist Party. In 1990, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet
elected him to the newly created post of president, and
he also became a member of the Soviet Communist
Party Politburo. In December 1991, he was popularly
elected president of Uzbekistan, winning 86% of the vote
against opposition Erk Party candidate Mohammad Solikh
(Salih). In 1995, Karimov orchestrated a popular
referendum to extend his presidency until 2000, won
reelection, and in 2002 orchestrated another referendum
to extend his term until 2007. He was reelected in
December 2007.

Only government-controlled parties operate legally: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP),
formerly the communist party headed by Karimov; the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party;
the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), consisting of government-connected businessmen; the
Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) Party, consisting of state-supported intellectuals; and the
Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan. Opposition parties such as Birdamlik, Birlik, Erk, Free
Farmers, and the Sunshine Coalition are illegal. The former Fidokorlar (Self-Sacrifice) National
Democracy Party, created by Karimov as a youth party, merged with the National Revival Party
in June 2008, and the enlarged party joined the “Democratic Bloc” of Legislative Chamber
factions (including Adolat and the Liberal Democratic Party) in August 2008. A constitutional law
on parties and democratization came into effect in 2008 that permits “opposition” party deputies
in the Legislative Chamber to offer alternative bills and take part in debates. The law also calls

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for the president to “consult” with Legislative Chamber factions before nominating a candidate
for prime minister.
In December 2008, President Karimov signed electoral legislation that eliminated the nomination
of candidates for legislative and presidential elections by independent initiative groups, leaving
only parties as eligible to nominate candidates.1 The law also expanded the size of the Legislative
Chamber from 120 to 150. Fifteen of the members of the Chamber are to be elected by delegates
to a conference of the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), registered as a political party
in September 2008. The EMU proclaims that it is not like green parties in other countries, so that
it can focus on environmental issues rather than grasping for political power.
The Uzbek Central Election Commission (CEC) in mid-November 2007 approved four
candidates to run in the prospective December 23, 2007, presidential election. Incumbent
President Karimov was nominated by the LDP. The party which Karimov once headed, the PDP,
nominated its current head, Asliddin Rustamov. The Adolat Social Democratic Party nominated
its head, Dilorom Toshmuhammadova. A citizen’s initiative committee nominated Akmal Saidov.
The CEC disqualified the candidates nominated by the Milliy Taklanish and Fidokorlar parties at
their conventions (the latter party had sponsored Karimov during his 2000 election), saying they
had not gathered enough signatures. Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more
than two terms, the CEC argued that since the most recent constitution was approved in 2002,
Karimov’s “first term” followed his election in January 2000, and that he was eligible to run for a
“second term” in December 2007.
According to the report of a small election observation mission sponsored by the OSCE’s Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Uzbek CEC and local electoral
commissions controlled public appearances and spending by the candidates. There were no
campaign debates and media coverage was minimal, according to ODIHR. Each presidential
candidate used similar language to laud economic development and democratization under the
incumbent president. State-owned media urged the electorate to vote for Karimov. According to
the CEC, Karimov received 88% of 14.8 million votes with a 90.6% turnout. The OHIDR
election mission issued a press statement assessing the election as “generally fail[ing] to meet
many OSCE commitments for democratic elections.” Besides the problems noted above, others
included lax rules regarding early voting, frequent voting by one member of a household for all
members, and an observed low turnout.2
Elections to the Legislative Chamber were held on December 27, 2009. Over 500 candidates from
the four approved parties ran for 135 seats, and an additional 15 seats were filled by voting at a
conference of the EMU. Turnout reportedly was almost 88% of 17.2 million registered voters.
The Central Electoral Commission reported that in 39 districts no candidate had received over
50% of the vote, so that run-offs would be held on January 10, 2010. Following these run-offs,
1

The chairman of the Legislative Chamber’s Committee on Legislation, Nurdinjon Ismoilov hailed the elimination of
this nomination process as “preventing various troublemakers from getting into parliament, including members of
organized crime groups, and their acquiring deputy immunity. This measure also prevents a parliament post from being
used to pursue clannishness and promote parochial and corporate interests.” National Word, 6 December, 2008, quoted
in Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov, “On the Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan,” Central
Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.
2
OSCE, ODIHR, Press Release: Strictly Controlled Uzbek Elections Did Not Offer a Genuine Choice, ODIHR
Observers Conclude, December 24, 2007; Republic Of Uzbekistan, Presidential Election, 23 December 2007,
OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission: Final Report, April 23, 2008.

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the Liberal Democratic Party had won 53 seats, the People’s Democratic Party had won 32 seats,
the Milliy Tiklanish Party had won 31 seats, and the Adolat Social Democratic Party had won 19
seats. The OSCE declined to send observers, stating that the electoral environment did not permit
a free and fair contest. Some U.S. embassy personnel observed some of the voting, and the
embassy stated afterward that the election campaign failed to reflect diverse viewpoints, since
candidates from only pro-Karimov parties were permitted to run.3 Indirect elections to the Senate
were held on January 20-22, 2010. The president’s 16 appointees to the Senate included deputy
prime ministers, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and the foreign minister, making the Senate
an amalgam of the three branches of government.
Perhaps to create the appearance of diversity, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish
Party, and the Adolat Social Democratic Party have declared that they form a “majority
democratic bloc” in the Legislative Chamber. The People’s Democratic Party has declared that it
is the “minority opposition” party. Opening a joint session of the newly elected legislature in late
January 2010, President Karimov called for studying the activities of the U.S. Congress in order
to boost the role of budgeting and oversight in the Uzbek legislature.4
In a speech in November 2010, President Karimov called for several constitutional changes which
were approved by the legislature and signed into law by the president in April 2011. One of the
changes provides for the political party that controls a majority of seats in the lower legislative
chamber to have the right to nominate a candidate for prime minister (all existing political parties
are pro-Karimov). Procedures also are outlined for the legislature to hold a vote of no confidence
in the prime minister. The prime minister is given responsibility for appointing regional
administrators, a power formerly lodged with the president. Another amendment specifies that in
the event the president is incapacitated, the chairman of the Senate will serve as the interim head
of state pending the holding of a presidential election within three months. Some skeptics have
linked the constitutional changes to government concerns that civil discontent could become
manifest as it did in several Middle Eastern countries in early 2011. Others suggest that since
some of the ostensible reform efforts predate the “Arab Spring,” they are linked to infighting
within the elite. Perhaps supporting the latter view, in mid-July 2011 the legislature passed a joint
resolution criticizing an economic report delivered by the prime minister.5
On December 5, 2011, the legislature approved amendments to the constitution reducing the
presidential term from seven to five years. The change was hailed as advancing democratization,
but was a reversion to the pre-2002 term in office. In March 2012, the legislature approved
holding legislative elections on December 28, 2014, and the presidential election in March or
April 2015. Some observers suggest that President Karimov might consider succession
contingencies at that time, such as designating a possible heir.

3
OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections 27 December 2009: OSCE/ODIHR Needs
Assessment Mission Report, October 21-22, 2009; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Holds Parliamentary
Elections,” Eurasia Insight, December 28, 2009. Uzbek analysts Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov claim that
turnout was actually around 50% or less and that candidates were pre-designated to win seats. They argue that even
though “the political parties of Uzbekistan are incapable of rallying people around them and governing the state,” the
parties are gaining experience and eventually may be permitted to freely and effectively aggregate interests. “On the
Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.
4
Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), January 28, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950069.
5
CEDR, July 22, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950121.

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In April 2012, Uzbek legislators and officials visiting the United States reported that bills had
been introduced to provide for the legislature to hold hearings to question the prime minister, to
hold a vote of non-confidence in the government, and to strengthen the rights of NGOs.6
Displaying a guarded attitude toward democratization, President Karimov stated in June 2012 that
“we should live in an evolutionary way ... not in a revolution or coup.... Tell me if it is possible to
say a people happy, if they live in uncertainties: how will life change tomorrow, how will prices
change, what sort of calamities are awaiting us.... Only peace, tranquility and unity make ... the
Uzbek people [happy].... This is the Uzbek people’s biggest demand from life.”7 U.S. analyst
Martha Olcott has argued that Uzbek society is becoming more religiously traditional (although
not radical), and that politics will probably be influenced by these societal views, so that a secular
liberal democratic political system may not soon emerge.8
In December 2012, President Karimov stressed that the country was following a path of
“evolutionary” democratization, including by increasing the checks and balances among the three
branches of power and strengthening political parties. At the same time, he stated that the
government’s power would continue to increase in the “transitional period” in order for it to
direct the reforms, and cautioned that the process of democratization was lengthy and neverending.9

Human Rights
The NGO Freedom House repeatedly has included Uzbekistan among nine countries such as
North Korea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan ranked as “the world’s worst human rights
abusers” in terms of human rights and civil liberties.10
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012,
police routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions, and torture
reportedly was common in prisons and detention facilities. The government frequently harassed,
arrested, and prosecuted human rights activists and political oppositionists. Most human rights
organizations estimated that authorities held hundreds or even thousands of political prisoners.
There were no jury trials. In the vast majority of criminal cases brought to court, the defendant
was found guilty. Judges often based their verdicts solely on confessions and witness testimony
extracted through abuse and threats to family members. In mid-2012, Gulnaza Yuldasheva, a
human rights activist, was convicted of charges of extortion viewed by many observers as
politically motivated; she had earlier accused a number of local officials of complicity in human
trafficking. Officials released some high-profile prisoners during the year, and a few police
officers were convicted on charges of torture or other abuse. In late 2012, legislation was
approved that ostensibly expanded the use of habeas corpus in criminal cases.

6

Carnegie Endowment, Current Developments in Uzbekistan’s Parliament, April 26, 2012, at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/26/current-developments-in-uzbekistan-s-parliament/acih.
7
CEDR, June 18, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950118.
8
Martha Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2012).
9
CEDR, December 8, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950005.
10
The Worst of the Worst 2012, Freedom House, 2012; Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House, 2013; Nations in
Transit, Freedom House, June 18, 2013.

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The government severely limited freedom of expression. The law imposed significant fines for
libel and defamation, and insulting the president was punishable by up to five years in prison. The
government used such charges as well as other methods to arrest, harass, and intimidate
journalists. The government allowed publication of a few private newspapers with limited
circulation that included infrequent stories critical of government socio-economic policies. Four
state-run television channels dominated broadcasting. Regional television outlets sometimes
broadcast some moderately critical stories on local issues. In late 2012, the government
reportedly issued new regulations widening control over media, including the power to block or
ban media that threaten the integrity of the “national information space.” The government
regularly gave explicit instructions about the types of stories permitted for publication.
The government often restricted freedom of assembly. Authorities dispersed and occasionally
detained persons who were involved in peaceful protests. The law requires that all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) be registered formally with the government. The government
compelled most NGOs to join a state-controlled NGO association that enabled close oversight
over their funding and activities. The government limited freedom of travel and emigration, in
particular through the continued requirement for citizens and permanent residents to obtain exit
visas, although it generally granted the visas. There were reports that the government delayed exit
visas for human rights activists and independent journalists. Government-compelled forced labor
occurred during the cotton harvest, including 15- to 18-year-old students, teachers, medical
workers, government and military personnel, retirees, and persons receiving welfare. Credible
reporting suggested that the expanded use of forced mobilization of adult state workers was to
compensate for reductions in labor by children younger than 15.11
Since November 2006, the State Department has designated Uzbekistan a “country of particular
concern” (CPC), for severe religious and other human rights violations that could lead to U.S.
sanctions. However, since 2009, the State Department has issued waivers for Uzbekistan, so that
no U.S. sanctions have been taken. According to the State Department, the Uzbek government
“engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” including
restrictions on unregistered groups and the prohibition of many activities, such as proselytizing.
Many members of registered and unregistered minority religious groups faced heavy fines and
short jail terms. The government continued to deal harshly with Muslims who practiced outside
of sanctioned mosques, but permitted the regular activities of religious groups deemed
traditionally present in the country, including the Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, and Russian
Orthodox communities. The State Department followed the recommendation of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom in again designating Uzbekistan as a CPC.12
In June 2013, the State Department reported that Uzbekistan is a source country for human
trafficking for forced labor and sex, and that while the government greatly reduced the number of
children under 15 years of age involved in the 2012 cotton harvest, the government continued to
subject older children and adults to forced labor in the harvest. Also, Uzbekistan has not
demonstratively investigated or prosecuted government officials suspected to be complicit in
forced labor. The State Department estimates that there are over 1 million individuals subject to
state-imposed internal forced labor in Uzbekistan. Since designations began in 2003, Uzbekistan
has ranked as a Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, or Tier 3 country (a Tier 2 country does not fully
11

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012, April 19, 2013.
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, April 2013; U.S. Department of State, Annual
Report on International Religious Freedom, May 20, 2013.
12

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comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant
efforts to comply; a Watch List country does not fully comply, the number of victims may be
increasing, and efforts to comply are slipping; a Tier 3 country does not fully comply and is not
making significant efforts to do so). In the 2003, 2006, and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan was listed as
a Tier 3 country, but in the 2008-2012 reports, Uzbekistan was on the Tier 2 Watch List. In the
2011-2012 reports, Uzbekistan was granted waivers from an otherwise required downgrade to
Tier 3 because the government had written plans to comply, according to the State Department.
However, the government plans were not realized, and since Uzbekistan had exhausted its
maximum of two consecutive waivers, it was placed on Tier 3 in the 2013 report. Countries
placed on Tier 3 are subject to certain sanctions, including the withholding of non-humanitarian,
non-trade-related foreign assistance. However, Uzbekistan has received partial or full waivers.13
The U.S. Department of Labor has listed Uzbekistan as among countries that use child labor to
pick cotton. This list is meant to inform the choices made by the buying public.14 In addition, on
July 23, 2013, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan again was included on a list that requires
U.S. government contractors to certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine
whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.15
In testimony to Congress in April 2013, an official of the U.S. International Labor Rights Forum
(IRLF), an NGO, reported that as a member of the Cotton Campaign, an international coalition of
NGOs, industries, and trade unions, the IRLF had supported diplomatic and economic pressure on
Uzbekistan to end forced child and adult labor in cotton production. He reported that forced child
and adult labor continued to be used in the autumn 2012 cotton harvest, and that security
personnel were deployed on the farms to enforce production quotas and to prevent pickers from
taking pictures or otherwise documenting the use of forced labor. Ostensibly, the pickers were
“volunteers” recruited from government agencies, private firms, colleges, and high schools, the
latter including a majority of all faculty members. Children under age 15 were officially excused
from the harvest, although many aged 11-15 were observed in the fields. Individuals could pay a
fee in lieu of participating in the harvest, but most reportedly were afraid of repercussions such as
dismissal from a job or university if they did not participate, according to the ILRF official. He
also reported that the use of forced labor throughout the economy was increasing. The IRLF has
called for the U.S. Customs Service to enforce the Tariff Act of 1930 to block the importation of
Uzbek cotton materials produced by forced labor 16
The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was permitted to monitor the autumn 2011 cotton harvest in
Uzbekistan, but not the 2012 harvest, and the country continues to bar monitors from the U.N.’s
International Labor Organization. The Uzbek Ministry of Labor asserted in early September 2012
13

U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 19, 2013. See also Uzbekistan: Forced Labor
Widespread in Cotton Harvest, Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2013.
14
U.S. Department of Labor, List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 26, 2012; For an
assessment of the 2011 harvest, see Department of Labor, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, September 30,
2011.
15
U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition
of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/.
16
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global
Human Rights, and International Organizations, Hearing on Tier Rankings in the Fight Against Human Trafficking,
Testimony of Brian Campbell, Director of Policy and Legal Programs, International Labor Rights Forum, April 18,
2013; ILRF, Press Release: Leading Labor Rights Watchdog Calls on U.S. Customs Service to Halt Imports of Forced
Labor Cotton from Uzbekistan, May 15, 2013.

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that the use of forced child labor in the agricultural sector was not permitted in Uzbekistan. It
stated that all cotton in the country is produced on private “family farms,” where international
legal norms permit children who are members of farmers’ families to assist in chores. Observers
have pointed out that the Uzbek government owns the land and sets production quotas and prices,
and that the farmers are tenants under contract.17
At his confirmation hearing on May 15, 2011, Ambassador-designate to Uzbekistan George Krol
reportedly stated that the United States will “relentlessly raise individual cases of [human rights]
repression both privately and publicly at all levels of the Uzbekistani government and will seek to
identify opportunities to support and expand space for civil society and human rights activists.”
He also pledged that the United States would continue to support “embattled civil society and
independent media.”18
In June 2013, Hasan Choriyev—the 71-year old father of oppositionist Bahodyr Choriyev, who
fled Uzbekistan in 2004 and resides in the United States—was arrested on rape charges the day
after a report that his son might be interested in eventually running for president. Observers
deemed the charges politically motivated, given the elder Choriyev’s ill health and the fact that he
had been detained for questioning on another matter at the time of the alleged rape.
On June 26, 2013, 12 U.S. Senators sent a letter to President Karimov urging him to release
human rights lawyer Agzam Turgenov and journalists Dilmurod Saidov and Salijon
Abdurakhmanov, whom had been imprisoned in 2008-2009 and were termed political prisoners
by the Senators.
In July 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council issued a working group report on Uzbekistan that
contained recommendations by the member states on improving human rights conditions in
Uzbekistan. The United States urged that forced labor and hazardous child labor be eliminated,
that all torture allegations be independently investigated, that politically motivated prosecutions
be ended, and that the harassment and detention of persons who exercise their rights to freedoms
of expression, assembly, association, and religion be ended and that those held on such grounds
be released. Uzbekistan rejected all the U.S. recommendations, as well as all others as factually
incorrect or un-germane. The Uzbek delegation asserted that there are no political prisoners in
Uzbekistan, and that so-called journalists and human rights defenders who were imprisoned had
been sentenced for criminal actions. They stated that all allegations of torture are investigated and
that as a result, five law enforcement officers had been brought to justice in 2012 and that
religious freedom is recognized, except for proselytism, missionary activities, and the operation
of unregistered religious groups. Missionary activities and proselytism, it warned, could upset the
majority Muslim population and inter-faith relations. The delegation asserted that Uzbekistan
does not use forced child labor during the cotton harvest, and rejected calls for an ILO special
mission to inspect the harvest on the grounds that such requests were the “result of competition
for economic markets [by] a number of Western cotton companies.” They claimed that an April
2013 decision by the ICRC to halt visits to prisons in Uzbekistan was not due to lack of
cooperation by Uzbekistan, as averred by the ICRC. They also stated that male homosexual
relations would continue to be outlawed in accordance with tradition.19
17

CEDR, September 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950095.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination Hearing, Statement by George Krol, Nominee for
Ambassador to Uzbekistan, May 17, 2011.
19
U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Commission, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
(continued...)
18

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Economic Developments
After economic dislocations associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy
ceased to decline and began to turn around in 1996. In 2003, Uzbekistan announced that it would
permit full currency convertibility, but vitiated the reform by reducing money in circulation,
closing borders, and placing punitive tariffs on imports. These restrictions helped fuel organized
crime, corruption, and consumer shortages. Uzbekistan is the world’s third-largest cotton
exporter. The agricultural sector accounts for about one-fifth of the country’s GDP, and nearly
one-half of the population depends on agriculture and related activities for their livelihoods. The
largest portion of foreign currency earnings is based on cotton exports, followed by exports of
gold and natural gas. Most exports in 2011 went to China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine,
and Bangladesh. The government closely controls export earning sectors. The government claims
that 16% of the population remains in poverty, based on calories of food consumption per day. A
sizeable portion of the working-age population has migrated abroad for work. Some international
companies have boycotted purchases of Uzbek cotton and finished goods on the grounds that
forced child and adult labor is used in harvesting.
In response to the global economic downturn in 2008, the Uzbek government launched an anticrisis program to increase budgetary expenditures on infrastructure modernization, extend credit
to export industries, restructure bank debts, boost investment in small-sized businesses, and
augment public-sector wages and social welfare. Transfers from the Fund for Reconstruction and
Development (FRD; a pool of export and portfolio earnings launched in 2006, currently said to
hold $15 billion) were used for some of these expenditures, although the Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) firm alleges that mainly state-owned companies received the funds. A new industrial
and infrastructure modernization program set at $47 billion was launched for 2011-2015, which
the government hopes to finance partly with FRD funds and increased domestic and foreign direct
investment (FDI). A new program of privatization has been announced to attract FDI. However,
since 2010, dozens of foreign investors have had their businesses seized by the Uzbek
government. Some Turkish businessmen whose stores were seized in 2011 alleged that they were
tortured until they signed confessions of tax evasion and illegal activities.20 In January 2013, a
Russian telecom firm filed for bankruptcy in Uzbekistan, accusing Uzbek government officials of
seeking to destroy the firm and seize its assets. These confiscations of foreign assets reportedly
have contributed to a sizeable falloff in FDI since 2011.
The EIU states that the Uzbek government’s economic data are untrustworthy, so that the true
state of the economy is hard to ascertain. The EIU estimates that GDP increased by 8.0% in 2012.
Economic growth was supported by increasing remittances by migrant workers and robust growth
in the service, construction, and agricultural sectors, but was hampered somewhat by stalling
world prices for gold and falling prices for cotton. These problems may continue to impede GDP
growth in 2013, which the EIU estimates may slow to 7.3%. In July 2013, Uzbekistan reported a
near-record grain harvest.
(...continued)
Review: Uzbekistan, A/HRC/24/7, July 5, 2013.
20
Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent’s Sticky Fingers Spoiling Foreign Investors’ Appetites,” Eurasianet, August 1,
2012; “Businessman Files Torture Case Against Uzbekistan,” IWPR, April 30, 2012; Ashley Cleek, “Uzbekistan:
Foreign Business Exodus Continues,” Choihona—Eurasianet, June 19, 2012; ‘No One Left to Witness’: Torture, the
Failure of Habeas Corpus, and the Silencing of Lawyers in Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, December 2011.

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Migrant workers remitted $2.3 billion in 2012, according to the World Bank (Russia’s Central
Bank reported remittances of $5.7 billion in 2012). By some accounts, up to one-fourth or more
of Uzbekistan’s labor force may be employed abroad. Appearing to discount the pressures driving
Uzbeks to seek work abroad, on June 20, 2013, President Karimov stated that “I describe as lazy
those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets and squares. One feels disgusted with Uzbeks
going there for a slice of bread. Nobody is starving to death in Uzbekistan.... I call such people
lazy because they go there in order to make big money fast, and they are a disgrace to us all.”21
The EIU estimates that inflation was 14.3% at the end of 2012. The Uzbek government has tried
to limit inflation through price controls on food and energy, but also has contributed to inflation
by increasing public sector wages, pensions, and educational stipends at an average rate of about
20% per year since 2006, according to the World Bank.22 Added restrictions in early 2013 on the
purchase of foreign exchange by residents may increase the import costs for private businesses
forced to obtain foreign currency on the black market.
In late 2008, Tashkent suspended its membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (a
Russia-led group including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that promotes
unified customs tariffs and free trade). Some observers linked this action to Uzbekistan’s
opposition to Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist initiatives (other moves include
suspending participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organizaton; see below). However,
during his June 4, 2012, visit to Uzbekistan, President Putin and President Karimov signed a
memorandum of understanding pledging Russian support for Uzbekistan joining the CIS Free
Trade Zone, launched in 2011.Uzbekistan was formally admitted as a member of the Free Trade
Zone at the end of May 2013. Uzbekistan’s strict border controls and corruption stifle regional
trade, according to observers.
The United States and Uzbekistan have minimal trade. U.S. exports to Uzbekistan were about
$285 million in 2012 (mainly aircraft; see below), and imports were about $26 million, according
to the U.S. Commerce Department. Among major trade initiatives, Uzbekistan purchased four
Boeing 767s in late 2008, of which three were delivered by mid-2012. A joint venture between
General Motors and the Uzbek state automobile firm UzAvtosanoat, termed GM Uzbekistan, was
formed in 2008 and assembles over 200,000 automobiles annually for the Uzbek domestic market
and for export to Russia and elsewhere. Another joint venture between the two firms opened a
factory in November 2011 to assemble engines for GM Uzbekistan.
Tajikistan has alleged that Uzbekistan delays rail freight shipments, purportedly to pressure
Tajikistan to halt construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River, which
Uzbekistan fears could limit the flow of water into the country. In November 2011, Uzbekistan
closed a rail link to southern Tajikistan, reporting that a bridge was damaged, but since then
allegedly has dismantled the span. In early April 2012, Tajikistan’s prime minister and its foreign
ministry denounced the rail restriction as part of an “economic blockade” aiming to destabilize
Tajikistan. The Uzbek prime minister responded that all Uzbek actions were in accordance with
bilateral agreements or responses to Tajik actions, so that the accusations were “groundless.”23
21
CEDR, June 21, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-50969548; David Trilling, “Uzbekistan’s President Attacks “Lazy” Labor
Migrants,” Eurasianet, June 21, 2013.
22
Uzbekistan: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2013; Uzbekistan Partnership: Country Program
Snapshot, The World Bank Group, March 2013.
23
Yulia Goryaynova, Galim Faskhutdinov, and Saule Mukhametrakhimov, “A Gas Row Highlights Tajik-Uzbek
(continued...)

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In July 2013, Tajikistan claimed that it had released water from its Qayroqqum reservoir into the
Syr Darya River, which flows into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Tajik officials stated that they
acted to avert water shortages downstream, and blamed the lowered river flow on upsteam
Kyrgyzstan, which was impounding virtually all water in its Toktogul reservoir for winter power
generation.

Oil and Gas
British Petroleum’s (BP’s) Statistical Review of World Energy reports that Uzbekistan has about
600 million barrels of proven oil reserves and an estimated 39.7 trillion cubic feet of proven
natural gas reserves as of 2012 (negligible in terms of world oil reserves but about 0.6% of world
gas reserves).24 Uzbekistan is a net importer of oil. Uzbek oil production has been declining for
many years, attributable to lack of investment. The country consumes the bulk of its gas
production domestically, but has used its network of Soviet-era gas pipelines to export some gas
to Russia and to other Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). According
to BP, Uzbekistan exported about 479 bcf of gas in 2010 (since then, BP’s Statistical Review has
not reported exports for Uzbekistan). According to some reports, gas exports declined to 424 bcf
in 2011 but rebounded slightly to 441.4 bcf in 2012. Gas is provided to Russia and Kazakhstan
through the Russian-owned Central Asia-Center Pipeline system. Uzbekistan began to export
some gas through this pipeline system to Ukraine in 2011. Reportedly, Uzbekistan has been an
unreliable gas exporter to other Central Asian states in recent winters, diverting exports to meet
urgent cold-weather domestic needs. At the end of 2012, Uzbekistan suddenly ended gas
shipments to Tajikistan, and these had not resumed as of August 2013.
Uzbekistan largely has been closed to Western energy investment, although efforts to attract
international energy firms have appeared to increase in recent years. Russian firms Gazprom and
Lukoil are the largest investors in Uzbek gas development and production. Reportedly, Gazprom
pays European-pegged gas prices for only a fraction of imports from Uzbekistan. In 2005, CNPC
and Uzbekistan’s state-owned Uzbekneftegaz firm announced that they would form a joint
venture to develop oil and gas resources. In 2007, Uzbekistan and China signed an agreement on
building a 326-mile section of the Central Asia-China Pipeline, and a joint venture between
Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC launched construction in 2008. Two side-by-side pipelines were
completed in 2009-2010, and the third is under construction. In October 2011, Uztransgaz (Uzbek
gas transportation firm) and a subsidiary of CNPC signed a contract to supply gas though this
pipeline beginning in 2012. In April 2012, China announced it would spend $15 billion for oil
and gas exploration in Uzbekistan. A production sharing consortium composed of Uzbekneftegaz,
Lukoil, the Korea National Oil Corporation, and CNPC is exploring for gas in the Aral Sea
region.
In August 2012, Uzbekistan began to export gas to China through the Central Asia-China
pipeline. The Uzbek State Statistics Committee reported that energy exports in 2012 had nearly
doubled over those of the previous year, from $2.78 billion to $5.03 billion, with exports to China
probably accounting for much of the increase. Reportedly, the exports constrained domestic
supplies, which were under further pressure from the declining output of Uzbekistan’s oil and gas
(...continued)
Tensions,” IWPR, April 24, 2012; CEDR, April 3, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950105; April 4, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.
24
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2013.

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fields. Uzbekistan reportedly exported 141 bcf of gas to China in the latter part of 2012 and plans
to supply 353 bcf of gas to China in 2013. In May 2013, Shokir Fayzullayev, the chairman of the
board of the state holding company Uzbekneftegaz (Uzbek Oil and Gas), denied that gas exports
were to blame for shortages. He claimed that the domestic gas distribution system was
inadequate, particularly in the winter, but that it was being upgraded.

Foreign Policy and Defense
Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role
in regional affairs. Foreign policy is highly dependent on presidential decision-making. A new
foreign policy concept was submitted to the legislature by President Karimov and quickly
approved in early August 2012. It states that the main goals of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy are
strengthening the state’s independence and sovereignty; ensuring a role in international affairs;
joining the ranks of democratic and developed countries; and creating security, stability, and
cooperative ties with neighboring states. Relations with Central Asian states are deemed the
highest foreign policy priority because the vital interests of the country are connected with the
region, including water sharing. The concept states that “Uzbekistan has always remained
committed to conducting an open, friendly, and pragmatic policy towards its neighbors [and] is
taking political, economic and other measures to prevent its involvement in armed conflicts and
tensions in neighboring countries.” The concept calls for regional problems to be solved without
the interference of external forces. It proclaims that Uzbekistan “reserves the right to conclude
unions, join commonwealths and other interstate groups, and also leave them.” At the same time,
however, the concept appears to embrace neutrality in security relations, specifying that
“Uzbekistan pursues a peace-loving policy and does not take part in military-political blocs,” and
that the country “reserves the right of exit from any interstate group in the case of its
transformation into a military-political bloc” (these provisions appear to reflect Uzbekistan’s
limited or non-participation in military exercises; see below). The concept also states that
Uzbekistan neither will permit the stationing of foreign military bases on its soil—ostensibly
referring to new bases—nor will participate in peacekeeping operations abroad.25
From the late 1990s until mid-2005, Karimov’s priority was to seek closer ties with the United
States, the European Union, and NATO while maintaining working relations with Russia and
China. However, after the mid-2005 events in Andijon (see below), he shifted to closer ties with
the latter two states. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in
2003 insisted on hosting its Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. During his early June 2012 visit to
China to attend a SCO summit, President Karimov and Chinese President Hu Jintao had a side
meeting and signed a declaration on strategic partnership to herald closer ties. Uzbekistan will
host a meeting of the SCO prime ministers in September 2013.
Uzbekistan has ongoing tensions with other Central Asian states over its mining of borders,
water-sharing, border delineation, and other issues.
•

Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan have been problematic, including
disagreements about water-sharing, Uzbek gas supplies, the mining of borders,

25
“Uzbekistan to adopt Concept of Foreign Policy Activities,” UzDaily News Service, July 31, 2012; “Legislative
Chamber Approves Concept of Foreign Political Activities,” UzDaily News Service, August 1, 2012; Joanna Lillis,
“Uzbekistan: Tashkent Says No to Foreign Military Bases and Blocs,” Choihona—Eurasianet, August 3, 2012.

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border demarcation, and environmental pollution. In July 2008, the head of the
Tajik Supreme Court asserted that Uzbek security forces had bombed the
Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of efforts to topple the
government. In late 2010, Uzbekistan began a transit slowdown and other
economic measures to pressure Tajikistan to halt building the Rogun dam (see
above).
•

Turkmenistan’s relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been tense.
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have rival claims to some Caspian Sea oil and gas
fields. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence and argued
over water-sharing. In 2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of
conspiring to overthrow it. Uzbekistan also objected to the treatment of ethnic
Uzbeks in Turkmenistan under the previous president.

•

The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had
provided training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants. Karimov
again accused Kyrgyzstan in late May 2009 of harboring terrorists whom had
attacked across the border. After the April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
tightened border controls with this country, greatly harming its economy. Conflict
between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010
further strained relations between the two countries. Up to 100,000 ethnic
Uzbeks fled fighting in southern Kyrgyzstan to refugee camps in Uzbekistan.
Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene
militarily or permit its citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the fighting.26

•

On July 17, 2012, border guards exchanged gunfire at a Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan
border post, reportedly killing a guard on each side. Uzbekistan responded by
restricting border crossings at this post. In January 2013, Kyrgyz border guards
wounded five Uzbeks in the Uzbek enclave of Sokh in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken
Region, bordering Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks allegedly had attempted to block an
incursion into Sokh by the Kyrgyz border guards. Up to 1,000 local Uzbeks then
temporarily took over three dozen Kyrgyz hostage.27 Uzbekistan in retaliation
closed a road from Kyrgyzstan to a Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan, and this road
remains closed. In July 2013, Kyrgyzstan began building a fence around the Sokh
enclave. That same month, Kyrgyz guards allegedly killed two Uzbek guards
along the Namangan-Jalalabad regional border during a reported shoot-out.28

On the other hand, there have been some contacts between Karimov and other Central Asian
leaders:
•

In early September 2012, President Karimov visited Kazakhstan for a bilateral
summit. One observer suggested that this summit was an effort by the two major

26
According to Assistant Secretary of State Eric Schwartz, “the Government of Uzbekistan acted quickly and
constructively in response to the humanitarian crisis, [and] cooperated closely with U.N. agencies, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. These efforts helped many people in a time of dire
need.” U.S. Department of State. Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, June 29, 2010. See also
“Tashkent’s Response to Kyrgyz Crisis Boosts Karimov’s Image,” Eurasianet, July 15, 2010.
27
Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter, CEDR), January 7, 2013, Doc. Nos. CEP-7950026,
CEP-950027, CEP-950043, CEP-950025, CEP-950014, and CEP-950005; January 9, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950134;
Interfax, January 6 and January 9, 2013.
28
CEDR, July 29, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-57040555.

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regional powers to join together to spur greater region-wide integration,
including common responses to security threats such as terrorism and instability
in Afghanistan. The two leaders also aimed to bolster significant trade ties and
issued a joint statement on regional water-sharing.29
•

In mid-June 2013, President Nazarbayev visited Uzbekistan. The two presidents
signed a strategic partnership treaty, stressing that their two countries were the
most strategically important in Central Asia and the necessity of holding
“constant” bilateral consultations. Karimov stated that closer bilateral ties were
needed to address the drawdown of International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) operations in Afghanistan and to buttress economic development and
trade. Both leaders stated that each country was economically complementary to
the other. Both also emphasized that regional water issues should be resolved
peacefully and equitably with an internationally mediated independent
examination of environmental hazards. However, President Karimov also
suggested that the Kambarata and Rogun dams should not be constructed because
of the danger of earthquakes, and rejected the idea that water was a commodity
that could be traded.30

•

Since Berdimuhamedow came to power, relations between Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan have improved. In early October 2012, President Karimov visited
Turkmenistan and met with President Berdimuhamedow, and the two leaders
discussed boosting trade and other cooperation. They also called for region-wide
talks before Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan build dams that could affect watersharing. In February 2013, President Karimov phoned Berdimuhamedow to
invite him to visit to discuss joint projects.

Uzbekistan has developed some ties with post-Taliban Afghanistan. In August 2011, Uzbekistan
completed a 50-mile railroad linking its border town of Hairatan with the city of Mazar-e-Sharif
in Afghanistan. The railway is part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of U.S. and
NATO-developed land, air, and sea routes from Europe through Eurasia to Afghanistan. Since
2002, Uzbekistan has provided some electricity to northern Afghanistan. Since early 2008,
President Karimov has advocated the opening of U.N.-sponsored “6+3” Afghan peace talks
(participants would include regional powers Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
China, and Iran and outside powers NATO, the United States, and Russia), similar to the “6+2”
Afghan peace talks he had helped originate and which were held from 1999 to 2001 (NATO was
not included at that time). The United States has stressed an Afghan-led reconciliation process
(see also below, “Contributions to Counter-Terrorism”).
The Uzbek armed forces is the largest in the region in terms of manpower, but some observers
have argued that Kazakhstan’s military modernization efforts are challenging Uzbekistan’s
security dominance. The armed forces consist of about 24,500 ground force troops, 7,500 air
force troops, and 16,000 joint troops. There are also up to 19,000 internal security (police) troops
and 1,000 national guard troops.31 Uzbekistan spent about 3.1% (about $1.4 billion) of its GDP in
2011 on the defense sector, which would be about 10% of the budget. One report stated that much
29
Richard Weitz, “Nazarbayev-Karimov Summit Imparts New Momentum to Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Relations,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 14, 2012.
30
CEDR, June 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-70043496.
31
International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, March 14, 2013.

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of this spending was on officer and servicemen’s benefits, and that this high level of defense
spending was straining the budget.32 Uzbekistan’s military doctrine proclaims that it makes no
territorial claims on other states and adheres to nuclear non-proliferation. President Karimov has
stated that he strongly opposes military hazing and supports adequate social support for the
troops. Military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is ensured through a 1992
Friendship Treaty, a 1994 military treaty, a 1999 accord on combating terrorism and Islamic
extremism, and a November 2005 Treaty of Alliance. The latter accord calls for mutual
consultations in case of a security threat to either party.
After withdrawing in 1999, Uzbekistan rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization in
December 2006 (CSTO; members have included Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and the Central Asian
states except Turkmenistan). However, Uzbekistan declined to participate in rapid reaction forces
established in June 2009 because of concerns that the forces could become involved in disputes
within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; a grouping of Soviet successor states) on
the basis of decisions made by the affected parties (rather than solely upon the agreement of all
CSTO members). At CSTO summits in December 2010 and December 2011, the members
reportedly agreed on procedures for intervening in domestic “emergency” situations within a
member state at the behest of the member. At the latter meeting, they also agreed that no member
could host a foreign military base without the permission of the CSTO. Uzbekistan reportedly
raised concerns about these measures.33 On June 20, 2012, Uzbekistan informed the CSTO that it
was suspending its membership in the organization, including because the CSTO was ignoring its
concerns. However, Uzbek officials stated that the country would continue to participate in the
CIS air defense system and other military affairs. According to some observers, the withdrawal of
Central Asia’s largest military from the CSTO highlighted the organization’s ineffectiveness.34
During President Putin’s early June 2012 visit to Uzbekistan, the two sides concluded a
Declaration on Deepening the Strategic Partnership, building on a 2004 agreement, which called
for mutual consultations in the event of a threat to either party. Uzbekistan signed a strategic
partnership accord with China within a few days and with Kazakhstan in June 2013 (see above).
According to some observers, these accords have been pursued by Uzbekistan as preferable to the
CSTO as a means to buttress cooperation on stability in Central Asia as ISAF draws down its
forces in Afghanistan.35 President Karimov highlighted his concerns about Afghanistan in early
May 2013 when he stated that “the main threat for not only Uzbekistan but also for all countries
surrounding Afghanistan is the cruel war that has been continuing in Afghanistan for over 30
years.... Unfortunately, when [ISAF] leaves, conflicts will intensify between the forces which are
opposing each other.... Terrorism, drug addiction, drug trafficking, and various religious and
ethnic conflicts ... will escalate.... Tension will definitely increase in the Central Asian countries
after they pull out without having settled the problem of Afghanistan.”36
Although the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Center is in Tashkent, Uzbek troops have not
participated in SCO exercises, although its officers have been observers. Uzbek officers were
observers at SCO military exercises held in Kazakhstan in June 2013 (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik

32

“Uzbekistan: Where Conscripts Are Eager to Serve,” EurasiaNet, May 16, 2012 .
Interfax, December 21, 2011.
34
“Interview: Analyst Says Uzbekistan’s Suspension Shows CSTO Is ‘Irrelevant,’” RFE/RL, June 29, 2012.
35
CEDR, June 19, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-34596495.
36
CEDR, May 10, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-52388391.
33

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troops took part, while Russian and Chinese troops held separate SCO Peace Mission 2013
exercises in Russia in August 2013).

Terrorism and Unrest
On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area by various reports killed
16-28 and wounded 100-351. Karimov termed the bombing an assassination attempt. He alleged
that exiled Erk Party leader Mohammad Solikh (Salih) led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s
Taliban and IMU co-leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namanganiy. Solikh denied any role in
the bombings. In November 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences and
Solikh 15.5 years in prison. Another defendant, Najmiddin Jalolov (see below), received 18 years
(all in absentia). Other security threats included the invasion of neighboring Kyrgyzstan in JulyAugust 1999 by several hundred IMU and other guerrillas. They were rumored to be aiming to
create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. By midOctober 1999, they had been forced out of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbek aid. In August 2000, dozens of
IMU and other guerrillas again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were expelled by late
October.
A series of bombings and armed attacks took place in Uzbekistan in late March-early April 2004,
reportedly killing 47 individuals. President Karimov asserted that the attacks were aimed to
“cause panic among our people, [and] to make them lose their trust” in the government. The thenCombined Forces Commander for Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, visited
Uzbekistan in April 2004 and stressed that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing down this
terrorist menace.” The obscure Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan (IJU; reportedly a breakaway
faction of the IMU) claimed responsibility. Suspected terrorists testified at a trial in mid-2004 that
Jalolov was the leader of IJU, that they were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan
and Pakistan, and that the IJU was linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al
Qaeda. During this trial, explosions occurred on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli embassies
and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJU claimed responsibility.
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shootings took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and
the apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had
been involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to
terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the
IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it
linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the

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Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and IMU cohead Namanganiy was probably killed.37
Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”38 In May 2005, the State Department
designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global
Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.39 In June
2008, IJG head Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N.
1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin
Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their
assets under U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with
the terrorists.40 IMU head Yuldashev reportedly was killed in late August 2009 in Pakistan by a
U.S. predator drone missile, and Jalalov allegedly similarly was killed in late September 2009.
Yuldashev’s deputy, Abu Usmon Odil, became the head of the IMU.
In July 2011, an Uzbek citizen on an expired student visa was arrested on charges of being
directed by IMU terrorists to assassinate President Obama. He confessed and was sentenced in
2012. Two other ethnic Uzbeks were arrested in the United States in early 2012 on charges of
collaborating with the IJU. One of the Uzbeks had been granted refugee status after he fled the
Uzbek government crackdown in Andijon in 2005. He was arrested at a U.S. airport while
allegedly planning to join IJU terrorists abroad. In May 2013, an ethnic Uzbek was arrested in
Idaho on charges of providing money and computer support to the IMU for an unspecified attack.

The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist
group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released
hundreds of inmates.41 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.
President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late
on May 13.42 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted
37

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter
J. Goss, March 17, 2005.
39
U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under
Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Press
Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,
2005.
40
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June
18, 2008.
41
There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed
mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In
Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and
Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:
An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:
The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.
42
Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student
demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,
(continued...)
38

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to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that
they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.43
The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international
inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.
In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were
“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for
the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,
military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”44 In October
2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms
embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive
trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in
place.45 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.
At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused
all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a
branch of Hizb ut-Tahrira (HT), a banned Islamic political organization launched in 1994 by
Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a caliphate in the area of the Fergana
Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance from HT, Akramiya was alleged to
receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The defendants also claimed that the U.S.
and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their effort to overthrow the government,
and that international media colluded with local human rights groups and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz governments denied involvement, and
many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-managed. Reportedly, 100 or more
individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some Uzbek opposition party members and
media and NGO representatives.46 Partly in response, the U.S. Congress tightened conditions on
aid to Uzbekistan at that time (see below).

U.S. Relations
According to testimony to Congress in 2012 by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake,
“Uzbekistan has been a critical part of regional support for Afghanistan, building a rail line
connecting Afghanistan to Central Asia and providing electricity that benefits the Afghan people.
In addition, Uzbekistan has a central role in the NDN, with the majority of supplies transiting
through the Uzbek-Afghan border.” He also stated that U.S. officials continue to raise human
rights concerns and that “we continually advocate for those who seek peaceful democratic
(...continued)
resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.
43
See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by (name redacted).
44
Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,
November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at
congressional request—because of human rights abuses.
45
Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th
and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General
Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008.
46
OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial
Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Uzbekistan, Comments on the
Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.

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reforms. In particular, we ask the government to take steps to eliminate the forced labor of
children and adults during the cotton harvest.... We are also working with the Government of
Uzbekistan to increase religious freedom by addressing its overly restrictive religious registration
policies and allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful religious leaders.” He
raised hopes that Uzbekistan would address restrictive currency conversion law and pervasive
corruption, so that U.S. investment could increase. He also called for Uzbekistan to facilitate
scientific and educational exchanges.47
During President Karimov’s March 2002 U.S. visit, former Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz
Komilov and former Secretary of State Colin Powell signed a Declaration on Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation that set forth broad-scale goals for political, economic, security, and
humanitarian cooperation. The accord pledged the United States to “urgent consultations” in the
case of external security threats to Uzbekistan and pledged Uzbekistan “to further intensify the
democratic transformation of society in the political, economic and spiritual areas,” and to
“ensure the effective exercise and protection of human rights.”48 U.S. relations with Uzbekistan
were set back in 2005 after the United States joined others in the international community to
criticize an Uzbek government crackdown in the town of Andijon (see above). The criticism
contributed to Uzbekistan’s closure of over a dozen U.S.-based or U.S.-supported nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the termination of U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad
(see below), a fall-off in official and diplomatic contacts, and the strengthening of U.S.
congressional restrictions on aid to the Uzbek government (see directly below).
U.S.-Uzbek relations recently have improved, according to the Administration. Assistant
Secretary Blake visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a
reflection of the determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to strengthen ties
between the United States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries set up high-level
annual consultations to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas. These include trade
and development, border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development of civil society, and
individual rights.”49 The first Annual Bilateral Consultation (ABC) took place in late December
2009 with a U.S. visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. The two
sides drew up a plan for cooperation for 2010 that involved diplomatic visits, increased militaryto-military contacts, and investment and trade overtures.50
In November 2010, Assistant Secretary Blake testified to Congress that
the Obama Administration has increased its engagement with Uzbekistan on a full agenda of
security, economic and human rights issues. In the regional security field, Uzbekistan has
become a key partner for the United States’ effort in Afghanistan…. It has facilitated transit
for essential supplies to Coalition forces and constructed an important railroad line inside of
Afghanistan.... We have seen an improved relationship with Uzbekistan, but many

47
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing on
U.S. Engagement in Central Asia, Testimony by Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs, July 24, 2012.
48
U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Release: United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic
Partnership and Cooperation Framework, March 12, 2002, at http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/pr031203.html.
49
U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.
50
CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019.

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challenges remain. We continue to encourage the Uzbek authorities to address significant
human rights concerns.51

During her December 2010 visit to Uzbekistan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that an
improved bilateral relationship was “crucial” to U.S. interests. She reportedly thanked President
Islam Karimov for Uzbekistan’s support for the Northern Distribution Network (transport routes
supporting military operations in Afghanistan) and for other assistance to Afghanistan. She stated
that issues of human rights also had been discussed. She hailed the signing of a bilateral science
and technology cooperation agreement as an effort “to try to find other ways to connect with and
promote positive cooperation between our two countries.”52
The second U.S.-Uzbek ABC took place in February 2011 with a visit to Uzbekistan led by
Assistant Secretary Blake. The talks reportedly included security cooperation, trade and
development, science and technology, counter-narcotics, civil society development, and human
rights. A U.S. business delegation discussed means to increase trade ties. Blake reported that the
United States had purchased $23 million in Uzbek goods for transit to Afghanistan in FY2010
(see below).
President Obama telephoned President Karimov on September 28, 2011, to thank him for
Uzbekistan’s cooperation in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, and reportedly to urge him to
facilitate the transit of U.S. and NATO cargoes into and out of Afghanistan. During her October
22-23, 2011, visit to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Secretary Clinton discussed the U.S. “New Silk
Road Vision” to turn Afghanistan into a regional transportation, trade, and energy hub linked to
Central Asia. She also warned the presidents of both countries that restrictions on religious
freedom could contribute to rising religious discontent. A congressional delegation led by
Representative Dan Burton visited Uzbekistan in early July 2012 and met with President
Karimov, who called for closer Uzbek-U.S. ties.
The third ABC was held in August 2012, and like the second involved a visit to Tashkent by a
U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary Blake. He reported that the meeting covered
Uzbekistan’s support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, energy, agriculture, health,
parliamentary exchanges, education, science and technology, counter-narcotics, border security,
counter-terrorism, religious freedom, trafficking in persons, and human rights. At an associated
U.S.-Uzbek business forum, Assistant Secretary of State Blake raised concerns about currency
convertibility and contract sanctity that hamper foreign investment.53
In a speech in October 2012, Blake stated that because of Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record,
the United States provided it only non-lethal security assistance.54

51

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global
Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.
Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, November 17, 2010.
52
U.S. Department of State, Meeting With Staff and Their Families of Embassy Tashkent, December 2, 2010.
53
U.S. Department of State, Press Availability Following the U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations, August
17, 2012; Daniil Kislov, “U.S. Ambassador in Uzbekistan George Krol: ‘We Recognize Democracy May Develop and
Look Differently in Uzbekistan,’” Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 25, 2012.
54
U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs, [at] Indiana University’s Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center, October 18, 2012.

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Indicative of U.S. interest in Uzbekistan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jane Zimmerman
visited Uzbekistan in mid-July 2013, reportedly to discuss human rights issues, and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Commerce Matthew Murray visited in May to discuss trade and investment
(U.S. businesses discussed projects in Uzbekistan at a business round table in Washington D.C.
later that month). Assistant Secretary Blake visited Uzbekistan in late April 2013. He reported
that human trafficking and civil society problems were among human rights issues that were
discussed. He indicated that discussions were beginning on providing Uzbekistan with possible
excess defense articles from Afghanistan. He also stated that trade and investment issues were
discussed, including U.S. concerns about added restrictions on currency convertibility and
repatriation. Assistant Secretary of State Mike Hammer visited Uzbekistan in April 2013. He
discussed U.S. concerns about freedom of the press, while praising some Uzbek open government
initiatives. In March 2013, Secretary Kerry met with visiting Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov.
Secretary Kerry stated that U.S.-Uzbek relations were continuing to improve, and to expand
beyond mutual concerns about Afghanistan. In February 2013, a Congressional delegation headed
by Representative Dana Rohrabacher visited Uzbekistan.
Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all
agencies and programs), according to the data compiled by the State Department’s Office of the
Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Of this aid, $393.0 million (about twofifths) was budgeted for combating weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive
Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing, counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and
anti-crime support.55 Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for
$222.4 million (nearly one-fourth), and democratization aid accounted for $174.1 million (nearly
one-fifth). See Table 1 and Table 2.
Budgeted assistance was $11.34 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in FY2012, and the
Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (numbers include funds from the
Economic Support Fund and other “Function 150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy
Department funds). Country totals are not yet available for FY2013. The main priorities of U.S.
assistance requested for FY2014 are technical advice for Uzbekistan’s planned accession to WTO
($3 million); training for judges and defense lawyers on habeas corpus, funding to improve the
legal environment for NGOs, and other support for local NGOs and independent media ($1.8
million); and funding for health programs ($3 million).56
In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 108-7) and thereafter, Congress prohibited
assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported
that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human
rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression,
and the independence of the media. Congress received a determination of progress in FY2003. In
FY2004 and thereafter, however, some aid to Uzbekistan was withheld because of lack of
55

In addition to this peace and security assistance reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department
provided some coalition support payments to Uzbekistan, including a payment of $15.7 million for use of the KarshiKhanabad airbase and associated services, and the Defense Department in September 2005 announced an intention to
pay another $23 million owed for such services. On October 5, 2005, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for
FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold on the payment. Despite congressional
concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in November 2005. The conferees on H.R. 2863 later
dropped the amendment (H.Rept. 109-360; P.L. 109-359).
56
U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives,
FY2014, May 17, 2013.

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progress on democratic reforms. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek
government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been
responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights.
In late 2009, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-84, §801)—for the first time since restrictions were
put in place—the provision of some assistance on national security grounds to facilitate the
acquisition of supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan from countries along the
Northern Distribution Network. In 2010, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-117) an expanded IMET
program for training Uzbek military officers on human rights, civilian control of the military, and
other democracy topics.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74; signed into law on December 23, 2011)
provides for the Secretary of State to waive conditions on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of
not more than six months and every six months thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national
security grounds and as necessary to facilitate U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. The law
requires that the waiver include an assessment of democratization progress, and calls for a report
on aid provided to Uzbekistan, including expenditures made in support of the NDN in Uzbekistan
and any credible information that such assistance or expenditures are being diverted for corrupt
purposes. The law also extends a provision permitting expanded IMET assistance for Uzbekistan.
The State Department has issued waivers for assistance to Uzbekistan, while assessing human
rights conditions as of “serious concern.” Under the waivers, $2.69 million in Foreign Military
Financing was provided to Uzbekistan for FY2012, and $1.5 million is requested for FY2014.
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2013 (P.L. 113-6; signed into
law on March 26, 2013), calls for foreign assistance to be provided under the authority and
conditions provided in FY2012 in P.L. 112-74.

Contributions to Counter-Terrorism
Even before the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Uzbekistan had
cooperated with the United States on regional anti-terrorism efforts, including allegedly serving
as a base for U.S. drone operations in Afghanistan. This Uzbek support was attributed by
observers to the country’s concerns about the IMU. An agreement on the U.S. use of the
Khanabad airbase, near the town of Karshi (termed the K2 base) for Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) in Afghanistan was signed in October 2001, and a joint statement pledged the two sides to
consult in the event of a threat to Uzbekistan’s security and territorial integrity. This non-specific
security pledge was reiterated in the March 2002 “Strategic Partnership” accord (mentioned
above). In addition to security assurances and increased military and other aid, U.S. forces in
Afghanistan killed many terrorists belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU;
dedicated to the forceful establishment of Islamic rule in Uzbekistan). Uzbekistan allegedly also
served as a site for extraordinary renditions of U.S. terrorism suspects in the early 2000s.
Following U.S. criticism of Uzbek government actions in Andijon, the government demanded at
the end of July 2005 that the United States vacate K2 within six months (U.S.-Uzbek relations
had shown strains before this demand). On November 21, 2005, the United States officially
ceased operations at K2. The Uzbek government has permitted Germany to maintain a small

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airbase at Termez with about 163 troops. According to some German reports, the country has paid
an average of 11 million euros since 2002 for basing privileges.57
Among possible signs of improving U.S.-Uzbek relations, in early 2008 Uzbekistan reportedly
permitted U.S. military personnel under NATO command, on a case-by-case basis, to transit
through the Termez airbase operated by Germany.58 President Karimov attended the NATO
Summit in Bucharest, Romania, in early April 2008 and stated that Uzbekistan was ready to
discuss the transit of non-lethal goods and equipment by NATO through Uzbekistan to
Afghanistan. This issue was part of the agenda during then-Assistant Secretary of State Richard
Boucher’s May 30-June 3, 2008, visit to Uzbekistan. After the Commander of the U.S. Central
Command, General David Petraeus, visited Uzbekistan in January 2009, the country reportedly
began facilitating the transit of U.S. non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan as part of the NDN. A first
rail shipment of U.S. non-lethal supplies departed from Latvia and entered Afghanistan in late
March 2009 after transiting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. President Karimov announced
in May 2009 that the United States and NATO had been permitted to use the Navoi airport
(located between Samarkand and Bukhara in east-central Uzbekistan) to receive non-lethal
supplies, which could then be transported by air, rail, and ground to Afghanistan. In August 2009,
General Petraeus visited and signed an accord on boosting military educational exchanges and
training. Reportedly, these visits also resulted in permission by Uzbekistan for military overflights
carrying weapons to Afghanistan. President Karimov hailed the visit by General Petraeus as a
sign that “relations between our states are developing further. In the fact that we are meeting with
you again I see a big element of the fact that both sides are interested in boosting and developing
relations.”59
Among other security-related visits, in November 2010, then-U.S. Central Command Commander
James Mattis visited Uzbekistan, where he signed a military cooperation accord with GeneralMajor Kabul Berdiyev, the Uzbek Minister of Defense, on engagements and training between
USCENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense to be held in 2011, a follow-on to the accord signed
in August 2009. In late May 2011, Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough met with
President Karimov to discuss Uzbekistan’s assistance to Afghanistan. In early July 2011,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Kurt Amend
visited Uzbekistan. His specialties include defense cooperation and status of forces negotiations.
In February 2012, the director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Middle East
regional office, Mark Destito, visited the Interior Ministry and reportedly discussed DEA training
courses carried out in Uzbekistan. Also in February 2012, Elizabeth Jones, the Deputy Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, visited Uzbekistan to discuss its cooperation efforts
in Afghanistan.
In late March 2012, then-USCENTCOM Commander Mattis visited Uzbekistan and met with
Karimov. During this visit, the two sides signed an accord on military air transit of cargo and
personnel from Afghanistan, which the Uzbek legislature later approved. In early June 2012,
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced that agreements had been reached
57

International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, March 7, 2012; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan:
Tashkent Tries to Stuff Termez Genie Back in the Bottle,” Eurasianet, August 4, 2011.
58
“U.S. Military Returns to Ex-Soviet Uzbekistan,” Agence France Presse, March 6, 2008; “Only Germany Can Use
Uzbek Bases Now,” United Press International, December 13, 2005.
59
Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), August 18, 2009, Doc. No CEP950264; July
14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950075.

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with Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan for the land transit of materials from Afghanistan.
On June 12-13, 2012, Deputy Secretary Bill Burns visited Uzbekistan to discuss security issues,
including Afghanistan. He also met with civil society representatives. A few days later, Alice
Wells, the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, visited
Uzbekistan. U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) Commander William Fraser
visited in October 2012, reportedly to discuss NDN-related issued, and new USCENTCOM
Commander Lloyd Austin visited in July 2013.
Although Uzbekistan’s rail network to Afghanistan has been relied upon to ship most of the fuel
used by ISAF, corruption and bureaucracy in Uzbekistan reportedly have posed challenges to the
use of the NDN routes through the country.60 Reportedly, only a small percentage of ISAF
material is being shipped out of Afghanistan along the NDN for a variety of reasons, including
the difficulties of the mountainous terrain in northern Afghanistan, the focus of current military
operations in eastern Afghanistan, and restrictions by NDN transit states on cargoes, particularly
Uzbekistan.61

60

Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent’s Shakedown Practices Hold Up NDN Traffic – Contractors,” Eurasianet,
February 27, 2012.
61
Joshua Kucera, “Uzbekistan Setting Up Checkpoints On New Silk Road,” Eurasianet, June 19, 2013; Joshua Kucera,
“NDN Only Carrying Four Percent Of U.S. Military Traffic Out Of Afghanistan,” Eurasianet, June 24, 2013.

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Table 1. U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY1992-FY2001
(millions of current dollars)
Objective

FY1992

FY1993

FY1994

FY1995

FY1996

FY1997

FY1998

FY1999

FY2000

FY2001

Economic
Growth

0.56

3.73

17.92

5.55

14.76

13.04

10.61

6.33

1.75

4.34

Governing Justly
& Democratically

2.24

4.81

7.79

5.62

4.84

5.25

8.58

10.12

8.21

9.55

Investing in
People

0.81

3.36

3.62

1.78

3.33

3.6

3.71

9.08

6.73

7.56

Peace & Security

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.41

7.93

3.47

7.02

9.8

24.27

Humanitarian

2.0

3.1

4.73

1.4

0.0

1.06

0.48

14.34

12.57

1.26

Cross-Cutting &
Program Support

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.35

Total

5.62

15.0

34.07

14.44

23.34

30.88

26.84

46.88

39.06

48.33

Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes all agencies and accounts. Some rounding has occured.

CRS-24

Table 2. US Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY2002-FY2010 (and Totals, FY1992-FY2010)
(millions of current dollars)

Objective

FY2002

FY2003

FY2004

FY2005

FY2006

FY2007

FY2008

FY2009

FY2010

Total
(FY1993FY2010)

Economic Growth

36.37

11.68

10.29

9.05

3.32

3.54

0.88

0.71

1.25

155.69

Governing Justly &
Democratically

23.22

15.31

15.11

14.08

9.03

8.87

6.37

9.13

5.98

174.1

Investing in People

19.93

9.4

10.81

8.7

5.03

4.25

3.29

2.73

1.27

109.0

Peace & Security

82.53

39.18

41.62

43.43

28.67

17.82

26.82

33.98

25.95

393.01

Humanitarian

49.06

12.68

5.38

1.8

0.95

0.75

0.47

0.4

1.01

113.44

Cross-Cutting &
Program Support

13.02

2.53

1.03

1.21

2.29

0.67

0.5

1.6

1.9

26.11

Total

224.14

90.77

84.25

78.28

49.3

35.9

38.33

48.55

37.38

971.35

Source: Derived from U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia.
Notes: Includes all agencies and accounts. Some rounding has occurred.

CRS-25

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan

Source: CRS

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARS21238. Public record. Not legal advice.