# Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL34387 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** April 2, 2009 - **Citation:** RL34387 ## Text ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Š‘Ž›’—ŽȱŠ•Žȱ ™ŽŒ’Š•’œȱ’—ȱ —Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ ™›’•ȱŘǰȱŘŖŖşȱ ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ ǯŒ›œǯ˜Ÿȱ řŚřŞŝȱ ȱŽ™˜›ȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ž––Š›¢ȱ Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S.-led coalition military operation in Iraq, was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi security agreement that went into effect on January 1, 2009, which confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in OIF and in US-Iraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the agreement a “watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.” U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing “how the war in Iraq will end,” in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel. The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue. The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering strands of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying how U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. This report is intended to provide background and analysis of current developments and options, and will be updated as events warrant. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ˜—Ž—œȱ Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ............................................................................................................................... 1 Revised U.S.-Iraqi Strategic Partnership................................................................................... 3 Strategic Framework Agreement and Security Agreement................................................. 3 Security Agreement Provisions........................................................................................... 3 Drawdown and Transition ......................................................................................................... 4 Current Strategic and Operational Dynamics............................................................................ 8 Current Strategic Dynamics: Tests and “Spoilers” ............................................................ 8 Current Operational Dynamics: Transitions ....................................................................... 9 Diminishing U.S. Leverage................................................................................................11 Future Strategic Considerations ...............................................................................................11 Clarifying and Updating U.S. Interests and Strategic Objectives ......................................11 Applying Strategic Leverage ............................................................................................ 12 Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Relationship with Iraq........................................................... 13 Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq................................................ 13 Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the Force........................... 14 Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination ........................................................ 15 Future Operational Considerations.......................................................................................... 16 How Much Help Is Enough?............................................................................................. 16 Further Troop Drawdowns................................................................................................ 17 Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission ....................................................... 18 Transition Teams......................................................................................................... 18 Unit Partnering ........................................................................................................... 19 Capacity-Building....................................................................................................... 19 ISF Training and Advising Under Transition.............................................................. 20 Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint .................................................................................. 20 Coordination on Operations under the Security Agreement ............................................. 21 Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities......................................................................... 24 Role of Contractors ........................................................................................................... 25 Equipment......................................................................................................................... 26 Options Available to Congress ................................................................................................ 27 Structure and Aim of the Report ............................................................................................. 28 Decision to Go to War in Iraq........................................................................................................ 28 Antecedents in the 1990s ........................................................................................................ 29 Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations............................................... 29 Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein................................................................................................ 30 War Planning ................................................................................................................................. 31 Strategic Objectives................................................................................................................. 31 Military Objectives.................................................................................................................. 32 Planning for Major Combat .................................................................................................... 32 Post-War Planning................................................................................................................... 35 Inter-Agency Post-War Planning ...................................................................................... 36 Military Post-War Planning .............................................................................................. 38 Organizational Decisions .................................................................................................. 39 Major Combat Operations ............................................................................................................. 40 Early Infiltration...................................................................................................................... 40 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ The Launch.............................................................................................................................. 40 The Ground Campaign............................................................................................................ 41 Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat...................................................................................... 43 End of Major Combat.............................................................................................................. 44 Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization ................................................................................ 45 Legal Basis for Coalition Presence ......................................................................................... 45 Formal Occupation............................................................................................................ 45 Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force............................................................................ 45 Security Agreement........................................................................................................... 47 Coalition Command Relationships.......................................................................................... 47 Post-Major Combat: The Force ..................................................................................................... 48 Structure and Footprint............................................................................................................ 48 U.S. Forces in Iraq .................................................................................................................. 49 Coalition Partner Forces.......................................................................................................... 51 Post-Major Combat: Security Situation......................................................................................... 52 Major Sources and Forms of Violence .................................................................................... 52 Sunni Extremism............................................................................................................... 52 Shi’a Extremism ............................................................................................................... 54 Nature of Sectarian Violence ............................................................................................ 57 Criminality ........................................................................................................................ 57 Other Security Challenges....................................................................................................... 57 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) ....................................................................................... 58 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) ............................................................................................... 58 Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations................................................................. 60 Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict............................................................................. 60 Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation ............................................................ 61 Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II)..................................................................................... 63 Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar............................................................................................... 65 “Clear, Hold, Build”................................................................................................................ 67 Operation Together Forward ................................................................................................... 68 New Way Forward .................................................................................................................. 69 “New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case ........................................... 69 Surge Forces...................................................................................................................... 70 Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case .................................................................... 71 Surge Operations in 2007.................................................................................................. 73 Baghdad Security Plan................................................................................................ 73 “Phoenix” Series of Corps-Level Operations ............................................................. 74 Military Operations in 2008.............................................................................................. 75 The Fight Against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Elements in the North ............................. 75 The Fight Against Shi’a Extremists in the South........................................................ 77 Counter-IED Efforts.......................................................................................................... 80 Special Operations Forces................................................................................................. 81 Air Power.......................................................................................................................... 81 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) ............................................................................................................ 83 Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces ........................................................................... 83 ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation .............................................................. 84 Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq ................... 85 ISF Training: Theory of the Case............................................................................................ 86 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities .................................................. 87 ISF Training: Transition Teams............................................................................................... 88 Interior Ministry Transition Teams ................................................................................... 89 Defense Ministry Transition Teams .................................................................................. 90 ISF Training: Unit Partnering.................................................................................................. 92 Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers ....................................................................................... 93 Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results ......................................................................... 94 Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole ...................................................................................... 95 Iraqi Army......................................................................................................................... 98 Iraqi Air Force................................................................................................................. 102 Iraqi Navy ....................................................................................................................... 104 Iraqi Special Operations Forces ...................................................................................... 104 Iraqi Police Service......................................................................................................... 105 Iraqi National Police ....................................................................................................... 107 Department of Border Enforcement................................................................................ 108 Oil Police ........................................................................................................................ 109 Ministry of the Interior.....................................................................................................110 Ministry of Defense .........................................................................................................111 Iraqi Population: “Reconciliation” ...............................................................................................112 Coalition Outreach to the Disaffected....................................................................................113 “Awakening” Movements ......................................................................................................114 Origins of the Awakening Movement in Al Anbar...........................................................115 Spread of the Awakening Movements to the North .........................................................116 Spread of the Awakening Movements to the South .........................................................116 Security Volunteers and “Sons of Iraq” (SoIs) .......................................................................117 Composition of the “Sons of Iraq”...................................................................................117 Origins of the “Sons of Iraq” Movement .........................................................................118 The “Sons of Iraq” System ..............................................................................................118 Security Volunteers in Al Anbar: Provincial Security Force........................................... 120 Iraqi Government and Other Views of the “Sons of Iraq” .............................................. 120 “Sons of Iraq” Integration into Permanent Jobs.............................................................. 121 GoI Assumption of Responsibility for the SoIs .............................................................. 123 Detainee Operations .............................................................................................................. 124 Accountability................................................................................................................. 124 “COIN Inside the Wire” Detainee Program.................................................................... 125 Detainee Releases ........................................................................................................... 125 Civil/Military Partnership in Governance and Economics......................................................... 127 Civil/Military Partnership in Iraq: Background .................................................................... 127 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.......................................................................................... 128 Coordination Between PRTs and Military Units................................................................... 130 Military Role in Governance and Economics ....................................................................... 132 Governance ..................................................................................................................... 132 Economics....................................................................................................................... 134 Assessing Security Trends........................................................................................................... 136 Security Situation by the Metrics .......................................................................................... 136 Overall Attacks ............................................................................................................... 136 Iraqi Civilian Deaths ....................................................................................................... 137 Weapons Caches ............................................................................................................. 137 High-Profile Attacks ....................................................................................................... 138 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)............................................................................ 138 Explaining the Security Gains............................................................................................... 139 Additional CRS Reports .............................................................................................................. 140 ’ž›Žœȱ Figure 1.Map of Iraq ................................................................................................................... 141 Š‹•Žœȱ Table 1. Iraqi Security Forces as of October 31, 2008 .................................................................. 93 ˜—ŠŒœȱ Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 142 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ŸŽ›Ÿ’Ž ȱ In 2009, the war in Iraq appears to be winding down, as security gains made since the height of the insurgency in 2006 and 2007 continue to be sustained, and as Iraqis increasingly seek management of their own affairs. A new U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement that went into effect on January 1, which confirmed the Iraqis’ responsibility for their own security, introduced a new era in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the US-led coalition military operation in Iraq—and in USIraqi bilateral relations. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the Agreement a “watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.”1 U.S. military commanders on the ground have indicated that in most parts of Iraq, the focus of U.S. military efforts has shifted from counterinsurgency (COIN) to stability operations, including advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and supporting security, economic, and governance capacity-building. On February 27, 2009, at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina, President Obama delivered a speech addressing “how the war in Iraq will end,” in which he announced the drawdown of U.S. combat forces by August 2010 and the transition of the rest of the military mission to training and advising Iraq security forces, conducting counter-terrorism, and providing force protection for U.S. personnel.2 The United States begins this transition from a position of significant commitment – including some 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq as of March 2009, in addition to civilian experts and U.S. contractors, who provide substantial support to their Iraqi counterparts in the fields of security, governance, and development. Senior U.S. officials, including outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Gates, have suggested that lasting change in Iraq will require substantially more time, and that while the U.S. military presence will diminish, U.S. engagement with Iraq is likely to continue.3 The Government of Iraq (GoI), for its part, still faces challenges at the operational level, in countering the lingering threads of the insurgency; and at the strategic level, in achieving a single, shared vision of the Iraqi state, and in improving its capacity to provide good governance, ensure security, and foster economic development for the Iraqi people. Key policy issues the Obama Administration may choose to address, with oversight from the 111th Congress, include identifying which U.S. national interests and strategic objectives, in Iraq and the region, should guide further U.S. engagement; monitoring and evaluating the impact of the changes in the U.S. presence and role in Iraq; and laying the groundwork for a future, more traditional bilateral relationship. ŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ OIF was launched on March 20, 2003. The immediate goal, as stated by the George W. Bush Administration, was to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime, including destroying its ability to use 1 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337. 2 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/. 3 See David Ignatius, “A Farewell Warning on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 18, 2009; and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The broad, longer-term objective included helping Iraqis build “a new Iraq that is prosperous and free.”4 In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq, to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq,” and to “enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”5 After the initial combat operations, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping an emerging new Iraqi leadership improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. Over time, challenges to the emerging Iraqi leadership from homegrown insurgents and some foreign fighters mounted. Sectarian violence grew, catalyzed by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. In January 2007, in an attempt to reverse the escalation of violence, President Bush announced a new strategic approach, the “New Way Forward,” including a “surge” of additional U.S. forces, together with additional civilian experts. The troop surge included five Army brigade combat teams (BCTs), a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and two Marine battalions. More importantly, most observers agree, Ambassador Crocker and the Commanding General of MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General David Petraeus, institutionalized counterinsurgency approaches across the force and the U.S. effort as a whole. Those approaches emphasized population security, empowering the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) through close partnership, and building GoI capacity to govern and foster economic development in order to capitalize on security gains. Over the course of the surge, observers generally agreed, security conditions on the ground improved markedly. In August 2008, GEN Petraeus agreed that there had been “significant progress” but argued that it was “still not self-sustaining.” “We’re not celebrating,” he commented, and there are “no victory dances in the end zone.”6 Practitioners and observers have identified a number of factors that may have contributed to the security improvements, including the additional surge forces; new and institutionalized counterinsurgency approaches concerning population security and reconciliation; the application of highend technological capabilities by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and closer integration between SOF and conventional forces; the accumulated experience of U.S. leaders at all levels after multiple tours in Iraq; the growing numbers and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces; the ground-up rejection of violence and support for the coalition by many Sunni Arabs; and the ceasefire declared by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the abandonment of violence by many of his followers. While conventional, force-on-force wars tend to end with the unequivocal defeat of one party, the parameters for “mission success” in counter-insurgency efforts like OIF tend to be less definitive 4 See “President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003,” the televised speech that included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html. 5 See “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,” H.J.Res. 114, Section 3(a), signed into law on October 16, 2002, (P.L. 107-243). The Senate vote was 77-23, and the House vote 296-133. 6 Rod Nordland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus, Newsweek, August 21, 2008. On September 16, 2008, GEN Petraeus relinquished command of MNF-I to Army General Raymond Odierno, a former Commanding General of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operational-level command under MNF-I whose area of responsibility includes all of Iraq. On October 31, 2008, GEN Petraeus assumed command of U.S. Central Command, to which MNF-I reports. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ and more subject to qualitative interpretation. OIF appears poised to end with policy decisions by the U.S. and/or Iraqi governments, rather than with a decisive military victory on the battlefield. ŽŸ’œŽȱǯǯȬ ›Šš’ȱ›ŠŽ’ŒȱŠ›—Ž›œ‘’™ȱ On November 17, 2008, U.S. and Iraqi officials signed two key new agreements, designed to define the terms of their future partnership at the strategic and operational levels. On November 27, the Iraqi parliament voted its support for the two agreements, and on December 4, the Iraqi Presidency Council approved them.7 ›ŠŽ’Œȱ›Š–Ž ˜›”ȱ›ŽŽ–Ž—ȱŠ—ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ›ŽŽ–Ž—ȱ The first document was the broad Strategic Framework Agreement, designed to provide a basis for future cooperation in multiple fields including diplomacy, culture, economics and energy, health and the environment, information technology, and law enforcement. This Agreement was based broadly on a declaration of principles, signed by President Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, on November 27, 2007.8 The second document, the Security Agreement, was similar to a status of forces agreement (SOFA). It was the product of a contentious negotiations process that began in spring 2008. It elaborated the terms of the bilateral security partnership at the operational level, and provided the legal basis for the U.S. troop presence in Iraq. When approving the two agreements, the Iraqi parliament made the Security Agreement subject to a popular referendum, scheduled to be held by July 2009. The Agreement went into effect on January 1, 2009, at the expiration of the United Nations mandate that had provided the legal basis for the presence of the multi-national force in Iraq.9 ŽŒž›’¢ȱ›ŽŽ–Ž—ȱ›˜Ÿ’œ’˜—œȱ The Security Agreement underscored both Iraqi sovereignty and the “temporary” nature of the U.S. military presence, and it imposed a number of constraints on the presence and operations of U.S. forces. It provided for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraqi cities and towns by June 30, 2009, and for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011.10 This language was a stricter version of earlier drafts that reportedly had provided for time “horizons” or target dates. 7 In the United States, the Bush Administration carried out “consultations” with key Members of Congress on the operationally-focused draft agreement. The Administration’s stated position was that the document was not a treaty and therefore did not require formal congressional approval. 8 The formal title of the document is “Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq,” and it is available at the White House website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SFA.pdf. See also the “Declaration of Principles for a LongTerm Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America,” November 26, 2007, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html. 9 The document, formally entitled, “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their Activities during their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf. The current UN resolution, UN Security Council Resolution 1790 (2007), December 18, 2007, is available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N07/650/72/PDF/N0765072.pdf?OpenElement. 10 “SOFA,” Article 24, para.1,2. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ The Security Agreement stipulated that the United States shall not use Iraqi land, sea or air as a “launching or transit point for attacks against other countries.”11 The Strategic Framework Agreement, which echoed this language, also provided that the United States shall not seek a “permanent military presence” in Iraq. The negotiations process reportedly considered various formulations regarding external threats to Iraq’s sovereignty. The agreed language, in the Security Agreement, required bilateral consultations in case of such a threat, but made no other actions compulsory.12 The Security Agreement required that U.S. forces coordinate all military operations with Iraqi authorities.13 It tightly constrained the role of U.S. forces in detaining Iraqis and mandated the transfer of current detainees to Iraqi custody. 14 It also granted Iraq some legal jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers and defense civilians – specifically, in cases of “grave, premeditated felonies” committed off base and “outside duty status.”15 As senior officials on the ground have underscored, the Security Agreement acknowledged that many of its provisions would require further interpretation. To that end, it established a committee structure to provide implementation guidance.16 ›Š ˜ —ȱŠ—ȱ›Š—œ’’˜—ȱ On February 27, 2009, at the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, President Obama announced “a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility.”17 The setting for the speech quietly echoed its theme of transition. U.S. Marines entered Iraq at the start of OIF and helped lead both major combat and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. Recently, senior Marine Corps officials have argued that significantly increasing the Marine deployment to Afghanistan will require drawing down in Iraq—“during calendar year 2010.”18 The President’s policy calls for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by August 31, 2010. That decision marked the culmination of a comprehensive strategic review of Iraq war efforts that 11 “SOFA,” Article 27, para.3. See also strategic framework agreement, Section 1, para.4. See “SOFA” Article 27, para 1: “In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq that would violate its sovereignty, political independence, or territorial integrity, waters, airspace, its democratic system or its elected institutions, and upon request by the Government of Iraq, the Parties shall immediately initiate strategic deliberations and as may be mutually agreed, the United States shall take appropriate measures, including diplomatic, economic, or military measures, or any other measure, to deter such a threat.” 13 “SOFA,” Article 4, para.2. 14 “SOFA,” Article 22. 15 “SOFA,” Article 12, para.1. 16 The “SOFA” mandates the formation of a Joint Ministerial Committee tasked to address interpretation and implementation of the agreement. That body is tasked to appoint a Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) to oversee military operations. It is also tasked to appoint a separate Joint Committee—which may in turn appoint Subcommittees—to oversee issues outside the competence of the JMOCC. See “SOFA” Article 23. 17 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/. 18 The “2010” timeline is attributed to senior logistics official at U.S. Central Command Terry Moores, in Chelsea J. Carter, “Road Map out of Iraq Takes Shape,” Seattle Times, March 2, 2009. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Conway stated in a January 2009 speech, before President Obama’s Afghanistan troop increase announcement: “My belief is that by the middle of the year, you’ll see a significant number of Marines in Afghanistan. Those must of necessity come from Iraq.” See Otto Kreisher, “Marine Commandant Expects Troop Surge in Afghanistan,” National Journal, January 15, 2009. 12 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ President Obama ordered on his first full day in office. Military commanders were reportedly asked to review alternative 16-month, 19-month, and 23-month timeline options for the withdrawal of U.S. combat forces. The announced withdrawal timeline will mark 18 months from the time of the announcement, and approximately 19 months from the Inauguration— slightly longer than the 16-month timeline suggested by then-Senator Obama during the presidential campaign. According to the new policy, after August 2010, the U.S. forces’ focus in Iraq will shift to a threepronged mission: training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi security forces (ISF); conducting targeted counter-terrorism operations; and providing force protection for both civilian and military personnel. That so-called “transitional force” will initially included between 35,000 and 50,000 troops. All remaining U.S. forces are expected to be withdrawn by the end of 2011, in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement. At the time of the announcement, there were approximately 140,000 U.S. troops deployed in Iraq, including 14 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) or equivalents, as well as a significantly larger number of support forces.19 On March 8, 2009, Administration officials announced that 12,000 U.S. troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by September 2009.20 Administration officials have suggested that between 10 and 12 BCTs would remain on the ground at the time of Iraq’s national elections tentatively planned for the end of 2009. The key components of the “transitional force” are expected to be “Advise and Assist Brigades” (AABs).21 Some officials have suggested an initial target figure of six AABs but have noted that the number could be adjusted. Officials have explained that each AAB will be built on the chassis, or foundation, of a BCT, and it will be augmented with capabilities required for the stability operations-focused mission in Iraq, including training and advisory capabilities and significant enablers. Each unit is expected to prepare and train as an organic whole before deploying. AABs are expected to work closely with U.S. civilian counterparts, including Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); those relationships, including co-location and the degree and kind of support provided to civilian efforts, is likely to vary geographically across Iraq. The troop withdrawal policy does not imply that no further deployments of U.S. military units to Iraq will take place. Some U.S. units schedule to redeploy from Iraq in the near term will be replaced by fresh U.S. units. In addition, some units may end up serving shorter tours in Iraq than the now-standard 12 months of “boots on the ground.” The drawdown and transition plans are expected to include a consolidation of three key military headquarters in Iraq: Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the overall strategic-level command currently led by General Raymond Odierno; Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), the operationallevel command led since April 4, 2009, by Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby and Ft. LewisWashington-based I Corps; and Multi-National Security Transition-Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), led by Lieutenant General Frank Helmick. Some officials have suggested that the headquarters consolidation is likely to take place after the Iraqi national elections, but well before the August 2010 transition. The new entity is expected to be significantly smaller in terms of personnel. The 19 For the purposes of rough calculation, a BCT can be said to include about 3,500 Soldiers. In Iraq, BCT headquarters have sometimes had command of additional units, giving total BCT force sizes of up to 5,000. 20 Anthony Shadid, “12,000 U.S. Troops to Leave Iraq,” Washington Post, March 9, 2009. 21 Emily S. Rueb, “Gates Defends Iraq Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, March 2, 2009. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ consolidation would reflect not only an elimination of redundancy, but also, as one official described it, discretely “choosing not to do some things.”22 The Obama Administration’s drawdown and transition policy was widely considered to reflect a compromise between two broad schools of thought—advocates, respectively, of a relatively gradual or a relatively accelerated drawdown. Many observers have suggested that the policy splits the difference by maintaining a relatively robust force on the ground through the political hurdles of 2009, which preparing to draw U.S. forces down relatively rapidly in 2010. One school of thought, which included many military commanders, supported a relatively longer timetable.23 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged, “I think that, if the commanders had complete say in this matter, that they would have preferred that the combat mission not end until the end of 2010.”24 One key concern was reportedly a desire to retain a robust force through the Iraqi political hurdles of 2009 to ensure their success and their ability to serve as catalysts of further stabilization. In December 2008, U.S. military commanders reportedly had recommended beginning the drawdown slowly, by withdrawing two BCTs over the first six months of 2009.25 Before the President’s policy announcement, GEN Odierno, MNF-I Commanding General, stated, “I believe that if we can get through the next year peacefully, with incidents about what they are today or better, I think we’re getting close to enduring stability, which enables us to really reduce.”26 Proponents of a gradual approach also argued that it is important to take every remaining opportunity to train, advise, and mentor the Iraqi security forces (ISF). MNSTC-I Commanding General LTG Helmick commented in February 2009 that the ISF still had “a long way to go.” He argued that if they continue to focus on logistics—their “Achilles heel”—and there are no major surprises from the enemy, then the ISF could have “a sustained ground capability to fight the insurgency” by the end of 2011.27 Some military commanders were also reportedly concerned that any significant drawdown would be complicated and would require substantial time and attention from U.S. military leadership on the ground. They urged delaying the bulk of the drawdown until 2010, to allow MNF-I to focus primarily on its substantive mission in 2009. The other broad school of thought urged the adoption of a relatively accelerated timeline. Some advocates of an accelerated timeline sought simply to end the U.S. military commitment in Iraq as soon as reasonably possible. Other proponents of this school argued that the U.S. troop presence in Iraq—and the antipathy that might be generated among the Iraqi population by the presence of a de facto occupier—could be hindering further progress. Announced troop 22 Interviews with MNF-I officials, February, March 2009. MNF-I officials, Interviews, February 2009. 24 Remarks by Secretary Gates on Meet the Press, cited in Sean Lengell, “Gates: Pullout Timeline Workable,” Washington Times, March 2, 2009. 25 See Elisabeth Bummiller and Thom Shanker, “Generals Propose a Timetable for Iraq,” The New York Times, December 18, 2008; and Elisabeth Bummiller and Thom Shanker, “Military Planners, in Nod to Obama, are Preparing for a Faster Iraq Withdrawal,” The New York Times, January 15, 2009. 26 Peter Baker and Alissa J. Rubin, “Obama Seeks Accord with Military on Iraq,” Washington Post, January 29, 2009. GEN Odierno added, “The longer we go, if we get through the elections, we get closer and closer to not being able to backslide.” 27 Andrew England and Demetri Sevastopulo, “US General Stresses Need for Time,” Financial Times, February 17, 2009. 23 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ withdrawal plans, it was argued, could spur progress by encouraging Iraqi leaders to accelerate their own efforts to assume more responsibility and make progress toward reconciliation, and by urging international partners to increase their constructive involvement.28 They stressed that it would be particularly helpful to reduce the visible presence of U.S. combat forces before the rest of the political “hurdles” Iraq faces in 2009, to reduce the risk that the U.S. presence might become the target of politically-motivated rhetoric and opposition.29 Some accelerated timeline advocates underscored the strain that simultaneous war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed on U.S. military forces—a strain likely to grow as the United States increases troop deployments to Afghanistan in 2009.30 The high demand for forces for the ongoing U.S. troop commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan has meant, for many servicemembers, repeated deployments, extended deployments, and/or short “dwell times” at home between tours. Military Departments, responsible in accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, for “organizing, manning, training and equipping” the force, and some key observers, have expressed concerns about the stress these demands have placed, and may continue to place, on the force.31 Over time, DOD has introduced a series of policies designed to manage that stress—for example, limiting active duty Army deployments to 12 months for those deploying after August 1, 2008. Some observers from each school of thought have expressed concerns about the Obama Administration policy. At the time of the policy announcement, some Democratic Party leaders in Congress, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, questioned the need for a residual force as large as 50,000 troops.32 Some gradualists, in turn, 28 See for example Kevin Benson, “Shift the Debate on Iraq from ‘When’ to ‘How,’” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, August 12, 2007. Colonel Benson was the lead OIF planner for CFLCC. 29 For example, several days before the January 31, 2009, provincial elections, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki told a political rally that he believed that the timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq “will be brought forward,” earlier than the deadline specified in the security agreement. See Robert H. Reid, “Iraqi Leader Predicts Faster U.S. Withdrawal,” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, January 27, 2009. 30 On February 17, 2009, President Obama announced approval of DOD requests to deploy approximately 17,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Those troops were scheduled to include the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), from Camp Lejeune, NC, in late spring; the 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, from Ft. Lewis, WA, in mid-summer; and approximately 5,000 enablers. See President Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan,” The White House, February 17, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-by-the-President-on-Afghanistan/; and DOD News Releases, “DoD Announces Afghanistan Troop Deployment,” February 17, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12493. Two further troop increases had previously been approved: the deployment of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, which took place in January and February 2009; and the deployment of the combat aviation brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, who began deploying in March 2009. On March 27, 2009, announcing the new U.S. Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama stated that an additional 4,000 U.S. troops would deploy to Afghanistan to train and advise the Afghan National Security Forces. 31 In a December 2007 assessment, retired General Barry McCaffrey advocated a reduction in the U.S. deployment to Iraq – down to 12 BCTs by January 2009 – due to stress on the force. He commented that “The Army is starting to unravel,” pointing to current recruiting campaigns that are bringing on board “those who should not be in uniform” due e.g. to drug use or criminality; to the loss of mid-career officers and NCOs; and to the “stretched and under-resourced” Reserve Component. See General Barry R. McCaffrey, “After Action Report, Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11 December 2007,” December 18, 2007, submitted as a Statement for the Record for the HASC O&I Subcommittee hearing on January 16, 2008. 32 Speaker Pelosi commented, “I don’t know what the justification is for …a presence of 50,000 troops in Iraq.” See Emily S. Rueb, “Gates Defends Iraq Withdrawal Plan,” New York Times, March 2, 2009. When the White House provided a pre-briefing to Congressional leaders, ahead of the public announcement of the new policy, Majority Leader Reid noted, “I am happy to listen to the Secretary of Defense, the President, but when they talk about 50,000, that’s a (continued...) ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ urged the Administration to remain flexible about the timeline in execution, cautioning that “it cannot be carried out rigidly” and urging a readiness to “slow the pace next year if necessary.”33 ž››Ž—ȱ›ŠŽ’ŒȱŠ—ȱ™Ž›Š’˜—Š•ȱ¢—Š–’Œœȱ The Obama Administration announced its Iraq transition policy, and the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement came into force, against a backdrop of ongoing strategic-level challenges to the Government of Iraq, and multiple operational-level transitions in the counter-insurgency effort. ž››Ž—ȱ›ŠŽ’Œȱ¢—Š–’ŒœDZȱȱŽœœȱŠ—ȱȃ™˜’•Ž›œȄȱ Most observers agree that the GoI faces several major tests in 2009. These began with the provincial elections held in most parts of the country on January 31, 2009, and are also scheduled to include district-level elections in June; a national referendum on the security agreement in July; and national-level elections at the end of the year. These events carry some risk of unrest, but, many observers contend, should these hurdles be cleared safely and successfully, they might serve to further catalyze the consolidation of the Iraqi state. In addition, the GoI still faces several persistent strategic challenges – potential “spoilers” – that could disrupt not only security conditions on the ground but also progress toward a unified and stable Iraq. One major challenge, increasingly prominent in 2009, is a portfolio of tensions and competing claims in “the north,” particularly between Iraqi Kurds and Arabs. The set of related issues includes resolving the political status of the multi-ethnic and oil-rich city of Kirkuk, together with other “disputed territories” along the Green Line that divides the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) from the rest of Iraq.34 The problems are complicated by the forced resettlement policies of Saddam’s regime, which moved Kurds out of their homes and resettled Arabs in those areas; and by Kurdish efforts in the post-Saddam era to reclaim those areas. Further, the KRG and GoI continue to dispute the proper dispensation of oil revenues generated by the areas rich oil reserves. While Kirkuk city itself has been relatively calm, coalition and Iraqi officials in Kirkuk have noted with concern that outside players with strong vested interests, including ethnically based Iraqi political parties, and Turkey-based supporters of Iraqi Turkmen, sometimes use inflammatory language to stir up tensions in the city.35 Elsewhere, violence has flared—in 2008, Iraqi security forces skirmished with KRG peshmerga forces in the restive town of Khanaquin, in (...continued) little higher number than I had anticipated.” See Major Garrett, “Obama Sets 2010 Timetable for Iraq Withdrawal,” Fox News, February 26, 2009. 33 See Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Iraq’s Year of Living Dangerously,” New York Times, February 26, 2009. 34 In a recent interview, the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, asked about his biggest worry for the future of Iraq, stated: “If I had to choose which one keep me awake at night, it is the disputed areas, because tension between Arabs and Kurds.” See Monte Morin and Tina Susman, “16 Killed in Suicide Attack in Northern Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, February 6, 2009. 35 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, and with the Governor of at Ta’amin province (of which Kirkuk is the capital), August 2008. U.S. commanders describe a summer 2008 visit to Kirkuk by the Iraqi Minister of Defense, who was reportedly surprised to discover, in contrast to information he had received, that there were not “two Kurdish pesh merga divisions” in Kirkuk. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Diyala province, on the GoI side of the Green Line.36 The year 2009 is likely to prove pivotal in this ongoing set of debates. UNAMI is expected to present a comprehensive set of recommendations for resolving tensions in the north, as a basis for discussion. Provincial elections, held elsewhere on January 31, 2009, remain to be scheduled for At Ta’amin province, which includes Kirkuk. A second major challenge concerns how effectively Sunni Arabs, are incorporated socially, economically, and politically into the Iraqi polity. Sunni Arabs, who are concentrated in western and central Iraq, were a disproportionately privileged minority under Saddam’s rule but lost much of that status after regime change. The provincial elections held on January 31, 2009, marked a positive step, by increasing Sunni Arab political representation at the provincial level. A particular concern is the ongoing integration of members of the Sons of Iraq (SoI) “community watch” program. A majority of the SoIs were Sunni Arabs—including some former insurgents— and key Shiite officials in the GoI were long wary of the SoI program. On October 1, 2008, the GoI began assuming responsibility for the SoIs, including paying their salaries, and this transition was expected to be completed by April 2009. The integration of former SoIs into the Iraqi security forces and civilian jobs has proceeded very slowly, and participants have reported serious delays in the payment of salaries. Some practitioners and observers have expressed concerns about the possible security repercussions if the GoI were to shut down the program, cease paying salaries, or fail to secure alternative employment for the SoIs.37 More seriously still, SoIs have reported a “campaign of arrests” against their members by Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in Baghdad and Diyala provinces. In late March 2009, the detention of a key SoI leader in Baghdad by the ISF led to localized armed clashes, the detention of scores of SoIs, and the GoI decision to disband that SoI group.38 A third major challenge is the potential for violence in “the south,” home to a long-standing and growing competition for power and resources between well-established Shiite political factions backed by militias that have sometimes used violence, and also to tribal Shi’a who may be beginning to find a public voice. Against that volatile backdrop in southern Iraq, both U.S. and Iraqi officials remain concerned about Iranian interventions—economic, social, and sometimes “military” in the form of the provision of lethal aid and sponsorship of proxies including Asa’ib al-Haq and Ketaib Hezbollah.39 Tensions in the south have the potential to be exacerbated by elections, and also by potential drives to form multi-provincial “regions” that would enjoy special access to authorities and resources. ž››Ž—ȱ™Ž›Š’˜—Š•ȱ¢—Š–’ŒœDZȱ›Š—œ’’˜—œȱ By the start of 2009, several major but uneven transitions were underway at the operational level in Iraq. First, the substantial security improvements achieved over the course of the “surge” had further deepened, with some fluctuations during combat operations in 2008 in specific parts of 36 Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008, p.1. Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August and October 2008, and February 2009. 38 See Ned Parker and Caesar Ahmed, “Sons of Iraq Movement Suffers Another Blow,” Los Angeles Times, March 30, 2009; and Rod Nordland, “Rebellious Sunni Council Disarmed After Clashes, Officials in Baghdad Say,” New York Times, March 30, 2009. 39 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials in Baghdad, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Basra; with UK officials in Basra; and with Iraqi officials in Najaf, Diwaniyah, Basra, 2008 and 2009. 37 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Iraq, and some remaining insurgent activity, particularly in north central Iraq.40 In March 2009, the outgoing Commanding General of MNC-I, LTG Austin, characterized the overall situation this way: “We are close to sustainable security but we’re not there yet.”41 Concerning the restive north, LTG Austin commented that the problems in Iraq’s third-largest city Mosul, in Ninewah province, could still “put us off track and cause violence to really reignite in a greater way.”42 East-central Diyala province, along the Iranian border, with its volatile mix of Kurds, and both Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, also remained a potential flashpoint. Second, accordingly, the focus of U.S. military operations shifted toward stability operations in the south and west, with greater remaining emphasis on COIN in north-central Iraq. Third, the operational capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continued to grow, reflected in—and catalyzed by—ISF operational experiences in 2008 in Basra, Sadr City, Amarah, Mosul, and Diyala. According to U.S. commanders, the March 2008 ISF operations in Basra, targeting Shiite militias, were poorly planned and required a strong rescue effort by coalition forces. The August 2008 operations in Diyala, targeting affiliates of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), were planned by the Iraqis in advance but still required coalition forces to provide enablers and to help hold areas once they were cleared.43 A fourth transition was a growth in 2008 in formal Government of Iraq (GoI) security responsibility, antedating the Security Agreement, as additional provinces transitioned to “provincial Iraqi control” (PIC). In practice, PIC arrangements varied from province to province but as a rule gave the GoI lead security responsibility—and practice exercising that responsibility—and mandated increased coordination of coalition operations and activities with the GoI.44 Fifth, as the ISF’s basic capabilities improved, the coalition’s approaches to training and partnering with the ISF evolved substantially though unevenly across Iraq. In terms of substance, many embedded “transition teams” shifted their training focus away from basic “move, shoot, and communicate” skills, toward more advanced skills including staff functions and the use of enablers. In terms of organization, the use of various forms of unit-to-unit partnering, which allows advising by example as well as by instruction, and complements the work of transition teams, grew substantially. Sixth, by early 2009, MNF-I was a far less “multi-national” force than in the past. By the end of 2008, most remaining coalition partner countries had brought their deployments in Iraq to a close. Major redeployments in late 2008 included the 2,000-strong Georgian contingent; the Poles, who had led Multi-National Division-Center South; and the South Koreans, who had led MultiNational Division-Northeast. Faced with the expiration of the UN mandate authorizing the multinational force in Iraq, several coalition partners—the United Kingdom, Australia, and Romania— each signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the GoI, providing a new legal basis for the 40 Interviews with MNF-I officials, August and September 2008, and February 2009, and “Security Incidents” slides, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, January 31, 2009. 41 Anne Gearan, “U.S. General Says No Further Withdrawals Planned,” Washington Post, March 9, 2009. 42 Associated Press, “Al Qaida Stronghold of Mosul is proving a Security Nightmare,” Arizona Daily Star, March 10, 2009. 43 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. 44 Interviews with commanders serving under MNF-I, August 2008. As of December 2008, 13 of Iraq’s 18 provinces had transitioned to PIC. PIC provinces and their dates of designation included Muthanna, July 2006; Dhi Qar, September 2006; An Najaf, December 2006; Maysan, April 2007; Irbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, May 2007; Karbala, October 2007; Basrah, December 2007; Qadisiyah, July 2008; Anbar, September 2008; Babil, October 2008; Wasit, October 2008. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŖȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ presence of their troops, but each of their mandates is set to expire on July 31, 2009. Seventh, the geographical focus of U.S. forces in Iraq shifted somewhat from north to south, as U.S. forces assumed some battlespaces in the south previously held by coalition partner forces.45 On March 31, 2009, the Multi-National Division-Center absorbed UK-led Multi-National DivisionSoutheast, to form the new Multi-National Division-South, under U.S. command, with responsibility for nine provinces.46 Eighth and finally, as civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) grew, they increasingly took the lead in some efforts formerly spearheaded by the U.S. military. In some cases, including Najaf and Karbala provinces, PRTs operated without a significant nearby U.S. forces presence. Nevertheless, the military’s extensive presence on the ground at district and local levels, compared with the limited number of U.S. civilian experts, meant that in practice, the military continued to play a strong “supporting” role in helping Iraqis develop civil capacity. ’–’—’œ‘’—ȱǯǯȱŽŸŽ›ŠŽȱ Meanwhile, U.S. practitioners in Iraq, both civilian and military, have suggested that the appetite of GoI officials to be mentored, advised, or guided by U.S. officials—and thus the leverage that the U.S. government is able to exercise – is diminishing. In 2008, as Iraqi civilian and military capacity and capabilities grew, and as Iraqi confidence in those capabilities increased, GoI officials demonstrated growing assertiveness and less inclination to consult with U.S. officials before taking action.47 That approach was manifested, for example, in the decision by Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki to launch military operations in Basra in March 2008, and the GoI’s unilateral decision to assume full responsibility for Sons of Iraq in fall 2008. Most practitioners and observers expect that U.S. leverage is likely to diminish further in 2009, under the new sovereignty regime and as the U.S. presence decreases. žž›Žȱ›ŠŽ’Œȱ˜—œ’Ž›Š’˜—œȱ President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy charts a new strategic course but also raises several questions about the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship. At the same time, OIF experiences as a whole raise additional strategic questions about U.S. Government preparations to undertake future complex contingencies. •Š›’¢’—ȱŠ—ȱ™Š’—ȱǯǯȱ —Ž›ŽœœȱŠ—ȱ›ŠŽ’Œȱ‹“ŽŒ’ŸŽœȱ Announcing the drawdown and transition policy, President Obama stated that the goal is “an Iraq that is sovereign, stable and self-reliant.” To that end, the President added, the United States would: • Work to promote an Iraqi government that is just, representative, and accountable, and that provides neither support nor safe haven to terrorists; 45 See Sudarsan Raghavan, “U.S. Takes Control of Basra Base,” Washington Post,” April 1, 2009. See “MND-C, MND-SE Operating Areas Combine to Create MND-South,” MNF-I press release, April 1, 2009, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25981&Itemid=128. 47 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008. 46 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŗȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ • Help Iraq build new ties of trade and commerce with the world; and • Forge a partnership with the people and government of Iraq that contributes to the peace and security of the region.”48 Under that broad rubric, as the U.S. role in Iraq transitions, it might be useful to confirm key U.S. national interests regarding Iraq, and the crucial strategic objectives that, at a minimum, it is important for the United States to achieve to support those interests. Such broad objectives might address the following elements: • U.S. interests in Iraq’s domestic political arrangements. Some might argue that a democratic or broadly representative and inclusive Iraqi polity is essential as a key to Iraq’s stability, while others might argue that the nature of Iraq’s domestic political arrangements is much less important than simply a unified and stable Iraq. • U.S. interests in Iraq’s role in the fight against global terrorist networks. Some might argue that the most important goal is simply ensuring that Iraq does not serve as a safe haven for terrorists. Others might stress the importance of active intelligence-sharing by Iraq with the United States. Still others might argue that it is in U.S. interests that Iraq couple the counter-terrorism skills it is currently developing as part of its domestic counter-insurgency effort, with expeditionary capabilities, so that it could participate in future regional counter-terrorist activities. • U.S. interests in the regional balance of power. Some might argue that Iraq’s strength, relative to that of its neighbors, is important. Others might simply stress the importance of an absence of conflict—that is, as a long-stated U.S. goal puts it, an “Iraq at peace with its neighbors.” Furthermore, it may prove judicious to update the formulation of U.S. strategic objectives as the U.S. mission and presence in Iraq change and results of those changes are assessed. In his policy announcement, President Obama stressed that the situation in Iraq remains dynamic and challenging: “But let there be no doubt – Iraq is not yet secure, and there will be difficult days ahead. Violence will continue to be a part of life in Iraq.”49 ™™•¢’—ȱ›ŠŽ’ŒȱŽŸŽ›ŠŽȱ As the Iraqi appetite for accepting guidance and advice from international partners continues to wane, U.S. policy makers may wish to reassess how the U.S. government might most effectively apply political, economic, and security “levers” to help shape Iraq’s transformation into a stable and prosperous state. One challenge is an apparent mismatch in Iraq between those who are most susceptible to leverage and those making key decisions. Iraqi warfighting commanders, as a rule, recognize the extent to which they rely on U.S. military enablers, and remain eager for a continuation of U.S. support. At the same time, Iraqi political leaders—those who make the 48 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/. 49 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq” remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-President-Barack-Obama-ResponsiblyEnding-the-War-in-Iraq/. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŘȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ decisions—tend toward overconfidence in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces, and a less urgent sense of the need for close mil-to-mil partnership with the United States. ‘Š™’—ȱŠȱ˜—ȬŽ›–ȱǯǯȱŽ•Š’˜—œ‘’™ȱ ’‘ȱ ›Ššȱ Another strategic consideration concerns the kind of long-term partnership the United States wants to have with Iraq, including the traditional panoply of diplomatic and economic as well as security ties, and the kind of U.S. presence in Iraq that would be required to support such a relationship. On January 27, 2009, Secretary Gates told the Senate and House Armed Services Committees that “…we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come.”50 One particular challenge for both states may prove to be the cultural or psychological adjustment from an essentially paternalistic relationship to a partnership on equal footing. In the security field, decisions about the shape of that future partnership could suggest different possible forms for a future U.S. presence. In theory, one option would be establishing permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq, to support broader U.S. policy in the region, possibly on the model of those in Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Italy. Kurdish leaders have reportedly long proposed a permanent U.S. military presence in northern Iraq. However, the “permanent basing” option does not appear to enjoy support from the Obama Administration, Members of Congress, or from the Government of Iraq as a whole. A presence of U.S. forces beyond December 2011 would require revisiting and amending the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement. Another option would be a particularly robust U.S. Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), responsible for some combination of training, advising, and mentoring Iraqi security forces, and helping build the capacity of Iraqi security ministries. Following the usual pattern, the OSC would be responsible to both the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and to the Commanding General of U.S. Central Command. One possible model might be the U.S. Military Training Mission to Saudi Arabia, which operates on the basis of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and serves to train, advise, and assist the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces. Ž’—’—ȱǯǯȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ˜ Š›ȱ ›Š—’Š—ȱ —Ž›ŸŽ—’˜—ȱ’—ȱ ›Ššȱ According to U.S. and Iraqi officials, Iraq, particularly in the south, continues to face a potential threat from Shi’a Iraqi proxy groups trained by Iran’s Quds forces, and other forms of lethal aid from Iran.51 In March 2009, U.S. forces reportedly shot down an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle over Iraqi territory, in eastern Diyala province.52 Meanwhile, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) is in the process of shifting its focus somewhat from north to south in Iraq, including relocating a Division headquarters to Basra and increasing the U.S. troop presence in southern Iraq as coalition partner troops withdraw or draw down. According to U.S. military commanders on the 50 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Services Committee, January 27, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1337. On September 10, 2008, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, he stated that “... we should expect to be involved in Iraq for many years to come, although in changing and increasingly limited ways.” See Robert M. Gates, Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008. 51 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials, Baghdad, August 2008, and with Iraqi civilian and military officials, August 2008. 52 Anthony Shadid, “U.S. Downed Iranian Drone Over Iraq,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗřȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ground, the growing U.S. footprint in southern Iraq is not likely to be lost on Iran.53 Any such Iranian concerns might be exacerbated by the growing U.S. forces presence across Iran’s eastern border, in Afghanistan. It is not clear to what extent U.S. “Iran policy” factors in current and potential Iranian activities in southern Iraq. In the context of growing potential for low-level U.S. military confrontations— “shadow-boxing”—with Iranian proxies in southern Iraq, as the U.S. force presence in that area grows, it may be important to consider scenarios in which tactical-level developments might escalate into strategic-level concerns. œœŽœœ’—ȱ‘Žȱ –™•’ŒŠ’˜—œȱ˜ȱ ȱŽœœ˜—œȱ˜›ȱ‘Žȱžž›Žȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ˜›ŒŽȱ How Military Departments fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to organize, man, train, and equip the force – how they make decisions about endstrength and capabilities required—may depend in part on lessons drawn from OIF, and on how applicable those lessons are deemed to be to potential future engagements. For example, lessons might be drawn from OIF concerning how to most effectively train foreign security forces and to prepare U.S. forces for that mission; how increasing the intelligence assets available to commanders on the ground affects their ability to identify and pursue targets; how “dwell time” policies for the Active and Reserve Components can best be implemented; and what closer operational integration between Special Operations Forces and conventional forces might suggest about the most effective division of labor between them. President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy for Iraq has pressed the Army, in particular, to address the question of how and whether to institutionalize key capabilities developed, often through trial and error, for use during OIF. The policy calls for the deployment to Iraq, by mid2010, of Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs). According to DOD officials, AABs are to be built on the chassis of existing BCTs and augmented as necessary with capabilities appropriate for the new stability operations mission in Iraq. The near-term requirement to prepare and deploy such units does not resolve a more fundamental question – how permanent should AABs be? In theory, for potential future contingencies, the Army could simply plan to use and adapt its standard force structure to meet new requirements as they arise, or it could dedicate resources to establish a standing capacity of some kind. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has underscored that “…building the security capacity of other nations through training and equipping programs has emerged as a core and enduring military requirement,”54 suggesting the need to institutionalize such capabilities. Dr. John Nagl has proposed one possible institutional solution – creating a permanent, standing Advisory Corps of 20,000 combat advisors, which would be organized, equipped, educated and trained to develop host nation security forces.55 53 Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, August 2008. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the planned increase in U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan, across Iran’s eastern border, may magnify the sense of uneasiness of some Iranian leaders. 54 See Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, Washington DC, July 15, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262. 55 John Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps, Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC, June 2007. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŚȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Meanwhile, some officials suggest that Army leaders remain reluctant to make permanent changes to the Army’s force structure, not least because such changes could mean assuming increased risk in more traditional areas of warfighting. The Army has advocated, as a substitute for “AAB,” the term Brigade Enabled for Stability Operations (BESO).56 In March 2009, the Army announced that new BESOs would deploy from Fort Bliss, TX, to Iraq and Afghanistan later in the year. BESOs, Army officials stressed, would not depart radically from the familiar BCT construct—they would “remain full-spectrum capable,” and would be “…a matter of augmentation … slight modifications to gain skill sets.”57 For the Department of Defense as a whole, in turn, OIF experiences may be used to help frame future discussions about the Department’s force planning construct—a shorthand description of the major contingencies the Department must be prepared to execute simultaneously—which is used to shape the total force. Drawing conclusions, however, is not simple. Analytical challenges include deciding what kind of contingency OIF represents, how likely it is to be representative of future contingencies, and which chronological “slice” of OIF requirements (given the great variation in troop commitment and equipment over time) to use to represent the effort. Recent DOD guidance documents—including DOD Directive 3000.07 “Irregular Warfare IW” issued on December 1, 2008, which stated that “it is DoD policy to recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare”; the 2008 National Defense Strategy; and the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report—all suggested a relatively strong future DOD emphasis on capabilities required for complex contingencies like Iraq and Afghanistan.58 ™™•¢’—ȱ ȱŽœœ˜—œȱ˜ȱ —Ž›ŠŽ—Œ¢ȱ˜˜›’—Š’˜—ȱ A further strategic consideration concerns how lessons are drawn from OIF regarding U.S. government coordination in complex contingencies, including decision-making, planning and execution.59 Just as the executive branch’s responsibilities in this area are divided among different agencies, congressional oversight responsibilities are divided among different committees of jurisdiction, such that achieving full integration can be a challenge for both branches of government. One set of questions prompted by OIF experiences concerns the decision-making process about whether to go to war and if so, how to do so. Key issues include the rigor of the inter-agency 56 Charmingly but surely unintentionally, the word “beso” means “kiss” in Spanish. Kris Osborn, “New U.S. Army Unit Adds Stability-Ops Troops,” Defense News, March 10, 2009. 58 See Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf; and Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report , January 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf 59 For an overview of the interagency reform debates, see CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted). On the role of DOD in foreign assistance activities, including security forces training and reconstruction activities, see CRS Report RL34639, The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress, by (name redacted) et al. On the capabilities of U.S. government civilian agencies, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by (name re dacted) and (name redacted). 57 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗśȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ debates, the effectiveness of the provision of “best military advice” to key decision-makers, and the thoroughness of congressional oversight in general.60 Another set of questions raised by OIF concerns balancing roles, responsibilities, resources, and authorities among U.S. government agencies to support implementation of activities required in complex contingencies—such as security forces training, local governance work, and economic reconstruction.61 In security forces training, OIF experiences included several different patterns for the distribution of responsibilities between the Departments of Defense and State. In OIF, governance and economic reconstruction work, in turn, have been carried out by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), by civilian U.S. government agencies operating separately from PRTs, and by military units—not always in close conjunction with one another.62 Based in part on OIF experiences, many observers have concluded that the capacity of U.S. Government civilian agencies, including deployable capabilities, should be enhanced; and that the modalities for coordinating and integrating civilian and military efforts in the field should be improved. žž›Žȱ™Ž›Š’˜—Š•ȱ˜—œ’Ž›Š’˜—œȱ The President’s drawdown and transition announcement left open a number of operational issues that U.S. practitioners, policy makers, and Members of Congress may wish to consider. ˜ ȱžŒ‘ȱ Ž•™ȱ œȱ—˜ž‘ǵȱ The Obama Administration transition policy generally calls for a diminishing U.S. government role in Iraq, but senior U.S. civilian and military officials on the ground are likely to continue to 60 President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1), which describes the organization of the national security system and replaced the George W. Bush Administration’s National Security Presidential Directive-1 (NSPD-1), includes several measures that apparently aim at instilling greater rigor. For example, the National Security Advisor is specifically instructed to carry out key support functions for the sessions of the National Security Council (NSC) “in a timely manner.” In turn, in supporting the sessions of the NSC Deputies Committee, the Deputy National Security Advisor is tasked to ensure that all papers for discussion “fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each.” See Presidential Policy Directive-1, “Organization of the National Security System,” February 13, 2009, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf. 61 The war in Afghanistan has raised a similar set of concerns, but it has offered a different set of empirical models for consideration. In Afghanistan, U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are almost exclusively military organizations, led by an Air Force or Navy officer and reporting up a military chain of command. U.S. Government civilian agencies – particularly the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture – have deployed experts to serve in key positions with both PRTs, and Division- and Brigade-sized task forces, but until 2009, the number of civilian experts was small. See CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). 62 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee hosted a series of hearings about PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the potential implications for future U.S. inter-agency coordination and organization. See House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, April 2008, available at http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf. The Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted interviews with PRT participants and published initial observations. See “PRT Playbook: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures,” Center for Army Lessons Learned, No. 07-34, September 2007. See also Rusty Barber and Sam Parker, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms: a USIP Trip Report,” United States Institute of Peace, December 2008. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŜȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ face myriad small choices about exactly how much support to provide, in various circumstances, to their host nation partners. During the formal occupation of Iraq, from 2003 to 2004, the coalition was responsible for all facets of Iraqi public life. In the early post-occupation days, the coalition’s general approach was to do everything possible to get Iraqi institutions up and running, limited primarily by resources and personnel available to implement the efforts. As Iraqi capacity grew, the role of Iraqi civilian and military officials and institutions shifted, to various degrees, from sharing responsibilities to leading, with some support or back-up from the coalition. By 2008, U.S. civilian and military officials in Iraq were seriously discussing a fundamental question: how much U.S. help is enough? The debates addressed both the U.S. military’s relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces, and U.S. government civilian expert assistance provided through Provincial Reconstruction Teams and at the national level. A number of U.S. officials, both civilian and military, argued that, in the words of one military commander, “it’s time to take the training wheels off,” that it is okay to “let the Iraqis fail.” Taking a step back, they argued, is not only a key to reducing the U.S. commitment over time—it may also be the best way to reduce the risk of Iraqi dependence on U.S. help, and to encourage Iraqis to assume more responsibility and to learn to solve problems themselves. One former brigade commander in Iraq, from this school of thought, argued, “It’s time to let go,” and added the observation: “The coalition has a very difficult time having the restraint and discipline to refrain from intervening.”63 Some officials countered that, given the shrinking U.S. presence as U.S. forces draw down, and the diminishing Iraqi appetite to be advised and mentored, it is important to facilitate the growth of Iraqi capacity as much as possible while the window of opportunity is still open.64 ž›‘Ž›ȱ›˜˜™ȱ›Š ˜ —œȱ President Obama’s drawdown and transition policy prescribes the withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by the end of August 2010, and the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement mandates that all U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2011. Further, in March 2009, the Obama Administration announced plans to withdraw a total of 12,000 U.S. troops from Iraq by September 2009. Within those parameters, remaining key remaining decisions include: • When, before the end of August 2010, to transition the U.S. force presence in each geographic area of Iraq from combat troops to Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs). 63 Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, who led a brigade in the Mahmudiyah area south of Baghdad, quoted in Larry Kaplow, “The Last Day of the War,” Newsweek, January 12, 2009. See also “Marine Commander Says Iraq Pullout in 16 Months ‘Doable’,” National Journal, February 24, 2009, based on an interview with Marine Major General John Kelly at the completion of his tour as Multi-National Force-West Commanding General, who stressed that leaving too slowly could keep the ISF from taking control. 64 Interviews with MNFI officials, January and February 2009. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŝȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ • How large of a residual transition force, between roughly 35,000 and 50,000 troops, to leave in Iraq after August 31, 2010. • How quickly to draw down the residual force between August 2010 and the end of 2011. • Whether the basic parameters of the Obama policy timeline, including the August 2010, could be adjusted, should changing circumstances on the ground appear to make that advisable. žž›Žȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱ ›Šš’ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ˜›ŒŽœȱ›Š’—’—ȱ’œœ’˜—ȱ Supporting the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is a critical focus of U.S. military operations in Iraq. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes the importance of conducting operations “by, with and through” host nation forces; and helping to build such forces when their capacity or capabilities are not adequate. From the outset, the organization and focus of the coalition’s efforts to train, equip, and mentor the ISF varied across the battlespace of Iraq, depending on the conditions on the ground, the level of development of the locally based ISF, and the availability of coalition forces for training missions. A key operational consideration, looking ahead, is how to accomplish the ISF training mission as U.S. forces draw down and AABs are established. ›Š—œ’’˜—ȱŽŠ–œȱ The “standard” approach to training the ISF has been the use of embedded “transition teams” that typically live and work with a host nation unit. One key point of variation over time has been the size of these teams. Transition teams working with the Iraqi Army, for example, typically included between 11 and 15 members, depending on the size of the Iraqi unit they embedded with. In practice, however, the numbers have varied—for example, in western Anbar province, Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), led by U.S. Marines, consistently used larger teams, with between 30 and 40 members.65 One key development over time, in the view of U.S. commanders on the ground and many experts, has been an overall improvement in the quality and effectiveness of the transition teams—in part a reflection of standardization and improvements in the training “pipelines” used by the Military Departments to produce the trainers.66 In 2008, as the basic operational capabilities of the ISF grew, the use of embedded transition teams shifted toward higher-level ISF headquarters, including brigades and divisions. The substantive efforts of the teams also shifted, from basic skills like patrolling to leadership and enablers. For example, teams working with the Iraqi Army increased their focus on staff functions and logistics, and teams working with the Iraqi Police increased the emphasis on specialized skills like forensics. In effect, transition teams work themselves out of a job, as their host nation partner unit improves. 65 Interviews with MNC-I, MNSTC-I, and MNF-I subordinate commands including MNF-W, August 2008. Interviews with MNF-I and MNC-I officials, and subordinate commands, August 2008. In the view of many experts, one issue shaping the quality of the transition teams has been individual incentive to serve on such teams, based on the degree to which promotion boards favorably regard such service. Some DOD officials note that the incentives, based on personnel rules, are improving, while some practitioners note anecdotally that training missions tend not to be as highly regarded as more traditional combat assignments. 66 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŞȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ The U.S. military may not, in every case, have the full spectrum of skills required to staff all types of embedded teams. While logistics experts in the U.S. military are well-placed to share that expertise with Iraqi Army counterparts, U.S. Military Police (MPs) generally do not have the requisite specialized policing skills and have thus relied on collaboration with civilian International Police Advisors, who have been in short supply. —’ȱŠ›—Ž›’—ȱ In addition to transition teams, coalition forces throughout Iraq have made substantial use of various forms of “unit partnering,” in which coalition maneuver units work side-by-side with Iraqi units of equal or larger size. Commanders on the ground have stressed the value of unit partnership, as a complement to the use of embedded teams, as an effective way to “show” rather than just “tell” ISF unit leaders how they might most effectively organize their headquarters, lead their troops, and manage staff functions.67 Unit partnership has not been envisaged as a permanent arrangement – any individual unit partnership has been designed to be temporary, a catalyst to the development of that Iraqi unit. As conditions permitted, commanders extended unit partnering beyond the Iraqi Army to Ministry of the Interior (MoI) forces, including the Iraqi Police and the Department of Border Enforcement. That outreach to the MoI was initially more common in Multi-National DivisionCenter, south of Baghdad, and in Multi-National Force-West in Anbar, than in Multi-National Division-North, which was still actively engaged in combat operations, together with ISF counterparts, in Diyala and Ninewah provinces, in late 2008. Š™ŠŒ’¢Ȭž’•’—ȱ Coalition forces have also provided substantial support to the “capacity-building” of the key security institutions of the Government of Iraq—the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Counter-Terrorism Bureau. This support, led by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), part of MNF-I, has included mentoring Iraqi senior leaders in leadership and management skills, as well as providing technical assistance to ministry personnel. Coalition officials have stressed the growing importance of maximizing such capacity-building efforts while Iraqis are still receptive to receiving such training. With appropriate leadership skills, they argued, Iraqi senior leaders in the security sector could make substantially greater and more effective contributions to the development of the ISF, gradually reducing the need for U.S. advice and support. Coalition commanders have also underscored the importance of utilizing the right U.S. and coalition personnel for the mission, including senior “mentors” with enough leadership experience and stature to carry weight with their Iraqi counterparts.68 67 Interviews with MNC-I officials, and subordinate commanders, August 2008. Interviews with MNF-I and MNSTC-I officials, August 2008. For example, some argue, a U.S. Army Colonel simply has not held high enough leadership positions within his own Department of Defense to be an appropriate advisor to an Iraqi Minister. 68 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗşȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ ȱ›Š’—’—ȱŠ—ȱŸ’œ’—ȱ—Ž›ȱ›Š—œ’’˜—ȱ The Obama transition policy for Iraq underscores the importance of the ISF training and advisory effort, naming it one of the three missions of the U.S. transition force from August 2010 forward. The increasingly smaller U.S. military footprint and the reduction in senior U.S. military leadership in Iraq could complicate that mission somewhat. One issue may be the ability of the U.S. AABs, spaced thinly across Iraq, to continue to provide ISF counterparts with key enablers, such as logistics; Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); and the ability to call in close air support (CAS). On the other hand, over time, ISF units are expected to rely increasingly on their own capabilities for such support. A related issue may be the ability of AABs to continue the practice of providing mentorship through close relationships with equivalent Iraqi units. For example, under MNC-I, MultiNational Divisions (MND) were often able to provide a BCT to partner full-time with an Iraqi Army (IA) Division based in the same province; and MND Commanding Generals themselves developed close relationships with their IA counterparts. One option, under the AAB footprint, might be a transition from a relationship of “partnership” to one of “liaison” with less senior U.S. officers. žž›Žȱ˜ȱ‘Žȱǯǯȱ˜›ŒŽœȱ˜˜™›’—ȱ The U.S.-Iraqi security agreement requires that all U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraqi “cities, villages, and localities” no later than the time when the ISF assume security responsibility in the relevant province, and in any case no later than June 30, 2009. By early 2009, many U.S. forces had already pulled out of major urban areas, consolidating at large Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and handing over to the ISF the responsibility to provide continual presence.69 The Obama drawdown and transition policy, including the planned withdrawal without replacement of 12,000 U.S. troops by September 2009, might serve to accelerate this shift. This dynamic marks a sharp departure from a basic premise of COIN in Iraq. Top U.S. commanders in Iraq long argued that “living where we work” is what made the counterinsurgency effort a success. This phrase refers to establishing a security presence in cities and towns, including small command outposts of U.S. forces, and Joint Security Stations that include both U.S. and various Iraqi forces. That presence, commanders have noted, allowed ongoing collaboration between U.S. and Iraqi forces, making those partnerships more effective, and it facilitated frequent interaction with the local population, building trust and confidence. In 2008, before the terms of the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement were finalized, U.S. commanders generally favored “thinning” the ranks in cities and towns over time – that is, using a progressively lighter but still dispersed U.S. footprint, as the ISF gradually assumed responsibility for providing the “presence” in each area. 69 For example, in December 2008, Major General Mark Hertling, then-Commanding General of Multi-National Division-North, noted that most U.S. forces in his area had already moved outside cities, with some exceptions, for example the city of Mosul, “where they have combat outposts throughout the city because there is still a significant fight against al Qaeda in that city.” See Major General Mark Hertling, DOD News Briefing, December 8, 2008. See also Ernesto Londono, “U.S. Prepares to Hand Over Baghdad Base,” Washington Post, December 25, 2008. For specific examples of FOB closures, see Richard Tomkins, “U.S. Starts to Leave Key Iraq Bases,” Washington Times, February 23, 2009. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŖȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Looking ahead, one option is that some U.S. forces might retain a light, distributed presence in some urban areas, after the June 2009 deadline, in advisory capacities to the ISF. In December 2008, Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), General Raymond Odierno, noted that some U.S. forces were likely to remain inside cities and towns after June 2009, in order to continue to train and mentor Iraqi security forces.70 In March 2009, Deputy Commanding General of Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Brigadier General Fred Rudesheim, noted that somewhere under 10% of U.S. troops based in Baghdad, for example training teams that work with the Iraqi Army and National Police, might remain in the city past June 30, 2009.71 At the end of March 2009, MNC-I Commanding General LTG Austin noted that based on joint assessments, Iraqi officials were likely to request for a continuation of some U.S. force presence in Mosul and Diyala, beyond the deadline.72 ˜˜›’—Š’˜—ȱ˜—ȱ™Ž›Š’˜—œȱž—Ž›ȱ‘ŽȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ›ŽŽ–Ž—ȱ The U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement required the coordination of all U.S. military operations— including ground operations, air operations, and detainee operations—with Iraqi authorities. The Agreement required the establishment of a committee structure to elaborate more detailed implementing instructions; by February 2009, such a structure of committees and subcommittees, including Iraqi and U.S. civilian and military participation, was in place and functioning. 73 In a December 2008 letter to the force, regarding the new Agreement, GEN Odierno noted that the new environment would “require a subtle shift in how we plan, coordinate, and execute missions throughout Iraq,” and that new rules of engagement would be issued.74 In early 2009, MNF-I officials noted that the Security Agreement was the fundamental theme of current U.S. efforts in Iraq.75 The premise for future U.S. operations, according to MNC-I, is to “figure out how to get it done through Iraqis.”76 A key issue is the further impact that the Security Agreement will have on U.S. operations. 70 Sudarsan Raghavan and Qais Mizher, “Troops Will Remain in Iraqi Cities After June, Odierno Says,” Washington Post, December 14, 2008; and Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Generals Propose a Timetable for Iraq,” New York Times, December 18, 2008. 71 Brigadier General Fred Rudesheim, MNC-I Operational Update, March 15, 2009, transcript available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25810&Itemid=131. 72 Jane Arraf, “U.S. General: American Forces May Not Leave Key Iraqi Cities,” Christian Science Monitor, March 27, 2009. 73 Interview with MNF-I official, February 2009; and MNF-I, slide “U.S. and Iraqi Security Agreement,” February 2009. Broad oversight is provided by the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), co-chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister, and the U.S. Ambassador and MNF-I Commanding General. Underneath that body, the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC), co-chaired by the Iraqi Minister of Defense and the MNF-I Commanding General, includes sub-sections, under U.S.-Iraqi co-chairmanship: Temporary Committee for Iraqi Handover; Military Operations, Training and Logistical Support; Vehicle, Vessel and Aircraft Movement; Transfer of Security Responsibility to the Provinces. Also underneath the JMC, the Joint Committee, co-chaired by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior and the US Ambassador and MNF-I Commander, includes sub-sections, under U.S.-Iraqi co-chairmanship: Detainee Affairs, Agreed Upon Facilities and Areas, Claims, Point of Entry, Imports and Exports, Jurisdiction, Frequency Management, and Surveillance and Control of Airspace. 74 GEN Raymond Odierno, letter dated December 4 2008, available at https://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/ CGs_Messages/cg_letter_on_the_security_agreement.pdf. 75 Interview with MNF-I official, February 2009, Washington DC. 76 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008. The counterinsurgency guidance issued by GEN Odierno on (continued...) ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řŗȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ In practice, according to commanders on the ground, before the Security Agreement went into effect, the vast majority of U.S. operations were already closely coordinated with the GoI. Further, most of those operations were already “combined” with Iraqi forces. These transitions had been facilitated by the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process, in which, by decision of the GoI in consultation with MNF-I, lead security responsibility for a given province was transferred to Iraqi control, based on assessments of security conditions and local ISF capabilities. Before the Security Agreement went into effect, 13 of 18 provinces had transitioned to PIC, and PIC arrangements generally required that U.S. operations be coordinated with the GoI. Another common practice, before the Security Agreement, was that the GoI granted approval in advance for U.S. forces to carry out certain categories of activities, or to take action against certain targets. The use of warrant-based arrests—now required—was already frequently practiced in 2008. As of early 2009, U.S. commanders on the ground, particularly those in PIC provinces, have reported a smooth transition to operations under the Security Agreement. One U.S. BCT commander, based in Qadisiyah province where the 8th Iraqi Army Division is headquartered, stated: “We do all of our operations … by, with and through the Iraqi security forces. They’re all joint. Anybody that we detain, we detain with a warrant.”77 Concerning the use of Iraqi air space, the Security Agreement stated: “Surveillance and control over Iraqi airspace shall transfer to Iraqi authority immediately upon entry into force of this Agreement”. It added a caveat: “Iraq may request from the United States forces temporary support for the Iraqi authorities in the mission of surveillance and control of Iraqi air space.”78 The caveat is important because the capabilities of the Iraqi Air Force are still in the very early stages of development and training. In addition, that training has focused, first of all, on skills relevant to the ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) fight, such as moving troops and supplies, and providing some ISR. U.S. officials have noted that Iraqi officials and commanders on the ground remain aware that they still lack key COIN capabilities such as sufficient ISR and CAS; that they acknowledge that they do not yet have the ability to defend Iraqi airspace; and that they remain eager for the support of U.S. air assets. In late 2008, U.S. officials expressed some confidence that it would be possible to reach agreements on shared use of air space.79 The Security Agreement did not address a parallel concern related to operational coordination: Iraqi coordination with U.S. forces concerning ISF operations. U.S. commanders on the ground report that it is increasingly common for ISF commanders to inform U.S. forces only after they have carried out local operations; some commanders add that these are positive developments in terms of growing ISF capabilities and initiative.80 At the same time, it could be helpful for U.S. forces to know in advance about significant ISF operations, for two reasons: first, the ISF might call on U.S. forces suddenly, during such operations, to provide key enablers; second, such operations could have an impact on U.S. force protection. (...continued) September 16, 2008, had already emphasized that as the ISF stand up, coalition forces will increasingly “enable from overwatch.” See “Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” September 16, 2008, available at http://www.mnf-iraq.com-odierno_coin_guidance.pdf. 77 See Colonel Butch Kievenaar, Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, DOD News Briefing, January 5, 2009, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript/aspx?trancriptid=4335. 78 “SOFA,” Article 9, para.4-5. 79 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. 80 Interviews with MNC-I and subordinate commands, August 2008. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŘȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Article 22 of the Security Agreement described provisions for detainee operations. One set of provisions placed tight constraints on the circumstances under which U.S. forces may take Iraqis into physical custody.81 Another set of provisions, of even more concern to U.S. commanders on the ground, specified how the cases of those detainees held by coalition forces would be further adjudicated. The Security Agreement mandated that U.S. forces provide information about all detainees held, and stated that Iraqi authorities would “issue arrest warrants for persons who are wanted by them.” The agreement required U.S. forces to turn over custody of all “wanted” detainees, and then to release all remaining detainees “in a safe and orderly manner.”82 In anticipation of a more stringent new detention regime, throughout 2008, MNF-I carried out a detainee release program, releasing detainees to their homes and communities whenever possible. As of late November 2008, U.S. forces held approximately 15,800 detainees in theater internment facilities, after releasing more than 17,500 during 2008.83 Some U.S. military commanders expressed concerns about the remaining “legacy” population. In many cases, for the detainees it held, the coalition lacked releasable evidence with legal sufficiency in Iraqi courts. Scrupulous collection of evidence—such as photographs, diagrams, eye-witness accounts—common in civilian law enforcement, was not always an integral part of coalition combat operations in Iraq. Such legacy detainees could pose real security threats to the Iraqi population, or to the coalition, commanders warned. Some coalition officials and outside observers also expressed concerns that the GoI adjudication of legacy detainee cases, whether or not legally sufficient evidence exists, might evince a sectarian bias—in particular, a tendency to treat Shiite Arabs more leniently than Sunni Arabs.84 In January 2009, Iraqi and U.S. officials reached an agreement that the U.S. military would transfer 1,500 detainees per month to Iraqi authorities. At the first such transfer, Iraqi officials had warrants for 42 of the 1,500; they chose to keep about 70 others for further investigation; and they planned to release the remaining persons to their home communities at a rate of about 50 per day.85 Some detainees have expressed fears that they may face harm if they return to their home communities, as part of the new release process; in those cases, the GoI reportedly agreed to help them resettle elsewhere.86 In March 2009, it was reported that six recently released detainees were abducted and killed by local police officers, in an apparent act of retaliation.87 Some local Iraqi officials, in turn, have expressed concerns that some released detainees may return to 81 “No detention or arrest may be carried out by the United States Forces (except with respect to detention or arrest of members of the United States Forces and of the civilian component) except through an Iraqi decision issued in accordance with Iraqi law and pursuant to Article 4.” If U.S. forces do detain Iraqis, “such persons much be handed over to competent Iraqi authorities within 24 hours.” “SOFA,” Article 22, para.1-2. 82 “SOFA,” Article 22, para.4. 83 MNF-I press release, November 30, 2008. 84 Interviews with MNF-I officials and subordinate commanders, August 2008. 85 Interview, MNF-I official, February 2009. 86 Interview, MNF-I official, February 2009; and see Tom A. Peter, “U.S. to Hand Its Captives to Iraqi Courts,” Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 2009. 87 See Rod Nordland, “With Local Control, New Troubles in Iraq,” New York Times, March 16, 2008. The article cites the released detainees’ tribal leader, Salah Rasheed al-Goud, as saying that local police from the town of Haditha, in Anbar province, hunted the men down, handcuffed them, and shot them. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řřȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ violence—for example, the deputy police chief in Fallujah, Anbar province, commented, “Of course they represent a threat.”88 ’Ÿ’•Ȭ’•’Š›¢ȱ˜•ŽœȱŠ—ȱŽœ™˜—œ’‹’•’’Žœȱ Over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the balance of U.S. civilian and military roles and responsibilities has evolved to include a larger civilian footprint and a stronger civilian role, and integration between U.S. civilian and military efforts has increased over time. Looking ahead, as U.S. forces draw down, a key operational issue is the most effective future balance and pattern of U.S. civilian and military efforts in Iraq. As a rule, the military has played the preponderant role in OIF, including in non-traditional fields such as governance and reconstruction. As of 2008, the U.S. military remained the de facto default option in many cases, though military officers were usually the first to note that they lacked the requisite expertise.89 One key role of the U.S. military in Iraq throughout has been supporting civilian-led efforts to provide Iraqis with governance mentorship, and in particular, to build linkages among the national, regional, and local levels. As MNC-I officials noted, “Our job at Corps is to establish the connective tissue between the center and the provinces.”90 As a rule, while PRTs focused on governance at the provincial level, military units, with far more boots on the ground, worked on a daily basis to foster governance at the district and local levels, and to help link those levels to higher levels of Iraqi government.91 Through early 2009, the U.S. military continued to provide some support for small-scale reconstruction initiatives, though unevenly across Iraq. Some commanders continued to facilitate the reopening of small businesses—and to use the number of reopened businesses as a metric of economic progress— while others decided to “give back,” that is, “not spend,” their Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, in order to encourage Iraqis to budget and spend their own money.92 As security conditions on the ground in Iraq improved, civilian and military officials all pointed to increased opportunities for civilian assistance initiatives, particularly capacity-building at all levels. As one U.S. commander argued, “Embassy people should be out more every day now, like we are.”93 Some provincial Iraqi officials, for their part, appear eager to welcome additional U.S. civilian expertise.94 In theory, one option, as U.S. troops draw down, would be to increase the U.S. civilian effort in Iraq in terms of personnel and resources, taking advantage of the improved security climate to boost support for Iraqi civilian capacity-building at the national, provincial, and local levels. In 2008, some key steps were taken to amplify U.S. government civilian assistance efforts at the provincial level, including authorization to add 66 civilian subject matter experts, in technical fields including agriculture and business development, to work with the PRTs.95 However, 88 Anthony Shadid, “In Iraq, Chaos Feared as U.S. Closes Prison,” Washington Post, March 22, 2009. Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders, August 2008. As one noted, “What you see is the U.S. military, but we don’t have the expertise.” 90 Interviews with MNC-I officials, August 2008. 91 Interviews with U.S. military officials and PRT members, August 2008. 92 Interviews with Multi-National Division commanders and subordinate commanders, August 2008. 93 Interview with Multi-National Division commander, August 2008. 94 Interviews with the Governor of Najaf, the Governor of Basra, August 2008. 95 Interview with the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), U.S. Embassy, August 2008. When PRT leaders were asked (continued...) 89 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŚȱ ȱ ™Ž›Š’˜—ȱ ›Šš’ȱ›ŽŽ˜–DZȱ›ŠŽ’Žœǰȱ™™›˜ŠŒ‘ŽœǰȱŽœž•œǰȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ officials at U.S. Embassy Baghdad and at the Department of State noted that it was likely that peak PRT staffing levels in Iraq had already been reached. In 2008, the Embassy—in response to direction from Congress—began working on “PRT strategic drawdown” plans.96 The Obama Administration’s drawdown and transition policy calls for consolidating PRT personnel at fewer locations, and for closely integrating the work of the PRTs and the AABs. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in January 2009, describing future plans, Secretary Gates noted: “The plans that General Odierno has developed in conjunction with Ambassador Crocker foresee that as we consolidate our forces, we would also consolidate our PRTs … so that the two would be stationed together and our forces would be in a position to continue to protect the civilian element.”97 Some officials have suggested that those civil-military relationships might vary geographically, including closer integration—including co-location or even full integration into a single staff structure—where security conditions remain unsettled, and looser partnerships in relatively permissive areas. Good test cases are already available, in Najaf and Karbala provinces, for the ability of PRTs to function without a substantial co-located U.S. forces presence. In May 2008, the personnel of the PRTs for Najaf and Karbala provinces, who had been operating from a remote base in Hillah, in Babil province, relocated to their respective areas of operation. Najaf and Karbala were both PIC provinces at that time, with limited U.S. military presence. In Najaf, for example, in late 2008, the PRT, including a diverse team of civilian experts and a small U.S. military team that provided them with movement, was based at a small Forward Operating Base (FOB), together with a U.S. Army transition team that worked with the local Iraqi Army battalion and a small U.S. military “mayor’s cell” that managed the installation.98 A team of private security contractors from Triple Canopy provided static security. In early 2009, U.S. officials in both Baghdad and Washington also pointed to Najaf as a possible model for the future.99 ˜•Žȱ˜ȱ˜—›ŠŒ˜›œȱ Over the course of OIF, the role of contractors supporting the operation has varied in both scope and scale. According to DOD, as of the first quarter of 2009, DOD had a total of 148,050 contractors in Iraq, including 39,262 U.S. citizens; 70,875 third-country nationals; and 37,913 host country nationals.100 A key operational issue looking ahead is the likely role of contractors supporting U.S. operations in Iraq as U.S. forces draw down. While some substantive requirements for contractor support may diminish, others could increase. For example, one of the three pillars of the mission of Advise and Assist Brigades, after August 2010, is to provide force protection to U.S. government civilians. As of early 2009, that function was performed, in many cases, by private security contractors. At the same time, requirements (...continued) how many subject matter experts they would like to receive, they reportedly requested a total of 170. 96 Interviews with U.S. Embassy and Department of State officials, August and December 2008, and January 2009. 97 See transcript, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, House Armed Services Committee, hearing on Defense Department Priorities, Washington, DC, January 27, 2009. 98 Interviews with U.S. civilian and military officials at the Najaf FOB. 99 Communications with U.S. military officials in Baghdad, and U.S. civilian of [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL34387. Public record. Not legal advice.