# Ship Navigation in Harbors: Safety Issues

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL34365

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** February 8, 2008
- **Citation:** RL34365

## Text

Ship Navigation in Harbors: Safety Issues
-name redactedSpecialist in Transportation Policy
February 8, 2008

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL34365

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Ship Navigation in Harbors: Safety Issues

Summary
On November 7, 2007, a container ship collided with a tower of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay
Bridge, spilling 58,000 gallons of the ship’s bunker fuel into the Bay. The incident has raised
questions about the role of maritime pilots and vessel traffic services (VTSs) in preventing
accidents in U.S. harbors, such as: Is there a need for further independent oversight of pilot
performance? Could VTSs operate more like Air Traffic Control centers? Should the pilot and
ship captain be required to agree on a passage plan before transiting a harbor?
Because of the additional challenges of navigating large ships through the constricted waters of a
harbor, most U.S. ports require shipping lines to hire a maritime pilot. Maritime pilots, through a
lengthy apprenticeship process and many years of experience, have gained intimate knowledge of
the navigational requirements of a particular harbor. Despite the federal government’s prominent
role in regulating interstate commerce, Congress has largely left it to the various coastal states to
regulate pilotage. Pilots are licensed by the state for ships engaged in foreign trade (“registered”
vessels carrying international cargo), which accounts for the vast majority of port calls. Typically
a state pilot board oversees the hiring, training, and performance of pilots, as well as setting
pilotage rates charged to the shipping lines. The U.S. Coast Guard has jurisdiction only over
pilots of ships engaged in domestic trade and the courts have ruled that the Coast Guard does not
have the authority to suspend or revoke the license of pilots for violations while piloting a
foreign-trade ship. To assist pilots, the busiest U.S. ports have established VTS stations to
monitor ship traffic and provide relevant information to pilots, such as the location of other ships.
While often compared to an air traffic control tower, a VTS is not directly involved in the
movement of vessels and is more accurately described as an advisory service than a traffic control
center.
Ever-larger ships, difficult or challenging slow-speed handling characteristics of some of these
ships, and rising port traffic that is predominantly foreign-flagged have led to proposals
concerning pilotage, VTSs, and other safety-related navigation services in U.S. ports. Given the
federal interest in marine environmental protection and the Coast Guard’s mission to ensure the
safety of shipping in U.S. waters, some experts have advocated stronger federal oversight of
pilots. They recommend that the Coast Guard or a national commission establish national
standards for pilot training and proficiency or that the Coast Guard be given disciplinary authority
over state-licensed pilots. State pilots resist greater federal oversight, arguing that the unique
geography and navigational requirements of each port justifies local oversight. Whether VTSs
should exert more direct control over vessel movement is also raised as a safety measure, but
most acknowledge that an experienced on-board mariner is probably in the best position to direct
a vessel’s movement. Requiring that a pilot and ship captain first agree on a harbor passage plan,
investigating language difficulties between pilots and foreign crews, and Coast Guard rotational
staffing practices, are other issues policymakers may examine in assessing the safety of ship
navigation in U.S. harbors.

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Ship Navigation in Harbors: Safety Issues

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Background ................................................................................................................................2
Peculiarities of Harbor Navigation ........................................................................................2
Challenges of Piloting Bigger Ships ......................................................................................2
Slow-speed Handling Characteristics ....................................................................................3
Maritime Pilotage .......................................................................................................................4
Pilotage Requirements Vary Among U.S. Ports......................................................................4
Pilot Training ........................................................................................................................4
State Pilot Associations .........................................................................................................5
Federal Pilots ........................................................................................................................5
Dual Oversight......................................................................................................................6
State Pilot Associations Are Regulated Monopolies ...............................................................7
Vessel Traffic Services ................................................................................................................8
VTS Development ................................................................................................................8
Safety and Security ...............................................................................................................9
VTSs and JHOCs ..................................................................................................................9
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 10
Oversight of Pilot Performance ........................................................................................... 10
Should VTSs Operate More Like ATCs? ............................................................................. 11
Ship Design Standards .................................................................................................. 12
Poor-Handling Vessels .................................................................................................. 12
VTS Expansion............................................................................................................. 12
Requiring a Passage Plan .................................................................................................... 13
Language Barriers......................................................................................................... 14
Other Issues ........................................................................................................................ 14
Near-Miss Data............................................................................................................. 14
Coast Guard Staffing Practices ...................................................................................... 15
Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress.................................................................................. 15

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 16

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Ship Navigation in Harbors: Safety Issues

Introduction
On November 7, 2007, at about 8:30 a.m., the container ship Cosco Busan sideswiped one of the
towers of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, ripping a 100-foot by 12-foot gash into the side
of the hull and releasing over 50,000 gallons of the ship’s bunker fuel into the Bay. Throughout
the morning, and at the time of the accident, there was heavy patchy fog, and the pilot had
delayed the ship’s departure from the Oakland pier by 90 minutes because of the fog.1 About
three minutes before the accident, but apparently too late to avoid the collision, the San Francisco
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), which monitors harbor traffic, contacted the ship’s pilot. The VTS
told him that he was running parallel to the bridge and inquired whether his intended course was
still to pass beneath the delta and echo spans of the bridge, as he had informed VTS earlier.
Although several investigations are pending, the suspected cause of the accident is pilot error.2
Considering the number of ships transiting U.S. harbors everyday, accidents are rare. This is
largely the result of the skill and expertise of pilots and the navigation support services they
receive from VTSs. When accidents occur, the public impact of the oil or fuel spilled can be
large, as the Cosco Busan accident demonstrated.
As a result of tanker safety improvements implemented in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez
spill, the amount of oil spilled by oil tankers has been declining significantly and is now
approaching the amount of oil spilled by non-tank vessels.3 According to the Coast Guard, the
Cosco Busan has a fuel capacity of 52,000 barrels,4 larger than the fuel capacity of the majority
of ocean-going non-tank vessels calling at U.S. ports which have a fuel capacity between 10,000
and 20,000 barrels. However, 360 vessels calling U.S. ports have a fuel capacity over 50,000
barrels and 100 vessels have a fuel capacity over 70,000 barrels. 5 While the fuel oil carried by
non-tank vessels is a relatively small fraction of the oil carried as cargo in tankers, it is still of
sufficient quantity to cause an environmental catastrophe and significant economic loss if spilled.
Much attention has focused on the timeliness of the Coast Guard’s response to the Cosco Busan
spill, but the accident has also raised questions about oversight of pilot proficiency and the role of
VTSs in harbor navigation. Congress has thus far held three hearings on the accident and has
introduced legislation in reaction to the accident. Other, preexisting legislation related to ship
navigation is pending (see the last section of this report). Important policy questions for Congress
include whether there is a need for further independent oversight of pilot performance; whether
VTSs’ should operate more like Air Traffic Control centers; and whether the pilot and ship
1
This account of the accident is based on the Statement of Admiral Craig E. Bone, 11th District Commander, U.S.
Coast Guard, in a hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation, November 19, 2007. The U.S. Coast Guard, the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), and the DHS Inspector General are investigating the accident which will provide more details into the
causes of the accident and will likely make recommendations for preventing this type of accident in the future.
2
The San Francisco Bay Pilot commission has suspended the pilot’s state license, pending a hearing, and the Coast
Guard has requested that the pilot voluntarily turn in his federal license, which he has done.
3
See Figure 2 in CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background, Governance, and Issues for
Congress, by (name redacted).
4
One barrel is equal to 42 gallons.
5
Statement of Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant U.S. Coast Guard, Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard,
December 18, 2007, p. 3.

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captain should be required to agree on a passage plan before transiting a harbor? Ever-larger
ships, difficult or challenging slow-speed handling characteristics of some of these ships, and
rising port traffic that is increasingly foreign-flagged may be cause for a review of pilotage,
vessel traffic services, and other safety-related navigation services in U.S. ports.
This report describes the role of pilots and VTSs in the safe navigation of ships in U.S. harbors
and reviews the controversy over the governance of pilot associations, the appropriate level of
interaction between the VTS and pilot, and other proposals for improving the safety of harbor
navigation. The report’s focus is on the prevention of ship collisions and groundings in harbors
and thus does not discuss oil spill response and clean-up.6 This report also does not discuss the
legal liabilities of carriers and mariners in ship accidents.

Background
Peculiarities of Harbor Navigation
The skill and knowledge required to navigate a ship in a harbor versus at sea is significantly
different. Most ship collisions, allisions,7 and groundings occur in harbors, because that is where
navigation becomes constricted by land, shallow water, other vessels, and man-made structures
like jetties, bridges, and piers. Tide and river currents are also an important factor in harbors but
not at sea. A ship’s response to the water displacement of a passing vessel, a channel’s bank, and
minimal under-keel clearance are hydrodynamics peculiar to a harbor’s constricted waters. A fully
loaded ship moving at typical harbor speed in a channel with a following tide may not be able to
stop, even with engines in reverse and the assistance of tugs, for one or more miles.

Challenges of Piloting Bigger Ships
Ever-larger ships, increasing port traffic, and ships carrying especially dangerous cargo have put a
premium on the skill and knowledge of today’s harbor pilots. In 2005, ocean-going vessels over
10,000 deadweight tonnage (dwt) made over 61,000 U.S. port calls, or an average of 167 per day.
From 2001 to 2006, container ship calls at U.S. ports increased by 14% while the average size of
containerships increased by 25%.8 The Cosco Busan, with a capacity of 5,500 TEUs,9 is a
member of the fifth generation of container ships built between 2000 and 2005. The ship is over
130 feet wide and just over three football fields long (901 feet). From 2001 to 2006, port calls by
smaller container ships (those with less than 4,000 TEU capacity) decreased by 15%, while port
calls by large container ships like the Cosco Busan or bigger (those with more than 5,000 TEU
capacity) increased by 241%. Unlike the largest oil tankers, which load and unload their cargo at
offshore pipelines or transfer their cargo to lightering ships at the harbor’s entrance, container and
other types of ships must transit the harbor to load and unload. Ships carrying cargo that can be
especially dangerous or damaging to the environment have also increased in number. From 2001
6

For a discussion of oil spill response and clean-up, see CRS Report RL33705, Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters:
Background, Governance, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
7
Allision is a Coast Guard term for a collision between a moving vessel and a stationary object.
8
Maritime Administration, U.S. Water Transportation Statistical Snapshot, May 2007, p. 5.
9
TEU = one 20-foot container, and is the standard unit of measure for container ship capacity. A 40-foot container is
the size most commonly used and is equal to 2 TEUs.

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to 2005, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) carrier calls increased by
31% and tanker calls increased by nearly 10%.10 Because of a boom in shipping in recent years,
especially in the dry bulk sector, there is also concern that older ships that otherwise would have
been sent to the scrap yard are still plying the seas and picking up dry bulk cargo at ports like
those along the lower Mississippi River, which is a load center for bulk cargoes.11
According to one observer, many ships transiting U.S. harbors may simply be “too big for their
ditches.”12 In other words, they exceed the size that the shipping channel was originally designed
for. While ships are designed and built for a particular route, over the life of a ship lasting from
20 to 25 years, markets change and ships end up calling other ports.13 Often, shipping channels
are deepened rather than widened, which some argue is an indication that economics (ship
productivity) motivates dredging more than safety concerns.14 In other words, it is argued that
efforts are made to accommodate ship displacement but not maneuverability. For example, when
two ships pass each other in opposite directions at a certain segment in the Houston ship channel,
they perform a maneuver called “Texas Chicken” because the two ships pass so close to one
another that they use the displacement from the other vessel for the extra water they need to avoid
grounding on the edges of the channel. A certain concrete structure in the Port of Long Beach is
referred to as the “can opener” because of the risk it poses to ships transiting the harbor.15

Slow-speed Handling Characteristics
In addition to their sheer size, the biggest ships can have some handling characteristics that pilots
need to compensate for when maneuvering them in constricted waters.16 Deep-sea speed is given
higher design priority than shallow and restricted water maneuverability in the design of cargo
ships. For example, high powered engines designed to achieve faster deep-sea cruising speeds can
have a minimum bare steerage speed of about eight knots, which is a relatively high speed in
constricted waters. In contrast, deep-sea speed is less important for cruise ships and they exhibit
better slow-speed maneuverability. As ships are getting bigger, the relative size of their rudders is
getting smaller; not a problem at sea but it does have an adverse impact on controllability at
slower speeds in narrow channels and in shallow water. Ships with a higher profile, like car
carriers, container ships (when fully stacked with containers on deck), and cruise ships, are much
more susceptible than other ships to the influences of cross winds during slow speed
maneuvering.

10

Maritime Administration, Vessel Calls at U.S. and World Ports, 2005, April 2006.
“Eye on Substandard Ships, Bulk Cargo Boom Brings Poorly Maintained Vessels into U.S. Ports,” American
Shipper, December 2007, p. 66.
12
“Channel Design and Vessel Maneuverability: Next Steps,” Marine Technology, vol. 40, no. 2, April 2003, p. 93.
11

13
“Critical Needs for Ship Maneuverability: Lessons From the Houston Ship Channel Full-Scale Maneuvering Trials,”
Marine Technology, vol. 42, no. 1, January 2005, p. 11-20.
14
“Channel Design and Vessel Maneuverability: Next Steps,” Marine Technology, vol. 40, no. 2, April 2003.
15
“Giants of the Sea; Massive New Container Ships Carry Huge Loads, but Docking Them Is Problematic for Pilots,”
Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2006, p. B1.
16
“Channel Design and Vessel Maneuverability: Next Steps,” Marine Technology, vol. 40, no. 2, April 2003.

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Maritime Pilotage
Maritime pilots are hired by ocean carriers to take command of the navigation of their ships
through harbors. They are navigational specialists for a particular harbor. They board ships at the
entrance to a harbor (with use of a pilot boat17 or in rare cases a helicopter) and take position at
the bridge alongside the master of the vessel (or the officer in charge of the watch) and other
bridge crew. Using his/her experience and intimate knowledge of the navigation through a
particular harbor, the pilot will order instructions to the helmsmen to steer the ship through the
harbor and may direct tugboats, if they are assisting. While the pilot is in command of the
navigation of the ship through the harbor, the captain of the ship remains in command of the ship
and retains ultimate responsibility for its safe passage. Only under emergency situations is a
captain likely to countermand the pilot’s orders. Often the pilot will board the ship with a
computer laptop or other handheld device that contains his/her own set of charts for that harbor as
well as ship tracking technology. The laptop may also be plugged into the ship’s navigation
console to incorporate the ship’s navigation technology into the pilot’s navigation software. When
the pilot boards the ship, the captain is required to inform the pilot about the navigation
particulars of the ship, such as the draft, air draft (highest point on the vessel), and maneuvering
characteristics. A “pilot card” is used for this purpose. Although English is the required language
of international shipping, language can be a barrier to expansive communication between the pilot
and captain.

Pilotage Requirements Vary Among U.S. Ports
Most U.S. ports require that a ship hire a pilot—that is, it is compulsory. In some ports, hiring a
pilot may be voluntary. In these cases, if a ship captain regularly calls at a port and is confident
that he/she can navigate the ship through the harbor, the captain may elect not to hire a pilot, but
the shipping line will still be charged either the full pilotage fee or some portion thereof. For
liability reasons, many shipping lines will take on a pilot even if not compulsory. On the West and
Gulf Coasts, the pilot usually navigates the ship from the harbor entrance to the dock (and vice
versa), but on the East Coast, some ports require a “docking pilot” to takeover from the pilot
when docking the ship. Docking pilots are usually former tugboat captains and are not members
of the local pilot association. In Louisiana, in addition to hiring a harbor pilot, shipping lines may
also be required to hire one or two “river pilots” depending on how far up the Mississippi River
the ship is transiting (to call at the Port of Baton Rouge or South Louisiana). Especially large
ships may be required to hire two pilots, or a full pilot and an assist pilot.

Pilot Training
A pilot may be a graduate of a maritime academy with sea experience. If a pilot has little sea
experience, he/she may begin with an apprenticeship under the supervision of a senior pilot
lasting several years. Eventually an apprentice pilot will have to pass a written exam that
includes, among other things, drawing the chart for the harbor, in every detail, by memory. A new

17
The boarding from pilot boat to ship and vice versa is done while the ship is moving, and, especially in conditions of
heavy seas, cold water, or sea spray ice, is extremely dangerous. Most pilots know of another pilot that lost their life
while boarding.

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pilot will begin solo piloting on smaller vessels and will typically have to have piloted a
minimum number of ships in each size range before advancing.
As explained below, there are pilots who hold state licenses and those that hold federal licenses or
endorsements. The requirements for obtaining a state license vary from port to port, but states
generally require that an applicant hold a federal pilot’s license as a minimum requirement.
Obtaining a state pilot license generally requires more hands-on experience than obtaining a
federal pilot license.

State Pilot Associations
A maritime pilot typically works as an independent contractor in a pilot’s association at a given
port. The association takes care of administrative functions for the pilots such as dispatching
pilots to vessels, maintaining pilot boats, and billing and collecting pilotage fees. Pilots are
assigned to ships on a rotating basis and the shipping line has no choice in the selection of the
pilot. Pilot associations are regulated by a state board of commissioners, or in some cases, by city
government.18 Typically, a pilot board is comprised of three to ten members who serve part-time.
Representation on the board must consist of a specific ratio of pilots, members of the broader
maritime industry in the port area, and members of the public not connected with the maritime
industry. The pilot board is responsible for ensuring the qualifications of the pilots, setting
pilotage fees charged to the vessel operators, and reviewing the performance of pilots. Pilotage
fees are based on the draft and/or tonnage of the vessel and, in some cases, the distance piloted.
Pilots do not work in a competitive environment and pilot associations are effectively local or
regional monopolies. The pilot association only selects enough member pilots to service the
traffic at hand. State and local pilot associations only have jurisdiction over the pilotage of ships
in the foreign trade—that is, ships carrying international cargo. 19

Federal Pilots
The federal government has jurisdiction over the pilotage of ships in the domestic trade: for
example, a tank vessel carrying oil from Alaska to California.20 Typically, a sea captain engaged
in the domestic trade will carry a Coast Guard pilot’s endorsement on his/her captain’s license
and therefore will not need to hire a pilot upon entrance to a harbor but rather has the authority to
pilot the vessel in that harbor. This type of federal pilot authorization is the most common. There
are also a few independent federal pilots that are not employed by a coastwise shipping line, but
offer their piloting service at the particular port for which they are licensed. Like the state pilot
license, the federal pilot license pertains to a specific port, therefore, the ship captain must obtain
a pilot license for each port that he/she expects to call on a routine basis. Generally, all state and
local pilots licensed to pilot foreign trade vessels also hold a federal license to pilot ships in the
domestic trade. As mentioned above, most state and local pilot associations require a federal
pilot’s license as a minimum requirement for being allowed to work towards a state pilot’s
license. The federal government will grant a federal pilot’s license to anyone that qualifies, unlike
the states that limit the granting of licenses based on their perceived need for pilot services.
18
At the Port of Los Angeles, pilots are city employees overseen by the port. At the Port of Long Beach, one private
company provides pilotage services in an exclusive contract with the port.
19
Statutorily, ships engaged in the foreign trade are referred to as “registered” vessels.
20
Ships engaged in the domestic trade (a.k.a. “coastwise trade”) are statutorily referred to as “enrolled” vessels.

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Dual Oversight
Significantly, the Coast Guard cannot suspend or revoke the license of a pilot for misconduct
while he or she is piloting a foreign trade vessel. The courts have ruled that the pilot in this
instance is acting solely under the authority of a state license.21 Conversely, a state cannot do the
same to a pilot while piloting a vessel in the domestic trade, because the courts have ruled that in
this instance the pilot is acting solely under the authority of his/her federal license.22 However, the
Coast Guard does have the authority (46 U.S.C. 2302) to levy a civil penalty of up to $25,000
against a person who operates a vessel in a negligent manner and charge a person operating a
vessel in a grossly negligent manner with a class A misdemeanor.
The dual regulatory structure of piloting dates back to the mid-1800s. As ports in colonial
America began to develop, the colonies instituted their own pilotage requirements as pilotage was
a long-established tradition in Europe. In 1789, the First Congress allowed the states to continue
to govern pilotage practices “until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.”23 It
was not until the mid-1800s after the introduction of steam vessels that Congress began to play a
role in pilotage. In 1871, Congress enacted a law that required steam powered ships in the coastal
trade to have federally licensed pilots and preventing the states from requiring state pilots for
these ships.24 A 1912 U.S. Supreme Court decision affirmed that federal jurisdiction over pilotage
pertains only to ships engaged in the domestic trade while the pilotage of ships engaged in the
foreign trade fell to state jurisdiction, until Congress decided otherwise.25 This bifurcated
regulatory structure continues today.
The bifurcated nature of pilot oversight is a product of legislative history and questions have been
raised why oversight is not purely based on safety considerations. Whether a ship is carrying
domestic or international cargo is not a factor in safe harbor navigation. The NTSB questions how
the Coast Guard can adequately perform its safety mission without direct oversight over the
pilotage of the vast majority of vessel transits in U.S. harbors. Moreover, with the current trend of
substituting oil from Alaska (which accounts for most U.S. coastal shipping) with imported oil,
further diminution of U.S. coastal shipping seems probable. 26 On the other hand, one could argue
that captains of coastwise trade vessels are deployed on voyages of much shorter duration than
international voyages, are likely to call at a limited number of U.S. ports more frequently, and
therefore can gain the expertise and knowledge of navigation necessary for safe transit in those
ports. In contrast, sea captains on international voyages, it is argued, do not gain the same level of
harbor expertise and knowledge because of much longer voyages and potential assignment to
voyages with different port callings. It is also argued by state pilot associations that because the
geography and the nature of maritime traffic varies tremendously among ports, it is best left to

21

Alex L. Parks, and Edward V. Cattell, J.R., The Law of Tug, Tow, and Pilotage, 3rd Ed., Cornell Maritime Press,
Centreville, Maryland, p. 997. See, Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 1974 AMC 283 (9th Cir. 1974) and Dietz v.
Siler, 414 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. La 1976).
22
See, Baggett v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Pilot Commissioners, 1984 AMC 1259, 717 F.2d
521 (11th Cir. 1983).
23
Section 4 of the Lighthouse Act of August 7, 1789 (1 Stat. 54). [Crowley, p. 173.]
24
Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 440.
25
Anderson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Company, 225 U.S. 187 (1912).
26
In the last half-decade, U.S. foreign waterborne trade increased by nearly 17% while coastwise and Great Lakes
shipping declined by 4%.

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each individual port to decide the level of pilot expertise and performance required to ensure safe
harbor navigation.

State Pilot Associations Are Regulated Monopolies
With a handful of exceptions, most ports have just one pilot association servicing that port.
However, there is generally nothing in state laws prohibiting a competing pilot association from
forming. It was only during the sailing era that competition among pilots in a harbor was the
norm. Pilot associations defend their monopoly status as being necessary to prevent commercial
interests from trumping safety. They contend that in a competitive environment, economic
pressures from the shipping lines would inevitably undermine their safety prerogative. Also, pilot
associations argue that if they granted licenses to all those who applied and met the requirements,
pilots would not obtain an adequate number of transits to maintain their expertise in a given
harbor. How an apprenticeship training program would function if senior pilots knew that their
trainees would soon be competing against them is also a concern. State licensed pilots further
contend that it is important that the pilot be an independent contractor, not a member of the crew
employed by the ship operator, as is typically the case with federal pilots. It is argued that an
independent contractor status insulates the pilot from cost pressures that could otherwise cloud
the pilot’s judgment.
The state pilot system has been criticized for being a relatively closed profession and claims of
nepotism have been directed at some pilot associations. 27 A study by the Marine Board of the
National Academies noted that28 “pilots generally have been reluctant to address colleague
performance because of social and business relationships, potential loss of earning for affected
individuals, and especially concern that any form of oversight might expose them to liability for a
colleague’s performance.” The integrity and credibility of pilot oversight was highlighted by a
1986 ship and barge collision on the Mississippi River in Louisiana. The NTSB found that the
pilot of the ship may have caused or contributed to five of six accidents in the previous five years,
but the pilot commission and the pilot performance review panel, both of whose membership was
comprised entirely of pilots, had not taken any disciplinary action against the pilot. 29 Since that
accident, Louisiana has amended its piloting regulations to include non-pilots on pilot boards,
other states have generally done the same, and some states do not allow any pilots to be on the
board. However, criticism of the monopoly structure of the pilot system in Louisiana continues30
and the Cosco Busan accident has raised this criticism against the San Francisco Bar Pilots as
well.31 The pilot of the Cosco Busan had been involved in a ship grounding in the same harbor in
February 2006.

27

See for instance, “River Pilot Reform Adrift,” Times-Picayune, October 3, 2007, p. 99; “River Pilots Say Craft
Handed Down Through Generations,” USA Today, September 28, 2005, p. B5; “Nepotism Continues for New River
Pilots,” Times-Picayune, April 27, 2002, p. 1; “Special Report: River Barons. How Pilots Exploit Their Monopoly on
the Mississippi,” Times-Picayune, November 4 and 5, 2001; “Harbor Pilot: Great Job, But Good Luck Getting It,” Wall
Street Journal, November 29, 1995, p. T-1.
28
Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting, Marine Board of the National Resource Council, National
Academy Press, 1994, p. 120.
29
NTSB, Marine Accident Report: Collision Between the Hong Kong Flag Bulk Carrier “Petersfield” and the U.S.
Towboat “Bayou Boeuf” and Tow, New Orleans, Louisiana, October 18, 1986, January 5, 1988.
30
“Editorial: When Pilots Police Themselves,” Times-Picayune, October 6, 2007, p. 6.
31
“Opinion: Ship Pilot, Board Deserve More Scrutiny for Spill,” Sacramento Bee, December 11, 2007, n.p.

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Pilotage fees also motivate the debate regarding the monopoly structure of pilotage. Ship
operators are concerned with the level of pilotage fees they pay. Likewise, port authorities and
other maritime service providers in a port are concerned that the level of pilotage fees may drive
business away from their port.32 Thus, in addition to navigation safety, port economics continues
to drive a debate over pilot governance.

Vessel Traffic Services
To assist the pilot and crew with safe navigation, the Coast Guard has established vessel traffic
services (VTS) in many ports. From the VTS, Coast Guard “watchstanders” can monitor and
provide guidance to harbor traffic with the use of electronic communication, radio, radar,
differential global positioning system (DGPS),33 surveillance cameras, and binoculars. A VTS
operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week. VTSs vary depending on the geography and the
nature and volume of vessel traffic in a port area, but VTSs generally are staffed with both
uniformed and civilian Coast Guard watchstanders. Currently there are VTSs in eleven U.S. ports
staffed by 155 civilian and 130 active-duty personnel. The Coast Guard estimates that about 43
active-duty watchstanders will transfer in and out of VTSs annually.34 VTSs may also be staffed
by members of a “maritime exchange” from which they have evolved. U.S. ports without a Coast
Guard-led VTS have a maritime exchange that provides “VTS-like” services, and are more
accurately called Vessel Traffic Information Services (VTIS). A maritime exchange may be
jointly operated or run by a pilot association and be staffed by pilots. VTSs and VTISs are funded
from some combination of user fees charged to vessel operators, financing from port authorities,
state governments, and the Coast Guard.

VTS Development
The original purpose of maritime exchanges was to alert ship service providers in port (i.e.,
agents, pilots, tugs, stevedores, longshoremen unions, terminals, U.S. Customs, and other vendors
and government agencies) of a ship’s pending arrival. Before the development of current
technology, a lookout was posted with a telescope, signal flags, and flashing signal lights.35 While
maritime information exchange is still the central function of marine exchanges, in the 1960s and
1970s they also began offering a VHF radio communication and radar system for pilots and
captains to avoid collisions and groundings. Participation was initially voluntary and unregulated
and there were no protocols. However, after a ship collision in San Francisco Bay in 1971,
Congress passed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-340), which directed the
Coast Guard to establish VTS systems at ports where the Coast Guard deemed necessary.36 In the
32
See for instance, “Shippers Bristle at River Pilots’ Fees, Louisiana’s Woes Felt Across U.S., Experts Say,” Seattle
Times, July 12, 2001, p. A-17; “Changing Course, Louisiana Overhauled its Ship-pilotage Regulation After Reformers
Made It an Economic-Development Issue,” Journal of Commerce, July 5-11, 2004, p. 12-14; and “River Pilot Group’s
Rates Blasted; Attempt to Create Windfall Alleged,” Times-Picayune, November 15, 2007, p. 1. “Cruise Lines Attack
Planned Fee Increase,” The Virginian-Pilot, July 13, 2006, p. D1.
33
DGPS is more accurate than civilian GPS.
34
“VTS Personnel and Training,” The Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council, Summer
2007, vol. 64, no. 2, p. 14.
35
“Vessel Traffic Service Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor,” A Report to the VTS International Symposium in Hong
Kong, China, February 10-13, 2004, p. 3.
36
In 1972, Congress also passed the Vessel Bridge to Bridge Radiotelephone Act (P.L. 92-63), requiring ships to be
(continued...)

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1970s, VTSs were established in San Francisco, Puget Sound, New York, New Orleans, and
Houston-Galveston. VTSs were added in Morgan City, Port Arthur, Louisville, Valdez, Los
Angeles, and Sault St. Marie thereafter. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed in response to the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, made participation in the VTS mandatory where they existed.

Safety and Security
As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack and the heightened concern for port security,
harbor traffic monitoring and ship tracking has received a boost in federal attention and funding.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-295) requires ships over 300 gross
registered tons (grt) to be equipped with Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders,
which electronically transmit ship information, location, speed, and direction. AIS data can be
transmitted ship-to-ship or between ships and shore-side VTSs or maritime exchanges. For
security reasons, the Coast Guard is planning to extend shore-side AIS receivers and transmitters
nationwide, but currently this technology is fully operational at just several major U.S. ports.
AIS was introduced into the shipping industry as a safety measure prior to 9/11. To some extent,
it allows for the replacement of voice radio communications with electronic communication,
which is regarded as more efficient, less distracting to the mariner, and a less error-inducing
medium for data transmission. Some vessel collisions have been caused, in part, because a pilot
was communicating by radio with more than one other vessel and mistook communication from
one vessel for another. It is highly desirable that VTS communications to the pilot or master be as
non-intrusive on the mariner as possible. For instance, in the Cosco Busan accident, when the
Coast Guard was asked why the VTS watchstander had not alerted the pilot earlier or repeatedly,
the Coast Guard replied that VTS personnel are trained “not to distract the pilot with interruptions
during any critical maneuver.”37
With the introduction of AIS, there was some speculation and debate that a ship could determine
its location without the need for navigation buoys and determine the location of other ships
without the need for a shore-side VTS. However, now that ship tracking and monitoring has
become a security objective, shore-side communication and tracking facilities are viewed as a
necessary component.

VTSs and JHOCs
The Coast Guard has also created Joint Harbor Operational Centers (JHOCs) to improve port
security and safety. JHOCs were authorized in the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347, section 108).
They are intended to be “fusion centers” for federal law enforcement (namely the Coast Guard,
Navy, and Customs and Border Protection) and local law enforcement (port authority police or
state or city police assigned to a port area) to share intelligence and equipment (e.g., patrol boats)
and coordinate response when the need arises. The Coast Guard is planning to co-locate JHOCs
and VTSs. JHOCs are currently operational at Norfolk, San Diego, Charleston, and Seattle; and
the Coast Guard plans to create a JHOC at each major port area.

(...continued)
equipped with VHF radio telephones for communication among each other.
37
“Coast Guard Admiral Grilled Over Spill,” Associated Press Online, November 20, 2007.

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Issues for Congress
Given the trend towards larger ships, an expected increase in port traffic, and a probable lag in the
expansion of shipping channels and terminal facilities due to fiscal and environmental constraints,
Congress may consider several issues related to the safety of harbor navigation.

Oversight of Pilot Performance
In response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress required that all pilots commanding ships in
Prince William Sound be operating under the authority of their Alaska pilot license in addition to
their federal license. 38 This created a system of dual accountability—to the State of Alaska and to
the U.S. Coast Guard. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended that
all state pilots be required to operate under Coast Guard authority to address a “lack of adequate,
consistent accountability of state pilots.”39 Under this requirement, a state-licensed pilot would
not be allowed to pilot either a foreign trade vessel or a domestic trade vessel if his/her federal
license was revoked. The NTSB contends that the consequences of a major marine accident,
particularly in terms of environmental damage, cannot be considered merely local in effect, and
therefore, federal oversight of pilot performance is appropriate. The NTSB has also stated that
“the near total immunity from Federal control enjoyed by state pilots prevents the Coast Guard
from carrying out its congressional mandate to ensure safety on all Federal waterways.”40
However, past Congresses have not favored granting the Coast Guard additional legislative
authority over state-licensed pilots. The Coast Guard’s response to a 1988 NTSB
recommendation regarding this matter states as follows:41 “The Coast Guard concurs with the
intent of this recommendation, and recognizes the need for establishing better disciplinary control
over some State-licensed pilots. However, past Coast Guard efforts to obtain the recommended
authority have not been successful in Congress.”
The Coast Guard requested this authority as a provision in S. 682, which was enacted as the Port
and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-474), but the provision was not included in final passage
of the bill. At that time, the American Pilots Association argued against the provision on the
grounds that the Coast Guard was not as knowledgeable and experienced as local pilots with the
local conditions in each harbor, due in part to the continual rotation of Coast Guard staff every
two to three years. Therefore, the association argued the local pilots were in the best position to
properly judge the performance of their peers.42 Shipping lines, however, argued in favor of the
provision, stating that43 “when there is misconduct, or there is slippage in the quality, the
38

Section 4116(a)(2) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-380).
NTSB Safety Recommendation addressed to Admiral J. William Kime, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, October 21,
1991, p. 6.
40
NTSB, Marine Accident Report, Collision Between the Hong Kong Flag Bulk Carrier Petersfield and the U.S.
Towboat Bayou Boeuf and Tow New Orleans, Louisiana, October 28, 1986, NTSB/MAR-88/01, p. 51.
41
Coast Guard reply dated July 13, 1988, excerpt quoted in NTSB Safety Recommendation addressed to Admiral J.
William Kime, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, October 21, 1991, p. 4.
42
Testimony of Captain Ernest A. Clothier, President of American Pilots Association, House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, September 13-15, 1977, pp. 410 and 413.
43
Testimony of James J. Reynolds, President, American Institute of Merchant Shipping, House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation, September 13-15, 1977, p. 313.
39

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evaluation of that should be at the Federal level so that we have uniform excellence all over the
country, and it does not depend on the particular political climate of the State to determine
whether you are going to have good pilots or bad pilots.”
The desire for an independent assessment of pilot performance was also voiced by the Marine
Board of the National Academies, noting that “measures to confirm maintenance of pilot
knowledge and skills are informal; systematic measures are not used to detect and correct
degraded capabilities before such weaknesses become factors in marine accidents” and that “the
effectiveness of corrective action at the state level by pilot associations and pilot boards has been
uneven.”44 The Marine Board did not call for the Coast Guard to have disciplinary authority over
state pilots, but called for the creation of a national commission on pilotage, chartered by
Congress, that would set national baseline standards for pilot training and qualifications and
would accredit each port’s piloting system. 45

Should VTSs Operate More Like ATCs?
The Coast Guard notes emphatically that VTS is an advisory service, not a traffic control center.
The Coast Guard describes VTSs as providing a range of four basic services that represent an
increasing continuum of involvement: 1) monitoring of harbor traffic, 2) providing information to
mariners so that they can navigate more safely or efficiently, 3) advising or recommending a
course of action to a vessel (usually infrequently), and (4) in rare circumstances, directing a
vessel to move to a certain location or hold at anchor or at the dock until safe to proceed, but
without giving direct maneuvering orders.46 While VTSs are often compared to an air traffic
control tower, the major difference is that VTSs do not give specific “conning” orders to the
pilots, such as heading and speed. 47 However, the level of VTS involvement in harbor navigation
varies depending on the circumstances of the harbor. For instance, in busy harbors or in harbors
with a drawbridge, the VTS may enforce a harbor traffic management plan that dictates one-way
traffic or order of procession through a waterway. 48 In these cases, the VTS could be described as
traffic management, as opposed to positive traffic control.
Whether VTSs could operate more like an ATC, which navigation experts refer to as “shore-based
pilotage” or “remote pilotage,” is a topic of speculation and debate. Pilots and other navigation
experts assert that there is no way of replacing the eyes of an experienced, on-board mariner. 49
Pilots describe turning a ship like to turning a car on ice—it slides through the turn, and pilotage
is described as a process of continually watching how the ship responds to a maneuver, which
44

Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting, Marine Board of the National Resource Council, National
Academy Press, 1994, p. 122.
45
Minding the Helm: Marine Navigation and Piloting, Marine Board of the National Resource Council, National
Academy Press, 1994, pp. 319-327.
46
“U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services,” Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council,
vol. 64, no. 2, summer 2007, pp. 10-13.
47
A closer parallel in aviation may be Flight Service Stations (FSS) which provide weather briefings and flight
planning services largely to general aviation pilots.
48
“U.S. Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services,” Coast Guard Proceedings of the Marine Safety and Security Council,
vol. 64, no. 2, summer 2007, p. 11.
49
See for instance, Mike Hadley, “Issues in Remote Pilotage,” Journal of Navigation, vol. 52, no. 1, January 1999, pp.
1-10; and Patrick van Erve, Norman Bonnor, “Can The Shipping-Aviation Analogy Be Used As An Argument To
Decrease The Need For Maritime Pilotage?” Journal of Navigation, vol. 59, no. 2, May 2006, pp. 359-363.

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will dictate the pilot’s next command. How a ship responds is affected by the characteristics of
the ship, weather, and water conditions.50 A pilot needs to be aware of multiple cues: wind, tide
and river currents, (in the case of estuaries); the salt water versus fresh water mix that affects
buoyancy. These are all factors that only an on-board mariner is in position to discern. Pilots
stress that visual cues and references are still of paramount importance in their trade and doubt
whether any kind of advanced VTS system could replace the process of continual evaluation by
an on-board pilot.
If conning a ship is beyond the present capability of a VTS, Congress might still move to assess
whether the VTS should exert more control over harbor traffic in bad weather conditions. The
Coast Guard already has authority to restrict vessel movements during hazardous weather
conditions, but does not regularly do so. One reason may be that the Coast Guard lacks standards
to judge the maneuvering capabilities of vessels in constricted waters (see below).

Ship Design Standards
Lawmakers might consider whether more scientific information and analysis about ship
maneuverability in harbor waters is needed. 51 While the IMO in 2002 developed maneuverability
standards for ships in deep, unrestricted water at sea speed, no analogous performance standards
for ships in shallow, constricted water at slow speed have been established. Because there is no
standard, the Coast Guard cannot establish harbor restrictions for certain ships that may be less
controllable during hazardous weather conditions. These standards would arguably also help
pilots better predict the maneuvering capabilities of vessels and aid in the development of pilot
training simulators and manned physical models to more accurately reflect real-life conditions.52

Poor-Handling Vessels
Given the particular handling characteristics of some vessels, policymakers might elect to
consider whether there should be a more systematic method for pilots to share their experiences
with vessels requiring special attention, both within their harbor and among pilots from other
harbors where the ship regularly calls. This was a recommendation of the U.S. Coast Guard
following an investigation into a 1997 ship collision in the Chesapeake Bay.53

VTS Expansion
Although the cost effectiveness of VTSs can be disputed on a port by port basis, Congress may
act to assess the need for VTSs in other U.S. ports, particularly those that have experienced large
traffic growth. For instance, at the Port of Savannah, vessel calls have increased by 34% in the
last half-decade54 and in the last decade, the port jumped from 11th to 4th largest in the country in

50

“Special Report: Marine Pilots,” Journal of Commerce, May 26, 1999, p. 11A.
“Channel Design and Vessel Maneuverability: Next Steps,” Marine Technology, vol. 40, no. 2, April 2003.
52
“Critical Needs for Ship Maneuverability: Lessons From the Houston Ship Channel Full-Scale Maneuvering Trials,”
Marine Technology, vol. 42, no. 1, January 2005, p. 11-20.
53
U.S. Coast Guard, “Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Collision Between the M/V Saudi Makkah
and the M/V Turtle Queen on March 12, 1997 in the Chesapeake Bay” September 24, 1997.
54
Georgia Ports Authority, http://www.gaports.com.
51

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terms of TEU throughput.55 The port has also recently become a major gateway for LNG
imports.56
For security reasons, the Coast Guard is actively pursuing its ability to track ships further from
shore using AIS technology. Congress may examine whether there are any safety benefits to this
expansion, such as avoiding ship collisions at the approaches to harbors.

Requiring a Passage Plan
The NTSB has consistently recommended that the pilot and master of the vessel first establish a
detailed passage plan of how the transit of the vessel is going to proceed through the harbor. The
pilot would inform the master of his intended course, noting “the essential features and relevant
checkpoints of maneuvers to be undertaken:” such as where he specifically intends to pass under
a bridge, maneuver around a shallow area, pass by a channel buoy; and contingency plans for
unexpected incidents.57 Because the master and the bridge crew essentially provide another set of
eyes, the NTSB contends that a passage plan would allow the ship’s crew to be a more effective
check on the ship’s position and movement, though some accident investigations reveal a
reluctance on the part of the bridge crew to “speak up” or “challenge” the pilot and some masters
may consider the pilot’s arrival as a chance to get some rest. A passage plan could also foster
teamwork, or more specifically, “Bridge Team Management” (BTM, a.k.a. Bridge Resource
Management, BRM), a concept adopted from the airline industry that, among other things,
emphasizes good communication among those manning the bridge. A common thread that runs
through many marine accident reports is a lack of communication between the pilot and bridge
crew. BTM has become part of the required training curriculum for pilots and bridge crews.
The Coast Guard has not supported the NTSB’s recommendation, arguing that it would “impinge
on the traditional master/pilot relationship”58 and that “the pilot cannot be expected to establish a
‘game plan’ with the master when so many aspects of a passage cannot be predetermined. The
Coast Guard believes there are sufficient Federal regulations59 and customary practices which
apply in master/pilot relationships.”60 A Canadian survey of mariners found that while 80% of the
pilots responding claimed that they “always” or “often” inform the master of a passage plan, less
than half of the masters said that they do. 61 On the other hand, while 96% of officers of the watch
and 95% of masters responded that the officers of the watch always or often monitor the ship’s
movement, only about 50% of pilots responded that officers of the watch always or often monitor

55

Maritime Administration, U.S. Waterborne Foreign Container Trade by U.S. Custom Ports, 1997-2006.
Maritime Administration, U.S. Water Transportation Statistical Snapshot, May 2007, pp. 4 and 6.
57
NTSB, Marine Accident Brief, Grounding of New Delhi Express in Kill Van Kull waterway, New York Harbor,
April 15, 2006, NTSB/MAB-07/02, p. 15-16.
58
NTSB, Marine Accident Brief, Grounding of New Delhi Express in Kill Van Kull waterway, New York Harbor,
April 15, 2006, NTSB/MAB-07/02, p. 15.
59
Current regulations, codified at 33 CFR 164.11(k), require that “If a pilot other than a member of the vessel’s crew is
employed, the pilot is informed of the draft, maneuvering characteristics, and peculiarities of the vessel and of any
abnormal circumstances on the vessel that may affect its safe navigation.”
60
NTSB Safety Recommendation addressed to Admiral J. William Kime, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, October 21,
1991, p. 6.
61
Transportation Safety Board of Canada, A Safety Study of the Operational Relationship Between Ship
Masters/Watchkeeping Officers and Marine Pilots, Report No. SM9501, n.d., p. 13.
56

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the ship’s movement. 62 The report noted that foreign masters who are not familiar with local
navigation conditions rely largely on the pilots and thus the verification of a pilot’s passage plan
becomes only a formality but, at the same time, Canadian masters who are well aware of the local
conditions may also pay little attention to the pilot’s passage plan. In 2003, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), a United Nations body that establishes safety standards for
international shipping, recommended that the information exchanged between the pilot and
master include, among other things, “general agreement on plans and procedures, including
contingency plans, for the anticipated passage.”63 Thus, while a passage plan maybe considered
good practice, an unresolved issue is whether it has any consistent value and whether it should
become a regulatory requirement.

Language Barriers
Given the global nature of the shipping business, language is always an issue in international
shipping operations. English is the standard language of shipping and the IMO has developed a
navigational code of basic commands in English. 64 However, the pilot, captain, crew, and VTS
can communicate in whatever language everyone is most familiar with, if different from English.
On foreign-flagged ships, the captain may be the only crew member that understands English, or
at least the basic IMO phraseology, and therefore may need to translate the pilot’s commands to
the helmsman. The largest single source of ship crews, both officers and unlicensed seamen, is the
Philippines, in large part because of their English language skills.65 More recently, China, India,
the Ukraine, and Russia have also become major suppliers of seamen. In light of the increasing
diversity of seamen, Congress may wish to examine whether language barriers are an increasing
problem in ship navigation and whether there is a need for additional enforcement of English
language proficiency among ship crews calling U.S. ports. Congress may opt to examine how the
aviation sector has addressed this problem.

Other Issues
Near-Miss Data
Congress might consider whether to establish a database of near misses like that in the aviation
sector. The Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration looked into establishing a data base of
near misses in the marine environment in 1997, but the project was disbanded in part because of
legal and practical concerns about mariner confidentiality.66
62

Transportation Safety Board of Canada, A Safety Study of the Operational Relationship Between Ship
Masters/Watchkeeping Officers and Marine Pilots, Report No. SM9501, n.d. p. 18.
63
IMO Pilotage Resolution 960 (Resolution A.960 [23], adopted December 5, 2003), section 5, “Master—pilot
information exchange.”
64
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW),
1978.
65
Filipinos accounted for 24% of officers and 46% of unlicensed crew for ships calling at a sample of U.S. ports in
2004. See Maritime Administration, “Foreign-Flag Crewing Practices: A Review of Crewing Practices in U.S.-Foreign
Ocean Cargo Shipping,” November 2006.
66
The Marine Transportation System and the Federal Role: Measuring Performance, Targeting Improvement, Special
Report 279, Transportation Research Board, 2004, pp. 124-125; see also the separate statement of William O. Gray, pp.
164-165.

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Coast Guard Staffing Practices
An ongoing concern expressed by some Members of Congress and some in the maritime industry
is a lack of technical expertise by Coast Guard safety personnel due to its practice of continually
rotating staff by subject area and location.67 This issue has been raised regarding limitations in the
capabilities of VTSs to exert more control over vessel movement and the agency’s capability to
judge pilot performance. Some have called for removing some safety functions from the Coast
Guard to a civilian agency, at which professional continuity could be better fostered. The Coast
Guard has responded to this criticism with a plan, among other things, to increase civilian
positions in the marine safety program, strengthen marine safety career paths, and increase hiring
from maritime academies. 68 The Coast Guard further argues that there are synergies between its
maritime safety and security missions. Therefore, the Coast Guard maintains that these missions
should be carried out by the same agency.

Legislative Activity in the 110th Congress
In the aftermath of the Cosco Busan accident, Senators Boxer and Feinstein introduced legislation
that would give authority to the VTS to direct a vessel’s speed and direction in an emergency and
require pilots to use laptop navigational equipment under certain circumstances (S. 2430). The
Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2007 (H.R. 2830) would require the Coast Guard to conduct a
vessel safety risk assessment for Cook Inlet and the Aleution Islands of Alaska. The Senate
version (S. 1892), in addition to this provision, would require the Coast Guard to study and report
on human errors that have caused oil spills and near-misses in the last ten years as well as any
data deficiencies impeding such a study, and includes several provisions regarding the secure
marine transport of especially hazardous cargo. The Hydrographic Services Improvement Act
Amendments of 2007 (H.R. 3352/S. 1582) authorizes funding to NOAA through FY2012 for its
coastal surveying and nautical chart functions. The Ocean and Coastal Mapping Integration Act
(H.R. 2400, which passed the House) and the Ocean and Coastal Exploration and NOAA Act (S.
39, reported by the Senate Commerce Committee) provides funds for updating and integrating
survey information for U.S. coastal regions.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-161) requires the DHS Inspector
General to investigate the role of the San Francisco VTS in the Cosco Busan accident and the
Coast Guard’s response to the spill and issue a report by April 1, 2008.

67
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Hearing on Challenges Facing The Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Program, August 2, 2007.
68
U.S. Coast Guard, “Enhancing the Coast Guard Marine Safety Program,” September 25, 2007.

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Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Transportation Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.g
ov, 7-....

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL34365. Public record. Not legal advice.