# Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33760 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** December 20, 2006 - **Citation:** RL33760 ## Text Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress (name redacted), Coordinator Specialist in Latin American Affairs (name redacted), Coordinator Specialist in Asian Affairs December 20, 2006 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33760 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Summary The 110th Congress will face a number of pressing foreign affairs, defense, and trade issues in the opening days of its tenure. This report identifies major issues most likely to be on the legislative agenda, discusses critical policy choices at stake, and summarizes some of the major alternatives that Congress may consider. The report lists Congressional Research Service reports that address these issues, and it identifies key analysts and their areas of responsibility. A major issue confronting the new Congress is what to do in Iraq. The Baker/Hamilton-led Iraq Study Group recommended pursuing a new diplomatic initiative, including negotiations with Iran and Syria; and making the training of Iraqi security forces the primary U.S. military mission. The commission concluded that the United States “could” aim to withdraw all U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force protection by the first quarter of 2008. Congress faces an evaluation of these recommendations and a decision as to what its role should be in implementing these or other new policies. Supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan may be the initial vehicle for debate over a new course in Iraq. U.S. and allied progress in Afghanistan may also be among the key issues in the 110th Congress along with international counter-terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional geopolitical dynamics, and trade developments. China’s rise is reshaping global economic relations and is affecting security dynamics in Asia and around the globe. The ongoing fight against terrorism, particularly in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, and efforts to dissuade or restrain Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons programs are key issues for consideration, as is the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Defense spending, and particularly budgeting for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will also be one of the major issues facing the 110th Congress. Congress may be asked to consider large increases in funding for the Army, and it faces a potentially difficult tradeoff between increases in the size of the Army and funding for major weapons programs. Other defense issues include the implementation of recent base closure plans, the status of intelligence reform, pay and benefits of military personnel, and the role and structure of National Guard and Reserve forces. Trade issues have become increasingly controversial in recent years, and may well remain so as many Members grapple with the real and perceived effects of globalization. Many Members have concerns about instances of lost jobs and lower wages, the growing income gap in the United States, and about burgeoning U.S. trade deficits. Debate over trade policy could be launched with the scheduled expiration on July 1, 2007, of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). TPA is the authority that Congress has delegated to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that receive expedited congressional consideration. Congress’s decision on TPA will have major implications for pending negotiations, and for U.S. participation in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Contents Issues of Continuity and Change in Foreign, Security, and Trade Policy ......................................1 Policy Priorities ..........................................................................................................................4 Iraq and Afghanistan Overview .............................................................................................4 Situation in Iraq ..............................................................................................................4 Situation in Afghanistan ..................................................................................................6 Cost and Budget Issues ...................................................................................................8 U.S. and International Counter-terrorism Efforts ................................................................. 11 Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction................................................................... 12 Regional Geopolitical Dynamics ......................................................................................... 13 People’s Republic of China and Taiwan......................................................................... 13 Iran............................................................................................................................... 15 Israel and Its Neighbors: Impediments to the Peace Process........................................... 17 North Korea .................................................................................................................. 18 Foreign Affairs.......................................................................................................................... 19 Global Issues ...................................................................................................................... 19 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 19 Transformational Diplomacy......................................................................................... 20 Transformational Development and Foreign Aid Restructuring...................................... 21 Peacekeeping, Stabilization, and Reconstruction: New Tools ......................................... 22 Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees ......................................................................... 23 Global Health and HIV/AIDS Issues ............................................................................. 25 United Nations Reform ................................................................................................. 26 Economic Sanctions...................................................................................................... 27 Africa ................................................................................................................................. 28 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 28 Sudan............................................................................................................................ 30 Somalia......................................................................................................................... 30 AIDS in Africa.............................................................................................................. 30 Asia .................................................................................................................................... 31 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 31 Japan ............................................................................................................................ 32 South Korea .................................................................................................................. 33 South Asia .................................................................................................................... 34 Southeast Asia............................................................................................................... 35 Europe ................................................................................................................................ 36 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 36 NATO and Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 37 Russia........................................................................................................................... 38 Kosovo ......................................................................................................................... 38 Latin America ..................................................................................................................... 39 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 39 Cuba ............................................................................................................................. 40 Colombia ...................................................................................................................... 40 Haiti ............................................................................................................................. 41 Mexico ......................................................................................................................... 42 Venezuela ..................................................................................................................... 43 Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Middle East......................................................................................................................... 43 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 43 Syria and Lebanon ........................................................................................................ 44 U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East ................................................................... 45 Iraq: Regional Implications ........................................................................................... 47 Defense and Security ................................................................................................................ 48 Overview: Defense Strategy and Military Force Planning.................................................... 48 Defense Budget Trends and Issues for Congress .................................................................. 49 Military Base Closure, Realignment, and Expansion ........................................................... 50 Intelligence ......................................................................................................................... 52 Special Operations Forces ................................................................................................... 52 Defense Modernization and Weapon Systems...................................................................... 53 Army Modernization..................................................................................................... 53 Navy Shipbuilding ........................................................................................................ 54 Air Forces Modernization ............................................................................................. 55 Ballistic Missile Defense............................................................................................... 55 Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program ........................................................... 56 Military Personnel............................................................................................................... 56 Recruiting and Retention............................................................................................... 56 Reserve Component Benefits ........................................................................................ 58 Military Medical Care................................................................................................... 59 Abortion and Military Medical Care.............................................................................. 59 Defense Acquisition Reform and Contract Management ...................................................... 60 International Trade and Finance ................................................................................................ 61 Overview ............................................................................................................................ 61 Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority ............................................................................... 62 Doha................................................................................................................................... 63 Free Trade Agreements/Implementing Legislation............................................................... 64 Trade Deficit Concerns ....................................................................................................... 65 Foreign Investment, Outsourcing, and Finance .................................................................... 66 Export Promotion................................................................................................................ 67 Export Administration Act................................................................................................... 68 International Financial Institutions ...................................................................................... 69 Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 70 Congressional Research Service Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Issues of Continuity and Change in Foreign, Security, and Trade Policy [(name redacted), Specialist in International Trade (7-....) (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....) (name redacted), Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs (7-....)] A number of challenging issues in foreign, defense, and trade policy are likely to confront the 110th Congress, starting with what the Baker/Hamilton-led Iraq Study Group (ISG) calls the “grave and deteriorating” situation in Iraq. In early 2007, the Administration is expected to ask for supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and to enhance social and political stability, democratization, and reconstruction in those countries. After Iraq, other high priorities will be the continuing fight against terrorism and efforts to dissuade or restrain Iran and North Korea from pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Congress will also consider a number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and whether to extend presidential Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). With both chambers set to pass from Republican to Democratic control, the 110th Congress is likely to intensify its oversight over these and other Administration policies and activities. As the 110th Congress convenes, the issue that overshadows all others is what to do in Iraq. Although not all Members agree entirely with the ISG’s grim assessment of the situation in Iraq, the predominant issue in Congress no longer seems to be whether to stay the course, but what to do differently. A key corollary question for Congress is what its role should be in redirecting policy. A key recommendation of the ISG calls for a major U.S. diplomatic initiative throughout the region to help stabilize the deteriorating situation in Iraq. The group’s report proposes U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria, among others, and intensified U.S. efforts to help resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the crisis in Lebanon. The 110th Congress may want to consider to what extent it supports this recommendation and what, if any, legislative measures might be called for to promote it. Among the central recommendations of the ISG are to make training of Iraqi security forces the primary U.S. military mission and to aim to withdraw all U.S. combat brigades not necessary for force protection by the first quarter of 2008. Congress faces an evaluation of these recommendations and a decision as to what, if any, legislative measures might be helpful to promote these or other policies. Following that, a central issue may be whether Congress should insert any specific, enforceable policy prescriptions into upcoming legislation to provide supplemental funding for the war. In early February, the Defense Department is expected to request supplemental appropriations to cover costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the remainder of FY2007. During the war in Vietnam, Congress frequently debated amendments to defense spending bills to reduce troop strength or to cut off funding for U.S. military operations. Congress finally approved a funding cutoff in 1973. Though Congress may not be inclined to go so far in Iraq, there may well be support for linking funding to achievement of political benchmarks, such as those that the ISG laid out. Some may propose a specific timetable for withdrawing forces. Alternatively, there has been some support in Congress for adding troops in Iraq. Congressional Research Service 1 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Congressional action on the FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill may also be the first round of what may be an ongoing debate in the 110th Congress over the preparedness of U.S. military forces and the sufficiency of planned funding for military personnel, training, and equipment. In recent years, Congress has provided progressively larger amounts of money for war-related costs in annual supplemental appropriations bills as well substantial and growing amounts in regular defense budget requests. In FY2006 Congress provided over $530 billion for the Department of Defense, of which about $120 billion were additional funds for the war. The 109th Congress also approved a “down payment” of $70 billion for war costs in FY2007, of which almost $25 billion was to repair and replace Army and Marine Corps equipment lost or worn down by the war. Now it appears that the Army, in particular, has toted up a much larger bill than had earlier been expected as the cost of equipping and reorganizing its forces to prepare, not only for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for possible future operations abroad. Initial reports are that the Army and the other services have requested an additional $125-130 billion in war-related expenses, which would bring the total for FY2007 to almost $200 billion, although it is not yet known how much of that the White House will request from Congress. For Congress, a central issue is how to ensure adequate readiness while also maintaining some degree of fiscal discipline. A key aspect of that issue is how to manage budgetary tradeoffs between pressures to add to the size of the Army and Marine Corps and also preserve sufficient funds to modernize military forces in the longer term. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, other central foreign policy issues facing the Administration and 110th Congress are how best to deal with the challenges posed by the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran. In 2007, there is likely to be a good deal of political and diplomatic activity regarding both countries’ nuclear programs. The 110th Congress may exercise oversight of Administration conduct in this area and may address aspects of the issue more directly through legislative action. European issues that the 110th Congress may address include NATO’s role in Afghanistan, the status of Kosovo, and relations with Russia. NATO’s expanding engagement in Afghanistan is the alliance’s largest and most problematic military operation to date. There is controversy over restrictions some allies have placed on the role of their forces there. The disputed status of Kosovo is set to be resolved in early 2007, possibly in some form of independence. Russia presents a complex set of challenges and opportunities for the United States, particularly with regard to its policies toward neighboring states and the implications of its growing influence as an energy supplier for Europe. Security issues in Asia that may draw the attention of the 110th Congress include flashpoints along the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, between India and Pakistan, and along the Pakistani border with Afghanistan, as well as terrorist activity in Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Pakistan. Two other long-term trends in Asia that may warrant Congressional attention are the rise of China and its increasing influence in the region and globally and increasingly negative attitudes toward the United States, particularly among Southeast Asian nations with large Muslim populations and in South Korea. Legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 110th Congress will likely focus on continued counternarcotics efforts, especially in the Andean region; potential immigration reform efforts as well as efforts to increase cooperation on border security, which have been key issues in relations with Mexico; efforts to deal with threats to democracy in such Congressional Research Service 2 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress nations as Venezuela as well as the rise of leftist populism in several Latin American countries, and debate over the best means to foster political change in Cuba. Key U.S. policy issues pertaining to Africa are likely to center on efforts to promote peace and security in the region; counter-terrorism initiatives; bilateral military cooperation and training in support of international peacekeeping; the programmatic focus, funding levels, and objectives of diverse U.S. assistance efforts, with a particular emphasis on fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and promoting democracy, human rights, trade, and market-driven economic growth. In January 2006, Secretary of State Rice announced a major foreign policy initiative that she called Transformational Diplomacy, “...a bold diplomacy to match the President’s bold mission of supporting democracy around the world with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Pursuant to this goal, State Department personnel are to be shifted largely from Europe and Washington, D.C. to designated critical locations in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East. They are to be trained in public diplomacy skills and encouraged not merely to report on the country in which they are posted, but to promote democratic principles there. This initiative will likely require increased funding for the foreign operations budget. The 110th Congress may seek to exercise oversight on how the money is spent, whether transformational diplomacy is effective, and how foreign governments respond to this U.S. promotion of democracy in their countries. Trade issues have become increasingly controversial in Congress during the last few years. This is likely to continue to be the case during the 110th Congress as many Members grapple with the real and perceived effects of globalization and how to balance the benefits and costs of trade liberalization. Many Members of Congress have raised concerns over lost jobs and lower wages, over the growing income gap in the United States, over the burgeoning U.S. trade deficits with trading partners, especially China, and the undervaluing of China’s currency. While mainstream economists generally assert that trade policy has a very limited role in these areas, for many Members the trends serve as backdrop to a debate on the shape and conduct of U.S. trade policy. That debate could be launched early in the 110th Congress with the scheduled expiration on July 1, 2007, of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). TPA is the authority that the Congress has delegated to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements that receive expedited Congressional consideration (limited debate and no amendments). Under this authority, the Bush Administration completed and the Congress approved free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, Central American countries, Bahrain and Oman. Also, the Administration signed agreements with Colombia and Peru and announced it would send implementing legislation for these agreements for Congressional approval under the TPA procedures. If the President requests renewal of TPA, Congress would face a decision of whether to accede to his request and, if so, what form the new authority should take. Congress’s decision could have major implications for pending FTA negotiations, such as those with Malaysia, South Korea, and Panama, and for U.S. participation in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). The debate over TPA renewal and its outcome could have major implications for U.S. trade policy as a whole and for the working relationship between Congress and the President on trade for the foreseeable future. Congressional Research Service 3 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Policy Priorities Iraq and Afghanistan Overview [(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....)] Current U.S. political and military engagements in both Afghanistan and Iraq are products of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Afghanistan under the Taliban hosted the Al Qaeda leadership at the time of the attacks. The Administration and some Members of Congress perceived Iraq as a sponsor of international terrorism and intent on building weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that could conceivably be transferred to Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. However, the September 11 Commission report found no evidence of an “operational” relationship between Saddam’s regime and Al Qaeda. U.S. forces are engaged in combat and stabilization missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, years after the removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes, respectively. Of the two missions, Iraq is far more troubled, with the number of U.S. service members killed now exceeding 2,880 and sectarian violence now surpassing the Sunni Arab-led insurgency as the key threat. In Afghanistan, the Taliban movement has displayed resiliency and resurgence in 2006 as the primary stabilization mission is being turned over to NATO peacekeeping forces. Violence continues in both countries despite the completion of U.S.-designed political transition processes, which culminated in Iraqi and Afghan national elections. Situation in Iraq [(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....)] Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency. These problems are compounded by SunniShiite violence that some believe is a “civil war”—a term that the Bush Administration says does not apply to the Iraq violence. President Bush, in a series of several speeches since 2005, has asserted that U.S. policy is showing important success, demonstrated by two elections (January and December 2005) that chose an interim and then a full-term parliament and government; a referendum that adopted a permanent constitution (October 15, 2005); progress in building Iraq’s security forces; and economic growth. He has maintained that U.S. forces should remain in Iraq until Iraq’s elected government is able to defend itself. While continuing to build, equip, and train Iraqi security units, the Administration has worked to include more Sunni Arabs in the power structure, particularly the security institutions: Sunnis were dominant during the regime of Saddam Hussein and previous Iraqi regimes, but many now feel marginalized by the newly dominant Shiite Arabs and Kurds. President Bush has said he believes that, over the longer term, Iraq will become a model for reform throughout the Middle East and a partner in the global war on terrorism. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs—without clear signs of security progress—have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing U.S. goals. Several senior U.S. military leaders have begun to express less optimism about the situation in Iraq and about the progress of standing up competent and effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), a pillar of the Congressional Research Service 4 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Administration efforts to turn over more responsibility to Iraqis. A reported memo on Iraq to President Bush by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, drafted in November 2006 and quoted in the New York Times (November 29, 2006), expressed doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s willingness or ability to curb Shiite sectarian militias that are said to be targeting Sunni Arabs and fueling a cycle of retaliatory sectarian violence that has gripped the country. Debates over Iraq policy options were held in the 109th Congress and, in light of the results of the November 2006 mid-term elections, will likely continue in the 110th Congress. Some in Congress believe the U.S. mission in Iraq is not progressing and that major new initiatives are required. Some believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by insufficient U.S. troop levels. Others maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of an all out civil war in Iraq and that setting a timetable for withdrawal might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Others believe that a U.S. move to withdraw might undercut popular support for the insurgency. Some Members maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counterinsurgent combat, but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad, an approach the Administration has adopted. Still others focus on political restructuring such as creating three autonomous regions for Iraq’s three major communities, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, and the mostly-Sunni Kurds. On December 7, 2006, the Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the findings of the congressionally-created Iraq Study Group chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations included engagement of Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria, and the gradual replacement of U.S. combat operations by stepped up U.S.-led training and advising of Iraq’s security forces.1 The 110th Congress is likely to hold more extensive hearings on these and other options. U.S./International Military Operations [(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....)] U.S. military operations in Iraq comprise several efforts. The 147,000+ troops in Iraq are engaged in counterinsurgency operations, training/advising Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and targeted special operations against terrorist cells. Increasingly heavy emphasis is being placed on improving Iraqi army performance through embedded U.S. advisory teams in Iraqi units. In the face of escalating violence, particularly in Baghdad and Al Anbar province, the nature of future military operations and U.S. troop levels are undergoing intensive scrutiny in the midst of an ongoing debate among U.S. military and civilian decision-makers regarding appropriate strategy. While an eventual handover of operations to the ISF remains a consensus objective, opinions vary widely on how and when this can be achieved. Some argue that, given the relatively poor ISF performance to date, at least a substantial short-term increase in U.S. troop levels and intensified counterinsurgency operations are necessary to establish a secure political environment. Critics of this approach believe that the ISF must be strongly encouraged to operate more effectively on their own, and that this will be best achieved by a phased drawdown of U.S. troops over the next year or more, with U.S. forces serving primarily in advisory and rapid reinforcement roles if needed. As the United States considers its military options in Iraq, many of its major coalition allies, including the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, and Japan have either withdrawn or are projecting a withdrawal of their military forces. 1 The text of the Iraq Study Group report is available at http://www.usip.org/isg/. Congressional Research Service 5 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Reconstruction Assistance [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] To date, nearly $35.7 billion in appropriations from all available budget accounts has been targeted at assisting the reconstruction of Iraq. More than $15 billion of this total has gone toward the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces. About $10 billion has gone to building Iraqi non-security infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and oil, water, sanitation, and electric power facilities. Another $10 billion has been aimed at more traditional forms of economic aid, including providing technical expertise, training, and associated equipment to support health care, democratization, education, civil society, private sector development and government reform. Among the key Congressional concerns at this time is whether, amid reports of waste and mismanagement, the funds already allocated have been employed efficiently and effectively to achieve U.S. objectives. Looking ahead, there are serious concerns regarding the ability of the Iraqi government to sustain U.S.-supported infrastructure projects with the limited financial and managerial resources at its disposal. Continuing security, infrastructure, and other challenges in Iraq may raise pressure for further U.S. economic assistance to make up for anticipated shortfalls in both Iraqi and other donor resources. CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31833, Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance, by (name redacted). Situation in Afghanistan [(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....)] Afghanistan’s political transition was completed with the convening of an elected parliament in December 2005, but since then insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s government have escalated to the point that some experts are questioning the future of U.S. and NATO-led stabilization efforts. In the political process, a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that had fought each other militarily for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban. Women are participating in economic and political life, including as ministers, provincial governors, and senior levels of the new parliament. Clouding the prior optimism has been the unexpected escalation of the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime in 2006, after several years in which it appeared the Taliban were mostly defeated. Taliban fighters have conducted several increasingly larger scale attacks on coalition and Afghan security forces in several southern provinces, setting back reconstruction and thwarting efforts to extend Afghan government authority. In addition, narcotics trafficking is resisting counter-measures, and independent militias remain throughout the country, although many have been disarmed. Observers attribute the increased violence to a number of different factors, including popular disappointment at the slow pace of reconstruction, official Afghan corruption, ample funding from narcotics trafficking, the continuing writ of regional faction leaders, the ability of Taliban fighters to find safe haven in neighboring Pakistan, and Congressional Research Service 6 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress possible inspiration from and cross-fertilization between Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda or other fighters coming from the insurgency in Iraq. The 110th Congress is likely to actively monitor U.S. civilian and military assistance to Afghanistan, amid calls by U.S. and NATO military leaders to accelerate reconstruction as a means of winning over the support of the Afghan population. In FY2006, Congress appropriated over $3 billion in U.S. civilian and military aid for Afghan stabilization and reconstruction, in both regular foreign aid (P.L. 109-102) and supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-234). U.S./NATO stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and its security forces and on promoting reconstructing while combating the renewed insurgent challenge. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army, deploying a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Opium Production and Counternarcotics [(name redacted), Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....)] Afghan, U.S., and European officials have stated that poppy cultivation and drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to the security of Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of post-9/11 counter-terrorism and reconstruction efforts there. In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade, U.N. officials estimate that a record opium poppy crop was produced in Afghanistan during the 2005-2006 season, supplying 92% of the world’s illicit opium and reversing a slight reduction that occurred from 2004 to 2005. Narcotics experts describe Afghanistan’s opium economy as the backbone of a multibillion-dollar trade that stretches throughout Central and Southwest Asia and supplies heroin to Europe, Russia, and the United States. Congress has appropriated more than $1.9 billion for U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan and surrounding countries since 2001, including several hundred million dollars for the expansion of initial counternarcotics efforts under a new interagency “five pillar” plan that blends eradication, interdiction, alternative livelihood assistance, judicial reform, and public awareness activities. During the term of the 110th Congress, the full effectiveness of this plan’s initiatives should become apparent—to date, insecurity in key opium poppy producing areas, delays in building and reforming Afghan institutions, and widespread local Afghan corruption have prevented its full implementation. Congress also has passed legislation requiring several formal reports on the Afghan narcotics trade and U.S. efforts to combat it: most recently, the FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (Section 1025 of P.L. 109-364) required the Administration to submit an updated policy review by December 31, 2006.2 Foreign Operations programs are currently operating under the terms of a continuing appropriations resolution (H.R. 5631/P.L. 109-289, as amended) which provides funding at the FY2006 or the House-passed FY2007 level, whichever is less. The continuing resolution expires on February 15, 2007. 2 The original policy review was submitted to Congress in October 2005. Report on Counter Drug Efforts in Afghanistan—October 18, 2005, as required by Sec.7104, Section 207 (b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-458); House Committee on International Relations, Ex. Comm. 4575. Congressional Research Service 7 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress U.S./International Military Operations [(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....)] To contribute to stabilization efforts, the United States has approximately 22,100 service members in Afghanistan, with approximately 12,000 of these troops under NATO command as part of NATO’s 32,000-strong International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). The remainder are under U.S. command as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which is responsible for counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. The United States had planned to modestly reduce its troop presence in Afghanistan when NATO assumed responsibility for overall Afghan security in the fall of 2006, but aggressive and more sophisticated insurgent operations against coalition forces forestalled this reduction and suggests that U.S. troop reductions are unlikely in the near future. The United States and a few NATO countries such as Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands—along with the Afghan National Army (ANA)—have conducted a number of largescale offensive operations against Taliban insurgents, but the insurgents continue to exert significant influence and presence in a number of Afghan provinces. Many NATO countries have placed national caveats on how their troops may be used in Afghanistan which limits their utility and creates the need for additional forces that can participate in combat operations. At NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006, progress was made on modifying some of these national caveats, but some maintain that these modifications do little to ease the burden on U.S., British, Canadian, and Dutch forces. U.S. and NATO forces play a limited supporting role in combating Afghanistan’s illegal opium trade - the profits from which help to finance the insurgents. Some argue, however, that because of the pervasive nature of the Afghan drug trade and its central role in Afghanistan’s rural economy, that aggressive military action without compensating economic efforts could cause more harm than good. Some U.S. and coalition military officials also have spoken out against proposals that could transform combat forces into “drug police” or otherwise undercut counterterrorism and stability operations. CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33503, U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in Afghanistan: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). Cost and Budget Issues [(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....7)] On February 7, 2007, the Administration is scheduled to submit the regular Department of Defense (DOD) budget. The Administration may also request what is reported to be a large FY2007 supplemental for Iraq, Afghanistan and other global war on terror operations plus funds to cover FY2008 war costs as is required by the FY2007 National Defense Authorization. The FY2007 supplemental request would be in addition to $70 billion that DOD has already received. The FY2007 Supplemental and FY2008 war cost requests would be in addition to the $507 billion already appropriated by Congress for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) for Iraq, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) for Afghanistan and other global war on terrorism operations and enhanced security for DOD (Operation Noble Eagle) since the 9/11 attacks. That total includes about $379 billion for Iraq, $97 billion for Afghanistan and other counter-terror operations, and $26 billion for enhanced DOD security. Over 90% of these funds were provided in emergency Congressional Research Service 8 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress bills that are not subject to spending caps in the annual congressional budget resolutions or to the standard year-long authorization and appropriations process. Two major war cost and budgetary issues that could come up early in 2007 are 1) budgetary levers that Congress could use to affect future troop levels in Iraq; and 2) the validity of the rationale and visibility of FY2007 and FY2008 war cost requests. Congress may turn to the Vietnam experience to look for ways to affect U.S. policy in Iraq. Although many amendments to reduce or end U.S. military operations in Vietnam were considered, only a half-dozen were enacted that limited or prohibited the use of funds for military operations during the 1970s. Funding restrictions have generally proven more effective than other tools like the War Powers Act, which has been challenged by the executive branch on constitutional grounds. Examples of key amendments that were enacted or debated include (1) the Hatfield-McGovern amendment rejected by 39-55 on September 1, 1970, that would have limited U.S. troop strength to 280,000 by April 30, 1971, and required that remaining troops be withdrawn by December 31, 1971, unless the president found that up to a 60-day extension was needed in case of a clear and present danger to U.S. troops, or the president submitted a new date for congressional approval (H.R. 17123); and (2) the Fulbright-Aiken and McGovern amendments enacted in 1973 after the January peace accord with Vietnam prohibiting the obligation or expenditure of all past and current funds after August 15, 1973 “to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia”(Sec. 108, P.L. 93-52; 87 Stat. 130). Congress will also be faced with assessing the Administration’s war requests, a task that has been difficult because of piecemeal information about annual costs, and limited information about key factors—such as past and current troop levels—that affect costs. The Iraq Study Group called funding requests for Iraq “confusing” and criticized the fact that it is difficult to identify the amount requested for the Iraq operations. DOD has not provided Congress with an allocation of all previously appropriated funds by operation, i.e. for Iraq, Afghanistan, or other counter-terror operations. War funds are also currently mixed with regular funds during execution, which limits visibility on how funds are ultimately spent and means that the effect of war costs on the deficit can only be estimated. Congressional leaders have promised increased scrutiny of DOD war costs. Congress may also choose to consider extending the scope of the Special Inspector General from reconstruction to DOD’s military activities rather than relying solely on DOD’s Inspector General or the services’ audit agencies. Echoing frequently expressed Congressional concerns, the Iraq Study Group calls on DOD to include a full year of war costs in DOD’s regular FY2008 budget so as not to circumvent the normal budget process or put pressure on Congress to review requests quickly to ensure monies to support the troops. It is not clear whether DOD will provide Congress with the detailed budget justification called for in the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act and initially required of the services. Recent press reports peg service requests for the FY2007 supplemental at $100 billion to $160 billion in addition to the $70 billion already enacted. According to the reports, the President is likely to request an additional $100 billion, or a total of $170 billion for FY2007, which would be 45% higher than the previous year. If troop levels remain at roughly current levels, it is not clear why the FY2007 supplemental should be larger than funding in FY2006. In that case, the FY2007 supplemental would be $50 billion in addition to the $70 billion already appropriated. If some combat troops are withdrawn Congressional Research Service 9 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress from Iraq in FY2007, as proposed by the Iraq Survey Report, war costs would be expected to decrease. In response to a Congressional request, CBO estimated that war costs would decrease by $11 billion if 25,000 troops were withdrawn and by $17 billion if 60,000 troops were withdrawn. On the other hand, if troop levels were temporarily increased as some have proposed, war costs could increase by several billion. Some might argue that funding should increase in order to intensify training of Iraqi security forces. Congress has thus far appropriated $15.4 billion to train Iraqi security forces including $3.9 billion that is available for FY2007. A three to four-fold expansion of U.S. military personnel embedded with Iraqi forces—as proposed by the Iraq Study Group—would be covered primarily by current military personnel costs though some increase in training monies could also be needed. On October 25, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense England issued new guidance on war costs to the services, requiring them to submit requests based on the “longer war against terror” rather than strictly OIF and OEF operations. In response, the services apparently greatly increased their original requests. Since the long war on terror is DOD’s key mission, it may not be clear why such costs be considered emergency war supplemental spending rather than part of DOD’s regular budget. Two issues that may be cited as reasons that war costs could be higher in FY2007 are current readiness problems and the cost of reset—the repair and replacement of war-worn equipment. According to various reports, current Army readiness rates have declined to the lowest levels since the end of the Vietnam war with roughly half of all Army units, both active and reserve, at the lowest readiness ratings for currently available units, primarily because of equipment shortages which may affect a unit’s ability to train fully for combat and limit the ability of the United States to respond to other contingencies. Equipment shortfalls reflect backlogs at maintenance depots as well as possibly ongoing equipment upgrades designed to modularize or standardize and restructure Army and Marine Corps units. As of FY2007, the Army and Marine Corps are fully-funded for their reset requirements, and maintenance backlogs may fall by up to one-half according to recent DOD reports. Together, the two services have already received $48.6 billion for reset including $23.7 billion for FY2007. If troop levels fall in FY2008, the Army has estimated that its reset requirements would drop from the $17.1 billion provided in FY2007 to $10.5 in the next year with further declines in later years. DOD’s FY2008 reset requirements will presumably reflect assumptions about troop levels. Readiness problems for reserves reflect primarily personnel shortages as individuals are transferred to fill holes in deploying units, and as some reservists bump up against the 24-month overall limit for mobilization in DOD policy. Some have also raised concerns about whether the military can continue to meet recruitment and retention goals because some active-duty forces are also deploying with less than one year at home to rest and retrain. It is not clear whether the Administration will submit a full year of war costs with detailed justification as is required by the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act although the newly-confirmed Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, stated his willingness to do so. The FY2008 request for war costs will reflect the Administration’s assumptions about troop levels. If troop levels decline so may operational and reset costs though the amount would vary depending on the pace of withdrawals and whether combat troops remain in the region or are re-deployed to the Congressional Research Service 10 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress United States. The Iraq Study Group report does not specify troop levels or deployment location. If Congress wishes to consider these options, the Department of Defense could be asked to identify how costs would change with different troop levels. CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by (nam e redacted). U.S. and International Counter-terrorism Efforts [Raphael Perl, Specialist in International Affairs (7-....) and John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism (7-....)] Terrorism is a global, national, and transnational phenomenon. Understanding current and future terrorist capabilities and the motivating factors that entice individuals to join groups with intentions of changing U.S. policies is central to the formulation of a successful counterterrorism strategy. How the U.S. counters terrorist operations while developing a plan to dissuade individuals from aligning with radical militant Islamists, remains a top policy concern for both the Administration and Congress. Questions relating to the alignment of the Administration’s September 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism with current and projected resources are likely to be issues of concern throughout the 110th Congress. Another likely subject of Congressional focus is overseeing the progress of the Administration’s efforts towards meeting the counterterrorism mission requirements contained in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-177). Specific areas of focus may involve assessing post 9/11 counterterrorism and intelligence organizations and related programs that are responsible for identifying, warning, preparing, thwarting, and responding to acts of terrorism. These programs will be assessed for successes and failures towards implementation as described in the aforementioned legislation including efforts that may threaten civil liberty protections. Other issues may include terrorists’ use of emerging technologies, availability and accessibility of material used in producing a portable weapons of mass destruction device, identifying and measuring success in U.S. counterterrorism policies and programs and understanding how individuals are attracted to joining cells that are decentralized from an organized terrorist group, yet ascribe to the same philosophical beliefs and desire to cause harm to U.S. interests. Finally, an issue that is likely to be of focus is the U.S. foreign policy impact on international counterterrorism partners and their response to changes in U.S. strategy and operations. As strategic options and recommendations are provided to the Administration by the Iraq Study Group, the Department of Defense’s Iraq Military Strategy Review Group, and the National Security Council’s Iraq assessment team, international partners may adjust their support to global counterterrorism efforts and the military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The possibility of international community support fragmenting with respect to global terrorism issues is likely to require the Administration to increase military and diplomatic efforts in certain areas, while decreasing focus and resources in others. These strategy considerations may change significantly should the escalation of insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan result in a civil war or failed state or if the leadership of these countries decide to assume primary responsibility for the security of their nation. Shifts in U.S. strategy and international partner support will have Congressional Research Service 11 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress resource implications that may prompt the 110th Congress to exercise its legislative and oversight functions. CRS Report RL33600, International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33160, Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33123, Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack: Overview and Policy Issues, by John Rollins and (name redacted). CRS Report RL33555, Trends in Terrorism: 2006, by (name redacted). Proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction [(name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....)] The United States has long sought to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and the missile systems that deliver such weapons of mass destruction (or WMD). A network of international treaties, supply controls, agreements, and initiatives constitute what has become known as the “nonproliferation regime.” The full range of tools includes diplomatic initiatives to discourage proliferation; economic policies, such as export controls, sanctions, incentives, or assistance to nations where proliferation might occur; and, in some cases, military action to counteract proliferation. The Bush Administration has continued to support many long-standing policies designed to preclude proliferation to a wide range of nations across the globe. In the wake of September 11, 2001, it has also specifically focused on new policies and programs that seek to ensure that rogue nations or terrorist groups do not acquire WMD. In the last two years, a few key events have helped define the contours of the proliferation threat—the revelations that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan sold sensitive nuclear technology to countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya; intensified inspections in Iran leading to a resolution by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran was in noncompliance with its safeguards obligation under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); and North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test. The response to the Khan network has included stronger implementation of export controls (especially through UNSC Resolution 1540); a growing emphasis on the 2003 Proliferation Security Initiative; and proposals to create a more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. Although the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), created in 2003 to disrupt trade in WMD technologies by interdicting vessels, aircraft or other modes of transport where possible when they are suspected of carrying WMD-related cargo, has no current funding allocation, several bills in the 109th Congress sought to fund those activities, and the 110th Congress may also take up the issue. On Iran, the 109th Congress held hearings and passed legislation (PL 109-293) to extend sanctions under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, among other things. Given the apparent impasse at the U.N. Security Council since it passed Resolution 1696 in July 2006, following Iran’s resumption of its uranium enrichment program, and the reluctance of China and Russia to support imposing sanctions on Iran, the 110th Congress may consider additional legislation. On North Korea, the impasse in the Six Party Talks prompted some lawmakers to urge the Administration to find a way to reinvigorate the talks in the fall of 2006. In some ways, the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test prompted China to make serious diplomatic efforts to bring North Korea back to the table. The 110th Congress is likely to follow the talks on the North Korean nuclear program closely. The 110th Congress will likely authorize and appropriate funding, and conduct oversight for U.S. programs that are designed to address the risks and consequences of WMD proliferation. Many of Congressional Research Service 12 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress these programs address U.S. concerns about the proliferation of weapons or materials from specific countries. For example, the United States provides about $1 billion per year in assistance to Russia and the other former states of the Soviet Union to help them secure WMD, related equipment and materials, and knowledge that might leak out to other nations. Other programs address U.S. concerns about proliferation from and to specific countries, like North Korea, Pakistan, and Iran. When reviewing these programs, Congress may address questions about the total amount of money allocated to these efforts, the amounts allocated to specific projects and programs, and the amounts that might be allocated to similar programs outside the former Soviet Union. Congress may also review the degree of international cooperation and whether the programs are meeting their stated objectives in a timely manner. CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31559, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, coordinated by Mary Beth Nikitin. CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by (name reda cted). Regional Geopolitical Dynamics People’s Republic of China and Taiwan [(name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs (7-....) and Wayne Morrison, Specialist in International Trade and Finance (7-....)] U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been less contentious during the George W. Bush Administration than they have been at any time since 1989. The two governments have resumed regular summitry and military-to-military relations, pursued workinglevel visits, cooperated on anti-terror initiatives, and worked closely to address North Korea’s nuclear weapons activities. The two economies have also become increasingly interconnected, with U.S. companies investing heavily in China and some PRC companies investing in the United States. The more regularized bilateral engagement suggests U.S. recognition of the PRC’s growing economic development and international engagement—what has been called “China’s rise”—and the new political clout accompanying it. The 110th Congress is expected to focus more on U.S.-China trade relations, which have grown increasingly strained in recent years. Key issues Members are likely to address include a large and growing U.S. trade deficit with China ($202 billion in 2005), China’s policy of pegging its currency to the dollar and refusal to adopt a floating currency (which some contend unfairly makes imports from China cheaper and U.S. exports to China more expensive), Beijing’s poor record of protecting U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), its failure to fully implement its WTO commitments, and its use of a number of unfair trade practices (such as use of subsidies and dumping) that many perceive as negatively affecting various U.S. manufacturing sectors. Numerous bills were introduced in the 109th Congress that addressed these issues. For example, in July 2005, the House passed H.R. 3283 to apply U.S. countervailing duties against subsidized imports from non-market economies (such as China); establish a comprehensive monitoring system to track China’s compliance with specific WTO commitments and other trade pledges to the United States; and to boost funding for U.S. trade compliance agencies. In addition, a bill Congressional Research Service 13 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress introduced by Senator Schumer (S. 295) that sought to impose a 27.5% ad-valorem increase in U.S. import tariffs on Chinese goods garnered significant bipartisan support. The 110th Congress is likely to continue to pursue such initiatives. In addition, the 110th Congress is expected to be more assertive in pressing the Bush Administration to press China to improve IPR protection, comply with WTO rules, and end various economic practices (such as a pegged currency and subsidies to domestic firms) that are deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests. Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue in Sino-U.S. relations. The PRC continues to claim sovereignty over the island and vows that one day Taiwan will be reunified with China either peacefully or by force. In March 2005, the PRC’s National People’s Congress (NPC) adopted an “anti-secession law” aimed at creating a legal basis for PRC military intervention in Taiwan. These PRC claims, many fear, could result in direct U.S.-PRC conflict under P.L. 96-8, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which spells out U.S. strategic interests in and arms sales commitments to Taiwan and states that forceful resolution to Taiwan’s status would be of “grave concern to the United States.” U.S. policy on Taiwan is complicated further by other factors. The Taiwan government essentially is grid-locked by a near-even split between ruling and opposition party coalitions. One hostage to this resulting political rancor has been a substantial U.S. arms package that President Bush authorized for sale to Taiwan in 2001. The bill has been blocked for years by the opposition-controlled legislature, a matter of growing concern to White House and Congressional officials. Congressional sentiment, long favorable toward Taiwan, has sought to find ways to support Taiwan’s interests amidst growing congressional frustrations over Taiwan’s political gridlock and lagging defense spending. Early in the 110th Congress, Members may seek to support a Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan—one of that government’s high priorities—and could renew efforts to discontinue funding for U.S. Government restrictions that limit U.S. contacts with Taiwan officials. As in past Congresses, the 110th is likely to remain interested in helping Taiwan gain observer status in the World Health Organization (WHO) despite obstacles mounted by the PRC. Finally, Members in the 110th also are likely to remain concerned about Taiwan’s waning defense spending and U.S. arms sales purchases. Many observers are now focusing on the critical implications China’s economic growth and increasing international engagement are having for U.S. economic and strategic interests. PRC global outreach has grown significantly in just a few years, and this international engagement has gone hand-in-hand with expanding political influence. While PRC officials appear to have no qualms about working with undemocratic or authoritarian governments, PRC outreach also has extended to key U.S. allies or to regions where U.S. dominance previously has been unquestioned. In pursuing its global relations, the PRC has sought to form and join international groupings that often exclude the United States. In December 2005, for instance, China took part in the first East Asia Summit (EAS)—a new grouping of 16 Asian countries that includes U.S. military allies. While Russia’s President Vladimir Putin attended as an invited observer, the United States was not asked and did not seek to participate in any capacity. “Energy politics” plays a key role in China’s global relationships, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Often these contacts are with countries the United States considers “rogue regimes.” PRC negotiators, for instance, signed significant oil deals with Iran in 2004, and Beijing has targeted other “bad actors” for energy-related development, such as resource-rich Sudan and Angola. Beijing and Venezuela have signed a series of agreements committing the China National Petroleum Corporation to spend over $400 million to develop Venezuelan oil and gas reserves. PRC energy interests also extend to Canada, with which China in 2005 signed a Congressional Research Service 14 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress series of agreements to prioritize cooperation on energy issues—including gas, nuclear, clean energy, and oil sources, primarily massive “oil sands” in Alberta. These and other PRC energy interests prompted the 109th Congress to begin debating the national security risks of selling American energy assets to the PRC. The 110th Congress is likely to remain concerned about and active on these issues. One focus for Members of the 110th may be the 13 relevant recommendations made to Congress in November 2006 by the Congressionally-mandated U.S.China Economic and Security Review Commission on how the United States should respond to China’s increasing international engagement. CRS Report RL32804, China-U.S. Relations in the 109th Congress, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33684, Underlying Strains in Taiwan-U.S. Political Relations, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by (name redac ted). CRS Report RL33604, Is China a Threat to the U.S. Economy?, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted). CRS Report RL33416, Social Unrest in China, by (name redacted). Iran [(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....), and (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense (7-....)] According to the Administration’s “National Security Strategy” document released on March 16, 2006, the United States “may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.”3 That perception was initially fed by reported advances in Iran’s nuclear program and by several comments by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, elected in June 2005, that Israel should be eliminated. U.S. concerns about Iran were intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006 and subsequent purported efforts by Hezbollah to topple Lebanon’s anti-Syrian governing coalition. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration’s focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy. As part of that effort, the Bush Administration announced May 31, 2006, that it would negotiate with Iran, in a multilateral framework consisting of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany (so-called “P5+1”), if Iran first suspends uranium enrichment; in past years the Bush Administration has had only limited dialogue with Iran on specific regional issues. Multilateral talks with Iran have remained stalled for over one year. In September 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors resolved that Iran was in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). This followed inflammatory remarks about Israel by Ahmadinejad at the U.N. General Assembly that September, as well as indications that Iran appeared poised to abandon its uranium enrichment suspension, brokered initially in late 2003. Although many, including Russia and China, hoped to keep Iran’s “dossier” in Vienna at the IAEA, Iran’s complete abandonment of its unilateral suspension, as well as its decision to end interim application of enhanced safeguards 3 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 16, 2006. Available at http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/ei/wh/c7889.htm. Congressional Research Service 15 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress inspections by the IAEA (per its Additional Protocol), led to the Board referring Iran to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1696 on July 31, 2006, which reiterated earlier demands for Iran to halt its activities and return to negotiations, and hinted that sanctions would follow should Iran fail to comply by an August 31, 2006 deadline. The foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (known as the EU3) continue to be closely involved in negotiating with Iran, even in the context of the Security Council, but Russia and China have remained stumbling blocks to imposing significant sanctions, despite what appeared to be agreement in the fall of 2006 for such an approach. Proposals and counter-proposals have been made to little effect, while Iran continues to improve its uranium enrichment capabilities. Iran’s nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat to the United States and its allies posed by Iran’s policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although there is no evidence of an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, some senior Al Qaeda activists are believed to be in Iran, although Iran claims they are “in custody.” U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq’s Sunnis there. The 110th Congress will likely monitor developments in U.S. policy toward Iran, and some in Congress are proponents of a variety of options should Iran continue to advance its nuclear program or continue efforts against U.S. interests in the region. Some might advocate military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure rather than acquiescence to the potential threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Others in the Administration and in Congress believe that only a change of Iran’s regime could end the threat posed by Iran. Legislation expressing support for regime change and extending certain sanctions on investment in Iran’s energy sector (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, ILSA), was passed in the 109th Congress. H.R. 6198, passed and then signed on September 30, 2006 (P.L. 109-293), extends ILSA until December 31, 2011, and drops Libya from the law. It codifies existing Iran sanctions, makes exports to Iran of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or advanced conventional weapons technology sanctionable, and authorizes funding for promoting democracy in Iran. It recommends a 180-day time limit for the Administration to determine whether a project violates ILSA. Passage of this law followed Congressional action on an Administration request for $75 million to promote democracy in Iran. A FY2006 supplemental appropriation (H.R. 4939, P.L. 109-234) provided a total of $66.1 million, as follows: $20 million for democracy programs ($5 million more than requested); $5 million for public diplomacy directed at the Iranian population (the amount requested); $5 million for cultural exchanges (the amount requested); and $36.1 million for Voice of America-TV and Radio Farda broadcasting ($13.9 million less than requested). CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted). CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 16 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Israel and Its Neighbors: Impediments to the Peace Process [(name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs (7-....)] In summer 2006, Israel fought wars in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon with inconclusive results that left both situations unstable. In Gaza, Israel escalated a military offensive against Hamas and its cohort to obtain the release of a soldier kidnaped on June 25 and to end Palestinian rocket fire into southern Israel. Neither goal was accomplished and a low level conflict persisted until Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert reached an agreement for a cease-fire at the end of November. The cease-fire is fragile, and Israel or the Palestinians could trigger a resumption of hostilities at any time. The United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia (known as the “Quartet”) insist that Hamas, which has led the Palestinian Authority (PA) since March 2006, disavow violence, recognize Israel, and accept prior Palestinian-Israeli agreements in order for an embargo on most international direct aid to the PA to be lifted. President Abbas conducted protracted negotiations with Hamas to form a new national unity government partly in order to get the Quartet-led embargo lifted, but he has announced that the talks have reached a “dead end.” Aside from other demands, Hamas will not meet the Quartet’s conditions. For its part, Israel seeks to deal with Abbas. On November 27, Prime Minister Olmert declared that if the Palestinians establish a new government committed to the Quartet’s principles and bring about the release of the Israeli soldier, then he would enter into an immediate dialogue with Abbas to establish an independent, viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity, free many Palestinian prisoners, and take other confidence-building measures. It remains unclear how or if Abbas will produce a new government acceptable to Israel, the United States, and others in the international community. In Lebanon to the north, Israel launched an all-out war against the Hezbollah after it attacked a military post in northern Israel and kidnaped two soldiers on July 12. The death toll was high: 119 Israeli soldiers and 41 civilians, 1,187 Lebanese civilians, an estimated 600 Hezbollah militiamen, and 44 members of the Lebanese security forces, and much Lebanese and some Israeli infrastructure was destroyed or damaged. An enlarged international peace-keeping force deployed to southern Lebanon to supervise a cease-fire and act as a buffer between Hezbollah and Israel. However, Hezbollah has not released the kidnaped soldiers nor disarmed, is believed to be rearming, and is pressing for an enhanced role in the Lebanese political system, placing Lebanese democracy at risk and increasing the potential for instability north of the Israeli border. Although Hezbollah appears to be preoccupied with domestic Lebanese politics, it could refocus on Israel when the Lebanese situation is resolved to its satisfaction and its resources are replenished. Meanwhile, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad appears to be using what he views as Hezbollah’s victory against Israel and the U.S. need for his help with Iraq to press Israel and Washington for a renewed peace process that would end with Syria’s regaining the Golan Heights—450 square miles of land along the border which Israel has occupied since 1967. Some in Israel and in the international community also seek to revive peace talks with Syria that were suspended in 2000. Others, including some in the U.S. Administration, prefer to keep Syria isolated until it monitors its border with Iraq effectively, plays a constructive role vis-a-vis Lebanon, and ceases support for Hezbollah and Hamas. They also do not want to interfere with a U.N. investigation into the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri for which some believe Syria may be culpable. Israeli Prime Minister Olmert also rejects engagement with Syria until it changes its behavior. Congressional Research Service 17 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress The U.S. Administration has expressed solidarity with Israel in its conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah, maintaining that Israel is exercising its right to self-defense. It has advocated for Israel’s views in the Quartet and in the United Nations and, during the war in Lebanon, expedited the delivery of some arms to Israel. The Administration seeks to assist in the reconstruction of Lebanon and has reprogrammed some funds for that purpose. It also has provided humanitarian aid to the Palestinians via international and non-governmental agencies, but no direct aid to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority. Congress similarly has passed resolutions supporting Israel and condemning Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel remains one of the largest annual recipients of U.S. foreign aid, but there have long been restrictions on aid to the PA, which some Members sought to tighten after Hamas took power. The 110th Congress will likely continue to scrutinize aid to the Palestinians and Lebanon and insist that Israel’s Arab neighbors meet preconditions before a return to the peace process. The new Congress also may examine recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, which argued that “Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues” and called for a “renewed and sustained commitment” to a comprehensive, negotiated peace on all fronts, including “direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and particularly Syria....” CRS Report RL33530, Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, by (name redacted) et al. North Korea [(name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs (7-....) and (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, (7-....)] The U.S. goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula suffered a setback when North Korea tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006. The test followed a pattern of North Korean provocations and escalations, including the July 2006 test-launch of several short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. Confidence that the Six-Party Talks (with South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia) can achieve a diplomatic solution to eliminate Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programs is diminishing. Since November 2005, Pyongyang has boycotted the talks, insisting that the United States end financial measures and pressure against foreign banks that deal with North Korea. North Korea also calls for direct talks with the United States, but the Bush Administration holds that it will negotiate bilaterally with Pyongyang only within the six-party framework. Despite supporting a United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the test, China and South Korea—the most significant trade partners and aid providers to the North—have not fundamentally altered their approach and appear unwilling to apply much stronger economic and legal pressure on the regime. In the wake of the test, North Korea continues to present a range of challenges to U.S. interests. Analysts fear that the medium and long-term implications of the test could include a more potent nuclear threat from Pyongyang, a nuclear arms race in Asia, and/or the transfer of nuclear weapons or material to states or groups hostile to the United States. There are also strong concerns about the impact on the global nonproliferation regime, particularly to other states poised to develop their own nuclear weapon programs. In addition to these security issues, North Korea’s human rights record, along with the plight of North Korean refugees, continue to elicit concern. Further law enforcement concerns exist with North Korea’s counterfeiting and narcotic trafficking programs. With the diplomatic process stalemated and with very limited military options, these challenges are unlikely to be resolved quickly. Congressional Research Service 18 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress In 2006, Congress became more involved in, and at times critical of, U.S. policy toward North Korea. In late September and early October 2006, Congress enacted two pieces of legislation on North Korea. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007 (P.L. 109-364), enacted on October 17, 2006, requires the President to appoint a Policy Coordinator for North Korea by December 17 who must then report to the President and the Congress with recommendations by January 17, 2007. It also requires the executive branch to report to Congress every 180 days in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 on the status of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. Congress’ role in North Korean policy in the 110th Congress will likely depend on the Administration’s response to these requirements. The North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-353) adds North Korea to the Iran-Syria Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178; P.L. 109112), authorizing sanctions on third party “persons” for weapons-of-mass-destruction-related transfers to and from North Korea. In particular, this could affect North Korea’s missile trade. CRS Report RL33590, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33709, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and U.S. Options, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions, by (name redacted). Foreign Affairs Global Issues Overview [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, (7-....)] The 110th Congress inherits from its predecessor a great amount of uncompleted work, primarily in the form of unfinished annual appropriations measures needed to fund the U.S. government and its programs. Foreign Operations Appropriations and State Department Appropriations are among those that the 109th Congress did not enact. The need to fund operations of the current fiscal year, either by a continuing resolution or passage of appropriations measures tailored to specific agencies, expectations that the President will send up a massive emergency spending measure to cover operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the shift of the majority from one party to the other, could presage a very robust Congressional agenda in 2007. Incoming Congressional leadership vowed a vigorous first 100 legislative hours, as well as oversight and investigation of the war in Iraq and counter-terrorism efforts, among other things. The Speaker of the House-elect has stated that among the many issues to form the first 100 legislative hours, the 110th Congress would implement the recommendations made in 2004 by the independent, bipartisan 9/11 Commission. And in the 79 recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, released December 6, 2006, the 110th Congress is likely to find a valuable impetus as it takes up global issues. New global issues initiatives put forth by the Executive Branch will also challenge the 110th Congress. In January 2006, for example, the Secretary of State announced significant organizational and philosophical changes to be implemented in the United States’ diplomatic and Congressional Research Service 19 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress foreign assistance services, the Transformational Diplomacy and Transformational Development initiatives. Other global issues will carry over from previous Congresses: United Nations reform; providing advice and consent on a new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; the humanitarian crisis in— and spilling over the boundaries of—the Darfur region of Sudan; international terrorist threats; statecraft decisions relating to other nations engaged in behavior the United States finds objectionable—among the most pressing, Syria, Iran, or North Korea; cyclical health disasters— most recently avian flu—and more persistent health tragedies—i.e., Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), malaria, and tuberculosis. The 110th Congress will have opportunities, through funding, authorizing, providing oversight, or creating new initiatives, to consider all these issues. Transformational Diplomacy [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade, (7-....)] Throughout the George W. Bush presidency, some foreign policy experts have expressed concern about the seeming reluctance of this Administration to use diplomacy as a foreign policy tool, particularly in Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In January 2006, however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice put forth a bold vision for U.S. diplomacy in the 21st century, referred to as Transformational Diplomacy. Secretary Rice has defined Transformational Diplomacy as working with partners “to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people” and helping others “better their own lives, build their own nations, and transform their futures.” Transformational Diplomacy includes global repositioning of State Department personnel largely from Europe and Washington, D.C. to designated critical locations in Africa, South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East. Implementation would create regional public diplomacy centers in Europe and the Middle East. Localization of diplomacy would include American presence posts operated by a single diplomat working in key population centers of a country. Enhanced language and technology skills would expand U.S. diplomacy effectiveness. Diplomats would be trained in public diplomacy skills, and encouraged to engage and promote democratic principles at posts, rather than just report on the culture in which they are living. The 110th Congress will be faced with funding and oversight issues concerning Secretary Rice’s Transformational Diplomacy when the President’s budget is submitted in early February, 2007. Global repositioning of State Department personnel is likely to require increased funding in the President’s FY2008 budget. Additionally, the 110th Congress may want to convene early committee hearings with Secretary Rice to examine how funds for the Transformational Diplomacy initiative are being spent, whether the initiative is improving the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy, and how foreign governments are responding to its emphasis on democracy promotion. Congressional Research Service 20 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress CRS Report RL31370, State Department and Related Agencies: FY2006 and FY2007 Appropriations and FY2008 Request, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33420, Foreign Operations (House)/State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Senate): FY2007 Appropriations, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33470, Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies (House)/Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (Senate): FY2007 Appropriations, coordinated by (name redacted) and (name redacted). Transformational Development and Foreign Aid Restructuring [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] The significance of foreign aid as a tool of U.S. foreign policy has come into sharper focus since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as policy makers recognized that failing states are permissive environments for terrorist activities. In September 2002, the Administration elevated global development as the third “pillar” of its National Security Strategy, along with defense and diplomacy. The Administration has begun a number of new foreign aid initiatives since 2002. The latest is a foreign aid restructuring process that was begun in January 2006 when Secretary Rice announced a Transformational Development initiative as part of her above-mentioned Transformational Diplomacy proposal. She created a new position at the State Department—the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance—and appointed the former Global AIDS Coordinator, Randall Tobias, to the position. He also concurrently serves as Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Tobias has authority to coordinate the foreign assistance programs managed by the Department of State and USAID, and provide guidance to programs administered by other departments and agencies. He has been charged with restructuring aid programs in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and with the goal of eventually graduating recipient countries from U.S. assistance. In response, Tobias has devised a Strategic Framework for Foreign Assistance to guide the budgeting process and to ensure that aid programs are aligned with a number of strategic objectives. The Framework has been used to write the FY2008 budget request for foreign aid that will be presented to Congress in February. The key issue for Congress will be to evaluate the impact of the new Framework with regard to its effects on program and country funding, particularly on issues in which Congress has expressed its interest. While the Administration believes that no new authorizing legislation is necessary to implement the Framework, Congress may decide to write an authorization bill, or to express its intent through the annual appropriations process. Previous to this initiative, President Bush launched two major new foreign assistance programs. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) pledged $15 billion over five years (2004-2008) to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the developing world. In FY2004, the Administration also created the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The MCA extends sizable aid grants to a few, low-income nations that have been determined, through a competitive process, to have the strongest policy reform records, and where new investments are more likely to achieve their intended development results. In 2005, the President launched a malaria initiative, pledging $1.2 billion in more resources through FY2010. Congressional Research Service 21 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Finding the resources to sustain these growing aid pledges, plus responding to unforseen foreign policy contingencies and natural disasters, may be the greatest foreign assistance challenge faced by lawmakers in the 110th Congress. Humanitarian and security emergencies, such as that in Darfur, Sudan, may also add pressure to an already extremely tight budget environment. Congress considers foreign aid spending and policy issues in the Foreign Operations appropriations bill. After largely supporting full funding for the President’s foreign aid appropriation requests through FY2004, Congress has made sharp cuts the past two years, including a $1.9 billion reduction in FY2006, and a House-proposed $2.4 billion cut in FY2007. Efforts to prioritize, focus resources, and find savings will likely characterize the foreign aid debate early in the 110th Congress. CRS Report RL33420, Foreign Operations (House)/State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (Senate): FY2007 Appropriations, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33491, Restructuring U.S. Foreign Aid: The Role of the Director of Foreign Assistance in Transformational Development, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Account, by (name redacted). CRS Report 98-916, Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). Peacekeeping, Stabilization, and Reconstruction: New Tools [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] The widespread perception that international terrorism will exploit weak, unstable states has been a major factor in convincing many policymakers of the need to strengthen U.S. and international capabilities to foster security, good governance, and economic development in conflict and postconflict situations. To that end, the 109th Congress supported, albeit with some reservation, the Bush Administration’s initiatives to bolster U.S. and international civilian and military “stabilization and reconstruction” (i.e., S&R) capabilities. (The term “stabilization and reconstruction” is understood to encompass the kinds of tasks and missions that in the past were loosely labeled “peacekeeping”). The Administration is expected to ask the 110th Congress to support the continuation of these activities, mostly likely with expansion in some areas, and may ask Congress to support new initiatives. Thus far, the centerpiece of the Administration’s initiatives has been the creation in mid-2004 of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to monitor states in crisis and to plan and coordinate civilian efforts to deal with such states. S/CRS was modeled on a proposal advanced by Senators Lugar and Biden in the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (S. 2127, 109th Congress), and endorsed by Congress in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447, Division D, Section 480). The Administration is expected to ask the 110th Congress to fund the expansion of S/CRS capabilities, in particular a proposal being developed by S/CRS for a civilian S&R reserve force. It may also ask the 110th Congress to reconsider previous Congress’ decisions to deny State Department funding for a Conflict Response Fund to support S/CRS’ overseas activities. (The 109th Congress provided such funding through the Department of Defense budget, however, granting the Secretary of Defense with $100 million in transfer authority in each FY2006 and FY2007 for S&R purposes in the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 109-163, Congressional Research Service 22 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Section 1207). The Administration may also ask Congress to approve new initiatives regarding inter-agency cooperation, in line with National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, issued in December 2005. Congressional consideration of the development of civilian capabilities for S&R operations may well entail a parallel determination of the appropriate role and capabilities for the U.S. military in such settings. DOD, as well as some key Members of Congress (especially on the defense and foreign affairs committees), have pushed for the development of civilian instruments to plan and carry out activities such as political institution building, the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, and humanitarian relief, which military forces have had to perform by default. Civilians can better carry out such activities, according to many analysts, and the creation of civilian capabilities would relieve military forces of the burden of doing them in all but combat situations. Unless adequate civilian personnel are provided, however, whether and to what extent to modify the size, structure, training, doctrine, or equipment of U.S. military forces in order to improve S&R performance becomes a major issue for some analysts. The Administration may ask the 110th Congress to consider enhancing military S&R capabilities as proposals are developed in line with the 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05, which mandates that S&R-type operations be treated as core military missions. Congress may also wish to consider issues regarding the scope and management of the State Department sponsored-DOD implemented FY2005-FY2009 Global Peace Operations Initiative, through which the United States trains and equips foreign military forces to participate in international peacekeeping operations. Issues regarding the wisdom of U.S. training for foreign troops may arise in the context of an expected Administration request to increase funding for the “Section 1206” foreign military training program authorized in the FY2006 and FY2007 National Defense Authorization Acts (P.L. 109-163 and P.L. 109-364). CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by (name re dacted). CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by (name re dacted). CRS Report RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). Humanitarian Assistance and Refugees [Rhoda M. Margesson, Specialist in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] There is no shortage of humanitarian emergencies worldwide stemming from natural disasters or manmade conflicts. In the 110th Congress, humanitarian assistance is likely to continue to have a strong measure of bipartisan support and priority. The key policy issues of concern to Congress will likely focus on budget priorities, levels of funding, and the types of support available worldwide. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to consist of urgent food, shelter and medical needs, the very nature of humanitarian disasters—the need to respond quickly in order to save lives and provide relief—often demands an unrestricted definition on both a policy and operational level. Congressional Research Service 23 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress Congress has consistently supported humanitarian efforts as a means of responding to crises in the short term, taking the lead, and promoting a U.S. presence. A decision by the United States to respond in a crisis results in varying amounts of relief and recovery assistance. Factors that may impact decision—making include the type of humanitarian assistance required; the impact of conflict and refugee flows on stability in the region in question; and the role of neighboring countries and the broader international community in contributing to the relief effort. The President can provide emergency humanitarian assistance through several sources whose funding is authorized and appropriated by Congress. In addition to competing aid and budget priorities, reimbursing U.S. government agencies for their expenditures, either to replenish the emergency accounts or other accounts that have been used to provide assistance will remain a Congressional issue. International recovery efforts are typically complex and, in addition to the United States, involve many actors. These include U.N. agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and bilateral and multilateral donors. Therefore, the broader international response—coordination of assistance, sharing the cost of an international recovery effort and donor fatigue—are of significant interest to Congress and may impact levels of funding and support available. Although it is usually impossible to predict when or where the next humanitarian or natural disaster may occur or how much funding will be needed in order to address it, cases of interest to Congress include a wide range of known situations, such as Darfur, North Koreans in China, Afghanistan, and Iraq (see below). Darfur, Sudan. Some experts consider the Darfur, Sudan situation to be the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. Estimates suggest that several million civilians have been displaced and refugees in neighboring Chad number more than 220,000. In addition to the impact of the conflict, some experts warn of the potential for an even greater humanitarian disaster if hostilities are not brought to an end and access by aid agencies is not increased and sustained. In FY2006, the United States provided $776.3 million in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and Eastern Chad. As of December 2006, the United States has provided $190.4 million for FY2007 in humanitarian assistance to Sudan and Eastern Chad. North Koreans in China. The status of the estimated tens of thousands of North Koreans living illegally in China has been of concern to Congress for some time. China sees the North Koreans as economic migrants rather than political refugees and has cracked down periodically on the population by forcibly returning them to North Korea where their fate is unknown, but reports of gross human rights violations abound. United Nations relief agencies have not been granted access to conduct an official full assessment of the unfolding situation, although a number of foreign, private NGOs have been tacitly accepted. Estimates of the number of refugees range from 10,000 to 300,000. In response to this situation, Congress passed H.R. 4011, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333). Afghanistan and Iraq. Although Afghanistan and Iraq represent two distinct situations, at differing levels of recovery, relief and reconstruction assistance operate on parallel tracks within close proximity to the military. The evolution of the civil-military relationship has received mixed reviews from the aid community, in part because of concerns about compromising neutrality and impartiality and increasing the possibility of a targeted attack. In some cases, violence has led to the suspension of activities or withdrawal of aid agencies from certain areas altogether. Many in Congress hold that disaster assistance should be provided whenever possible with foreign assistance funds through NGOs, and yet, aid worker security remains an issue of significant concern, particularly in Iraq. The role of the military in post-emergency transitions and Congressional Research Service 24 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress reconstruction is still evolving as demonstrated by developments in Afghanistan and Iraq. The use of Department of Defense funds and personnel may continue to be controversial. CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL31766, Iraq: United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations, by (name redacted) CRS Report RL33701, Uganda: Current Conditions and the Crisis in North Uganda, by (name redacted). Global Health and HIV/AIDS Issues [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] Issues that Congress is expected to take up in the 110th Congress, include enacting appropriations for global health programs; determining whether to reauthorize the President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR); strengthening ailing health systems in developing countries; and containing outbreaks of infectious disease. It is estimated that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and malaria together kill more than 6 million people each year. Since HIV/AIDS was identified in 1981, about 65 million people have reportedly contracted HIV, and more than 25 million people have died from AIDS. More than 40 million people are reportedly living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, including more than 4 million of whom were newly infected in 2005. Each year, there are reports of about 300 million malaria cases globally, which cause more than one million deaths annually. Between 85% and 90% of those deaths reportedly occur in Africa. More than 80% of the estimated 14 million people living with TB worldwide live in Asia and Africa. A number of FY2007 appropriations bills that provide funds for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria have yet to be enacted. H.R. 5522, FY2007 House Foreign Operations appropriations, provides about $3.6 billion for the three diseases, some $47 million less than requested. H.R. 5647, FY2007 House Labor, HHS, Education appropriations provide $121.9 million for CDC’s Global AIDS Program, meeting the President’s request. S.Rept. 109-277, the Senate report to FY2007 Foreign Operations appropriations, provides about $3.8 billion for the three diseases. S. 3708, FY2007 Labor, HHS, Education appropriations, does not provide funds for global HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria programs. P.L. 108-25, the U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, authorized $15 billion to be spent from FY2004 to FY2008 on fighting HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. Some health advocates would like Congress to authorize more than $15 billion for the five-year initiative. Although P.L. 108-25 authorizes $1 billion for U.S. contributions to the Global Fund through FY2008, appropriators have already exceeded that amount by more than $500 million. Some argue that this has taken from U.S. spending on bilateral programs, while others encourage the United States to contribute more. A number of Members introduced legislation in the 109th Congress to amend language in the act, which reserves 33% of prevention funds for abstinence programs. Others advocate that Congress increase spending on other prevention strategies, such as those that prevent the transmission of HIV from mother to child. A number of analysts have requested that Congress expand the list of PEPFAR Focus Countries to include countries in other regions where the virus is rapidly spreading, such as in Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. A large number of countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are struggling with inadequate health systems, which are crippled by shortages of medical personnel. WHO estimates that there Congressional Research Service 25 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress is a global shortage of 4.3 million health workers. Of the 57 countries with critical shortages of health care workers, 36 are in Africa and none are in industrialized nations. Global health experts contend that the rapid infusion of funds targeted at HIV/AIDS initiatives is pulling in-country resources and health workers away from government-run health clinics to foreign-funded HIV/AIDS programs. This movement, health analysts purport, exacerbates the current health worker shortage and limits the number of health professionals capable of treating other afflictions. Proponents of greater spending on global health argue that the global spread of avian influenza (H5N1) and the inability of countries such as Indonesia to contain the virus demonstrates the need to increase investment in strengthening public health systems. Supporters also argue that increased spending might encourage state openness and responsibility, and enhance global cooperation and containment efforts. New and evolving infectious diseases and the potential for bioterrorism are creating growing linkages between domestic and global health policies. These developments have raised a host of issues for policy makers, including ensuring health data reporting, enhancing pandemic preparedness capacity, managing public fear and information disclosure, coordinating national and international responses to infectious disease outbreaks, and overcoming resource and distribution challenges. CRS Report RL33485, U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008, by (name redacte d). CRS Report RL33219, U.S. and International Responses to the Global Spread of Avian Flu: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33349, International Efforts to Control the Spread of the Avian Influenza (H5N1) Virus: Affected Countries’ Responses, by (name redacted) et al. United Nations Reform [(name redacted), Specialist in International Relations (7-....) and (name redacted), Analyst in Foreign Affairs (7-....)] United Nations reform, as variously defined, has drawn the attention of many in Congress and the executive branch as well as other U.N. member governments. In the past, Congressional views and expectations on the need for U.N. reform have resulted in significant arrearage in U.S. contributions, especially to U.N. regular budget and peacekeeping accounts, and led Congress to specify conditions that had to be met prior to the release of U.S. funds appropriated to finance these contributions or arrearages. As the 110th Congress convenes, several issues relating to U.N. reform remain pending, although former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and U.N. member states have proposed or put into place a series of management, programmatic, and structural reforms aimed at improving the organization. Many of these reforms are in various stages of implementation, while others are still being considered by U.N. member states. Some in Congress may wish to examine how these reforms are being implemented, as well as the extent to which previously-implemented reforms meet their intended goals. Some Members may also want to examine reform issues that have not been fully addressed by the United Nations. In addition, on December14, 2006, Ban Ki-Moon of South Korea replaced Kofi Annan as Secretary-General of the United Nations. Ban has stated that U.N. reform will remain a priority Congressional Research Service 26 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress during his tenure as Secretary General. Another potential area of focus may be the Senate’s consideration of a nominee to replace John R. Bolton, who resigned as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations may have implications for U.S. policy toward the United Nations, as well as for ongoing U.N. reform efforts. As the single largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has actively participated in the U.N. reform process. Some Members of Congress and the Administration have advocated for, among other things: strengthening U.N. internal oversight, improving U.N. human rights mechanisms, and increasing fiscal discipline. Areas of concern that may have contributed to current U.N. reform efforts include allegations related to the U.N. oil-for-food program in Iraq and associated investigations; allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by members of U.N. peacekeeping forces and missions; the effectiveness and transparency of the U.N. administrative apparatus to investigate wrong-doing, especially by mid-and top-level officials; the widelyperceived ineffectiveness of U.N. human rights mechanisms; and the capacity of the United Nations to provide security for its activities around the world. It is anticipated that U.S. interest in U.N. reform will continue to remain strong as reform initiatives are debated and considered by U.N. member states. CRS Report RL33611, United Nations System Funding: Congressional Issues, by (name redacted) and (name reda cted). CRS Report RL33700, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33608, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted). Economic Sanctions [(name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation, (7-....)] The United States imposes various types of economic sanctions on numerous countries, individuals, or entities, in furtherance of foreign policy or national security goals. The United States maintains economic sanctions that restrict most transactions with those countries it has identified as supporters of international terrorism: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. The United States maintains an arms embargo on Belarus, Burma, China, Liberia, Somalia, Vietnam, and the aforementioned terrorist states (and it continues to be the policy generally to deny export or import licenses for defense articles and defense services for Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, and Rwanda). The United States limits foreign aid to about two dozen states or regions and the terrorist states. The United States, under authority granted the President to recognize conditions of national emergency and to curtail transactions accordingly, limits trade, transactions, and investment in Burma, Cuba, Iran, Liberia, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, and the Western Balkans. Finally, the United States maintains economic restrictions on individuals identified as narcotics traffickers, terrorists, those who disrupt the Middle East peace process, those who engage in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, those who contributed to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and diamond traffickers (when the diamonds have not been subject to a certification process). These individuals and entities number in the hundreds. Congress has always sought—some would say it has struggled—to find the balance among competing foreign policy and national security concerns. In the 1970s, for example, Congress enacted legislation that focused on human rights concerns, while the 1980s ushered in increased Congressional Research Service 27 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress attention to proliferation. Congress, in recent years, has focused on implementing counterterrorism and democracy promotion measures. The use of economic sanctions, particularly after the events of September 11, 2001, the onset of the war on terrorism, and the war in Iraq, seems to have become more pragmatic, less driven by absolutes. Several countries could be targeted for sanctions based on their human rights or proliferation records—for example, Pakistan, Russia, or Saudi Arabia—but are recognized, and some would say rewarded, instead as vital allies in the war on terrorism. Nonetheless, the Administration reports to Congress annually on human rights (February), drug trafficking (March and September), cooperation with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts (May), religious freedom (May), and human trafficking (June), and each of these reports could provide the impetus for calling on the Administration to exercise statutory authority to impose economic sanctions on countries with objectionable practices. Or Congress could initiate new legislative requirements to restrict trade, aid, or transactions with states with objectionable behavior. The 110th Congress is also faced with a range of recent events that could be addressed by the use of existing, or creation of new, economic restrictions: The Six Party talks are tentatively set to resume on North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capability; Iran continues pursuing its own nuclear ambitions. The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan is spilling into its neighboring states. Cuba appears to be facing an imminent change in leadership. Recent events in—and U.S. relations with—Belarus, Libya, Syria, Iran, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, and Iraq all could raise the possibility of imposition of new, or adjustment of existing, sanctions regimes. CRS Report RL31502, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Selected Current Law, by (name reda cted). CRS Report RL33948, State and Local Economic Sanctions: Constitutional Issues, by (name redacted). CRS Report RL33499, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation, by (name redacted). Africa Overview [(name redacted), Specialist in African Affairs (7-....) and Lauren Ploch, Analyst in African Affairs (7-....)] U.S. policy priorities pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa likely to be taken up by the 110th Congress may build upon or amend many of those pursued by the 109th Congress, but a range of new Africa-focused policy problems will also face the 110th Congress. Key U.S. policy issues pertaining to Africa are likely to center on U.S. efforts to promote peace and security in the region; U.S. counter-terrorism initiatives; bilateral military cooperation and training assistance efforts, particularly in support of international peacekeeping capacity building; the programmatic focus, funding levels, and objectives of diverse U.S. assistance efforts; the promotion of democratic governance and transparency, the rule of law, and human rights in Africa; and efforts to promote U.S.-Africa trade and market-driven African economic growth. U.S. relations with the African Union (AU) are likely to continue to focus on peacekeeping cooperation, crisis mediation, and U.S. support for AU capacity and institution building to advance democracy, counter-terrorism, and justice goals. U.S.-AU relations may expand following the appointment of Congressional Research Service 28 Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade: Key Issues for the 110th Congress a new U.S. ambassador to the African Union and the anticipated opening of an AU mission in Washington, DC. U.S. efforts to promote peace and security in Africa are likely to remain prominent issues of concern to U.S. policy makers. These will prospectively center on diplomatic, policy, and logistical assistance initiatives aimed to mediate and mitigate political and military crisis in several countries, while also supporting the consolidation of post-conflict transition processes in others. Resolution of the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan is likely to remain a key Africarelated issue for Congress, as is implementation of Sudan’s north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Peace and security concerns will also likely focus on current, emergent, or recent military-political crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea-Ethiopia, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, Chad, and the Central African Republic, and related U.S. policy responses and assistance programs, including post-confli [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33760. Public record. Not legal advice.