# 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33742 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** December 4, 2006 - **Citation:** RL33742 ## Text 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status /name redacted/ Specialist in International Security December 4, 2006 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33742 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Summary This report provides a review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the status of their implementation at the end of the 109th Congress. The discussions herein are organized on the basis of policy themes that are at the core of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, rather than through a review of each numbered item set out in the Commission’s final report. The analysis was produced by a large team of CRS Specialists, analysts, and attorneys who are responsible for the wide variety of policy areas covered by the 9/11 Commission in its work. The authors of the varied segments of this report are identified in footnotes. Each section of the report summarizes the pertinent elements of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation relevant to the section’s policy theme. Then a review is made of responses made by the Congress to implement, in whole or in part, the given recommendation. Where appropriate, notice is taken of Executive branch actions regarding the policy matter. A detailed table of contents provides the reader with a guide to each of the policy themes discussed. Footnotes in each section of the report provide references to more detailed information on particular topics related to each policy theme. This report will only be updated if circumstances warrant. Congressional Research Service 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 Strengthening the Intelligence Function.......................................................................................1 Commission Concerns and Recommendations.......................................................................1 Congressional Responses ......................................................................................................1 Intelligence Oversight: Congressional Options ............................................................................2 Commission Concerns and Recommendations.......................................................................2 Congressional Responses ......................................................................................................3 Improving Transitions Between Administrations .........................................................................4 Commission Concerns and Recommendations.......................................................................4 Congressional Responses ......................................................................................................5 Enacted Provisions..........................................................................................................5 Related Potential Congressional Concerns for the 110th ...................................................8 Afghanistan and Terrorism ..........................................................................................................9 Commission Concerns and Recommendations.......................................................................9 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 10 Future Considerations ................................................................................................... 11 Pakistan and Terrorism.............................................................................................................. 11 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 11 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 12 Foreign Assistance ........................................................................................................ 12 Coalition Support Funds................................................................................................ 13 Saudi Arabia and Terrorism....................................................................................................... 13 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 13 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 14 Provisions Enacted........................................................................................................ 14 Related Options Also Considered .................................................................................. 15 Terrorism: Its Global Dimensions.............................................................................................. 15 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 15 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 16 Legislation Enacted....................................................................................................... 16 Policy Concerns Not Addressed or Postponed ............................................................... 16 Islam and U.S. Policy................................................................................................................ 17 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 17 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 17 Policy Concerns Not Addressed .......................................................................................... 18 Radical Islam in Europe ................................................................................................ 18 Islam in Politics ............................................................................................................ 19 Terrorism: U.S. Policy Instruments............................................................................................ 19 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 19 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 19 Public Diplomacy, Education and Exchange Programs ........................................................ 20 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 20 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 20 Terrorist Financing.................................................................................................................... 22 Congressional Research Service 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 22 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 23 U.S. Military Forces and the War on Terrorism.......................................................................... 24 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 24 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 25 Relevant Provisions Enacted by Congress ..................................................................... 25 Policy Concerns Not Addressed .................................................................................... 25 Options Considered by the 109th Congress..................................................................... 25 Weapons of Mass Destruction: Proliferation Security and Threat Reduction .............................. 26 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 26 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 26 Border Security and Immigration .............................................................................................. 27 Terrorist Travel ................................................................................................................... 27 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 27 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 28 Terrorist Screening and Watch Lists .................................................................................... 29 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 29 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 29 Related Administrative Response .................................................................................. 29 Biometric Screening System and Data Systems Integration ................................................. 31 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 31 Congressional Responses .............................................................................................. 31 Standards for Identification Documents ............................................................................... 32 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 32 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 32 Other Immigration Concerns ............................................................................................... 33 Commission Concerns .................................................................................................. 33 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 33 Transportation Security ............................................................................................................. 35 Aviation Security ................................................................................................................ 35 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 35 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 36 Policy Concerns Not Addressed In Enacted Legislation................................................. 40 Port and Maritime Security ................................................................................................. 41 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 41 Congressional Response................................................................................................ 41 Surface Transportation Security........................................................................................... 43 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 43 Status of Implementation of the Recommendations ....................................................... 43 Critical Infrastructure Security .................................................................................................. 44 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 44 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 45 Emergency Preparedness and Response and the 9/11 Commission............................................. 46 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 46 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 47 Department of Defense and the 9/11 Commission...................................................................... 49 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 49 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 50 Congressional Research Service 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Homeland Security Oversight: Congressional Options............................................................... 50 Commission Concerns and Recommendations..................................................................... 50 Congressional Responses .................................................................................................... 50 Civil Liberties and Government Information Policies and Practices ........................................... 51 Driver’s Licenses, Personal Identification Cards, Birth Certificates, and Social Security Numbers ............................................................................................................ 51 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 51 Congressional Responses .............................................................................................. 51 Future Considerations ................................................................................................... 53 Protection of Civil Liberties ................................................................................................ 54 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 54 Congressional Responses .............................................................................................. 55 Balancing Security and Information Sharing ....................................................................... 57 Commission Concerns and Recommendations............................................................... 57 Congressional and Administrative Responses ................................................................ 57 DHS Reorganization Related to Information Sharing..................................................... 61 Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 62 Congressional Research Service 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Introduction This report provides a review of the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the status of their implementation at the end of the 109th Congress. It is intended to provide a structured road map to this end. The discussions herein are organized on the basis of policy themes that are at the core of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations, rather than a review of every numbered item set out in the Commission’s final report. The analysis was produced by a large team of CRS Specialists, analysts, and attorneys who are responsible for the wide variety of policy areas covered by the 9/11 Commission in its work. The authors of the varied segments of this report are identified in footnotes. Each section of the report summarizes the pertinent elements of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations relevant to that section’s policy theme. Then a review is made of responses made by the Congress to implement, in whole or in part, the given recommendation. Where appropriate, notice is taken of executive branch actions regarding the policy matter. A detailed table of contents provides the reader with a guide to each of the policy themes discussed. Footnotes in each section of the report provide references to more detailed information on particular topics related to each policy theme. Strengthening the Intelligence Function1 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission concluded that the organization of the U.S. Intelligence Community had contributed to a failure to develop a management strategy to counter Islamic terrorism. The Commission recommended a major reordering of the Intelligence Community to enable a single official to manage the entire national intelligence effort and oversee the agencies that contribute to it. The Commission also recommended the establishment of national intelligence centers, including a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), to correlate and analyze information from all sources on particular topics. A principal recommendation of the Commission was the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI), separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who would have major statutory authorities over the Intelligence Community’s 16 agencies, including the preparation of budgets, systems acquisition, and the setting of personnel policies and standards for information use throughout the Intelligence Community. The DNI would also be the principal intelligence advisor to the President and would prepare national intelligence estimates. Congressional Responses Congress responded to many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), hailed by some as the most important intelligence legislation since the National Security Act of 1947. The Act established a DNI (along with a separate Director of the CIA) and provided him with additional 1 Prepared by Richard A. Best, Jr., Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 1 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status authorities beyond those that the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had over all intelligence agencies. The DNI possesses substantial authorities to prepare the national intelligence budget and the expenditure of funds appropriated for the national intelligence effort. The DNI also is charged with establishing priorities for collection and analysis; and managing intelligence centers composed of analysts from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Questions involving the DCI’s budgetary authorities were debated at length during consideration of the legislation. The management and oversight authorities proposed by the 9/11 Commission and reflected in some versions of intelligence reform legislation appeared to some Members as complicating, undermining, or replacing the authorities of the Secretary of Defense over intelligence agencies in the Defense Department (in particular, the National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, that are also integral components of DOD’s warfighting capabilities). The agreement reflected in the final legislation provides the DNI with authority to “develop and determine an annual consolidated National Intelligence Program budget,” along with authorities to manage appropriations, transfer or reprogram funds (within strict limitations), transfer a limited number of personnel annually, and establish common information technology standards. At the same time, the Act called for the President to issue guidelines to ensure that the authorities granted to the DNI are implemented “in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities” of other departments including DOD. Some observers have suggested that the legislation has not definitively resolved the question of the DNI’s responsibilities for the Defense agencies in particular, and have argued that further legislative changes may be required and/or that an effective solution will depend on the ability of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense to work in close coordination. To a large extent P.L. 108-458 adopted the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission regarding the organization of the Intelligence Community but it did not centralize management of the Intelligence Community to the extent that at least some on the 9/11 Commission would have preferred. As a result there remains a potential that the national intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense may be subject to conflicting guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the DNI. Thus far, however, there has been little public controversy regarding the budgets of intelligence agencies since the enactment of P.L. 108-458. Intelligence Oversight: Congressional Options2 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission stated that congressional oversight for intelligence and counter-terrorism is “dysfunctional.” Commission members suggested two basic alternatives for strengthening and improving Congress’s oversight of these policy domains. The two recommendations were: (1) to create either a joint committee on intelligence modeled after the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; or (2) establish a committee in each chamber that has the authority to both authorize and appropriate for intelligence agencies and activities. In addition, the commission suggested that an intelligence committee should have a subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight; the panel should have subpoena authority; majority party representation on the 2 Prepared by (name redacted), Senior Specialist in the Legislative Process, Government and Finance Division. Congressional Research Service 2 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status panel should exceed the minority by only one member; a member from each of these panels— Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee— should serve on an intelligence committee; Members who serve on an intelligence committee should not be subject to term limits; the staff of an intelligence committee should be nonpartisan and serve the entire committee; and the size of an intelligence committee should range from seven to nine members. Congressional Responses The House and Senate did not create a joint intelligence committee, nor did either chamber consolidate authorizing and appropriating responsibility for the intelligence community in a single committee. On the other hand, the two chambers followed some but not all of the commission’s other recommendations. In the House, the Permanent Select Intelligence Committee for the 109th Congress has an oversight subcommittee, subpoena authority, and members who serve also on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the Armed Services, Judiciary, and International Relations Committees. The House panel’s ratio of majority to minority party members does not, however, track the commission’s recommendation. The House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee’s size is larger than nine; its members are subject to tenure limitations with exceptions for the chair and ranking minority member; and it has a partisan staff model. In October 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445, which made a number of changes affecting oversight of the intelligence community. Some of the recommendations in S.Res. 445 parallel the commission’s ideas, while others are new proposals agreed to by the Senate. The ideas in S.Res. 445 that affect the Select Intelligence Committee, and which generally emulate the commission’s proposals, are these: an oversight subcommittee; subpoena authority; a one-seat margin for the majority party; a two-seat representation on the panel from each of these committees: Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary; moreover, Intelligence members are not subject to term limits. On the other hand, the Select Intelligence Committee employs a partisan staff model and its size is larger than nine members. S.Res. 445 made a number of other changes affecting the Select Intelligence Committee. These include granting the Majority Leader formal authority to name the chairman, and the Minority Leader the vice chairman, of the panel; authorizing the chair and vice chair of the Intelligence panel to name, respectively, the chair and vice chair of any subcommittee; assigning to the panel jurisdiction over civilian nominations to advice-and-consent positions within the intelligence community; permitting each Intelligence member to appoint a staff aide to the committee (subject to appropriate security clearances); allocating committee staff resources between the parties on a 60/40 ratio, excluding staff designees appointed by individual Senators; expanding current requirements that the Intelligence Committee report periodically to the Senate on its findings and to require such reports quarterly; elevating the Select Intelligence Committee to a category “A” assignment status; obligating the panel to consult with the Majority Leader and Minority Leader about the disclosure of classified information given to the committee by the executive branch; and reducing what are called “on demand sequential referrals” from 30 days to 10 days. Congressional Research Service 3 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status S.Res. 445 recommended that the Committee on Appropriations “shall reorganize into 13 subcommittees as soon as possible after the convening of the 109th Congress.” The Senate Committee on Appropriations did not establish its customary 13 subcommittees. Bicameral discussions at the start of the 109th Congress involving, among others, the majority party leaders and the respective House and Senate Appropriations chairs, led to a downsizing and reshuffling of Appropriations subcommittees and jurisdictions. In mid-February 2005, the House panel established 10 subcommittees, eliminating three (District of Columbia, Legislative Branch, and VA-HUD). A few weeks later the Senate Appropriations Committee created 12 subcommittees. The panel retained its District of Columbia and Legislative Branch subcommittees, but, like the House, it eliminated its VA-HUD subcommittee and transferred its jurisdiction to other Appropriations subcommittees. One goal of revamping the organizational structure of the two Appropriations Committees is to minimize the need for endof-year appropriations measures. The recommendation in S.Res. 445 for an Appropriations Subcommittee on Intelligence was not acted upon by the Committee on Appropriations during the 109th Congress. The Resolution stated that the proposed Intelligence subcommittee “shall have jurisdiction over funding for intelligence matters, as determined by the Senate Committee on Appropriations.” A Senate Appropriations member indicated that it would be difficult to create a subcommittee with a classified budget. The 9/11 Commission recommended public disclosure of the nation’s budget for intelligence, which has not been agreed to by the Congress.3 Improving Transitions Between Administrations4 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission Report5 included a general recommendation that appointments to key national security positions at the time of presidential transitions occur more quickly. The goal of the 9/11 Commission’s recommended changes was to “minimize as much as possible the disruption of national security policymaking” and maintain national security continuity when a new President comes into office. The recommendation addressed the commission’s concern about the length of time a new Administration takes to install key national security personnel. The commission noted, in particular, the abbreviated transition period resulting from the delayed resolution of the 2000 presidential race. The report stated, “Given that a presidential election in the United States brings wholesale change in personnel, this loss of time hampered the new administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation of key appointees.”6 As a result, the commission reported, “the new administration did not have its 3 For further information generally, see CRS Report RS21955, S.Res. 445: Senate Committee Reorganization for Homeland Security and Intelligence Matters, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). For historical background on the public disclosure issue, see CRS Report 94-261, Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 4 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in American National Government, and (name redacted), Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance Division. 5 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington: GPO, 2004), p. 422. 6 9/11 Commission Report, p. 198. Congressional Research Service 4 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status deputy cabinet officers in place until the spring of 2001, and the critical subcabinet officials were not confirmed until the summer—if then. In other words, the new administration—like others before it—did not have its team on the job until at least six months after it took office.”7 In line with its overall recommendation, the commission called for seven specific changes, six of which are related to presidential appointments and transitions. Two of these proposed changes are related to the national security clearance process during transitions. First, the commission recommended starting the security clearance process for prospective appointees to national security positions immediately after the presidential election. It also proposed that, prior to the election, each presidential candidate provide to the FBI “the names of selected members” of his or her prospective transition team to facilitate quicker security clearances following the election. Three additional recommendations would modify the nomination and Senate consideration processes for certain national security positions. First, the report proposed that all nominations to positions on the “national security team”8 be submitted to the Senate by the President-elect no later than the date of his or her inauguration. Furthermore, the commission called for the Senate to “adopt special rules requiring hearings and votes to confirm or reject national security nominees within 30 days of their submission.” The final recommended change to the appointment process would be the elimination of advice and consent requirements for any “national security team” members below Level III of the Executive Schedule. The commission also suggested that, beginning immediately after the election, the transition include a prompt and thorough written national security information exchange between the outgoing and incoming Administrations. In addition to these six changes, the commission called for centralization of the security clearance process in one agency, including providing and maintaining security clearances and ensuring uniform standards.9 Congressional Responses Enacted Provisions The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the “Intelligence Reform Act”)10 included several provisions that responded to commission concerns and recommendations. The legislation amended the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 to (1) recommend submission by the President-elect to the agency with national security clearance functions of the “names of candidates for high level national security positions through the level of undersecretary” of agencies and departments, as soon as possible after the presidential election; (2) require the responsible agency or agencies to carry out background investigations of these candidates for high-level national security positions “as expeditiously as possible ... before the date of the inauguration”; and (3) authorize “relevant outgoing executive branch officials” to prepare a “detailed classified, compartmented summary ... of specific operational threats to 7 9/11 Commission Report, p. 422. The phrase “national security team” was not defined in the report. 9 9/11 Commission Report, p. 422. 10 P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638. 8 Congressional Research Service 5 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status national security; major military or covert operations; and pending decisions on possible uses of military force,” which would be provided to the President-elect and Vice President-elect as soon as possible after the general election. 11 Just as the Intelligence Reform Act seeks to facilitate more rapid security clearances for top national security position candidates, it also does so for transition team members. It allows each major party presidential candidate to submit, before the general election, security clearance requests for “prospective transition team members who will have a need for access to classified information” in the course of their work. The law directs that resulting investigations and eligibility determinations be completed, as much as possible, by the day after the general election. 12 The Intelligence Reform Act also expresses “the sense of the Senate” about a timetable for submission and consideration of high-level national security nominations during transitions. Under this timetable, nominations to such positions should be submitted by the President-elect to the Senate by Inauguration Day, and Senate consideration of all such nominations should be completed within 30 days of submission.13 Because most presidential appointees are subject to a limited “vetting” process and not a full-scale security clearance investigation and adjudication, these changes may have a significant impact on the duration and difficulty of the confirmation process. A personnel security clearance investigation, for instance, is normally more exhaustive and longer than the usual “vetting” process for potential nominees. A background investigation for access to the highest clearance level—Top Secret with access to Sensitive Compartmented Information—may take a year. That is because the process requires a full field investigation, including interviews with former colleagues and employers, neighbors, friends, and acquaintances, along with checks of databases from law enforcement entities, financial services, and, to a degree, medical services. The Intelligence Reform Act also made government-wide changes to the national security clearance process that are designed to consolidate and streamline this function. Concerns have long existed over the substantial backlog, delays, and time consumed in initial background investigations and subsequent re-investigations associated with gaining access to classified national security information. These problems have been exacerbated by the increased number of personnel requiring access to classified information and the growth of materials being classified or being classified at higher levels; both of these changes, in turn, have been driven by the expanding programs in national and homeland security. Other reasons for seeking improvements in the clearance process, especially the background investigations, are (1) the lack of reciprocity among agencies, so that one federal agency may not accept the findings of investigations previously conducted for another federal agency; and (2) questions about the capacity of existing agencies to handle the increased workload (or overload) in light of its size and recent growth. 14 11 P.L. 108-458, Sec. 7601(a). P.L. 108-458, Sec. 7601(c). 13 P.L. 108-458, Sec. 7601(b). 14 U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, What’s the Hold Up? A Review of Security Clearance Backlog and Reciprocity Issues Plaguing Today’s Government and Private Sector Workforce, hearings, 108th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 2004). At the same time, the Department of Defense transferred the background investigation function and related personnel to the Office of Personnel Management, which now handles about 90% of all federal background investigations. 12 Congressional Research Service 6 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status The Intelligence Reform Act required the President to designate a single executive entity to oversee and develop uniform standards and policies for access to classified information and to designate other investigative agencies, if appropriate, for national security and efficiency purposes.15 The statute further stipulated that reciprocity should be the rule among agencies for clearances at the same level and the legislation established a national database to track clearances. The head of the entity charged with overseeing the process is to evaluate and report to Congress on the use of available technology in clearance investigations and adjudications, as well as to consult with Congress and adjudicative agencies in developing a plan, within five years, to reduce the length of the clearance process. The first step along this new path was undertaken during the 109th Congress, with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) designated as the lead agency in conducting security clearance background checks under the guidance and oversight of the Deputy Director of OMB. Certain deadlines and a reciprocity requirement among agencies have also been established to speed up the process and make it less costly and more efficient. Setting this in motion was an executive order issued by President George W. Bush, designed to strengthen and speed up processes to determine eligibility for access to classified national security information.16 In the order, the President called upon the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop the policy for meeting the following goals: “To the extent consistent with safeguarding the security of the United States and protecting classified national security information from unauthorized disclosure, agency functions relating to determining eligibility for access to classified national security information shall be appropriately uniform, centralized, efficient, effective, timely, and reciprocal.”17 The Intelligence Reform Act also contained appointment process-related provisions18 that were not specifically recommended by the 9/11 Commission. These included provisions that (1) require a report from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) regarding potential improvements 15 P.L. 108-458, Title III, Sec. 3001(c). Executive Order 13381, “Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information,” issued by President George W. Bush, June 27, 2005, 70 Federal Register 37953, June 30, 2005. 17 Ibid., Sec. 1. In developing the plan, the OMB Deputy Director was required to consult with the heads of the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security, as well as the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The OMB Director issued guidelines and instructions to the heads of agencies to ensure such goals. A separate section covers Sensitive Compartmented Information, that information generated by way of intelligence sources and methods, and special access programs pertaining to intelligence activities, including special activities or covert operations. The Deputy Director for Management at OMB has been delegated responsibility for carrying out the order. Along with this, specialized areas of responsibility have been assigned to the Directors of OPM and of National Intelligence as well as to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The particulars of the plan and its production are covered in several executive reports, testimony before Congress, and a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. See U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Report on the Status of Executive Branch Efforts to Improve the Security Clearance Process Required under Title III of P.L. 108-458 (Washington: OMB, 2006), and Plan for Improving the Personnel Security Clearance Process (Washington: OMB, 2005); and Kathy L. Dillaman, Associate Director, Federal Investigative Services Division, OPM, testimony on Human Capital Issues and Security Clearance Procedures, before the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, House Committee on Homeland Security, May 18, 2006. GAO, however, has found continuing weaknesses in this area; see U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional OMB Actions Are Needed to Improve the Security Clearance Process, GAO-061070 (Washington: GAO, 2006). 18 P.L. 108-458, Sec. 8403. 16 Congressional Research Service 7 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status to the financial disclosure process for executive branch employees;19 (2) direct the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to transmit an electronic record “on Presidentially appointed positions,” with specified contents, to each major party presidential candidate soon after his or her nomination, and to make such a record available to any other presidential candidate after this; (3) direct each agency head to submit an advice and consent position reduction plan, with specified contents, to the President, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (as of the 109th Congress, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs), and the House Committee on Government Reform;20 and (4) require the Director of OGE, in consultation with the Attorney General, to “conduct a comprehensive review of conflict of interest laws relating to Federal employment,” with specified contents and recipients.21 Although the Intelligence Reform Act addressed each of the recommendations in this section of the 9/11 Report, its provisions were generally not identical to the commission’s recommended actions. For example, whereas the commission recommended that the “Senate should not require confirmation of [national security] executive appointees below Executive Level 3,” the statute requires agencies to submit advice and consent position reduction plans to the President and congressional committees. Related Potential Congressional Concerns for the 110th The presidential transition process changes called for by the 9/11 Commission and provided for in the Intelligence Reform Act are arguably more critical to national security continuity at the time of a transition between Presidents than between the first and second terms of a two-term President. Nonetheless, some top-level national security positions changed hands at the beginning of the second George W. Bush Administration, and Congress may elect to conduct oversight, during the 110th Congress, on the implementation of the modifications to the presidential transition process. Congress might also elect to conduct oversight regarding provisions that would be implemented during the run-up to the 2008 presidential election. Changes to the national security clearance process under the Intelligence Reform Act extend beyond the presidential transition and presidential appointment processes. Some changes are designed to modernize the national security clearance process, by adding new formal requirements (e.g., for reciprocity among agencies) and by consolidating the process under a single entity, the Office of Personnel Management, with guidance and supervision under the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The implementation of these and other new developments might become the subjects of congressional oversight, to determine whether the changes are proceeding as expected, whether their goals are being met, whether legislative intent is being followed, what the implementation costs are, and what other modifications might be necessary. 19 OGE submitted this report on March 17, 2005. It is available at http://www.usoge.gov/pages/forms_pubs_otherdocs/ fpo_files/reports_plans/rpogc_fin_dis_03_05.pdf. 20 At the end of the 109th Congress, staffers for both of the congressional committees indicated that only a few agencies had submitted the required PAS position reduction plans. 21 OGE submitted this report in Jan. 2006. It is available at http://www.usoge.gov/pages/forms_pubs_otherdocs/ fpo_files/reports_plans/rpt_title18.pdf. Congressional Research Service 8 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Several provisions of the law reflect ongoing concern among some Members of Congress about the length and complexity of the presidential appointment process. The last several Congresses have seen efforts to develop consensus, inter alia, on streamlining executive branch financial disclosure requirements; reducing the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation for appointment; and simplifying conflict of interest laws and decriminalizing conflict of interest. With the submission of reports to Congress concerning these topics, required by the Intelligence Reform Act, discussions regarding possible changes may be renewed during the 110th Congress. Congress might elect to revisit provisions contained in earlier versions of the intelligence legislation that were not included in the enacted law. These include proposed changes to provisions of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 that would make it easier for the President to make long-term temporary appointments to advice and consent positions during presidential transitions. 22 Other appointments-related issues could be of interest in the 110th Congress. For example, it is possible that the Senate may attempt to change its floor procedures concerning nominations. In addition, issues related to recess appointments may come to the fore. At times, for instance, the President’s use of his recess appointment power has been seen as circumventing the Senate confirmation process and has proven controversial. Afghanistan and Terrorism23 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission Report (p. 370) praised the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan to that date, but emphasized the need for a sustained, long-term commitment by the United States and the international community to Afghanistan’s stability and security, 24 in order to prevent Afghanistan from “again becom[ing] a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.” The Commission was far-reaching in its recommendations, calling for greater peacekeeping participation by international forces, particularly NATO; stepped up counter-narcotics activities, disarmament of regional militias, and efforts to promote rule of law; and follow through on funding pledges with increased flexibility in allocating money for relief and reconstruction.25 Most of the recommendations had already formed major pillars of Administration policy on postTaliban Afghanistan, and these efforts accelerated after the release of the 9/11 report. Key milestones in the U.S. stabilization effort were the October 9, 2004 presidential election, in which interim leader Hamid Karzai was elected, and the September 18, 2005 elections for a 249 seat lower house of parliament, and subsequent selections to a 102-seat upper house. 22 23 See 108th Cong., H.R. 10, § 5042. Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. 24 For further information on U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: PostTaliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted). 25 See The 9/11 Commission Report, Section 12.2, Recommendation No. 3. Congressional Research Service 9 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status The Commission recommendation for increased NATO participation in Afghanistan peacekeeping has, by most accounts, been implemented. As of October 5, 2005, NATO now has overall control of peacekeeping operations throughout Afghanistan, including the volatile and violent south and east of the country. NATO’s force in Afghanistan now numbers about 31,000, including about 11,250 U.S. forces. NATO countries run 13 of the 25 total “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs)—regional civilian-military enclaves intended to promote security and reconstruction. The United States, Afghanistan, and the international community have also had significant success over the past few years in disarming regional militiamen—a “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR), run jointly by the United Nations, Japan, and the United States, resulted in the disarmament of 63,000 private militiamen by the June 2005 close-out of the program, according to U.S. and U.N. officials. A follow-on program, called Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) is currently in the process of attempting to disband several hundred illegal militia groups around Afghanistan, although progress is said to be slow. Counter-narcotics programs, on the other hand, have not been as successful. U.N. officials estimate that a record opium poppy crop was produced in Afghanistan during the 2005-2006 season that supplied 92% of the world’s illicit opium and reversed a slight reduction that occurred from 2004-2005. U.S., Afghan, and international officials have cited the cultivation and trafficking as a serious strategic threat to U.S.-led efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan. Congressional Responses The 108th and 109th Congresses have acted to implement at least some of the Commission’s recommendations. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) contained a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandated the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan in order to streamline and instill greater flexibility and inter-agency cooperation in the administration of U.S. programs in Afghanistan. The subtitle also required additional Administration reports to Congress on progress in reconstruction. In addition, the subtitle contained “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid disarmament of private militias; expansion of the NATO-led peacekeeping force; and new initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking. The subtitle did not specify dollar amounts for U.S. aid to Afghanistan for FY2005 and FY2006, authorizing instead “such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006.” In appropriations legislation, the 108th and 109th Congresses have sought to address the need for reconstruction funds. For FY2005, a total of $4.3 billion was appropriated for programs in Afghanistan, from a regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) and a supplemental (P.L. 109-13). Of those funds, about $1.6 billion was earmarked to equip and train the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Policy (ANP). Slightly less was appropriated for FY2006—a total of about $3.05 billion in a regular appropriation (P.L. 109-102) and a supplemental (P.L. 109-234). The FY2006 funds include a total of about $2 billion to train and equip the ANA and the ANP. As noted above, building up the ANA is a key recommendation of the September 11 Commission so that the central government can extend its writ and services throughout Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service 10 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Future Considerations For FY2007, some funding for Afghanistan awaits congressional action. The Administration requested $1.1 billion for civilian reconstruction programs, including counter-narcotics, and congressional action on these funds has not been completed to date, although both House and Senate versions fund roughly the total amounts requested. The FY2007 Defense appropriation (P.L. 109-289) provides $1.5 billion to train and equip the ANA and ANP and provides $100 million for Defense Department counter-narcotics support activities for Afghanistan. Some experts believe that the upsurge in Taliban opposition violence during 2006 is a product of popular frustration at the slow pace of reconstruction, particularly in southern Afghanistan, and several experts believe the remedy for this is accelerated reconstruction. Pakistan and Terrorism26 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes that the mounting of large-scale international terrorist attacks appears to require sanctuaries in which terrorist groups can plan and operate with impunity. In addition to identifying Pakistan as a principal transit country for the 9/11 hijackers and naming the western regions of the country as one of six “actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries” worldwide, the report warns that Pakistan’s “vast unpoliced regions” remain attractive to extremist groups. The first recommendation of the Commissioners is identification and prioritization of terrorist sanctuaries and the development of a realistic strategy for denying them to terrorists. In its country-specific discussion, The 9/11 Commission Report further claims that—even after acknowledging problems in U.S.-Pakistan relations and President Musharraf’s role in them— “Musharraf’s government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.” It recommends that the United States make a long-term commitment to provide comprehensive support for Islamabad so long as Pakistan itself is committed to combating extremism and to a policy of “enlightened moderation.” Specifically, the Commission urges sustaining U.S. assistance to Pakistan at “current scale” with programs that extend from military aid to support for better education.27 A November 2005 follow-on report by Commissioners gave a “C” grade to U.S. efforts to support Pakistan’s anti-extremism policies and warned that the country “remains a sanctuary and training ground for terrorists.” 26 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. See also CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, CRS Report RL32615, Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments, and CRS Report RS22009, Education Reform in Pakistan, all by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL32745, Pakistan’s Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options, by (name redacted), (name re dacted), and (name redacted). 27 See Sections 12.1 and 12.2 (p. 361-374) of The 9/11 Commission Report. The concept of “enlightened moderation,” as expounded by Musharraf himself, is a direct response to a growing world perception that Islam is linked to fundamentalism, and thus to extremism, and thus to terrorism. It is a strategy meant to both shun the militancy that is rooted in “political injustice, denial, and deprivation,” and to bring “socioeconomic uplift” in the Muslim world. Musharraf has called upon Muslims to “adopt a path of moderation and a conciliatory approach to fight the common belief that Islam is a religion of militancy in conflict with modernization, democracy, and secularism” (Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” Washington Post, June 1, 2004). Congressional Research Service 11 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status The issue of a long-term U.S. commitment to supporting Pakistan is key for many analysts, as past experiences have engendered Pakistani skepticism regarding the strategic (as opposed to tactical) reliability of the United States as an ally. Many Bush Administration officials, Members of Congress, and independent analysts remain concerned about the continued existence in Pakistan of terrorist groups and their supporters, evidence that Pakistan has been the source of significant “onward” proliferation of nuclear weapons materials and technologies to third parties, and continuing human rights abuses, including perceived nondemocratic practices, by the military-dominated government in Islamabad. Congressional Responses In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), the 108th Congress broadly endorsed the Pakistan-specific 9/11 Commission recommendations. Section 7103 of the bill, entitled “United States Commitment to the Future of Pakistan,” called for U.S. aid to Pakistan to be sustained at a minimum of FY2005 levels and required the President to report to Congress a description of a long-term U.S. strategy to engage with and support Pakistan. It further extended the President’s authority to waive coup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2006, allowing continued U.S. military and economic assistance to Pakistan despite the 1999 overthrow of an elected government in Islamabad. Foreign Assistance In June 2003, President Bush vowed to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan. Annual installments of $600 million each began in FY2005 and are split evenly between military and economic aid. The Foreign Operations FY2005 Appropriations bill (P.L. 108-447) established a new base program of $300 million for military assistance for Pakistan. When additional funds for development assistance, law enforcement, and other programs are included, the aid allocation for FY2005 was about $688 million. Significant increases in economic support, along with relief funding in response to Pakistan’s devastating October 2005 earthquake, may bring the FY2006 total to around $874 million. The Bush Administration’s FY2007 request calls for another $739 million in aid to Pakistan, although the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 109-486) recommended reducing that amount by $150 million (ostensibly for domestic budgetary reasons unrelated to Pakistan-U.S. relations). In S.Rept. 109-277, the Senate Appropriations Committee called for redirecting some of the requested FY2007 U.S. economic aid to Pakistan toward development and democracy promotion programs there (House and Senate committees have issued separate concerns about “the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan”). In the five years since September 2001, Pakistan has received nearly $1.5 billion in direct U.S. security-related assistance (Foreign Military Financing totaling $970 million plus about $516 million for other programs). Congress has taken no action to block major U.S. arms sales to Pakistan during this period, including the multi-billion dollar sale of F-16 combat aircraft currently in process.28 Programs overseen by USAID in Pakistan include those aimed at 28 Other major government-to-government arms sales and grants in recent years have included C-130 military transport aircraft, P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters, F-16 combat aircraft, surveillance radars, air traffic control systems, military radio systems, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Phalanx guns, and TOW anti-armor missiles. Other pending sales include Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and self-propelled howitzers. Congressional Research Service 12 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status strengthening that country’s democratic institutions and civil society, reforming the education sector, alleviating poverty, improving health, and bolstering macroeconomic stability while stimulating economic growth. Such efforts have been funded with some $2 billion since September 2001 (Economic Support Funds of nearly $1.7 billion plus $288 million for other programs). Congress also has eased Islamabad’s foreign debt burden by authorizing Pakistan to use $388 million in economic support to cancel about $1.5 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. Coalition Support Funds In addition to the foreign assistance discussed above, Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Islamabad for its support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations (Pakistan has since 2002 been undertaking military operations along its border with Afghanistan). As of December 2006, a total of $6.65 billion had been appropriated for FY2002-FY2007 Defense Department spending for coalition support payments to “Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations.” Pentagon documents indicate that disbursements to Islamabad—averaging about $66 million per month—account for the majority of these funds. This amount is roughly equal to one-fifth of Pakistan’s total military expenditures. The Defense Department Appropriations Act, 2007 (P.L. 109-289) allows that up to $900 million in Pentagon funds be used for FY2007 reimbursements. Saudi Arabia and Terrorism29 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The September 11, 2001 attacks kindled criticism within the United States of alleged official Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups. Some critics believe that Saudi domestic and foreign policies have created a climate that may have contributed to terrorist acts by Islamic radicals. Critics, for example, have cited reports that the Saudi government permitted or encouraged fund raising by allegedly charitable institutions with links to Al-Qaeda. Saudi leaders maintain that they are working to suppress terrorism, which they say is aimed even more at the Saudi regime than at the United States. The U.S. State Department acknowledges a more proactive Saudi stance against terrorist groups since terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2003. In its July 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission described Saudi Arabia as having been “a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.” The report took note of long-standing cooperative relations between the U.S. and Saudi governments and acknowledged the integral role of charitable donations in the Islamic religion. At the same time, the report noted a lack of oversight mechanisms to monitor charitable spending in Saudi Arabia, misunderstandings between the United States and Saudi Arabia at the popular level, and recent reform measures adopted by the Saudi Government. In its recommendations, the Commission states that the United States and Saudi Arabia must confront openly the problems in their relationship and “determine if they can build a relationship that both sides are prepared to publicly defend—a relationship about 29 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle East Affairs, and (name redacted), Analyst in Middle East Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 13 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status more than oil.” The report went on to urge a “shared commitment” to political and economic reform” in Saudi Arabia and a “shared interest in greater tolerance and cultural respect,” as a means of fighting violent extremists.30 In late 2005, U.S. and Saudi officials initiated a “strategic dialogue” to expand cooperation in six key areas: counterterrorism, military affairs, energy, business, education and human development, and consular affairs. Congressional Responses Provisions Enacted Relevant sections of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108458) capture many of the concerns reflected in the 9/11 Commission report regarding Saudi Arabia. Section 7105(a) contains findings which review problems in the bilateral relationship but note improvements in counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries since mid-2003. Section 7105(b) expresses the sense of Congress that “there should be a more robust dialogue between the people and Government of the United States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia.” Section 7120(b) required the President to submit to Congress within 180 days a strategy for collaboration with Saudi Arabia, as part of a larger report on U.S. government activities to implement the provisions of this act. The strategy paper was to include steps to institutionalize U.S.-Saudi relationships, intelligence and security cooperation, ways to increase Saudi contributions to peace and stability in the Middle East, political and economic reform, ways to promote tolerance and diversity in Saudi Arabia, and ways to diminish support from Saudi sources to extremist groups. The Administration transmitted the classified report to designated congressional committees on September 7, 2005.31 Though not directly addressed as an issue in the 9/11 Commission Report, some Members of Congress have criticized the U.S. military assistance program of $20-25,000 per year under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program because of what they perceive to be the failure of Saudi authorities to suppress terrorist activity and incitement. House amendments to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts for FY2005 (incorporated as Division D of the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 108-447, December 8, 2004) and FY2006 [P.L. 109-102] banned U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia. However, Senate versions of both bills did not include such bans, and presidential national security waiver authority was included in the final versions of both pieces of legislation. President Bush exercised his waiver authority in FY2005, but did not issue a waiver for FY2006 funds because, according to State Department officials, FY2006 funds appropriated for use in Saudi Arabia were not obligated. On June 9, 2006, the House adopted H.Amdt. 997 to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2007 (H.R. 5522) by 312-97 (Roll no. 244); the amendment prohibits U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia and contains no presidential waiver provision. H.R. 5522 passed the House on June 9; the Senate has not passed its version as of November 20. 30 For additional information, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations and CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues, both by (name redacted). 31 House Committee on International Relations, Survey of Activities, Week of September 6, 2005: Letter Transmitting Report—September 7, 2005, CLASSIFIED, Department of State, pursuant to Sec. 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-458); Ex. Comm. 3684. Congressional Research Service 14 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Related Options Also Considered Congressional concerns continue during the 109th Congress over the role of Saudi Arabia in the war against terrorism, with particular emphasis on encouraging Saudi leaders to heighten their efforts against terrorist financing. H.R. 2037/S. 1171, the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005, is similar to the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act proposed but not enacted in the 108th Congress (H.R. 3643/S. 1888). Like the earlier bills, the 109th proposal would prohibit export or issuance of an export license to Saudi Arabia for any U.S. defense articles or defense services on the U.S. munitions list or dual use items and would restrict travel of Saudi diplomats in the United States. S. 12, the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, introduced on January 24, 2005, contains sections on Saudi Arabia including: • A statement of U.S. policy to work with the Saudi government to curtail terrorist financing through a variety of methods. • Findings that Saudi Arabia has an uneven record in fighting terrorism, especially with regard to terrorist financing, support for radical madrasas (schools), and lack of political outlets for its citizens; and that the Saudi government must undertake political and economic reforms. • A requirement for the President to submit a report to designated congressional committees containing a long-term strategy for U.S.-Saudi engagement and for effective prevention of terrorist financing.32 H.R. 2037, S. 1171, and S. 12 remained in committee and had not passed as of November 30, 2006. Terrorism: Its Global Dimensions33 (Denying Sanctuary and Building a Coalition) Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission Report emphasizes the global nature of the terrorist threat. It is portrayed as a threat that is motivated by religion. It is a threat consisting of a stateless network of terrorists. This threat with global dimensions is also characterized as a radical ideological movement in the Islamic world, inspired in part by al Qaeda. The Commission advocates attacking terrorist organizations as a strategy and tactic for responding to the threat. It recommends that the United States identify and prioritize terrorist sanctuaries, working with allies, and developing a realistic strategy to keep terrorists insecure and on the run. As specific examples, it refers to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia, but also identifies broader regions: the Arabian Peninsula; Horn of Africa; Southeast Asia; West Africa; and European cities. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the Bush Administration in September 2006, places strong emphasis on closing down terrorist sanctuaries. 32 Section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)—required the President to submit a strategy as part of a larger reporting requirement within 180 rather than 90 days, as explained above. 33 Prepared by Raphael Perl, Specialist in International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 15 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status A second Commission recommendation relating to the global dimensions of terrorism centers on turning a national strategy into a coalition strategy. To this end, the Commission recommends that the United States engage other nations in developing a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. Included here are joint strategies for targeting terrorist travel and a common strategy to deal with sanctuaries. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, released by the Bush Administration in September 2006, also places strong emphasis on promoting international cooperation in the global fight against terrorism. Congressional Responses Legislation Enacted Many congressional decisions related to measures designed to respond to the global terrorist threat are expected to be manifested through the appropriations process. Title VII, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, section 7102, mirrors Commission recommendations by expressing a Sense of the Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to identify terrorist sanctuaries, work with allies, and develop a strategy to prevent terrorists from using foreign countries as sanctuaries. It also requires a report from the President to Congress on terrorist sanctuaries and what is being done to eliminate them. H.R. 4942, (109th Congress, Second Session), the Promoting Antiterrorism Capabilities through International Cooperation Act, would establish an office within DHS to promote international anti-terrorism cooperation. Policy Concerns Not Addressed or Postponed The issue of creating a coalition is arguably, a matter best suited for diplomats and not legislators. Notwithstanding, an office within DHS charged with promoting anti-terror cooperation could arguably do much to enhance such cooperation. However, the need for such cooperation, as envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, goes well beyond the jurisdictional domain of DHS. In this regard, creation of a joint congressional/executive branch commission to look at the overall issue of promoting international anti-terror cooperation—similar in structure to the National Commission on terrorism may warrant consideration. Arguably also, physical sanctuaries are declining in overall importance to terrorist groups which are becoming increasingly decentralized both geographically and in terms of organizational hierarchy. This might warrant congressional consideration of the pro’s and con’s of including the issue of use by terrorists of virtual sanctuaries in any required reports to Congress on the issue of terrorist sanctuaries. Congressional Research Service 16 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Islam and U.S. Policy34 Commission Concerns and Recommendations Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many experts have stated that the fight against terrorism cannot be won using force alone; it must be accompanied by long term policies that address development and reform issues in Arab and Muslim-majority countries and by a sophisticated public diplomacy effort that seeks to counter anti-American views commonly found in these countries. The 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations on tempering extremism in the Middle East and elsewhere echoed these sentiments. According to the report, “A comprehensive U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future.” The 9/11 Commission Report also stressed that while U.S. public diplomacy, trade and cultural exchange, and international assistance programs are necessary, ultimately, it is our policies in the region that fuel anger and resentment. According to the report, “Right or wrong, it is simply a fact that American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American actions in Iraq are dominant staples of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim world.” Increasingly, public debate over how best to win the “struggle of ideas” in the Arab and Muslim world has shifted away from the “means” (policy instruments) and toward the “ends” (overall direction of U.S. policy). Critics charge that U.S. efforts to highlight its outreach and assistance to Muslim societies has been overtaken by the negative Arab and Muslim reaction to alleged human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay. Furthermore, many Arabs and Muslims feel that the United States continues to place its strategic regional interests above those of human rights and democracy by insufficiently protesting alleged abuses committed by friendly regional governments under the guise of the war on terror. Congressional Responses Due to the complexity and broad scope of directives laid out by the 9/11 Commission Report, it has been difficult for the U.S. government, including Congress, to address all of the various policy problems and solutions to the challenge of Islamic extremism. P.L. 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, is one piece of legislation that addresses many of the 9/11 Commission Reports recommendations. However, P.L. 108-458 only authorized the expansion of existing programs; it did not appropriate new funds. For example, P.L. 108-458 authorized the following steps to expand U.S. public diplomacy efforts with the Muslim world and promote reform and democracy throughout the “broader Middle East:” • 34 (section 7112) authorized a substantial expansion of U.S. exchange, scholarship, and library programs that benefit people in the Muslim world. Prepared by (name redacted), Middle East Policy Analyst, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 17 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status • (section 7112) authorized the creation of a pilot program to make grants to United States-sponsored elementary and secondary schools in countries with predominantly Muslim populations for the purpose of providing full or partial merit-based scholarships to students from lower-income and middle-income families of such countries to attend such schools. • (section 7113) authorized the establishment of an International Youth Opportunity Fund to provide financial assistance for the improvement of public education in the Middle East and other countries of strategic interest with predominantly Muslim populations. • (section 7115) authorized the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), an economic assistance program designed to promote reform and democracy in the Arab world. MEPI, which Congress had not previously authorized, has received $284 million since its creation in FY2002. For fiscal years 2005-2006 and possibly for fiscal year 2007, Congress has used the appropriations process to expand funding for various government sponsored activities such as cultural exchange, democracy promotion in the Arab world, international broadcasting in Arabic and Farsi, and development assistance for education and health. H.R. 5522, the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (passed the House but not the Senate), provides $75 million for MEPI, of which $9 million is for scholarship programs for students from countries with significant Muslim populations at not-for-profit institutions of basic and higher education in the Middle East. H.R. 5522 also recommends $20 million for the promotion of democracy in countries located outside the Middle East region with significant Muslim populations, such as Indonesia. The Senate version of H.R. 5522 also recommends $750,000 for the Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue, an organization whose mission is to provide a forum for ongoing interaction and dialogue between citizens of the United States and Muslim-majority countries on key issues of mutual concern. Policy Concerns Not Addressed Radical Islam in Europe Some critics assert that although poverty-reduction measures and the promotion of liberal reforms are desperately needed in many Arab and Muslim-majority countries, they are not a panacea and that many international terrorists, including some of Al Qaeda’s top planners, were Westerneducated and middle class residents of European countries. Some terrorism experts suggest that fundamentalist ideologies enjoy the most receptivity among Arab and Muslim migrant communities in Western countries, which face psychological dislocation and alienation in a new and unfamiliar environment.35 35 For more information, see CRS Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, coordinated by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 18 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Islam in Politics By calling for political reform and liberalization in the Muslim world, policymakers run the risk of empowering religious opposition parties that may seek to permanently enshrine Islamic religious law in a country’s political and social system. Critics of U.S. foreign policy to combat extremism argue that based on their experience with Iran during its 1979 revolution and the subsequent influence of Islamist militant groups elsewhere in the region, the United States and other Western powers are wary of Islamist groups taking power (as Hamas did in 2006) and that Western support for secular autocratic regimes further enhances the credibility of opposition Islamist groups and some radical organizations. Political conditions vary across the Middle East and some Islamic groups are more moderate than others. Terrorism: U.S. Policy Instruments36 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The report of the 9/11 Commission underlined the importance for the United States of using the full range of policy instruments at its disposal to attack terrorists and their organizations and prevent the continued growth of Islamic terrorism. These policy instruments include not only intelligence, law enforcement, military force (treated elsewhere), but also diplomacy, bilateral support and economic assistance to front-line and failing states, support for democracy and good governance, international education and exchanges, and public diplomacy to engage the struggle of ideas and define and defend U.S. ideals and values (see below). The Commission called on the United States to offer an example of moral leadership in the world, commit to treating people humanely, abide by the rule of law, and be generous and caring to its neighbors. It argued that the United States must stand for a better future in countries whose governments are repressive, even if they are friendly towards the United States. Congressional Responses The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) addressed a number of themes in the 9/11 Commission Report. In Sec. 7101, Congress found that long-term success in the war on terrorism would require the use of all elements of national power, in addition to military action, intelligence, covert operations, law enforcement, and homeland defense, also including economic policy, foreign aid, and public diplomacy. The Act stated that the United States must give economic and diplomatic instruments as high a priority as military capabilities. This implied the need for increased funding for foreign affairs programs. In Sec. 7115, it was the sense of Congress that U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage development, open societies, and opportunities for people. The Act further states that U.S. policy should include lowering of trade barriers for poor countries, as well as promote economic reform and rule of law, especially in Muslim countries. 36 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 19 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status More concrete Congressional action related to these recommendations was not contained in P.L. 108-458. The Administration’s and Congress’ response to these recommendations was reflected to some degree in subsequent foreign relations authorizations and the FY2006 and FY2007 State Department and Foreign Operations Appropriations legislation. While the FY2007 appropriations have not yet been enacted, both the President’s request and the relevant bills in the House and Senate reflect some of the priorities contained in the recommendations. Funding for diplomacy and foreign aid have been more closely tied to strategic requirements of the war on terrorism. Foreign aid to the “front-line states” in the war has been increased. More generally, economic assistance has been directed to reducing poverty, creating jobs, and improving education as an antidote to terrorist recruitment in impoverished areas. Resources have also been increased for improving America’s image through public diplomacy and international broadcasting, as well as for cultural and educational exchange programs. In the FY2007 appropriations the Administration has requested funding to implement its “transformational diplomacy” and “transformational development” initiatives, aimed at revamping U.S. diplomacy and foreign aid policy for the 21st Century. Public Diplomacy, Education and Exchange Programs37 Commission Concerns and Recommendations Noting that terrorism is a result of resentment by some Muslims because of American engagement in the Muslim world, the 9/11 Commission asserted that public diplomacy is a key tool in the war on terrorism in helping to change attitudes about America. The Commission recommended that the United States, through the use of public diplomacy, convey respect for human dignity, assist in providing education for their children, and offer hope for economic opportunity. The Commission recommended that America more aggressively promote its values and advertise the aid given by the citizens of the United States. The Commission specifically recommended increasing funding for such public diplomacy activities as international broadcasting, exchanges, and overseas library programs, targeting these activities toward the youth. Congressional Response The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) contained several measures intended to increase U.S. government public diplomacy activities as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. Sense of Congress provisions affirmed that the U.S. government should offer an example of values and respect for human dignity and should work with other governments to provide human dignity, economic opportunity, and tolerance. Furthermore, the United States should promote the ideas of individual freedom, educational opportunity, political participation and tolerance for opposing points of view. 37 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy and Trade, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 20 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Other provisions: • stated that it is United States policy to promote free media and journalistic integrity overseas through public diplomacy programs and required establishing a media network with grants provided to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and authorizes such sums as may be necessary to establish the media network. • required the Secretary of State to make public diplomacy an integral component in U.S. foreign policy and coordinate public diplomacy activities with all agencies as well as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. • urged the Secretary of State to recruit, hire, train and promote Foreign Service Officers with an emphasis on public diplomacy and foreign languages of Muslim populations. • declared that the President and Secretary of State should use the weight of the United States to promote public diplomacy in multilateral organizations and shall provide public diplomacy training for Foreign and Civil Service personnel who represent the United States in multilateral organizations. For the Consolidated Appropriations Act of FY2005 (P.L. 108-447), conferees noted that alarming public opinion polls and media content continue to reveal profound anti-American sentiments and direct the Department of State to submit reports outlining the criteria for measuring performance of expanded public diplomacy efforts. This Act expanded funding for international information programs, cultural exchanges and international broadcasting, particularly in Muslim populations. The 109th Congress made some gains in meeting the public diplomacy recommendations of the 9/11 Commission largely through the appropriations process. The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation, FY2006 (P.L. 109-102) established a new account entitled Democracy Fund. This account is intended to increase effectiveness and oversight of programs that promote democracy, governance, human rights, independent media, and the rule of law globally. Within this new account amounting to $95 million for FY2006 is additional funding for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), as well as other programs and countries. Within the State Department appropriation for FY2006 (P.L. 109-108) Congress increased funding for already-established public diplomacy programs, including educational and cultural exchanges, international broadcasting, and regular appropriations for the NED. Additional funding for public diplomacy programs, specifically U.S. broadcasting into Iran, was included in the FY2006 supplemental (P.L. 109-234). The 109th Congress also considered, but did not pass, Foreign Relations Authorization legislation (H.R. 2601/S. 600) which included measures to authorize grants be extended to the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN), subject to specified limitations and restrictions, such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) taking full responsibility for the direction taken by the MBN. Congressional Research Service 21 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Terrorist Financing38 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9-11 Commission report) sought to refocus the policy debate concerning terrorist financing. The Commission recommended that the Bush Administration shift its focus from seizing terrorist funds to tracking terrorist financial networks in order to gain actionable counter-terrorism intelligence. 39 The Commission also emphasized terrorist organizations’ increasing shift to informal methods of money transfer such as hawala or hundi.40 These recommendation have led to an ongoing discussion over the sources and methods used to collect financial intelligence. For example, Congress has investigated efforts by the Department of the Treasury to track international transfers of funds to and from terrorists by accessing information held by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).41 SWIFT is a Brussels-based entity that serves as a major hub for international communications among banks and other financial institutions. Given the experience of the five years since 9/11, legislators and executive branch officials have determined that combating terrorist financing requires effective coordination of many different federal government activities including intelligence gathering, financial regulation, law enforcement, and building international coalitions. Improving the interagency coordination of U.S. counter-terrorist financing efforts remains one of the largest challenges for the U.S. government. According to a 2006 Government Accountability Office report, “the U.S. government lacks an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance to countries it deems vulnerable to terrorist financing.”42 The report recommends, among other things, that the Secretaries of State and the Treasury implement an integrated strategic plan and a Memorandum of Agreement for the delivery of training and technical assistance. In an effort to focus U.S. counter-terrorist financing efforts, in March 2004, the Department of the Treasury created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). TFI was designed to integrate several offices within Treasury: the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime (TF/FC), the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), and the Treasury Executive 38 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in International Trade and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade. According to Commission Chairman Thomas Kean, “Right now we have been spending a lot of energy in the government trying to dry up sources of funding ... , obviously if you can dry up money, you dry it up, but we believe one thing we didn’t do effectively is follow the money. That’s what we have to do.” Quoted in Laura Sullivan, “U.S. Split on Tracing, Freezing Terror Funds,” Baltimore Sun, Aug. 2, 2004. 40 See Nikos Passos, “Hawala and Other Informal Value Transfer Systems: How to Regulate Them?” available at http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/ Hawala_and_Other_Informal_Value_Transfer_Systems_How_to_Regulate_Them.html 41 CRS Report RS22469, Treasury’s Terrorist Finance Program’s Access to Information Held by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 42 Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad, United States Government Accountability Office, October 2005, GAO 06-19. 39 Congressional Research Service 22 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Office for Asset Forfeiture (TEOAF). In addition to an Under Secretary, four new senior level positions were created: Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Terrorist Financing and Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Intelligence and Analysis. Congressional Responses Several sections of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) address terrorist financing. The Act made technical corrections to the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) (Sec. 6202); authorized the Treasury to produce currency, postage stamps, and other security documents for foreign governments subject to certain conditions (Sec. 6301); and reauthorized funds for the biannual money laundering and financial crimes strategy report, the most recent of which was released in 2003 (Sec. 6102).43 As of November 2006, the expected 2005 national money laundering and financial crimes strategy report has not been released. The Act authorized funding to improve FinCEN (Sec. 6101). The Act authorized $19 million for improvements related to FinCEN’s telecommunications and analytic capacity and authorized $16.5 million for the development of FinCEN’s Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Direct program. In June 2004, Treasury established the BSA Direct Retrieval and Sharing program (BSA R&S). This program was designed to make it easier for law enforcement to access and analyze BSA data and to improve overall data management. Treasury had trouble implementing the BSA R&S program due to problems with its main contractor, Electronic Data Systems. On July 13, 2006, FinCEN halted the program. 44 Robert Werner, FinCEN Director, testified on September 12, 2006 that FinCEN is initiating a “re-planning effort” for the retrieval and sharing component of BSA Direct. No expected completion date has been announced. 45 The Act required the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations requiring selected financial institutions to report to FinCEN certain cross-border electronic transmittals of funds (wire-transfers) (Sec. 6302). New regulations must be promulgated by December 2007. Treasury is currently determining the feasibility and impact of these additional reporting requirements.46 The Act required the President to submit to Congress a report evaluating and making recommendations on: (1) the effectiveness of efforts and methods to track terrorist financing; (2) ways to improve governmental cooperation; (3) ways to improve the performance of financial institutions; (4) the adequacy of agency coordination and ways to improve that coordination; and (5) recommendations for changes in law and additional resources required to improve this effort (Section 6303). This report was due in September 2005 and has not yet been submitted to Congress.47 43 “2003 National Money Laundering Strategy Report,” Department of the Treasury, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/publications/ml2003.pdf. 44 FinCEN Halts BSA Direct Retrieval and Sharing Project, Treasury Press Release, July 13, 2006, available at http://www.fincen.gov/bsa_direct_nr.html. 45 Statement of Robert W. Werner, Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network United States Department Of The Treasury before The Senate Banking Committee, September 12, 2006, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ releases/hp101.htm. 46 FinCEN seeks industry input on feasibility of collection of cross-border wire transfer data, Treasury Press Release, March 10, 2006, available at http://www.fincen.gov/fincennewsrelease03102006.html. 47 Phone discussion with Treasury Legislative Affairs, November 29, 2006. Congressional Research Service 23 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status The Act requires the Secretary of the Treasury to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to combat terrorist financing and to testify before Congress on the status of implementation of international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards by the IMF and other multilateral agencies (Sec. 7703). The IMF is actively involved in establishing anti-money laundering standards and continues to review the anti-money laundering frameworks of IMF member countries.48 The Secretary of the Treasury is also required to continue to convene the interagency United States Government Financial Action Task Force (FATF) working group to review and develop U.S. and international anti-money laundering standards (Sec. 7704).49 The U.S. government is actively involved in FATF operations and has promoted the adoption of international anti-terrorist financing best practices through engagement with and support of a number of FATF-style regional bodies, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) FATF. In March 2006, the Treasury Department established a U.S.-MENA Private Sector Dialogue. A similar dialogue with the Latin American financial community is underway and Treasury is planning to hold an antimoney laundering conference in Latin America in early 2007.50 U.S. Military Forces and the War on Terrorism51 Commission Concerns and Recommendations Recommendation 32 of the 9/11 Commission Report states that “the lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department. There it should be consolidated with the capabilities for training, direction, and execution of such operations already being developed in the Special Operations Command.” (Page 415). The 9-11 Commission’s apparent concern appeared to be both performance and cost-based. The report states that the CIA did not sufficiently invest in developing a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel prior to 9/11, and instead relied on improperly trained proxies (foreign personnel under contract) resulting in an unsatisfactory outcome. The report also states that the United States does not have the money or people to build “two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations,” and suggests that we should “concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities in one entity.” 48 “IMF Executive Board Reviews the Quality and Consistency of Assessment Reports for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism and the Effectiveness of Coordination,” International Monetary Fund Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 06/72. 49 The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. For more information on the Financial Action Task Force, see Financial Action Task Force Annual Report 2005-2006,available at http://www.fatfgafi.org/dataoecd/38/56/37041969.pdf and CRS Report RS21904, The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview, by (name redacted). 50 Testimony of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, September 12, 2006, available at http://banking.senate.gov/_files/glaser.pdf. 51 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service 24 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Congressional Responses Relevant Provisions Enacted by Congress Section 1013 of P.L. 108-458 requires the National Intelligence Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to develop joint procedures to improve the coordination and deconfliction in the planning, execution, and sustainment of operations involving DOD and the CIA. It also requires information exchange between the Secretary of Defense and Director CIA, so that senior operational officials have knowledge of the existence of all ongoing operations. When appropriate, it requires mutual agreement on tactical and strategic objectives. Policy Concerns Not Addressed P.L. 108-458 did not address the recommended shift of responsibility for paramilitary operations from the CIA to DOD. Some speculated that this particular issue was too complex and contentious to be included in intelligence reform legislation and that it required further study and analysis. Others suggested that there was no need to shift responsibilities, only to improve coordination and planning between the CIA and DOD which Section 1013 addresses. Options Considered by the 109th Congress The 109th Congress did not address this issue legislatively. On November 23, 2004, President Bush issued a letter requiring the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence to review matters relating to Recommendation 32 and submit their advice to him by February 23, 2005. This review directed the examination of all aspects including legal, funding, operational, and supporting infrastructure. A preliminary Pentagon study reportedly concluded that DOD should not take over the paramilitary responsibility from the CIA. 52 In unclassified testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in February 2005, the Director of the CIA testified that the CIA and DOD disagreed with the 9-11 Committee’s recommendation. 53 In June of 2005 it was reported that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency responded to the President, stating that “neither the CIA nor DOD endorses the commission’s recommendation on shifting the paramilitary mission or operations.”54 The Administration apparently accepted DOD’s and the CIA’s recommendation and reportedly rejected the 9-11 Commission’s recommendation to shift the responsibility for paramilitary operations to DOD. 55 52 Ann Scott Tyson, “Study Urges CIA Not to Cede Paramilitary Functions to Pentagon,” Washington Post, Feb. 5, 2005, p. 8. 53 Transcripts, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subject: National Security Threats to the United States, Federal New Service, February 16, 2005, p. 29. 54 John J. Lumpkin, “Rumsfeld, Goss Oppose DOD Assumption of CIA Paramilitary Covert Operations,” Army Times, June 29, 2005. 55 Douglas Jehl, “White House is Said to Reject Panel’s Call for a Greater Pentagon Role in Covert Operations,” New York Times, June 28, 2005. Congressional Research Service 25 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Weapons of Mass Destruction: Proliferation Security and Threat Reduction56 Commission Concerns and Recommendations In view of intelligence assessments that al-Qaeda has been seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction for several years, the 9/11 Commission concluded that WMD nonproliferation efforts should be expanded and provided additional resources. Specifically, the Commission recommended: (1) the development of an international legal regime “with universal jurisdiction” to interdict, capture, and prosecute those trafficking in WMD and related technology; (2) the expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to include Russia, China, and all NATO countries; (3) the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and the provision of additional financial resources. Congressional Responses There has been no congressional initiative regarding the establishment of an international WMD anti-smuggling regime, aside from the continued full funding of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).57 The Administration has secured the passage of United Nations Resolution 1540 which requires member states to criminalize proliferation, establish export controls over WMDrelated technology, and secure WMD-related materiel. The resolution does not provide for enforcement, nor address the establishment of any international anti-smuggling regime. Members of the 109th Congress introduced several bills and resolutions that called for strengthening and expanding the PSI: S.Con.Res. 36, H.Con.Res. 133, S.Con.Res. 40, H.R. 422, H.R. 665, H.R. 5017/S. 3456, and S. 2566. None, however, was brought to the floor of either chamber. Geographic expansion remains a key issue—particularly how to engage China and India, as well as states in important regions like the Arabian Peninsula. The 110th Congress may consider how intelligence resources are handled. Is intelligence sufficient and are there intelligence-sharing requirements with non-NATO allies? Also, how is PSI coordinated with other federal interdiction-related programs (e.g., export control assistance)? One potential complication for congressional oversight of PSI is the absence of a way to measure PSI’s success, relative to past efforts. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also known as Nunn-Lugar), which is administered by DOD’s Threat Reduction Agency, continues to receive congressional funding support. In the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-176, Sec. 1308), Congress authorized the Bush Administration to spend $50 million of unobligated funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in states outside the former Soviet Union. As of 56 Prepared by (name redacted) and (name redacted), Specialists in National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. 57 The PSI is an agreement among some nations to cooperate in the detection and interdiction of illicit WMD-related materiel shipments. Currently, sixteen nations are PSI participants. See also CRS Report RS21881, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 26 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status September 2006, the Administration had spent such funds only in Albania ($38.5 million) for the purpose of eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. The 109th Congress considered the following legislation that could restrict the provision of CTR assistance to some countries. The State Department’s annual foreign operations appropriations bill, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, includes provisions that prohibit assistance to certain countries. Section 507 of the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill (P.L. 109-102) states that no funds will be “obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance or reparations to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran, or Syria.” The FY2007 bill passed in the House (H.R. 5522) and awaiting passage in the Senate includes the same provision. The Iran Freedom Support Act, introduced in both the House and the Senate (H.R. 282/S. 333), could make supplying CTR assistance to Iran more difficult. The IranLibya Sanction Act (P.L. 104-172) has been extended through September 2011, pursuant to the Iran Freedom Support Act (P.L. 109-293). Sudan has been severely limited from receiving U.S. assistance since 1997 by a combination of executive order and U.S. law. These include Executive Order 13067, Section 520 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102), the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-497) and The Sudan Peace Act (P.L. 107-245). The 109th also considered legislation that could affect third party states, or any state that could potentially receive CTR assistance, to the extent such states are considered for these initiatives. For example, Section 542 of the FY2006 foreign operations bill (P.L. 109-102) prohibited assistance to countries that provide lethal military equipment to State Sponsors of Terrorism. Other examples include P.L. 109-267 which extended the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments Act (P.L. 109112), which added Syria to that Act, and the North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (S. 3728), which added North Korea to the Iran—Syria Nonproliferation Act.58 Border Security and Immigration59 Terrorist Travel Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission issued several recommendations that directly pertain to immigration law and policy. These recommendations focused primarily on targeting terrorist travel through an intelligence and security strategy based on reliable identification systems and effective, integrated information-sharing, including the expansion and consolidation of the border-screening systems. More specifically, the 9/11 Commission concluded that targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money, and recommended that the United States combine intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility. 58 See also, CRS Report RL32359, Globalizing Cooperative Threat Reduction: A Survey of Options, by (name redacted). 59 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Immigration Policy, Domestic Social Policy Division. Congressional Research Service 27 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Congressional Response60 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (ITRPA) of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) included several provisions aimed at targeting terrorist travel. The Act calls for the accelerated deployment of the biometric entry and exit system to process or contain certain data on aliens and their physical characteristics (see discussion below).61 It required an in-person consular interview of most applicants for nonimmigrant visas between the ages of 14 and 79, and also required an alien applying for a nonimmigrant visa to completely and accurately respond to any request for information contained in his or her application.62 The Act also expanded the pre-inspection program that places U.S. immigration inspectors at foreign airports, increasing the number of foreign airports where travelers would be pre-inspected before departure to the United States. Moreover, it required individuals entering the United States (including U.S. citizens and visitors from Canada and other Western Hemisphere countries) to bear a passport or other documents sufficient to denote citizenship and identity. The Act required improvements in technology and training to assist consular and immigration officers in detecting and combating terrorist travel. It (1) established the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, which included an interagency program devoted to countering terrorist travel; (2) required the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center, to establish a program to oversee DHS’s responsibilities with respect to terrorist travel; and (3) established a Visa and Passport Security Program within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the Department of State. In the 109th Congress, the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, Division B), among other things, required DHS to: conduct a study on U.S. border security vulnerabilities; establish a pilot program to test ground surveillance technologies on the northern and southern borders to enhance U.S. border security; and implement a plan to improve communications systems and informationsharing between federal, state, local, and tribal agencies on matters relating to border security. DHS was also required to submit reports to Congress regarding its implementation of these requirements. 63 The Secure Fence Act (P.L. 109-367) required DHS to deploy double-layer fencing to 850 miles of the U.S. international border with Mexico. 64 60 For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32616, 9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S. Immigration Law and Policy in the 108th Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 61 For background and analysis, see CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, by Lisa M. Seghetti and (name redacted). 62 For background and analysis, see CRS Report RL31512, Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation, by (name redacted). 63 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33125, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 109th Congress, by (name redacted) et al. For a legal analysis of the REAL ID Act, see CRS Report RL32754,Immigration: Analysis of the Major Provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted). 64 For more information on border fencing, see CRS Report RL33659, Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border, by (name redacted), Yule Kim, and (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 28 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Terrorist Screening and Watch Lists65 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission concluded that the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community missed several vital opportunities to watch-list and screen several conspirators involved in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.66 In addition, the Commission recommended that U.S. border security systems be integrated with other systems to expand the network of screening points to include the nation’s transportation system and access to vital facilities.67 Despite problems with high-profile misidentifications,68 the Commission also recommended that the controversial “No-Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists maintained by the DHS’s Transportation Security Administration be improved without delay.69 Congressional Response In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Congress included several watch list related airline passenger prescreening provisions that require that airline passengers, among others, be prescreened against the consolidated terrorist watch list database. Another provision requires the Administration to report to Congress on (1) the criteria used to place persons on terrorism-related watch lists, and (2) the privacy and civil liberty implications of the further use of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists. These and other aviation security provisions are described below under “Transportation Security.” Related Administrative Response Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6),70 the Bush Administration elevated and expanded terrorist identification and watch-list functions by establishing a consolidated terrorist watch list database.71 Undergirding these screening processes is a consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which under HSPD-6 has been established and maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)—a multi-agency effort administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Among other things, the TSC provides support to: 65 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Domestic Security, Domestic Social Policy Division. 66 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Three 9/11 Hijackers: Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking,” Staff Statement no. 2, (Washington, 2004), p. 1. 67 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 387. 68 Sara Kehaulani Goo, “Committee Chairman Runs Into Watch-List Problem: Name Similarity Led to Questioning at Anchorage and Seattle Airports, Alaska Congressman Says,” Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2004, p. A17, and “Hundreds Report Watch-List Trials: Some Ended Hassles at Airports by Making Slight Change to Name,” Washington Post, Aug. 21, 2004, p. A08. 69 According to the FBI, the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists have been consolidated in the TSDB and the lookout records on those lists are being expanded and improved. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division, “Terrorist Screening Center Consolidates Data for Law Enforcement Needs,” The CJIS LINK, vol. 7, No. 4, October 2004, pp. 1-2. 70 The TSC was established under HSPD-6. See, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Washington, Sept. 16, 2003). Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html. 71 For further information, see CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 29 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status • the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs by issuing terrorism-related security advisory opinions for visa issuance purposes; • the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Customs and Border Protection in evaluating potential matches between terrorist lookout records and persons entering the United States at international ports of entry; and • nearly 750,000 state and local law enforcement officers to whom limited TSDB lookout records have been made available through the National Crime Information Center. In April 2006, the DHS Privacy Office issued a report assessing the impact of the “No Fly” and “Automatic Selectee” lists on privacy and civil liberties.72 The report cited concerns about the quality of the information of those lists, as well as the underlying intelligence.73 The report also noted allegations about profiling on the basis of race, religion, or national origin, but reported that it could not substantiate those allegations.74 In regard to the criteria used to place individuals on terrorist watch lists, it is unknown whether the Administration reported to Congress on this matter. Nevertheless, the Privacy Office report stressed that those criteria could not be made public without: (1) comprising intelligence and security, or (2) allowing persons wishing to avoid detection to subvert those lists.75 In addition, in late September 2006, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report on efforts to reduce the adverse effects of terrorist watch list screening, outlining measures that DHS and the TSC had taken to reduce and alleviate misidentifications. 76 It also noted that while the total number of misidentifications is unknown, their frequency, which is estimated to be in the tens-of-thousands, remains a serious concern.77 72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, DHS Privacy Office Report on Assessing the Impact of the Automatic Selectee and No Fly Lists on Privacy and Civil Liberties as Required Under Section 4012(b) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, April 27, 2006, 22 pp. 73 Ibid., p. 8. 74 Ibid., p. 9. 75 Ibid. 76 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Terrorism Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO-06-1031, Sept. 2006, p. 55. 77 Ibid., p. 12. Congressional Research Service 30 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status Biometric Screening System and Data Systems Integration78 Commission Concerns and Recommendations The 9/11 Commission called for the expeditious implementation of “a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a single system for speeding qualified travelers.” With respects to biometrics, the 9/11 Commission noted the following: “Biometrics have been introduced into an antiquated computer environment” and that “replacement of these systems and improved biometric systems will be required.” The 9/11 Commission also recommended the integration of the various border screening systems with the US-VISIT system, including frequent traveler programs such as NEXUS and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspections (SENTRI).79 Congressional Responses80 In an effort to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). Previously, Congress passed legislation that mandated DHS to implement entry and exit controls and integrate immigration-related databases and data systems. Congress first mandated that the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implement an automated entry and exit data system that would track the arrival and departure of every alien in §110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208).81 Several provisions in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (Border Security Act; P.L. 107-173) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, however, required the immediate implementation of an automated entry and exit data system and called for enhancements in its development, including a requirement that biometric identifiers be used in all visas and other travel documents and that the entry and exit data system be interoperable with other law enforcement and national security databases. Congress, however, first required the entry and exit data system be interoperable with other law enforcement systems in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (PATR [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33742. Public record. Not legal advice.