# Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): Background and Issues for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33698 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** January 29, 2007 - **Citation:** RL33698 ## Text ȱ ŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱ‘ŽȱŽŽ›Š•ȱŸ’Š’˜—ȱ –’—’œ›Š’˜—ȱǻǼDZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱ Š—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Š›ȱ•’Šœǰȱ˜˜›’—Š˜›ȱ ™ŽŒ’Š•’œȱ’—ȱŸ’Š’˜—ȱ˜•’Œ¢ȱ Š—žŠ›¢ȱŘşǰȱŘŖŖŝȱ ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȬśŝŖŖȱ ǯŒ›œǯ˜Ÿȱ řřŜşŞȱ ȱŽ™˜›ȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœ Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ž––Š›¢ȱ Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and other aviation programs is likely to be a high priority in the 110th Congress. Funding authorizations for aviation programs, as well as authorization of existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end of FY2007. Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the ability of the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing operational costs and planned infrastructure improvements. One particularly controversial alternative under consideration is a user fee system, which is supported by the airlines but strongly opposed by many other system users. Faced with growing operational costs and fiscal needs to support system expansion, airport capital improvements, and modernization efforts, options to control costs within the FAA and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) may be a particular focus of reauthorization. Cost control options generally revolve around two overarching strategies: consolidation of facilities and functions, and competitive sourcing. Some have recommended that a formal process, similar to the military’s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, be implemented to assess how the FAA could best consolidate its functions to control costs and address future system needs. Besides controlling costs, options to maintain and balance air traffic controller staffing levels are likely to be of particular interest, as the FAA is facing a large wave of controller retirements over the next five years. Options for improving and streamlining training, increasing productivity, better balancing staffing needs, and perhaps consolidating air traffic facilities over the long-term may be considered during reauthorization. Congress may examine a variety of aviation safety issues during debate over FAA reauthorization. Options for preventing runway overruns and for reducing the risk of runway collisions may be of particular interest. The adequacy of FAA safety oversight has been a continuing concern, and recent accidents may draw particular attention to oversight of contract repair facilities, smaller passenger service operators, as well as air charter and air tour operators. Other safety issues that may arise include longstanding concerns, such as mitigating the risks of fuel tank explosions, addressing concerns over aging aircraft, and addressing the unique safety issues affecting all-cargo operations. Issues regarding airliner cabin health and safety may also be considered. Options to mitigate the spread of infectious diseases among aircraft occupants and the safety-of-flight implications of cell phones and portable electronic devices may also be examined. Growing interest in alternatives to petroleum fuel may generate some debate over alternative fuel technologies for aircraft and airport ground vehicles, and growing international pressures to regulate aircraft emissions may prompt debate on aviation’s environmental impacts. Longstanding aircraft noise policies may also be examined to assess whether quiet aircraft technologies and policy changes could further mitigate the community impacts of aircraft noise. This report will be updated. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ˜—Ž—œȱ Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1 FAA Budget and Finance Issues................................................................................................ 1 Airport Development and Finance Issues ................................................................................. 2 Cost Control Issues ................................................................................................................... 3 System Demand and Capacity Issues........................................................................................ 5 System Modernization Issues.................................................................................................... 6 Safety Issues.............................................................................................................................. 7 Airliner Cabin Issues................................................................................................................. 8 Energy, Environment, and Noise Issues.................................................................................... 9 International Civil Aviation Issues ............................................................................................ 9 FAA Budget and Financing Issues................................................................................................. 10 FAA Spending ......................................................................................................................... 10 Airport and Airway Trust Fund Issues .....................................................................................11 Aviation Trust Fund Revenue Adequacy ...........................................................................11 Tax and Fee Structural Issues............................................................................................ 14 The General Fund Share ................................................................................................... 16 Aviation Spending Guarantees.......................................................................................... 17 Airport Development and Finance ................................................................................................ 19 Airport Capital Needs Estimates ............................................................................................. 20 Airport Improvement Program (AIP)...................................................................................... 21 AIP Funding Distribution.................................................................................................. 22 Apportionment and Eligibility Changes ........................................................................... 23 Discretionary Fund Set-Asides ......................................................................................... 23 Minimum Discretionary Fund........................................................................................... 23 Grant Assurances .............................................................................................................. 24 Airport Noise Issues.......................................................................................................... 24 Federal Share .................................................................................................................... 24 Privatization ...................................................................................................................... 25 Partial Defederalization .................................................................................................... 25 Airport Security Project Eligibility................................................................................... 25 Very Light Jets (VLJs) and the Airbus A380: Impact on AIP ........................................... 25 Earmarking/ “Place Naming” ........................................................................................... 26 Passenger Facility Charge Issues ............................................................................................ 26 Airport Bonding Issues ........................................................................................................... 26 Options to Control Operational Costs at the FAA ......................................................................... 27 Consolidation of Facilities and Functions............................................................................... 27 Competitive Sourcing and Privatization of Functions ............................................................ 29 The Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program.................................................................... 30 Automated Flight Service Station Contracts..................................................................... 32 Aeronautical Charting....................................................................................................... 33 FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure .......................................................................... 34 The Use of Designees ....................................................................................................... 35 Air Traffic Controller Staffing ................................................................................................ 36 FAA Labor Relations and Negotiations................................................................................... 38 Future Airport and Airspace Demand and Capacity Needs ........................................................... 41 Quantifying Delay and Mitigating Its Impacts........................................................................ 41 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ The Asymmetry of Capacity Straining Operations ................................................................. 43 Accommodating Future Airspace Users.................................................................................. 44 Very Light Jets .................................................................................................................. 44 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles................................................................................................ 46 Options for Maintaining Access and Controlling Demand at Capacity-Constrained Airports ................................................................................................................................ 47 Non-price De-peaking Strategies and Incentives.............................................................. 49 Slots and Quotas ............................................................................................................... 50 Providing Air Service to Small Communities ......................................................................... 51 The Essential Air Service Program ................................................................................... 51 Small Community Air Service Development Program..................................................... 53 Fostering Investment and Development of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS)........................................................................................................................ 53 NGATS Funding Requirements .............................................................................................. 53 Management of the NGATS Development Effort................................................................... 57 The Role of the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) .......................................... 57 Technological Objectives and Core Technologies .................................................................. 60 The Present-Day Airspace System and Its Technologies .................................................. 61 Precision Navigation......................................................................................................... 62 Shared Situation Awareness and Distributed, Adaptive Decision Making.............................. 65 Phasing Out Legacy Systems .................................................................................................. 67 Wake Vortex Detection, Prediction, and Avoidance................................................................ 69 Improving Aviation Safety ............................................................................................................ 70 Preventing Runway Overrun Accidents .................................................................................. 71 Preventing Runway Incursions and Collisions........................................................................ 73 Improving Oversight Of Maintenance Facilities..................................................................... 76 Improving Oversight of Charter and Air Tour Operators........................................................ 78 Mitigating the Risk of Fuel Tank Explosions on Commercial Airliners ................................. 79 Addressing Aging Aircraft Issues............................................................................................ 81 Addressing the Safety of All-Cargo Operations...................................................................... 84 Aircraft Cabin Occupant Safety, Comfort, and Public Health....................................................... 87 Cabin Air Quality .................................................................................................................... 87 Preventing the Spread of Infectious Disease in the Aircraft Cabin......................................... 88 Cell Phones and Portable Electronic Devices ......................................................................... 89 Infant and Toddler Seats.......................................................................................................... 90 Energy and Environmental Considerations ................................................................................... 91 Alternative Fuels for Aircraft .................................................................................................. 92 Alternative Fuels for Airport Ground Service Vehicles .......................................................... 93 Air Pollution............................................................................................................................ 93 Ozone Nonattainment Areas ............................................................................................. 93 Aircraft and Climate Change ............................................................................................ 95 Mitigating Aircraft Noise Through Policy and Technology.................................................... 95 Aircraft Noise Reduction Technologies and Technology Policy ...................................... 96 Airport Noise Mitigation Policy ....................................................................................... 97 International Civil Aviation Issues .............................................................................................. 102 “Open Skies” Agreements..................................................................................................... 103 Foreign Ownership and Control............................................................................................ 103 Cabotage................................................................................................................................ 105 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ’ž›Žœȱ Figure 1. AIP Authorizations and Obligations ($ millions) ........................................................... 22 Figure 2. FAA Projections of Controller Attrition, Planned Hiring Rates, and Anticipated Controller Staffing Levels .......................................................................................................... 37 Figure 3. Causes of Air Carrier Flight Delays (2003-2005) .......................................................... 42 Figure 4. Continuum of Government Involvement in Market-Based Strategies to Alleviate Aviation Congestion.................................................................................................... 48 Figure 5. Preliminary Estimates of Increased F&E Funding Needs to Support NGATS Development .............................................................................................................................. 55 Š‹•Žœȱ Table 1. FAA Major Program Funding: AIR-21 and Vision 100: FY2001 - FY2006 ................... 10 Table 2. Airport And Airway Trust Fund: Revenue Flow and Balances, FY1997-FY2006 .......... 12 Table 3. Authorized, Appropriated Funding Levels and Analysis of Future Funding Needs for FAA Programs ........................................................................................................... 56 ™™Ž—’¡Žœȱ Appendix. Glossary of Key Aviation Technology Terms and Concepts...................................... 106 ˜—ŠŒœȱ Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................ 108 CRS Aviation Policy Staff ........................................................................................................... 108 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ ŸŽ›Ÿ’Ž ȱ ŗ The pending debate over reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is likely to be a high priority in the 110th Congress. Funding authorizations for aviation programs set forth in Vision 100—the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176, hereafter referred to as Vision 100), as well as authorization of the existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund, are set to expire at the end of FY2007. CRS has identified nine broad categories of issues that Congress may address in the context of FAA reauthorization. These include FAA budgeting and finance; airport development and finance; FAA cost control measures; system-wide demand and capacity issues; modernization of national airspace system (NAS) infrastructure; aviation safety; airliner cabin issues; energy, environment, and noise issues; and international civil aviation issues. ȱžŽȱŠ—ȱ’—Š—ŒŽȱ œœžŽœȱ Authorization of the existing aviation tax structure that provides revenue for the aviation trust fund will expire at the end of FY2007. While such tax authorizations have expired in the past, the current deliberations over FAA funding are considered particularly critical. This, in part, is because uncommitted balances in the airport and airways trust fund (AATF), commonly referred to as the aviation trust fund, have declined in recent years, leaving a relatively small reserve to pay for aviation programs in the event that tax collection authorities are allowed to expire. Also, major initiatives to develop and deploy the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) by 2025, initiated during the last reauthorization process, are reaching a stage where they will require additional funding resources if these plans are to be realized. While no official projections are yet available on the total cost for NGATS, early estimates indicate that it will require an average of $200 million to $1 billion annually in facilities and equipment costs over the next several years to keep NGATS development initiatives on track. Congress may consider a variety of financing options to maintain the ability of the aviation trust fund to provide a sufficient revenue stream for ongoing operational costs and planned infrastructure improvements, in the near-term and to support the long-term NGATS development efforts. In the course of this debate, Congress may consider the appropriate cost allocation between aviation system users, the share of the cost burden to be borne by the aviation trust fund, and the share to be derived from Treasury general funds (the so-called public interest contribution). The relative tax burden placed on various industry participants has been a source of controversy for over 36 years, since the aviation trust fund was created. The airlines argue that they have been paying a disproportionately larger share of the system costs compared to general aviation users since the largest revenue sources for the aviation trust fund are derived from passenger ticket taxes. The airlines claim that in their highly competitive industry, they must absorb some of the tax-related costs in their fare pricing schemes. The airlines have identified general aviation2 users, and business jet operators in particular, as a segment of the aviation economy that, in their opinion, is not paying its fair share of the costs to maintain and improve the national airspace 1 2 See Appendix for a glossary of key aviation technology terms and concepts. General aviation refers to all aviation activity except for commercial airline, all-cargo airline, and military operations. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ system (NAS). General aviation users argue, on the other hand, that the NAS has largely been developed to support the airline industry, that the incremental costs to accommodate general aviation users is not that large, and that existing fuel taxes are sufficient to compensate for their impact on the system. One alternative to the existing tax structure supported by the airlines is a fee-for-service system that would be more of a direct user fee system than what is in place now. Some industry observers claim that the FAA has been mulling the idea of a direct user fee structure to replace existing aviation taxes and fees, and an administration proposal has reportedly been under review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for some time.3 While the details of the proposal are unknown, speculation is that it will conform more closely to international standards that stipulate user fees be computed as some function of the specific impact on air traffic facilities and services, such as the commonly used fees based on aircraft weight and distance flown used by many nations. During the reauthorization debate, Congress may consider a variety of aviation trust fund revenue alternatives that may include keeping the existing passenger ticket and fuel taxes largely or completely intact, moving to a tax revenue scheme based solely on fuel taxes, adopting a user feebased system, or developing a hybrid scheme that consists of some combination of these alternatives. One hybrid approach that has been discussed is to charge user fees for airlines and operators of larger general aviation aircraft, while small general aviation users would continue to contribute solely by means of a fuel tax, although these fuel tax rates and structure could differ from what currently exists. ’›™˜›ȱŽŸŽ•˜™–Ž—ȱŠ—ȱ’—Š—ŒŽȱ œœžŽœȱ The Airport Improvement Program (AIP) provides federal grants for airport development. Its funding is derived from the airport and airways trust fund, and it is one of five major sources of funding for airport development and improvement. Airports also fund capital projects using taxexempt bonds, passenger facility charges (PFCs; a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and airport revenue. The preeminent reauthorization issue for AIP is whether its funding levels will be increased substantially, held steady/increased modestly, or reduced. The outlook for AIP funding will be influenced by the resolution of the debate concerning taxes and fees supporting the aviation trust fund as well as any decision concerning the scope of the general fund share of the FAA budget. A failure to secure more revenue for the FAA budget, in light of the recent decline in the uncommitted balance of the trust fund, could constrain any attempts to increase the AIP budget. During the reauthorization process, Congress may also examine a wide variety of other issues pertaining to the AIP program including airport eligibility and apportionments among various sizes of airports; discretionary funding levels and uses of discretionary grants; the scope of grant assurances to protect federal interests in airport projects; funding levels set aside for noise-related projects; the appropriate federal share of funding for airport projects at airports of various sizes; possible expansion of or modification to the airport privatization pilot program; partial defederalization of airport funding allowing airports to use PFCs instead of AIP as a primary or sole source for project funds; limitations on the use of AIP funds for airport security projects; the 3 Paul Lowe, “Alphabet Groups Ready To Wage User-Fee Battle,” Aviation International News, The Convention News Co., Inc., Midland Park, NJ, April, 2006. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ possible impacts of accommodating new users classes such as very light jets (VLJs) and the Airbus A380 super-jumbo jet on airport infrastructure needs and airport financing; and the use of earmarks or “place naming” in legislation regarding airport infrastructure projects. In addition to AIP funding and related issues, Congress may consider options to raise the cap on PFC levels to provide additional funding availability outside of AIP, and options to make airport bonds more attractive to investors, although some may argue the latter may be more appropriately addressed through tax reform legislation rather than FAA reauthorization. ˜œȱ˜—›˜•ȱ œœžŽœȱ Besides consideration of a revenue system for funding the aviation trust fund, controlling the costs of operating and maintaining the existing national airspace system has been an ongoing concern for the FAA and for congressional oversight. Cost control measures may be a particular issue of interest during the FAA reauthorization debate as Congress grapples with the prospect of escalating operational costs that must be balanced with the fiscal needs to support planned infrastructure development, both over the near-term to fund ongoing and planned system expansion and over the long-term to support the NGATS development. Outsourcing has been seen as a viable alternative for controlling costs in some instances, such as the FAA’s federal contract tower (FCT) program and the recently privatized automated flight service stations (AFSSs). Expanded outsourcing of various FAA functions, such as further expansion of the contract tower program and privatization of the FAA’s aeronautical charting functions, are possible options that both the FAA and Congress may examine. Also, the FAA and Congress may look to increase the use of designees4 to carry out certain aviation oversight functions. However, some critics argue that these outsourcing options are likely to yield relatively small cost savings in comparison to the overall FAA operations budget. Further, these options are likely to be highly contentious and face strong opposition from labor organizations. Whether these outsourcing measures potentially compromise safety in any way remains a specific point of contention. While some have advocated large scale privatization of air traffic services—as has been done in Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and parts of mainland Europe—this approach would be highly complex to carry out, and this option has failed to garner much support in Congress. The current administration has indicated previously that is has no plans to privatize en route and terminal air traffic control facilities, but may opt to expand the contract tower program. Consolidation of facilities and functions has also been viewed as a possible way to control operational costs at the FAA. The FAA is currently in the process of consolidating administration and support functions in its regional service areas, and has plans to consolidate weather services provided at en route centers. Also, under the privatized AFSS program, an extensive consolidation of flight service facilities is currently in process. Some have proposed that the FAA implement a systematic process, perhaps using something akin to the military’s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, to address future consolidation plans for facilities and functions. Congress may debate the merits of this proposal during the pending FAA reauthorization. 4 Designees are individuals that are neither government employees nor government contractors, that are authorized or designated by the FAA to carry out regulatory functions. Examples include designated medical examiners that issue medical certification, pilot examiners that issue pilot certificates and ratings, and manufacturing representatives that certify the airworthiness of production aircraft. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ řȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ In the long term, under NGATS, consolidation of air traffic services and air traffic facilities may be possible. With increased reliance on automation and by increasing the autonomy, flexibility, and authority granted to individual flights operating in the national airspace system (NAS), the ratio of air traffic controllers to aircraft operating in the system is likely to drop. In the near term, this will likely be offset by the growth in air traffic operations, so that a modest increase in the overall number of air traffic controllers is expected. In the long-term, however, the changing nature of controller responsibilities and functions may result in a need for fewer controllers, and may allow for considerable consolidation in air traffic control facilities across the United States. The FAA has also expressed interest in consolidation of air traffic facilities as a possible means to address ongoing staffing issues, particularly among en route centers, where there is a shortage of fully qualified controllers to handle the most complex airspace sectors. The FAA believes that facilities consolidation could help in its efforts to better match controller skills and levels of experience with airspace complexity and provide controllers with better job advancement opportunities while, at the same time, reducing infrastructure and relocation costs. With regard to controlling operational costs, air traffic controller pay remains a contentious issue as controller compensation and benefits make up a sizable proportion of the FAA’s operational costs, comprising roughly 35% of total operating costs.5 Under a 1998 contract agreement between the FAA and controllers, controller compensation and benefits grew about 64% in eight years,6 outpacing the increase in labor costs for other FAA employees and federal workers. During contract renegotiations in 2005 and 2006, the FAA looked to obtain sizable concessions from controllers, but the two sides could not come to agreement. As called for in statute, the impasse was referred to Congress. However, Congress did not act on the impasse submittal, thus allowing the FAA to implement its final contract proposal, which became effective in September 2006. While the law giving the FAA authority to negotiate compensation and benefits in labor contracts, a rarity in the government sector, was enacted largely for the purpose of improving the FAA’s ability to attract and retain a high quality professional workforce, it has been criticized by management for leading to escalating operating costs and by both management and labor for straining relations between the two sides. While the main objectives of the law, to improve the recruitment and retention of high quality employees, is laudable, Congress may wish to examine whether options to improve the law are available to control escalating operational costs and maintain more positive and constructive management-labor relations within the FAA. With regard to labor negotiations, one legislative option offered during the 109th Congress proposed to add an additional phase, requiring management and labor to enter into binding arbitration, after the period of congressional review that follows an impasse in the contract negotiation process.7 While Congress did not take up formal debate on this proposal in the midst of the recent FAA/controller labor dispute, this proposal may resurface during debate over FAA reauthorization. Other options to streamline the labor negotiations process within FAA may also be considered in the context of FAA reauthorization, as recent labor negotiations were rather disruptive and highly contentious. Controller staffing is also likely to be a key focus in the reauthorization debate, as the FAA seeks to effectively manage its controller workforce in preparation for an expected surge in retirements 5 CRS calculation based on FAA budget documents and statements regarding average air traffic controller workforce compensation and benefits. 6 “Soaring Controller Pay Looms Large in Discussions on ATC.” Air Transport World Daily News, May 16, 2005. 7 See, e.g., see S. 2201 and H.R. 4755, which were introduced during the 109th Congress. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Śȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ over the next several years. Some available options that Congress may consider include dedicated funding authorizations marked for new controller hiring and training; authorization for new hires from accredited collegiate air traffic programs to enter directly into on-the-job training; funding authorization for initiatives to enhance controller training using advanced simulation technologies; and consolidation of certain air traffic facilities and functions to provide for greater flexibility in meeting staffing needs. ¢œŽ–ȱŽ–Š—ȱŠ—ȱŠ™ŠŒ’¢ȱ œœžŽœȱ The current FAA reauthorization cycle comes at a critical time with respect to addressing increasing capacity needs at high-volume airports, in airspace around many major metropolitan areas, and along certain highly congested routes. While recent stopgap measures implemented by the FAA have served to stave off unacceptable congestion and delays thus far, long-term solutions are likely needed in consideration of future air traffic growth projections. Many believe that technology is needed to reduce low visibility aircraft spacing standards to those allowable in good visibility in order to accommodate projected future growth at busy airports. However, some experts caution that even with the implementation of these proposed options and the completion of planned airport expansions across the country, certain very busy airports, including both major commercial airports and busy general aviation reliever airports, may experience peak hour demand levels that exceed airport capacity limitations. Besides addressing expected capacity needs, a significant challenge facing Congress and the FAA in the years ahead is accommodating new classes of airspace users in a manner that optimizes safety and efficiency for all users. New users will consist of the very big, such as the Airbus A380 super-jumbo jet, as well as the very small, very light jets (VLJs). The most talked-about class of new system users are the VLJs, which are expected to begin operations in small numbers in 2007 and are projected to experience rapid growth over the next ten years. VLJs are seen by some as a possible solution to provide small communities improved access to the national air transportation system. Therefore, their introduction may spur renewed public policy debate over approaches to enhance air transportation in small communities. Also, because these VLJs will share high altitude airspace and congested airspace around major metropolitan areas with commercial passenger jets, their impact on system capacity and air traffic control workload is likely to be of particular interest. Besides VLJs, the introduction of pilotless Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs), also poses significant challenges to maintaining safety and not impeding access to airspace for other users such as small general aviation aircraft. Due to persisting capacity limitations in certain locations, the FAA and Congress may be faced with difficult choices regarding how best to maintain access and address demand in an equitable manner at capacity constrained airports. Vision 100 provided the FAA with limited authority to implement negotiated scheduling among air carriers at a few capacity-constrained airports on a trial basis. This approach, along with other options such as peak-period pricing, slots, and quota systems have all been examined as possible options. The FAA’s approach to addressing capacity constraints at New York’s LaGuardia Airport is likely to be an issue of particular interest during the debate over reauthorization as the statutorily imposed slot system for LaGuardia expired in January 2007. While capacity constraints are posing challenges at major metropolitan airports, several trends, including the continuing loss of commercial air carrier service in rural America, are making the essential air service (EAS) air carrier subsidy program more attractive to many rural ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ śȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ communities. However, even with increased funding for this program in recent years, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the EAS program to generate additional air service. Against this backdrop the EAS program faces a number of issues that are likely to be addressed in forthcoming reauthorization legislation. Primary among these is how to prioritize access to the program so that EAS funds are used in the most efficient manner possible. It is likely, however, that without a significant increase in funding, additional limitations on the use of EAS program funding may have to be considered. In addition to the EAS program, the Small Community Air Service Development (SCASD) Program was established to develop solutions for improving air carrier service to communities that are experiencing insufficient access to the national air transportation system. While an initial review of the program found mixed results, it has been noted that it is still too early in the program’s history to fully assess its potential effectiveness. ¢œŽ–ȱ˜Ž›—’£Š’˜—ȱ œœžŽœȱ Present initiatives to modernize air traffic facilities and services have been channeled into a unified effort to develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) under a provision in Vision 100. Vision 100 created the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), a multi-agency entity headed by the FAA and charged with the task of conceptualizing and integrating the development of the NGATS. The DOT envisions NGATS as a system capable of tripling effective system capacity by 2025. By some estimates, air traffic levels throughout the United States could increase at that pace thereby necessitating these system enhancements. The specifics of these efforts and future funding and management challenges facing the JPDO and the FAA in carrying forth the plans to build the NGATS are likely to be a major focus during the current FAA reauthorization process. A significant issue facing Congress during the upcoming FAA reauthorization process is obtaining working estimates of what building the NGATS will cost. CRS analysis of available preliminary cost estimates indicates that the total cost to build the NGATS by 2025 is estimated to be between $69 billion and $76 billion, which is roughly $5 billion to $12 billion above baseline facilities and equipment (F&E) spending levels. Another significant issue that may be addressed during the reauthorization process is how to best manage the NGATS development effort. One major hurdle is that while the JPDO can set objectives, goals, and strategies for the NGATS framework, the funding stream for carrying out these plans will ultimately come from the budgets of the various agencies involved, primarily the FAA and NASA. In recognition of this, Congress may examine options to align budget elements of the various agencies involved within the NGATS framework. Another potential issue is the appropriate scope of the JPDO’s efforts. While some consideration of various ancillary functions and issues—such as security and environmental impacts—may improve the overall system design for the NGATS, too much emphasis on these various issues could impede progress on the central issue of improving the efficiency and capacity of the air traffic system. Besides the scope of the JPDO’s efforts, another issue of interest is the JPDO’s approach. Some observers contend that the JPDO has remained too focused on policy and establishing a paradigm for collaboration among agencies and stakeholders, and it has not yet translated these general objectives into a cohesive blueprint, with a high degree of engineering specification regarding timelines and contingencies among the various component elements of the NGATS. One possible option being discussed for streamlining NGATS system development is the use of an overarching lead systems integration (LSI) contract for overseeing the NGATS project. While many questions still remain regarding the management approach to developing NGATS, there is a growing consensus among experts in the field regarding the technological objectives ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Ŝȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ and likely technologies that will comprise the core functionality of the NGATS system. The core technologies needed to meet these objectives include (1) precision navigation capabilities to pinpoint aircraft locations, project flight paths or flight trajectories, and predict future aircraft positions with a high degree of accuracy; and (2) highly integrated information networks to enable a shared situation awareness regarding traffic, weather, airport conditions, and other factors affecting flights and provide tools to facilitate distributed, adaptive decision-making and information-sharing about operational changes, such as flight path deviations and their potential impacts on other system users. The investment strategy for these technologies that is adopted and carried forth over the next three to five years is likely to have a lasting impact on both the endstate of NGATS and the path to reaching that end state. In addition to deciding on a technology investment and deployment strategy for the NGATS, a challenging and potentially contentious issue is the phasing out of existing facilities and equipment for air traffic communications, navigation, and surveillance. Phasing out of existing systems must be addressed carefully because, on the one hand, maintaining legacy systems while deploying new technologies can be costly and resource intensive. On the other hand, phasing these systems out too quickly could place an undue burden on system users to equip aircraft and could pose safety concerns if adequate backups and redundancies are not in place. Congress may express particular interest in the FAA’s efforts to assess how proposals envisioning new navigation and surveillance technologies will address the issue of providing equivalent safety to the current radar-based air traffic surveillance system. Congressional interest regarding the phaseout of legacy systems may also focus on how these plans may impact airspace system users, particularly smaller operators who may face a greater challenge in equipping aircraft to keep pace with the evolution from the existing national airspace system to NGATS compliant avionics and aircraft systems. While advances in precision navigation and information sharing show great promise for reducing aircraft spacing in all weather conditions thereby increasing system capacity, wake turbulence produced by large transport aircraft currently imposes practical limitations on aircraft spacing, even under ideal weather conditions. Current air traffic procedures specify separation standards for aircraft departing behind large and heavy jets to allow their wake vortices to dissipate. Some view these standards as overly conservative and argue that accurate wake vortex prediction capabilities could allow for decreased separation, thereby increasing airport capacity in many weather conditions. Others argue that the limited capability of available technology and the complexities of wake vortex propagation make it difficult to predict wake turbulence or to use such predictions to significantly reduce arrival and departure spacing without compromising safety. Vision 100 authorizes the expenditure of such sums as may be necessary for the development and assessment of wake vortex advisory systems. Promising emerging technology for wake turbulence detection may be able to increase effective landing capacity at airports, perhaps by as much as 20%, but is still at a very early stage of research and development. ŠŽ¢ȱ œœžŽœȱ Since the last reauthorization, major airlines have maintained an impressive safety record. Congressional oversight of FAA safety initiatives and programs has not been a major focus of Congress in several years, as concerns over aviation security since September 11, 2001 have been a much more dominant issue. However, there are many aspects of safety where there is still room for improvement in an industry that is, for the most part, very safe. One area of growing concern is the safety of the airport environment. Recent runway overrun accidents have highlighted ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŝȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ concern over the adequacy of runway safety areas and the level of attention the FAA has given to mitigating the risk of catastrophic runway overrun accidents. Also with regard to runway safety, the FAA has identified mitigating runway incursions, or potential ground collisions with departing or landing aircraft, as one of its highest priorities. However, the FAA’s approach to addressing this issue has been criticized by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and other aviation safety advocates who maintain that improving pilot situation awareness of the airport environment is a critical need for effectively mitigating runway incursions. A long-running safety concern is the adequacy of the FAA’s oversight of air carrier operations and maintenance. The growing trend of outsourcing maintenance to third party maintenance, repair, and overhaul facilities has raised questions over the adequacy of these facilities’ compliance with air carrier and FAA standards for work conditions and quality assurance. Particular concerns over repair facilities that service commuter aircraft, and work performed on air carrier aircraft by small repair shops that are not required to be certified by the FAA, are two particular issues where Congress may consider options to enhance regulatory requirements and FAA oversight of these maintenance activities. Another continuing safety concern that Congress may again examine during this reauthorization process is the continued airworthiness of aging aircraft, which was highlighted by the ongoing investigation of a commuter seaplane built in 1947 that crashed while departing Miami for the Bahamas on December 17, 2005. A particular issue of interest is the FAA’s approach to continued airworthiness and safety monitoring of the fleet of small commuter aircraft and the aging general aviation fleet, which are not covered under the aging aircraft inspections program established for large airliners. The 10-year anniversary of the crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 2006, has renewed interest in measures being taken to mitigate the risk of fuel tank explosions on large transport-category aircraft. While technological advances in fuel inerting systems have been made in recent years and the FAA has proposed fuel tank flammability reduction requirements for new and existing passenger airliners, critics have expressed frustration that steps to prevent another catastrophe attributable to a fuel tank explosion are moving too slowly, in their opinion.8 Congress may debate available alternatives to accelerate safety initiatives to reduce fuel tank flammability and, perhaps, options to mitigate the financial impact of complying with proposed aircraft modifications on air carriers. ’›•’—Ž›ȱŠ‹’—ȱ œœžŽœȱ Issues related to passenger safety, comfort, and public health in aircraft cabins have often been of interest in past FAA reauthorization processes, and may again generate considerable debate during the current reauthorization cycle. One particular concern is the potential for spread of a deadly infectious disease, such as a communicable strain of avian flu, among airline passengers. The risk of such a threat was highlighted a few years ago when the deadly Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus caused widespread concern over the public health risks posed by airline travel. Congress may debate whether more research is needed on methods to prevent the spread of infectious diseases in the aircraft cabin, and how to effectively deploy available methods to detect and mitigate the spread of disease among airline travelers. With 8 “10 Years After Flight 800, Just Hot Air,” Air Safety Week, 20(31), August 7, 2006. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Şȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ regard to cabin occupant safety, Congress may once again consider whether infants and toddlers under two years of age should be restrained in child seats on airline flights, or whether the current practice of allowing “lap children” should be continued. The FAA recently rescinded its plans to require child restraints for these children, as advocated by the NTSB, citing fears that families would opt to instead travel by car—an arguably riskier mode of travel—if faced with the prospect of paying for an additional ticket for their infant or toddler to fly. The NTSB maintains that the failure to restrain all aircraft occupants is an unsafe practice, and the FAA’s cross-modal safety comparisons detract from the central issue of whether such a practice should be allowed to continue. Also, with regard to issues of passenger comfort, safety, and convenience in the airliner cabin, the use of cell phones and portable electronic devices (PEDs) has been an issue of growing interest. Technological advances in wireless voice and data communications are far outpacing the FAA’s ability to study the safety implications of using these radio frequency (RF) emitting devices on board aircraft and make sound policy decisions regarding the in-flight use of these devices. While vendors are pushing for approval of onboard systems to make cell phone and wireless Internet access available in flight, researchers have expressed continuing concern that cell phones and other PEDs may interfere with aircraft instrumentation. During the current reauthorization debate, Congress may consider whether more focused research on this issue is needed to determine if, and under what circumstances, these devices can be used in flight without any foreseeable safety consequences. —Ž›¢ǰȱ—Ÿ’›˜—–Ž—ǰȱŠ—ȱ˜’œŽȱ œœžŽœȱ Issues related to energy and the environment may play a larger than usual role during the current reauthorization debate. Energy and fuel issues in particular have been part of the larger public policy debate in recent years, and may spur consideration of alternative fuels for aircraft and airport vehicles. Growing concerns over global warming and environmental impacts may also prompt debate over options for reducing aircraft emissions. Historically high fuel costs are driving much of the current push for more efficient aircraft, which also can be cleaner and quieter. However, Congress may debate available options to study alternative aircraft fuels, monitor international approaches to mitigating aircraft emissions and noise, sponsor research on aircraft emissions-reduction and quiet aircraft technologies, and provide incentives for manufacturers and operators to develop and utilize aircraft technologies that reduce dependence on fossil fuels and environmental impacts. —Ž›—Š’˜—Š•ȱ’Ÿ’•ȱŸ’Š’˜—ȱ œœžŽœȱ Although not technically within the jurisdiction of the FAA, there are at least three major international aviation issues, falling under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DOT), that may arise as Congress considers FAA reauthorization legislation. First, there is the potential that the “Open Skies” agreement with the European Union will remain unsigned and unimplemented, which is a major concern for many U.S. airlines seeking greater flexibility to operate flights in European markets. Second, is the closely related issue regarding DOT’s rulemaking on foreign ownership and control of domestic carriers. Although the administrative process has been completed, the DOT has not to date issued a final rule. The delay has been due in part to strong congressional opposition that has taken the form both of introduced legislation and attempts to prevent the final rule through appropriations riders. According to some commentators, as comprehensive as the proposed agreement appears to be, there cannot be ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ şȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ meaningful reform in the international aviation market until Congress repeals the so-called “citizenship test,” which limits foreign ownership and control of U.S. air carriers. Finally, there is the longstanding issue of cabotage, which is defined as the transportation of passengers or cargo by foreign air carriers from one point in the United States to another and is, with a couple of narrow exceptions, generally prohibited by U.S. law. A limited statutory exception to this prohibition, allowing international carriers to carry certain cargo shipments between airports within the United States and destinations in Alaska while en route to foreign destinations, was included in Vision 100. In light of these various ongoing international aviation issues, the FAA reauthorization process may provide Congress with a unique opportunity to legislate and play a major role with respect to these developments in international civil aviation. The following sections of this report provide an in-depth examination of the various issues that may be considered during congressional debate over reauthorization of the FAA. ȱžŽȱŠ—ȱ’—Š—Œ’—ȱ œœžŽœȱ ȱ™Ž—’—ȱ The aviation taxes and fees associated with funding the federal aviation system will expire at the end of FY2007, as will most federal aviation programs. The FAA and others have expressed concern that the existing funding system for aviation is inadequate to meet future needs. The FAA receives the majority of its funding from receipts to the airport and airway trust fund (aviation trust fund). It also receives an annual appropriation of Treasury general funds (GF) to pay for the remainder of its activities. The trust fund pays for all of the FAA’s airport improvement program (AIP), facilities and equipment (F&E) program, and research, engineering and development (RE&D) program. It also pays for much of the FAA’s operations and maintenance (O&M) program, which also receives general funds. As can be seen in Table 1, annual appropriations for the AIP program roughly followed the amounts authorized in the last two FAA reauthorization acts, AIR-21 (P.L. 106-181) and Vision 100, but appropriations for the other three programs have not. Funding for F&E tracked the authorization through FY2004, but has since been significantly below the authorized amount. Annual RE&D appropriations have been well below their authorized levels in each year. O&M appropriations have been higher than the amounts authorized in two years, below in the other four, but in only one instance, FY2003, did the program fail to grow on a year-over-year basis. . FAA Major Program Funding: AIR-21 and Vision 100: FY2001 - FY2006 Table 1 ($ in millions) AIP (TF) F&E (TF) RE&D (TF) authorized oblimit authorized appropriations authorized appropriations ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 3,200 3,193 2,657 2,651 237 187 3,300 3,475 2,914 3,021 249 245 3,400 3,378 2,981 2,942 —147 3,400 3,380 3,183 2,863 346 119 3,500 3,472 2,993 2,525 356 130 3,600 3,515 3,053 2,555 352 137 ŗŖȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ O&M (TF/GF) Total (TF/GF) authorized appropriations GF share oblimit & appropriations FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 6,592 6,603 2,198 12,634 6,886 7,077 1,104 13,818 7,357 7,023 3,248 13,490 7,591 7,479 3,010 13,843 7,732 7,707 2,828 13,858 7,889 8,104 2,619 14,311 Authorization amounts from AIR-21 and Vision 100 (AIR-21 did not include an RE&D authorization for FY2003). Appropriations information from FAA data. Note: TF = aviation trust fund, GF = Treasury General Funds Sources: As is discussed throughout this report, there are many in the aviation industry, and also within the FAA, who believe that significantly greater funding will be required in the years ahead for each of the four major FAA programs. These requests come against the backdrop of three years of FAA spending in which annual appropriations for the agency increased on a fairly modest basis. ’›™˜›ȱŠ—ȱ’› Š¢ȱ›žœȱž—ȱ œœžŽœȱ The forthcoming reauthorization debate is likely to focus on three major issues related to the trust fund. First is the question of whether the trust fund will provide sufficient revenue to meet the growing needs of the FAA’s activities and programs. Second is the long standing issue of whether the existing tax and fee system is the appropriate mechanism for producing trust fund revenues, or whether an entirely new revenue collection mechanism should be adopted. And third is the controversial issue of how much of FAA’s total funding should come from Treasury general funds (GF). Ÿ’Š’˜—ȱ›žœȱž—ȱŽŸŽ—žŽȱŽšžŠŒ¢ȱ There is considerable discussion over the question of trust fund revenue adequacy for the years ahead. Table 2 shows that total trust fund income rose dramatically in FY1998 following the last major reauthorization of trust fund directed taxes and fees by the Taxpayers Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34). Income increased even further in FY1999, declined somewhat in FY2000, and dropped precipitously after September 11th. As a result primarily, but not exclusively, of the post September 11th drop in airline activity, the revenue stream did not exceed the FY2001 level until FY2005, and was not expected to exceed the record FY1999 level until FY2006. Throughout this period FAA spending has not been reduced to accommodate the trust fund’s reduced income stream. Rather, FAA spending has continued apace, mostly by spending down the uncommitted balance of the trust fund, which stood at over $7.3 billion at the end of FY2001 and is expected to be down to around $1.2 billion by the end of FY2006.9 When the FAA began discussing reauthorization in 2005, the future of the aviation trust fund was listed as a key item for consideration.10 The FAA contends that something needs to be done to increase the trust fund income stream and to prevent further erosion in the uncommitted balance of the fund. For a number of reasons detailed at its reauthorization website, the FAA sees little 9 The FY2006 Treasury estimate excludes interest payments to the trust fund which could significantly raise this amount. 10 http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/trust_fund/media/Trust_Fund.pdf. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŗȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ prospect of a major increase in revenue from the trust fund’s existing tax and fee system. Instead, as will be discussed subsequently, the FAA seeks a reexamination of the tax and fee system with an eye toward a new system that more closely tracks actual aviation industry activity than the current system and in the process ensures that the trust fund will receive adequate revenues to finance future FAA aviation system needs. The FAA position is supported by the Department of Treasury estimates that suggest that annual revenue increases to the trust fund in the years ahead will be modest.11 Treasury forecasts that annual increases in trust fund revenue will increase by $766 million in FY2007 to $11.6 billion. Increases in future years will be between $710 million and $816 million annually, Treasury projects, leaving the trust fund with total annual revenues of $14.7 billion in FY2011. As will be discussed later in this report, in the section on Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) funding requirements, these levels of increase may be insufficient to fund the FAA’s already identified needs for the NGATS and other ongoing air navigation program upgrades, as well as expected increases in other necessary FAA program activities. . Airport And Airway Trust Fund: Revenue Flow and Balances, FY1997-FY2006 Table 2 ($ in millions) Fiscal Year Income 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006E Ticket Tax Flight Segment Fee Waybill Tax Fuel Tax Rural Airports Tax Frequent Flyer Tax International Arrival/Depart. Tax Tax Refunds Interest on Balance Offsetting Collections 3,389 — 5,455 547 5,941 1,339 5,103 1,655 4,805 1,556 4,726 1,532 4,223 1,783 4,556 1,800 5,044 2,042 5,395 2,193 331 128 — 313 659 48 412 1,009 57 500 887 86 493 769 82 474 789 80 422 711 67 499 712 71 567 977 76 599 1,091 80 — 141 149 159 150 148 147 145 159 163 194 948 1,484 1,349 1,336 1,282 1,331 1,391 1,651 1,798 (35) 481 — 543 — 698 — 805 — 882 — 860 — 591 — 477 — 423 — 450 20 42 32 144 76 178 97 36 152 152 Total Trust Fund (TF) Income $4,508 $8,696 $11,121 $10,688 $10,149 $10,069 $9,372 $9,687 $11,092 $11,921 Operations TF Share Appropriations. $1,700 $1,902 $4,112 $5,898 $4,405 $5,973 $3,775 $4,469 $4,879 $5,486 11 U.S. Department of the Treasury. Office of Tax Analysis. Airport and Airway Trust Fund: FY2007 Mid Session Review. Current Law Baseline. Summer 2006. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŘȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ Fiscal Year 1997 Total Trust ($5,758) ($5,914) ($8,089) ($9,198) ($9,601) ($11,909) ($9,618) ($10,415) ($11,092) ($11,921) Fund Cash Outlays End of Year $6,422 (EOY) Balance 1998 $9,140 1999 $12,446 2000 $13,934 2001 $14,482 2002 $12,642 2003 $12,397 2004 2005 2006E $11,669 $11,596 $10,857 Commitments ($5,088) ($4,801) ($5,080) ($6,860) ($7,167) ($7,855) $1,354 $4,339 $7,366 $7,074 $7,315 $4,787 ($8,499) ($9,222) $3,898 $2,447 ($9,493) $2,103 ($9,622) $1,195 Total FAA Appropriations GF Share of FAA Budget GF Percent Share $8,537 $9,052 $9,808 $10,043 $12,634 $13,818 $13,490 $13,843 $13,858 $14,311 3,241 3,351 1,474 0 2,198 1,104 3,248 3,010 2,828 2,619 38% 37% 15% 0% 17% 8% 24% 22% 20% 18% Uncommitted Balance EOY General Fund Share of FAA Appropriations Air Transport Association, see http://www.airlines.org/NR/rdonlyres/AD28984D-CF8D-4C37-96D32681BD89776D/0/trustfund.pdf for more detail concerning outlays. Also see Federal Aviation Administration websites: http://www.faa.gov/aba/html_budget/2003.html and http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/ headquarters_offices/aep/aatf/ for more trust fund information. Data for FY2006 income are estimates, appropriations data are enacted. Appropriations data (including trust fund and general fund share data) provided by FAA. Sources: An estimate produced by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) appears somewhat more positive about the future of the trust fund’s finances long-term.12 CBO expects that the annual trust fund revenue stream will increase at a slightly higher rate than inflation and that the trust fund, assuming FAA spending only increases at the rate of inflation, would have an uncommitted balance of $4.3 billion in 2011 and an uncommitted balance of $18.6 billion in 2016. In the CBO analysis “the trust fund can support about $19 billion in additional spending over baseline levels (the 2006 funding level growing with inflation), provided that most of that spending occurs after 2010.”13 Whether this scenario provides adequate future funding, assuming significant increased FAA investment needs in the years ahead, is likely to be a matter of considerable debate. In line with the CBO estimate, a number of outside groups disagree with the Treasury and the FAA’s assessment of future trust fund revenues as being insufficient to fund NGATS and other initiatives. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), for example, has produced its own revenue forecasts and predicts that the trust fund will have an adequate revenue stream well into the future.14 Unlike the FAA view, AOPA and others sharing their perspective, believe that rising airline fares and airline activity, increased income from fuel taxes, and cost reductions from air traffic control (ATC) modernization will be sufficient to result in an unexpended trust fund 12 U.S. Congressional Budget Office. CBO Testimony. Financing Investment in the Air Traffic Control System, Statement of Donald B. Marron, Acting Director, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, September 27, 2006. 13 Ibid., p.6. 14 http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/la-userfees.html. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗřȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ balance of over $4 billion by FY2011, with the possibility that the balance could be considerably higher. Š¡ȱŠ—ȱŽŽȱ›žŒž›Š•ȱ œœžŽœȱ The coming debate about how the FAA should be funded largely revolves around the concept of user fees. There are a number of variations as to how a user fee is defined. A useful definition of a user fee from a transportation perspective was provided in 1953 by the Department of Commerce, Office of Transportation, and is still valid for today’s discussion: ... a user charge is defined as any charge made to beneficiaries or users of services and facilities directly related to transportation and furnished in whole or in part by the Federal Government. Such charge must be paid for use of such service or facility and shall be fixed to recover part or all of the capital, operating, and maintenance costs of such service or facility. The services shall not include cash subsidies, mortgage-aid, or tax-aid or certain other activities not confined to transportation or involving transportation only incidentally.15 For aviation, most of the interest in user fees has been in recovering the costs associated with industry use of the national air navigation system (airway system or air traffic control system).16 User fees can be direct (sometimes referred to as pay-for-use or pay-for-service), whereby an aircraft or pilot is charged for a specific activity. Examples of direct charges include radio contacts with ATC en-route centers, contacts with airport towers, and weight-distance charges of the type levied frequently outside the United States (the weight of the aircraft multiplied by the distance flown). The other type of user fee that can be levied is an indirect fee. Examples include fuel taxes, aircraft registration fees, and gross revenue taxes. Indirect fees and charges are often viewed by economists as proxies for user fees rather than as actual user fees. They are normally viewed as imperfect in that the fee charged is often more poorly correlated to the service provided than a direct fee would be. A common example is the existing airline passenger tax, where airline passengers flying on the same aircraft are charged user fees based on the fare that they paid, even though all are using exactly the same amount of airway resources. For a number of reasons, indirect fees are the dominant type of fee in use in the U.S. aviation system today. On May 21, 1970, President Nixon signed the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Acts of 1970 (P.L. 91-258; 1970 Act), which was the origin of the trust fund financing system still in place today. The fee system created to provide revenue for the trust fund consisted of an airline ticket tax, a freight/cargo waybill tax, an international departure tax (also applied to Alaska and Hawaii), a per gallon tax on noncommercial (primarily GA) use of gasoline and jet fuel, and finally, a graduated aircraft registration fee. Three and a half decades later, the same basic framework of taxes and fees—with the deletion of the aircraft registration fee, and the addition of a segment fee, an international arrivals tax, and a frequent flyer tax (which can be viewed as an extension of the ticket tax)—remain the principal sources of income for the trust fund (see Table 2). 15 U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Transportation, Charges for Private Use of Federally-Provided Transportation Services and Facilities, A Staff Study of the Principles Involved in Federal User Charges, Washington, D.C., July 1953, p. 9. 16 The terms airway system and air traffic control are often used interchangeably. In the context of this report the airway system is broader, including air traffic control services, personnel, and equipment, as well as U.S. navigable airspace and some other supporting activities of the FAA. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŚȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ In 2005, the FAA announced that it was beginning a detailed examination of how the agency was funded and whether there could be a more appropriate funding mechanism. A key element of the examination is the long-debated issue of whether the existing indirect system of taxation should be replaced by direct charges for specific air navigation services. To some degree the FAA tipped off the aviation industry as to the likely direction of its study when FAA Administrator Marion Blakey remarked that using the existing ticket tax mechanism was a system that “might as well be tied to the price of milk.”17 The FAA, however, has not yet made any public proposals for a new funding mechanism and no such proposal is expected during the 109th Congress. Although the elements of the FAA plan are still unknown in their totality, enough has been surmised for aviation interest groups to begin actively supporting or opposing various potential elements of a direct user fee system. The concept of cost-allocation among system users and non-users permeates the discussion of federal aviation user fees. It has been perhaps the most crucial single issue in the now six-decade old discussion of how user fees should be charged and allocated. It is also a major focus of the FAA’s ongoing examination of the existing user fee system and is expected to be a major determinant of any new user fee proposal. While the FAA continues its studies, aviation interest groups have in effect launched their own preemptive strikes for and against a fee-for-service system of financing. The airline industry, through the Air Transport Association (ATA), struck first, making its own proposal for a new financing system in early March 2006.18 ATA’s so-called “Smartskies” proposal would be based on charges for departures and flight duration that would apply to all aircraft regardless of size or type of use. The exception in the ATA proposal is that piston-powered general aviation aircraft should continue to pay only a fuel tax. By its own estimates, the ATA proposal, could shift an estimated $2 billion of system costs to certain GA sector users, primarily corporate aircraft, which the ATA believes currently underpay for their use of the ATC system.19 The ATA proposal goes beyond just fee structure changes and suggests that the FAA’s air traffic organization (ATO) become an autonomous part of the agency, with the ability to operate without the need for direct congressional appropriations. Instead the fees collected from aviation system users, which would still be deposited in the aviation trust fund. One final feature of the proposal would give the ATO the authority to issue bonds for infrastructure improvements backed by expected future fee collections. On the same day that the ATA made its proposal, a group of GA-related interest groups released a statement suggesting that the “airlines’ plan for improving the air transportation system is for them to pay less and control more.”20 From the GA perspective, the ATA case that certain GA users underpay for their use of the ATC system is incorrect for a number of reasons. The GA contention is that the current structure of the ATC system was primarily created to support commercial airline use and that they are not putting a significant additional burden on the ATC system as a result of their flying activities. From the GA perspective fuel taxes remain the most appropriate type of user fee, and the ATA’s proposal to reorganize the ATO outside of the congressional appropriations process is viewed as undesirable public policy. 17 Wald, Matthew W. F.A.A. Seeks New Source of Revenue in User Fees. The New York Times. March 7, 2006. p. A18. 18 Bond, David. “Fire when Ready,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 13, 2006, p. 47. 19 Ibid. 20 http://web.nbaa.org/public/news/200607eaa/GAUnitedAgainstUserFees.pdf. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗśȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ The above discussion is a simplification of a very complex and contentious issue about who pays and who should pay for FAA aviation services, that goes back over at least six decades. It should be noted that the discussion of aviation user fees has been almost exclusively a conversation between the federal government and aviation industry. For example, the views of the largest group of current contributors to the aviation trust fund, airline passengers, are not well known. Little non-government or non-interest group-funded research on the aviation user fee system has been done and the lack of such outside research in itself might be a subject worthy of some attention as part of the reauthorization debate. ›’ŸŠ’£Š’˜—Ȧ˜›™˜›Š’£Š’˜—ȱ Over the last two decades, part of the ATC debate has moved away from whether or not the airways system should be operated as a public good and is instead often focused on how the system could be operated more efficiently using business principles. Calls for ATC privatization in the United States, and the fact that other nations have at least to some degree allowed their airways systems to be privatized, would seem to indicate that the provision of airways services is not something that must always be exclusively performed by government. Corporatization, the concept that the FAA’s ATC services could be reorganized as a government corporation within the FAA and/or independent from the FAA, was considered at length in the 1990s during the Clinton Administration. The idea was that an independent entity operated along business principles, although not fully privatized, would be able to operate more efficiently and make needed system improvements on a more timely basis. Although the effort had the support of the Administration, and especially Vice President Gore, it ultimately failed to gain much congressional support and was abandoned in favor of other personnel system and procurement system reforms adopted in the latter half of the 1990s.21 Privatization, unlike corporatization, would most likely move the ATC organization outside of government and require that the organization act like a private corporation in most respects. This would include pricing (for example, setting fees) at levels designed to recoup operating costs and to provide capital for needed investment. Privatization in some form has been adopted in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand among other nations. Privatization has strong proponents22 and attempts have been made to make it at least an option for consideration during the upcoming reauthorization debate. It remains to be seen, however, whether the FAA or Congress will consider the concept in earnest. ‘Žȱ Ž—Ž›Š•ȱž—ȱ‘Š›Žȱ Since the existing tax and fee structure was created in 1970 there has been general acceptance of the concept that there is a public interest component to the operation of the national aviation 21 For a full discussion of the corporatization debate see CRS Report 94-371, Reorganization of the Federal Aviation Administration: Safety and Efficiency Issues, by (name redacted), J. Glen Moore and Pamela Hairston (out of print; available from (name redacted)). 22 Numerous reports in support of privatization have been produced over the last two decades. Two recent discussions are: Robert W. Poole, Business Jets and ATC User Fees: Taking a Closer Look, The Reason Foundation. Policy Study 347. August 2006 (available at http://www.reason.org); and Clinton V. Oster, Reforming the Federal Aviation Administration: Lessons from Canada and the United Kingdom, IBM Center for The Business of Government, 2006 (available at http://www.businessofgovernment.org). ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŜȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ system. From the perspective of federal aviation policy, the public interest generally refers to that portion of the cost of the FAA’s operation of the airway system that is appropriated from the Treasury general fund for the FAA’s budget. This is the amount that is supposed to equate to what the military and nonuser beneficiaries (also known as societal users) of the aviation system might have contributed to the aviation trust fund through the payment of user fees, if they actually paid these fees. This has been one of the most contentious elements of the aviation funding debate and is likely to remain so in the year ahead. In sum, many aviation interest groups believe that the federal general fund contribution to the FAA’s annual appropriation is too small to correspond to the existing and potential military and other public benefits of the airways system. Conversely, the FAA, OMB, and other government agencies, as well as congressional appropriations and budget committees, usually believe the general fund contribution is too large. The authors of the 1970 Act envisioned that the trust fund would primarily support FAA capital programs. Although there are some who contend that the trust fund was intended “only” for capital programs, several studies have suggested that this was not the case, and that the 1970 Act allowed trust fund revenues to be spent for noncapital, mostly operations and maintenance activities.23 Since President Nixon unsuccessfully sought to fund all FAA activities out of the trust fund in the early 1970s, a tension has existed between those who seek to maximize use of the trust fund for all aviation purposes and those who seek to have its funds directed only/primarily toward capital activities. As Table 2 shows the general fund contribution to overall FAA appropriations has varied over the last decade ranging from a low of 0% in FY2000 to a high of 38% in FY1998 and FY1999. In the most recent four year period, however, the general fund share has been a more consistent 20% or so. The issue of the general fund share is closely tied to the issue of spending guarantee provisions, including penalty and cap provisions, which are an almost routine portion of FAA reauthorization legislation. These provisions and their policy implications are discussed in the next section of this report. Ÿ’Š’˜—ȱ™Ž—’—ȱ žŠ›Š—ŽŽœȱ As mentioned above, since the 1971 creation of the user-supported airport and airway trust fund there has been disagreement over the appropriate use of the trust fund’s revenues. This led, beginning in 1976, to the enactment of a series of legislative mechanisms designed to assure that federal capital spending for U.S. airports and airways (i.e., AIP and F&E) would be funded at their fully authorized levels. Supporters also hoped that these provisions would assure a significant general fund share for the FAA budget. Such funding guarantee proposals have been part of every FAA reauthorization debate since 1976.24 ‘ŽȱŠ™ȱŠ—ȱŽ—Š•¢ȱ›Šȱ From FY1977 through FY1990, the guarantees consisted of a variety of both “cap” and “penalty” provisions which, by law, set a ceiling on the amount of aviation trust fund money that could be 23 U.S. Congressional Budget Office. The Status of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund. Washington, CBO, 1988. p. X, 1-7; and U.S. General Accounting Office, Whether the Airport and Airway Trust Fund Was Created Solely to Finance Aviation “Infrastructure.” B-281779. Washington, GAO, 1999, 16 p. 24 See CRS Report RL33654, Aviation Spending Guarantee Mechanisms, by (name redacted). ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŝȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ used to fund FAA operations, and a penalty that would reduce this ceiling by a formula linked to the capital programs’ appropriations shortfall below their authorization for the fiscal year. Although the cap and penalty (C&P) provisions had some apparent early success (FY1977FY1980), there was growing resistance to passing appropriations bills that adhered to the penalties during the 1980s. The cap alone appears to have been even less often adhered to during the mid-1990s, following the penalty’s elimination in 1990. Over time, however, certain unintended consequences arose that continue to play a part in the debate over funding guarantee mechanisms. For example, the C&P appeared to have a significant role in the growth of the uncommitted balance in the trust fund (sometimes referred to as a surplus). Although the various mechanisms may have succeeded in restricting spending from the aviation trust fund on operations, they did not necessarily succeed in forcing full appropriation of authorized AIP and F&E funding levels. Overall congressional support for adherence to the annual caps and penalties during the appropriations process was not always sufficient to lead to their enforcement.25 In addition, especially during the 1990s, within the context of the unified congressional budget, some appropriations and budget committee Members were more concerned about the overall size of the budget or deficit than with adhering to the spending guarantee mechanisms. Under the unified congressional budget, the growing unexpended balance of the trust fund could be viewed as, in effect, offsetting spending elsewhere in the budget or reducing the apparent size of the budget deficit. This broader budget situation and related appropriations priorities trumped the C&P mechanisms. Under the C&P (especially prior to the elimination of the penalty), the general fund share remained, in most years, significantly higher than most estimates of the appropriate public interest share. During FY1999 and FY2000, however, years when no spending guarantee was authorized, the general fund share dropped to 15% and 0%, respectively. ž››Ž—ȱŠ DZȱ˜’—ȱ˜ȱ›Ž›ȱ—˜›ŒŽȱ™Ž—’—ȱ žŠ›Š—ŽŽœȱ In 2000, AIR21 included two new spending guarantees. One made it “out-of-order” in the House or Senate to consider legislation that failed to use all aviation trust fund receipts and interest annually. The second made it out-of-order to consider any bill that provided any funding for RE&D or O&M if it failed to fully fund the FAA’s two capital programs, AIP and F&E, at their authorized levels. As a penalty of sorts, any failure to fully fund F&E would lead to an increased appropriation (“pop-up” budget authority) for AIP equal to the appropriations shortfall for F&E. As was true under the C&P mechanism, the first years of the AIR21 guarantees, FY2001FY2003, appeared to have successfully assured that both AIP and F&E were funded at or very near their authorized levels. However, as was true under the C&P mechanism, congressional support for adherence declined during the following years. Adherence to the guarantees in the annual appropriations bills during the last three years has been mixed. On the one hand, the obligation limitations for AIP for FY2004-FY2006 have been very close to their authorized levels for these years. On the other hand, F&E spending has been cut significantly in each of these years (see Table 1). F&E’s annual appropriation fell below its authorization as follows: $320 million for FY2004; $468 million for FY2005; and $498 million for FY2006. These F&E funding levels were out of conformance with the guarantees and should have made the funding of the O&M and RE&D components of FAA’s budget out of order during these years. It also should have led to additional “pop-up” budget authority for the AIP equal to the annual underfunding of F&E. 25 An element of this softening of support was that the implementation of the NAS fell behind the schedule that was assumed when F&E was being authorized. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗŞȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ There are a number of reasons that the guarantee provisions have not been adhered to in recent years. Specific to F&E spending, there has been the lack of confidence that Congress has had in the ability of the FAA to oversee NAS modernization. The hesitance to fully fund F&E may have more to do with this, than with specific resistance to adherence to the funding guarantees. However, some other weaknesses in the current guarantee mechanism have manifested themselves in recent years. Spending guarantees that are enforced by point-of-order actions only work if the point-of-order is raised by a Member and if they have not been waived by rule. In the House, recent annual appropriations bills have had all points-of-order waived by the Rules Committee. Senators have also chosen not to raise points-of-order against violations of the AIP and F&E funding guarantees.26 Points-of-order have not been allowed on appropriations bill conference reports. Also the “pop-up” AIP budget authority, which some viewed as part of the mechanism for preventing appropriators from spending any F&E shortfall for noncapital aviation spending, can and has been rescinded. These rescissions allow appropriators to bring down the nominal total cost of the Transportation/Treasury Appropriations bills in the next budget year. As was true during the C&P era, the current spending guarantees can still be trumped by broader budget policy goals (such as deficit reduction) or, at times, by the spending priorities of appropriators. ž—’—ȱ žŠ›Š—ŽŽȱ™’˜—œȱ Aviation funding guarantees are expected to be considered in the FAA reauthorization debate during the 110th Congress and could include keeping the current system, modifying the current guarantees, resurrecting a mechanism analogous to the cap and penalty provisions, reconsidering taking the trust fund “off-budget,” or erecting budgetary “fire walls” as was done for the highway and transit programs in 1998. Some would argue that there should be no guarantees and that the normal congressional budget process should be allowed to progress unfettered. The absence of a large uncommitted trust fund balance could also have an impact on the support for new or continued aviation spending guarantee mechanisms during FAA reauthorization in the 110th Congress. ’›™˜›ȱŽŸŽ•˜™–Ž—ȱŠ—ȱ’—Š—ŒŽȱ The Airport Improvement Program (AIP), the source of federal airport grants, is one of five major sources of funding for airport development and improvement. Airports also fund capital projects using tax-exempt bonds, passenger facility charges (PFCs; a local tax levied on each boarding passenger), state and local grants, and airport revenue.27 Different airports use different combinations of these sources depending on the individual airport’s financial situation and the type of project being considered. Small airports are more likely to be dependent on AIP grants than large-or medium-sized airports. The larger airports are also much more likely to participate in the tax-exempt bond market or finance capital development projects with the proceeds 26 In part, this may have been because, if a point of order were upheld, the entire AIP or F&E financing provision would be stricken from the bill that Senate conferees would take to conference. This absence of a funding provision could put the Senate conferees at a disadvantage in negotiating with House conferees over the contents of the bill to be voted out of conference. 27 Airport revenues sources include airfield area fees/landing fees, terminal area concessions and rent, airline leases, parking, etc. See CRS Report 98-579, Airport Finance: A Brief Overview, by (name redacted). PFCs are sometimes referred to as a “head tax.” ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŗşȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ generated from PFCs. Each of these funding sources places differing legislative, regulatory, or contractual constraints on the airports that use them. The two financing sources for airports with the most significant federal involvement are the AIP and the PFC programs. The AIP provides federal grants to airports for airport development and planning. The airports participating in the AIP range from very large publicly-owned commercial primary airports to small public use general aviation airports that may be privately-owned, but are available for public use. AIP funding is usually limited to construction or improvements related to aircraft operations, typically for planning and construction of projects such as runways, taxiways, aprons, noise abatement, land purchase, and safety, emergency or snow removal equipment. Commercial revenue producing portions of terminals (such as shop concessions or commercial maintenance hangars), automobile parking garages, and off-airport road construction are examples of improvements that generally are not eligible for AIP funding. Airports smaller than medium hub, however, have broader eligibility on terminal projects under certain conditions.28 AIP money cannot be used for an airport’s operational expenses. The PFC is a local tax imposed, with federal approval, by an airport on each boarding passenger. PFC funds can be used for a broader range of projects than AIP grants and are more likely to be used for “ground side” projects such as passenger terminal and ground access improvements. PFCs can also be used for bond repayments and in some cases to provide the local match for AIP projects. ’›™˜›ȱŠ™’Š•ȱŽŽœȱœ’–ŠŽœȱ Both the FAA in its 2005-2009 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) and the Airports Council International/North America (ACI/NA) have releases estimates of U.S. airports’ capital needs for 2005-2009. The NPIAS report was based on planned project information taken from airport master plans and state system plans. FAA planners screened out projects that were not justified by aviation activity forecasts or that were not eligible for AIP grants. The FAA limits its estimate to AIP eligible projects at airports listed in the NPIAS. In the 2004 NPIAS report, the FAA has estimated that the national system’s capital needs for 2005-2009 will total $39.55 billion (an annual average of $7.91 billion).29 The Airport Council International / North America (ACI-NA) capital needs survey produced an estimate of $71.5 billion for 2005-2009 (an annual average of $14.3 billion).30 ACI-NA concludes that airports face an annual $3-4 billion shortfall every year through FY2009.31 The ACI-NA study reflects the broader business view of major airport operators and casts a substantially 28 Primary commercial airports are categorized by the percentage of the total national passenger boardings (enplanements) that occur at the individual airport during a year: large hub airports enplane at least 1% of the national total; medium hub enplane at least 0.25% but less than 1%; small hub enplane 0.05% but less than 0.25% and nonhub enplane more than 10,000 but less tan 0.05%. Large and medium hub airports accounted for almost 90% of all enplanements in 2002. 29 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems: 2005-2009, pp. 41-47. 30 A fact sheet of the ACI-NA, 2005 Airport Capital Development Needs is available at http://www.aci-na.org/docs/70_capitalneeds2005.pdf. 31 ACI-NA, ACI-NA 2005 Airport Capital Needs Survey v. FAA’s NPIAS. Washington, DC: ACI-NA, 17 p. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŖȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ broader net, including AIP ineligible or low AIP priority type projects which would normally be funded by bonds, PFCs, airport revenues, or local funding; airport-funded air traffic control facilities; airport or TSA-funded security projects, etc.32 Because the $14.3 billion is based on “proposals” for airport development projects, some would argue that this figure is high reflecting wants rather than needs and projects that would never be completed in any case. The Air Transport Association (ATA) has not released an estimate in advance of the current reauthorization debate but in the past their estimates of needs were limited almost exclusively to AIP eligible projects at primary airports and tended to be lower than either the FAA or ACI/NA estimates.33 In March 2004, FAA Administrator, Marion C. Blakey, stated that the agency’s goal was to improve the overall capacity at the top 35 U.S. airports by 30% over a ten-year period. These airports account for about 73% of commercial passenger boardings. The FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) is intended to increase the capacity and efficiency of the National Airspace System (NAS) over a ten-year period to keep up with the expected growth in demand for air travel and shipping. The plan focuses on “infrastructure—primarily new runways—and technological and procedural initiatives at the top 35 airports.”34 An AIP focus on the OEP could put substantial pressure on the availability of AIP discretionary funds. ’›™˜›ȱ –™›˜ŸŽ–Ž—ȱ›˜›Š–ȱǻ Ǽȱ The preeminent reauthorization issue for AIP is whether its funding levels will be increased substantially, held steady/increased modestly, or reduced. As can be seen in Figure 1, AIP’s funding underwent a major increase in FY2001 and has had a relatively small increase of $100 million each year since. The outlook for AIP funding will likely be influenced by the resolution of the debate concerning the taxes and fees supporting the aviation trust fund as well as any decision concerning the scope of the general fund share of the FAA budget. A failure to secure more revenues for the FAA budget, in light of the recent decline in the uncommitted balance of the trust fund, could constrain attempts to increase the AIP budget. A consensus in Congress to reduce the federal budget deficit or hold the deficits to existing levels, as happened during the mid-1990s, also could constrain any AIP budget increases.35 These broader budget issues could have implications not only for the AIP program’s funding but also for its scope and formula and discretionary funding distribution. Under such overall budget constraints, Congress could consider changes ranging from the defederalization of some large airports to the reconsideration of the scope of funding provided for smaller noncommercial service airports currently in the NPIAS. Also, should AIP not be reauthorized by October 1, 2007, the program will go into abeyance: projects already funded could continue, but no new projects could be begun. 32 ACI-NA, Executive Summary ACI-NA 2005 Airport Capital Development Needs, Washington, DC: ACI-NA, 2006, 3 p. 33 See GAO, Airport Development Needs: Estimating Future Costs, “GAO/RECD-97-99,” Washington, GAO, 1997, pp. 7-9. 34 FAA and Mitre, Capacity Needs in the National Airspace System. See also FAA. Operational Evolution Plan, 20052015: Executive Summary; Version 7.0, Washington, DC: FAA, 2005. 35 For a brief discussion of transportation policy within the broader fiscal environment, see U.S. General Accountability Office, Fundamental Reexamination of Federal Transportation Programs and Policies Required: The Driving Force of the Nation’s Long-Term Fiscal Challenges, Washington, DC: GAO, 2006, available at http://www.highways.org/ Mar06-speaker-slideshows/Hecker.ppt. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řŗȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ Figure 1. AIP Authorizations and Obligations ($ millions) Source: FAA, Fifteenth Annual AIP Report. FAA.  ȱž—’—ȱ’œ›’‹ž’˜—ȱ The distribution system for AIP grants is complex. It is based on a combination of formula grants (also referred to as apportionments) and discretionary funds.36 Each year, formula grants are apportioned automatically to specific airports or types of airports (primary airports, cargo service airports, states and insular areas, and Alaska airports). The funds are available during the year that they are first apportioned and continue to be available for use for two years thereafter. The remaining funds are apportioned to the discretionary fund. Airports sponsors apply for discretionary funds to pay for planned airport capital development needs. In recent years, however, significant amounts of discretionary funding have been earmarked by Congress.37 In recent years AIP discretionary funds have ranged from roughly 25%-30% of the total annual AIP funding distribution.38 Entitlement (formula) and discretionary small airport set-asides tend to be supported by smaller airports and most airport advocates. The air carriers tend to be critical of entitlements and setaside funding, especially when it benefits the smaller noncommercial service airports and have argued that “Congress must reconsider the vast array of set-asides and earmarks under the AIP program, which have seriously undermined its utility in providing meaningful system capacity 36 See U.S.C. 49 Chapter 471 and U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, Airport Improvement Program Handbook. Available at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/resources/publications/orders/media/aip_5100_38c.pdf. 37 For an explanation of FAA’s policy for selecting discretionary projects see the 21st AIP Annual Report of Accomplishments, pp. 25-27. Available at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/aip/grant_histories/media/Annual_Report_2004.pdf. 38 Based on figures from the AIP Annual Reports of Accomplishments, for FY2001-FY2003 and FY2004. The discretionary funding percentage for FY2001 was 30%, for FY2002 was 25%, for FY2003 was 25%, and for FY2004 was 27%. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŘȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ improvements.”39 Business and general aviation advocates take exception to this view and counter that airports of all sizes are critical to the national airport system as a whole and that reliever airports in particular are “a critical component of managing airline and general aviation traffic in an urban environment.”40 ™™˜›’˜—–Ž—ȱŠ—ȱ•’’‹’•’¢ȱ‘Š—Žœȱ Apportioned funds (sometimes referred to as entitlements) were substantially increased in AIR-21 and the range of land-side projects that are eligible for AIP grants were increased somewhat in both AIR-21 and Vision 100. Most of the eligibility changes benefitted airports smaller than medium-hub.41 Although this trend could continue in the upcoming reauthorization debate, if the budget environment is constrained project eligibility might need to be reconsidered. If the overall authorization is reduced, the apportioned funds may have to be reduced to assure that sufficient funds remain to fund discretionary grants (in particular for operational evolution plan projects). The ACI-NA supports the maintenance of AIP funding for smaller airports and argues for giving these airports increased flexibility in the use of their entitlements. The case can be made that, over the years, the broadening of AIP eligibility at small airports has made it increasingly difficult to identify the federal interest that has been met by such spending. As mentioned earlier, air carriers are skeptical of the benefit to the national airport system of some proposals seeking to broaden project eligibility.42 ’œŒ›Ž’˜—Š›¢ȱž—ȱŽȬœ’Žœȱ The discretionary funds (which are the remainder funds after the apportionments are satisfied) are subject to set-asides for noise mitigation, the Military Airports Program (MAP), reliever airports, and the capacity/safety/security/noise set-aside. Any of these could be modified during reauthorization. However, the greater the total of all the set-asides, the smaller the remaining amounts that are truly unrestricted discretionary funds. ’—’–ž–ȱ’œŒ›Ž’˜—Š›¢ȱž—ȱ U.S.C. 47115 requires that a minimum amount—$148 million plus any outstanding pre-January 1, 1997 letters of intent—remains available for the discretionary fund after all apportionments and set-asides are satisfied. If less money remains, the apportionments are reduced pro rata to bring the discretionary funding up to the required level. Because AIP has been funded since FY2001 at historically high levels, the minimum discretionary fund provision has not been a factor in AIP funding. If, however, AIP’s budget is reduced substantially or if the entitlements are increased substantially, the appropriate minimum discretionary fund level may need to be reconsidered. 39 “Airlines Seek Reduction in AIP Funding for Small Airports,” The Weekly of Business Aviation, Nov. 7, 2005: 212. Ibid. 41 Airports smaller than medium hub are airports that enplane less than 0.25% of the total national enplanements. Altogether they account for just under 11% of the total national of enplanements (2005-2009 NPIAS, p. 5). 42 Recently the Air Transport Association (ATA), which represents the major air carriers, argued that the current AIP entitlements and set-asides provides nearly one third of federal airport grants to airports that provide no commercial service. The ATA argued that such expenditures would be more appropriately funded from general fund revenues than from the airport and airway trust fund, which supports AIP. 40 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řřȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ȱ ›Š—ȱœœž›Š—ŒŽœȱ Along with the acceptance of AIP funds come certain obligations (generally referred to as assurances) that airports must agree to. These assurances include the obligation to maintain and operate their facilities safely and efficiently, as well as more specific obligations such as not to discriminate against any class of air system users43, to adhere to Davis-Bacon prevailing wage requirements, and to use airport revenue solely for spending on airport operations and capital costs. Proposals to alter the AIP grant assurances can be expected to arise during the reauthorization debate. For example, the ACI/NA is seeking a bill that “simplifies airport grant assurances including reforms that permit airports to use non aeronautical revenue sources to attract new and competitive air service to their communities.” Supporters of maintaining the grant assurances generally argue that they not only help establish and enforce federal policy priorities but also insulate airports from local efforts to limit or shut down airport operations (for example, because of noise concerns or for land development). ’›™˜›ȱ˜’œŽȱ œœžŽœȱ Airport noise policy is linked to airport development because airport noise is a major factor in local resistance to airport capacity projects. One issue is whether to again raise the AIP noise compatibility set-aside (Vision 100 raised the set-aside to 35%).44 Funding eligibility issues could also arise. One is whether the FAA should be granted the flexibility to use AIP funds for noise mitigation projects that are outside the 65 decibel noise impact areas. Another issue is making the planning for noise mitigating arrival and departure operational (air traffic control) procedures eligible for AIP funding. In what was perhaps the most significant expansion of AIP noise funding eligibility, Vision 100 authorized the FAA to make grants for land use compatibility planning and projects around large and medium hub airports that have not submitted a part 150 noise compatibility plan, as was previously required. The provision is limited to grants that are awarded through FY2007. Congress may wish to review this provision and extend or modify it, or allow it to lapse. ŽŽ›Š•ȱ‘Š›Žȱ Vision 100 raised the federal share from 90% to 95% for airports smaller than large and mediumhub and airports in states participating in the state block grant program,45 but included a sunset clause that returns the federal share back to 90% after 2007. Should the federal or FAA budget be constrained or held at current levels Congress may wish to consider adjusting the federal share. The federal share for most projects at large and medium hub airports is 75%. 43 For example, against cargo or commuter aircraft, or night time flight operators. For a more extensive discussion of noise issues see chapter “Energy and Environmental Considerations,” later in this report. 45 Under the state block grant program participating states (Illinois, Missouri, North Carolina, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee) administer the AIP funding of nonprimary commercial service, reliever, and general aviation airports. 44 ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŚȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ ›’ŸŠ’£Š’˜—ȱ The Airport Privatization Pilot Program authorizes the FAA to exempt up to five airports from certain federal restrictions on the use of airport revenue. Participating airports may be exempted from such requirements as repayment of federal grants. During the nine years since the application procedures were published only one airport, Stewart International Airport in New York, has obtained an approved exemption.46 Congress may wish to review the pilot program. Although most U.S. airports are public entities, it is noteworthy that nearly all airport activities are carried out by private firms working under contract arrangements for the airport owners. The City of Chicago recently expressed interest in offering Midway Airport up for a long term lease. It has not yet applied for a privatization exemption, however. Š›’Š•ȱŽŽŽ›Š•’£Š’˜—ȱ One way to reduce the amount of trust fund revenue needed for AIP would be to allow large and medium hub airports to opt out of the AIP program in favor of unrestricted or higher PFC financing. This would, in the view of some airport executives, give them the flexibility they would prefer to have in managing their airports. These airports would no longer be bound by all of the grant assurances that are currently required of participants. ’›™˜›ȱŽŒž›’¢ȱ›˜“ŽŒȱ•’’‹’•’¢ȱ Vision 100, included a provision that repealed the language of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-264) that permitted the use of AIP and PFC funds for security related improvement of facilities and the purchase or deployment of equipment for security purposes. Vision 100 did, however, allow for use of AIP formula funds for the replacement of baggage conveyor systems, and the reconfiguration of terminal baggage areas, necessary to install bulk explosive detection devices. Such use, however, has been specifically prohibited each year by appropriators in the legislative language for Grants-in-Aid for Airports in recent transportation appropriations acts. Despite this prohibition, some still view AIP as a potential source of funding for certain security-related airport improvements in the future. Ž›¢ȱ’‘ȱ Žœȱǻ œǼȱŠ—ȱ‘Žȱ’›‹žœȱřŞŖDZȱ –™ŠŒȱ˜—ȱ ȱ Some predictions of the rapid growth of a new type of aircraft, the very light jet (jets with a takeoff weight less than 12,500 pounds that can land on a 3,000 foot runway), have, in turn led to concerns that increased airport funding will be needed to accommodate them. Even if the optimistic estimates of the speed of introduction of VLJs pan-out, given that VLJs have been specifically designed to operate at most existing general aviation airports, existing airport facilities should be able to handle the traffic. If, however, the advent of VLJs leads to increasing demands for installing all weather capabilities at small airports or if insurers place requirements on VLJ use, for example that VLJs only be used at airports with runways longer than 3,000 feet, the demand for AIP funded improvements at small airports could increase over time. As mentioned previously, small airports are more dependent on AIP funding for their capital projects 46 The lease for this privatized airport was recently put up for sale by its United Kingdom-based holder, National Express Group (NEG), after seven years of a 99-year lease. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řśȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ than larger airports. The potential impact of VLJs across the entire national airspace system is discussed further in the section on “Accommodating Future Airspace Users”. More likely to have an impact on AIP funding in the short term is the Airbus super jumbo A380. The GAO identified 18 U.S. airports making changes to accommodate the A380 at an estimated cost of roughly $927 million. These airports identified AIP as the planned source for 50% of these costs and PFCs for another 21%.47 Some policy makers have expressed opposition to using federal funding for these A380-related projects. Š›–Š›”’—Ȧȱȃ•ŠŒŽȱŠ–’—Ȅȱ Historically, Congress has not earmarked AIP discretionary funding in the manner typical to highway or transit appropriations where specific projects have specific dollar amounts designated in the language of the appropriations bills or report. Since FY2001, dollar amounts and project descriptions have usually been specified in the appropriations bill conference reports. One of the issues related to the earmarking is the impact it has on the grant application process. Another is the impact of the earmarking on the availability of limited discretionary funds for national priorities such as the operation evolution plan (OEP). ŠœœŽ—Ž›ȱŠŒ’•’¢ȱ‘Š›Žȱ œœžŽœȱ The PFC is a local tax imposed, with federal approval, by an airport on each boarding passenger. The basic PFC issue is whether to raise the $4.50 per emplaned (i.e., boarding) passenger ceiling or to eliminate the ceiling all together. Airports have long argued for elimination of the cap but would also be pleased with an increase of some sort. Although PFC revenues can be used for a broader range of projects than AIP, some airport advocates argue there is still room for more flexibility in PFC eligibility requirements. For example, some would like more freedom to use PFC funds on off-airport projects, such as transportation access projects. Airports would also like the application process to be streamlined. Additionally they would also like to have the competition plan requirement that is placed on large and medium hub airports that charge PFCs at the $4.50 level eliminated. Air carriers and passenger advocates will probably oppose an increase in the PFC. Airlines feel that the passenger taxes have become a large enough component of the total ticket price that they constrain the airlines’ pricing ability. ’›™˜›ȱ˜—’—ȱ œœžŽœȱ Historically, bonds have been a major source of funding for capital projects at primary airports. Because most airports are owned by public authorities, they can seek funds in the tax-exempt bond market. One change sought by ACI-NA would be to make tax exempt airport bond income no longer subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT). This would make airport bonds more attractive to investors. On the negative side, the change would cost the U.S. Treasury money. Some would argue it would make more sense to change the AMT as part of a tax bill rather than as a specific exemption provided for income on airport bonds in an FAA reauthorization bill. 47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Aviation: Costs and Major Factors Influencing Infrastructure Changes at U.S. Airports to Accommodate the New A380 Aircraft, “ GAO-06-571” Washington, DC: GAO, 2006. Available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06571.pdf. ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ ŘŜȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ Recently there has been interest in using private activity bonds for airport development. Private activity airport bonds could allow a private entity to enter the tax-exempt bond market to raise funding for a capital project at a public use airport. Generally, it is envisioned as facilitating public-private partnerships. As a possible precedent, the recently passed surface transportation act, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: a Legacy for Users (P.L. 109-59; SAFETEA-LU), allowed for up to $15 billion in private facility bond funding for highways or freight transfer facilities.48 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Treasury Department, however, have generally opposed bonding as adding additional government borne costs to the airport improvement process.49 ™’˜—œȱ˜ȱ˜—›˜•ȱ™Ž›Š’˜—Š•ȱ˜œœȱŠȱ‘Žȱȱ Faced with rising operational costs and future funding needs for infrastructure enhancements and system expansion, the FAA and Congress have made the identification of methods to reduce or control operational costs a priority over the last few years. Besides general measures to conserve resources, the FAA’s approaches to controlling operational costs mostly fall into two general categories: (1) the consolidation of facilities and functions, and (2) the outsourcing or privatization of certain operational components. Additional options for controlling costs may involve shifting certain operational functions and costs onto private-sector users of the NAS and leveraging private-sector capabilities through government-industry partnerships, or other costsaving arrangements. ˜—œ˜•’Š’˜—ȱ˜ȱŠŒ’•’’ŽœȱŠ—ȱž—Œ’˜—œȱ The FAA is currently in the process of consolidating administrative and support staff in its nine functional service area offices for terminal and en route support services and technical operations into three consolidated regional facilities, in Seattle, WA; Fort Worth, TX; and Atlanta, GA. The FAA is also consolidating its flight services information area offices for the lower 48 states to a single facility in Kansas City, MO. Flight service information for Alaska will continue to be coordinated out of the Anchorage office. The FAA selected these sites for placing its consolidated area offices primarily based on costs, but considered a variety of quality of life factors for employees. The FAA estimates that it will save between $38 and $41 million between FY2006 and FY2015 by relocating about 315 employees to areas with lower costs of living and lower locality pay rates.50 Further, by reducing facilities-related costs, the FAA anticipates that total savings over next 10 years, from its overall consolidation of administrative and support functions, will total between $360 and $460 million.51 48 For a description of the Federal Highway Administration program see: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/private_activity_bonds.htm. 49 CBO reiterated this position at recent (September 27, 2006) House Aviation Subcommittee hearings on Financing Options for FAA and Redesign of the Air Transportation System. GAO also expressed the reasons for its concerns about the costs of bonding. See GAO. National Airspace System Modernization: Observations on Potential Funding Options for FAA and the Next Generation Airspace System. “GAO-06-1114T” Washington, GAO, 2006. p. 16-17. 50 Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization (ATO) Service Area Office Location Study, October 2005. 51 Federal Aviation Administration, Air Traffic Organization Administrative & Staff Support Function Restructuring (Undated). ˜—›Žœœ’˜—Š•ȱŽœŽŠ›Œ‘ȱŽ›Ÿ’ŒŽȱ Řŝȱ ȱ ȱŽŠž‘˜›’£Š’˜—DZȱŠŒ”›˜ž—ȱŠ—ȱ œœžŽœȱ˜›ȱ˜—›Žœœȱ As the ongoing personnel transitions are expected to be fully completed by December 2006, the current service area consolidation plan is likely to be largely completed before Congress considers FAA reauthorization legislation. Therefore, the issues that may arise are likely to center on whether the FAA and the Air Traffic Organization’s (ATO’s) approach and implementation of this consolidation effort can serve as an effective model for future plans of this kind. One option Congress might consider is whether an analysis of the “lessons learned” from this consolidation process, conducted by an auditing agency such as the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) or the Government Accountability Office (GAO), could identify areas for improvement and establish a framework for conducting future consolidation efforts. Effective models for consolidation may aid the FAA in considering future consolidation efforts, such as consolidation of certain air traffic service functions, which are likely to be much more complex and could be much broader in scope compared to consolidation efforts carried out thus far. Consolidation of air traffic services has been identified by some as a potential means to adapt to anticipated changes in the controller workforce resulting from large scale retirements of experienced controllers as well as potential changes in controller job functions, and to address staffing shortages, particularly at certain en route facilities. Congress may also have a particular interest in the FAA’s future consolidation plans of this kind because relocation of federal workers is likely to have impacts on regions and congressional districts. Even if the size of the job losses in a particular location have a minimal impact on the local economy, they can be viewed as a symbolic loss to a community in terms of losing federal jobs, and the perception that the federal government viewed the particular locale less favorably than other sites. Placing regions and districts in competition for consolidated federal facilities has the potential of creating large political pressures that can complicate the location selection process. Some observers have suggested that the military base realignment and closure (BRAC) process is a well established model for conducting such assessments of proposed facility consolidation, and have suggested that the FAA develop or adopt a similar approach for its future assessments of consolidation proposals.52 During the upcoming reauthorization debate, Congress may consider whether utilizing such a process could benefit the FAA as it continues to look toward consolidation of facilities and functions as a means to control costs and adapt to anticipated changes in air traffic services under NGATS, or whether such a requirement would prove too burdensome and time consuming. Because of the specific interest in how consolidation might apply to air traffic control facilities, the FAA’s current efforts to consolidate weather support functions at air traffic control facilities may be of particular interest. How this ongoing consolidation effort unfolds may provide insight into how FAA might go about the much larger scale process of consolidating various air traffic control facilities and functions. The FAA has been actively pursuing the consolidation of center weather service units (CWSUs) that provide weather forecasting to en route air traffic control facilities. Initial plans for consolidation called for centralizing weather support functions, currently provided to the FAA [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33698. Public record. Not legal advice.