# Pakistan-U.S. Relations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33498 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** July 1, 2009 - **Citation:** RL33498 ## Text Pakistan-U.S. Relations K. Alan Kronstadt Specialist in South Asian Affairs July 1, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33498 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Pakistan-U.S. Relations Summary A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively combating religious militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; democratization and human rights protection; the ongoing Kashmir problem and Pakistan-India tensions; and economic development. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials praise Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad’s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s army has conducted unprecedented and, until recently, largely ineffectual counterinsurgency operations in the country’s western tribal areas, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban militants are said to enjoy “safe haven.” U.S. officials increasingly are concerned that indigenous religious extremists represent a serious threat to the stability of the Pakistani state. The United States strongly encourages maintenance of a bilateral cease-fire and a continuation of substantive dialogue between Pakistan and neighboring India, which have fought three wars since 1947. A perceived Pakistan-India nuclear arms race has been the focus of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Attention to this issue intensified following nuclear tests by both countries in 1998. The United States has been troubled by evidence of transfers of Pakistani nuclear technologies and materials to third parties, including North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Such evidence became stark in 2004, and related illicit smuggling networks may still be operative. Pakistan’s macroeconomic indicators turned positive after 2001, with some meaningful poverty reduction seen in this still poor country. However, conditions deteriorated sharply in 2008-2009. Democracy has fared poorly in Pakistan, with the country enduring direct military rule for more than half of its existence. In 1999, the elected government was ousted in a coup led by Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, who later assumed the title of president. Musharraf retained the position as army chief until his November 2007 retirement from the military. Late 2007 instability included Musharraf’s six-week-long imposition of emergency rule and the assassination of former Prime Minister and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto. However, February 2008 parliamentary elections were relatively credible and seated a coalition led by Bhutto’s widower, Asif Zardari, and opposed to Musharraf’s continued rule. Musharraf resigned the presidency in August and Zardari subsequently was (indirectly) elected as the new President. The Bush Administration determined in early 2008 that a democratically elected government was restored in Islamabad, thus permanently removing coup-related aid sanctions. The Obama Administration states an intention to continue pursuing close and mutually beneficial relations with Islamabad. As part of its “new strategy” for Afghanistan, the Administration seeks development of a “more coherent” Pakistan policy to include tripling nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, as well as conditioning U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and on democratization. A Special Representative was appointed to coordinate U.S. government efforts with both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is among the world’s leading recipients of U.S. aid and will by the end of FY2009 have obtained more than $7.7 billion in overt assistance since 2001, including about $4.6 billion in development and humanitarian aid. Pakistan also has received about $7.2 billion in military reimbursements for its support of counterterrorism efforts. Congress in 2009 authorized large and sustained increases in bilateral assistance to Pakistan along with conditions on future security aid. Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................1 Key Current Issues and Developments ........................................................................................3 The New U.S. Administration ...............................................................................................3 The Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative..........................................................5 The Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review..............................................6 May 2009 Trilateral Summit............................................................................................8 Deteriorating Economic Circumstances .................................................................................8 The Friends of Pakistan (FOP) Group....................................................................................9 Increasing Islamist Militancy .............................................................................................. 10 Threats to Punjab and Sindh.......................................................................................... 12 Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency ............................................... 13 Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies.................................................................. 16 The Swat Valley ............................................................................................................ 19 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) .............................................................................. 23 Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency................................................... 27 Major Shift in Pakistani Attitudes Toward the Taliban ................................................... 29 U.S. Policy and Bilateral Counterterrorism Cooperation ...................................................... 29 Cross-Border Coordination and U.S. Military Action..................................................... 32 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks ...................................................................... 33 Deteriorated Relations With India ....................................................................................... 36 Pre-November 26 Pakistan-India Engagement............................................................... 36 Mumbai Terrorism and Islamabad’s Response ............................................................... 37 Fallout for Bilateral Relations ....................................................................................... 39 Implications for U.S. Interests ....................................................................................... 41 Selected Commentary on U.S. Policy Options ..................................................................... 42 Setting and Regional Relations.................................................................................................. 44 Historical Setting ................................................................................................................ 44 Political Setting................................................................................................................... 46 Musharraf’s 1999 Coup d’Etat ...................................................................................... 46 The 2008 Democratic Revival ....................................................................................... 46 Role of the Pakistani Military........................................................................................ 53 Regional Relations .............................................................................................................. 55 Pakistan-India Rivalry................................................................................................... 55 The “IPI” Pipeline Project ............................................................................................. 57 Afghanistan .................................................................................................................. 58 China ............................................................................................................................ 60 Pakistan-U.S. Relations and Key Country Issues ....................................................................... 61 Terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 62 Al Qaeda’s Resurgence in Pakistan................................................................................ 64 Infiltration Into Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 66 Infiltration into Kashmir and India ................................................................................ 68 Domestic Terrorism....................................................................................................... 69 Other Security Issues .......................................................................................................... 70 Pakistan-U.S. Security Cooperation............................................................................... 70 Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation ................................................................... 74 U.S. Nonproliferation Policy ......................................................................................... 79 Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Pakistan-India Tensions and the Kashmir Issue.............................................................. 80 Baluchistan Unrest ........................................................................................................ 82 Narcotics ...................................................................................................................... 83 Islamization, Anti-American Sentiment, and Madrassas ...................................................... 84 Democratization and Human Rights .................................................................................... 88 Democracy and Governance.......................................................................................... 88 Human Rights Problems................................................................................................ 92 Economic Issues ................................................................................................................. 94 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 94 Trade and Investment .................................................................................................... 97 U.S. Aid and Congressional Action ..................................................................................... 98 U.S. Assistance ............................................................................................................. 98 Possible Adjustments to U.S. Assistance Programs ...................................................... 106 Coup-Related Legislation............................................................................................ 108 Proliferation-Related Legislation................................................................................. 108 9/11 Commission Recommendations........................................................................... 109 Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 110th Congress .............................................. 109 Selected Pakistan-Related Legislation in the 111th Congress .............................................. 111 Figures Figure 1. Map of Pakistan ....................................................................................................... 115 Figure 2. District Map of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.................................................................................................... 116 Tables Table 1. Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2010 .............. 113 Contacts Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 116 Congressional Research Service Pakistan-U.S. Relations Introduction A stable, democratic, prosperous Pakistan actively working to counter Islamist militancy is considered vital to U.S. interests. Current top-tier U.S. concerns regarding Pakistan include regional and global terrorism; Afghan stability; domestic political stability and democratization; nuclear weapons proliferation and security; human rights protection; and economic Pakistan in Brief development. Pakistan remains a vital U.S. Population: 176 million; growth rate: 1.95% (2009 est.) ally in U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. Yet the Area: 803,940 sq. km. (slightly less than twice the size outcomes of U.S. policies toward Pakistan of California) since 9/11, while not devoid of meaningful Capital: Islamabad successes, have seen a failure to neutralize Heads of Government: President Asif Ali Zardari and anti-Western militants and reduce religious Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani (both of the Pakistan extremism in that country, and a failure to People’s Party) contribute sufficiently to the stabilization of Ethnic Groups: Punjabi 45%, Pashtun 15%, Sindhi 14%, neighboring Afghanistan. In the assessment of Saraiki 8%, Muhajir 8%. Baloch 4%, other 6% a former senior U.S. government official, Languages: Punjabi 48%, Sindhi 12%, Saraiki 10%, “Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the Pashtu 8%, Urdu (official) 8%; Baluchi, English (official), world today. All of the nightmares of the 21st and others 14% century come together in Pakistan: nuclear Religions: Muslim 95% (Sunni 75%, Shia 20%), Christian, proliferation, drug smuggling, military Hindu, and other 5% dictatorship, and above all, international 1 Life Expectancy at Birth: female 66 years; male 64 terrorism.” Terrorist bombings and other years (2009 est.) militant attacks became a near-daily scourge in 2008 and continue at a high rate in 2009, Literacy: 50% (female 36%; male 63%; 2005 est.) with Islamist militancy spreading beyond Gross Domestic Product (at PPP): $406 billion; per western tribal areas and threatening major capita: $2,440; growth rate 5.1% (2008) Pakistani cities. Foreign Policy magazine’s Currency: Rupee (100 = $1.21) Failed State Index 2009 ranked Pakistan 10th Inflation: 14.4% (May 2009) in the world with a “critical” score, citing especially acute group grievances and Defense Budget: $3.56 billion (2.8% of GDP; 2008) factionalized elites.2 U.S. Trade: exports to U.S. $3.6 billion; imports from U.S. $1.9 billion (2008) Pakistan suffered a series of destabilizing Sources: CIA, The World Factbook; Departments of developments in 2007, including a monthsCommerce and State; Government of Pakistan; long political crisis and a November Economist Intelligence Unit; Global Insight; The Military emergency proclamation which severely Balance undermined the status of the militarydominated government of then-President and Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf; a surge in domestic Islamist militancy following the July denouement of a standoff involving Islamabad’s Red Mosque complex; and the December assassination of former Prime Minster and leading opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan from self-imposed exile only months earlier. These developments led many Washington-based analysts to more forcefully question the Bush Administration’s largely uncritical support for President Musharraf as a key 1 Bruce Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 618, 31, July 2008. 2 See the July 2009 index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/the_2009_failed_states_index. Congressional Research Service 1 Pakistan-U.S. Relations U.S. ally. Following February 2008 parliamentary elections that seated a coalition of former opposition parties vehemently opposed to Musharraf’s continued rule, the U.S. government became more measured in its public posturing and, when Musharraf came under imminent threat of impeachment in August, the Bush Administration called his fate a matter of internal Pakistani politics. Abandoned by many political allies and even by his military successor, Musharraf made the decision to resign the presidency and exit Pakistan’s political stage that month. Islamabad’s new civilian ruling dispensation was welcomed by U.S. leaders. In July 2008, President George W. Bush hosted Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani at the White House, where the two leaders issued a joint statement reaffirming the U.S.-Pakistan “Strategic Partnership.”3 In September, Benazir Bhutto’s widower Asif Ali Zardari—a controversial figure long bedeviled by corruption charges who had taken the reins of her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) upon her demise—ascended to the Pakistani presidency with the congratulations of senior U.S. officials. Later that month, a third round of the Pakistan-U.S. Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington, where the two sides “reaffirmed their commitments to a wide-ranging, substantive, and long-term strategic partnership.”4 President Zardari warns American audiences that failure to neutralize the militant threat in his country will have global repercussions and he requests immediate financial assistance along with increased trade to foster Pakistan’s economic independence. 5 There exist widely held suspicions among foreign governments and independent analysts alike that Islamabad’s civilian leaders do not fully control the army, that the army does not fully control the intelligence agencies, and that these intelligence agencies have lost their ability to rein in the very militant groups they helped to create. Moreover, anti-American sentiments are deep and widespread in Pakistan, with a significant segment of the populace viewing years of U.S. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization there. Underlying this sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam.6 The Bush Administration continued to proclaim its ongoing support for Musharraf even after his imposition of emergency rule and the later sweeping rejection of his parliamentary allies by Pakistani voters. However, during the course of 2008, that Administration shifted its long-standing Pakistan policies, in particular on the issue of democratization. Still, many Pakistanis remained resentful of perceived U.S. interference and pressure. Many also have been hopeful that the new U.S. administration of President Barack Obama would be less overbearing in its dealings with Islamabad and do more to nurture Pakistan’s nascent democratic institutions.7 3 See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080728-5.html. Gilani’s visit was panned by many analysts, who saw the new Pakistani leader failing to impress audiences in both Washington and Islamabad, thus further straining already tense bilateral relations (see, for example, “Gilani’s Poor Show in the US,” Jane’s Foreign Report, August 12, 2008). 4 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110444.htm. 5 Asif Ali Zardari, “The Frontier Against Terrorism” (op-ed), Washington Post, June 22, 2009. 6 Kenneth Ballen, “Bin Laden’s Soft Support,” Washington Monthly, May 2008. A mid-2009 opinion poll found fully 88% of Pakistani respondents believing it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide the Muslim world (see http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_rpt.pdf). 7 “Pakistanis Hope U.S. Under Obama Will Be Less Bossy,” Reuters, November 5, 2008. Congressional Research Service 2 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Key Current Issues and Developments Pakistan’s worsening economic conditions, fluid political setting, and perilous security circumstances make the job of U.S. decision makers difficult. On the economic front, the civilian government in Islamabad faces crises that erode its options and elicit growing public resentment. On the political front, an unprecedented ruling coalition including the country’s two leading mainstream parties collapsed almost immediately upon the resignation of President Musharraf, without having enacted any major policies. A more narrow ruling coalition then narrowly survived a March 2009 crisis. On the security front, Pakistan is the setting for multiple armed Islamist insurgencies, some of which span the border with Afghanistan and contribute to the destabilization of that country. Al Qaeda forces remain active on Pakistani territory. In September 2008, at least 53 people were killed and hundreds wounded when a suicide truck bomber attacked the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. Pakistani officials suspect Taliban militants based in western tribal areas of perpetrating the bombing. The attack—called “Pakistan’s 9/11” by some observers—spurred numerous commentaries arguing that the “war on terrorism” could no longer be perceived as an “American war” as it clearly requires Pakistanis to fight in their own self-defense. 8 In February 2009, pro-Taliban militants consolidated their positions in the Swat Valley, reached a peace accord with the government, and began incursions into the Buner district only 60 miles from Islamabad. Upon this accord’s collapse in April, Pakistani security forces launched major and apparently successful offensive operations in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), encouraging U.S. and other Western observers that Islamabad is willing to undertake sustained counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, perhaps with the broader support of the Pakistani public, which may have a newly negative attitude toward indigenous religious extremists. Government military operations in northwestern Pakistan have created up to 3 million internally displaced persons in less than one year. The New U.S. Administration A key aspect of the Obama Administration’s new approach to Pakistan is the development of a more coherent policy, to include conditioning U.S. military aid to Islamabad on that government’s progress in combating militancy and also the tripling of nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of the Pakistani people, with a particular focus on the FATA region. President Obama, Vice President Joseph Biden, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton all supported the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2008 (S. 3263) as Senators in the 110th Congress, and they encourage the 111th Congress to pass a new version of that legislation in the 111th Congress (S. 962).9 Another Pakistan-specific bill, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009 (H.R. 1886) was passed by the full House in June 2009. Even as President-elect, Barack Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without “solving Pakistan” and working more effectively with that country, saying he thinks Pakistan’s 8 See, for example, “Admit It: This is Pakistan’s War” (editorial), News (Karachi), September 22, 2008. See Secretary of State Clinton’s confirmation hearing statements at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/ KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 9 Congressional Research Service 3 Pakistan-U.S. Relations democratically elected government understands the threat and will participate in establishing “the kind of close, effective, working relationship that makes both countries safer.”10 Pakistani President Zardari said his country looked forward to a “new beginning” in bilateral relations, but repeated his admonition that Pakistan “needs no lectures on our commitment [to fighting terrorism]. This is our war.” He has asked the Obama Administration to strengthen Pakistan’s democracy and economic development in the interest of fighting extremism. 11 Despite Pakistani hopes that President Obama will more energetically engage diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kashmir problem, the Administration has offered no public expressions of support for such a shift. Secretary of State Clinton has recognized the dangers of rising tensions in Kashmir while also deferring calls for greater U.S. involvement there, saying the U.S. role will continue to be as it was under the previous Administration: settlement facilitation, but no mediation.12 In what many observers considered to be a bracing U.S. government wake-up call to Islamabad, Secretary Clinton told a House panel in April that “the Pakistani government is basically abdicating to the Taliban and to the extremists.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates followed with his own warning that U.S.-Pakistan relations could suffer if Islamabad did not “take appropriate actions” to deal with the militant threat.13 Days later, President Obama himself expressed “grave concern” about the situation in Pakistan, offering that the “very fragile” civilian government there did not appear to have the capacity to deliver basic services to the Pakistani people. He further stated that this lack of capacity makes it difficult for the government to gain the support and loyalty of its people. He did, however, acknowledge that the Pakistani military was showing more seriousness in addressing the threat posed by militants.14 Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani issued a rare public statement of reaction to the U.S. criticisms, condemning the “pronouncements by outside powers raising doubts on the future of the country.” Shortly after, the Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, penned an article in which he downplayed fears of an extremist takeover in Pakistan and called the “panicked reactions” in the U.S. media counterproductive to the cause of strengthening Pakistani democracy or facilitating the counterterrorism effort. He warned that “ordinary Pakistanis are beginning to wonder if our alliance with the West is bringing any benefits at all.”15 The Obama Administration’s tone shifted after Pakistani forces launched major offensive operations against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley later in April. Visiting Islamabad and the camps of internally displaced persons in early June at the specific request of President Obama, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke saw Pakistan having turned a corner in both public attitudes toward the militants and in the military’s offensive posture in western regions. Secretary Clinton also expressed being “incredibly heartened by the resolve shown by the Pakistani people, government, and military.” Pentagon officials say they are “encouraged” by the Pakistani military effort, asserting that “sustained operations” will be key to success. In this regard, they look 10 See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635. Asif Ali Zardari, “Partnering With Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, January 28, 2009. 12 See http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. 13 Transcript: House Committee on Foreign Affairs Holds a Hearing on “New Beginnings: Foreign Policy Priorities in the Obama Administration,” April 22, 2009; “Pentagon Chief in Taliban Warning,” BBC News, April 23, 2009. 14 “Obama Transcript: First 100 Days,” CNN.com, April 29, 2009. 15 “Pakistan Army Chief Hits Back at US Criticism,” Financial Times (London), April 27, 2009; Husain Haqqani, “How Pakistan is Countering the Taliban” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2009. 11 Congressional Research Service 4 Pakistan-U.S. Relations favorably upon signals that Pakistan has undertaken “fairly significant combat operations in South Waziristan.”16 The Appointment of a U.S. Special Representative Two days after taking office, President Obama announced the appointment of former Clinton Administration diplomat Richard Holbrooke to be Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke’s central task will be to coordinate across the entire U.S. government to achieve U.S. strategic goals in the region. Secretary of State Clinton strongly recommended such an appointment on the grounds that Afghan-Pakistani relations were troubled and required special attention from Washington. 17 In accepting the job, Holbrooke called the Pakistan situation “infinitely complex” and noted the need to coordinate what he called a “clearly chaotic foreign assistance program.”18 Prior to the announcement, there was speculation that the new U.S. President would appoint a special envoy to the region with a wider brief, perhaps to include India and even Kashmir. Upon persistent questioning, a State Department spokesman insisted that Holbrooke’s mandate is “strictly” limited to dealing with “the Pakistan-Afghanistan situation.”19 Even some Pakistani analysts see Holbrooke’s leverage in Islamabad as being inherently limited by the omission of India from his brief.20 Given Ambassador Holbrooke’s reputation as a “bulldozer” with strong and sometimes negative views about South Asia’s circumstances, his appointment caused some consternation in the region. 21 One senior analyst—seeing “dim and dismal” prospects for Holbrooke—predicted that efforts to get Islamabad to finally shut down militant sanctuaries on Pakistani territory will be the single hardest test of the Special Representative. Indeed, a key task for Holbrooke may be determining whether Pakistan’s security establishment continues to see a strategic interest in maintaining links with Islamist extremist groups or whether lack of capacity for dealing with such groups is the crux of the problem. Other analysts warn that the regional setting is not amenable to increased U.S. diplomatic engagement and/or pressure, and that U.S. involvement could even backfire by breeding resentments in regional capitals. These observers urge instead a measured approach focused on the creation of a coherent and comprehensive U.S. regional strategy. 22 16 See the June 5, 2009, State Department press release at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/124399.htm; “Clinton Hails Pakistani Resolve in Battling Taliban,” USA Today, June 2, 2009; see the June 8, 2009, Defense Department press release at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4430; “U.S. Sees New Pakistan Combat Drive in Waziristan,” Reuters, June 8, 2009. 17 “Special Representative Holbrooke’s Role in Afghanistan and Pakistan” at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/ 2009a/02/116314.htm. 18 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115297.htm. In 2008, Holbrooke penned a Foreign Affairs article in which he declared that Afghanistan and Pakistan “now constitute a single theater of war.” Among the major problem areas identified with regard to U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, he called pacifying the “insurgent sanctuaries” in Pakistan’s tribal areas as being the toughest, noting that “Pakistan can destabilize Afghanistan at will—and has” (“Mastering a Daunting Agenda,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2008). 19 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jan/115448.htm. 20 Moeed Yusuf, “Welcome to South Asia, Mr. Holbrooke!” (op-ed), Friday Times (Lahore), February 6, 2009. 21 “New Envoy Unnerves South Asia,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2009; “South Asian Chasm of Mistrust Awaits Obama’s Envoy,” Reuters, February 8, 2009. 22 “For Holbrooke, Situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan is ‘Dim and Dismal’” (interview with Bruce Riedel), Council on Foreign Relations, January 28, 2009; “US Envoy Faces Tough S Asia Test,” BBC News, February 11, 2009; Daniel Markey, “So You Want to Be a Special Envoy,” Foreign Policy (online), January 2009. Congressional Research Service 5 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Ambassador Holbrooke has made multiple trips to the region in 2009. His maiden visit was made to “listen and learn the ground realities.” In Islamabad, the Ambassador heard expected requests for more U.S. assistance, as well as what was reported to be “universal” opposition to Predator strikes on Pakistani territory.23 In April, Holbrooke and Adm. Mullen traveled together for meetings with senior officials in Pakistan, where they reportedly sought to get Pakistan to step up its fight against Islamist militants. By some accounts, the duo was coolly received by Pakistani leaders who resent ongoing unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks and criticisms of the InterServices Intelligence agency. 24 When the visit continued in New Delhi, Holbrooke sought to forge unified purpose by identifying “a common threat, a common challenge, a common task” facing the United States, Pakistan, and India alike. Indian audiences can be skeptical of such a tack, given pervasive sentiments there that the Pakistani government is a fomenter, rather than pure victim, of Islamist extremism. 25 The Administration’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Policy Review In February, President Obama assigned former CIA official and current Brookings Institution scholar Bruce Riedel to lead a review that would bring together various other U.S. government strategy proposals for Afghanistan and Pakistan. His co-chairs in the process were Special Representative Holbrooke and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy. In March, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that conceives of the two countries as being part of “one theater of operations for U.S. diplomacy and one challenge for our overall policy.”26 The strategy is rooted in the assumption that, “The United States has a vital national security interest in addressing the current and potential security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” All elements of U.S. national power— including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—are to be brought to bear in attaining the “core goal” of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and in preventing their re-emergence in Pakistan or Afghanistan. To this end, the Administration intends to overcome the “trust deficit” the United States faces in the region and to “engage the Pakistani people based on our long-term commitment to helping them build a stable economy, a stronger democracy, and a vibrant civil society.”27 As such, the Administration supports the Enhanced Partnership With Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962). It also supports congressional passage of legislation that would provide duty-free treatment for certain goods from designated “Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” in Afghanistan and western Pakistan. There are seven key aspects of the new strategy for U.S.-Pakistan relations: (1) bolstering Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation; (2) engaging and focusing Islamabad on the common threat posed by extremism; (3) assisting Pakistan’s capability to fight the extremists; (4) increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan; (5) exploring other areas of bilateral economic cooperation; (6) strengthening Pakistani government capacity; and (7) asking for assistance from U.S. allies for 23 See http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/press-releases-2009.html; “In Pakistan, U.S. Special Envoy Finds Discontent,” New York Times, February 12, 2009. 24 “US Pushes Pakistan to Boost Fighting of Militants,” Associated Press, April 6, 2009; “Holbrooke’s Visit,” News (Karachi), April 11, 2009. 25 “U.S. Envoy Seeks Alliance With India and Pakistan Against Militants,” New York Times, April 9, 2009. 26 “Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009. 27 See the “White Paper” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf. Congressional Research Service 6 Pakistan-U.S. Relations both Afghanistan and Pakistan.28 The Administration thus supports a policy that would significantly increase nonmilitary aid to Pakistan and that would establish as yet undetermined “benchmarks” for measuring Islamabad’s success in combating extremism. President Obama stated that “we must focus our military assistance on the tools, training, and support that Pakistan needs to root out the terrorists. After years of mixed results, we will not provide a blank check.”29 Performance benchmarks for military aid are likely to concentrate on measures of violence. A process for establishing benchmarks was only just beginning as of late March, but the Administration intends to establish these “across the board.”30 Ambassador Holbrooke has asserted that, of the many challenges faced by the Administration in formulating its “AfPak” policy, the most daunting is dealing with western Pakistan and the “red lines” set by Islamabad barring foreign troops from operating there.31 Holbrooke believes the new approach differs from that of the previous Administration in its aim of better integrating “stovepiped” policies, in its greater resource endowment, and in its proposed effort to more directly counter the propaganda of Islamist radicals in the region. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator John Kerry welcomed the new strategy as “realistic and bold.” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Howard Berman also voiced strong support for the President’s plan to boost civilian assistance efforts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Zardari called the strategy “positive change” and welcomes increased U.S. aid as the best way to combat militancy. 32 Even well before the U.S. President announced the new regional strategy, Islamabad had expressed support for a regional approach emphasizing reconstruction and development, and warned that a past overemphasis on the military dimension had not proven fruitful. 33 Some analysts worried that the new strategy was in trouble even before its unveiling, as a weakened Pakistani government might be unable to serve as a viable counterpart in implementation.34 In April, when asked by a Senate panel how the Administration would know if its new strategy was working, Under Secretary of Defense Flournoy said there were “some very broad metrics” for Pakistani counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, and she promised that “in a very short amount of time” the Administration would provide details about more specific metrics. There are in Washington some analysts who argue that U.S. success in Afghanistan will require taking a far harder line with the Pakistani military than has been the case to date, perhaps by threatening to cut off all aid to compel better cooperation.35 28 Ibid. President’s speech at http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/03/27/obama-announces-new-strategy-for-afghanistanand-pakistan. 30 “Administration Officials Hold a News [sic] on the Administration’s Interagency Policy Review on Pakistan and Afghanistan,” CQ Transcriptions, March 27, 2009. 31 Ibid. 32 “President Obama’s Afghanistan- Pakistan (AFPAK) Strategy,” U.S. Department of State Foreign Press Center briefing, March 27, 2009; “Interview with Amb. Holbrooke and Gen. Petraeus,” Jim Lehrer Newshour (PBS) transcript, March 27, 2009; Sen. Kerry’s statement at http://kerry.senate.gov/cfm/record.cfm?id=310648; Rep. Berman’s statement at at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=603; “Pakistan’s President Praises Obama and Offers New Concession to Opposition,” New York Times, March 28, 2009. 33 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Feb/PR_62_09.htm. 29 34 “Pakistani Political Crisis Jeopardizes U.S. Regional Strategy,” Washington Post, March 17, 2009; “Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on US Policy Toward Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, April 1, 2009. 35 See, for example, Selig Harrison, “Face Down Pakistani Army” (op-ed), USA Today, April 1, 2009. Congressional Research Service 7 Pakistan-U.S. Relations U.S. policy options for addressing Pakistan’s myriad problems are quite limited, and the United States seeks to fight Pakistani militants by proxy, “through an army over which it has little control, and in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence.”36 A pair of May opinion articles in the Hong Kong-based Far Eastern Economic Review contained harsh, and in some ways representative, criticism of the Pakistani government and the new U.S. strategy. One called President Obama’s strategy “wholly inadequate” and said the real problem was Islamabad’s lack of will, not lack of capacity. Another argued that massive new foreign aid is unlikely to produce positive results because Pakistan’s central problem is a dysfunctional government that will not be repaired through infusions of foreign assistance, but rather requires the Pakistanis themselves to reform their own political system and restore the primacy of parliament. 37 May 2009 Trilateral Summit Following a February trilateral meeting of top diplomats from the United Sates, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Secretary of State Clinton announced that the format had proved valuable enough to continue on a regular basis.38 On May 6 and 7, President Obama hosted the Pakistani and Afghan presidents in Washington, where he characterized their meeting as one of “three sovereign nations joined by a common goal”: to permanently defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The U.S. President expressed being pleased that his counterparts were serious in addressing the threat posed by such extremists, and he stated that such trilateral meetings would continue on a regular basis.39 Secretary Clinton saw “very promising early signs” of improved trilateral cooperation, and said she was “quite impressed” by the recent Pakistani military operations.40 Press reports suggested that President Zardari’s meeting with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs left many Members confused and disappointed, with the Chairman quoted as saying Zardari “did not present a coherent strategy for the defeat of the insurgency.”41 Deteriorating Economic Circumstances42 Soaring inflation and unemployment, along with serious food and energy shortages, have elicited considerable economic anxiety in Pakistan. Such concerns weigh heavily on the civilian government. The Finance Ministry’s most recent annual Economic Survey (June 2009) reported dismal economic performance, growing fiscal and current account deficits, rising external debt, dwindling foreign exchange reserves, and a depreciating currency.43 Consumer prices in 2008 reached their highest levels since 1975, with an inflation rate above 25% for many months. The rupee’s value hit record lows, down more than 20% against the U.S. dollar for the year, and net international reserves have declined by more than half in only one year to around $7 billion. Two major international investor rating indices recently cut Pakistan’s sovereign debt rating to 36 “U.S. Options in Pakistan Limited,” Washington Post, May 4, 2009. 37 Jeff Smith, “Time to Get Tough With Pakistan” (op-ed), and Mosharraf Zaidi, “Pakistan Demands Money for Nothing” (op-ed), both in Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 2009. 38 See http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119864.htm. 39 See http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900331.pdf. 40 White House press briefing, May 6, 2009. 41 “Emphasis on Al Qaeda at Three-Way Talks,” New York Times, May 7, 2009. 42 See also “Economic Issues” section below and CRS Report RS22983, Pakistan’s Capital Crisis: Implications for U.S. Policy. 43 See http://www.finance.gov.pk/finance_economic_survey.aspx. Congressional Research Service 8 Pakistan-U.S. Relations “negative.” Moreover, serious power shortages have led to nationwide outages, triggering protests that turned violent at times and further harmed the economy. 44 Such economic deterioration likely leads to an increase in the pool of potential recruits for extremist groups.45 A senior International Monetary Fund (IMF) official saw Pakistan requiring “substantial external financing” to stabilize its economy. Estimates in the fall of 2008 had Pakistan urgently requiring at least $4 billion to avoid defaulting on its balance of payments. Islamabad first looked to intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank and to traditional close state allies such as China and Saudi Arabia. Meeting with no clear assurances, it then shifted attention to the recently created, informal “Friends of Pakistan” grouping of countries, which met in midNovember. Yet this “Plan B” also failed to generate the desired results.46 As a fallback position, Pakistani leaders approached the IMF to discuss infusions of desperately sought capital, although these came with stringent fiscal belt-tightening conditions that threatened to damage the government’s domestic political standing. In November the IMF reached a StandBy Arrangement (SBA) to provide a $7.6 billion loan to Pakistan aimed at resolving the country’s serious balance of payments difficulties. A first tranche of about $3.1 billion was delivered on November 24. An IMF official later expressed confidence that Islamabad possessed a sound strategy of action to include reducing unsustainably high fiscal deficits and tightening monetary policy to reduce inflation and boost foreign exchange reserves.47 In its first formal review of the SBA, the IMF in February reported being “impressed” by the Islamabad government’s “strong resolve to sustain prudent macroeconomic policies, strengthen and broaden the social safety net, and pursue reforms to enhance Pakistan’s medium-term growth prospects.”48 A second loan tranche of $847 million was delivered on April 1, 2009. In addition, the World Bank, which also has praised Islamabad’s stabilization program, intends to loan Pakistan up to $2 billion in 2009 to support economic growth and poverty-focused programs.49 The Friends of Pakistan (FOP) Group A “Friends of Pakistan” (FOP) group was launched in September 2008, when President Zardari and the top diplomats of the United Arab Emirates, Britain, and the United States were joined by foreign ministers from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey, and representatives of China, the European Union, and the United Nations. A resulting statement expressed agreement to work in strategic partnership with Pakistan to combat violent extremism; develop a comprehensive approach to economic and social development; coordinate an approach to stabilizing and developing border regions; address Pakistan’s energy shortfall; and support 44 “Moody’s Cuts Pakistan’s Bond Outlook to Negative,” Reuters, September 23, 2008; “Electricity Outages Anger, Frustrate Pakistanis,” Associated Press, June 4, 2008. See also “Troubled Pakistan Economy Compounds Leaders’ Woes,” Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2008. 45 “Pakistan’s Slump Creates Openings for Terrorists,” USA Today, February 24, 2009. 46 In October, the lead U.S. diplomat for the region told an Islamabad audience that the purpose of the Friends of Pakistan effort was not to “throw money on the table” or to provide “a cash advance,” but rather to forward a “systematic process” in which foreign aid to Pakistan is optimally targeted (see http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/ 2008/111084.htm). 47 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/car111508a.htm and http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/ 2008/121108.htm. 48 IMF press release, February 25, 2009, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0948.htm. 49 World Bank press release, February 7, 2009. Congressional Research Service 9 Pakistan-U.S. Relations democratic institutions.50 The FOP met in Abu Dhabi in November to discuss the parameters of its work. Participants noted Pakistan’s formidable challenges and called for well-coordinated international action to address them. Such cooperation is planned for four broad areas: development, security, energy, and institution-building.51 In April, 31 countries and 18 international institutions sent representatives to an FOP/Donors’ Conference in Tokyo. There Ambassador Holbrooke announced the Administration’s intent to provide a total of $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan over the 2009-2010 period, calling the funds a “downpayment on President Obama’s commitment” to support pending Pakistan-specific legislation (S. 962).52 The U.S. pledge brought to more than $5 billion the total offered by the international community on top of the IMF package. In the lead-up to the conference, Pakistani officials called for a “Marshall Plan” for Pakistan that would provide $30 billion in international donations over a five-year period. The Pakistani Ambassador to the United States is among those who called such proposed aid “miniscule” when compared to the bailouts being provided to American automobile and other companies, a characterization that rankled some in Congress. 53 Increasing Islamist Militancy Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007. Pakistan is the site of numerous armed insurgencies of various scales that represent an increasingly severe threat to domestic, regional, and perhaps global security.54 The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that, “Radical elements in Pakistan have the potential to undermine the country’s cohesiveness.” A September 2008 report by leading U.S.-based experts on Pakistan claimed that, “Militant groups freely meet, train, and raise funds throughout Pakistan.”55 According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 (released April 2009), The United States remained concerned that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan were being used as a safe haven for Al Qaeda (AQ) terrorists, Afghan insurgents, and other extremists. ... The coordination, sophistication, and frequency of suicide bombings that increased sharply in 2007, continued to grow in Pakistan in 2008. ... Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud and other AQ-related extremists spread north throughout the FATA with 50 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/sept/110353.htm. 51 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/Nov/PR_345_08.htm. During President Zardari’s June 2009 visit to Brussels, EU officials pledged to provide as much as $92 million in new humanitarian aid. 52 See the State Department’s April 17, 2009, press release at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/04/121822.htm. 53 “Pakistan Asks U.S. for 30 Billion Dollar ‘Marshall Plan’ to Stabilize Region” (interview), Washington Times, April 8, 2009. 54 For example, in late 2008, the British Prime Minister estimated that three-quarters of the most serious terrorism plots investigated in Britain had links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan (“Brown Offers Pakistan Anti-Terror Aid,” Washington Post, December 15, 2008). 55 See http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080227_testimony.pdf and http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/ attachments/PakistanPolicyWorkingGroupReport.pdf. One mid-2008 Pakistani newspaper editorial estimated that only 30% of the country or less was under the effective writ of the state, down from about half in the late 1990s. Another lamented that “it is quite obvious that the militants call the shots” in much of western Pakistan. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, “Militancy is spreading and recruitment is in full swing.” The group cites what it calls credible reports that “militants are being handled with kid gloves while security forces are regularly using excessive force against noncombatants” (“Is There Peace Deal with the Terrorists or Not?” (editorial), Daily Times (Lahore), June 11, 2008; “Militant Menace” (editorial), News (Karachi), June 25, 2008; “HRCP Urges Holistic Approach to Combating Militants,” Press Release, June 3, 2008). Congressional Research Service 10 Pakistan-U.S. Relations an increased presence in Bajaur and Khyber. In most of the FATA, the militants continued to openly challenge the writ of the state with high levels of violence. ... There was a growing trend of militants garnering support by promising to fill a vacuum left by “ineffective” government structures.56 The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reports that the incidence of terrorism in Pakistan in 2008 was more than double that of the previous year, with 2,293 terrorism-related fatalities placing the country second in the world on such a scale, after Iraq. The country also suffered 1,264 kidnappings in 2008, the most in the world and more than double the number in neighboring Afghanistan.57 Only two suicide bombings were reported in Pakistan in 2002; that number grew to 59 in 2008. Pakistan’s intelligence agency reports that Pakistan has overtaken Iraq as site of the world’s most suicide-bombing deaths. Pakistani police have proven unable to deal with suicide attacks, given a dearth of proper training and equipment. By nearly all accounts, Pakistani law enforcement personnel are outgunned and out-financed by militants.58 The myriad militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have displayed mutual animosity in the past, have increased their levels of coordination and planning. According to Secretary of Defense Gates, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and other affiliated groups are “all working together” in safe havens on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line.59 The FATA has been called “the most ungoverned, combustible region in the world,” and an unrelenting surge in Islamist-related violence in Pakistan has some observers fearing for the stability of the civilian government in Islamabad and even the potentially total collapse of the Pakistani state.60 Representative of such concerns are the warnings of a senior regional analyst who asserts that a “chronic failure of leadership” by Pakistani civilians and military alike had left “state institutions paralyzed” and brought the country “close to the brink, perhaps not of a meltdown of the government, but to a permanent state of anarchy.”61 Top Islamabad government officials identify terrorism and extremism as Pakistan’s most urgent problems. They vow that combating terrorism is their top priority, and President Zardari stated in June 2009 that his government would “continue this war to the end.”62 Opinion surveys in Pakistan in late 2008 and early 2009 found strong support for an Islamabad government emphasis on negotiated resolutions. They also showed scant support for unilateral U.S. military action on Pakistani territory.63 As Islamist-related violence in Pakistan increases in intensity, Pakistani animosity toward U.S. policies appears to grow, as well. Afghan and Pakistan Taliban militants 56 See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122434.htm. NCTC 2008 report at http://wits.nctc.gov/ReportPDF.do?f=crt2008nctcannexfinal.pdf; Asif Ali Zardari, “The Terrorists Want to Destroy Pakistan, Too” (op-ed), New York Times, December 9, 2008. 58 See http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/Fidayeenattack.htm ; “Suicide Attacks a Growing Threat in Pakistan,” Christian Science Monitor,” October 10, 2008; “Neither Safe Nor Sorry,” Herald (Karachi), December 2008; “Pakistan Losing Fight Against Militants,” Associated Press, December 5, 2008. 59 Transcript: “Meet the Press With David Gregory,” March 1, 2009. 60 “Like the Wild, Wild West, Plus Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, March 30, 2008; “Analysts Fear Pakistan Could Fall to Extremists,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2008; “Islamist Insurgency Threatens Pakistan’s Fledgling Democracy,” Agence France Presse, December 7, 2008; “Militants Killing Laughter and Music in Pakistan Region,” Reuters, February 9, 2009. 61 Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink,” New York Review of Books, June 11, 2009. 62 Quoted in “Pakistan’s Zardari Vows to Fight Taliban to the End,” Reuters, June 12, 2009. 63 See http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf and http://www.iri.org/ newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp. 57 Congressional Research Service 11 Pakistan-U.S. Relations may also be closing ranks in preparation for an expected influx of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. In March, one of a trio of senior Taliban commanders in the FATA told an interviewer that Pakistanbased militants are specifically targeting U.S. troops in Afghanistan.64 U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told a House panel in 2009 that, No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan taking control of its border areas and improving governance and creating economic and educational opportunities throughout the country. In 2008, Islamabad intensified counterinsurgency efforts, but its record in dealing with militants has been mixed, as it balances conflicting internal and counterterrorist priorities. The government is losing authority in the north and the west and even in the more developed parts of the country. Mounting economic hardships and frustration over poor governance have given rise to greater radicalization.65 Threats to Punjab and Sindh Lahore—the provincial capital of Punjab and so-called cultural heart of Pakistan—was for many years mostly unaffected by spiraling violence elsewhere in the country. This conclusively ended with three major terrorist attacks in less than three months in early 2009: On March 3, about a dozen terrorists attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team with automatic weapons, rockets, and hand grenades as it was being driven through central Lahore. Six players were wounded, and six policemen in another vehicle were killed along with two by-standers. Most or all of the assailants escaped, and the security lapses were a major international embarrassment for the Pakistani state. Then, on March 30, militants loyal to Baitullah Mehsud attacked a police academy in Manawan—near the Indian border and only a few miles from central Lahore—killing eight cadets and wounding scores more before elite commandos secured the facility in a day-long siege. Four extremists were reported killed during the commando raid. Mehsud himself claimed the attack was revenge for U.S.-launched drone attacks in Pakistan.66 Finally, on May 27, terrorists used automatic weapons and a car bomb in a failed effort to attack the Punjabi headquarters of the ISI. Security personnel apparently prevented the suicide bombers from reaching the target building, but their explosives leveled a neighboring building and the assault left 27 people dead, including an ISI agent, 12 policemen, and several civilian bystanders. Such attacks heighten the sense of crisis surrounding Pakistan’s civilian leaders. Militants from western Pakistan appear intent on attacking Lahore to demonstrate the extent of their capabilities and to threaten the government’s writ throughout the country.67 Following the May suicide assault, Army Chief Gen. Kayani said Pakistan “will not be terrorized” and he vowed to press ahead with efforts to “defeat the destabilizing forces that are out to harm the country.”68 64 “Pakistani and Afghan Taliban Unify in Face of U.S. Influx,” New York Times, March 27, 2009; “Taliban Commander Says U.S. Troops Are Being Targeted,” ABC News.com, March 18, 2009. 65 Transcript: “House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Holds Hearing on ‘Worldwide Threats,’” February 25, 2009. 66 “Militant Claims Responsibility for Pakistan Attack,” New York Times, April 1, 2009. 67 “Sense of Crisis Deepens in Pakistan After Lahore Attack,” Reuters, March 3, 2009; “Why Attack Lahore?,” BBC News, March 30, 2009; “Insurgent Threat Shifts in Pakistan,” Washington Post, March 31, 2009. 68 See the Inter-Service Public Relations May 28, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/28. Congressional Research Service 12 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Islamist militants may be increasing their influence in southern Punjab, where most anti-India groups have originated and where a number of Taliban cells have already been discovered. 69 A report from the Brussels-based International Crisis Group urged Islamabad to end its effort to differentiate between militant networks and instead move toward a “zero-tolerance” policy, especially with regard to Punjab-based Sunni extremist organizations. 70 The “Punjabi Taliban,” a loose conglomeration of banned militant groups in the Pakistani heartland, are comparatively better educated and better equipped than their Pashtun countrymen, and are notable for having in many cases enjoyed state patronage in the recent past.71 An apparent consolidation of an alliance between Taliban forces from western Pakistan and indigenous Punjabi extremists is identified as having the potential to seriously destabilize the Pakistani state.72 Extremists may also be moving from the FATA to Karachi in large numbers in 2009, exacerbating preexisting ethnic tensions and perhaps forming a new Taliban safe haven in Pakistan’s largest city. In April, at least 20 people were killed in ethnic clashes pitting Muhajirs against Pashtuns in Karachi.73 A human rights group has warned that an influx of Pashtuns displaced by combat in the northwest into Karachi’s Sindh province is leading to discrimination and could further inflame interethnic tensions.74 Conflict in Western Pakistan and the Afghan Insurgency75 An ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and its connection to developments in Pakistan remain matters of serious concern to U.S. policy makers. It is widely held that success in Afghanistan cannot come without the close engagement and cooperation of Pakistan, and that the key to stabilizing Afghanistan is to improve the longstanding animosity between Islamabad and Kabul. In September 2008, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen said he viewed the two countries as “inextricably linked in a common insurgency” and had directed that maps of the Afghan “battle space” be redrawn to include the tribal areas of western Pakistan. 76 As Presidentelect, Barack Obama asserted that Afghanistan cannot be “solved” without “solving Pakistan” and working more effectively with that country.77 Numerous other senior U.S. officials—both civilian and military—share the view that Pakistan and Afghanistan are best considered as a single “problem set” in the context of U.S. interests.78 69 “Pakistan Fears Taliban Will Regroup in South,” Financial Times (London), June 25, 2009; “Meeting Punjab’s Police and Bombers,” BBC News, June 25, 2009. 70 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” Asia Report No. 164, March 13, 2009. 71 Hasan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel 2:4, April 2009. 72 “Insurgents Make Inroads in Key Pakistan Province,” New York Times, April 14, 2009. 73 “Pakistan Influx Fans Karachi Tensions,” BBC News, February 12, 2009; “Are the Taliban Finding a New Foothold in South?,” Christian Science Monitor, May 6, 2009; “Refugee Crisis Inflames Ethnic Strife in Pakistan,” Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2009; “Deadly Clashes Rock Pakistan City, BBC News, April 29, 2009. 74 See Amnesty International’s July 2, 2009, press release at http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/ pakistan-more-two-million-people-living-outside-displacement-camps-face-. 75 See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. 76 Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008. 77 See the December 7, 2008, “Meet the Press” transcript at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28097635. 78 “Petraeus: Afghan, Pakistan Problems Are Really One,” Associated Press, January 9, 2009; “National Security Advisor Say Pakistan is Top U.S. Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2009. Congressional Research Service 13 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Many independent analysts agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy “sanctuary” in Pakistan, their Afghan insurgency will persist. U.S. civilian and military now call for a more comprehensive strategy for fighting the war in Afghanistan, one that will encompass Pakistan’s tribal regions. According to a 2008 Pentagon report, the existence of militant sanctuaries inside Pakistan’s FATA represents “the greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan.” In March 2009, an American combat commander in Afghanistan claimed that major Taliban attacks inside that country continue to occur only with an “almost absolute reliance on foreign fighters from Pakistan and other countries.” Despite an upswing in Pakistani military efforts in western Pakistan, U.S. requests that Pakistan “do more” in its fight against the Taliban did not recede: In April, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan said Pakistan “must erase these [Taliban] safe havens” near the border. However, more recently, a U.S. combat officer said that Pakistani military operations were having a major impact on the ability of Taliban forces to operate on both sides of the Durand Line and that U.S. military efforts in eastern Afghanistan were being coordinated with the Pakistanis to maximize this effect.79 Afghan officials accuse Pakistani officials of aiding and abetting terrorism inside Afghanistan. Islamabad has sought to allay fears that truces in the tribal regions would lead to more crossborder attacks, assuring Afghan officials that Pakistan makes no distinction between Pakistani and Afghan interests on this issue.80 Yet Afghan President Karzai has specifically named Baitullah Mehsud and Maulana Fazlullah among the anti-Afghan militants he wishes to see neutralized.81 Pakistan’s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory.82 The “Kandahari clique” reportedly operates not from Pakistan’s tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta.83 Many analysts believe that Pakistan’s intelligence services know the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leadership elements and likely even maintain active contacts with them at some level as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Some reports indicate that elements of Pakistan’s major intelligence agency and military forces aid the Taliban and other extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire support for Taliban offensives (see also “Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency” below). 84 Other reports indicate that U.S. military personnel have been unable to count on the 79 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” June 2008; Defense Department press release, March 6, 2009, at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx? transcriptid=4367; “US Commander: Pakistan Must Do More to Fight Taliban,” Reuters, April 19, 2009; U.S. colonel’s June 23, 2009, comments at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4437. 80 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/June/PR_156_08.htm. Some nongovernmental commentators in Pakistan openly insist that Pakistan’s domestic security is the primary goal and helping Afghanistan is a secondary objective, only (see, for example, Khalid Aziz, “Has Waziristan Stabilized?” (op-ed), News (Karachi), June 7, 2008). 81 “Karzai Threatens to Send Soldiers Into Pakistan,” New York Times, June 15, 2008. Afghan intelligence officials claimed that suicide bombers who undertook a brazen daylight attacks in Kabul in February 2009 were trained at camps in the FATA (“Pakistan Accused of Link to Kabul Attacks,” New York Times, March 20, 2009). 82 “Right at the Edge,” New York Times, September 7, 2008; “Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game,” Newsweek, September 15, 2008. 83 Mukhtar Khan, “Quetta: The Headquarters of the Afghan Taliban,” CTC Sentinel 2,5, May 2009. 84 See, for example, “Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,” Salon.com, March 10, 2008. One U.S. military officer claimed that Pakistani military forces flew multiple helicopter missions to resupply Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province in 2007. The Islamabad government angrily denied the claims and a former top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan cast doubt on their veracity. In another example, an October 2008 press report claimed that British officials covered up evidence that a Taliban commander killed in Afghanistan in 2007 was in fact a Pakistani military officer (“Pakistani Forces Helped Taliban in 2007: U.S. Lt. Col.,” Defense News, September 22, 2008; (continued...) Congressional Research Service 14 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Pakistani military for battlefield support and do not trust Pakistan’s Frontier Corps, whom some say are active facilitators of militant infiltration into Afghanistan. At least one senior U.S. Senator has questioned the wisdom of providing U.S. aid to a group that is ineffective, at best, and may even be providing support to “terrorists.”85 As pressure on Islamabad to curtail the cross-border attacks has increased, Pakistani officials more openly contend that the problem is essentially internal to Afghanistan and has its roots in the inability of the Kabul government to effectively extend its writ, and in the lack of sufficient Afghan and Western military forces to defeat the Taliban insurgents. This view is supported by some independent analyses.86 Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. They ask interested partners to enhance their own efforts to control the border region by undertaking an expansion of military deployments and checkposts on the Afghan side of the border, by engaging more robust intelligence sharing, and by continuing to supply the counterinsurgency equipment requested by Pakistan. Islamabad touts the expected effectiveness of sophisticated technologies such as biometric scanners in reducing illicit cross-border movements, but analysts are pessimistic that such measures can meaningfully address militant infiltration, as such elements generally skirt border checkposts, in any case.87 U.S./NATO Supply Routes With roughly three-quarters of supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan moving either through or over Pakistan, insurgents in 2008 began more focused attempts to interdict NATO supply lines, especially near the historic Khyber Pass connecting Peshawar with Jalalabad, Afghanistan. Such efforts included a March 2008 attack that left 25 fuel trucks destroyed. In November, scores of masked militants hijacked a supply convoy of 13 trucks, capturing loads of wheat along with two Humvees. Weeks later, insurgents set fire to nearly 100 trucks, destroying at least 50 cargo containers and killing several Pakistani drivers in the process. At year’s end, the Pakistani military reportedly launched a major offensive in the Khyber agency aimed at securing the supply route, which was temporarily closed during the height of the fighting. Despite the Pakistani effort, sporadic interdiction attacks continue to date.88 U.S. military officials claim that attacks on supply routes have a negligible effect on combat operations in Afghanistan, with only about 1% of the cargo moving from the Karachi port into Afghanistan being lost to such attacks, and with stockpiled supplies that could last 60-90 days in the event of a severing of the supply chain. 89 Nevertheless, in the fall of 2008 the U.S. military (...continued) “Taliban Leader Killed by SAS Was Pakistan Officer,” London Sunday Times, October 12, 2008). 85 “Border Complicates War in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, April 4, 2008; “Democrat Questions US Aid to Pakistan,” Associated Press, May 27, 2008. 86 See, for example, “As ISAF Command Changes, Time for a Reality Check on the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, June 4, 2008; “American Failure in Afghanistan & Need for a New Social Contract in the FATA,” Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, July 2008. 87 See http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/July/PR_208_08.htm; “Stopping Terrorists” (editorial), News (Karachi), June 10, 2008. 88 “Taliban Hits NATO Supply Line,” New York Times, February 4, 2009; “Militants in Pakistan Torch Afghan-Force Supplies,” Reuters, March 15, 2009. 89 “US Plays Down Impact of Convoy Attacks in Pakistan,” Reuters, December 8, 2008. In April 2009, Centcom Commander Gen. Petraeus told a House panel that between February 15 and March 15 roughly 3,600 NATO cargo containers went through the Khyber Pass and only about 1% of these was damaged or destroyed in transit (“House (continued...) Congressional Research Service 15 Pakistan-U.S. Relations began testing alternative routes, concentrating especially on lines from Central Asia and Russia. Moscow agreed to allow non-lethal NATO supplies to Afghanistan to cross Russian territory, but apparently declines to allow passage of troops as sought by NATO. The Centcom commander subsequently reported that alternative routes had been secured, but it is not yet clear whether these can carry the kind of heavy traffic seen in Pakistan. In March, an alternate route through Russian and Uzbek territory opened for nonlethal cargo. It is expected to carry about 500 containers per month, less than one-seventh of that taken through Pakistan.90 Pro-Taliban Militants in the Tribal Agencies Fighting between government security forces and religious militants intensified in 2008. Shortly after former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s December 2007 assassination, the Pakistan army undertook a major operation against militants in the South Waziristan agency assumed loyal to Baitullah Mehsud. Occasionally fierce fighting continued in that area throughout the year and into 2009. The NWFP governor has claimed Mehsud oversees an annual budget of up to $45 million devoted to perpetuating regional militancy. Most of this amount is thought to be raised through narcotics trafficking, although pro-Taliban militants also sustain themselves by demanding fees and taxes from profitable regional businesses such as marble quarries. The apparent impunity with which Mehsud is able to act has caused serious alarm in Washington, where officials worry that his power and influence are only growing.91 The Pakistani Taliban The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emerged as a coherent grouping in late 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud’s leadership. This “Pakistani Taliban” is said to have representatives from each of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the “settled” districts abutting the FATA. There appears to be no reliable evidence that the TTP receives funding from external states. The group’s principal aims are threefold: (1) to unite disparate pro-Taliban groups active in the FATA and NWFP; (2) to assist the Afghan Taliban in its conflict across the Durand Line; and (3) to establish a Taliban-style Islamic state in Pakistan and perhaps beyond. As an umbrella group, the TTP is home to tribes and sub-tribes, some with long-held mutual antagonism. It thus suffers from factionalism. Mehsud himself is believed to command 5,000-10,000 militants. 92 In August 2008, the Islamabad government formally banned the TTP due to its involvement in a series of suicide attacks in Pakistan. (...continued) Armed Services Committees Holds Hearing on the New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” CQ Transcripts, April 2, 2009). 90 Pentagon Seeks New Afghan Supply Routes,” Financial Times (London), September 23, 2008; “U.S. to Widen Supply Routes in Afghan War,” New York Times, December 31, 2008; “U.S. Secures New Supply Routes to Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 21, 2009; “Seeking Safe Supply Routes,” Chicago Tribune, February 2, 2009; “Avoiding Pakistan, New Supply Route to Afghanistan Opens,” New York Times, March 4, 2009. 91 “Mehsud Spending Up to 3bn on Militancy Annually: Ghani,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 30, 2008; “Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business,” New York Times, July 14, 2008; “Taliban Leader Flaunts Power Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, June 2, 2008. 92 “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, October 28, 2008; Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel, January 2008. Congressional Research Service 16 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Militancy in western Pakistan is not coherent, and Taliban forces there are riven by deep-seated tribal rivalries that may prevent the TTP from ever becoming a truly unified force. Some analysts believe that by pursuing sometimes contradictory military strategies in the region the United States and Pakistan have missed a chance to exploit such divisions. According to this argument, U.S.-launched missile strikes have a unifying effect on the militants and so undermine the Pakistani strategy of driving a wedge between various Islamist factions.93 In 2009, U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly have launched a major effort to examine potential fault lines within the Islamist militant groups of western Pakistan with an eye toward exploiting rifts with diplomatic and economic initiatives, a strategy associated with Gen. Petraeus that realized successes in Iraq.94 Some scholars argue, however, that the Taliban is not nearly as fragmented as many believe, but rather is a decentralized organization, and that distinctions between Pakistani and Afghan networks are largely arbitrary.95 Pakistani Military Operations The Pakistan army has deployed some 120,000 regular and paramilitary troops to western Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there. Their militant foes have employed heavy weapons in more aggressive tactics, making frontal attacks on army outposts instead of the hitand-run skirmishes of the past. Pakistan has sent major regular army units to replace Frontier Corps soldiers in some areas near the Afghan border and has deployed elite, U.S.-trained and equipped commandos to the tribal areas.96 Ongoing battles with militants have concentrated on three fronts: the Swat valley, and the Bajaur and South Waziristan tribal agencies. Yet the strife has affected other areas of western Pakistan. Taliban forces may also have opened a new front in the Upper Dir valley of the NWFP, where one report says a new militant “headquarters” has been established. 97 In late 2008 and early 2009, Taliban forces also spread their activities into the previously relatively peaceful Orakzai agency, the only in the FATA that does not border Afghanistan.98 Moreover, an unprecedented January 2009 attack on a Frontier Corps outpost in the Mohmand district by some 600 Taliban militants represented an unusual reversal in that the militants had crossed into Pakistan from Afghanistan, signaling increased coordination by Taliban units spanning the border.99 Military Operations in the Tribal Agencies “Operation Sher Dil,” launched in Bajaur in September 2008, reportedly caused the deaths of more than 1,500 militants and some 100 soldiers before Pakistani officials declared it successfully completed in February. Still, pessimistic analysts view the gains from such operations as 93 94 “Tribal Tribulations – The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 13, 2009. “US Probes Divisions Within Taliban,” Boston Globe, May 24, 2009. 95 See, for example, Antonio Giustozzi, “One or Many? The Issue of the Taliban’s Unity and Disunity,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief No. 48, April 23, 2009. 96 “Pakistan May Step Up Action Against Insurgents,” Los Angeles Times, August 3, 2008. 97 “Taliban Opens New Front in Pakistan,” Daily Telegraph (London), September 19, 2008. 98 “Six Killed in Orakzai Agency Suicide Blast,” Daily Times (Lahore), December 6, 2008; “Orakzai Becomes New Haven for Taliban,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 4, 2009. 99 “46 Die in Taliban Attack on Pakistani Troops,” New York Times, January 12, 2009. Congressional Research Service 17 Pakistan-U.S. Relations temporary and predict that widespread militant presence in Bajaur and neighboring regions is apt to continue in the future. A new peace agreement was signed with Bajaur’s tribal elders, but it appears that the bulk of militants forces repositioned themselves, and the army’s heavy bombardments may have alienated large segments of the local population.100 Some 8,000 Pakistani troops were backed in Bajaur by helicopter gunships and ground attack jets. The Frontier Corps’ top officer estimated that militant forces in the agency numbered about 2,000, including foreigners. Battles included a series of engagements at the strategic Kohat tunnel, a key link in the U.S. military supply chain running from Karachi to Afghanistan.101 The fighting apparently attracted militants from neighboring regions and these reinforced insurgents were able to put up surprisingly strong resistance, complete with sophisticated tactics, weapons, and communications systems, and reportedly made use of an elaborate network of tunnels in which they stockpile weapons and ammunition. 102 Sporadic military operations in the FATA have been ongoing, with Pakistani authorities sometimes reporting significant militant casualties, although these claims cannot be corroborated. Civilians are often killed in the fighting. 103 The Pakistani military reports that many FATA tribal leaders are fully supportive of the army’s efforts there.104 In June 2009, Pakistani security forces apparently opened a new front for offensive operations in the northwest. During the second week of the month, some 800 militants reportedly moved into the Bannu region 90 miles southwest of Peshawar.105 The army responded with artillery and helicopter gunship assaults on Taliban positions. Operations were expanded into South Waziristan with multiple strikes by fixed-wing aircraft in direct response to Taliban-launched suicide attacks. On June 14, the NWFP governor announced that the government was preparing to begin military operations targeting Baitullah Mehsud and his loyalists in South Waziristan, with army troops reportedly massing in surrounding areas. Within days, the troops were reported to have virtually surrounded Mehsud-controlled areas (on the Pakistani side of the international border), though no ground operation has been launched to date. Islamabad has ramped up pressure by posting large monetary rewards for information leading to the death or capture of Mehsud and his deputies. A military blockade of Mehsud’s strongholds and weeks of near-constant airstrikes against his fighters’ positions have no doubt weakened Taliban forces in South Waziristan, yet the June 23 assassination of a key pro-government tribal leader there demonstrated that Mehsud remained a potent enemy able to violently suppress local opposition.106 100 “Pakistan Says Wins Key Region on Afghan Border,” Reuters, February 28, 2009; “28-Point Bajaur Peace Accord Signed,” News (Karachi), March 10, 2009; “Pakistan Regains Control of Remote Area, For Now,” New York Times, March 9, 2009.. 101 “‘Stability in Bajaur Within Two Months,’” Daily Times (Lahore), September 27, 2008; “Pakistan and Taliban Battle for Key Tunnel,” London Sunday Times, October 19, 2008. 102 “Pakistani Troops Destroy Taliban Stronghold,” Financial Times (London), September 30, 2008; “8,000 Pakistani Soldiers Take on Al Qaeda in Volatile Tribal Region,” London Times, September 27, 2008. 103 See, for example, “Pakistan Militant Raid ‘Kills 50,’” BBC News, February 7, 2009; “11 Children Among 26 Killed in Darra Shelling,” News (Karachi), February 10, 2009. 104 See for example, the Inter-Services Public Relations’ February 7, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/ front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/2/7. 105 “Pakistan Lifts Veil on Not-So-Secret Waziristan War,” Reuters, May 20, 2008; “War on Taliban Sparks Refugee Crisis,” Sunday Times (London), November 16, 2008. 106 “Pakistan Treads Warily as New Fight Looms,” Washington Post, June 29, 2009. Congressional Research Service 18 Pakistan-U.S. Relations In June, North Waziristan militants loyal to Hafiz Gul Bahadar formally scrapped a 16-month-old peace deal with the government in what they called a protest against U.S. drone attacks in the region. Bahadar also reportedly demanded an end to military operations against Mehsud’s forces. Shortly after, some 150 militants ambushed a Pakistani army convoy moving through North Waziristan, killing up to 30 soldiers. Despite such provocation, there are no signs of a Pakistani military offensive in the region where Bahadar’s forces are active. Increased conflict in North Waziristan could, however, make more difficult the campaign against Mehsud.107 Some analysts suspect that the Pakistani military is setting what may, from a U.S. perspective, be overly narrow objectives in targeting Mehsud while leaving untouched other Taliban groups operating in the FATA. These include militant forces loyal to Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadar, and perhaps even Jalaluddin Haqqani, all of whom are seen to be focused on fighting U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan rather than against the Pakistani army. They are thus in some accounts considered to be “pro-government Taliban” with whom the Pakistani army may yet hope to conclude truce deals. 108 Indeed, to the extent that the Pakistani military’s motives are limited to ending Mehsud’s ability to launch attacks inside Pakistan, they may not sufficiently coincide with the U.S. aim of ending the region’s status as an Al Qaeda safe haven from which attacks inside Afghanistan and potentially on Western/U.S. targets can be plotted and launched.109 The Swat Valley Pakistan has since late 2007 faced a “neo-Taliban” insurgency in the scenic Swat Valley just 100 miles northwest of the capital, where radical Islamic cleric Maulana Fazlullah and some 5,000 of his armed followers seek to impose Sharia law. This rebellion against the state is notable as the only insurgency with geographic reach beyond the “tribal belt” and in part of Pakistan’s “settled areas” nearer the Indus river plains. Fazlullah, also known as “Maulana Radio” for his fiery (and unlicensed) FM broadcasts, moved to create a parallel government like that established by Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan. Some 2,500 Frontier Corps soldiers were deployed to the valley, and the army soon took charge of the counterinsurgency effort at the request of the provincial governor, massing about 15,000 regular troops. By the close of 2007, militant elements in the area were reported to be in retreat, and the Pakistani government claimed victory. 110 Yet, in 2008, with militants still active in Swat, government officials reportedly struck a peace deal. That deal collapsed by mid-year, with sporadic and sometimes heavy fighting in Swat continuing throughout the year.111 By all accounts, Islamist insurgents expanded their influence in Swat in 2008, and many observers asserted that by 2009 the state’s writ had completely vanished from the scenic valley. Over the course of 2008, scores of local police officers were killed by insurgents, many of them beheaded, and fully half of the region’s police force reportedly deserted in the face of brutal Taliban assaults.112 Aggressively pursuing their radical social agenda, Taliban militants issued an 107 “Second Front Opens in Waziristan Following Militant Attack,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 3, 2009. “Analysis: Waziristan Operation to Focus on Baitullah Mehsud,” Long War Journal, June 17, 2009. 109 “Gains in Pakistan Fuel Pentagon Optimism for Pursuing Al Qaeda,” Washington Post, June 13, 2009. 110 “Pakistan Claims Win in Crucial NW Valley,” Washington Post, December 15, 2007. 111 “Forces Launch New Offensive in Swat,” Dawn (Karachi), January 6, 2008; “Army Vows to Clear Swat of Militants,” News (Karachi), February 26, 2008; “Pakistan Clashes Take Heavy Toll,” BBC News, August 4, 2008. 112 “In Pakistan, Radio Amplifies Terror of Taliban,” New York Times, January 25, 2009; Kamila Hyat, “Debacle in Swat” (op-ed), News (Karachi), January 22, 2009; “In Pakistan, Swat Valley Cops Give Up Fight,” Christian Science (continued...) 108 Congressional Research Service 19 Pakistan-U.S. Relations edict that girls’ education cease as of mid-January. In response, the government ordered all private schools closed in the region. Pakistan’s army chief claimed that month that his forces “had both the will and resolve to establish the writ of government” in Swat.113 The 2009 Swat Accord By February, the NWFP chief minister was calling the problem a full-blown rebellion against the state, and President Zardari himself conceded that militant forces had established a “huge” presence in his country. Shortly after, Zardari reportedly agreed in principle to restore Sharia law in the Swat region in a bid to undercut any popular support for the uprising there.114 The accord announced on February 16 hung in limbo for nearly two months, with neither side willing to formalize its still clouded terms. 115 In addition to bringing Islamic law to the entire Malakand division of the NWFP (including Swat), the provisions of the accord reportedly included requirements that the Taliban recognize the writ of the state, give up their heavy weapons and refrain from displaying personal weapons in public, denounce suicide attacks, and cooperate with local police forces. In return for such gestures, the government agreed to gradually withdraw the army from the region.116 Pakistanis appeared to strongly support the government’s move. 117 President Zardari asserted that his government’s strategy in Swat was to engage “traditional local clerics to help restore peace in the area, and return the writ of the state.” He insisted that there was not and would not be any negotiations with the Taliban.118 The deal may have been an attempt at face-saving by a provincial government that had been badly discredited by the NWFP’s rapidly worsening security circumstances.119 It may also have been part of a “counter-spin” strategy by the Pakistani army, which would demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the government was not taking dictation from the United States, while also showing that the government was willing to negotiate. When the Taliban disregarded the provisions of the accord, Pakistani leaders would have more firm justification for an all-out military offensive. 120 On April 13, Zardari signed a regulation imposing Islamic law after Parliament passed a resolution recommending such a move. (...continued) Monitor, February 5, 2009. 113 See http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/1/28. 114 “Pakistani Violence Intensifies As Policy Wobbles,” Reuters, February 10, 2009; “Taliban is in ‘Huge’ Amounts of Pakistan: Zardari,” Reuters, February 13, 2009; “Pakistan Restores Islamic Law to Pacify Swat Valley,” Reuters, February 16, 2009. 115 “Taliban’s Terms Unclear,” Los Angeles Time; February 24, 2009. 116 “Secret Details of Swat Peace Accord,” News (Karachi), April 11, 2009. 117 According to one scientific opinion survey taken in March, an impressive 80% of Pakistani respondents supported the government’s decision to sign the Swat accord, with nearly that percentage believing the deal would bring peace to the region. A majority (56%) also expressed support for potential future Taliban demands to impose Sharia law in major Pakistani cities (see http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp). 118 Asif Zardari, “Pakistan is Steadfast Against Terror” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2009. 119 “Sharia Deal Saves ANP Govt?,” Pulse (Islamabad), February 20, 2009. 120 This narrative was conveyed by a Pakistani army spokesman in “Winning Over Pakistan,” Macleans (Toronto), may 21, 2009. Congressional Research Service 20 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Reactions to the Swat Accord The White House was critical of the April Sharia deal in Swat, saying that solutions to Pakistan’s security problems “don’t include less democracy and less human rights.” A State Department spokesman emphasized that the United States was “very concerned” and maintained a view that “violent extremists need to be confronted”121 Prime Minister Gilani dismissed U.S. criticisms by claiming the issue was an internal matter and that his government had no alternatives given the circumstances. Pakistan’s lead diplomat in Washington sought to assure a skeptical American audience that his government was not offering any concessions or ceding any ground to the Taliban, but rather was “attempting to drive a wedge” between Al Qaeda and Taliban militants on the one hand, and an indigenous Swati movement on the other, as part of a “pragmatic” strategy “to turn our native populations against the terrorists.”122 Still, most observers saw the deal as a blatant capitulation and unprecedented surrender of territory to a militant minority beyond the FATA, and as part of a disturbing broader trend. 123 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan marked April 13 as a day of “humiliating submission” by the government. London-based Amnesty International warned that the deal could legitimize human rights abuses that have taken place as Taliban influence increases. New York-based Human Rights Watch called the move a “grave threat” to the rights of women, especially. 124 A senior independent Pakistani analyst and former army general said the government “has yielded under compulsion at a time when Talibanization is sweeping the country and overwhelming the state.” Even a senior Pakistani Islamist politician, Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam chief Fazlur Rehman, told Parliament that the Taliban were threatening the Pakistani capital.125 The peace deal was particularly alarming for India, where officials feared it would further exacerbate the existing Islamist militant threat they face. The Pakistan army’s subsequent offensive operation was not entirely encouraging for New Delhi, as Islamabad was seen to be selectively targeting some extremist groups while leaving so-called “anti-India assets” undisturbed. 126 Accord Fails, Army Moves In As with past iterations of truce deals in the nearby FATA, the Swat accord was seen to give militants breathing space and an ability to consolidate their gains. Reports immediately arose that Taliban forces were moving into the valley by the thousands to establish training camps in the forests around Mingora, Swat’s largest town. Lucrative emerald mines came under control of militants and profits reportedly were used to finance attacks on NATO forces in Afghanistan.127 121 “US Criticizes Islamic Law Deal in Pakistan,” Associated Press, April 14, 2009; http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/ 2009/04/121748.htm. At least one report claimed that U.S. officials were privately supportive of a truce deal as an attempt to drive a wedge between Swat’s militants and the Al Qaeda-linked Pakistani Taliban led by Baitullah Mehsud (US Backs Sharia Plan to Split Muslim Extremists,” London Daily Telegraph, February 18, 2009). 122 “Gilani Defends Deal With Swat Militants,” Financial Times (London), April 20, 2009; Husain Haqqani, “We’re Not Ceding Ground” (op-ed), USA Today, February 19, 2009. 123 See, for example, Shuja Nawaz, “ Wariness in Pakistan” (op-ed), Boston Globe, February 22, 2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s Deal With the Devil” (op-ed), Los Angeles Times, February 24, 2009. 124 HRCP press release, April 14, 2009; AI press release, February 16, 2009; HRW press release, April 15, 2009. 125 Talat Masood, “Implications of the Deal” (op-ed), News (Karachi), April 20, 2009; “Taliban Nearing Capital, Warns Fazl,” News (Karachi), April 23, 2009. 126 “Pakistan’s Swat Offensive Leaves India Skeptical,” Reuters, May 18, 2009. 127 “Truce in Pakistan May Mean Leeway for Taliban,” New York Times, March 6, 2009; “Pakistan Peace Deal Gives New Clout to Taliban Rebels,” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2009; “Swat’s Taliban Expand Operations,” BBC News, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 21 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Fears that, rather than being placated by the truce, militants would use their Swat positions as a springboard from which to launch further forays were quickly confirmed. In early April, Taliban forces moved into the neighboring Buner district, now only 60 miles from the Pakistani capital. Local tribal militias put up resistance, but were quickly overwhelmed, and the Pakistani army had no local presence. Within two weeks Taliban forces were said to have taken full control of Buner. 128 Islamabad responded to the incursion with assurances that regular army troops would be used to evict militants from the district.129 In late April, Pakistani paramilitary troops supported by helicopter gunships reportedly were engaging militants in Buner and Lower Dir. At the same time, the army accused the militants of “gross violations” of the accord. 130 Pakistani commandos were airdropped into Buner’s main town and regained control, but heavy fighting forced many hundreds of civilians to flee. Some reports had the militants using civilians as “human shields.”131 The fighting pitted about 15,000 government troops against an estimated 4,000-5,000 militants. As militants appeared to consolidate their hold on large swaths of the NWFP, alarm grew in Washington that the Pakistani government may have lacked the will to sustain the fight; on May 4 Adm. Mullen expressed being “gravely concerned” about the progress made by militants. He indentified Pakistan’s simultaneous pursuit of peace deals and military operations as “strategic moves” that are, from an American perspective, “at cross purposes.”132 Secretary of Defense Gates concluded that the Swat agreement’s “failure,” followed by militant movements into neighboring Buner, was a “real wakeup call for the Pakistani government.”133 Heavy combat raged throughout May, with militants putting up strong resistance. When Taliban forces returned in large numbers to Mingora, army leaders reportedly resolved to finally abandon negotiations and press ahead with a larger offensive effort, this time with greater support from the Pakistani public.134 Still, the army itself continued to avoid heavy ground combat, preferring instead to employ helicopter gunships, aerial bombing, and artillery.135 By mid-May, Pakistani government officials were reporting that more than 1,000 militants had been killed in the military offensive, though these figures cannot be independently confirmed. Still, reports indicated that even in Buner the army was not in full control, and Pakistani commanders were acknowledging (...continued) April 21, 2009; “Taliban Jihad Against West Funded by Emeralds From Pakistan,” Sunday Telegraph (London), April 5, 2009. 128 “Taliban Swarm District Near Swat,” BBC News, April 8, 2009; “Pakistani Taliban Begin Imposing Rule in New Area,” Reuters, April 13, 2009; “Buner Falls to Swat Taliban,” Dawn (Karachi), April 22, 2009. 129 “Pakistan Military Prepares to Block Taliban Expansion,” Financial Times (London), April 25, 2009. 130 Inter-Services Public Relations press release, May 2, 2009, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/2. 131 “Taliban Face Human Shields Charge,” BBC News, May 4, 2009. 132 “Taliban Advance, Pakistan’s Wavering Worry Obama Team,” Washington Post; “U.S. Questions Pakistan’s Will to Stop Taliban,” New York Times, both April 24, 2009; “DoD News Briefing With Adm. Mullen From the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.,” May 4, 2009. 133 “Interview With Secretary Gates,” CNN.com, May 3, 2009. 134 “The Taliban Tightens Hold in Pakistan’s Swat Region,” Washington Post, May 5, 2009; “Pakistani Army Posed for New Push Into Swat,” New York Times, May 6, 2009. At one point, the army claimed to have killed up to 200 militants in in a single day (see http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/5/10). 135 “Pakistani Army Avoiding Close Combat With Taliban,” Associated Press, May 8, 2009; “Pakistan Says it is Stepping Up Attacks Against Taliban,” New York Times, May 13, 2009. Congressional Research Service 22 Pakistan-U.S. Relations that regaining full control of the region could take many months. 136 In late May, the battle for Mingora was engaged and a week later the army was declaring that Swat’s main city had been fully secured. On June 4, Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani told a Corps Commanders’ meeting that the tide in Swat had “decisively turned,” and he expressed hope that the government would immediately launch “a robust administrative effort” to enable the return of IDPs as soon as possible. By month’s end, the army was claiming to have cleared the last remaining Taliban stronghold in Swat. Nevertheless, sporadic lethal battles have continued in the region in July even as IDPs have begun returning. 137 If the summer passes and Swat is still seen to be unsecured, the Zardari government is likely to face growing domestic political problems. Some observers speculate that the military wants to substantively secure the Swat Valley before initiating an anticipated ground offensive in South Waziristan. The army reportedly plans to maintain a presence in Swat for at least six months and perhaps for as long as one year. One estimate sees reconstruction of Swat and four neighboring districts costing $1 billion or more.138 A senior Pakistani official reportedly claimed the two-month-long Swat offensive had left more than 3,500 militants dead, but Islamabad’s official body count stands at about 1,700. There are no independent confirmations of such claims. There are, however, signs that the Swat militants refrained from entering pitched battles with army forces and instead retreated back into rural areas, thus retaining the capability to harass both residents and security forces in the future. No top Taliban commanders are known to have been killed or captured and, by many accounts, the military succeeded only in establishing control of Malakand’s urban centers and main roadways. Particularly skeptical observers suspect that the Pakistani military has vastly over-reported Taliban casualties in a possible effort to impress an American audience and so continue to receive large assistance packages.139 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Violence between Pakistani security forces and religious militants in western Pakistan beginning in the first half of 2008 and continuing to date has driven millions of civilians from their homes and caused a humanitarian crisis of major proportions. Current estimates of the total number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) range from 1.9 million to 3.5 million, a significant discrepancy that in part reflects the difficulty of identifying and reaching a population that is scattered in villages, remote areas, and urban environments. 136 “Pakistan Army Struggles in Buner,” BBC News, May 20, 2009; “Pakistani Troops Make Gains Against Taliban in Swat Valley,” Washington Post, May 22, 2009. 137 See the June 4, 2009, press release at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2009/6/4; “Pakistani Troops Clear Taliban Stronghold in Swat,” Reuters, July 1, 2009; “Taliban Resurface in Parts of Buner District,” News (Karachi), July 18, 2009. 138 Inter-Services Public Relations press release, May 31, 2009, at http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=tpress_release&date=2009/5/31; “Pakistan Focus Turns to Swat Reconstruction,” Financial Times (London), May 26, 2009. 139 “Pakistan’s Victories Over the Taliban: Less Than Meets the Eye,” Time, June 1, 2009; “Taliban Losses Are No Sure Gain for Pakistanis,” New York Times, June 28, 2009; B. Raman, “The Missing Dead” (op-ed), Outlook (Delhi), June 24, 2009. Congressional Research Service 23 Pakistan-U.S. Relations According to one report, nearly half of the estimated 450,000 residents of the Mehsud territories of South Waziristan were driven from their homes by conflict in early 2008.140 The Pakistani military effort in Bajaur ran from mid-2008 to early 2009; some 300,000 refugees reportedly fled the region and many continue to live in makeshift camps near Peshawar.141 By June, following weeks of fierce combat in the Swat Valley, more than two million Pakistanis had been displaced, about half of them children. Less than 10% of these were reported to be staying in the 26 U.N.run camps; the remainder appear to have found haven with friends, relatives, or in “spontaneous shelters.”142 Beds and medicine have been in short supply in the affected areas; indeed, the crisis may be pushing Pakistan’s already deteriorated health care system to the brink of collapse. Humanitarian relief efforts inside Pakistan historically have been significantly hindered by bureaucratic snags and by corruption.143 International human rights groups have called for greater international assistance to civilians adversely affected by the more recent fighting in and around the Swat valley. One warned that citizens there were being left “at the mercy of the Taliban” and it accused the Pakistani government of “fiddling while the NWFP burns.” In May, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees called for a massive aid operation to cope with the new IDPs caused by the combat. To date, the United Nations has received less than half of the $543 million in requested international donations for Pakistani IDP relief. Aid agencies warn that the funding gap threatens to undermine their efforts to address what one called the worst funding crisis faced in a major humanitarian emergency in more than a decade. 144 On May 19, 2009, Secretary of State Clinton announced that some $110 million in urgent U.S. humanitarian assistance would flow into Pakistan, to include relief kits, tents, radios, and generators to provide light and water, along with many thousands of tons of wheat and other basic foodstuffs. Upon arriving in Islamabad and visiting IDP camps in early June at the explicit request of President Obama, Amb. Holbrooke announced that the United States would provide an additional $200 million in urgent humanitarian assistance to address Pakistan’s IDP problem. 145 In mid-June, a House committee hearing on the crisis heard testimony from several witnesses who warned against premature returns, but who also emphasized that fast action was required to forestall any increase in anti-government sentiments among the displaced. 146 140 “Pakistan Lifts Veil on Not-So-Secret Waziristan War,” Reuters, May 20, 2008. “Pakistan: People of Buner at Mercy of Taliban,” Amnesty International press release, April 23, 2009; “Pakistanis Flee Into Afghanistan,” BBC News, September 29, 2008; “War on Taliban Sparks Refugee Crisis,” Sunday Times (London), November 16, 2008. 142 These “invisible refugees” are placing a crushing burden on the country’s already insufficient infrastructure (“Pakistan’s ‘Invisible Refugees’ Burden Cities and Families’ Hospitality,” New York Times, June 18, 2009). 143 “Pakistan Hospitals, Camps Are Overwhelmed,” Los Angeles Times, May 15, 2009; “Pakistan Health Care Crumbles With Refugee Influx,” Associated Press, June 8, 2009; “Pakistan Appears Unprepared for ‘Massive Displacement,’” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2009. 144 “Aid Warning Amid Pakistan Unrest,” BBC News, June 11, 2009. 141 145 See the State Department’s press release at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/05/123640.htm and a June 3, 2009, press release at http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pr-09060301.html. 146 “Rep. John F. Tierney Holds a Hearing on U.S. Contributions to the Response to Pakistan’s Humanitarian Crisis,” CQ Transcriptions, June 16, 2009. Congressional Research Service 24 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Civil-Military Relations and Relief Efforts Poor civil-military coordination appears to have hindered humanitarian relief efforts. Civilian administration of the “underprepared, underfunded, and overwhelmed” undertaking has by many accounts been poor. 147 The Islamabad government’s relief and reconstruction efforts are being overseen by a federal Special Support Group (SSG) of the Pakistani army established on May 11, 2009. The SSG’s director, Mangla Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed, had previously served as deputy director of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority, the lead agency in the 2005 earthquake response which, by some accounts, was marred by a lack of transparency and accountability.148 In mid-July, U.S. Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen lauded the Pakistani army for learning from previous failed campaigns against the Taliban and for dealing effectively with the problem of IDPs.149 The Pakistani military’s years of vacillation and inconsistent operations against Islamist militant groups in the NWFP and FATA likely expanded the geographic scope and collateral effects of the Malakand fighting. If such wavering policies continue in the Waziristan regions, as some observers fear they may, the negative impact on civilians could again be worsened. As articulated by one analysis, The military’s contradictory policies of appeasement and heavy force have dramatically raised the civilian costs of fighting terrorism, but the military will nevertheless be keen to exploit any successes in relief and reconstruction to win public support and bolster its standing. ... The elected federal government must be the focal point of reconstruction and ensure local community participation in identifying priorities, implementing projects and maintaining accountability.150 Independent analysts strongly urge the Islamabad government and the international community to ensure that relief and reconstruction efforts are overseen by civilian authorities so as to best empower displaced communities in determining their own needs and priorities. This would entail intimate engagement of the NWFP provincial government, and include building the capacity of civilian police forces and judicial administration. Indeed, it is widely held that the government’s broader counterinsurgency effort can only succeed if the military component is combined with sustained political outreach to consolidate the anti-Taliban consensus that appears to have emerged among the Pakistani public. Such outreach would emphasize the reconstruction and rehabilitation aspects of the government’s policy goals. Ultimately, this process would for many analysts result in bringing the full writ of the Pakistani state into largely autonomous areas like the FATA.151 Obama Administration officials remain concerned that the Islamabad government 147 “After the Exodus,” Economist (London), June 4, 2009. “Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 46, March 15, 2006. 149 See the June 5, 2009, State Department press release at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/remarks/124399.htm; “Clinton Hails Pakistani Resolve in Battling Taliban,” USA Today, June 2, 2009; see the June 8, 2009, Defense Department press release at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4430; “U.S. Sees New Pakistan Combat Drive in Waziristan,” Reuters, June 8, 2009; “Head of U.S. Joint Chiefs Praises Pakistani Operation,” New York Times, July 17, 2009. 150 “Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 93, June 3, 2009. 151 See, for example, Maleeha Lodhi, “Winning the Peace” (op-ed), News (Karachi), June 2, 2009, Rasul Bakhsh Rais,” Securing Victory” (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), June 2, 2009; Sherry Rehman, “Malakand: The Next Test” (op-ed), News (Karachi), June 6, 2009. 148 Congressional Research Service 25 Pakistan-U.S. Relations will be unable to follow through on its stated intentions to quickly rebuild and provide lasting security to the areas devastated by the Swat offensive.152 Pakistani Public Perceptions Available evidence strongly suggests that recent months have witnessed a major shift in Pakistani public attitudes toward religious militancy and extremism, with a majority of citizens now appearing to support Pakistani military operations that were only recently and for many years seen to have been launched only at the behest and in the interests of the United States.153 Yet Pakistani leaders, along with independent analysts, are concerned that public sentiments will quickly shift if the government fails to effectively assist the IDPs.154 The broad public and political support for military operations could evaporate if civilian casualties mount and the government’s humanitarian response is seen as inadequate.155 Some analysts are pessimistic in this regard, given a lack of effective civil or judicial systems in place and the absence of the kinds of local police forces that could ensure civilian security in the middle- and long-term. In a setting of rampant government corruption and nearly nonexistent public services, extremism could continue to thrive. According to one mid-June commentary, “We are still waiting to see any semblance of a government plan for dealing with the IDP’s return home.”156 Pakistan’s refugee crisis may provide the U.S. government with an opportunity to demonstrate its professed humanitarian concerns for the Pakistani people and so perhaps reverse widespread public hostility toward the United States.157 Yet Islamist charities have been active in the relief effort and by some accounts are using the opportunity to forward an anti-Western agenda, potentially turning public sentiment against Islamabad’s cooperation with the United States. Such a tack is facilitated by the near-total absence of an overt U.S. “footprint” due to still-pervasive anti-American sentiments, despite America’s status as the leading contributor of international relief funds. Sensitive to being too closely associated with an unpopular ally, Pakistani authorities reportedly do not allow American aid workers or aircraft to distribute humanitarian aid at IDP camps, thus denying potential public diplomacy gains and leaving open a space in which extremist groups such as the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD, now operating as Falah-i-Insaniat) can influence opinion without “competition.”158 152 “Seeking Truth and Trust in Pakistan,” Washington Post, June 16, 2009. “For Pakistanis, A Fight Against Their Own,” Washington Post, June 12, 2009;”Support for Pakistan’s Anti-Taliban War Seen Solid,” Reuters, June 29, 2009. 154 “Pakistani Leaders Worries About Public Relations War,” Reuters, May 15, 2009. 155 “Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 93, June 3, 2009; Ahmed Rashid, “Hearts on the Line in Pakistan” (op-ed), Washington Post, June 12, 2009; “Urgency Rises in Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, June 8, 2009. 156 Shuja Nawaz, “Pakistan’s Summer of Chaos,” Atlantic Council, June 18, 2009; “Pakistan Faces Challenge of Cementing Victory Against Taliban,” Los Angles Times, June 22, 2009. 157 Trudy Rubin, “Pakistanis’ Flight Opens Window for U.S.” (op-ed), Philadelphia Inquirer, May 24, 2009. 158 “In Pakistani Relief Camps, Charities Press Anti-U.S. View,” New York Times, July 2, 2009. The JuD—a nominally charitable organization—is identified as a continuation of the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) with a new name. The LeT, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, has been held responsible for numerous deadly attacks inside both Pakistan and India, including the November 2008 gun and bomb assault on Mumbai that left some 173 people dead. 153 Congressional Research Service 26 Pakistan-U.S. Relations Questions About Pakistan’s Main Intelligence Agency The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is Pakistan’s main intelligence agency. Close U.S. links with the ISI date back at least to the 1980s, when American and Pakistani intelligence officers oversaw cooperative efforts to train and supply Afghan “freedom fighters” who were battling the Soviet Army. Yet mutual mistrust has been ever-present and, in 2008, long-standing doubts about the activities and aims of the ISI compounded. 159 Some analysts label the ISI a “rogue” agency driven by Islamist ideology that can and does act beyond the operational control of its nominal administrators. Yet most conclude that the ISI, while sometimes willing to “push the envelope” in pursuing Pakistan’s perceived regional interests, is a disciplined organization that obeys the orders of its commanders in the Pakistani military.160 A 2002 statement by the then-British foreign secretary noted the British government’s acceptance of “a clear link” between the ISI and Pakistan-based terrorist groups including the LeT, JeM, and Harakat Mujahideen. 161 The Afghan government claims to have evidence of ISI complicity in both an April 2008 assassination attempt on President Karzai and in the July 2008 bombing of India’s Kabul Embassy. New Delhi joined Kabul in accusing the ISI of involvement in the latter attack. Islamabad countered that, despite repeated demands, neither neighbor provided evidence supporting the “unsubstantiated allegations.”162 The top Afghan intelligence official has reported to his government that the ISI provides material support to Taliban commanders based in Quetta.163 A 2008 think-tank report on insurgency in Afghanistan included the finding that, “There is some indication that individuals within the Pakistan government—for example, within the Frontier Corps and the ISI—were involved in assisting insurgent groups” inside Afghanistan.164 The ISI may even maintain contacts with Baitullah Mehsud, possibly tipping off the Taliban commander when Pakistani army forces get any fixes on his position.165 In mid-2008, a top U.S. intelligence official reportedly presented evidence to Pakistani officials that ISI agents were providing assistance to militant elements who undertake attacks in Afghanistan. Specifically mentioned was an alleged relationship between ISI agents and members of the Haqqani network believed based in the FATA and named as responsible the Kabul embassy 159 “When Spies Don’t Play Well with Their Allies,” New York Times, July 20, 2008. See, for example, “The ISI and Terrorism: Beyond the Accusations,” Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, July 9, 2008. In an episode that only brought embarrassment for Pakistan’s newly seated civilian government, a July 2008 effort to bring the ISI under the formal control of the Interior Ministry was reversed only hours its announcement, fueling speculation that the Pakistani military does not intend to relinquish its traditionally primary role in foreign and national security policy making. U.S. officials reportedly continue to quietly criticize the new civilian government for its alleged “lack of supervision” of the ISI (“Spy Agency Confusion in Pakistan,” BBC News, July 27, 2008; “Pakistan Puts Move to Rein in Spies on Ice,” Reuters, August 5, 2008; “Pakistan’s ‘Rogue’ Spy Agency Attacked,” Financial Times (London), August 19, 2008). 161 See the June 2002 British Foreign Office press release at http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/news/2003/10/ fco_nst_100602_strawindpak. 162 “Pakistan ‘Behind Afghan Attacks,’” BBC News, July 14, 2008; “India Blames Pakistan in Embassy Bombing,” Associated Press, July 21, 2008; http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2008/Aug/Spokes_13_08_08.html. 163 “Afghan Official: Pakistan Spy Agency Aided Taliban Militants,” Associated Press, March 27, 2009. 160 164 Seth Jones, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” RAND Counterinsurgency Study 4, 2008, at http://www.rand.org/ [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33498. Public record. Not legal advice.