# U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33222 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** Reports - **Published:** May 28, 2025 - **Citation:** RL33222 ## Text U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Updated May 28, 2025 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33222 SUMMARY U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II. Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with assistance reflective of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in the Middle East; and historical ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To date, the United States has provided Israel $174 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted, dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding. RL33222 May 28, 2025 Jeremy M. Sharp Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Over the last two decades, including during Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hamas, American public attitudes toward Israel as expressed in public-opinion polling have shifted somewhat when compared to previous eras. Though lawmakers continue to vote in favor of U.S. assistance to Israel, there have been calls from some political and ideological groups to reevaluate the long-standing U.S.-Israeli assistance relationship. In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid, covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants plus $5 billion in missile defense appropriations) to Israel. While negotiations over the next MOU have yet to start, U.S. and Israeli experts and government officials have already started to formulate proposals to shape future U.S.-Israeli military cooperation. Since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Congress has provided emergency supplemental military assistance to Israel and appropriated funding beyond the annual MOU terms for joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs. In April 2024, Congress passed P.L. 118-50 (Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes). That act included, among other things, $3.5 billion in FMF for Israel. The act also included $5.2 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense ($4 billion) and Israel’s new laser defense system, Iron Beam ($1.2 billion). P.L. 119-4, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, provides FMF to Israel at the FY2024 base level ($3.3 billion). The act also contains several Israel-specific provisions or anomalies, such as: Section 11206(1) specifies FY2025 FMF for Off-Shore Procurement for Israel (per the terms of the MOU) at $450.3 million; Section 11208(c) reauthorizes loan guarantees to Israel through 2030; and Section 11208(d) reauthorizes annual monetary caps for U.S. additions to the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies program, including the stockpile in Israel, through FY2027 (at $500 million per year). P.L. 119-4 did not include an accompanying explanatory statement specifying defense funding allocations at the line-item level. Section 1422 of the Act required the Department of Defense, after consulting the Defense Appropriations subcommittees, to submit within 45 days “a spending, expenditure, or operating plan” for FY2025 at the same level of detail required for a department report known as Base for Reprogramming Actions. In spring 2025, the Department of Defense released the Base for Reprogramming Actions report, which contained, among other things, $500 million in missile defense for Israel, $47.5 million for the U.S.-Israeli anti-tunneling program, $55 million for the U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial systems program, and $20 million for “emerging technologies” cooperation. In the 119th Congress, lawmakers have proposed The United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 (H.R. 1229 & S. 554), which would, among other things, authorize additional defense funding for U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial systems cooperation and anti-tunnel cooperation, and would mandate that the Secretary of Defense engage the “Minister of Defense of Israel in a discussion of the process of the ascension of Israel into the national technology and industrial base (as defined in Section 4801 of Title 10, United States Code).” In the Senate, Senator Bernie Sanders has proposed multiple resolutions disapproving various U.S. arms sales to Israel. As of May 2025, the Senate has voted against discharging the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of two resolutions (S.J.Res. 26 and S.J.Res. 33) by votes of 15-83 and 15-82, respectively. Congressional Research Service U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background and Recent Trends ....................................................................................................... 1 U.S. Military Aid Policy to Israel During Wartime: 2023-2025...................................................... 2 President Biden’s Immediate Response .............................................................................. 3 The United States “Leases” Its Own Iron Dome Batteries Back to Israel .......................... 3 Early Congressional Attempts to Condition Aid ................................................................. 4 Biden Administration uses Emergency Authorities for Arms Sales to Israel ...................... 4 Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum 20 .............................................. 4 Congress Passes Supplemental Appropriations for Israel ................................................... 5 Biden Administration Reviews Sales of Aerial Munitions to Israel ................................... 6 International Restrictions on Arms Sales to/from Israel ..................................................... 7 Congressional Opposition to Biden’s “Arms Embargo” ..................................................... 8 Biden Administration and Key Members of Congress Approve F-15 Sale ........................ 8 Biden Administration Warning to Israel over Gaza Humanitarian Aid............................... 9 Senate Considers Resolutions of Disapproval .................................................................... 9 Biden Administration Pre-Notifies Congress of Major Sales to Israel ............................... 9 Israel Opts to Produce More Armaments Domestically.................................................... 10 President Trump Releases Bomb Shipment and Exempts Israel from Aid Freeze ........... 10 Trump Administration Bypasses House Foreign Affairs Committee Review and Notifies Congress of over $8 billion in Arms Sales to Israel ......................................... 10 Lawmakers Introduce the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 ............. 11 Trump Administration Rescinds NSM-20 ......................................................................... 11 Trump Administration Circumvents Congressional Review of Arms Sales to Israel ............................................................................................................................... 11 Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Rifle Sales to the Israeli National Police ............................................................................................................................. 12 Second Round of Senate Voting on JRDs since October 7 ............................................... 13 U.S. Arms Deliveries to Israel since October 2023 .......................................................... 13 U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology ................................................................... 13 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) ................................................................................................. 16 U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel .............................................................................................. 19 The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) .............. 19 Considerations for the Next MOU .................................................................................... 20 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales ................................................................ 22 Cash Flow Financing ........................................................................................................ 23 Early Transfer and Interest-Bearing Account.................................................................... 26 Shorter Congressional Review Period of Arms Sales ....................................................... 26 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ................................................................................................... 26 F-15IA............................................................................................................................... 28 KC-46A Pegasus ............................................................................................................... 29 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters ....................................................................................... 31 Excess Defense Articles .......................................................................................................... 32 Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs ................................ 33 Iron Dome ............................................................................................................................... 34 David’s Sling ........................................................................................................................... 36 The Arrow and Arrow II .......................................................................................................... 36 Congressional Research Service U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 High Altitude Missile Defense System (Arrow III) ................................................................ 37 Iron Beam ................................................................................................................................ 38 U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Cooperation During Wartime: 2023-2025................................. 41 Emergency U.S. Stockpile in Israel ............................................................................................... 44 Background ....................................................................................................................... 44 Legal Authority and Legislative History ........................................................................... 45 Defense Budget Appropriations for Anti-Tunnel Defense ............................................................ 47 Defense Budget Appropriations for Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) and Supporting Directed Energy Capabilities ................................................................................... 49 Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations....................................................................................... 50 Arms Sales and Use of U.S.-Supplied Equipment .................................................................. 51 End-Use Monitoring ......................................................................................................... 51 Human Rights-Related Prohibitions in Legislation................................................................. 52 Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act ..................................................................... 52 Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law) ................................................................................. 52 Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act ...................................................................... 54 Use of U.S. Funds Within Israel’s Pre-June 1967 Borders ..................................................... 54 Israeli Arms Transfers to Third Parties.................................................................................... 55 Israel and China....................................................................................................................... 56 Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs.................................................................. 58 Migration and Refugee Assistance .......................................................................................... 58 Loan Guarantees...................................................................................................................... 59 American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA)................................................... 60 The U.S.-Israeli Binational Foundations (BIRD, BARD, and BSF) ....................................... 61 U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation (BIRD Energy) ............................................................. 63 U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology (Energy Center).............................................................................................................. 63 BIRD Homeland Security (BIRD HLS) ........................................................................... 64 BIRD Cyber ...................................................................................................................... 64 Other Congressionally Authorized Cooperative Endeavors .................................................... 65 Figures Figure 1. U.S. Military Equipment Arrives in Israel ....................................................................... 3 Figure 2. Who Supplies Arms to Israel? .......................................................................................... 8 Figure 3. Israel’s Annual Arms Exports: 2012-2024 ..................................................................... 14 Figure 4. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU ....................................... 21 Figure 5. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel over Decades................................................ 22 Figure 6. FMF as a Percentage of Israel’s Defense Budget........................................................... 23 Figure 7. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in Formation......................................................................... 27 Figure 8. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display ...................................................................................... 28 Figure 9. The KC-46A Pegasus ..................................................................................................... 29 Figure 10. CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter for Israel .................................................................... 32 Figure 11. Locations of U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Co-Production ........................................... 34 Figure 12. How Iron Dome works ................................................................................................. 35 Figure 13. Israel Launches Arrow Interceptor ............................................................................... 42 Congressional Research Service U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Figure 14. Israel-China Bilateral Trade ......................................................................................... 58 Tables Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2025 .................................................. 1 Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel During the Gaza War ............................................................... 6 Table 3. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel .................................................. 25 Table 4. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III) .................. 38 Table 5. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense: FY2006FY2023 ....................................................................................................................................... 40 Table 6. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunnel Cooperation .............................................................................. 48 Table 7. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Drone Cooperation ............................................................................... 49 Table 8. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funding Levels for Israel ......................................... 59 Table 9. Recent ASHA Grants to Israeli Institutions ..................................................................... 61 Table A-1. P.L. 119-4, the FY2025 Continuing Resolution ........................................................... 67 Table A-2. P.L.118-159, the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act ................................... 67 Table A-3. P.L.118-50, Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024 ........................................................................................................ 68 Table A-4. P.L.118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2024 ............................ 69 Table B-1. Emergency or Supplemental Aid to Israel ................................................................... 71 Appendixes Appendix A. Israel and Recent Legislation ................................................................................... 67 Appendix B. Emergency or Supplemental Aid to Israel................................................................ 71 Appendix C. Common Acronyms and Abbreviations used in this Report .................................... 73 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 73 Congressional Research Service U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Introduction This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues, including a description of key events since the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks against Israel and the ensuing conflicts in Gaza and beyond. The information and foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including CRS communications with various U.S. government agencies, Foreignassistance.gov, and annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications. For terminology and abbreviations used in this report, see Appendix A. For general information on Israel, see Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti. Background and Recent Trends For over half a century, the United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral ties, based on a number of factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in the Middle East; an avowed mutual commitment to democratic values; and historical ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many lawmakers have long considered Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages for Israel have reflected this calculation. Some U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S. support for Israel since its creation in 1948. Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, advocates for Israel have engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress for the bilateral relationship, including for U.S. aid to Israel. Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2025 current, or non-inflation-adjusted, U.S. dollars in millions Fiscal Year 1946-2020 Military Economic Missile Defense Total 104,506.200 34,347.500 7,411.409 146,265.110 2021 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 2022 3,300.000 - 1,500.000 4,800.000 2023 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 2024 6,800.000 - 5,700.000 12,500.000 2025 3,300.000 - 500.000 3,800.000 Total 124,506.200 34,347.500 16,111.409 174,965.110 Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), Foreign Assistance.gov, the U.S. State Department, and the Missile Defense Agency. Notes: The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense. According to State Department/USAID Data Services as of January 2025, in constant 2024 U.S. dollars (inflationadjusted), total U.S. aid to Israel obligated from 1946-2024 is an estimated $298 billion. Congressional Research Service 1 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Over the past few years, some Members of Congress have become more openly critical1 of U.S. military aid to Israel and have focused more on issues of Palestinian human rights.2 This trend has accelerated since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza, with its associated humanitarian crisis.3 At the same time, many other Members of Congress have continued to voice support of continued U.S. support for Israel.4 Congressional majorities have continued to vote consistently in favor of U.S. military aid to Israel through the appropriations process,5 though some Members have expressed opposition to unconditional U.S. security assistance by, for example, more frequently voting for resolutions of disapproval aimed at halting certain U.S. arms sales to Israel (see below).6 U.S. Military Aid Policy to Israel During Wartime: 2023-2025 Israel and Hamas’s ongoing war in Gaza following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 will likely be a subject of contested scholarly research for decades within the larger ambit of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One possible subtopic may be how U.S. officials and lawmakers treated U.S. military aid to Israel during the war. In contrast to routinely publishing U.S. security cooperation “fact sheets” that summarized assistance for Ukraine in its war with Russia,7 the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs under the Biden Administration did not publish a summary regarding conflict-related assistance for Israel until January 20, 2025.8 The following is a narrative description based on open sources of important events that have 1 The issue of what constitutes legitimate criticism of Israel (or U.S. policy toward Israel) and its actions toward the Palestinians, and what qualifies as the de-legitimization of Israel or even anti-Semitism, is legally and politically contested. The U.S. Department of State’s working definition of anti-Semitism is drawn from the “non-legally binding working definition” adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. According to the IHRA, contemporary examples of anti-Semitism include, among other things, “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,” and “Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.” See, International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, “IHRA non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism,” May 26, 2016. In the 118th Congress, H.R. 6090, the Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023 (passed by the House 390-21 and received in the Senate), would have adopted the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism for the purposes of the act. Some lawmakers who voted against the bill claimed that it would suppress “valid criticism of the state of Israel.” See, Representative Jerry Nadler, “I’m Jewish. Here’s why I voted against the Antisemitism Awareness Act,” Washington Post, May 8, 2024. 2 Jonathan Weisman, “Democratic Primaries Are Embroiled in Debate Over Support for Israel,” New York Times, July 15, 2022; Alex Kane, “The New Debate Over Aid to Israel,” Jewish Currents, August 8, 2023; and Ross Barkan, “How Oct. 7 Drove a Wedge into the Democratic Party,” New York Times, February 7, 2024. 3 Kayla Guo, “Liberal Democrats Urge ‘No’ Vote on Israel Aid to Pressure Biden on Gaza,” New York Times, April 19, 2024 and Senator Bernie Sanders, “Sen. Bernie Sanders Has Become a Leading Critic of Israel’s War in Gaza,” May 29, 2024. 4 House Majority Leader Steve Scalise, “Scalise’s End-of-Congress Recap: House Republicans Delivered Wins Despite Slim Majority,” December 22, 2024 and Michelle Boorstein, “Huckabee pick as Israel ambassador reflects long evangelical alliance,” Washington Post, December 2, 2024. 5 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict. 6 Representative Pramila Jayapal, “Jayapal Introduces Legislation to Block Offensive Weapons Sales to Israel,” March 31, 2025. 7 For example, see U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine, Fact Sheet,” May 10, 2024. 8 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel,” October 19, 2023; “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel: Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2025. Congressional Research Service 2 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 transpired throughout the war pertaining to U.S. assistance to Israel within the Biden and Trump Administrations and Congress.9 President Biden’s Immediate Response In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attacks against Israel, President Joe Biden announced that his Administration would surge “additional military assistance, including ammunition and interceptors to replenish Iron Dome” so that “Israel does not run out of these critical assets to defend its cities and its citizens.”10 President Biden’s order resulted in hundreds of aircraft deliveries and sea shipments to Israel of tens of thousands of tons of munitions and weapons systems.11 When U.S. resupply operations began in October 2023, President Biden emphasized “the critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting civilians in combat as best as they can.”12 In an October 2023 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced an emergency supplemental budget request to support U.S. partners, including Ukraine and Israel; the President sought over $14 billion in Israel-related funding.13 The United States “Leases” Its Own Iron Dome Batteries Back to Israel After receiving two bipartisan congressional letters14 calling on the Biden Administration to provide Israel with two Iron Dome batteries previously purchased by the U.S. Army, the Administration announced on October 24, 2023 that it would transfer the batteries to Israel; the Pentagon did not publicly indicate the terms and legal authorities underpinning the planned transfer.15 According to one U.S. defense official, the Iron Dome agreement was conducted as a “cost to lease under an FMS [foreign military sales] case: [It] was the Figure 1. U.S. Military Equipment Arrives in Israel December 2023 Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense. 9 For additional background, see CRS Report R47754, Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and CRS Report R47828, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options for Congress. 10 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” October 10, 2023. 11 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “US sends 500th aircraft to Israel as airlifts of weapons, equipment continue,” Jerusalem Post, August 26, 2024. 12 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” October 20, 2024. 13 The White House, “FACT SHEET: White House Calls on Congress to Advance Critical National Security Priorities,” October 20, 2023. 14 See, Senator Jacky Rosen, “Rosen Leads Bipartisan Group of Senate Armed Services Committee Members in Requesting Additional Iron Dome Batteries for Israel,” October 11, 2023; and Representative Brian Mast, “Mast, Moskowitz, Bipartisan Coalition Urge DoD to Send Additional Iron Dome System to Israel,” October 16, 2023. 15 Noah Robertson, Bryant Harris, and Jen Judson, “US agrees to send two Iron Dome batteries to Israel,” Defense News, October 24, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 fastest way to get Israel the Iron Dome batteries and the missiles.”16 Early Congressional Attempts to Condition Aid Several months into the war, as Palestinian civilian casualties mounted, some Members of Congress began to call for conditioning aid to Israel. In December 2023, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced S.Res. 504, a privileged resolution, which would have mandated that the State Department provide Congress with information on Israel’s human rights practices within 30 days of passage, pursuant to Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. After receiving any such report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security assistance to Israel. On January 16, 2024, the Senate voted 72-11 to table a motion to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.Res. 504.17 In addition, Senator Chris Van Hollen introduced an amendment to a Senate supplemental appropriations bill (S.Amdt. 1389 to H.R. 815) which would have, prior to the disbursement of defense articles to a recipient of U.S. security assistance, required the President to obtain assurances that “the recipient country will cooperate fully with any United States efforts and United States-supported international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in an area of conflict where United States defense articles or defense services are being used by the recipient.” Biden Administration uses Emergency Authorities for Arms Sales to Israel For the first six months of the war, most U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) to Israel were previously approved for delivery and accelerated, taken from the U.S. stockpile in Israel (known as War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Israel, or WRSA-I), and/or were not notified to Congress because their dollar value fell below the prior notice threshold for transfers to Israel.18 Between October and December 2023, there were two FMS cases notified to Congress under emergency circumstances that therefore bypassed congressional review.19 Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum 20 Amidst continued international scrutiny of Israel’s conduct during the war, the Biden Administration took additional steps aimed at promoting adherence to international law and accountability for U.S. arms deliveries to Israel. In February 2024, President Biden issued NSM20, a National Security Memorandum (an executive branch policy document, not standing U.S. law) requiring that prior to the transfer of any U.S. defense article, the Departments of State and Defense must obtain “credible and reliable” written assurances from the recipient country that it will use any such defense articles in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as applicable, other international law. It also required that in any area where such defense articles are used, the “recipient country will facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict, or otherwise impede 16 Ashley Roque, “Army’s Iron Dome batteries on 11-month lease with Israel, which could be extended,” Breaking Defense, November 7, 2023. 17 Roll Call Vote 118th Cong. - 2nd sess., available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-resolution/ 504/actions?s=1&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22s.res.504%22%7D. 18 See, Jared Malsin and Nancy A. Youssef, “How the U.S. Arms Pipeline to Israel Avoids Public Disclosure,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2024. 19 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—M830a1 120mm Tank Cartridges,” December 9, 2023, and “Israel – 155mm Artillery Ammunition,” December 29, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 the transport or delivery” of humanitarian assistance.20 NSM-20 also required the Secretaries of State and Defense to assess for Congress whether U.S. defense articles have been used after the memorandum’s issuance in a manner not consistent with international law. In March, Israel provided its recipient country assurances to the United States. Following the issuance of NSM-20, there was continued scrutiny from some lawmakers,21 in the context of additional reports of U.S. munitions used in airstrikes which resulted in civilian casualties of Palestinians and others,22 and Israel’s errant April 1, 2024 targeting of World Central Kitchen aid workers. That month, President Biden reportedly toughened his calls for increased humanitarian access and protection of aid workers.23 During his April 4 phone call with Prime Minister Netanyahu, according to the White House readout, President Biden “made clear that U.S. policy with respect to Gaza will be determined by our assessment of Israel’s immediate action” on steps to address civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and the safety of aid workers.24 Some analysts assessed that President Biden had implicitly threatened “to slow U.S. arms transfers to Israel or to temper U.S. support at the U.N.” if Israel did not take certain steps.25 In May 2024, the Biden Administration released its report to Congress under Section 2 of NSM20, concluding (according to a document released online by an advocacy group stating that it is a copy of that report) that “given Israel’s significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL [International Humanitarian Law] obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm.”26 Despite the concerns raised, the report, as it appeared online, assessed Israel’s March assurances (along with those of the other countries covered in the report) to be “credible and reliable so as to allow the provision of defense articles covered under NSM-20 to continue.” Congress Passes Supplemental Appropriations for Israel Between 2023 and 2024, Congress considered and passed multiple versions of supplemental legislation amidst a broader public debate over conditioning aid and restricting U.S. arms sales to Israel, in the context of continued reports of some Israeli air strikes resulting in civilian casualties as well as a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.27 In March 2024, Congress also passed P.L. 118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, which includes $3.3 billion in FMF for Israel and $500 million in missile defense funding, per the terms of the MOU. 20 The White House, “National Security Memorandum on Safeguards and Accountability with Respect to Transferred Defense Articles and Defense Services,” February 8, 2024. Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2378-1) says that “[n]o assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export Control Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to any country when it is made known to the President that the government of such country prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance.” 21 Senator Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen, Schatz, Colleagues Press Administration on Concerns with New Arms Sales to Netanyahu Government, Request Assurances Prior to Proceeding,” February 23, 2024. 22 Stephen Semler, “Gaza breakdown: 20 times Israel used US arms in likely war crimes,” Responsible Statecraft, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, August 25, 2024. 23 Yasmeen Abutaleb, “Biden cease-fire push falters again after new demand by Hamas,” Washington Post, September 7, 2024. 24 The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel,” April 4, 2024. 25 “Biden ultimatum to Netanyahu: protect Gaza civilians, or else,” Reuters, April 5, 2024. 26 Just Security, “State Department Submits Key Report to Congress on Israel’s Use of US Weapons,” May 10, 2024. 27 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict. Congressional Research Service 5 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 On April 13, 2024 Iran initiated the first-ever direct military action against Israel from Iranian territory in the form of aerial attacks (drones and ballistic and cruise missiles). Iran stated that the attacks were in retaliation for an April 1 strike reportedly by Israel against a building within the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria. Eleven days after Iran’s direct attack on Israel, and four days after an apparent Israeli strike in Iran that may have been sufficiently narrow in scope to avoid additional immediate escalation, Congress passed P.L. 118-50 (Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes). That act included, among other things (see Table 2), $3.5 billion in FMF for Israel28 ($769.3 million or more of which may be spent on Israeli equipment) to remain available through FY2025.29 The act also included $5.2 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense ($4 billion) and Israel’s new laser defense system, Iron Beam ($1.2 billion)—the first dedicated U.S. funding for this system.30 Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel During the Gaza War (in millions of current U.S. dollars) Foreign Military Financing Missile Defense Missile Defense - Iron Beam P.L. 118-50, Division A—Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024 $3,500.00 $4,000.00 $1,200.00 n/a P.L. 118-47, Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 $3,300.00 $500.00 n/a $95.50 n/a n/a n/a $13.00 Law P.L. 118-42, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 Total $6,800.00 $4,500.00 $1,200.00 Other $108.50 Source: congress.gov. Notes: The “Other” column includes Department of Defense appropriations for counter-tunnel and counterdrone programs, U.S. contributions to binational foundations, and support for migrants. Biden Administration Reviews Sales of Aerial Munitions to Israel In spring 2024, as Israel prepared for a ground offensive in southern Gaza (Rafah), U.S. officials pressed Israel not to proceed with an offensive in Rafah without clearly planning for civilian safety and welfare.31 Some lawmakers also warned against an Israeli military operation in Rafah, saying that they would vote to condition aid to Israel if such an operation ensued without making 28 Unlike regular FMF appropriations for Israel, which Congress annually mandates be apportioned within 30 days of passage, the FY2024 supplemental FMF for Israel was treated like all other global FMF allocations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) notified the relevant congressional committees of the Administration’s intent to obligate FMF for Israel (August 2024); when that notification cleared, it apportioned the funds. See, “US releases $3.5 billion to Israel to spend on US weapons, military equipment,” Reuters, August 9, 2025. 29 The Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate the $3.5 billion in FMF in August 2024. See, “US releases $3.5 billion to Israel to spend on US weapons, military equipment,” Reuters, August 9, 2024. 30 In January 2025, sources noted that Israel had used $5.2 billion in supplemental appropriations to reach a contract with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to fund procurement of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Iron Beam components and systems. See, Lara Korte, “US aid package funds $5.2 billion deal to bolster Israeli air defenses,” Stars & Stripes, January 16, 2025. 31 U.S. Department of State, “Department of State Press Briefing,” March 25, 2024. Congressional Research Service 6 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 provisions for the safety and welfare of Gaza’s civilian population.32 In early May, as Israeli forces approached Rafah, President Biden said in a CNN interview that “I have made it clear to Bibi [Netanyahu] and the war cabinet they’re not going to get our support [weapons and artillery shells] if, in fact, they’re going into these population centers.”33 After Israel launched major ground operations in Rafah, U.S. officials confirmed reports that the Biden Administration was “reviewing some near-term security assistance” for Israel and had paused a shipment of 2,000-pound and 500-pound bombs, based on concern about their potential use in Rafah.34 Though the Administration later released the shipment of 500-pound bombs,35 it continued to review the 2,000-pound bomb shipment until President Biden’s term ended. International Restrictions on Arms Sales to/from Israel Along with the Biden Administration’s withholding of bomb shipments, other nations also suspended or reduced some of their arms exports to Israel during the war. Over the past decade, the United States and Germany have been Israel’s main weapons suppliers (see Figure 2). Actions to either limit some exports to, or imports from, Israel, have come from countries such as: Britain,36 Belgium, Canada, Columbia,37 Germany,38 Italy,39 the Netherlands,40 and Spain.41 In October 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron called on the international community to cease supplying Israel with weapons that could be used in either Gaza or Lebanon.42 32 “Senior Democrat backs conditioning Israel aid if Rafah op launched sans provisions to protect civilians,” Times of Israel, April 4, 2024. 33 “Erin Burnett Outfront: One-On-One with the President of the United States,” CNN, May 8, 2024. 34 U.S. Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing,” May 9, 2024. 35 Nancy A. Youssef and Jared Malsin, “U.S. Agrees to Ship 500-Pound Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2024. 36 Oliver Holmes, “Which countries have banned or restricted arms sales to Israel?” The Guardian (UK), September 3, 2024. 37 Astrid Suarez, “Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment,” Associated Press, May 3, 2024. 38 “Germany has stopped approving war weapons exports to Israel, source says,” Reuters, September 19, 2024. Some sources have claimed that contrary to reports of German restrictions on certain exports to Israel, overall, German defense exports to Israel actually increased in 2024. See, “German arms exports to Israel up sharply,” Globes (Israel), October 28, 2024. 39 “Italy arms exports to Israel continued despite block, minister says,” Reuters, March 24, 2024. 40 “FACTBOX-Who are Israel ’s main weapons suppliers and who has halted exports?” Reuters, May 10, 2024. 41 “Spain cancels purchase of police ammunition from Israeli firm,” Reuters, October 29, 2024; and “Maersk container ship denied docking at Spanish port over arms to Israel,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2024. 42 “Macron calls to halt arms deliveries to Israel in Gaza war,” BBC News, October 5, 2024. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Congressional Opposition to Biden’s “Arms Embargo” Figure 2. Who Supplies Arms to Israel? (% of Total Weapons Sold to Israel, 2013-2023) While some Members of Congress continued to support the application of U.S. laws that would restrict U.S. aid to recipient countries in various circumstances,43 other Members rejected calls for conditioning U.S. aid to Israel and criticized the Administration for pressuring the Israeli government amid ongoing hostilities against foreign terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.44 On April 9, 2024, H.Res. 1117 was introduced in the House. Among other things, it opposed “efforts to place one-sided pressure on Israel with respect to Gaza.” On May 16, 2024, the House passed (224-187) H.R. 8369, the Israel Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, estimated volume of major arms transfers, Security Assistance Support Act, which, 2013-2023. among other things, would have prohibited FY2024 or earlier funds from being used to withhold defense items/services to Israel. Some lawmakers accused the Administration of not only publicly withholding the shipment of 2,000pound bombs, but also conducting an “arms embargo” against Israel by delaying consideration of other U.S. sales.45 The Biden Administration claimed that by mid-2024, it could no longer bypass Congress in approving weapons sales, and seeking congressional approval appeared to contribute to making the process of clearing FMS and DCS cases longer than in the early months of the war.46 Biden Administration and Key Members of Congress Approve F-15 Sale In summer 2024, after Israel launched a military operation in Rafah that then-Secretary Blinken argued reflected restraint as compared to its original plans,47 Netanyahu criticized the Administration publicly for withholding weapons.48 Both Israel and Hamas then resisted various ceasefire proposals, and the Administration accelerated efforts to finalize a series of major arms sales to Israel, including for F-15 fighter aircraft.49 In June, the foreign affairs committee leaders in the House and Senate, after a period of consideration, signed off on this major package of FMS 43 Senator Peter Welch, “Welch Leads Colleagues Calling for Consistent Application of Leahy Law to the IDF,” May 7, 2024; and Representative Jason Crow, “Reps. Crow, Deluzio Lead 86 Members in Letter Urging Biden to Enforce U.S. Law & Policy Regarding US Humanitarian Aid to Gaza,” May 3, 2024. 44 Speaker Mike Johnson (@SpeakerJohnson), “The President’s ultimatums should be going to Hamas, not Israel,” X post, April 4, 2024, https://twitter.com/SpeakerJohnson/status/1776046097086972393. 45 Senator Tim Scott, “Scott, Cotton, 46 Senate GOP Colleagues to Biden-Harris Admin: Delaying Weapons to Israel Undermines Our Ally, Accommodates Iran,” August 2, 2024. 46 David Horowitz, “The ambassador’s farewell warning: You can’t ignore the impact of this war on future US policymakers,” Times of Israel, January 12, 2025. 47 Lulu Garcia-Navarro, “The Interview: Antony Blinken Insists He and Biden Made the Right Calls,” New York Times, January 4, 2025. 48 Julia Frankel and Drew Callister “Israel’s Netanyahu blames Biden for withholding weapons. US officials say that’s not the whole story,” Associated Press, June 18, 2024. 49 John Hudson, “Key Democrats approve major arms sale to Israel, including F-15s,” Washington Post, June 17, 2024. Congressional Research Service 8 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 sales to Israel.50 In August 2024, during a congressional recess, the Administration formally notified Congress of five potential FMS to Israel for over $20 billion total, including up to 50 new F-15IA fighter aircraft and F-15 upgrades for $18.82 billion.51 On September 25, 2024, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced six joint resolutions of disapproval, or JRDs (S.J.Res. 111, S.J.Res. 112, S.J.Res. 113, S.J.Res. 114, S.J.Res. 115, and S.J.Res. 116). Five of these JRDs corresponded to the five FMS sales mentioned above;52 a sixth resolution corresponded to a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) to Israel of Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAMs.53 On November 6, 2024, the Israel Ministry of Defense and Boeing signed a procurement contract in which Israel will acquire 25 advanced F-15IA fighter jets over a number of years for more than $5 billion. Biden Administration Warning to Israel over Gaza Humanitarian Aid On October 13, 2024, senior U.S. officials sent a letter to their Israeli counterparts, which the State Department reportedly described as a “private diplomatic communication.”54 The letter stated that “Israel must, starting now and within 30 days,” act on several “concrete measures” visa-vis Gaza, such as enabling a surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza. The letter stated that “[f]ailure to demonstrate a sustained commitment to implementing and maintaining these measures may have implications for U.S. policy” under existing law. After the 30-day period, the Department of State said that it had not made an assessment that the Israelis are in violation of U.S. law, and that it would continue monitoring Israeli actions and assessing their compliance with U.S. law.55 Senate Considers Resolutions of Disapproval On November 20, 2024, the Senate failed to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of three JRDs (S.J.Res. 111, S.J.Res. 113, and S.J.Res. 115), pertaining to proposed sales of guided and unguided munitions.56 In each of the three instances, at least 17 Senators voted in favor of discharging the committee, with 19 voting for discharging the committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 113 (pertaining to a proposed sale of mortar cartridges) and 78 opposing. Biden Administration Pre-Notifies Congress of Major Sales to Israel In late November 2024, the Administration approved and pre-notified (an informal step generally taken before providing formal notification under the Arms Export Control Act) the foreign relations committees of a possible $680 million package of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) kits and small diameter bombs to Israel.57 In early January 2025, media reports indicated that the Administration had notified Congress of several additional possible munitions Robert Jimison, “After Delay, Top Democrats in Congress Sign Off on Sale of F-15 Jets to Israel,” New York Times, June 17, 2024. 51 See https://www.dsca.mil/tags/israel. 52 Senators Peter Welch, Jeff Merkley, and Brian Schatz each cosponsored one or more of the JRDs. 53 Senator Bernie Sanders, “Sanders and Colleagues Move to Block Arms Sales to Israel,” September 25, 2024. 54 X, Barak Ravid, October 15, 2024, 9:33am, at https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1846182689222664471. 55 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing,” November 12, 2024. 56 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict, by Travis A. Ferrell and Clayton M. Levy. 57 Felicia Schwartz, “US to approve $680mn arms sale to Israel,” Financial Times, November 27, 2024. 50 Congressional Research Service 9 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 sales totaling $8 billion, including guidance kits for MK-84 2,000-pound bombs and MK-82 500pound bombs, BLU-109 bunker buster bombs, AMRAAM and Hellfire missiles, and 155mm artillery rounds. At least $6.75 billion would fund two different kinds of precision kits—one for small diameter bombs, and one for 2,000-pound bombs—unnamed officials said.58 Israel Opts to Produce More Armaments Domestically In January 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense signed contracts with Israeli firms to produce some munitions previously purchased from outside suppliers, including the United States. According to one Israeli defense analyst, “Israel has refrained, until recently, in producing certain munitions primarily because of profit considerations.... It is cheaper to buy them with the money allocated to Israel by the U.S.”59 Some reports suggested that by fall 2024, some of Israel’s munitions supplies had become low, particularly missile defense interceptors.60 President Trump Releases Bomb Shipment and Exempts Israel from Aid Freeze In late January 2025, President Trump announced that he had released a Biden Administration hold on the delivery of 1,800 MK-84, 2,000-pound bombs destined for Israel.61 At the same time, the State Department issued guidance regarding the execution of an Executive Order freezing all U.S. foreign aid; the guidance exempted U.S. foreign aid to Israel and Egypt from the freeze (along with life-saving global humanitarian food aid).62 Trump Administration Bypasses House Foreign Affairs Committee Review and Notifies Congress of over $8 billion in Arms Sales to Israel On February 7, 2025, the Trump Administration officially notified Congress of four FMS/DCS sales to Israel totaling $8.4 billion, of which one case totaled $6.75 billion for precision-guided and un-guided munitions and guidance conversion kits – the largest single munitions sale to Israel since 2015.63 According to one analysis, Israel’s request for large numbers of guidance kits, but not certain guided bombs, may indicate its willingness to produce certain munitions domestically.64 Reportedly, as previously mentioned, the Biden Administration had already approved the sales65 and pre-notified these cases to the foreign affairs committees in each chamber; after the presidential transition, although (according to the New York Times) the Ranking Member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee had not cleared the sales, the Trump 58 Jared Malsin, Nancy A. Youssef, and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “U.S. Plans Big Arms Sale to Israel—Administration tells Congress $8 billion package will include bombs, missiles,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2025. 59 Adam Taylor, “Israel moves to make heavy bombs, but U.S. reliance hard to shake, experts say,” Washington Post, January 12, 2025. 60 Ha’aretz and Yaniv Kubovich, “Report: Israel Is Facing a ‘Serious’ Shortage of Interceptor Missiles,” Ha’aretz, October 15, 2024. 61 “Trump makes 2,000-pound bombs available to Israel, undoing Biden pause,” Reuters, January 26, 2025. 62 Edward Wong, “Sweeping Halt to Foreign Aid Does Not Apply to Arms for Israel and Egypt,” New York Times, January 25, 2025. 63 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – Munitions, Guidance Kits, Fuzes, and Munitions Support,” Transmittal No. 24-13, February 7, 2025. 64 Jeremy Binnie, “US approves air-launched munitions for Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 10, 2025. 65 Felicia Schwartz, “US to approve $680mn arms sale to Israel,” Financial Times, November 27, 2024. Congressional Research Service 10 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Administration proceeded to formally notify Congress.66 Clearance of U.S. arms sales cases by congressional committee leaders prior to official notification is a long established, normative process developed between the executive and legislative branches. It is not codified in law. On February 20, Senator Sanders introduced JRDs corresponding to each sale.67 Lawmakers Introduce the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 On February 12, 2025, a group of bipartisan House and Senate lawmakers introduced H.R. 1229 and S.554, respectively, the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025. The bills would, among other things • • • • establish a new U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial systems program (CUAS) authorized at a funding level of $150 million per year through FY2030; raise the funding cap on the existing U.S.-Israeli CUAS program from $55 million annually to $75 million annually through calendar year 2028; direct the Department of Defense to establish a Defense Innovation Unit office in Israel in order to collaborate with the private sector to counter Iran’s dual-use defense technologies; and mandate that the Secretary of Defense engage the “Minister of Defense of Israel in a discussion of the process of the ascension of Israel into the national technology and industrial base (as defined in Section 4801 of Title 10, United States Code).” Trump Administration Rescinds NSM-20 According to the Washington Post, on February 21, 2025 then-National Security Adviser Michael Waltz rescinded President Biden’s NSM-20.68 While some lawmakers decried the move,69 others welcomed it.70 Trump Administration Circumvents Congressional Review of Arms Sales to Israel On February 28, 2025, the Trump Administration, citing Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),71 declared that an “emergency exists,” that requires the sales to Israel of various weapons systems, such as general purposes bombs, JDAMs, and Caterpillar D9 bulldozers.72 In sum, the President issued an emergency declaration for four FMS cases to Israel, totaling nearly $4 billion. Amongst these four cases, Israeli press reports had focused on the sale 66 Edward Wong and Robert Jimison, “Trump Administration Moves to Send $8 Billion in Arms to Israel, Bypassing Some Lawmakers,” New York Times, February 8, 2025. 67 Some of the JRDs were duplicative due to updates in filing. In sum, they included S.J.Res. 20, S.J.Res. 21, S.J.Res. 22, S.J.Res. 23, S.J.Res. 26, and S.J.Res. 27. 68 Alex Horton, Missy Ryan, and Meg Kelly, “Trump repeals Biden directive linking U.S. arms transfers to human rights,” Washington Post, February 25, 2025. 69 Horton, et al., “Trump Repeals Biden Directive.” 70 For example, Senate Foreign Relation Committee, “Risch Statement on Trump NSM-20 Revocation,” February 24, 2025. 71 See 22 U.S. Code §2776. 72 For example, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – Munitions and Munitions Support,” Transmittal No. 25-34, February 28, 2025. Congressional Research Service 11 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 of D9 bulldozers. In late 2024, these items had been reported as awaiting export approval by the Biden Administration, alongside speculation that the Biden Administration may have delayed approval because of its apparent opposition to Israeli use of bulldozers to raze Palestinian homes.73 Israeli media noted that before leaving office, the Biden Administration had begun to issue export licenses for some of the D9s sought by Israel, possibly in part due to ceasefire agreements.74 One report noted that the ranking members of the foreign affairs committees in Congress had placed a hold on at least two of the four pre-notified cases, including the sale of bulldozers.75 Upon issuing the emergency declaration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated I have signed a declaration to use emergency authorities to expedite the delivery of approximately $4 billion in military assistance to Israel. The decision to reverse the Biden Administration’s partial arms embargo, which wrongly withheld a number of weapons and ammunition from Israel, is yet another sign that Israel has no greater ally in the White House than President Trump. Since taking office, the Trump Administration has approved nearly $12 billion in major FMS sales to Israel. This important decision coincides with President Trump’s repeal of a Biden-era memorandum which had imposed baseless and politicized conditions on military assistance to Israel at a time when our close ally was fighting a war of survival on multiple fronts against Iran and terror proxies. The Trump Administration will continue to use all available tools to fulfill America’s long-standing commitment to Israel’s security, including means to counter security threats. 76 On March 10, Senator Sanders again issued new JRDs for the aforementioned four sales (S.J.Res.32, S.J.Res.33, S.J.Res.34, and S.J.Res.35). Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Rifle Sales to the Israeli National Police On March 6, 2025, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it was issuing export licenses for three DCS cases to Israel of various automatic rifles to the Israeli national police requested by Israel before the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023.77 Previously, during the Biden Administration, then-Secretary Blinken had not approved the export licenses, reportedly due to some congressional concern that the weapons could be used in the West Bank against Palestinians in “acts of unjustified violence” by Israeli forces or could fall into the hands of settler militias, according to the New York Times.78 Congressional notification of the issuing of the licenses corresponded with the visit of an ultra-nationalist member of the Netanyahu government, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, to Washington, DC. On March 27, Senator Sanders again issued new JRDs for the aforementioned three sales (S.J.Res.40, S.J.Res.41, and S.J.Res.42). 73 Yoav Zitun, “D9 bulldozer shipment stalled by US embargo, leaving Israeli soldiers exposed,” YnetNews.com, November 10, 2024. 74 Yehuda Shlezinger, “US partially lifts arms embargo on Israel ahead of ceasefire,” Israel Hayom, January 19, 2025; and Danny Zaken, “Revealed: How US-Israel deal helped Netanyahu sign off on ceasefire,” Israel Hayom, November 27, 2024. 75 Laura Kelly, “Congress puts hold on Trump’s $1 billion arms sale to Israel,” The Hill, February 4, 2025. 76 U.S. Department of State, “Military Assistance to Israel,” March 1, 2025. 77 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Gaza War Turns Spotlight on Long Pipeline of U.S. Weapons to Israel,” New York Times, April 7, 2024. 78 Edward Wong, “U.S. Considers Sending Israel 24,000 Assault Rifles Held Back Under Biden,” New York Times, January 31, 2025. Congressional Research Service 12 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Second Round of Senate Voting on JRDs since October 7 On April 3, 2025, the Senate voted against discharging the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of two JRDs (S.J.Res.26 and S.J.Res.33) by votes of 15-83 and 15-82, respectively. U.S. Arms Deliveries to Israel since October 2023 On May 27, 2025, the Israeli Defense Ministry reported that the United States had dispatched 800 transport planes and 140 ships to deliver more than 90,000 tons of armaments and military equipment to Israel since the start of the war in October 2023.79 U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is military assistance.80 U.S. military aid has helped transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the world (see “Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”). U.S. military aid also has helped Israel build its domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global arms exporters.81 Israeli defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit Systems, export nearly 70% of their products82 and combined, those three companies account for 70% of all Israeli defense exports.83 Rather than producing large-scale hardware (combat aircraft, tanks), Israeli companies generally export advanced technological products (such as missile defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications systems) to numerous customers globally. India (34%), the United States (13%), and the Philippines (8.1%) are Israel’s largest defense export markets as of 2025.84 In 2024 and 2025, several reports have suggested that despite global criticism of Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon, foreign demand for Israeli defense products has surged (see Figure 3).85 Recently, there have been several major Israeli exports of defense equipment, including • • 2023: Finland – David’s Sling Long Range Air Defense System ($330 million); 2023: Germany – Arrow 3 Missile Defense System ($4.3 billion); 79 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel marks 800 th planeload of US guns, bombs and ammo as war nears day 600,” Times of Israel, May 27, 2025. 80 For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation), Israel has become one of the world’s most dynamic economies (as of 2025, according to the International Monetary Fund, Israel’s Gross Domestic Product per capita ranks 21st worldwide). Israel and the United States agreed to gradually phase out economic grant aid to Israel. In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund (ESF) grants. The country had been a large-scale recipient of grant ESF assistance since 1971. 81 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2020 to 2024, Israel was the 8th largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for 3.1% of world deliveries. See “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2025. 82 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” INSS, Memorandum No. 202, July 2020. 83 Dov Lieber, “Defense Industry Is Booming in Israel—Regional war, quest for aerial-defense systems fuel a surge despite embargoes,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2025. 84 See Zain Hussain and Dr Alaa Tartir, “Recent trends in international arms transfers in the Middle East and North Africa,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 10, 2025. 85 See, for example, Dov Lieber, “Defense Industry Is Booming in Israel—Regional war, quest for aerial-defense systems fuel a surge despite embargoes,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2025. Congressional Research Service 13 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 • • 2024: Slovakia—Barak MX Integrated Air Defense System ($579.1 million); and 2024: Netherlands – Elbit Self Protection Suites for Aircraft ($175 million) 86 Figure 3. Israel’s Annual Arms Exports: 2012-2024 Current U.S. $ in billions $14.80 $12.56 $13.07 $11.30 $9.20 $7.40 2012 $6.54 2013 $5.66 $5.60 2014 2015 $6.50 2016 2017 $7.50 $7.20 2018 2019 $8.30 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 Source: Created by CRS. Information from Israel Ministry of Defense, International Defense Cooperation Directorate (SIBAT), as reported by various media sources. Notes: SIBAT does not produce a specific list of Israeli customers by country. As Israel has become a global leader in certain niche defense technologies, Israeli defense exports to the U.S. market have grown substantially.87 The United States has purchased from Israel, among other items, the following Israeli defense articles: the Iron Fist Active Protection Systems (APS) for U.S. Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Trophy APS for M1 Abrams tanks, enhanced night-vision goggles, laser range finders for the U.S. Marines, helmets for F-35 fighter pilots, wings for the F-35, and portable satellite communication (SATCOM) terminals. To facilitate the unhindered access to some key supplies, the Department of Defense (DOD) has entered into bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSAs) with selected foreign governments to secure the mutual timely provision of defense-related goods and services during peacetime, emergencies, and armed conflict.88 SOSAs allow DOD to request prioritized performance of contracts from companies in SOSA-signatory nations, and for SOSA signatories to request the same from U.S. firms. In 2023, the United States and Israel signed a (SOSA) agreement.89 86 Due to U.S. participation in the David’s Sling and Arrow 3 programs, the United States approved Israel’s sale to Finland and Germany respectively in 2023, several months before both final sales agreements had been signed. 87 Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, as amended (Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli and U.S. defense contractors are able to compete for contracts in both countries on an equal basis. For the text of the MOU, see https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ Docs/mou-israel.pdf. 88 See CRS In Focus IF11894, Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSAs): Background and Issues. 89 U.S. Department of Defense, Security of Supply, available at https://www.businessdefense.gov/security-ofsupply.html. Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Israeli Exports of Spyware Revelations regarding the export of Israeli software have drawn attention to Israel’s Defense Export Controls Agency (DECA), which was established in 2006. In 2021, after investigative reports indicated the Israeli-owned cybersecurity firm NSO Group had sold mobile-phone software to foreign governments that then used it to spy on other heads of state, dissidents, and human rights activists, the Israeli media looked more closely at DECA’s export licensing process. In December 2021, Israel altered its export licensing policy for cybersecurity software, requiring purchasers to pledge they will not use Israeli equipment to commit “terrorist acts” or “serious crime,” as defined by DECA.90 Since then, DECA has increased its oversight of cyber technology exports and limited to 37 the number of countries eligible to procure Israeli cyber technology.91 In February 2024, the State Department announced that it would impose visa restrictions for individuals who abused the use of commercial spyware, as well as for those who facilitated such actions.92 The United States and Israel are in the process of gradually phasing out Israel’s ability to use a portion of its U.S. military assistance for domestic purchases (also known as Off-Shore Procurement);93 as a result, some Israeli companies have opened subsidiaries that are licensed to do business in the United States. Incorporating in the United States enables Israeli companies to both increase business with the U.S. military and, in some cases, conduct U.S. aid-financed military deals with the Israeli government. The establishment of a U.S. presence by more Israeli companies has led to an increase in defense partnerships between U.S. and Israeli firms, whereby weapons development takes place in Israel and production in the United States.94 Elbit Systems of America (Fort Worth, Texas), a wholly owned subsidiary of Israel’s Elbit Systems, is one of the largest Israeli-owned firms operating in the United States. It acts as a purchasing agent for the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales programs.95 In 2022, Leonardo DRS (a subsidiary of the Italian firm Leonardo SpA) purchased Israeli firm RADA Electronics Industries, in one of the first major acquisitions of an Israeli firm by a U.S.-based firm.96 In April 2025, General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems announced the joint manufacture of a long-range, precision-guided strike missile to be constructed in Tupelo, Mississippi.97 As long as these subsidiaries follow U.S. guidelines (each must be a U.S.-based supplier, manufacturer, reseller, or distributor incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States and registered with the Israeli Ministry of Defense Mission in New York),98 they are eligible (pending U.S. government approval) to enter into FMF-financed Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 90 See “Israel Issues Stricter Guidelines for use of its Cyber Tech Exports,” Reuters, December 6, 2021. 91 Omer Benjakob, Josh Breiner, and Avi Scharf, “Israeli Firm Suspected of Illegally Selling Classified Spy Tech,” Ha’aretz, March 8, 2023. 92 “US to restrict visas for those who misuse commercial spyware,” Reuters, February 5, 2024. 93 P.L. 118-50, the FY2024 Emergency Supplemental Act, did permit up to up to $769.3 million (out of $3.5 billion) in FMF to be used for Off-Shore Procurement. 94 Ora Coren, “Israel’s Arms Makers to Become more American under New Military-Aid Pact,” Ha’aretz, updated April 10, 2018. 95 Available online at https://elbitsystems.com/globalpresence/. 96 Stephen Losey, “Ukraine lessons helped drive acquisition of RADA, Leonardo DRS chief says,” Defense News, June 22, 2022. 97 General Atomics, “General Atomics Partners with Rafael to Build Precision-Guided Missile for U.S. Defense Customers,” April 7, 2025. 98 CRS conversation with U.S. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), January 6, 2022. Congressional Research Service 15 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 contracts99 with the Israeli government.100 Recurring language in annual appropriations bills,101 as implemented by Department of Defense guidance, permits Israel (along with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Pakistan) to use FMF to finance DCS contracts, in which the purchaser (Israel) enters into a contract directly with a vendor.102 According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Israel’s Ministry of Defense spends approximately one-third of its annual FMF allocation on Direct Commercial Contracts (DCC) procurements.103 Israel Moves to Expand its Industrial Base Perhaps as a response to soaring international demand for certain armaments, as well as international pressure against Israel for its conduct of the war in Gaza, former Israeli defense leaders104 and the current coalition government have advocated for greater Israeli independence in the domestic manufacturing of certain weapons, most notably air-dropped munitions. In March 2024, as tensions between the Biden Administration and Israel heightened over Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office issued a statement declaring, “We need to be much more independent in the ability to manufacture the war materiel that we need.... We will do this but we will do so very responsibly and prudently, so that Israel will be independent.”105 Months later, Israeli media reported on the government’s decision to manufacture heavy bombs (akin to the MK-84) and tank ammunition domestically.106 Called the Blue and White Independence Program, this initiative has begun producing materiel that Israel has previously imported. In January 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced that it had contracted with Elbit Systems to produce heavy aerial munitions and a “national raw materials plant” that will produce materials previously sourced abroad.107 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over neighboring militaries. The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and 99 Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)/DCS allow a foreign entity to contract directly with a U.S.-based company in order to obtain needed supplies or services (subject to U.S. Government review and approval). This process takes the U.S. Government out of the “middleman” role that it plays in facilitating FMS transactions. See CRS In Focus IF11441, Transfer of Defense Articles: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). 100 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts, March 2017. 101 See, for example, Section 7035(b)(3), “Commercial Leasing of Defense Articles” in P.L. 118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024. 102 P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, states that “Only those countries for which assistance was justified for the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program in the fiscal year 1989 congressional presentation for security assistance programs may utilize funds made available under this heading for procurement of defense articles, defense services or design and construction services that are not sold by the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Security Assistance Manual further states that “DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)) approves DCCs to be financed with FMF on a case-by-case basis.” See Chapter 9.7.3, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20. 103 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Israel - Country Commercial Guide, Aerospace and Defense,” October 6, 2023. 104 Dov S. Zakheim, “Is Turkey a threat to Israel?” The Hill, January 10, 2025. 105 Alisa Odenheimer, “Israel Must Be More Independent in Weapons Production, PM Says,” Bloomberg, March 31, 2025. 106 Lilach Shoval, “Amid US tensions, Israel pivots to self-reliance on homegrown arms,” Israel Hayom, August 13, 2024. 107 Jeremy Binnie, “Israeli MoD orders locally produced bombs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7, 2025. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its potential adversaries. The Origins of QME The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the balance of power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because Warsaw Pact countries had a numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must maintain a “qualitative edge” in defense systems.108 The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to its Arab adversaries. In 1981, then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A central aspect of US policy since the October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.”109 For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress, have taken measures to maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example, • • • • U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional access to U.S. defense technology. For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years before Saudi Arabia. It received delivery of the F-16 fighter in 1980, three years before Egypt.110 In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform, Israel has first received either a more advanced version of the platform or the ability to customize the U.S. system.111 In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and legislated conditions on the usage and transfer of such weapons prior to or after a sale.112 The United States has compensated Israel with “offsetting” weapons packages or military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern state (see textbox below). Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in ways that encouraged a more deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments other than Israel.113 In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation 108 For example, see Written Statement of General William O. Gribble Jr., Hearings on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23, 24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972. 109 Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981. 110 In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided that “In accordance with the historic special relationship between the United States and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress joins with the President in reaffirming that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales ceilings, shall not impair Israel’s deterrent strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.” 111 “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” Israel Policy Forum, April 11, 2016. 112 See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. 113 Prior to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle East, QME concerns were addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and committee staff. Some congressional staff argued that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective and asserted that codifying the requirement would rationalize the process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular component of the U.S. arms sales review process to Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff member, September 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 17 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 (H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.” After becoming chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), then-Chairman Berman was able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-429). The relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined QME;114 (2) they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export of a U.S. defense article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale would not adversely affect Israel’s QME. Preserving QME: Offsetting Weapons Packages for Israel The following specific instances supplemented general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME:115 • In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H. W. Bush Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and pre-positioned U.S. defense equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approval.116 • In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to Israel.117 • In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel following a sale to Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.118 • In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the United Arab Emirates (UAE) advanced F-16 fighters, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with KC-135 refueling aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.119 At the time, the U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor Ospreys to another country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22, citing budgetary constraints. Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the AECA, the interagency process to assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors and with little fanfare. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance Manual, QME determinations can be classified.120 After a QME determination has been made regarding a specific proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional notification reading, “The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.” Lawmakers have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that the Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other 114 Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.” 115 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military Advantage,” Jewish Virtual Library. 116 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September 26, 1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994. 117 Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘Smarter’ U.S.-made Bombs than Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2020. 118 Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining over Saudi Arms,” Daily Beast, January 10, 2014. 119 “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” Reuters, April 19, 2013. 120 See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5. Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Middle Eastern states, “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by such sale or export.” U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel Since 1999, U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-government Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements like treaties, and do not require Senate ratification. Additionally, Congress may accept or change year-to-year assistance levels for Israel or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless, past MOUs have significantly influenced U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has appropriated foreign aid to Israel largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time (with the exception of supplemental appropriations acts). P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021, contains Section 1273 of the United States Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020, which authorizes “not less than” $3.3 billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the current MOU (see below). Appropriators have matched or exceeded that authorization level each year since its passage. Brief History of MOUs on U.S. Aid to Israel The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 billion in total economic and military aid (of which $21.3 billion was military aid) during its duration.121 This MOU provided the template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel. In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a $30 billion military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that agreement, Israel was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israelimanufactured equipment (known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP—discussed below). The agreement stated that “Both sides acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign assistance overall, and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”122 The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) On September 14, 2016, U.S. and Israeli government representatives signed another 10-year MOU on military aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the United States pledges, subject to congressional appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in FMF grants, plus $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the MOU, “Both the United States and Israel jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in this MOU, and not to seek changes to the FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”123 During the negotiations for the current MOU, Israeli officials had sought a higher U.S. commitment of as much as $45 billion.124 One of the MOU’s negotiators, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel B. Shapiro, explained constraints that precluded such an increase: 121 See, The White House, “Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak,” July 19, 1999. 122 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007. 123 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016. 124 Peter Baker and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “U.S. Finalizes Deal to Give Israel $38 Billion in Military Aid,” New York Times, September 13, 2016. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 At $3.1 billion (the closing level of FMF in the previous MOU), the Israeli share of the global FMF budget stood at roughly 40 percent. Two of the three next largest recipients of FMF were Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s two Arab peace partners. The American side explained that there would be no way to increase FMF to Israel to certain levels without cutting deeply into the Egyptian and Jordanian programs, and likely eliminating altogether a number of smaller programs in other countries. 125 The terms of the FY2019-FY2028 MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as, • • Phasing out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP).126 OSP was to decrease slowly until FY2024, and then phase out more dramatically over the MOU’s last five years, ending entirely in FY2028 (see Figure 4). The MOU calls on Israel to provide the United States with “detailed programmatic information related to the use of all U.S. funding, including funds used for OSP.” In response to the planned phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense contractors started merging with U.S. companies or opening U.S. subsidiaries to continue their eligibility for defense contracts financed through FMF (see “U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology”).127 Missile Defense. The Administration pledged to request $500 million in annual combined funding for missile defense programs with joint U.S.-Israeli elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and David’s Sling. Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which has traditionally been appropriated via separate interactions between successive Administrations and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United States and Israel to a $500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it also stipulates that under exceptional circumstances (e.g., major armed conflict involving Israel), both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million annual cap).128 Considerations for the Next MOU The current MOU is in effect through September 30, 2028. U.S. and Israeli officials will probably soon begin the formal process for negotiating the next assistance agreement. Israeli lawmakers and various experts have begun publishing position papers on the future of U.S. military assistance to Israel. Some call for maintaining or increasing aid, while others call for gradually phasing out assistance and, instead, pursuing a model of cooperative programming.129 During 125 Daniel B. Shapiro, “A Review of the Negotiations on the 2016 US-Israel MOU on Military Assistance,” in Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even, Editors, Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid, INSS, pp. 61-68. 126 Section 42(c) (22 U.S.C. §2791(c)) of the AECA prohibits using funds made available under this act for procurement outside the United States unless the President determines that such procurement does not have an adverse effect on the U.S. economy or the industrial mobilization base. Executive Order 13637 designated this authority to the Secretary of Defense and the issuance of an OSP waiver requires concurrence by the Departments of State and Commerce. See U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Manual, Chapter 9. 127 “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2017. 128 In FY2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in additional missile defense funding for Israel. In FY2024, Congress appropriated $8.7 billion in combined FMF and missile defense funding (see Table 2). 129 “By Itself, With U.S.: The Case for a U.S.-Israel Mutual Defense Treaty Post-10/7,” The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), October 7, 2024. Lahav Harkov, “Meet the Likud lawmaker advocating for the U.S. to phase out military aid to Israel,” Jewish Insider, March 13, 2025; and “U.S.–Israel Strategy: From Special Relationship to Strategic Partnership, 2029–2047,” The Heritage Foundation, March 12, 2025. Congressional Research Service 20 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 both the Biden and Trump Administrations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that Israel needs to “wean ourselves off of American security aid.”130 With both sides having already agreed to tens of billions worth of U.S. arms sales since October 7, 2023, and with Israel’s ability under U.S. law to use cash flow financing (see below) to stretch FMF payments on those contracts over years, a new MOU may be necessary to finance existing payment schedules on equipment already purchased. If the two sides are unable to reach an arrangement, and Congress does not appropriate FMF to Israel, the Israeli government would either have to pay for existing contracts with national funds, arrange other sources of external financing, or terminate ongoing contracts, at which point the United States and Israel may both be liable for certain contract termination costs. As both sides prepare for MOU negotiations, projected Israeli defense budgets and U.S. foreign assistance budgets may factor into the aid levels in the next MOU. Israel has signaled that it may raise its own defense spending significantly in the coming years. An Israeli government commission recently recommended adding another $30 billion to military spending over the next decade.131 As Congress considers recent Administration reviews of U.S. foreign assistance, some experts have noted that reductions in U.S. assistance globally could have an indirect impact on Israel even if U.S. aid to Israel continues. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel Shapiro has said that if other countries are receiving U.S. aid, “Israel is not so exposed,” as the recipient of a majority of FMF.132 Figure 4. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU Source: CRS graphics. 130 Lahav Harkov, “Netanyahu calls to ‘wean’ Israel off U.S. aid amid growing tensions,” Jewish Insider, May 12, 2025. 131 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israel Must Bolster Military, Panel Warns,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2025. 132 Daniel B. Shapiro, “Let’s talk about the next US-Israel military-assistance agreement,” Defense One, January 31, 2025. Congressional Research Service 21 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Figure 5. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel over Decades Source: CRS graphics. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales The Foreign Military Financing appropriations account is the primary legislative funding vehicle through which Israel receives security assistance. Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient of FMF. Annual FMF grants to Israel represent approximately 14% of the overall Israeli defense budget.133 In the decades-long history of U.S. military aid to Israel, current levels of U.S. military aid represent a lower percentage of overall Israeli defense spending than in previous eras due to the growth of Israel’s economy and national budget.134 Israel’s defense expenditure as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (8.8% in 2024) is one of the highest in the world.135 Like other global recipients of major U.S. defense equipment, the state of Israel procures U.S. arms through the Foreign Military Sales program (recipient procures item from the U.S. government) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licenses (U.S. firms sell defense articles directly to international partners). From 1950 to 2022, the United States implemented more than $53.4 billion in FMS for Israel, making it the second largest U.S. defense customer by value worldwide (after Saudi Arabia).136 In April 2025, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (POLMIL) at the State Department (the bureau responsible for policy direction of U.S. arms sales) reported that “as of April 2025, the United States has 751 active Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases with Israel that are valued at $39.2 billion.... From FY2018 through FY2022, the U.S. has also authorized the permanent export of over $12.2 billion in defense articles to Israel via the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process.”137 133 The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by Jane’s, “Israel Defence Budget,” January 12, 2024. Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense budget calculations to reflect how much Israel independently spends on defense. 134 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel,” Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, June 24, 1983. 135 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military spending as a share of GDP rose from 5.4 per cent in 2023 to 8.8 per cent in 2024, giving Israel the second highest military burden in the world behind Ukraine.” See, Xiao Liang, Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, Lorenzo Scarazzato, Zubaida Karim, and Jade Guiberteau Ricard, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 2025. 136 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Historical Sales Book Fiscal Years 1950 to 2022, FY2022 edition. 137 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel: Fact Sheet,” April 25, 2025. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Figure 6. FMF as a Percentage of Israel’s Defense Budget Source: Jane’s Defence Budget (April 2025). Notes: This table does not include annual missile defense appropriations. Jane’s Defence uses Israeli Ministry of Finance figures and other sources to estimate annual budget projections. Jane’s figures are in constant 2025 USD billions. Cash Flow Financing Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this authority to permit Israel to utilize FMF funds to finance multiyear purchases in advance appropriations, rather than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up front (see text box below). Known as “cash flow financing,” this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.138 138 Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the AECA and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Congressional Research Service 23 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Early History of Cash Flow Financing to Israel The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 billion for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans or grants] extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President may determine and without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time, the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976), capped the annual amount of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more than $250 million per year. Under the authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Richard Nixon, in two separate determinations (April and July 1974), allocated the $2.2 billion to Israel as $1.5 billion in grant military aid, the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the time. The remaining $700 million was designated as a military loan. According to the New York Times, the Ford Administration reached a new arms sales agreement with Israel a year-and-a-half later, providing that “the cost of the new military equipment would be met through the large amount of aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress as well as the aid that will be approved by future Congresses.”139 Cash flow financing and its derivatives also have allowed Israel to use U.S. government-approved sources of external financing to support the procurement of major U.S. defense systems, such as combat aircraft. Beginning with its purchase of F-16D aircraft from Lockheed Martin over 20 years ago and continuing presently with ongoing procurement of the F-35, the United States has utilized what is known as the “Deferred Payments Program.”140 This program allows Israel to defer payments owed under its Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for F-35 aircraft and use future-year FMF appropriations to make payments pursuant to a pre-determined payment schedule. Upon deferral of a given payment by Israel, a private bank (in the case of the F-35, a small consortium led by Citibank) pays Lockheed Martin in full and Lockheed Martin assigns its right to be paid by the U.S. Government to the bank.141 In Foreign Military Sales cases in which Israel and the United States seek to execute LOAs beyond the scope of the current MOU (either beyond FY2028 or above the $33 billion pledged), the U.S. government has established a “Special Billing Arrangement” (SBA) with Israel. The purpose of SBAs, according to DSCA, is to “improve cash management for eligible FMS partners.”142 Under an SBA, Israel may use national cash reserves for funding requirements associated with an FMS case (e.g., funds to cover termination liability) that exceeds the amount of funds listed in or duration of the current MOU.143 139 See “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel That It Blocked in the Past,” New York Times, October 12, 1976. 140 Under this arrangement, Lockheed Martin sells Citibank a legal claim on its defense contract with Israel. The Defense Department then repays Citibank using the available FMF allocation for Israel. The Israeli government uses its own national funds to pay interest on the Citibank loans. One organization in support of continued U.S. support for Israel has advocated for Congress to authorize the use of FMF to cover Israeli interest payments on weapons deals to creditors. See Jonathan Ruhe, Charles B. Perkins, and Ari Cicurel, “Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations,” The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), February 2021. However, according to DSCA, it is unclear whether FMF is legally available for that purpose. 141 CRS Correspondence with DSCA, January 2022. 142 See Chapter 9.10.2, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20. 143 According to DSCA, “Since requirements and procedures are unique to each country, they are normally established in an agreement between the customer country, DSCA, and the appropriate banking institutions in the U.S. and the purchaser’s country.” See Defense Security Cooperation University, Security Cooperation Management, Chapter 12, edition 41, May 2021. Congressional Research Service 24 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Table 3. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel Amount/Description Cong. Notice Primary Contractor(s) Estimated Cost KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft 2020 Boeing Corporation $2.4 billion JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and unleaded gasoline 2020 N/A $3 billion 18 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters (with support equipment) 2021 Lockheed Martin (parent company of Sikorsky) and General Electric Company $3.4 billion *120mm M830A1 High Explosive AntiTank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT) tank cartridges 2023 U.S. Army inventory $106.5 million *M107 155mm projectiles 2023 U.S. Army inventory $147.5 million 50 new F-15IA multi-role fighter aircraft and modification kits for 25 F-15I multirole fighter aircraft 2024 Boeing Corporation $18.82 billion 30 AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and 1 AMRAAM guidance section 2024 RTX Corporation $102.5 million 32,739 120mm tank cartridges 2024 General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems and Northrop Grumman Defense Systems $774.1 million 50,000 M933A1 120mm High Explosive Mortar Cartridges 2024 General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Inc. $61.1 million M1148A1P2 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) 2024 Oshkosh Corporation $583.1 million Heavy Duty Tank Trailers (HDTT) 2024 Leonardo DRS $164.6 million Munitions, Guidance Kits, Fuzes, and Munitions Support 2025 Boeing Corporation and others $6.75 billion AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles 2025 Lockheed Martin $660 million *Caterpillar D9 Bulldozers 2025 Caterpillar $295 million *Munitions, Guidance Kits, and Munitions Support 2025 Boeing Corporation and others $675.7 million *Munitions and Munitions Support 2025 General Dynamics and others $2.04 billion Eitan Powerpack Engines 2025 Rolls-Royce Solutions America, Inc $180 million Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s. Notes: All figures are approximate. ***Notified under emergency authority under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. Congressional Research Service 25 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 Early Transfer and Interest-Bearing Account Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump sum during the first month of the fiscal year (not including supplemental appropriations).144 P.L.118-47, the FY2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act states that, “of the funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘Foreign Military Financing Program,’ not less than $3,300,000,000 shall be available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30 days of enactment of this Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interestbearing account with the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.145 In the past, Israel used interest collected on its military aid to pay down, among other things, its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S. government agencies. As of September 2024, Israel no longer maintained any outstanding sovereign debt to the United States government.146 Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense procurement inside Israel. Shorter Congressional Review Period of Arms Sales Per provisions in the AECA, Israel, along with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand (commonly referred to as NATO+5) have shorter congressional review periods (15 days instead of 30) and higher dollar notification thresholds than other countries for both government-to-government and commercially licensed arms sales. The prior notice threshold values for transfers to these recipients are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment; $100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and $300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services.147 F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Israel was the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.148 It has purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts using FMF grants and agreed to a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the U.S. government for 25 more planes (for a total of $3 billion) pending finalized contracts with Lockheed Martin. Deliveries of this additional tranche of jet fighters are not expected to be completed until 2035. As of January 2025, Israel had received 39 of 50 jets on order,149 which it has divided into three squadrons (the 116th ‘Lions of the South,’ the 144 On at least one occasion when government operations were funded by a continuing resolution, Congress has included provisions in the resolution preventing the early transfer of FMF to Israel until the final appropriations bill for that fiscal year was passed. See Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014. 145 According to DSCA, “Some countries may establish an account with the federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms, conditions, and mechanics of the account’s operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest-bearing account in the FRB.” See Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),” 34th edition, April 2015. 146 Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government, United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Global Economics and Debt. Israel finished paying off long-standing debts to the U.S. government in June 2023. 147 See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. 148 In September 2008, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel - F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 08-83, September 29, 2008. 149 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel inks deal to buy 25 more F-35 fighter jets for $3 billion,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2024. Congressional Research Service 26 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 140th ‘Golden Eagles,’ and the 117th Training Squadron) based at Nevatim Air Base in southern Israel.150 In 2018, Israeli defense officials claimed that Israel was the first country to operate the F-35 in combat.151 To date, only the United States and Israel have ever used the aircraft in aerial strikes. Since 2018, Israeli pilots have reportedly flown the F-35 across multiple theaters (both permissive and contested in terms of air defenses), such as Syria, Iran, and Yemen.152 Some reports suggest that Israel used its F-35s to strike deep within Iranian territory in October 2024, destroying Iran’s Russian-supplied S-300 anti-aircraft systems.153 When asked how the Israel Air Force’s versions of the F-35 have performed, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael J. Schmidt stated in a 2023 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee that it had been “absolutely outstanding” and “their full mission capable rates are high.”154 The Department of Defense’s F-35 program is an international cooperative program in which Israel (and Singapore) are considered “security cooperation participants” outside of the F-35 cooperative development partnership.155 Israel is not eligible to assign staff to the F-35 Joint Program Office in Virginia and does not receive full F-35 technical briefings.156 The U.S. government and Lockheed Martin retain exclusive access to the F-35’s software code, which Israel is not permitted to alter. Figure 7. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in Formation Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020) Despite these limitations, Israel’s involvement in the F-35 program is extensive, with Israeli companies making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and Source: U.S. Air Force. helmets (Elbit Systems). Under a 2020 agreement with Lockheed Martin, the defense contractor committed to re-investing 35%157 of the F-35 contract’s value into Israeli industry through offset and counter-trade activity; as of 2020, Lockheed had invested over $4 billion in Israel’s defense sector.158 Israel also has received significant development access to the F-35 and the ability to customize its planes with Israeli-made C4 (command, control, communications, computers) systems, under the 150 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2020. 151 Anna Ahronheim, “IAF commander: Israel first to use F-35 jet in combat,” Jerusalem Post, May 22, 2018. 152 For example, see “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” BBC News, May 22, 2018 and “Israel - Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019, Yaakov Lappin and Jeremy Binnie, “IDF details Iranian UAV incursions,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 9, 2022, Jake Epstein, “The F-35 stealth fighter’s victory against Iran’s air defenses highlights its ability to wage a higher level of war,” Business Insider, December 14, 2024. 153 Aaron Spray, “5 Times The F-35 5th-Generation Fighter Has Been Used in Combat,” Simpleflying.com, November 11, 2024. 154 CQ Transcripts, “House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Holds Hearing on F-35 Acquisition Program Update,” December 12, 2023. 155 See CRS Report R48304, F-35 Lightning II: Background and Issues for Congress. 156 “Israel,” Jane’s World Air Forces, September 1, 2020. 157 According to Jane’s, FMF‐funded contracts in Israel (see Off-Shore Procurement) cannot be used for direct offsets. See, “Israel – Market Report,” Jane’s Emerging Markets Reports, January 17, 2024. 158 Charles Forrester, “Lockheed Martin signs umbrella offset agreement with Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 17, 2020. Congressional Research Service 27 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 condition that the software coding be done by the United States. In 2018, the Navy awarded Lockheed Martin a $148 million contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique weapons certification, modification kits, and electronic warfare analysis.”159 Software upgrades (called Block 3F+) added to the main computer of Israel’s F-35s reportedly facilitate the “use of Israelidesigned electronic equipment and weaponry,” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own external jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided munitions.”160 In December 2021, the Defense Department awarded a $49 million contract to Lockheed Martin to support work on “an F-35 variant ‘tailored’ for an undisclosed FMS customer,” probably Israel.161 F-15IA Israel has flown variants of the F-15 since the late 1970’s, and due to their ranges and payload capacities, these variants (F-15I) have been considered the top fighters in Israel’s F-15 fleet. However, for over two decades, Israel had not acquired any new F15 fighters. Internal Israeli budgetary and political disagreements had delayed a formal Israeli request to move ahead with an acquisition of 25 F-15IAs (or F-15EXs) until 2023.162 In a long-range Israeli air strike scenario (against a country like Iran), the stealthy F-35 is designed to target an enemy’s air defenses, while the F-15IA is to use its heavy-weapons payload against various hardened targets. Figure 8. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems Source: Elbit Systems Ltd. Notes: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Collins. As mentioned above, in August 2024, the Biden Administration formally notified Congress of potential Foreign Military Sales to Israel for up to 50 new F-15IA fighter aircraft and F-15 upgrades for $18.82 billion.163 In November 2024, Israel and Boeing agreed to contract terms for the purchase of 25 F-15IAs for $5.2 billion. Initial delivery is set to take place in 2031, with 4-6 aircraft to be supplied annually thereafter.164 Reportedly, the new F-15IA will be equipped with advanced Israeli electronic warfare equipment and data links.165 159 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts for February 2, 2018. 160 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2020. 161 Gareth Jennings, “Lockheed Martin to Design and Develop F-35 Variant ‘Tailored’ for Foreign Customer,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 29, 2021. 162 Arie Egozi, “Israel formally requests 25 F-15 EX from the US: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2023. 163 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – F-15IA and F-15I+ Aircraft,” Transmittal 24-01, August 13, 2024. 164 “Israel signs $5.2 billion deal to acquire 25 F-15 fighter jets from Boeing,” Reuters, November 7, 2024. 165 Emanuel Fabian, “Defense Ministry signs $5.2 billion deal to buy 25 advanced F-15IA fighter jets,” Times of Israel, November 7, 2024. Congressional Research Service 28 U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023 KC-46A Pegasus To extend the range of its aerial attack capability and enhance personnel mobility, Israel has pursued procurement of Boeing’s KC-46A “Pegasus” multirole tanker. The Pegasus can refuel all types of U.S. and allied military aircraft and can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment. The Israeli Air Force originally procured its current fleet of tankers (converted Boeing 707s) in the 1970s. According to one account, “With the ability to fly for 36 hours, the KC-46A has a high endurance for long missions and comes equipped with anti-electronic jamming equipment to make the large target safer from attack.”166 According to several Members of Congress, “Israeli KC-46As would not only benefit Israel’s refueling operations but, since they are interoperable with U.S. aircraft, would also expand U.S. capabilities in the Middle East—without the United States having to pay to station and maintain tankers in the region.”167 In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A Boeing “Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated $2.4 billion.168 Israel is the second foreign country approved by the United States to receive the KC-46A, after Japan. In February 2021, Israel signed an LOA to buy two KC46As and, in January 2022, it reached a second LOA for two additional tankers. In late August 2022, Boeing and Israel signed a contract for four KC-46As, plus associated maintenance, logistics, and training, for $927 million. Delivery of the Pegasus tankers may occur at some point in either 2025 or 2026; Israel’s government has sought to expedite this timetable.169 Figure 9. The KC-46A Pegasus Source: U.S. Air Force. Since Israel may use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters, a key capability in projecting force toward Iran and elsewhere,170 some lawmakers have sought to expedite deliveries of the refueling aircraft along with associated specialized training for Israeli pilots. Section 1256 of P.L.118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024, directs the Secretary of the Air Force to, among other things: provide U.S. resources to train members of the Israel Air Force on the operation of KC-46A, authorize Israeli participation in an Air Force Military Personnel Exchange Program, and provide an estimated date of delivery to Israel of KC-4 [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33222. Public record. Not legal advice.