# Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33185 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** May 25, 2010 - **Citation:** RL33185 ## Text Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance (name redacted) Specialist in African Affairs May 25, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RL33185 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Summary This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of the Taylor regime. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential runoff vote with 59.4% of votes cast and took office in January 2006, becoming the first elected female president of an African country. Her runoff rival, George Weah, a former star soccer player, conceded Sirleaf’s win after initially contesting it. Most observers viewed the vote as orderly, free, and fair. It fulfilled a key goal of an August 2003 peace accord that had ended the second civil war and led to an ongoing, U.S.-aided post-war transition process, which is bolstered by the multifaceted peacekeeping and development-focused U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The next election is scheduled for 2011, and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia’s security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed; widespread corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia’s economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by the SCSL. In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia’s post-war peace and reconstruction processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey); H.R. 3288 (Olver); S. 656 (Reed); H.R. 2258 (Kennedy); H.R. 2410 (Berman); H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen); S. 1434 (Leahy); and H.R. 2346 (Obey). Congressional Research Service Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Contents Recent and Ongoing Developments.............................................................................................1 U.S. Ties .....................................................................................................................................3 Background ................................................................................................................................3 U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).........................................................................................4 Current Strength..............................................................................................................4 Drawdown ......................................................................................................................4 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse........................................................................................6 Transition Process .......................................................................................................................7 2005 Post-War Elections .............................................................................................................7 Conduct of Elections .............................................................................................................9 2005 Election Dispute ................................................................................................... 10 Subsequent Elections .................................................................................................... 10 Sirleaf Government ................................................................................................................... 11 Policy Agenda..................................................................................................................... 11 Economic Renewal ....................................................................................................... 11 Governance................................................................................................................... 12 Foreign Policy............................................................................................................... 12 Women ......................................................................................................................... 12 Corruption .................................................................................................................... 13 Performance........................................................................................................................ 13 Sirleaf Administration: Criticisms and Challenges ............................................................... 14 Security Issues .......................................................................................................................... 17 Security Conditions............................................................................................................. 17 Rubber Sector Reform................................................................................................... 20 Security Sector Reform ....................................................................................................... 21 New Military Created.................................................................................................... 21 Defense Sector Reform and the AFL: Current Issues and Challenges ............................. 23 Coast Guard.................................................................................................................. 27 National Guard State Partnership Program..................................................................... 28 Other Defense Cooperation ........................................................................................... 29 Police and Justice Sector Assistance .............................................................................. 30 Special Security Service...................................................................................................... 32 Humanitarian Conditions .......................................................................................................... 33 Health Issues....................................................................................................................... 34 AIDS .................................................................................................................................. 34 Governance: Background .......................................................................................................... 35 Transitional Government..................................................................................................... 36 Post-NTGL Corruption Trials........................................................................................ 37 Concession Deals ................................................................................................................ 38 New Contracts .............................................................................................................. 40 NTGL Anti-Corruption Efforts ............................................................................................ 41 Key Governance Issues ............................................................................................................. 42 Anti-Corruption Efforts Under Sirleaf ................................................................................. 42 Forestry Sector.............................................................................................................. 42 Congressional Research Service Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Diamonds ..................................................................................................................... 45 GEMAP........................................................................................................................ 46 Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) ........................................ 47 Legislative Branch .................................................................................................................... 48 U.S. Legislative Assistance ................................................................................................. 49 Congressional Role ....................................................................................................... 50 War Crimes, Human Rights Cases, and Transitional Justice....................................................... 51 Taylor Trial ......................................................................................................................... 51 Trial Venue ................................................................................................................... 52 Sirleaf Administration Role........................................................................................... 53 SCSL: U.S. Views and Assistance ................................................................................. 54 Transitional Justice in Liberia.............................................................................................. 56 Potential for War Crimes Tribunal in Liberia ................................................................. 56 Truth and Reconciliation Commission........................................................................... 56 Cases Against “Chuckie” Taylor.......................................................................................... 58 U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 60 111th Congress..................................................................................................................... 62 Appropriations .............................................................................................................. 62 Immigration .................................................................................................................. 63 Other Bills .................................................................................................................... 65 110th Congress .................................................................................................................... 65 Immigration Issues........................................................................................................ 67 U.S. Assistance Summary ................................................................................................... 67 Development Assistance and Related Bilateral Cooperation .......................................... 68 Millennium Challenge Corporation ............................................................................... 69 Peace Corps .................................................................................................................. 69 Trade Benefits............................................................................................................... 70 Economic Cooperation and Investment ......................................................................... 70 Air and Communications Links ..................................................................................... 71 Debt Relief, Donor Cooperation, and Related Issues...................................................... 72 U.S. Assistance Levels ........................................................................................................ 73 Figures Figure 1. Map of Liberia ........................................................................................................... 76 Tables Table 1. 2005 Election: Legislative Results by Party....................................................................9 Table 2. U.S. Assistance for the Special Court for Sierra Leone ................................................. 55 Table 3. U.S. Bilateral and Related Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-FY2011............................... 73 Contacts Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 76 Congressional Research Service Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Recent and Ongoing Developments Liberia’s president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf,1 is currently visiting the United States. Her several-day trip is aimed at deepening her high-level contacts with the Administration of President Barack Obama, Congress, and other U.S. policy makers.2 Sirleaf, who also maintained warm ties with former President George W. Bush’s Administration, is scheduled to meet with President Obama, possibly to be joined by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, on May 27.3 She is expected to update U.S. policy makers, including interested Members, on Liberia’s progress since her election, as well as remaining challenges in such areas as security sector reform, anti-corruption efforts, unemployment, economic growth, and legal system capacity building. Her visit is expected to include a Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program pre-signing event and a possible U.S. Global Food Security Initiative country program. 4 On March 18, 2010, President Obama extended for 18 months the Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) status of eligible Liberian U.S. resident aliens, which had previously been set to expire on March 31, 2010, allowing them to remain in the United States. DED is a special immigration status that effectively suspends the deportation of eligible U.S. aliens. The presidential directive ordering the extension, which had been sought by some Members, notably from districts with significant populations of Liberian origin, also authorized those eligible to work during the duration of their DED status.5 In addition, two bills introduced in the 111th Congress would allow certain Liberian aliens to become permanent U.S. residents. (See “Immigration Issues.”) The trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, which began in mid-2007, but was beset by procedural delays for a time, is continuing. Cross-examination of defense witnesses by the Prosecutor’s Office of the U.S.-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which began in November 2009, proceeded in early 2010.6 (See “Taylor Trial.”) In her late January 2010 annual address to the Liberian legislature, President Sirleaf announced that she would seek reelection to a second term in 2011, as many observers had expected. Her announcement came in spite of a recommendation by Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in its draft June 2009 final report that Sirleaf, as one of 49 alleged “political leaders and financiers of different warring factions” party to Liberia’s civil wars, be “barred from 1 Although her name is widely cited as Johnson-Sirleaf, the Liberian president does not employ a hyphenated form of her last name. See Wil Haygood, “For Liberia’s ‘Iron Lady,’ Toughness Part of Territory,” Washington Post, December 16, 2005. 2 Such contacts have included an April 2009 meeting with Secretary of State Clinton, an official visit to Liberia in August 2009 by Secretary Clinton, and an April 2010 visit to Liberia by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns, which are discussed below; see section on “U.S. Relations”. 3 White House, “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Visit of President Sirleaf of Liberia to the White House,” May 24, 2010; and Reed Kramer and Tami Hultman, “President Reports Progress Amid Problems to U.S. Backers,” allAfrica.com, May 25, 2010. 4 Liberian Government, “President Sirleaf To Meet US Government Officials in Washington,” May 14, 2010. 5 Administration of Barack H. Obama, Memorandum on Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians, March 18, 2010. 6 Taylor is being tried by the SCSL on war crimes and related charges under an amended, 11-count indictment first brought against him in 2003. The Prosecutor alleges that he directly aided and abetted diverse crimes allegedly committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF. Open Society Institute, “Trial Proceedings,” http://www.charlestaylortrial.org; and SCSL press releases and court documents. Congressional Research Service 1 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance holding public offices” or “elected or appointed” for 30 years.7 (See “Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”) In early 2010, the Unity Party (UP, President Sirleaf’s party), the Liberia Action Party (LAP), and the Liberia Unification Party (LUP) were in the process of holding party conventions and were all expected to ratify an April 2009 agreement among them to merge.8 In mid-2010, a full-fledged Peace Corps Volunteer (PCV) country program for Liberia is scheduled to begin. It will build on the work of a special short-term humanitarian service program that began in October 2008.9 (See “Peace Corps.”) U.S.-Liberia flights by Delta Airlines are slated to begin in mid-2010. The initiation of the new route, originally planned for mid-2009, was delayed when the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced in June 2009 that due to security deficiencies at Liberia’s international airport, it would not permit the operation of U.S.-Liberian flights. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), a DHS unit, is providing Liberia with assistance to enhance aviation security. 10 (See “Air and Communications Links.”) In May 2009, a jury acquitted former National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) Chairman Gyude Bryant and four former Liberia Petroleum Refinery Company (LPRC) executives from the NTGL period of corruption charges in a case involving the alleged embezzlement of LPRC assets.11 Bryant faces a separate corruption case related his tenure as NTGL chairman. (See “Post-NTGL Corruption Trials.”) In late 2009, Liberia held a Senatorial by-election to fill a vacancy created by an incumbent’s death in which President Sirleaf’s Unity Party lost in a run-off against the opposition Congress for Democratic Change (CDC). Although the election reportedly featured a low voter turnout, it was viewed as a dry run of the National Elections Commission’s (NEC) operational capability ahead of national elections in 2011 because nearly half of Liberia’s electorate was eligible to participate in it. (See “Subsequent Elections.”) The Sirleaf government is negotiating or has in recent years entered into several multi-year, large natural resource or agricultural concession deals, collectively worth multiple billions of dollars 7 TRC, Consolidated Final Report (unedited), Volume II, June 29, 2009. These party realignments are viewed as part an effort to create a strong political coalition in support of the reelection of President Sirleaf in 2011. Just prior to the LUP convention in mid-February 2010, a number of politicians from several smaller parties, some former LUP members, agreed to join the party. The Informer, “Several Cross Carpet to LUP,” February 12, 2010 via AllAfrica.com; Nana Adu Ampofo, “Major Liberian Parties Merge Ahead of 2011 Election,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, April 2, 2009; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Liberia, June 2009. 9 Peace Corps, “Liberia,” December 17, 2009. 10 Delta Air Lines, “Delta Expands Africa Presence with First-Ever Flight between Atlanta and Monrovia, Liberia,” October 22, 2008; Dow Jones News Service, “TSA Blocks Delta Flights To 2 African Cities On Security,” June 3, 2009; and TSA, “TSA and Liberia Partner to Enhance Aviation Security,” April 7, 2009. 11 Two of the other LPRC accused include the former speaker of the incumbent Liberian House of Representatives, Edwin Swone, Jr., and Senator Richard Devine. C. Emmanuel Johnson, “Court Continues Jurors Selection,” The News (Monrovia) via AllAfrica.com January 6, 2009; Agence France Presse (AFP), “Former Liberia Leader Faces More Corruption Charges,” May 17, 2008; The Analyst, “Bryant Pities Country - He, Others Absolved of Sabotage Charges,” via allAfrica.com, May 8, 2009; and information to CRS provided by the State Department February 2 and 3, 2009. 8 Congressional Research Service 2 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance worth of investment and potential exports, indicating that large foreign investors’ confidence in the country’s political progress and prospective stability is strong.12 Sirleaf has cited strong economic growth—which, she said in May 2010, had averaged 7% annually over the past four years, in spite of a period of global recession—as a key benchmark of advances made under her administration.13 U.S. Ties The United States has long-standing ties with Liberia that date back to the founding of the modern Liberian state by “Americo-Liberians,” black freemen and former slaves from the Americas who settled in Liberia beginning in 1821. Liberia was also a close U.S. ally, albeit a relatively minor one, during World War II and the cold war, and the country hosted U.S. communications facilities in the 1960s and 1970s, and received extensive U.S. development assistance. The Reagan Administration cultivated ties with the government of President Samuel K. Doe during the first half of the 1980s, although these later soured. The United States also provided meditational support and extensive humanitarian assistance for Liberia during its first and second civil wars. It has also invested substantial amounts of aid in the current United Nations peacekeeping operation in Liberia, as well as substantial post-war rebuilding and development assistance. There has generally been strong congressional support for these efforts. The Administration of former President George W. Bush formed a close and cordial relationship with the Sirleaf government, and similarly close relations have continued under the Obama Administration. Contemporary U.S. relations with and policy developments related to Liberia are discussed in the “U.S. Relations” section of this report.14 Background Liberia, a small, poor West African country of about 3.4 million people, is undergoing a postconflict transition and peace-building process after its second civil war within a decade. The latter conflict burgeoned in 2000, after several minor border incursions in 1999. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and 12 These include several iron ore projects with China Union, $2.6 billion; BHP Billiton, $2 billion; Severstal, $2 billion; Elenilto; $2.2 billion; and ArcelorMittal, $1.5 billion. ArcelorMittal and BHP Billiton are also in talks to create a joint venture to export ore from BHP Billiton holdings in Guinea through an ArcelorMittal-controlled rail link to Liberia’s coast and achieve other business synergies, and Liberia’s government is in talks with Brazil’s Vale, which also owns concessions in Guinea, regarding a possible iron ore deal. AmLib Holdings, a gold mining firm, owns a $200 million concession. Recent large agricultural contracts include an $800 million palm oil concession deal with Sime Darby, and a possible $1.6 billion palm oil with Golden Agri Resources; and two prospective rubber deals, with the Cavalla Rubber Corporation ($75 million) and the Liberia Agricultural Company ($25 million). Liberia has also recently entered into several oil exploration contracts worth a total of $60 million. Reuters, “Major Foreign and Local Investments in Liberia,” May 4 2010; Boakai Fofana, “Liberia: Govt Secures Huge Investment in Palm Oil Production,” December 1, 2009, AllAfrica.com; Eric Onstad and Philip Blenkinsop, “ArcelorMittal, BHP Discuss Africa Iron Ore JV,” Reuters, January 19, 2010. 13 allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010. 14 For information on past U.S.-Liberian relations, see CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, by (name re dacted); and CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 3 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). The war led to an extreme deterioration in political, economic, humanitarian, and human rights conditions. It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces. The Taylor regime also sponsored or facilitated acts of armed aggression against its neighbors, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire.15 A peace accord was signed on August 18, 2003, after months of international mediation. It was facilitated by two events: Charles Taylor’s resignation of the presidency and departure from Liberia on August 11, after he was granted political asylum in Nigeria; and the early August deployment of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with extensive U.S. and U.N. assistance, deployed to Liberia to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening humanitarian crisis in the wake of a failed June 2003 cease-fire. It was tasked with monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid, and preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) UNMIL, first authorized by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on September 19, 2003, deployed to Liberia on October 1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) took office on October 14. ECOMIL was dissolved and its military forces absorbed into UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and socioeconomic assistance functions in support of Liberia’s transition process. UNMIL provides a military guard force for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed below, for which it assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), upon UNMIL’s termination in late 2005. U.S. funding for UNMIL is covered in Table 3. Current Strength UNMIL has a current authorized force strength of 14,875 military personnel and 1,240 police. As of late April 2010, it had a total force strength of 9,644, made up of individual police (449 in total, 12.9% female); formed police units (845 in total, 16.2% female); military observers (124 in total, 5.6% female); and contingent military troops (8,226, 1.8% female). As of late April 2010, U.S. personnel deployed with UNMIL included 10 individual police, 3 military observers, and 5 contingent troops. Drawdown A gradual, phased drawdown of the UNMIL force, guided by progress in implementing a series of benchmarks set out by the Security Council and initiated by a UNSC decision to repatriate 1,000 troops in 2006, is continuing. The benchmarks were first proposed in by the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (UNSG) in 2006 (S/2006/159, March 14, 2006), in response to a September 2005 Security Council request for an UNMIL force drawdown plan, to include specific benchmarks 15 This report focuses on current issues and recent events. CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace, and CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, both by (name re dacted), provide in-depth background on events in Liberia during recent decades, and on the presidential tenure of Charles Taylor. Congressional Research Service 4 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance and a schedule for achieving that end. The UNSG found that it was “too early for a major drawdown of UNMIL.” He called, instead, for a two-year “consolidation period” during which UNMIL would implement an “adjusted mandate” defined by an 11-point agenda of “priority tasks.” These centered on achieving such objectives as maintenance of a stable and secure environment; completion of ex-combatant, refugees, and internally displaced persons reintegration; security sector reform; and consolidation of state authority and governance capacity. Notwithstanding a need to complete these tasks, he proposed that “in the absence of an immediate armed threat within Liberia,” the military component of UNMIL be reduced by one infantry battalion in mid-2006 and another infantry battalion in early 2007, and that a drawdown of the Mission, beginning in early 2007, security conditions permitting, ensue. By mid-March 2007, the United Nations was reporting significant progress in meeting key benchmarks, including with For the sake of brevity, the full titles of U.N. documents, respect to police and military training, which are often accompanied by extensive sub-titles and restructuring and reform; management of meeting session data, are—with some exceptions—not natural resources; and the creation of a employed in this report. Instead, the U.N. agency source of national security strategy and architecture— such documents is given, followed by the item’s U.N. though each of these activities faced often document symbol and date of release, except with respect to Security Council documents, for which only the considerable challenges. Progress toward document symbol and date are given. Security Council ex-combatant reintegration and the documents can be readily be identified by their distinct consolidation of state authority was slower document numbers, which always begin with the symbol than planned, however, largely due to “S/.” In this report, these primarily include periodic reports resource constraints. Due to these and on UNMIL by the U.N. Secretary-General, Security Council Resolutions, and statements by the President of the Security diverse other reconstruction and Council The Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on development challenges, and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, with the U.N. document notwithstanding areas of progress, in March symbol S/2006/159, and dated March 14, 2006, for instance, 2007 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, would be cited as S/2006/159, March 14, 2006. The full text and title of all U.N. documents cited in this report can be citing what he called “limited progress found online using the U.N. document symbol search box of made in meeting the benchmarks for the the U.N. Official Document System (ODS), consolidation and drawdown of the http://documents.un.org. Mission,” recommended a year-long extension of the UNMIL’s existing 16 mandate. Assessments of and adjustments to these and a range of subsequent benchmarks, along with two associated, phased UNMIL force repatriations, have since continued. 17 Note on United Nations Documents and Usage in this Report On September 15, 2009, the Security Council passed Resolution 1885 (S/RES/1885), authorizing a third-phase drawdown, to take place between October 2009 and May 2010. It involves the repatriation of 2,029 military personnel, 3 attack helicopters, and 72 armored personnel carriers. Upon completion of this process, UNMIL’s force will include 8,202 military personnel (including 7,952 troops in Liberia and 250 at the Special Court for Sierra Leone), while the UNMIL police 16 S/2007/151, March 15, 2007. 17 On benchmarks, see S/2007/479, August 8, 2007; S/2008/183, March 19, 2008; and S/2009/86, February 10, 2009. Congressional Research Service 5 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance component will include about 1,344 personnel (465 police advisers, 843 officers in seven formed police units, 23 corrections officers, and 13 immigration officers).18 Resolution 1885 also reauthorized UNMIL’s Liberia at a Glance19 mandate through September 30, 2010, and Geography: Small tropical coastal West African country ordered that the post-May 2010 UNMIL force about the size of Virginia size be maintained until the completion of Population: 3.4 million (2009) presidential and legislative elections in late 2011, which it authorized UNMIL to assist in Ann. population growth rate: 2.67% (2009) administering. It also permitted UNMIL to Exchange rate adjusted Gross National Income reinforce the U.N. Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (GNI) total: $634.4 million (2008) (UNOCI) on a contingency basis, if needed GNI per capita: $170 (2008) during anticipated elections in Côte d’Ivoire, External debt: $1.7 billion (2010 ) or vice versa, should the security situation in Liberia deteriorate. The resolution called the Key exports: Rubber, timber, iron, cocoa, gold, coffee, diamonds. Value: $254 million, of which $225 million or “conduct of free and fair, conflict-free 88.6% of rubber (2008, IMF); and $160 millioin, of which elections ... a core benchmark for UNMIL’s $94 million, or 58.8% of rubber (2009 proj.) future drawdown,” among others, such as the Languages: English & 29 distinct local languages further development of “national security and rule of law institutions that are fully Ethnic groups: 16 indigenous groups, 95%; and freed slave descendants from the Americas, 5% independently operational.” It also requested that UNMIL submit to the Security Council, in Religions: Christian, 85.6; Muslim, 12.2; Traditional collaboration with the Liberian government, a beliefs, 0.6; Other/no Religion, 1.7 (LC). Note: Many observers view Liberian adherents of world religions as strategic plan aimed at integrating and often being heavily influenced by traditional beliefs. consolidating post-conflict peace-building, stability, and development efforts in Liberia. Literacy: Women, 40.8%-46.3%; Men, 65.5%-70.3% In the meantime, the Security Council remains Infant and under-5 mortality rate, respectively: 93 cautious about the extent of Liberia’s post-war and 132 deaths/1,000 live births (2007) evolution. In passing Resolution 1903 HIV/AIDS adult infection rate: 1.5% (2007) (December 17, 2009), which renews or alters a range of Liberia-related sanctions, the Security Life expectancy, years at birth: National average. 41.84 (ave.); Male, 40.71; Female, 43 (2009) Council declared that “despite significant progress having been made in Liberia, the situation there continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region.” Sexual Exploitation and Abuse UNMIL has implemented measures to prevent, detect, investigate, and punish acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), in line with recent reforms and renewed U.N.-wide regulations regarding sexual conduct, following abuses in several U.N. peacekeeping missions around the world, including in Liberia. U.N. Resolution 1626 (2005) bars SEA, and UNMIL has created a mission conduct and discipline team and investigatory capacity to ensure adherence to these 18 See S/RES/1885, September 15, 2009; and S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 19 Text Box Sources: CIA World Factbook 2009; World Bank World Development Indicators; International Monetary Fund press release, April 2010; Liberian 2008 Census; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); Ethnologue.com; and Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007; IMF Country Report No. 09/332, December 2009; and UNAIDS. Congressional Research Service 6 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance rules. 20 In mid-March 2006, five crew members of a UN contractor, who had been under investigation for alleged rapes and the assault of Liberian police officers, left Liberia after being released on bond. According to UNMIL, their departure was “highly regretted and the matter is being brought to the attention of the authorities of the country concerned.”21 There were reportedly 12 alleged SEA incidents reported between January 1, 2009, and August 31, 2009, and six such allegations in the period between August 10, 2009, and February 1, 2010.22 Transition Process The August 30, 2003, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed by the three warring factions and 18 political parties, laid out a peace process, provided for the creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and allocated leadership positions within it.23 The NTGL was mandated to reestablish functioning government authority and prepare for national elections that were held in mid-October and November 2005. The elected government of President Sirleaf replaced the NTGL in late January 2006, as described below. The NTGL consisted of an executive branch, presided over by a chairman, Gyude Bryant, and an interim parliament, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. Bryant, a businessman and church layman who led the Liberian Action Party, oversaw the functions of the central government and various public corporations, agencies, and commissions. Bryant was given the title of NTGL “chairman” to differentiate his unelected NTGL role and authority from that of a constitutionally elected president. The transition faced many challenges, most related to the extremely destructive effects of many years of war in Liberia. Others included the dominant role within the NTGL of the three former armed factions, which were prone to internal rivalries; political discord over the allocation of state positions and resources; very limited state capacities; and reported public sector corruption. 2005 Post-War Elections Peaceful Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential elections were held on October 11, 2005, and a presidential runoff vote was held on November 8. The 22-candidate presidential poll led to a runoff race. It pitted George Manneh “Oppong” Weah, 39 years of age, a former professional top soccer player whose star status and rags-to-riches history make him a hero to Liberian youth, against Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, then 67 years of age, a Harvard-trained economist and former businesswoman who had served as Liberian finance minister and as a United Nations and World Bank official. On November 15, 2005, the National Elections Commission (NEC) 20 Between January 1, 2004 and June 8, 2006, 17 UNMIL military personnel were repatriated to their home countries for probable SEA crimes; two UNMIL civilians were dismissed or faced a non-renewal of their contract; three UNMIL civilians were suspended; and investigations cleared 13 UNMIL military personnel and three UNMIL civilian police. State Department compilation. 21 See UNMIL, “Statement on the Departure from Liberia of Five Crew Members, Employees of a UN Contractor,” March 14, 2006. 22 It was not clear, based on information available to CRS as of the date of this report, how much overlap there may have been in the number of cases reported during these two overlapping periods. State Department compilation of U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services data covering the period January 1, 2009 through August 31, 2009; and UNSC, S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 23 CPA text available from U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html. Congressional Research Service 7 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance declared Sirleaf the winner of the presidential race, with 59.4% of votes against Weah’s 40.6%, making her the first-ever female president of an African country. Despite its declaration in favor of Sirleaf, the NEC subsequently probed and later rejected claims by Weah that the election was fraudulent. A presidential election will next be held in 2011. In contrast to the presidential race, election results for seats in the bicameral legislature were disparate; no party received more than 24% of seats in either chamber, and none dominated in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The largest party in the 64-member House, in which members serve six-year terms, is Weah’s Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), which won 15 seats. The Liberty Party (LP) won nine House seats, while Sirleaf’s Unity Party (UP) and the Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) each won eight. Seven other parties each won between one and five House seats, and seven independent candidates each won a seat. In the 30-seat Senate, in which members normally serve nine-year terms,24 COTOL won seven seats and the UP won four; all other parties won between one and three seats.25 Political party mergers in 2009 and 2010, discussed below, have changed the allocation of seats among parties. Notable among the newly elected legislators were several former Taylor regime officials and leaders of former armed factions or security services. These include senators Jewel HowardTaylor, a former wife of Charles Taylor (NPP; Bong County); Prince Yormie Johnson (independent, Bong County); and Saye-Taayor Adolphus Dolo (COTOL, Nimba County). Johnson is the former leader of a faction that splintered from Taylor’s early in the first civil war, and is infamous for personally presiding over the bloody, videotaped murder of former head of state Samuel Doe. He returned to run in the election from exile in Nigeria, where he had professed to have become a born-again Christian evangelist. Dolo is a former pro-Taylor militia leader, known by the nom de guerre General Peanut Butter, who reportedly committed war-time atrocities and recruited child fighters, and who is said to have aggressively opposed UNMIL peacekeeping activities. In the House, they include Edwin Snowe (independent, Montserrado County); Saah Richard Gbollie (NPP, Margibi County); and Kai G. “White Flower B-50” Farley, (CDC, Grand Gedeh County). Snowe, who was elected speaker of the House in mid-January 2006 but has since stepped down, is a former Taylor in-law. He is also the former head of the Liberian Petroleum and Refining Corporation (LPRC), from which Taylor regime officials reportedly diverted significant amounts of funds, some of which may have benefitted Taylor during his exile in Nigeria.26 Gbollie is a former Taylor fighter and Taylor administration police official accused of human rights abuses. Farley is an ex-MODEL commander and NTGL official accused of threatening the 2003 peace accord. Jewel Taylor, Dolo, Snowe, and Farley are subject to U.N. travel sanctions. 24 Current junior senators, those who obtained the second highest number of votes in the 2005 elections, will serve a six-year term. Thereafter, all senators will serve nine year terms. 25 Full election results are available from the NEC at http://www.necliberia.org/results. 26 Coalition for International Justice, Following Taylor’s Money: A Path of War and Destruction, May 2005. Congressional Research Service 8 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Table 1. 2005 Election: Legislative Results by Party (Seats and percentage of vote won) Senate Party House Seatsa Vote (%) Seatsa Vote (%) Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) 3 10 15 23.4 Coalition for Transformation of Liberia (COTOL) 7 23.3 8 12.5 Liberty Party (LP) 3 10 9 14.1 Unity Party (UP) 4 13.3 8 12.5 Independent 3 10 7 10.9 Alliance for Peace and Democracy (APD) 3 10 5 7.8 National Patriotic Party (NPP) 3 10 4 6.3 All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP) 1 3.3 2 3.1 Nation Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) 2 6.7 1 1.6 New Deal Movement (NDM) - - 3 4.7 National Reformation Party (NRP) 1 3.3 1 1.6 United Democratic Alliance (UDA) - - 1 1.6 Source: National Elections Commission of Liberia, 2005 Election Results, available at http://www.necliberia.org/ results. a. This data reflects the 2005 electoral results. Political party mergers in 2009 and 2010, discussed below, have since changed the allocation of seats among parties. Conduct of Elections27 With some mostly minor exceptions, the election was reportedly well-administered. About 1.35 million citizens registered to vote in April and May 2005, in a process that was marred by some minor acts and threats of violence and localized disruptions but was generally peaceful. Attempts by some NTGL ministers to try to run for office in the 2005 election, in violation of the CPA, also sparked controversy. About 1.012 million registered voters (74.9%) participated in the October 11 Senate, House of Representatives, and presidential elections, and over 821,000 (60.7%) voted in the November 8 presidential runoff poll. Results from voter registrations at 2,000 sites guided decision making about the composition of constituencies, the placement of about 2,900 polling places, and the distribution of voter education and polling materials. The large number of presidential candidates (over 50 initially, of whom 22 were ultimately registered) and registered political parties (30) reportedly proved confusing for some voters. Key election issues included national reconciliation and unity, corruption, jobs, general economic growth, and social services and physical infrastructure needs. Polling on both elections dates was peaceful.28 27 Various periodic UNSG progress reports on UNMIL; State Department information, both published and provided to CRS; and NEC data. The author of this section served as an election observer. In the county where he monitored the voting process, the election was well-run. Poll workers appeared well trained; voting equipment and materials were distributed on time and in sufficient quantity; and voting was peaceful and voter turnout rates high. 28 Various periodic UNSG progress reports on UNMIL; and information provided to CRS by USAID. Congressional Research Service 9 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) elections staff and U.N. agencies provided extensive support to the NEC and other relevant agencies involved in such activities as media outreach and civic education, technical elections tasks, and electoral security coordination, as called for under the CPA. UNMIL aid for the elections reportedly totaled about $8 million, and the European Union pledged $1 million. Most of $10 million in U.S. elections assistance supported the programs of the nonprofit democracy strengthening organizations International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), elections technical assistance; National Democratic Institute (NDI), civic education); and International Republican Institute (IRI), political party training. IRI and NDI, the latter jointly with the Carter Center, deployed teams to monitor the elections, as did the African and European Unions, the U.S. and many other governments, and international organizations. 29 The vote was monitored by at least 29 international organizations or governmental entities (369 individuals), as well as 52 civil society groups (over 3,500 individuals) and a roughly equal number of party observers; and 246 local journalists. 2005 Election Dispute Weah, who had claimed to have been cheated in the first round, contested his loss in the second round and called for a re-run of the vote. He pursued his claim though a number of formal channels, but after the NEC dismissed his claim, after meeting with Sirleaf, and under heavy international pressure, in late December 2005 he agreed to drop his claim and accept the poll results. Many observers doubted that systematic or large-scale fraud had marred the election. U.S. officials viewed the process as having been orderly, largely well-administered, and free and fair, and such views were shared by most other governments and international entities that observed the vote. The United States nevertheless called for a probe of Weah’s claims and for any contest of results to be carried out peacefully and through established legal channels. Subsequent Elections30 In late 2009, a by-election—the fifth to be conducted after the 2005 election—was held to fill a vacancy for the Montserrado County Senate seat created by an incumbent’s death. None of 10 participating candidates, five independents and five from political parties, won the 51% of votes necessary to win the election outright. This outcome triggered a run-off election between the top two vote winners, a candidate from President Sirleaf’s Unity Party and one from the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC), the largest opposition party. The CDC candidate emerged as the victor during the run-off, garnering 56% of votes cast against 46% for the UP candidate. Although the election reportedly featured a low voter turn-out (20% during the first round and 22.4% during the run-off), nearly half of Liberia’s electorate was eligible to participate in it, given that Montserrado is the urban county surrounding Monrovia, where about half of Liberia’s population lives. As a result, the election was viewed as a dry-run of the ability National Elections Commission (NEC) to conduct a large election ahead of national elections in 2011. 29 For an assessment of these and subsequent USAID-administered elections and participatory democracystrengthening work, see USAID/Liberia, Liberia Elections and Political Processes Program Evaluation, Final Report, November 2008. 30 NEC, Statement by Hon. James M. Fromayan, Chairman of the National Elections Commission (NEC) on the Occasion of the Announcement of the Final Results of the Montserrado County Senatorial By-election Run-Off, November 26, 2009; IFES-Liberia, “Briefing Note on Liberia’s Successful Senatorial By-election,” December 4, 2009; and IFES, “IFES Returns to Work with Liberia’s National Elections Commission,” October 7, 2009. Congressional Research Service 10 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance According to IFES, an electoral capacity-building non-governmental organization that is working with the NEC, the “process was seen as void of fraud and recognized as free, fair and transparent.” IFES also reported that conduct of the “first round saw some logistical and operational challenges,” but “the second round was vastly improved,” and the NEC’s performance was widely lauded by local election stakeholders and international observers. IFES is providing technical and financial support to the NEC under a five-year U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-supported project called Building Sustainable Election Management in Liberia. IFES supported the Montserrado by-election by providing the NEC with election administration materials and technical assistance.31 Sirleaf Government Policy Agenda President Sirleaf took office on January 16, 2006, and shortly thereafter nominated a cabinet seen as dominated by technocrats, professionals, and former opposition or policy activists. In her inaugural address, she laid out a detailed governance agenda, and launched her tenure with a series of actions to counter corruption. Sirleaf highlighted what she pledged would be “a new era of democracy” defined by political inclusion and toleration, non-violence, and safeguarding and promotion of constitutional and civil liberties and rights. She stressed the need for national reconciliation as an “urgent” and “compelling” task facing her administration. During the first 150 days of her tenure, in coordination with donors, her government also pursued diverse rapid impact projects aimed at showing “quick and visible progress.” These were grouped under four (initially five) “major pillars”: Security; Economic Revitalization; Basic Services and Infrastructure; and Good Governance. The same pillars continue to define her administration’s medium- to long-term development efforts. These are spearheaded by an entity called the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC), which is composed of four working committees, each of which supports a separate “pillar.” Economic Renewal Sirleaf is pursuing an economic agenda emphasizing the creation of an investment-friendly climate; the exploitation of Liberia’s rich natural resources; land tenure reform focused on increasing agricultural production; job creation, notably for youths; and expanded economic and social infrastructure rehabilitation, particularly in historically economically marginalized areas. The Sirleaf administration has consistently emphasized the importance of laying the groundwork for sustained economic growth and job creation. The latter is viewed as key by many observers, both because formal sector unemployment rates are reportedly high and because unemployment is a potential source of instability. 32 The economic and educational disenfranchisement of Liberia’s 31 IFES’s $17.5 million project, which runs through 2014, seeks to support the NEC’s elections administration capabilities and will support its activities as they relate to the 2011 general election, a planned constitutional referendum, local elections, and any by-elections. Key activities center on boundary delimitation, voter registration processes, civic and voter education, notably at the community level, and making the NEC’s capacity to undertake its mandate autonomously in the absence of donor assistance, notably through the provision of technical assistance and training. IFES, Building Sustainable Elections Management in Liberia, n.d. (current as of late April 2010). 32 Post-war unemployment was often cited in U.N. documents and reports by diverse private research organizations as standing between 80% and 85%. In late 2007, President Sirleaf stated that previous reports that the unemployment rate (continued...) Congressional Research Service 11 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance large youth population is viewed as having fueled Liberia’s armed conflicts, and joblessness is a continuing source of popular dissatisfaction. In mid-2007, the United Nations reported that the majority of ex-combatants remained unemployed and that thousands had regrouped in order to illegally exploit diamonds, gold, and plantation-grown rubber. Governance Sirleaf has vowed to take forceful action against corruption, including by requiring all key officials to declare their assets and follow a national code of conduct. She strongly endorsed and promised to “enforce” the Governance and Economic Management Program (GEMAP, discussed below) to deal with “serious economic and financial management deficiencies” and pursue an “integrated capacity building initiative.” She also vowed to overhaul the “seriously bloated” civil service, while noting that civil servant pay was poor and in arrears.33 She promised to institutionalize a meritocratic, performance-based civil service system. Foreign Policy Sirleaf declared economic private sector-focused regional integration and security cooperation to be her guiding foreign policy goal. She vowed to maintain strong international bilateral and multilateral partnerships. Notably, given recent regional history, she stated that “no inch of Liberian soil will be used to conspire to perpetrate aggression” against neighboring countries.34 Her government has also shown itself to be open to new foreign ties. Liberia now has diplomatic relations with Cuba, and it established bilateral relations with China in late 2003, after the departure from power of President Taylor, who had maintained relations with Taiwan.35 Women Paying homage to what she said were the special efforts of women in securing her election and the peace that made it possible—even in the face of war-related “inhumanity,” “terror,” military conscription, forced labor, and rape—Sirleaf vowed in her inaugural address to “empower Liberian women in all areas.” She pledged to strengthen laws and law enforcement to protect women against rape, support the education of children, notably of girls, and to provide programs to enable women to play a key role in the economic revitalization process.36 Sirleaf has nominated women to head multiple key ministries and public agencies. (...continued) stood at 85% were exaggerated. A 2007 study funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), several U.N. donors, and the Liberian government and undertaken by several Liberian government agencies with with technical assistance from Macro International Inc. reported a national unemployment rate of 26.5%, 34.2% for women and 18.8% for men. See Liberia Demographic and Health Survey 2007, June 2008. 33 President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address of H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, January 16, 2006. 34 President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address, op cit. 35 On China’s diplomatic rivalry with Taiwan, see CRS Report RL33510, Taiwan: Overall Developments and Policy Issues in the 109th Congress. 36 President Sirleaf, Inaugural Address, op cit. According to UNMIL media summaries, local Liberian media reported that a Liberian women’s group demanded the establishment of a special expedited rape cases court during a late June 2006 public demonstration. See also Katharine Houreld, “Liberia’s Women Fight Back,” Mail & Guardian, June 2, 2006. Congressional Research Service 12 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Corruption Upon taking office, Sirleaf announced an audit of the previous transitional government and dismissed all transitional government political appointees. She also laid off the entire staff of the Finance Ministry, pending a screening of employees’ qualifications and level of probity. In February 2006, she revoked all existing timber concession contracts, which had been widely criticized for being let in a corrupt fashion and for being executed in an environmentally unsustainable manner. This action provided the basis, in part, for the U.N. Security Council’s June 2006 lifting of a ban on Liberian timber exports. Sirleaf later initiated reviews of other contracts and concession deals granted by the transitional government. In early June 2006, she fired three sub-cabinet level officials and several mid-level civil servants accused of corruption. Her administration has also publicly released audit reports of several state agencies. Performance In mid-April 2006, in a document entitled 150 Day Action Plan: A Working Document for a New Liberia, the Sirleaf administration laid out a detailed status report on short-term, quick impact policy and project implementation efforts and achievements to date. 37 The document, which was aimed both at increasing government transparency and proving her administration’s adherence to Sirleaf’s campaign and inaugural pledges, demonstrated that most of her plans were being implemented in a timely manner. The Executive Mansion, the equivalent of the U.S. White House, also releases similar documents pertaining to ongoing LRDC activities. Sirleaf has faced challenges in meeting high voter expectations, for instance, in relation to her election promise to provide public electricity in Monrovia within six months of being elected, despite the complexity and great cost of that undertaking. Many voters appeared to have given the new government a honeymoon period, although expectations remained high following what many saw as disappointing performance by the transitional government. The public remains eager to see rapid job growth and rapid improvements in social services and the construction of physical infrastructure, particularly in support of education, healthcare, and transportation. In various public comments, Sirleaf has assured Liberians that her government is successfully continuing to build the groundwork for sustained growth, but has counseled Liberians to be patient, since many ongoing investments in infrastructure, basic services capacity building, and foreign investment business projects will take time to generate jobs and incomes. Several road building projects are currently underway, and the government is examining options for large-scale electricity generation and long-distance power transmission. Despite the fact that such projects, which are largely donor-financed, may not generate general economic growth for some time, Liberia’s economy is growing rapidly. In December 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reported estimates and projections showing a sharp jump in Liberia’s gross domestic product, from 5.3% in 2005, to 7.8% in 2006, to 8.5% in 2007, with rates of 9.5% and 11% projected for 2008 and 2009, respectively.38 In March 2008, Liberia is expected to publish a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which expected to guide economic policy and provide the basis an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a credit and technical assistance 37 Available from PeaceAfrica, a project of the AllAfrica Foundation; see http://allAfrica.com/peaceafrica/resources/ view/00010785.pdf. 38 EIU, Country Report/Liberia, December 2007. Congressional Research Service 13 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance program for 2008-2010, as well as ongoing cooperation with the World Bank. Liberia is also in the process of awarding offshore oil exploration contracts. President Sirleaf has also been an active participant in African Union activities, sometimes taking stances at odds with other African leaders (e.g., overtly criticizing the June 2008 elections in Zimbabwe as “not credible” and urging the AU to “declare the results unacceptable”) as well as those of ECOWAS and the Mano River Union (MRU). 39 She has been particularly been involved in efforts to strengthen the MRU and in efforts to resolve the political crisis in neighboring Guinea.40 Sirleaf Administration: Criticisms and Challenges The general public largely gave Sirleaf a political honeymoon in her first years in office, but she has since been the target of some criticism, both of a routine political nature by opposition parties (including Taylor supporters upset by his SCSL trial) and by some human rights and transparency policy advocates. Although many Liberians and international human rights advocates have praised Sirleaf’s strongly stated support for such rights and the rule of law, some criticized her nomination of Kabineh Janneh as a Supreme Court Justice, who was later confirmed in the post.41 Her administration had also been criticized for not creating an Independent National Commission for Human Rights (INCHR), an institution called for under the 2003 peace agreement. In June 2009, however, the president ratified an amended act passed by the legislature in May 2009, and in mid-August 2009 forwarded to the Senate seven INCHR nominees. Criticism has since shifted to the Senate for failing to confirm the nominees.42 In 2006, there were several reports of assaults or harassment of journalists by members of the Special Security Service (SSS), a Liberian executive branch security agency, and by regular police. In response, the Press Union of Liberia (PUL) threatened to launch a “news black-out” of coverage of the government. President Sirleaf reportedly responded to the allegations by stating that “those who violate the rights of the Liberian people or journalists for that matter will be dealt with and punished appropriately” and that her “government will not tolerate violation of the rights of people, including journalists.”43 Information Minister Johnny McClain also met with the PUL and reemphasized that the Sirleaf administration “is committed to press freedom and that there is 39 Liberian Government, “Liberia: President Sirleaf Urges African Union to Denounce Zimbabwe Election Results,” July 2, 2008. The MRU is a sub-regional body, originally an economic development entity that later became a forum for political crisis interventions and dialogue, made up of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, which Cote d'Ivoire agreed to join in 2008 during a visit by President Johnson-Sirleaf. 40 On Guinea, see CRS Report R41200, Guinea’s New Transitional Government: Emerging Issues for U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) and CRS Report R40703, Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 41 Janneh was the transitional government’s justice minister and is a former leading member of the LURD rebel group. Critics see Janneh as responsible, in part, for violence committed by LURD fighters against civilians during the Liberian war and view his nomination as counter to the goals and spirit of the TRC. Michael Kpayili, “Liberia: Liberian Senate Confirms Kabineh Jan’eh As Associate Supreme Court Justice,” The Liberian Times, May 9, 2006. 42 The Analyst, “Gov't Reconstitutes Human Rights Commission,” August 18, 2009; Executive Mansion, “Commissioners of Independent Human Rights Commission Named,” August 18, 2009; and International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), “Liberia: Delay of Human Rights Commission Undermines Human Rights and Accountability,” February 19, 2010. 43 The Analyst (Monrovia), “Liberia: President Promises to Probe Manhandling of Journalists,” June 19, 2006. Congressional Research Service 14 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance a standing policy of respect and cordiality toward the press.”44 The international press rights advocacy organization Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) stated in an open letter to President Sirleaf that it was “troubled” by the alleged attacks on the press and that “despite an Information Ministry statement [ ... ] affirming the government’s commitment to press freedom, there has been no evidence of an investigation into these incidents nor any public effort to punish those responsible.” The CPJ also stated in an open letter to President Sirleaf that While there is no evidence that these incidents are the result of government policy, your administration has a responsibility to restrain security forces from attacking or harassing journalists who are trying to do their jobs. As an organization of journalists dedicated to defending the rights of our colleagues worldwide, CPJ respectfully urges you to make good on your pledges to uphold press freedom by ensuring a prompt and transparent investigation into these cases.45 Some critics have alleged that the Sirleaf government, like its predecessors, is corrupt, but the Sirleaf Administration rejects such accusations, citing its record of anti-corruption actions.46 Given the historically embedded presence of public sector corruption in Liberia, the government’ approach to addressing the problem combines a continuing series of law enforcement actions, institutional reforms, and education and training programs. It may, however, face difficulties in prosecuting indictments, given the limited capacity of Liberia. Another challenge is to ensure that it pursues enforcement actions in a professional and apolitical manner, as recent Liberian history has been marked by the use of corruption prosecutions as a tool for achieving political retribution. The Liberian government under the Sirleaf Administration has recorded a number of successes in fighting corruption, but it remains a key, abiding challenge, as President Sirleaf has publicly acknowledged on many occasions. During her May 2010 visit to the United States, she described corruption in Liberia as a “systemic” and “societal” phenomenon attributable to a decades-long, entrenched value system which could be characterized as one of dependency and dishonesty ... [and as] a means of survival for many of the people who did not have jobs, were conscripted into warring factions, who had no skills and had never been to school ... [and] were placed into the civil service.47 In late August 2008, President Sirleaf signed into law a bill establishing a Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC). In September 2008, she appointed as its chair Frances Johnson Morris, a former minister of Justice and Commerce and the former head of the National Elections Commission, and a Sirleaf relative. 48 Her Administration has also highlighted reported progress in 44 James Butty, “Liberian Media Reports Government Harassment of Press,” VOA, June 16, 2006; CPJ, “Liberia: Journalist Assaulted by Security Forces,” May 24, 2006; and CPJ, “Liberia: Sports Editor Assaulted,” March 10, 2006, among others. 45 Ann Cooper, Exec. Dir, “Liberia: CPJ Urges President to Probe Attacks on Press [open letter],” CPJ, June 16, 2006. 46 See Tristan McConnell, “Persistent Corruption Threatens Liberian stability,” Christian Science Monitor, September 25, 2008; and FrontpageAfrica.com, “Liberian Govt. Responds to ‘Persistent Corruption Threatens Stability’,” January 10, 2008 [response to McConnell article published on third party website by Dr. Laurence Bropleh, Minister of Information, Culture & Tourism and Chief Spokesperson]. 47 allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010. 48 The Inquirer (Monrovia), “Liberia: Ellen Signs Anti-Corruption Act, Commissions Several Officials,” via AllAfrica.com, August 26, 2008; Nana Adu Ampofo, “Liberian President Signs Anti-Corruption Commission Act into Law,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, August 27, 2008; Africa Confidential, Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, May (continued...) Congressional Research Service 15 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance fighting corruption, for instance by citing the country’s rapid positive progress as measured by the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators.49 The government as also strongly supported the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) and the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI), both discussed below. A government Public Procurement and Concessions Commission (PPCC) is also pursuing a range of efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in government purchases and contracts. Sirleaf has also highlighted increased public sector compensation and ongoing capacity-building in the judicial sector, particularly with respect to increasing the prosecution of corruption-related crime, as key to furthering her Administration’s efforts to combat corruption. 50 Despite such efforts, some Sirleaf Administration officials have periodically been accused of corruption. In September 2008, President Sirleaf appointed a special seven-member independent corruption commission, the so-called Dunn Commission, named after its chair, Dr. D. Elwood Dunn. It was charged with investigating allegations that certain current and former Sirleaf Administration officials had received contract renewal bribes from the U.S. head of the Liberian International Ship Corporate Registry (LISCR) aimed at preventing a competitive bid for the work, as well as allegations of other corrupt actions, in several cases associated with former Acting State and Presidential Affairs Minister, Willis Knuckles. The Administration also faced allegations that it had attempted to cover up the issue by bribing journalists not to report the story.51 The Commission, which hired the James Mintz Group as an expert technical investigator, issued a public report of its findings in January 2009.52 There have also been a series of other cases of apparent actual or alleged corruption involving top officials, in many cases uncovered by investigations by the independent General Auditing Commission (GAC). Led by Auditor-General, John Morlu, who has publicly criticized the Sirleaf Administration’s record on corruption, the GAC has released reports indicating several million (...continued) 14, 2010; and Liberian Presidency, “Cllr. Frances Johnson Morris Appointed Head of Anti-Corruption Commission,” September 1, 2008. 49 See “Liberia Shows Dramatic Improvement in Controlling Corruption,” document posted on Liberian presidential website, no date (likely circa mid-2008). 50 allAfrica.com, “Sirleaf Says Nation Can Achieve Self-Sufficiency in 10 Years [interview],” May 25, 2010. 51 LISCR administers Liberia’s widely used flag of convenience ship registry, which under the Taylor regime was alleged to have been a source of corruptly diverted funds. Prior to the allegations that led to the appointment of the Dunn Commission, the Sirleaf Administration had faced a sex scandal associated with the Acting State and Presidential Affairs Minister, Willis Knuckles, that was linked in the press to a corruption probe associated with the ouster of former Liberian House Speaker, Edwin Melvin Snowe (see below). See Nana Adu Ampofo, “President Appoints Special Corruption Commission in Liberia,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, September 4, 2008; Liberian Presidency, “Executive Mansion Reacts to Purported Email Exchanges—Distances President Johnson Sirleaf,” August 24, 2008; James Butty, “Under Pressure, Liberian Government Appoints Special Corruption Commission,” VOA, September 3, 2008; and Ugochukwu Ejinkeonye, “The Willis Knuckles Saga,” SaharaReporters.Com, March 7, 2007, among others. 52 Its findings were complex, due to the alleged nature of the allegations. In some cases, it refuted the allegations, while in others it found partial or clear proof of wrong-doing. It found that there “were violations and breaches of Liberian laws and policies by some” government officials, private individuals, and private businesses investigated, but was not able to fully investigate all matters under its purview because some of its subjects refused to cooperate with the Commission. See Report of the Ad-Hoc Independent Commission on the E-Mail Saga, January 7, 2009; and Liberian presidency, “ECOWAS Summit on Guinea and Dunn Commission Report Take Center Stage at Press Conference,” January 12, 2009. Congressional Research Service 16 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance dollars worth of unaccounted spending within the Health, Education, Mines and Finance ministries.53 Prominent cases involving key officials, among others, include • the suspension in October 2009, resignation in January 2010, and current prosecution of the former information minister, Lawrence Bropleh, over allegations of his involvement in a “ghost worker” fund diversion scheme; • a procurement irregularities case that led to the February 2010 resignation of the then-internal affairs minister, Ambulai Johnson, Sirleaf’s brother, and questions over the origins of his personal assets; • the September 2009 dismissal of Harry Greaves, a former Sirleaf advisor, as managing director of the Liberian Petroleum Refinery Corporation (LPRC) over a case involving Greaves’ alleged involvement in the allocation of a contract to a firm in exchange for compensation more than double as large as the estimated value of the contract by another bidder, and allegations of bribery pertaining to an ensuing investigation of the contract award; and • the resignation in 2009 or removal of serving ministers, including Agriculture Minister Christopher Toe, Public Works Minister Luseni Donzo, and Justice Minister Philip Banks, in cases involving alleged fiscal mismanagement, administrative irregularities, or other matters, and there have been allegations of mismanagement and possible corruption regarding the administration of county development funds, of which, as a result, the presidency has taken control. 54 Security Issues Security Conditions Liberia’s security situation has improved markedly since August 2003. It is currently “generally stable, but fragile,” and is subject to periodic volatility and localized instability.55 Public security and police authority are formally entrusted to the Liberia National Police (LNP), who are advised and supported by UNMIL civilian police (CIVPOL). LNP patrols in the capital reportedly increased in the latter half of 2009, leading to a marked decrease in armed robbery, but rates some other serious crimes, including rape, notably of juvenile females, have remained high.56 Despite increasing LNP capacity, the LNP continues to face serious challenges, and the public often perceives public security as being guaranteed by UNMIL CIVPOL, who earlier during UNMIL’s deployment played more direct roles in ensuring that end. The LNP is reportedly making progress in building up its capabilities, but reportedly remains beset by operational deficits and absenteeism, has a limited presence and mobility in many rural areas, and some LNP 53 Africa Confidential, “Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, “ May 14, 2010; and GAC, multiple documents available from GAC website, http://www.gacliberia.com/. 54 Africa Confidential, “Liberia: A Second Term for Sirleaf, “ May 14, 2010; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Liberia, March 2010; Agence France Presse, “Liberia’s Agriculture Minister Resigns Amid Caterpillar Crisis,” April 5, 2009; and The Analyst, “Sirleaf Draws the Dagger,” September 9, 2009. 55 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 56 S/2008/88, February 17, 2010. Congressional Research Service 17 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance members reportedly engage in acts of bribery. In addition, the capacity of the judicial sector remains limited, and public confidence in the judicial system is low; according to the State Department, the “Liberian public views the police and other formal justice institutions with fear, skepticism, and mistrust.”57 There have also been clashes between police, other security agency units, and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and. Some AFL members have reportedly violently assaulted or robbed civilians. As a result of public mistrust in the capabilities and of the LNP, other security agencies, and the judicial sector, vigilantism and periodic mob violence present continuing problems.58 A key post-war source of instability in Liberia, former fighters associated with various armed factions, was largely neutralized in the year after the August 2003 peace agreement was signed. More than 101,000 ex-combatants (22% women and 10.8% children), were demobilized under a disarmament program administered by UNMIL and the NTGL that ended in late 2004. Some demobilized fighters remain a periodic source of sometimes violent protest, mostly related to the status of generalized joblessness among ex-combatants and the demands of those who are owed reintegration job training and subsistence assistance. A small minority of ex-combatants have reportedly turned to crime, including armed robbery and the illegal exploitation of natural resources.59 Public protests relating to severance and pension payments by former members of the Liberian military and members of security services not included in demobilization programs have generally subsided. Other public security threats include a wave of armed robbery in Monrovia, which the government is attempting to suppress, and periodic civil unrest related to socioeconomic grievances, predominantly involving students, workers, civil servants, and jobless youth. Price increases for rice, fuel, and cement are also sources of public dissatisfaction. In her annual address to the legislature in January 2008, Sirleaf stated that she would temporarily suspend a $2 tax on bags of rice, the Liberian staple food, pending consideration of a legislative tax reform proposal. Periodically, ritual-related killings by so-called “heartmen” provoke public safety fears and sometimes mob violence against alleged perpetrators.60 Community-level property dispute conflicts have repeatedly occurred throughout Liberia, but notably in Nimba County in northern Liberia between members of the Gio/Mano and Mandingo 57 State Department/International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau, Fiscal Year 2010 Program and Budget Guide. 58 S/2008/88, February 17, 2010; S/2009/640, December 11, 2009; State Department, Liberia Country Specific Information [Travel Information], August 10, 2009; and Magnus Jörgel and Mats Utas, The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2007. 59 In mid-2009, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that “many of the 14,000 deactivated Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers also maintain viable command and control structures, which are utilized to organize recurrent, sometimes violent, demonstrations to challenge the legality of their deactivation or demand benefit arrears owed by the Government.” S/2009/299, June 10, 2009. 60 “Heartmen” is a Liberian English term for killers whose purpose is to remove various body organs for uses, including consumption, in traditional occult ceremonies that participants believe bestow supernatural powers, allowing beneficiaries to increase their personal wealth, power over others, and achieve other ends. Such practices, known as gboyo in southeast Liberia, have been reported to increase during times of armed conflict, notably in situations in which combatants have harvested organs from dead enemies in order to increase their chances of further military victory. Analagous occult practices occur in some other African countries. New Dawn, “More Arrest in “Gbo-yo” Business,” March 29, 2010; Christopher Melville, “Riots and Ritual Killings in South-Eastern Liberia Highlight Paradox of Improving Security,” WMRC Daily Analysis, January 26, 2005; and Stephen Ellis, “Mystical Weapons: Some Evidence from the Liberian War,” Journal of Religion in Africa, 31: 2, May, 2001, among others. Congressional Research Service 18 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance ethnic groups. Contested claims over home and land occupancy and ownership rights are often at the center of such disputes, which sometimes take on ethnic dimensions. Such disputes often have origins in property occupations and appropriations that occurred as a result of war-time population displacements and movements. Lack of land rights documentation, property fraud, often involving state officials, and the absence of effective dispute resolution mechanisms have aggravated such problems. A Presidential Commission created to probe such disputes in Nimba County recommended that a process of community reconciliation and dispute resolution be pursued, and President Sirleaf ordered that contested properties in Nimba be returned to their legal owners. In addition, an act creating a national Land Commission charged with pursuing reforms in land tenure and ownership policy, laws, and administration, in part to resolve and prevent land conflicts, was signed into law in August 2009. The Commission, which was formed in late 2009 and became operational in early 2010, has a five-year mandate. It is receiving capacity-building assistance from the U.N. Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT).61 Political parties who lost in Liberia’s elections and the attendant realignment of Liberian political forces remain a potential source of instability or violent acts. The family of a witness in the SCSL trial of former president Charles Taylor (see “Taylor Trial”), for instance, was reportedly targeted with death threats in early 2008. Prior to his capture, U.N. and U.S. officials and many Members of Congress had been concerned about persistent, credible reports that Taylor had periodically interfered in Liberian affairs from exile in Nigeria through a network of political, military, and business associates, which Taylor denied. These alleged actions were seen as destabilizing and threatening to the consolidation of peace (see section on Taylor below). There had been some speculation that former Taylor administration officials would make large gains in the 2005 elections and that he would be able to use them as proxies to influence the new government. There was no such general outcome, but several close Taylor associates were elected (see “2005 Post-War Elections”). In July 2007, George Koukou, the transitional government house speaker, Charles Julu, a top military officer under former president Samuel Doe who was accused of wartime human rights abuses, and several associates were arrested and charged with treason for allegedly plotting the ouster of the Sirleaf government. They were acquitted, however, in May 2008. Liberia remains under U.N. sanctions, which were first imposed to counter the Taylor regime’s alleged regional destabilization efforts and other activities counter to international law and U.N. policy goals. Under the current sanctions, individuals associated with the Taylor regime’s activities remain subject to a U.N. travel ban and, in some cases, asset freezes. 62 Liberia also remains subject to a partial arms embargo. 63 Bans on the export of Liberian timber and diamonds 61 Amos Sawyer, “Land Governance Challenges: The Case Of Liberia,” World Bank presentation, n.d./circa 2008; and S/2009/640, December 11, 2009; Executive Mansion, “Special Land Commission Presents Report to Liberian President,” May 24, 2009; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Liberia: Land Commission Act Approved,” July 24, 2009; and UN-HABITAT, “A New Land Programme in Liberia, December 21, 2009. 62 These sanctions were first imposed under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003), which prohibited trade in arms and diamonds with Liberia, and the travel of certain designated individuals, mostly members or associates of the Taylor regime. Some of the listed individuals are also subject to financial asset freezes mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1532 (2004). 63 Liberia remains under an arms embargo, with an exception for government purposes, although all arms transfers to the government must occur under a Security Council notification and control regime; see Resolution 1903 (S/RES/1903, December 17, 2009). When the war ended in 2003, Liberia was subject to a general arms embargo, but the Security Council gradually amended it to allow certain vetted and trained police and security forces to be trained and armed, and for military training purposes. UNMIL regularly inspects government security force weapons armories; see S/2009/290, June 5, 2009. Congressional Research Service 19 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance have been lifted. The threat to Liberia from instability in neighboring Côte d’Ivoire, which posed a significant external threat to the stability of Liberia and to sub-regional security for several years, according to United Nations reports, waned after the signing of a political accord in that country.64 Widespread violent general strikes in neighboring Guinea in early 2007 and political instability in Guinea in 2009, following a coup d’état in late 2008 after the death of thenPresident Lansana Conté, was also viewed as potential external threat to Liberia. The appointment of a new transitional government in Guinea following the signing of an early 2010 accord, however, appears to have substantially lessened any threat to Liberia.65 Although there have been currently no specific publicly reported personal security threats against President Sirleaf, the United States provided her with a personal State Department Diplomatic Security team at the start of her tenure and supported training efforts for the Special Security Service, Liberia’s presidential and VIP protection service; see below. An electrical fire in the Executive Mansion in July 2006 during a visit by neighboring heads of state highlighted Liberia’s general lack of emergency services. Firefighters from UNMIL, the Firestone rubber company, and the international airport, the latter two based about 45 minutes out of the capital, were called in to fight the blaze, since National Fire Service largely lacks the capacity to respond to fires in the capital. That lack of capacity was again illustrated in August 2006, when the U.S. Navy’s Apache, an ocean tug boat, helped to extinguish a fire on a commercial freighter in the Port of Monrovia, and later rescued a fishing crew at sea. The Apache crew was in Monrovia to conduct repairs on the city’s main commercial pier and survey the harbor. Following the Apache’s departure from Liberia, marine safety experts from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) undertook an assessment of Liberia’s search and rescue capabilities. 66 Rubber Sector Reform Rubber has traditionally been a key source of state export revenues and employment in Liberia. The presence, however, of ex-combatants on several rubber plantations, some armed, undermined the industry’s post-war redevelopment. In the years after the 2003 peace agreement, rubber workers and local residents near plantations reported that former fighters robbed them and coerced them into selling rubber latex at sub-market prices, in the process earning revenues that were reportedly not taxed.67 Ex-combatant control of plantations also reportedly resulted in unsustainable harvesting practices, various human rights abuses, and environmental degradation. To address this situation, in 2006 the government and armed UNMIL troops took possession of Gutherie, a major rubber tree plantation in western Liberia, from former LURD ex-combatants who had squatted on it, tapping rubber and in some cases controlling local rubber sales. Gutherie was reportedly the site of forced child labor and diverse violent crimes against persons. The repossession was one of the objectives of a joint government-U.N. task force created to make the 64 The accord is the Ouagadougou Political Agreement of March 2007, which lays out political and military disarmament processes leading to elections, which have repeatedly been delayed. 65 For further information, see CRS Report R40703, Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 66 Navy News Stand, “Navy Tug Fights Fire Aboard Freighter in Liberia,” August 11, 2006 and “Navy Tug Rescues Liberian Fishermen,” August 16, 2006; U.S. Embassy-Monrovia, “U.S. Navy Tug Begins Repair Work in Liberian Harbor,” August 10, 2006; and Karfa Jamanka, “Maritime Receives Assessment Team,” The Inquirer, September 22, 2006. 67 Marcus Malayea, “Gunmen Seize Cocopa, Claim Right of Inheritance,” The Analyst, August 18, 2006, among others. Congressional Research Service 20 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance rubber industry transparent, environmentally sound and sustainable, subject to state governance and regulation, and a source of legal jobs—including for the ex-combatants from whom control of Gutherie was seized. UNMIL plans called for a similar seizure of another key ex-combatantoccupied rubber plantation in the southeast county of Sinoe, though ex-combatants at the plantation reportedly met with local officials and agreed to vacate the site peacefully. 68 In May 2006, the UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS) studied Liberia’s rubber sector and published a series of key findings and recommendations pertaining to the sector.69 Issues that it examined included human rights concerns pertaining to the industry; post-conflict business practices and corruption; the status of and role of commercial rubber concession and management agreements; worker, child, and community rights; implications of plantation agriculture and sectoral industrial practices for the environment; and the rule of law within the rubber sector, including issues relating to ex-combatant occupation of plantations. While the normal peacetime functioning of the rubber sector has largely resumed and the sector has been brought under state regulatory control, in February 2010 UNMIL reported that The situation in and around Liberia’s rubber plantations continued to be of concern. Labour disputes, including over salary and severance payments, prompted demonstrations at the Guthrie and Cavalla plantations, with the conflict over control of rubber at Sinoe Plantation continuing to be a major security concern.70 In addition, in November 2009 the president and general manager of a large-scale rubber plantation and rubber processing firm, who also served as the chairman of Liberia’s national Public Procurement and Concession Commission was murdered, “allegedly by disgruntled workers” near the firm’s work site. 71 Security Sector Reform New Military Created With U.S. assistance, Liberia has created a new military made up of approximately 2,000 initial recruits.72 The force is commanded, on an interim basis, by officers from other countries in West 68 Executive Mansion, “Liberian Leader Concludes Visit to Sinoe,” May 5, 2009; Rebecca Murray , “Liberia: Wild West - the Sinoe Rubber Plantation,” Inter Press Service, April 8, 2009; IRIN, “Liberia: Gov’t Reclaims Rubber Plantation from Former Fighters,” August 16, 2006; Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia takes rubber estate back from exrebels,” Reuters, August 15, 2006; IRIN, “Liberia: UN Vows to Repossess another Troubled Rubber Plantation,” 23 August 23, 2006; and D. Sonpon Weah II, “Ex-Combatants at SRC Ready to Leave,” The Analyst, September, 27, 2006. 69 UNMIL, Human Rights in Liberia’s Rubber Plantations: Tapping into the Future, May 2006. 70 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 71 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. Nine indicted grand jury defendants went on trial for the murder in February 2010. Marcus Zoleh, “Liberia: Keith Jubah Murder Trial to Resume Tomorrow,” The Informer (Monrovia), February 16, 2010, inter alia. 72 The size of the force reflects a compromise between the need to build a force that can be sustainably funded over the long-term, taking into account Liberia’s high rate of poverty and relatively small national budget; field a force capable of defending against possible regional threats; start with a relatively moderately sized force and potentially gradually enlarge it in response to emergent need; and create a force over which civilian control can be maintained, in part by limiting its size and rate of growth. Congressional Research Service 21 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance Africa, including Nigeria, Ghana, and Benin. 73 The recruit pool was drawn from across Liberia and includes members from diverse ethnic groups to ensure ethno-regional balance. A goal that 20% of the total force be female was not met; less than 5% of the force is female.74 Selection of volunteer enlistees, for purposes of screening out human rights abusers, began in early 2006, and less than 20% of applicants were accepted. Prospective recruits underwent a vetting process administered by U.S. contractors that included reviews of selectees’ records by personnel from the U.S. embassy, UNMIL, and other donor governments, and Liberian civil society and government representatives. 75 As of late January 2009, recruiting of 2,057 personnel had been completed, and basic training for all elements was completed in late 2009.76 As of mid-August 2008, 45 recruits had been commissioned as officers. 77 Despite having received commissions and training, in mid-2008, UNMIL officials viewed the “command effectiveness” of the officer corps as limited and in need of further development. Military restructuring was initially hindered by a need to demobilize and verify the severance pay eligibility of over 13,000 irregular forces and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. Funds for this purpose were initially scarce, but all irregular and regular forces were demobilized. 78 U.S. assistance for these post-war military security sector reform (SSR) activities was administered by the State Department and carried out primarily by the defense services contractors DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). DynCorp was charged with helping to vet, recruit, and provide basic training and equipment for the new force. It also refurbished and provided operations and maintenance services for two AFL bases, Camp Sandee Ware (formerly known as VOA Camp) and Barclay Training Center (BTC), and provided 73 In mid-February 2006, President Sirleaf, stating that “our country currently lacks the technical and tactical capacities and proficiency to provide for its own defense and national security,” appointed Major-General Luka Yusuf, a Nigerian UNMIL officer, to be Liberia’s military Chief of Staff heading the rebuilding of the armed forces. He was later replaced by another Nigerian, General Suraj Abdurrahman. The appointment of a Nigerian head of the army drew criticism from former Liberian military elements, who called it unconstitutional and an insult to Liberia’s national pride. See Agence France-Presse, “Liberian Leader Names Nigerian to Head Military,” February 13, 2006 and Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Leader Gets Flak for Hiring Nigeria General,” Reuters, February 14, 2006. 74 Female recruitment reportedly faced substantial cultural and gender biases against the participation of women in the military. Jonathan Paye-Layleh, “Liberia Begins Recruiting Women Soldiers,” Associated Press, June 5, 2006; International Crisis Group (ICG), Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform, January 13, 2009; and Mark Malan, Security Sector Reform In Liberia: Mixed Results From Humble Beginnings, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, March 2008. 75 CRS field visit, 2006; Dorina Bekoe and Christina Parajon, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Domestic Considerations and the Way Forward,” Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention/USIP, April 2007; and The Inquirer (Monrovia), “Liberia: Public Vetting for Army Recruits Begins Monday,” June 23, 2006. For more detailed information on recruitment and vetting, see ICG, Liberia: Uneven Progress. 76 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and President Sirleaf, annual message to the legislature, January 26, 2009. 77 A number of officers and other personnel underwent training at Nigeria’s Command Army Staff College. The United States, China, and Germany, among other donor governments, have also provided specialist training to some personnel. See S/2008/553, August 15, 2008; and S/2008/183, March 19, 2008. 78 Total demobilization costs totaled approximately $15 million, and the process was the subject of some local controversy. In late April 2006, 400-500 former AFL soldiers claiming nonpayment of salary arrears and retirement benefits conducted a violent protest outside the defense ministry and clashed with UNMIL peacekeepers sent to contain the unrest. Some of these soldiers reportedly later received some back pay, although some arrears remain. “President Authorizes Defense Ministry to Pay Salary Arrears to Former Soldiers,” UNMIL media summary citing ELBS Radio and Star Radio, June 14, 2006; USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.,” May 11, 2007; Executive Mansion, “Leadership of Demobilized AFL Soldiers Assure President Sirleaf of Unwavering Support,” February 24, 2010; periodic U.N. reports on the progress of UNMIL and developments in post-war Liberia; and State Department information (email communication April 2, 2010). Congressional Research Service 22 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance O&M for the two bases.79 PAE provided construction services and specialty training, equipment, logistics, and base services. State Department expenditures for U.S. assistance for military SSR and the training of the reconstituted post-war AFL are estimated at $240.56 million through the end of FY2009, when the bulk of new AFL training had been completed. Part of this funding supported base reconstruction and operations and maintenance. Additional funding for these and related purposes may be provided in FY2010 and FY2011, respectively; $5.2. million had been obligated as of early FY2010 (see below). FMF and IMET Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)administered assistance programs for Liberia, which are not formally a component of U.S. military reform/restructuring assistance programs, have bolstered and complemented these efforts. U.S. assistance for military restructuring was also accompanied by efforts to help Liberia build the capacity of its Ministry of Defense (MOD) and establish a defense policy framework, although lapses in funding for this effort reportedly resulted in mixed results and a loss of capacity-building opportunities.80 Two results of these efforts were the approval of a new Liberian national security strategy in January 2008 and the passage in August 2008 of a new national defense act. Defense Sector Reform and the AFL: Current Issues and Challenges In early 2010, U.S. assistance for defense sector reform, which is in general facilitated by the existence of a U.S.-Liberia military cooperation agreement, entered a new phase. 81 Initial training of the founding units of the new AFL ended in December 2009, by when the force had achieved operational status and undergone an Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP). The Liberian MOD assumed full formal control of the newly trained force in early 2010.82 U.S. 79 Camp Sandee Ware was formerly known as VOA Camp, named for a nearby former Voice of America and U.S. government communcations transmission tower, now scrapped. Sorbor George, “VOA Military Camp renamed ‘Camp Sandee Ware’,” Star Radio, July 22, 2007. 80 According to one observer, at one point, due to “U.S. Government funding shortfalls, the MOD Reform program was terminated following completion of civil servant training but prior to the implementation of a planned five-month mentoring and ‘on the job’ training phase. Consequently, new civil servants had no source of advice or assistance as they assumed their official duties in the newly restructured Ministry of National Defense. The failure to follow through with the mentoring component of MOD Reform missed a valuable opportunity to shape the operation of the new MOD as an institution.” See Thomas Dempsey, “Security Sector Reform in Liberia Part I: An Assessment of Defense Reform,” Perspectives on Peace & Stability Operations (Issue Paper No. 2008), Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1, 2008. Liberian defense officials were sometimes critical about the manner in which U.S. SSR resources were used by contractors, notably with regard to subcontracting issues, and sometimes complained of a lack of information or consultation regarding assistance-related communications between U.S. SSR contractors and U.S. embassy officials in Monrovia. USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister ... ”; Jake Sherman, Strengthening Security Sector Governance in West Africa, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, March 2009; Charles Crawford, “Samukai Destests Awarding of Feeding Contract of New Army to Foreigners,” The Inquirer, August 22, 2006; The Inquirer, “Delay Over Army Training?,” January 29, 2007; Michael M. Phillips, “In Liberia, an Army Unsullied by Past,” Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2007; and The Inquirer, “Who’s Responsible for Soldiers’ Outburst,” April 14, 2008 81 The document signed is an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), one of at least 90 worldwide, which permits “the exchange of logistics, support, supplies and services,” between the United States and Liberia. U.S. EUCOM, “U.S.-Liberia Agreement Meant to Ease Acquisition Process,” Press Release, April 24, 2007. 82 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and The Analyst, “Liberia: From the Cold - AFL Marches Gallantly,” February 12, 2010. Congressional Research Service 23 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance support to the new AFL has shifted from a program of contractor-based basic training and capacity building to one centering on military-to-military mentoring and advice, bolstered by some continuing assistance in support of AFL base operations and maintenance (O&M) and certain other functions. DynCorp International has been contracted to provide $5.2 million worth of support for electrical power generation, water supply, waste disposal, and vehicle maintenance at two AFL bases during the first half of 2010.83 The Army Corps of Engineers also tentatively plans to fund the “design, construction, upgrade and revitalization of several arms storage and ammunition storage facilities” at AFL bases.84 UNMIL troops are also pursuing joint training with specialized AFL units, e.g., engineering, military police, and signal and headquarters staff.85 The mentoring mission, supported with State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funding under a program dubbed Defense Sector Reform (DSR) Phase I, began in early 2010 and is slated to run for five years. It is being undertaken by a Marine-led team of approximately 60 U.S. Africa Command military personnel drawn predominantly from the Marines but also incorporating members of other services. Their collective deployment and activities are known as Operation Onward Liberty. Activities under the DSR program are vetted and authorized by the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, although day-to-day work is undertaken by the designated AFRICOM officer in charge (a Marine Forces Africa [MARFOAF] officer), who reports to AFRICOM and the Ambassador via the embassy-based DOD Office of Security Cooperation (OSC). The objective of Operation Onward Liberty is to help the Liberian government “build a professional military that is apolitical, subordinate to civilian leadership, and respectful of human rights.”86 Team members will advise AFL units at various command levels as they pursue continued locally led training, particularly at the unit level. Such continuing training is viewed as a critical follow-up to previous basic training; according to the UNSG, “it is assessed that the Armed Forces of Liberia will not be independently operational before 2012, given that the Force’s officer corps needs significant additional experience before it is able to take command.”87 The DSR program is to be complemented by a program of assistance by the Defense Department’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) that is slated to focus on improving the capacity of the MOD and Liberia’s defense policy structure.88 The DIRI Liberia program is 83 The work is being undertaken under a five-year, State Department PKO account-funded indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity [IDIQ]) defense services, support, and capacity-building contract called the Africa Peacekeeping Program (AFRICAP). Awardees under AFRICAP include DynCorp International, PAE Government Services, AECOM, and Protection Strategies Incorporated. See Business Wire, “DynCorp International Wins $20 Million AFRICAP Task Order in Liberia,” January 28, 2010; and documents pertaining to State Department Africa Peacekeeping Program contract solicitation SAQMMA08R0237 (“AFRICAP Recompete”) available from the Federal Business Opportunities (FBO) website, https://www.fbo.gov. 84 The projected contract for this work would be worth between $.25 million and $.5 million. See Army Corps of Engineers, Ammunition/Arms Facility Design and Upgrade Liberia, Africa LI-B-HAB [Pre-Solicitation Synopsis], solicitation number W912GB10-R0029, March 11, 2010, available from the FBO website. 85 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010; and S/2009/411, August 10, 2009. 86 The U.S. mentoring team is complemented by a United Kingdom Ministry of Defense-level advisor. Lydia M. Davey, “ONWARD LIBERTY Provides U.S. Mentors to Armed Forces of Liberia,” Marine Forces Africa press release, February 24, 2010; and AFRICOM, US Africa Command Contribution to Defense Sector Reform in Liberia, January 15, 2010. 87 The 2009/10 fiscal year national budget totaled $371.9 million. S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 88 DIRI is a DOD-led program designed initiated in FY2010 to help selected foreign governments to “develop accountable, professional, and transparent defense establishments that can manage, sustain, and employ their forces and the capabilities developed through U.S. security cooperation programs.” While DOD-led, it “supports broad USG security sector reform objectives and whole-of-government approaches. The program primarily supports activities related to defense policy and strategy formulation, and planning, budgeting and resource management; civilian and (continued...) Congressional Research Service 24 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance currently being formulated. An initial consultative DIRI team visit to Liberia (part of what DIRI terms its “Requirements Determination”) took place in September 2009 and a follow-up program assessment and implementation visit (part of a DIRI “Program Development” process) followed in March 2010. The Liberian MOD has established a Liberian working group to collaborate with the U.S. DIRI team, which DIRI officials interpret as indicating “strong Liberian interest in, and ownership of, the project.” A key initial area of planned activity is work to finalize National Defense Strategy (NDS), integrating inter-agency and AFL inputs, “that would empower the Ministry to effectively develop policy, budgets, and resource management plans, and manage logistics, personnel issues, and public relations.” A further U.S. DIRI team was slated to take place in mid-April and at six-week intervals thereafter. A longer-term program roadmap, with associated benchmarks, will also be designed and implemented. These activities will be assessed every 12-18 months.89 While the United States is currently continuing to provide operations and maintenance support to the AFL, as defense sector capacity-building proceeds, the long-term success and sustainability of the effort will increasingly rely on the ability of the Liberian government to adequately manage and fund the new AFL. Funding, in particular, may pose a significant challenge, given Liberia’s modest annual national budget. 90 Defense Minister Brownie Samukai, Jr., however, has asserted that the government intends to keep the defense budget at a 9% or less share of the overall national budget, suggesting that the government is taking measures to ensure that defense reform is both adequately funded and fiscally sustainable. 91 Competing development and reconstruction priorities in the long-term, however, may decrease the availability of resources for the defense sector, particularly if advocates of increased social welfare expenditures successfully argue that non-defense investments are more likely to produce larger and more productive, tangible benefits for a larger number of Liberians than the defense sector.92 While some may contend that Liberia can ill afford to unilaterally fund a national military, the need for continued AFL and MOD professionalization is widely viewed as crucial, for multiple reasons. Prominent among these is a core national defense rationale: Liberia lies within a subregion that has experienced substantial political instability and cross-border armed conflict in recent decades, and must be able to defend its territorial integrity. Such investments are also seen as being necessitated by a need to prevent a recurrence of the politically destabilizing role that Liberia’s military and state security forces have played in the past. Training and constitutionally based military institution-building are seen as necessary in order to ensure that the new AFL does not intervene in civilian politics or engage in other extra-legal activities. (...continued) military defense sector human resource development and training; logistics and infrastructure capacity-building; civilmilitary relations; and interagency coordination. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Estimates, February 2010; and DOD/Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Institution Reform Initiative Fact Sheet, September 1, 2009. 89 Information from DIRI Liberia Program officer current as of April 13, 2010. 90 S/2009/640, December 11, 2009 91 USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.,” May 11, 2007. 92 Defense Minister Samukai has suggested that in the long-term, public investments in the AFL are likely to contribute to non-defense related national development, as members of the AFL with specialized functional training enter the civilian sector upon retiring from the AFL. USIP, “A Discussion with Liberia’s Defense Minister, Brownie J. Samukai, Jr.,” May 11, 2007 Congressional Research Service 25 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance While there are no indications that the new AFL—which is explicitly designed to function as an apolitical, professional force—is a likely to reprise such a destabilizing role, there have been occasional problems of AFL absenteeism, rank and file protests about living conditions, and some reports of indiscipline among some AFL members, in some cases of a violent or criminal nature, or involving intoxicants.93 While the scope of such phenomena have been limited to date and do not threaten state stability, the contemporary history of civil-military relations in the West Africa suggests that, if not addressed, they may have the potential to develop into more serious threats. Military absenteeism and indiscipline, both within Liberia and in the surrounding sub-region, have historically underpinned negative outcomes ranging from military ineffectiveness to abuse of civilians by diverse military units, and military protests over pay and living conditions have spurred state instability and played a causative role in several coups d’état and putsches. It is notable that, as of early 2010, while U.S. defense equipment has been donated to the Liberian MOD, weapons and ammunition reportedly continued to be under U.S. control.94 Sector Reform: Challenges of Balancing Foreign Support for and National Ownership of Security As described elsewhere in this report, the Liberian security sector reform (SSR) process has relied heavily on U.S. and other external assistance, which has often been provided through the use of foreign contractors. Adapted U.S. institutional models, norms, and policy objectives have also played an influential role in shaping the SSR process. In the view of a number of observers, such external inputs were essential because rapid military reform was widely seen as crucial to building long-term stability, and post-war Liberia largely lacked requisite financial, human, and other resource capacities. Similarly, the strong American role was seen as apropos because Liberia has long drawn from U.S. legal and institutional models in defining its state structure. The extensive foreign role in Liberia’s SSR process, however, may also pose challenges for the long-term sustainability of the outcomes of the SSR process since, while historically U.S.-influenced, Liberia’s state and society are the unique product of local history, ethno-social make-up and culture, and geographic scale, among other factors. As a result, to the extent that the institutions and processes that SSR produces were not initially organically or integrally defined by local cultural norms and socio-political authority, interests, and needs, over the long-term, these influences may reshape the resulting institutions, potentially in a manner at odds with their original formal purposes. Similarly, to the degree that their design did not incorporate adequate public input, their political legitimacy might be called into question.95 Furthermore, while many criticisms and problems associated with SSR in Liberia have been cited in the research literature, including lack of adequate participation by the broad public, sequencing of institution-building and associated law and policy-making, a number of 93 UNMIL reports that there have been continuing tensions between the AFL and civilian security agencies, including at least eight confrontations, some violent, since September 2008, and that there have been several “aggravated assaults” by AFL members on civilians, including at least two stabbings. See S/2010/88, February 17, 2010, along with Julius Kanubah, “AWOL Soldiers Begin Returning to Base,” Star Radio, May 5, 2008; and Rebecca Murray, “Liberia: New Army Faces Greatest Challenge,” Inter Press Service, December 26, 2009. 94 S/2010/88, February 17, 2010. 95 Louise Andersen, Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform and the Challenge of Ownership - The Case of Liberia, Danish Institute for International Studies, July 2006; Sean McFate, “Outsourcing the Making of Militaries: DynCorp International as Sovereign Agent,” Review of African Political Economy, December 1, 2008; and Alan Bryden, Linkage between DDR and SSR, Second International Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa/U.N. Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA), June 12-14, 2007. 96 David C. Gompert, Olga Oliker, Brooke Stearns, Keith Crane, and Kevin Jack Riley, Making Liberia Safe: Transformation of the National Security Sector, RAND, June 2006. RAND is a U.S. think tank and policy research organization that often carries out sensitive U.S. government contract work. Quotation from Adedeji Ebo, “Local Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of Outsourcing in Liberia,” in Timothy Donais (Ed.), Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform, LIT Verlag, 2008. See also Alexander Loden, “Civil Society and Security Sector Reform in Post-conflict Liberia: Painting a Moving Train without Brushes,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 1, 2007. Congressional Research Service 26 Liberia’s Post-War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance researchers have also pointed out that substantial efforts were undertaken to ensure that the SSR process was shaped by Liberian interests and views. For instance, while some observers were concerned that a 2006 U.S.-funded report by the RAND Corporation was overly influential in shaping the design of national security structures, after it was released, the Liberian government facilitated a “participatory and democratic security reform process.”96 This included a “widely consultative” national security review led by a Liberia’s Governance Reform Commission (GRC).97 While not without its critics and problems, the review included input from a range of civil society and political actors, and reportedly critically informed a subsequent government-drafted national security strategy.98 Coast Guard99 In order to protect Liberia’s 360 mile coast line and associated 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone against periodic poaching by foreign trawlers, potential drug trafficking, human trafficking, piracy, and illicit maritime dumping, as well as the need for search and rescue capacities, Liberia is developing a coast guard. The effort is dependent, in large part, on the provision of U.S. training and technical assistance funded primarily with State Department Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funding through Defense Security Cooperation Agency in collaboration with AFRICOM. The field program is coordinated and carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), with some assistance from U.S. Navy elements. In August 2008, in response to a 2007 request from the Liberian government and a subsequent request from AFRICOM, and in coordination with the U.S. embassy in Monrovia, a USCG team conducted an in-country technical needs assessment to identify Liberia’s potential coast guard needs and capacities. It subsequently produced an assessment report and recommendations based on its findings, which it presented to the U [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33185. Public record. Not legal advice.