# China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33153 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** Reports - **Published:** April 24, 2025 - **Citation:** RL33153 ## Text China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Updated April 24, 2025 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33153 SUMMARY China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress RL33153 April 24, 2025 Ronald O'Rourke Specialist in Naval Affairs China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force. China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships, meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. DOD states that China’s navy “is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The… overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030.” The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030. U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China’s shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of ship, aircraft, weapon, and C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) acquisition programs, as well as improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. China’s navy currently has certain limitations and weaknesses, which it is working to overcome. China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power. Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific; assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific; maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy; initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; and developed new operational concepts for countering PRC maritime A2/AD forces. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China’s naval modernization effort. Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1 Sources and Terminology .......................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ........................................................... 2 Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ......................................................................... 6 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6 Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known ............................. 7 Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be of Value Analytically ....................................................................................................... 7 Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships ........................................... 7 Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships.........................................11 Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................... 17 Anti-Ship Missiles ............................................................................................................ 17 Submarines........................................................................................................................ 23 Aircraft Carriers ................................................................................................................ 27 Surface Combatants .......................................................................................................... 36 Amphibious Ships ............................................................................................................. 41 Operations Away from Home Waters................................................................................ 47 U.S. Navy Response ................................................................................................................ 50 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 50 Planned Size of Navy ........................................................................................................ 50 Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems......................................... 51 New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept ................................. 52 Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries......................................... 53 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 54 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 54 U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power ................................................................................. 54 Davidson Window/Decade of Concern ............................................................................. 56 Shipbuilding Capacity ....................................................................................................... 59 Other Specific Issues......................................................................................................... 60 Legislative Activity for FY2025 .................................................................................................... 65 Coverage in Related CRS Reports .......................................................................................... 65 FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638/H.R. 5009 /P.L. 118-159) ............................................................................................................................... 66 House ................................................................................................................................ 66 Enacted.............................................................................................................................. 68 Figures Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ......................... 12 Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ................................. 13 Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships ....................................................... 14 Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships........................................................ 15 Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements ................................................... 16 Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy ........................... 17 Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) ................................................................ 18 Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) ................................. 19 Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) .................................................. 21 Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 21 Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 22 Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher.............................. 22 Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS) ..................................................................... 25 Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN) ................................................................ 25 Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) ................................................... 26 Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier ........................................................................... 30 Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier ......................................................................... 31 Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 31 Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 32 Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 33 Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier ...................................................................... 34 Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter .................................................................. 35 Figure 23. J-35 Carrier-Capable Fighter........................................................................................ 35 Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 37 Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 38 Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer .............................................................................. 38 Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate .................................................................................. 39 Figure 28. Jiangkai II (Type 054B) Frigate ................................................................................... 40 Figure 29. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette ....................................................................................... 40 Figure 30. Reported New Corvette Design ................................................................................... 41 Figure 31. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship ........................................................................... 42 Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 43 Figure 33. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 44 Figure 34. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship................................................................. 45 Figure 35. Bridge-Equipped Landing Barge ................................................................................. 46 Tables Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004 ............................... 8 Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030 .......................... 10 Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040 ................................................11 Appendixes Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and PRC Numbers of Ships and Naval Capabilities ..................... 70 Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter PLA ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons ................ 72 Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 77 Congressional Research Service China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Introduction Issue for Congress This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the naval modernization effort of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities. China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.1 The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China’s naval modernization effort. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base. Sources and Terminology This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,2 a 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China’s military power,3 a 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report on China’s navy,4 published reference sources such as IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships,5 and press reports. For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization effort to refer to the modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of PLA forces outside China’s navy that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air Force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for detecting and tracking ships at sea. China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force, or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the Philippines and Guam.6 1 For an overview of China’s military, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. 2 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Annual Report to Congress, released on December 18, 2024, 166 pp. Hereinafter 2024 DOD CMSD. The report is also sometimes referred to by a predecessor title, the China Military Power Report. See, for example, Department of Defense, Fact Sheet, 2024 China Military Power Report, undated but with an internet file date of December 18, 2024, 2 pp. 3 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp. Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP. 4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, undated but released in April 2015, 47 pp. 5 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2022-2023, and previous editions. 6 For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 67. Congressional Research Service 1 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Background Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following: • • • • China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader PRC military modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,7 has been underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force. China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China’s navy the numerically largest in the world. DOD states, “The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.”8 The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.9 U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China’s shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.10 China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to 7 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging militaryapplicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy technologies, and quantum technologies. For more on China’s military modernization effort in general, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For a discussion of advanced military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler. U.S.China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic competition that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions. 8 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 51. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63. 9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 10 See, for example, Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024; James Stavridis, “China Has 350 Warships. The US Has 290. That’s a Problem,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2024; Lauren C. Williams, “China Is Winning the Shipbuilding Numbers Game—and That’s a Problem, INDOPACOM Nom [Nominee] Says,” Defense One, February 2, 2024; Svetlana Shkolnikova, “China’s Buildup of Warships on a ‘Concerning Trajectory,’ Says Nominee to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 2 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities • • • the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a PRC challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are much more modern and capable than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are comparable in many respects to those of Western navies. DOD states, “Today, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors.”11 ONI states that “Chinese naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”12 China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs),13 and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.14 China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the Command US Forces in Indo-Pacific,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2024; Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Navy Is Falling Behind China, And The Pentagon Knows It,” 19FortyFive, October 31, 2023; Michael Lee, “Chinese Shipbuilding Capacity Over 200 Times Greater Than US, Navy Intelligence Says,” Fox News, September 14, 2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China’s 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity,” The Drive, July 11, 2023; Chris Bradford, “Point of No Return, US Navy Faces Being Totally Outgunned by China in Just Seven Years—We Need a Fleet Ready to Fight War Now, Says Expert,” U.S. Sun, March 1, 2023; Keith Griffith, “China's Naval Fleet Is Growing and the US ‘Can't Keep Up’ with the Warship Buildup as Beijing Uses Its Sea Power to Project an ‘Increasingly Aggressive Military Posture Globally,’ Navy Secretary Warns,” Daily Mail (UK), February 23, 2023; Brad Lendon and Haley Britzky, “US Can’t Keep Up with China’s Warship Building, Navy Secretary Says,” CNN, February 22, 2023; Meredith Roaten, “Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military Leaders,” National Defense, January 26, 2023; Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning About China From US Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the ‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022. For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever— The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power, Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp. 11 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 49. 12 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. 13 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Reveals New Heavily Armed Extra-Large Uncrewed Submarine,” Naval News, February 23, 2023; Ryan Martinson, “Gliders With Ears: A New Tool in China’s Subsea Surveillance Toolbox,” Maritime Executive, March 21, 2022; Gabriel Honrada, “Underwater Drones Herald Sea Change in Pacific Warfare,” Asia Times, January 12, 2022; Ryan Fedasiuk, “Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea Vehicles,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 17, 2021. 14 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020. Congressional Research Service 3 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities • • • South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15 defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major world power.16 Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating PRC nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations. Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces. The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels. Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s naval capabilities, China’s navy currently is assessed as having limitations or weaknesses in certain areas,17 including joint operations with other parts of China’s military,18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far from home waters,19 a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,20 a need to train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,21 non-commissioned officers (NCOs) that are not empowered by unit commanders through mission command to achieve a commander’s intent,22 and a lack of recent combat 15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 16 For additional discussion, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020. 17 For discussions focusing on these limitations or weaknesses, see David Roza, “Not 10 Feet Tall: Experts Say China’s Military Faces Major Issues,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, January 31, 2025; Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese Military's Doubtful Combat Readiness, RAND, PEA 830-1, January 2025 (posted online January 27, 2025), 31 pp.; Girish Linganna, “China’s Big but Weak Navy: The illusion of Maritime Power,” Modern Diplomacy, January 4, 2025. 18 See, for example, Ben Noon and Chris Bassler, “Schrodinger’s Military? Challenges for China’s Military Modernization Ambitions,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021. 19 See, for example, Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National Defense, June 10, 2020. 20 See, for example, Kristin Huang, “Size of China’s Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet But What Can the PLA Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2021. 21 See, for example, Peter Suciu, “China’s Aircraft Carriers Might Have an ‘Achilles Heel,’” National Interest, October 10, 2024 (concerning a shortage of pilots for carrier-based aircraft); Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy Goes Back to Work on Big Ambitions but Long-Term Gaps Remain,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020. See also Mallory Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,” USNI News, September 20, 2023. 22 See, for example, Rich Abott, “INDOPACOM Official Names Chinese Military Structure Limitations And Russian Debts To China,” Defense Daily, October 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 4 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities experience.23 China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations and weaknesses.24 Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to China’s leaders. 23 Alastair Gale, “China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2022; Benjamin Brimelow, “China’s Military Is Growing Rapidly, But It Hasn't Been ‘Tested’ Like US Troops Have, Former Top US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, March 29, 2022. See also Andrew Scobell, “Xi Jinping’s Worst Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2023. In November 2023, The Economist published a collection of articles regarding weaknesses and limitations in China’s military as a whole, including its navy. The online landing page for the collection is “Unknown Soldiers, Overestimating China’s Armed Forces Would Be Dangerous, Argues Jeremy Page,” Economist, November 11, 2023. Individual articles in the collection include the following: “How Scary is China? America Must Understand China’s Weaknesses as Well as Its Strengths,” Economist, November 9, 2023; “The People’s Liberation Army Is Not Yet as Formidable as the West Fears,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “From Hypersonic Missiles to Undersea Drones, The PLA Is Making Leaps, But China’s Military Tech Still Lags Behind the West’s,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “China Is Struggling to Recruit Enough Highly Skilled Troops,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Worries That China’s Troops Are Not Ready to Fight,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Is Obsessed with Political Loyalty in the PLA, Ideology Is Undermining China’s Drive to Prepare Forces for Combat,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Invading Taiwan Would Be a Logistical Minefield for China,” Economist, November 6, 2023. See also Paul Dibb, “Be Alert to China’s Military Weaknesses,” Strategist, December 1, 2023. The use of a dual command structure in the crews of larger PLA Navy ships, involving both a commanding officer and a political officer, has been raised as a source of potential reduced command effectiveness in certain tactical situations. See Mallory Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,” USNI News, September 20, 2023; Roderick Lee, PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational Performance, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, June 2023, 21 pp.; “Leadership: China Cripples Naval Officers,” Strategy Page, July 18, 2020. Regarding corruption in China’s military, see, for example, Minxin Pei, “Trump Wants Hitler’s Generals? That’s Xi’s Problem, Massive Corruption Continues to Plague the Chinese Military Because of a Promotion System that Prizes Loyalty above Competence,” Bloomberg, December 11, 2024; “Fresh Doubts about China’s Ability to Invade Taiwan, How Corruption in the PLA Is Changing the Calculations of Analysts,” Economist, December 5, 2024; Bloomberg News, “China’s Military Probes Slew of Graft Issues Going Back to 2017,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2023; “Xi Jinping Is Struggling to Stamp Out Graft in the PLA, How Will It Affect China’s Fighting Ability?” Economist, January 11, 2024; Chun Han Wong, “China’s Military Shake-Up Raises Questions About Combat Readiness,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2024; Peter Martin and Jennifer Jacobs, “US Intelligence Shows Flawed China Missiles Led Xi to Purge Army,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2023; Gordan G. Chang, “China’s Military Is Nowhere Near as Strong as the CCP Wants You to Think,” Newsweek, June 16, 2023. For an alternative perspective, see Alex Velez-Green, “Corruption in China’s Military Is No Excuse for American Complacency,” Defense News, January 22, 2024; John Grady, “Chinese Military Corruption Won’t Slow PLA Expansion, Panel Says,” USNI News, October 31, 2023. 24 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some ship components. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced incountry, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission.) Regarding the ASW capabilities of China’s Navy, DOD states The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability. (2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53.) See also Gabriel Honrada, “China Simulates ‘Z-day’ Total Sea War with the US,” Asia Times, July 5, 2023; Stephen Chen, “Chinese Military Conjures World War Z Scenario of All-Out Conflict to Test and Evaluate New Navy Weapons,” South China Morning Post, June 28, 2023; Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Bryan Clark, “Submarines Will Not Solve America’s Eroding Undersea Advantage,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2022; Ryan D. Martinson and Conor Kennedy, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Beijing’s New Approach to Prepare its Navy for War,” China Brief, March 25, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Network: Bold Moves for Ocean Dominance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, February 17, 2022. Congressional Research Service 5 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities • As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential missions. In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the size and capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China’s coast guard is “the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world.”25 China also operates a sizeable maritime militia that includes a large number of fishing vessels. China relies primarily on its maritime militia and coast guard to assert and defend its maritime claims in its near-seas region, with the navy operating over the horizon as a potential backup force.26 Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy Overview DOD states The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.27 DIA states that “the PLAN is rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger, multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors and C2 [command and control] facilities.”28 Another set of observers states China’s rapid military buildup has left the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) poised to overtake the U.S. Navy in several measures of maritime might more quickly than sometimes assumed. If China continues to expand its fleet at the current pace and the United States does not revitalize its shipbuilding industry, China will grow increasingly likely to emerge victorious from interstate war, especially a prolonged great power war…. 25 DOD states that The CCG’s continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable, enabling them to operate farther off shore and remain on station longer. The CCG has over 150 regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels include over 20 corvettes transferred from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. The newer, larger CCG vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, multiple interceptor boats and guns ranging from 30 mm to 76 mm. Revised estimates indicate the CCG operates more than 50 regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 tons to 499 tons). In 2023 and early 2024, the CCG launched seven offshore patrol ships as well as two additional patrol ships based on a large salvage ship design. Several more offshore patrol ships are likely under construction. (2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 76-77. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 78.) 26 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 76-78, and CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 27 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 51. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63. 28 2019 DIA CMP, p. 69. Congressional Research Service 6 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities China now possesses the world’s largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships [excluding auxiliary and support ships] to the U.S. Navy’s 219 [warships excluding auxiliary and support ships].29 Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navy makes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.30 In contrast, China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, or resulting projected force levels. The ultimate size and composition of China’s navy might be an unsettled and evolving issue among China’s military and political leaders. One observer states that “it seems the majority of past foreign projections of Chinese military and Chinese navy procurement scale and speed have been underestimates…. All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired ‘critical mass’ to aspire toward. Whether the Chinese navy is close to its desired force or not, is of no small consequence.”31 Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be of Value Analytically Relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative numbers of U.S. and PLA ships (or comparative aggregate fleet displacements [i.e, tonnages]). Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate displacement) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bear on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. As a result, as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China’s navy and the U.S. Navy (or aggregate displacements) are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends over time in these relative numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) can shed some light on how the relative balance of U.S. and PLA naval capabilities might be changing over time. Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships—those that might be thought of as the principal combat ships (PCSs)32 of China’s navy—from 2004 to the present, along with the number of China Coast Guard ships from 2016 to the present, as presented in DOD’s annual reports on military and security developments involving China. (The DOD report for a given year 29 Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. 30 For more information on the U.S. Navy’s force-level goal, 30-year shipbuilding plan, and five-year shipbuilding plan, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 31 Rick Joe, “Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s,” Diplomat, December 25, 2020. 32 The term principal combat ships (PCSs) is a term used in this CRS report. Congressional Research Service 7 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities presents data for PLA forces for the previous year.)33 As can be seen in Table 1, most PLA Navy ships shown in the table have increased numerically since 2004. Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004 Figures for PLA ships taken from annual editions DOD reports on military and security developments involving China dated 2005 and subsequent years, showing data for 2004 and subsequent years Principal PLA combat ships—excludes auxiliary and support ships. (The figure for total U.S. battle force ships shown toward the right includes auxiliary and support ships, but excludes patrol craft, of which the Navy has very few.) Data for that year (as shown in DOD report dated the following year) SSB SSN SS CV CG DD FF FFL PC 2004 1 6 51 0 0 21 43 0 2005 1 5 50 0 0 25 45 2006 1 5 53 0 0 25 2007 1 5 54 0 0 2008 2 6 54 0 2009 2 6 54 2010 2 5 2011 2 2012 Submarines Surface combatants Amphibious ships Total U.S. battle force ships U.S. vs. China LHA LST/ LPD LSM Total China Coast Guard 51 0 20 23 216 n/a 292 +76 0 45 0 25 25 221 n/a 281 +60 47 0 41 0 25 25 222 n/a 281 +59 29 45 0 45 0 26 28 233 n/a 279 +46 0 27 48 0 70 0 27 28 262 n/a 282 +20 0 0 25 49 0 85 0 27 28 276 n/a 285 +9 49 0 0 26 53 0 86 0 27 28 276 n/a 288 +12 5 48 0 0 26 53 0 86 0 28 23 271 n/a 284 +13 3 5 49 1 0 23 52 0 85 0 29 26 273 n/a 287 +14 2013 3 5 51 1 0 24 49 8 85 0 29 28 283 n/a 285 +2 2014 4 5 53 1 0 21 52 15 86 0 29 28 294 n/a 289 -5 2015 4 5 57 1 0 23 52 23 86 0 30 22 303 n/a 271 -32 2016 4 5 54 1 0 21 56 23 88 0 34 21 317 185 275 -42 2017 4 5 57 1 0 28 51 28 86 0 33 23 306 240 279 -27 2018 4 6 50 1 0 33 54 42 86 0 37 22 335 248 286 -49 2019 4 6 46 2 1 32 49 49 86 0 37 21 333 255 290 -43 2020 6 9 56 2 1 32 48 51 86 57 348 223 296 -52 2021 6 9 56 2 6 36 45 50 84 57 351 224 294 -57 2022 6 6 47 2 8 42 47 50 60 3 57 328 142 289 -39 2023 6 6 47 3 8 42 49 50 60 3 58 332 141 291 -41 -4 +3 +8 +21 +6 +50 +9 +116 n/a -1 -117 Change from 2004 to 2023 +5 0 +18 Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2024 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military and security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The DOD report shows data for 33 Thus, the 2023 edition of the DOD report covers presents data for 2022, and so on for prior-year editions of the report. Congressional Research Service 8 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities China for the year prior to the report’s cover date. For example, the 2005 edition of the DOD report shows data for 2004. Key to abbreviations: n/a = data not available in annual DOD report. SSB = ballistic missile submarines. SSN = nuclear-powered attack submarines. SS = diesel attack submarines. CV = aircraft carriers. CG = cruisers. DD = destroyers. FF = frigates. FFL = corvettes (i.e., light frigates). PC = missile-armed patrol craft. LST = amphibious tank landing ship. LPD = amphibious transport dock ship. LSM = amphibious medium landing ship. (Starting with the 2021 edition, the annual DOD report shows a combined figure for LST/LPD and LSM.) Column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right, which shows what might be thought of as the principal combat ships of China’s navy, does not include other PLAN ship types not shown to right, such as auxiliary and support ships. CCG = China Coast Guard ships. U.S. total = Total U.S. Navy battle force ships, which includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). U.S. vs. PLAN ship types shown = total U.S. Navy battle force ships compared to the column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right. As can be seen in Table 1, about 84% of the net increase in the total number of PLA ships since 2004 (a net increase of 97 ships out of the total net increase of 116 ships) resulted from increases in cruisers and destroyers (29 ships), corvettes (i.e., light frigates) (50 ships), and amphibious ships (18 ships). The corvettes alone account for about 43% of the total net increase. Table 1 lumps together less capable older PLA ships with more capable modern PLA ships. In examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of the types of PLA ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more capable modern designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types was changing little. For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs), meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy, and compares it to the total number of the types of PLA ships that are shown in the table. The result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison, because the PLA figures exclude auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). Changes over time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison, however, can be of value in understanding trends in the comparative sizes of the U.S. and PLA navies. On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2014, the total number of principal combat ships in China’s navy (a figure that excludes PLAN auxiliary and support ships) surpassed the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure that includes U.S. Navy auxiliary and support ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.34 Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020 Table 2 shows comparative total numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs), as well as specific figures for certain types of ships that contribute toward China’s total number of battle force ships from 2000 to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The figures for China’s ships are taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. (As noted earlier, battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. The ONI information paper applied the same counting rules to the PLA Navy.) For China, the total number of battle force ships shown excludes the missile-armed patrol craft (PCs) shown in 34 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Congressional Research Service 9 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Table 1, but includes auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to Table 1, the figures in Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain.35 Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030 Figures for PLA Navy ships taken from ONI information paper of February 2020 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 Ballistic missile submarines 1 1 3 4 4 6 8 Nuclear-powered attack submarines 5 4 5 6 7 10 13 Diesel attack submarines 56 56 48 53 55 55 55 Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers 19 25 25 26 43 55 65 Frigates, corvettes 38 43 50 74 102 120 135 Total number of China Navy battle force ships, including types not shown above 210 220 220 255 360 400 425 Total U.S. Navy battle force ships 318 282 288 271 296 287 294 U.S. total above compared to China total above +108 +62 +68 +16 -64 -113 -131 Selected ship types Sources: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year. Note: In the column for the year 2000, the ONI information paper showed a figure for the total number of China navy battle force ships of 110, but the Navy later stated that this was a typo, and that the correct figure is 210. As shown in Table 2, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1, however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy currently has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.36 Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020 Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040. The figures for China’s ships were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with Table 1, the result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison between the PLA Navy and U.S. Navy totals, because the PLA total excludes auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total includes auxiliary and support ships, but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). 35 See, for example, Richard Sterk, “Chinese Missile Boats Operate on an Attack Swarm Principle,” Defense and Security Monitor, March 19, 2024. 36 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Congressional Research Service 10 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040 Figures for PLA ships are from U.S. Navy, reflecting data as of October 2020 2020 2025 2030 2040 2040 change from 2020 Ballistic missile submarines 4 6 8 10 +6 Nuclear-powered attack submarines 6 10 14 16 +10 Diesel attack submarines 47 47 46 46 -1 Aircraft carriers 2 3 5 6 +4 Cruisers and destroyers 41 52 60 80 +39 Frigates and corvettes 102 120 135 140 +38 LHA-type amphibious assault ships 0 4 4 6 +6 LPD-type amphibious ships 7 10 14 14 +7 LST-type amphibious tank landing ships 30 24 24 15 -15 TOTAL for China of types shown above 239 276 310 333 +94 TOTAL number of U.S. Navy battle force ships 296 287 294 378 +82 U.S. total above compared to China total above +57 +9 -16 +45 -12 Ship type Sources: For PLA Navy ships: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, reflecting data as of October 26, 2020. For U.S. Navy ships: U.S. Navy data—actual for 2020, and projections for subsequent years shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Navy projects that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of PLA ships of the types shown in the table will increase by 94, or about 39%, with most of that increase (77 ships out of 94) coming from roughly equal increases in numbers of large surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers—39 ships) and small surface combatants (frigates and corvettes—38 ships). The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2040 assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.37 Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships Graph Showing PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships Figure 1, which uses numbers from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy principal combat ships (PCSs)—a figure that excludes auxiliary and support ships—and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships—a figure that includes auxiliary and support ships. In other words, Figure 1 depicts the apples-vs.-oranges comparison discussed earlier in connection with Table 1 and Table 3. The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040 assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. 37 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11, 2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17), entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.” Congressional Research Service 11 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.38 Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships PLAN principal combat ships (PCSs) excludes auxiliary and support ships; U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs) includes auxiliary and support ships Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 3 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data, including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. PCSs are principal combat ships (which exclude auxiliary and support ships); BFSs are battle force ships (which include auxiliary and support ships). Graph Showing PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships Figure 2, which uses figures from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships (BFSs), the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships plus missile-armed patrol craft (PCs), and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships. (As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft.) As discussed in connection with Table 2, comparing total 38 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11, 2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17), entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.” Congressional Research Service 12 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities numbers of battle force ships comes closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain. As discussed in connection with Figure 1, the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040 assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.39 Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships Figures for both PLAN and U.S. Navy are total number of battle force ships (BFSs), which include auxiliary and support ships. Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 2 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data, including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. BFSs are battle force ships; PCs are missile-armed patrol craft. 39 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11, 2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17), entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.” Congressional Research Service 13 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Graph Showing PLAN and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding Patrol Craft Figure 3, which was prepared by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) using data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), shows numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy principal combatant ships, excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs). The dashed line at the top is the line for the U.S. Navy. Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs) Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Figure 4, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the launch dates of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy warships. (Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction.) Congressional Research Service 14 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Note: Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction. Figure 5, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the aggregate displacement (i.e., tonnage) of PLA Navy submarines and U.S. Navy submarines. A ship’s displacement is sometimes used as a rough proxy for its capability, as a larger ship can carry more combat system equipment and more weapons. As mentioned earlier and discussed in further detail in Appendix A, displacement is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out other factors bearing on a ship’s capability. Congressional Research Service 15 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Notes: “Chinese conventio…” is Chinese conventionally powered submarines. “Chinese nuclear-p…” is Chinese nuclear-powered submarines. Figure 6, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the ratio between the aggregate number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells on U.S. Navy ships and the aggregate number of VLS cells on PLA Navy ships. VLS cells are cells on a ship for storing and firing missiles. A ship’s number of VLS cells is one measure of the ship’s weapon capacity, though not a complete one, as ships can be armed with additional missiles that are fired from deck-mounted box launchers rather than VLS cells, and ships can be armed with weapons other than missiles, including guns. Even so, aggregate numbers of VLS cells are sometimes used as a shorthand for measuring a navy’s total missile capacity.40 40 See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2025, March 2024, p. 11 (Figure 1), and Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, p. 22 (Figure 8). Congressional Research Service 16 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Notes: VLS is vertical launch system. Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort Below are brief overviews of selected elements of China’s naval modernization effort. Anti-Ship Missiles Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) China has fielded two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at sea at extended ranges—the DF-21D (Figure 7), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 810 nautical miles),41 and 41 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 65. Congressional Research Service 17 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities the DF-26 (Figure 8), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range of 3,000 kilometers to 4,000 kilometers42 (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles to 2,160 nautical miles). DOD states that “the multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and antiship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS [South China Sea] from mainland China.”43 Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,” AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019. Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific.44 Prior to the advent of these weapons, the U.S. Navy had not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon. China reportedly is developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into PLA ASBMs, could make PLA ASBMs more difficult to intercept.45 DOD states: In April 2022, the PRC had reportedly developed a new type of ASBM, possibly designated the YJ-21, small enough to fit into a surface combatant’s VLS cell and tested-fired from a RENHAI [i.e., Type 055 cruiser or large destroyer]…. 42 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 64. A map on page 67 of the report shows the DF-26 with a range of 4,000 kilometers. 43 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 65. The report similarly states on page 89: “The DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile is a capable of ranging Guam and is capable of conducting nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.” 44 See, for example, Chris Panella, “China Has a Lot More Missiles — with US Warships and Bases in Its Sights,” Business Insider, May 4, 2024. 45 See, for example, Jeff Schogol, “How Much of a Threat Are Chinese Hypersonic Missiles to US Navy Ships and Sailors?” Task & Purpose, April 18, 2025. Congressional Research Service 18 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities In April 2019, the PLAN revealed during its 70th anniversary celebration that its new guided-missile cruiser [i.e., the Renhai or Type 055] can employ long-range, land-attack cruise missiles and, in 2022, launched the YJ-21 hypersonic missile designed to defeat aircraft carriers.46 Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng-26 (DF-26),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019, accessed August 28, 2019. An August 9, 2024, press report states Through a series of images and videos that went viral via Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources, the latest test launches of the new YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile from a Type 055 destroyer of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have come to light…. The YJ-21 is one of the most advanced hypersonic anti-ship missiles in service at the People’s Liberation Army Navy, with an operational range of approximately 1,500 kilometers [about 810 nm] and cruising speeds of Mach 6, reaching terminal speeds of Mach 10. Although many details about the missile remain classified, various sources speculate that the missile is an adapted version for launch from surface ships, based on the CM-401 missile, but with substantial improvements in speed and range. Furthermore, as various reports suggest, there are versions designed to be launched from H-6N bombers in service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.47 A February 2, 2023, press report states For the first time, the PLA has officially revealed the performance of its advanced antiship hypersonic missile, sending a warning to the US amid high tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese analysts said. China’s YJ-21, or Eagle Strike-21, has a terminal speed of Mach 10, cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapons system in the world and can launch lethal strikes towards 46 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 88, 150. 47 “A Type 055 Destroyer of the Chinese Navy Successfully Conducted the Launch of the New YJ-21 Hypersonic Anti- Ship Missile,” Zona Militar, August 9, 2024. See also Mark Nicol, “China Has Made ‘Dramatic Advances’ in Its Hypersonic Missiles that Can Reach up to 6,500mph and Are Almost Impossible to Stop, Intelligence Officials Warn,” Daily Mail (UK), February 7, 2024. Congressional Research Service 19 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities enemy ships, according to an article posted by the official Weibo account of the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force on Monday [January 30].... The article declares that the missile travels six times the speed of sound all the way, and has a terminal speed of 10 times the speed of sound, meaning a speed of 3,400 metres per second (11,155 feet per second) when it hits the target. “Such a terminal speed cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapon system at this stage. Even if it is dropped directly at this terrifying speed [hitting the target] without an explosion it will cause a fatal strike to the enemy ship,” the article stated. The debut of its export variant, the YJ-21E, at last year’s Airshow China “shows that the domestic version of the Eagle Strike-21 ship-borne hypersonic missile is no longer the navy’s most advanced ship-borne hypersonic missile, and more advanced ship-borne hypersonic missiles are likely to have appeared,” it said. The article was first published on the website of China Science Communication, Guangming Online last year, but it was reposted by an official PLA account for the first time, a development experts described as a clear message for the US.48 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) Although China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs, observers are nevertheless concerned about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively long ranges of certain PLA ASCMs have led to concerns among some observers that the U.S. Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged ASCMs. China’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 for examples of reported images) include both Russian- and PRC-made designs, including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the PRC-made YJ-18.49 Press reports in April 2019 and December 2021 stated that China might be developing a YJ-18 launcher that can be packaged inside a standard commercial shipping container, for the potential purpose of surreptitiously deploying YJ-18s on merchant ships (Figure 12),50 a capability that, if implemented, could violate the law of naval warfare.51 DOD states, “It is possible the PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside 48 Amber Wang, “Chinese Military Announces YJ-21 Missile Abilities in Social Media Post Read as Warning to US Amid Tension in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023. Material in brackets as in original. See also Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Hypersonic Triad Pressing Down on US,” Asia Times, April 4, 2023. 49 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 54, 61, 88. See also Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, PT. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower And Mass Firing Schemes,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 1, 2023 (the acronym DMO refers to distributed maritime operations); Sam Goldsmith, Vampire Vampire Vampire, The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 2022, 43 pp.; Michael Peck, “Chinese Scientists Say They’re Working on an Anti-Ship Missile that Can Fly as High as an Airliner and Dive as Deep as a Submarine,” Business Insider, October 20, 2022; “China Is Developing a New Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile,” Naval News, September 19, 2022. 50 See, for example, Bill Gertz, “China Building Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Ship Container,” Washington Free Beacon, March 27, 2019; Alex Hollings, “China’s New Long-Range Cruise Missiles Are Built to be Fired from Containers on Merchant Ships,” SOFREP (Special Operations Forces Report), April 4, 2019; “China Is Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers,” Navy Recognition, April 8, 2019; Rajesh Uppal, “Threat of Concealed Weapon and Missiles Systems on Standard International Shipping Container,” International Defense, Security & Technology, October 20, 2021; Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021. See also Fan Wei and Cao Siqi, “China Debuts Container-Type Missile Launch System; Weapon Can ‘Effectively Improve Defense Capabilities of Coastal Countries,’” Global Times, November 12, 2022. 51 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare,” International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College), vol. 97, 2021: 1160-1170. Congressional Research Service 20 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities a standard commercial shipping container for covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant ships.”52 Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, “China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic ASCM,” Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states “This is an article published in our December 2016 Issue.”) The article states “According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as ‘the world’s best anti-ship missile.’ The missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early November [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be used in the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-302 is the export version of CASIC’s YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC’s armed forces.” Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Source: Photograph accompanying “YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1, 2019. The article states, “A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People’s Republic of China’s 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship missiles called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in central Beijing.” 52 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 54. Congressional Research Service 21 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an unnumbered page following page 14. The caption to the photograph states, “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at 2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos. Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher Source: Illustration accompanying Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021. Congressional Research Service 22 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Submarines Overview China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now built to relatively modern PRC and Russian designs.53 Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,54 but compared to China’s earlier submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.55 An August 2023 Naval War College Report on China’s submarines states After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.56 A September 2023 Naval War College report on China’s submarine industrial base states In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards…. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.57 53 For a discussion of Russian military transfers to China, including transfers of submarine technology, see Paul Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 2021, 8 pp. See also Gabriel Honrada, “China-Russia in a Nuclear Sub Counter to AUKUS,” Asia Times, October 23, 2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Top Russian Submarine Design Bureau Hit By Cyber Attack With Chinese Characteristics,” The Drive, May 10, 2021. 54 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines as being the most capable faced by the U.S. Navy. See, for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese and Russian Subs,” Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia’s Submarines,” National Interest, October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface Challenge,” War on the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the Pentagon,” Foreign Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News, October 28, 2014. 55 For an additional overview of China’s submarine force, see U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute, Quick Look Report “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” undated, 2 pp., which summarizes an academic conference on China’s undersea warfare capabilities that was held by the China Maritime Studies Institute on April 11-13, 2023. See also Alastair Gale, “The Era of Total U.S. Submarine Dominance Over China Is Ending, New Chinese Submarines and Sensors to Catch U.S. Subs Will Alter the Balance of Power,” Wall Street Journal, November 20, 2023. 56 Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang, A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines Nuclear Submarines, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, August 2023, p. 1. 57 Sarah Kirchberger, China’s Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics State-Led (continued...) Congressional Research Service 23 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Types and Numbers Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue for some time to consist mostly of SSs. DOD states that China’s navy “has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it matures its force, integrates new technologies, and expands its shipyards. The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.”58 ONI states that “China’s submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine production yards could allow higher future production numbers.” ONI projects that China’s submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76 boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030.59 A November 27, 2022, press report states “The dry-docks at China’s nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a new generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.”60 China’s newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 13), its newest SSN class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 14), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin (Type 094) class SSBN (Figure 15). DOD states The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced ASCMs. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which can launch ASCMs. PRC shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electric airindependent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.61 Innovation with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, September 2023, p. 1. 58 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 52. 59 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 1. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. See also H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Production Of AIP Submarines With Massive New Shipyard,” Naval News, February 16, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Nuclear Submarine Under Construction,” Naval News, February 1, 2021. 60 Jamie Seidel, “Satellite Photos Reveal China’s Hypocrisy After Dig to Australia,” News.com.au, November 27, 2022. See also Monty Khanna, The Nuclear Submarine Building Capacity of China’s Bohai Shipyard, Observer Research Foundation, September 2024, 23 pp.; H. I. Sutton, “Further Expansion Of China's Nuclear Submarine Shipyard,” HISutton.com, January 5, 2023. 61 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 52-53. Congressional Research Service 24 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS) Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 039A Yuan class,” SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019. Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN) Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, “Type 093 Shang Class,” July 1, 2018, accessed August 27, 2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/. Congressional Research Service 25 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China Puts a Damper on Navy’s 70th Anniversary Celebrations As It Tries to Allay Fears Over Rising Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 23, 2019. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua. DOD states further that Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms [i.e., submarines], the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.” The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with LACMs. The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.62 A June 21, 2024, press report states 62 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53. See also H. I. Sutton, “New Unreported Submarine In China Leaves West Guessing,” Naval News, February 3, 2025; Sarah Kirchberger and Christopher P. Carlson, “Neither Fish nor Fowl: China’s Development of a Nuclear Battery AIP Submarine,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), January 22, 2025; Bill Gertz, “Sunken Chinese Submarine Was a New Hybrid Nuclear-Conventional Attack Boat, U.S. Says,” Washington Times, September 30, 2024; H. I. Sutton, “China Launches Its Most Sophisticated Submarine to Date,” Naval News, August 21, 2024. Congressional Research Service 26 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities China’s increased focus on nuclear-powered submarines is aimed at boosting long-distance naval combat and deterrence power amid growing risks of high-seas confrontation with the US, according to military analysts. The People’s Liberation Army has for the first time publicly acknowledged a strategic shift away from conventional submarines, as Beijing pushes to build a modernised military by 2027. “The current development of China’s submarine fleet is dual-capable, both nuclearpowered and conventional, with a focus on nuclear capabilities,” Wen Xuexing, a member of a PLA Navy submarine unit, told state broadcaster CCTV.63 Submarine Weapons China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface ships to decoy. China reportedly is also developing a capability for submarines to deploy drones.64 DOD states that each Jin-class SSBN is equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 nucleararmed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).65 The JL-3 is a new SLBM with a range longer than that of the JL-2. A May 2, 2021, press report stated that China’s latest Jin-class SSBN is armed with JL-3s.66 Aircraft Carriers Overview China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001), entered service in 2012. China’s second aircraft carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 002), entered service in 2019. China’s third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), reportedly began conducting sea trials in 2024. China’s fourth carrier reportedly has begun construction. Liaoning and Shandong are conventionally powered and launch fixed-wing aircraft using an upward-sloping “ski ramp” at the ship’s bow. Compared with Liaoning and Shandong, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are larger, nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising endurance than a 63 Zhao Ziwen and Coy Li, “Chinese Military Focusing on Nuclear-Powered Subs with Eye on US Navy: Analysts,” South China Morning Post, June 21, 2024. 64 Stephen Chen, China’s Submarine-Launched Drones Can Do More than the US Military Thinks: Study,” South China Morning Post, January 22 (updated January 23), 2025. 65 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 56, 104. DOD estimates the range of the JL-2 at 3,900 nautical miles (2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53). Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from protected bastions close to China, targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from locations south of Japan, targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii, or targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii. DOD states that With a range of approximately 3,900 nm, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean to threaten targets in the western half of the continental United States (CONUS) (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii to threaten targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400 nm, which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from PRC littoral waters. (2024 DOD CMSD, p. 56.) 66 Minnie Chan, “China’s New Nuclear Submarine Missiles Expand Range in US: Analysts,” South China Morning Post, May 2, 2021. The article states that the JL-3 has a “range [of] over 10,000km (6,200 miles), a source close to the [PLA] navy said.” Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack larger portions of the United States from the locations described in the previous footnote. Congressional Research Service 27 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities conventionally powered ship), able to embark and operate a larger number of aircraft, and launch fixed-wing aircraft using catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of aircraft launched with a ski ramp. Fujian is conventionally powered, closer in size and flight deck configuration to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers,67 and equipped with catapults rather than a ski ramp for launching aircraft. Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more than six) aircraft carriers. Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters carrierbased aircraft operations on a substantial scale.68 Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, they are not considered critical for PLA operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within range of land-based PLA aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power. PLA aircraft carriers could be used for powerprojection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces, and to impress or intimidate foreign observers.69 In a combat situation involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, PLA aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing other missions. PLA aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Liaoning (Type 001) Liaoning (Figure 16) is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998 as an unfinished ship.70 It has an estimated full load displacement of about 60,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters, including 24 fighters. China has used Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018, China reportedly announced that the aircraft carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached initial operational capability (IOC),71 although that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems. 67 For a graphic providing an overhead comparison of the Type 003 design to the U.S. Navy’s Gerald R. Ford (CVN- 78) class aircraft carrier design, see Kathrin Hille, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Prepares to Take to the Seas,” Financial Times, September 12, 2023. 68 For additional discussion, see Bradley Perrett, “Chinese Carrier Aircraft Fleet Is Poised For Rapid Growth,” Aviation Week, June 20, 2023; Michael Dahm, “Lessons from the Changing Geometry of PLA Navy Carrier Ops,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2023; Michael Peck, “China Is Scrambling to Find Pilots to Fly From Its Growing Aircraft Carrier Fleet,” Business Insider, March 8, 2023. 69 For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft Carriers, China’s Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com), April 10, 2014; Sebastien Roblin, “All of the Reasons Why the World Should Fear China’s Aircraft Carriers,” National Interest, October 24, 2017. See also Ben Ho Wan Beng, “(Re)assessing the Near-Term Chinese Carrier Threat in a Taiwan Scenario,” Breaking Defense, July 21, 2023. 70 Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union and the place where the Soviet Union built its aircraft carriers. 71 Andrew Tate, “Liaoning Carrier Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4, 2018. See also Travis Fedschun, “China Says Carrier Group Reaches ‘Initial’ Combat Capability,” Fox News, May 31, 2018; “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Formation Capable of Systemic Combat Operation,” CGTV.com, May 31, 2018; Global Times, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Forming All-Weather Combat Capability with Successful Night Takeoff and Landing,” People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2018. Congressional Research Service 28 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Shandong (Type 002) Shandong (Figure 17) is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.72 Its displacement is estimated at about 66,000 tons. Fujian (Type 003) Fujian (and Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20) was launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) on June 17, 2022,73 and reportedly began conducting sea trials in early May 2024.74 Some observers believe it could be years before the ship begins making regular deployments.75 The ship has an estimated full load displacement of about 80,000 tons and is equipped, as observers had expected, with electromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which will improve the range/payload capability of the fixed-wing aircraft that it operates.76 China’s Fourth Carrier China reportedly is building a fourth aircraft carrier.77 The ship’s design, including its estimated displacement and whether it will be nuclear-powered or conventionally powered, had not been announced as of April 2025. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier China reportedly is building a new dedicated drone carrier (i.e., a carrier whose embarked air wing would consist entirely of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) (Figure 21).78 72 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,” Global Times, August 13, 2019; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,” South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019. 73 See, for example, Alexandra Stevenson, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier in Major Milestone for Xi Jinping,” New York Times, June 17, 2022; Chun Han Wong, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier, Advancing Naval Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2022; Jack Lau, “China Launches Fujian, PLA Navy’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier,” South China Morning Post, June 17, 2022. 74 See, for example, Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,” China Daily, May 8, 2024; Jesse Johnson, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Begins First Sea Trials,” Japan Times, May 1, 2024; Brad Lendon, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Heads to Sea for First Time,” CNN, May 1, 2024; Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Leaves for First Set of Sea Trials,” USNI News, May 1, 2024; Jun Mai, Yuanyue Dang, and Hayley Wong, “China’s Third Aircraft Carrier Fujian Tests Power, Navigation in Maiden Sea Trial,” South China Morning Post, May 1, 2024; Yuichi Shiga and Tamayo Muto, “China Flexes Muscle at Sea as New Aircraft Carrier Starts Trials,” Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024; Albee Zhang, Ryan Woo and Kevin Krolicki, “China Launches Sea Trials for Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier,” Reuters, May 1, 2024. 75 See, for example, Alex Wilson, “China’s Newest Carrier Likely Several Years Away from Regular Deployments, Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, May 2, 2024. 76 China Power Team. “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 17, 2023 (updated May 3, 2024); Naval News, “3rd China Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Fujian Holds Propulsion Tests,” Navy Recognition, May 4, 2023. 77 Matthew Bodner and Keir Simmons, “China Is Working on an Enormous Aircraft Carrier That Rivals the Biggest in The U.S. Fleet, Analysts Say,” NBC News, March 2, 2025; Thomas Newdick, “Structure At Chinese Shipyard May Point To China’s Next Aircraft Carrier’s Capabilities,” The War Zone, February 13, 2025. 78 H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First Dedicated Drone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024. Congressional Research Service 29 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Chris Osieck, “Analysis of Chinese Aircraft Carriers Their History, Modifications, Spotted Places, and What the Future Has in Store for Us,” Medium, June 14, 2022. Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship See also the discussion of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship that might be equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft catapult, in the section on China’s amphibious ships. Commercial Heavy-Lift Ship Reportedly Used in Exercise as Helicopter Carrier In August 2020, it was reported that China had used a commercial heavy-lift ship in a military exercise as a platform for operating at least two PLA Army helicopters.79 79 David Axe, “Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship Into An Instant Helicopter Carrier,” Forbes, August 22, 2020; Dave Makichuk, “PLA Army Tests Commercial Ships as Wartime Flight Decks,” Asia Times, August 25, 2020; John Dotson, “Semi-Submersible Heavy Lift Vessels: A New “Maritime Relay Platform” for PLA Cross-Strait Operations?” Jamestown Foundation, August 31, 2020. For articles discussing other aviation-capable ships whose purpose is not clear, see Hayley Wong, “China Tests CarrierLike Ship, but Mystery Vessel’s Purpose Remains Murky,” South China Morning Post, December 3, 2024; Thomas Newdick, “Detailed Deck View Emerges Of China’s Mysterious Aircraft Carrier-Like Ship,” The War Zone, December (continued...) Congressional Research Service 30 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “China’s Shandong Aircraft Carrier Strike Group Operated under Strict Surveillance by Japanese Naval Air Assets,” Zona Militar, July 17, 2024. Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Orange Wang, “China Says Its Fujian Carrier Is World’s Largest Conventionally Powered Warship,” South China Morning Post, June 23, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua. 2, 2024; Edward Szekeres and Brad Lendon, “Satellite Imagery Shows Mystery Ship Built in China amid Breakneck Naval Expansion,” CNN, November 1, 2024; Joseph Trevithick, “New Chinese Mystery Flattop Emerges,” The War Zone, October 28, 2024. Congressional Research Service 31 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier Source: Photograph accompanying Ryan Chan, “China Puts Most Advanced Aircraft Carrier to Sea,” Newsweek, September 3, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to “Pu Haiyang/Xinhua via AP.” Carrier-Based Aircraft80 China’s primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15, or Flying Shark (Figure 22), an aircraft derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate from carriers equipped with a ski ramp rather than catapults, but that some observers have critiqued for its range/payload limitations in operations from carriers equipped with ski ramps rather than catapults.81 China has developed an upgraded, catapult-capable version of the J-15 that could have improved range/payload when operated from a catapult-equipped carrier.82 80 For an overview of PLA naval aviation forces, see “PLA Navy Aerospace Forces” in PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 3rd Edition, Air University, China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), undated, posted August 15, 2022, pp. 38-52. See also Akhil Kadidal, “Armed to the Teeth: China’s New Aircraft Carrier Provides Unprecedented Strike Power,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 5, 2023. 81 For a discussion of the J-15, see, for example, Rick Joe, “China’s J-15 Carrierborne Fighter: Sizing up the Competition,” Diplomat, May 20, 2021. 82 Thomas Newdick, “China’s J-15T Enhanced Carrier-Based Flanker Officially Unveiled,” The War Zone, November 6, 2024; Thomas Newdick, “Two New Versions Of China’s J-15 Carrier Fighter Now Appear To Be Operational,” The War Zone, October 31, 2024; Andreas Rupprecht Mainz and Jon Grevatt, “Shenyang Produces First Catapult-Capable J-15,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 16, 2021; David Axe, “China’s Next Carrier Fighter Is A Lighter, Meaner J15,” Forbes, December 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 32 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier Source: Photograph accompanying Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,” China Daily, May 8, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua. Congressional Research Service 33 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First Dedicated Drone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024. The uncropped version carries a mark showing that it is from Airbus DS. The line extending away from the left end of the ship is an annotation that was added to the uncropped version to indicate that this is the dedicated drone carrier. DOD states that China is developing a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31/J-31 fifth-generation stealth fighter, known as the F-35 (Figure 23), to complement or succeed the J-15 on catapultequipped PLA carriers.83 China reportedly is also developing a carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600, that is similar to the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft,84 and stealth drone aircraft.85 83 See 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 55, 61. See also Seong Hyeon Choi and Amber Wang, “China’s J-35 Stealth Fighter to Be Suited Up for Aircraft Carrier Service,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2024; Liu Xuanzun, “China’s New-Type Warplane Tested on Aircraft Carrier Liaoning,” Global Times, September 14, 2024; Yukio Tajima, “China Develops New Stealth Aircraft Likely to Be Deployed on Carriers,” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2024; Amber Wang, “China’s Latest Stealth Fighter Jet ‘J-31B’ Ready for Military Service, CCTV Video Post Suggests,” South China Morning Post, July 6, 2024. 84 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 55. See also, for example, Liu Zhen, “China’s Military Steps Up Development of Ship-Based Warplanes to Keep Up with Aircraft Carrier Advances,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2022; Liu Xuanzun, “China’s First Carrier-Based Early Warning Plane Continues Flight Tests: Report,” Global Times, February 22, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Carrier-Based AEW Plane,” Forbes, August 29, 2020; Liu Xuanzun, “China’s First Carrier-Based, Fixed-Wing Early Warning Aircraft Makes Maiden Flight: Reports,” Global Times, September 1, 2020; Peter Suciu, “The Xian KJ-600 Could Make China’s Aircraft Carriers Far More Powerful,” National Interest, September 5, 2020; Kris Osborn, “KJ-600: China’s New Surveillance Plane Will Make Their Aircraft Carriers Even More Deadly,” National Interest, September 8, 2020. 85 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China Morning Post, September 17, 2019. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Seen With A Fleet Of Drones On Its Deck,” The Drive, June 2, 2022. Congressional Research Service 34 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter Source: Photograph accompanying “China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea,” Military Watch Magazine, August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019. Figure 23. J-35 Carrier-Capable Fighter Source: Photograph accompanying Gordon Arthur, “China Unveils J-35A and Other New Fighters at Zhuhai Airshow,” Defense News, November 13, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to China Military. Congressional Research Service 35 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Surface Combatants Overview China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built surface combatants, including a highly capable new cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), several successive classes of increasingly modern and capable destroyers and frigates, a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missile-armed patrol craft. These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology. DOD states that China’s navy “remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface combatants. As of early 2024, the PLAN is building a new batch of CG [cruisers], DDG [destroyers], and two different classes of guided-missile frigates, including a larger, more capable variant: designated JIANGKAI III ([Type] 054B). These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems.”86 DIA states that “the era of past designs has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China’s technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies.”87 China has also upgraded some of its older surface combatants with new weapons and other equipment.88 Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer China is building a new class of cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), called the Renhaiclass or Type 055 (Figure 24 and Figure 25) that reportedly displaces between 12,000 and 13,000 tons.89 A March 7, 2021, press report by a PRC media outlet states that the ship displaces more than 12,000 tons.90 By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers) displace about 10,100 tons and 9,700 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy’s three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers displace about 15,700 tons. ONI states that Type 055 ships are being built by two shipyards.91 The first Type 055 ship was reportedly commissioned into 86 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53. 87 2019 DIA CMP, p. 70. 88 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Potency Of Anti-Carrier Capabilities,” Forbes, May 1, 2020; Peter Suciu, “Chinese Warships Are Now Armed with Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles,” National Interest, May 10, 2020. 89 One article from a Chinse media outlet, for example, states, “This ship class has a displacement of more than 12,000 tons.” (Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese PLA’s Two Newly Commissioned Large Destroyers ‘Ready for Combat’ with Latest Drills,” Global Times, August 22, 2022.) See also China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s Daily Online, March 10, 2021.) For a discussion of the Type 055 design, see Sidharth Kaushal, “The Type 055: A Glimpse into the PLAN’s Developmental Trajectory,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 19, 2020. 90 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021. 91 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Congressional Research Service 36 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities service in January 2020,92 and the 10th was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) in May 2024.93 Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, “Meet the Type 055 Destroyers Steering China’s Blue-Water Ambitions as Far as Australia,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2025. The article credits the photograph to CCTV. China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 26), which displaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Type 052D ships have been in serial production for some time; a March 12, 2023, press report states that the 27th and the 28th Type 052D ships had been launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of their construction), and that three additional Type 052D ships were under construction at the same shipyard.94 92 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021. See also China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s Daily Online, March 10, 2021; Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Destroyer ‘Lhasa’ 拉萨 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, March 7, 2021; Xavier Vavasseur, “China Commissions A Type 055 DDG, A Type 075 LHD And A Type 094 SSBN In A Single Day,” Naval News, April 24, 2021. 93 Alex Luck, “China Launches 10th Type 055 Vessel, Increases Production At Dagushan,” Naval News, May 28, 2024. 94 Tayfun Ozberk, “China Launches Two More Type 052DL Destroyers In Dalian,” Naval News, March 12, 2023. See also Liu Xuanzun, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers: Media,” Global Times, March 12, 2023; John Hill, “China’s Navy Launches New Destroyers at Dalian Shipyard,” Naval Technology, March 14, 2023. An August 21, 2022, press report (Xavier Vavasseur, “Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China,” Naval News, August 21, 2022) referred to a photograph of five Type 05D ships under construction at a shipyard at Dalian, China. The article stated, “Contacted by Naval News, two Chinese military observers confirmed that there are currently 25 destroyers of the class (13 Type 052D and 12 Type 052DL) currently in service with the PLAN. They will soon be joined by the five under construction at Dalian and (at least) one more being built at the Jiangnan Changxing Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Corporation (the other Chinese shipyard building large surface combatants, located North East of Shanghai).” Congressional Research Service 37 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Joseph Trevithick, “China’s Sudden Live Fire Naval Drills Off Australia Rattle Canberra,” The War Zone, February 21, 2025. The article credits the photograph to “Chinese Navy.” Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Type 052D Luyang-III Class,” SinoDefence.com, September 3, 2017, accessed August 28, 2019. Type 054 Frigate China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 27), which displaces about 4,000 tons. ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service between 2008 and 2019.95 Construction of Type 054 frigates reportedly has shifted to improved 95 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the (continued...) Congressional Research Service 38 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities versions called the Type 054AG and 054B (Figure 28).96 The first Type 054B reportedly was commissioned into service in January 2025.97 Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Steaming Ahead for Training,” China Military Online, March 30, 2025. The photograph is credited to “eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Fang Zhikun.” The ship (hull number 553) is identified as a Type 054A frigate in China Military Online, “Helicopter Engages in Take-Off and Landing Training,” People’s Daily Online, March 7, 2025. Type 056 Corvette China has built a new class of corvettes (i.e., a light frigates, or FFLs) called Jiangdao class or Type 056 ships (Figure 29) that reportedly displace 1,300 tons to 1,500 tons.98 Type 056 ships were built at a high annual rate in four shipyards—the first was commissioned in 2013, and the 72nd and final ship of the type was reportedly commissioned in early 2021, implying an average commisisoning rate of about eight ships per year. DOD states that China’s navy “commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently transferred the early flight Type 056 variants, likely 22 ships total, to the CCG [China Coast committee’s permission. For a press article discussing the potential features of China’s next frigate design beyond the Type 054A, see Rick Joe, “What Will the Chinese Navy’s Next Frigate Look Like?” Diplomat, May 15, 2020. 96 Richard Thomas, “China’s New Type 054B Frigate Exposes US Naval Inertia,” Naval Technology, January 24, 2025; Alex Luck, “China Launches Improved Type 054AG Frigate, More Hulls Coming,” Naval News, August 14, 2024; Liu Zhen, “China’s Navy Starts Open Water Trials for New Type 054B Frigate,” South China Morning Post, January 19, 2024; Minnie Chan, “China Has Launched Bigger, Faster Version of 054A Guided Missile Frigate, Online Photos Suggest,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2023; Alex Luck, “China’s Type 054B Next-Gen Frigate Under Construction?” Naval News, January 30, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Makes Progress on Advanced Warship Bigger than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2023; “China Makes Progress on Advanced Warship Bigger than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,” Pakistan Defence, January 27, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Naval Steel Order Sparks Speculation over Bigger, Faster Frigate,” South China Morning Post, May 7, 2022. 97 Christopher Bodeen, “China’s Navy Commissions New-Generation Frigate as Competition Rises with US and Others,” Associated Press, January 22, 2025; Xinhua, “China’s First Type 054B Frigate Luohe Commissioned,” People’s Daily Online, January 22, 2025. 98 For an overview of the Type 056 corvette, see Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of the First Island Chain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2022. Congressional Research Service 39 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Guard] in 2021, probably due to the early models’ lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array s [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL33153. Public record. Not legal advice.