# Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32521

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** March 12, 2007
- **Citation:** RL32521

## Text

Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness
(name redacted)
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
March 12, 2007

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL32521

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness

Summary
The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly
recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001.
Agroterrorism is a subset of bioterrorism, and is defined as the deliberate introduction of an
animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or
undermining social stability.
The goal of agroterrorism is not to kill cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing
economic damage, social unrest, and loss of confidence in government. Human health could be at
risk if contaminated food reaches the table or if an animal pathogen is transmissible to humans
(zoonotic). While agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first choice because it lacks the “shock
factor” of more traditional terrorist targets, many analysts consider it a viable secondary target.
Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique vulnerabilities. Farms are geographically
disbursed in unsecured environments. Livestock are frequently concentrated in confined
locations, and transported or commingled with other herds. Many agricultural diseases can
be obtained, handled, and distributed easily. International trade in food products often is tied
to disease-free status, which could be jeopardized by an attack. Many veterinarians lack
experience with foreign animal diseases that are eradicated domestically but remain endemic
in foreign countries.
In the past five years, “food defense” has received increasing attention in the counterterrorism
and bioterrorism communities. Laboratory and response capacity are being upgraded to address
the reality of agroterrorism, and national response plans now incorporate agroterrorism.
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and enacted laws and appropriations with
agroterrorism-related provisions. The executive branch has responded by implementing the new
laws, issuing several presidential directives, and creating liaison and coordination offices. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has studied several issues related to agroterrorism.
Appropriations and user fees for agriculture-related homeland security activities in USDA and
DHS have more than tripled from a $225 million “pre-September 11” baseline in FY2002 to $818
million in FY2007. Agriculture now receives about 2.1% of the total non-defense budget
authority for homeland security.
Increasing the level of agroterrorism preparedness remains a concern, as do interagency
coordination and adequate border inspections. The 110th Congress may consider bills or oversight
hearings to address funding and the level of preparedness or coordination to respond to an
agroterrorist attack.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness

Contents
Agriculture as a Target of Terrorism ............................................................................................1
Overview of Agroterrorism ...................................................................................................1
Federal Recognition of Agroterrorism ...................................................................................3
Importance of Agriculture in the United States ......................................................................4
Potential Economic Consequences ........................................................................................8
A Brief History of Agricultural Bioweapons ........................................................................ 11
Congressional Responses .......................................................................................................... 12
Hearings on Agroterrorism.................................................................................................. 12
Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188) ..................................................................... 13
Expanded FDA Authority over Food ............................................................................. 13
Tighter Security for Biological Agents and Toxins......................................................... 15
Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) ................................................................................ 15
Transferring Agricultural Border Inspections ................................................................. 15
Plum Island Animal Disease Center............................................................................... 17
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374).................................................................. 18
GAO Studies....................................................................................................................... 18
Executive Branch Responses..................................................................................................... 20
HSPD-7 (Protecting Critical Infrastructure)......................................................................... 20
HSPD-9 (Defending Agriculture and Food) ......................................................................... 21
National Response Plan (NRP)............................................................................................ 22
Public-Private Partnerships ................................................................................................. 23
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) .............................................................. 23
Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPAA).................................................... 24
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) .......................................................... 24
Laboratories and Research Centers...................................................................................... 25
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) .......................................................... 25
USDA Laboratories....................................................................................................... 27
Laboratory Networks .................................................................................................... 28
DHS Centers of Excellence ........................................................................................... 29
Federal Funding to Respond to Agroterrorism ........................................................................... 29
By Year and Source............................................................................................................. 31
By Agency .......................................................................................................................... 33
By Function for Homeland Security .................................................................................... 35
Chronology of Appropriations ............................................................................................. 37
FY2008 Budget Request ..................................................................................................... 39
FY2008 USDA “Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative” ............................................ 39
FY2008 DHS Budget Initiative ..................................................................................... 40
Possible Pathogens in an Agroterrorist Attack............................................................................ 41
Animal Pathogens ............................................................................................................... 42
OIE List........................................................................................................................ 42
Select Agents List ......................................................................................................... 43
Plant Pathogens................................................................................................................... 44
Countering the Threat ............................................................................................................... 45
Deterrence and Prevention .................................................................................................. 46
Detection and Response ...................................................................................................... 47

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Federal Authorities........................................................................................................ 49
National Veterinary Stockpiles (NVS) ........................................................................... 51
Recovery and Management ................................................................................................. 51
National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS)....................................................... 52
Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 52
Appropriations .................................................................................................................... 52
Legislation .......................................................................................................................... 52
Context from the 109th Congress ................................................................................... 53
USDA Programs to Bolster Preparedness ...................................................................... 54
Responsibilities of DHS ................................................................................................ 54
Inter-agency Coordination............................................................................................. 55
Judicial Issues ............................................................................................................... 57

Figures
Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Agricultural Production......................................................5
Figure 2. Concentration of Cattle Production...............................................................................6
Figure 3. Concentration of Hog Production .................................................................................7
Figure 4. Concentration of Chicken Production ...........................................................................7
Figure 5. Concentration of Corn Production ................................................................................7
Figure 6. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Source .............................................. 33
Figure 7. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Agency ............................................. 35
Figure 8. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Function ........................................... 36

Tables
Table 1. Percent of Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture ................................................ 32
Table 2. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Agency............................................... 34
Table 3. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Function............................................. 36
Table 4. USDA Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative............................................................ 40
Table 5. Livestock Diseases in the Select Agent List.................................................................. 43
Table 6. Plant Diseases in the Select Agent List ......................................................................... 45
Table 7. Bills in the 109th Congress Addressing Agroterrorism................................................... 53

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 57

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Agriculture as a Target of Terrorism
Overview of Agroterrorism
The potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly
recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001. In this
context, agroterrorism is defined as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with
the goal of generating fear over the safety of food, causing economic losses, and/or undermining
social stability. The response to the threat of agroterrorism has come to be called “food defense.”1
An agroterrorist event would usually involve bioterrorism, since likely vectors include pathogens
such as a viruses, bacteria, or fungi. People more generally associate bioterrorism with outbreaks
of human illness (e.g., anthrax or smallpox), rather than diseases affecting animals or plants.
The goal of agroterrorism is not killing cows or plants. These are the means to the end of causing
economic crises in the agricultural and food industries, social unrest, and loss of confidence in
government. Human health could be at risk through contaminated food or if an animal pathogen
is transmissible to humans (zoonotic).
While agriculture may not be a terrorist’s first choice because it lacks the “shock factor” of
more traditional terrorist targets, an increasing number of terrorism analysts consider it a viable
secondary target.2 Agroterrorism could be a low-cost but highly effective means toward an
al-Qaeda goal of destroying the United States’ economy. Evidence that agriculture and food
are potential al Qaeda targets came in 2002 when terrorist hideouts in Afghanistan were
found containing agricultural documents and manuals describing ways to make animal and
plant poisons. 3
Agriculture has several characteristics that pose unique problems:
•

Farms are geographically disbursed in unsecured environments (e.g., open fields
and pastures throughout the countryside). While some livestock are housed in
facilities that can be secured, agriculture generally requires large expanses of
land that are difficult to secure.

•

Livestock frequently are concentrated in confined locations (e.g., feedlots with
thousands of cattle in open-air pens, farms with tens of thousands of pigs, or
barns with hundreds of thousands of poultry) allowing diseases to infect more
animals quickly. Concentration in slaughter, processing also makes large scale
contamination possible.

1
The terms “food defense,” “food safety,” and “food security” refer to different issues. Food defense refers to
protecting the food supply from intentional contamination, that is agroterrorism. Food safety refers to avoiding
accidental contamination by promoting safe food handling practices at processors or at home. Food security refers to
having access to enough food to maintain proper nutrition and an active lifestyle (avoiding starvation).
2
Peter Chalk, “The U.S. Agricultural System: A Target for al-Qaeda?” Terrorism Monitor, March 11, 2005
http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369398.
3
Susan Collins, “Opening Statement” in Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, S.Hrg. 108-491, Nov. 19, 2003, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:91045.wais.pdf.

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•

The number of lethal and contagious biological agents is greater for plants and
animals than for humans. Most of these diseases are environmentally resilient,
endemic in foreign countries, and not harmful to humans—making it easier for
terrorists to acquire, handle, and deploy the pathogens.

•

Live animals, grain, and processed food products are routinely transported and
commingled in the production and processing system. These factors circumvent
natural barriers that could slow pathogenic dissemination.

•

International trade in livestock, grains, and food products is often tied to diseasefree status. The presence (or rumor4) of certain pests or diseases in a country can
quickly stop exports of a commodity, cause domestic consumption to drop,
disrupt commodities markets, and can take months or years to recover.

•

The past success of keeping many diseases out of the U.S. means that many
veterinarians and scientists lack direct experience with foreign diseases. This may
delay recognition of symptoms in case of an outbreak, and the ability to respond
to an outbreak.

Thus, the general susceptibility of the agriculture and food industry to bioterrorism is difficult to
address in a systematic way due to the geographically dispersed, yet industrially concentrated
nature of the industry, and the inherent biology of growing plants and raising animals.
In an attack, the agricultural sector would suffer economically from plant and animal health
losses, and the supply of food and fiber may be reduced. The demand for foods targeted in an
attack may decline (e.g., dairy, beef, pork, poultry, grains, fruit, or vegetables), while demand for
substitute foods may rise.
Economic losses would accrue to individuals, businesses, and governments through costs to
contain and eradicate the disease, and to dispose of contaminated products. More losses
would accumulate as the supply chain is disrupted from farm-to-fork. Domestic markets for
food may drop, and trade restrictions could be imposed on U.S. exports. The economic impact
would range from farmers to input suppliers, food processors, transportation, retailers, and food
service providers.
Significant threats to the currently-held notion of food security could affect our social order. Fear
of food shortages moved further from American psyche as the United States from an agrarian
society to the industrial and information age. Nevertheless, food remains an important element of
everyone’s daily routine and is necessary for survival.

Scope of This Report
This report addresses the use of biological weapons against agriculture, rather than terrorists
using agricultural inputs or equipment in attacks against non-agricultural targets. For example, the
Department of Transportation issued regulations for developing security plans to protect

4

A May 2005 incident in New Zealand over the supposed release of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was declared a
hoax after two weeks of extensive testing and quarantine of Waiheke island http://www.maf.govt.nz/mafnet/press/
operation-waiheke/index.htm. A letter demanded money and changes to tax policies. The response efforts may have
cost the New Zealand government about $716,000 per day (USD).

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dangerous agricultural materials such as fuels, chemicals, and fertilizers against theft.5 Legislation
proposed in 2005-2006 (H.R. 3197, H.R. 1389, and S. 1141, 109th Congress) would have
restricted the handling of ammonium nitrate, an agricultural fertilizer that can be converted into
an explosive. Another example is the concern over misuse of small aircraft, particularly cropdusters, to spread biological weapons.6
This report focuses primarily on biological weapons (rather than chemical weapons) because
biological weapons generally are considered the more potent agroterrorism threat. This report
also focuses more on agricultural production than food processing and distribution, although the
later is discussed.
For more on chemical and biological weapons, see CRS Report RL32391, Small-scale Terrorist
Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary
Comparisons, by (name redacted) and (name redacted); and CRS Report RL31669,
Terrorism:
Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and Options for Lessening Their
Impact, by (name redacted).

Federal Recognition of Agroterrorism
Even before September 11, 2001, and the focus on terrorist threats that ensued, references to
agroterrorism and/or agricultural bioweapons can be found in the government, academia, and the
press. For example, the Gilmore Commission (on terrorism), in its first report to Congress in
1999, noted that
“... a biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form
of assault, which has a high probability of success and which also has the prospect of
obtaining political objectives, such as undermining confidence in the ability of government
or giving the terrorists an improved bargaining position.”7

Senator Roberts from Kansas also raised the awareness of agroterrorism with a hearing of the
Senate Committee on Armed Services in 1999.8
However, as the 20th century ended, agriculture and food production received less attention, or
sometimes was overlooked, in federal counterterrorism and homeland security activities. A
Presidential directive in 1998 on protecting critical infrastructure did not include agriculture and
food. Agriculture was added to this list only in December 2003. Thus, after what many observers
claim to be a slow start after September 11, 2001, agriculture now is garnering more attention in
the expanding field of terrorism studies and policies.

5

Agricultural inputs as defined in 49 CFR 171.8 are included in the security plans required in 49 CFR 172.800.
Security issues and guidelines for agricultural aviation are discussed at http://www.agaviation.org/securitypage.htm.
7
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
(also known as the Gilmore Commission), First Annual Report to the President and Congress: Assessing the Threat,
Dec. 15, 1999, pp. 12-15, at http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel.
8
Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, “The Agricultural Biological Weapons
Threat to the United States,” Oct. 27, 1999 http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/e991027.htm.
6

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Agroterrorism received heightened national attention in December 2004 when then-Secretary of
Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson said in his resignation speech, “For the life of
me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food supply because it is so easy
to do.”9
Congress has held hearings on agroterrorism and, while addressing terrorism more broadly, has
implemented laws and appropriations with provisions important to agriculture. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has studied aspects of food safety, border inspections, interagency
coordination, and physical security with respect to agroterrorism. The executive branch has
responded by implementing the new laws, issuing several presidential directives, creating
terrorism and agroterrorism task forces, and publishing protection and response plans. The law
enforcement community has recognized agroterrorism as a threat, highlighted by FBI and JTTF
(Joint Terrorism Task Force) sponsorship of an annual conference on agroterrorism.10
The 9/11 Commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States) does
not make any direct references to agroterrorism or terrorism on the food supply in its 2004
report.11 However, agriculture obviously would be affected, along with other sectors of the
economy, by some of the commission’s recommendations regarding coordination of intelligence,
information sharing, and first responders. An evaluation of those separate issues, however, is
outside the scope of this report.

Importance of Agriculture in the United States
Agriculture and the food industry are very important to the social, economic, and arguably, the
political stability of the United States. Although farming employs less than 2% of the of the
country’s workforce, 16% of the workforce is involved in the food and fiber sector, ranging from
farmers and input suppliers, to processors, shippers, grocers, and restaurateurs. In 2002, the food
and fiber sector contributed $1.2 trillion, or 11% to the gross domestic product (GDP), even
though the farm sector itself contributed less than 1%.12 Gross farm sales exceeded $200 billion,
and are relatively concentrated throughout the Midwest, parts of the East Coast, and California
(Figure 1). Production is split nearly evenly between crops and livestock. In 2002, livestock
inventories included 95 million cattle, and 60 million hogs. Farm sales of broilers and other meattype chickens exceeded 8.5 billion birds.13

9

New York Times, “U.S. Health Chief, Stepping Down, Issues Warning,” Dec. 4, 2004.
International Symposium on Agroterrorism, http://www.fbi-isa.org.
11
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, July 2004, at
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.
12
USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Outlook tables, Table 1 (Key Statistical Indicators), April 2005, at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/Agoutlook/AOTables.
13
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
10

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Figure 1. Geographic Distribution of Agricultural Production

Source: USDA, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Note: 1 dot = $20 million; United States Total: $200.6 billion.

Agriculture in the U.S. is technologically advanced and efficient. This productivity allows
Americans to spend only about 10% of their disposable income on food (both at home and away
from home). Productivity increases over time have allowed the share of disposable income spent
on food in the U.S. to fall from 23% in 1929 to 10% in 2003. The United States has the lowest
spending on food prepared at home (6.5%) compared to the rest of the world, which ranges from
10%-15% for most developed countries and 30% or higher for some developing countries.14
The U.S. produces and exports a large share the world’s grain. In 2003, the U.S. share of world
production was 42% for corn, 35% for soybeans, and 12% for wheat. Of global exports, the U.S.
accounted for 65% for corn, 40% for soybeans, and 32% for wheat. If export markets were to
decline following an agroterrorism event, U.S. markets could be severely disrupted since 21% of
U.S. agricultural production is exported (10.5% of livestock, and 22% of crops). The U.S.
exported nearly $60 billion of agricultural products (8% of all U.S. exports), and imported $47
billion of agricultural products (4% of all U.S. imports), making agriculture a positive contributor
to the country’s balance of trade. 15

14

USDA Economic Research Service, Food Expenditure Tables, Tables 7 and 97, at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
CPIFoodAndExpenditures/Data, accessed Jan. 18, 2007.
15
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-2005—Agriculture, at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2004pubs/04statab/agricult.pdf.

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The price of land is directly correlated to the productivity and marketability of agricultural
products, and the level of federal farm income support payments. In 2003, farm assets exceeded
$1.3 trillion, with $1.1 trillion in equity.16 Land and other real estate accounts for 80% of those
assets. Of the 938 million acres of farm land in the U.S., 46% are in crop land, 42% are pasture
and range land, and 8% are wood land. 17
Agricultural production in the U.S. is concentrated geographically and on a subset of large farms.
Although the number of farms in the 2002 Census of Agriculture totaled 2.1 million, 75% of the
value of production occurs on just 6.7%, or 143,500, of these farms. This subset of farms has
average sales of $1 million annually, and averages 2,000 acres in size.
Livestock and poultry production are concentrated in different regions of the country, and in large
numbers. Cattle are the least concentrated of the major types of livestock, given the prevalence of
small cow-calf herds throughout the country and pockets of dairy on the West Coast, upper
Midwest, and Northeast. However, beef cattle feedlots are particularly concentrated in a swath
from northern Texas through Kansas, Nebraska, eastern Colorado, and western Iowa. The top five
cattle-producing states (Texas, California, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Nebraska) produce 35% of
U.S. cattle (Figure 2).18
Figure 2. Concentration of Cattle Production

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Note: Cattle production consists of milk and beef cattle.

16

USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Outlook tables, Table 32 (Balance Sheet of the U.S. Farming
Sector), April 2005.
17
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2002 Census of Agriculture, June 2004, at http://www.nass.usda.gov/
census.
18
GAO, Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, GAO05-214, Mar. 8, 2005, pp. 10-11, 70-71.

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Figure 3. Concentration of Hog Production

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Note: Three states did not disclose their information.

Figure 4. Concentration of Chicken Production
Total percentage
of theU.S. chickenproducing states

Chicken:
Top 3chicken-produci ng states

Percentage composition of
U.S. chicken-producing states
Top 3 chickenproduci ng
states

41%

59%

Georgia
Arkansas
Alabama

15
14
12
59

Remaining 45 states
10
0
Percentage

Th e remai nin g 4 5 st ates pro duce 59 %
(e ach produc es 9% o r less).

20

30

40

50

60

40

46
50

Note: Chic ken production consists of broil ersand layers.
Two states did not discl oset heir i nformation.

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Note: Chicken production consists of broilers and layers. Two states did not disclose their information.

Figure 5. Concentration of Corn Production
Corn:
Top 4 corn (ac res)-p
roducing states

Total percentage
of theU.S. corn (acres)producing states

Top 4 cornproducing
states
54%

46%

Percentage composition of
U.S. corn (acres)-p
roducing states

Iow a
Illinois
Nebraska
Minnesota

17
16
11
10

Remaining 45 states
0
10
Percentage
The remaining 45 states produce 46%
(each produces 8% or less).

20

30

Note:Onest atedid not producecorn.

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2002 Census of Agriculture.
Note: One state did not produce corn.

Hog inventories are concentrated in the Midwest, especially Iowa and southern Minnesota, and in
North Carolina. The top three hog-producing states (Iowa, North Carolina, and Minnesota)
produce 53% of U.S. hogs (Figure 3). The production of broilers for poultry meat is concentrated
throughout the Southeast, ranging from the Oklahoma-Arkansas border up to the Delmarva
peninsula (Delaware-Maryland-Virginia). The top three chicken-producing states (Georgia,
Arkansas, and Alabama) produce 41% of U.S. chickens (Figure 4).

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Grain production is concentrated in the Midwest, although other states may contribute significant
shares for particular commodities. The top four corn-producing states (Iowa, Illinois, Nebraska,
and Minnesota) produce 54% of the crop (Figure 5).

Potential Economic Consequences
Economic losses from an agroterrorist incident could be large and widespread.
•

First, losses would include the value of lost production, the cost of destroying
diseased or potentially diseased products, and the cost of containment (drugs,
diagnostics, pesticides, and veterinary services).

•

Second, export markets could be lost if importing countries place restrictions on
U.S. products to prevent possibilities of the disease spreading. Sanitary and
phytosanitary rules in international trade agreements would be important for
maintaining export markets.

•

Third, multiplier effects could ripple through the economy due to decreased sales
by agriculturally dependent businesses (farm input suppliers, food
manufacturing, transportation, retail grocery, and food service). Tourism can be
affected of access to certain destinations within the country is limited or
perceptions of food or personal safety falter.

•

Fourth, federal and state governments could bear significant costs,
including eradication and containment costs, and compensation to producers
for destroyed animals.

Depending on the erosion of consumer confidence and export sales, market prices of the
affected commodities may drop. This would affect producers whose herds or crops were not
directly infected, making the event national in scale even if the disease itself were contained to
a small region.
For food types or product lines that are not contaminated, however, demand may become
stronger, and market prices could rise for those products. Such goods may include substitutes for
the food that was the target of the attack (e.g., chicken instead of beef), or product that can be
certified to originate from outside a contaminated area (e.g., beef from another region of the
country, or imported beef). For example, when Canada announced the discovery of mad cow
disease (BSE, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy) in May 2003, farm-level prices of beef in
Canada dropped by nearly half, while beef prices in the United States remained very strong at
record or near record levels. When a cow with BSE was discovered in the United States in
December 2003, U.S. beef prices fell, but less dramatically than in Canada.19

19

CRS Report RS21709, Mad Cow Disease and U.S. Beef Trade, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

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Consumer confidence in government may also be tested depending on the scale of the eradication
effort and means of destroying animals or crops. The need to slaughter perhaps hundreds of
thousands of cattle (or tens of millions of poultry) could generate public criticism if depopulation
methods are considered inhumane or the destruction of carcasses is questioned environmentally.
For example, during the United Kingdom’s foot-and-mouth (FMD) outbreak in 2001, euthanizing
thousands of cattle and incinerating the carcasses in huge open air pyres provided poignant
television images and difficult public relations situations for the agriculture ministry. Dealing
with these concerns can add to the cost for both government and industry.
Depending on the disease and means of transmission, the potential for economic damage depends
on a number of factors such as the disease agent, location of the attack, rate of transmission,
geographical dispersion, how long it remains undetected, availability of countermeasures or
quarantines, and incident response plans. Potential costs are difficult to estimate and can vary
widely based on compounding assumptions.
Drawing on the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001, Price Waterhouse Coopers
estimated that the economic impact was $1,389 to $4,477 for each of the 2.6 million head of
livestock (cattle, sheep, and hogs) on which indemnities were paid in the U.K. These impacts
exceed the value of the animals because of the number of industries affected by the outbreak,
ranging from feed suppliers to tourism. Applying the loss ratios from the U.K. incident to the
larger U.S. livestock industry, Price Waterhouse Coopers estimates that 7.5 million animals (5.3
million cattle, 1.4 million hogs, and 800,000 sheep) might be destroyed in a similar scale
outbreak in the United States. The resulting economic impact could range from $10.4 billion to
$33.6 billion, using the range of impacts estimated from the U.K.20
A 2002 National Defense University study estimates that a limited outbreak of FMD on just 10
farms could have a $2 billion financial impact.21 A study by the USDA Economic Research
Service (ERS) outlines the wide-ranging implications of a FMD outbreak in the U.S., assigning
probabilities for animal losses but not estimating a dollar loss.22 A 1994 study by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on African swine fever suggested that if the disease
were to become entrenched in the U.S., the 10-year impact would be at least $5.4 billion.23 The
impact in today’s dollars could be much higher.
However, not all assessments agree that the economic consequences of an agroterrorist attack
would be large and widespread. A December 2004 report by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) concludes that the nation’s economic loss from an agroterrorist attack

20

Beth Lautner and Steve Meyer, “U.S. Agriculture in Context: Sector’s Importance to the American Economy and Its
Role in Global Trade,” Conference Proceedings of the [White House] Office of Science and Technology Policy Blue
Ribbon Panel on the Threat of Biological Terrorism Directed Against Livestock, Washington, DC, Dec. 8-9, 2003, at
http://www.rand.org/scitech/stpi/Bioagpanel.
21
Henry S. Parker, Agricultural Bioterrorism: A Federal Strategy to Meet the Threat, McNair Paper 65, National
Defense University, March 2002, at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/McNair/mcnair65/McN_65.pdf.
22
Kenneth H. Mathews and Janet Perry, “The Economic Consequences of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and
Food and Mouth Disease Outbreaks in the United States,” Appendix 6 in Animal Disease Risk Assessment, Prevention
and Control Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-9): Final Report of the P.L. 107-9 Federal Inter-Agency Working Group, January
2003, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/pubs/PL107-9_1-03.pdf.
23
Renlemann and Spinelli, “An Economic Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of African Swine Fever Prevention,”
Animal Health Insight, Spring/Summer 1994.

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“would probably be small, primarily because the food and agriculture industry is
well adapted to the prospect of disruptions from weather, pests, and occasional
health incidents.”24

The CBO report also suggests that the food industry’s experience recalling contaminated lots and
the existence of commodity support programs “to sustain the incomes of some agricultural
producers” might keep economic losses “within the realm of industry experience and current
public plans for detection and response.”25
Such a conclusion likely overstates the capacity of traditional farm commodity programs to
respond to the scale devastation possible in agroterrorism. The purpose of farm commodity
programs is to support farm income when prices and production vary within normal year-to-year
cycles. They were never envisioned to compensate for losses due to agroterrorism or even
widespread pest and disease outbreaks.
The federal farm commodity support programs subsidize about 25 agricultural commodities (such
as corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, and cotton). These supported commodities represent about onethird of gross farm sales. The list of commodities that normally do not receive direct support
includes meats, poultry, fruits, vegetables, nuts, hay, and nursery products. These non-supported
commodities account for about two-thirds of gross farm sales26 and are possibly more likely to be
the targets of an agroterrorist attack.
Thus, the food products more vulnerable to attack (meats, fruits, and vegetables) do not have
existing federal farm income support programs. Food processors or retailers beyond the farm gate
do not receive any commodity support payments. Any federal assistance to producers or
processors stemming from an agroterrorist attack would likely come from the emergency transfer
authority available to the Secretary of Agriculture27 (for producers) and through supplemental
emergency appropriations enacted by Congress (for producers, and possibly processors). Making
disaster payments to individuals who do not normally receive commodity payments is technically
more difficult than supplementing regular program payments.
In the end, despite the CBO suggestion that the economic effects of agroterrorism might fall
within the realm of normal experience, numerous federal agencies, state agencies, and private
corporations continue to prepare for agroterrorism based on the assumption that an attack could
exceed the typical experience with naturally or accidentally occurring outbreaks.

24

Congressional Budget Office, Homeland Security and the Private Sector, December 2004, p. 41, at
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6042&sequence=0&from=7.
25
Ibid.
26
CRS Report RL34594, Farm Commodity Programs in the 2008 Farm Bill, by (name redacted).
27
For pest and disease emergencies, the Secretary of Agriculture has long-standing authority to transfer money from
the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, both for eradication and
control and indemnities to producers (7 U.S.C. 7772, and 7 U.S.C. 8316). Between $168 million and $378 million per
year has been transferred for 10 or more natural or accidental pest and disease outbreaks in recent years. See CRS
Report RL32504, Funding Plant and Animal Health Emergencies: Transfers from the Commodity Credit Corporation,
by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

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A Brief History of Agricultural Bioweapons
Attacks against agricultural production are not new, and have been conducted both by nationstates and by substate organizations throughout history.28 At least nine countries had documented
agricultural bioweapons programs during some part of the 20th century (Canada, France,
Germany, Iraq, Japan, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and the former USSR). Four
other countries are believed to have or have had agricultural bioweapons programs (Egypt, North
Korea, Rhodesia, and Syria).29
Despite extensive research on the issue, however, biological weapons have been used rarely
against crops or livestock, especially by state actors. Examples of state actors using biological
weapons against agriculture include Germany’s use of glanders against Allied horses and mules in
World War I, the alleged use of anthrax and rinderpest by Japan in World War II, and the alleged
use of glanders by Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s.30 Thus, in recent decades, using
biological weapons against agricultural targets has remained mostly a theoretical consideration.
With the ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972, many countries,
including the United States, stopped military development of biological weapons and destroyed
their stockpiles.
Although individuals or substate groups have used bioweapons against agricultural or food
targets, only a few can be considered terrorist in nature. In 1952, the Mau Mau (an insurgent
organization in Kenya) killed 33 head of cattle at a mission station using African milk bush (a
local plant toxin). In 1984, the Rajneeshee cult spread salmonella in salad bars at Oregon
restaurants to influence a local election. 31
Chemical weapons have been used somewhat more commonly against agricultural targets. During
the Vietnam War, the U.S. used agent orange to destroy foliage, affecting some crops. Among
possible terrorist events, chemical attacks against agricultural targets include a 1997 attack by
Israeli settlers who sprayed pesticides on grapevines in two Palestinian villages, destroying up to
17,000 metric tons of grapes. In 1978, the Arab Revolutionary Council poisoned Israeli oranges
with mercury, injuring at least 12 people and reducing orange exports by 40%.32

28

This report considers only “modern” instances of directing weapons against agriculture and food. However, such
attacks can be cited for centuries prior to 1900, usually on a much smaller scale than generally conceived today.
29
Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Agro-terrorism,” at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/agromain.htm;
University of Minnesota Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP), “Overview of Agricultural
Biosecurity,” at http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/biosecurity/ag-biosec/biofacts/agbiooview.html; and Peter
Chalk, RAND National Defense Research Institute, “Hitting America’s Soft Underbelly: The Potential Threat of
Deliberate Biological Attacks Against U.S. Agricultural and Food Industry,” 2004, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
monographs/2004/RAND_MG135.pdf.
30
Monterey Institute of International Studies; and Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy.
31
Peter Chalk (2004), p. 29.
32
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP).

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Congressional Responses
Hearings on Agroterrorism
From 1999 to 2006, Congress has held five hearings entirely devoted to agroterrorism or
agricultural biosecurity, four in the Senate and one in the House, each by a different committee
or subcommittee.
The first Congressional hearing on agroterrorism was in October 1999, called by Senator Pat
Roberts of the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats in the Senate Committee on Armed Services.
The hearing was titled, “The Agricultural Biological Weapons Threat to the United States,” and
had both closed and open sessions with different witnesses.33
Four years later, on November 19, 2003, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs held an
open hearing titled, “Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket,” including witnesses
from the Administration, state governments, and a private think tank. 34 During the four years
between these two hearings when the specter of terrorism was raised after September 11, 2001, a
few individual panelists at more general hearings on food safety, homeland security, or terrorism
discussed agroterrorism.35
In May 2005, a subcommittee of the House Homeland Security Committee held a hearing titled,
“Evaluating the Threat of Agro-Terrorism.”36 Both an open session and a closed session were held
with the same two witnesses.
Two months later, in July 2005, the Senate Agriculture Committee held a hearing titled, “Biosecurity and Agro-Terrorism.”37 Eight panelists from government, law enforcement, academia,
and industry discussed vulnerabilities and preparedness efforts.
In January 2006, the Senate Agriculture Committee’s Subcommittee on Research,
Nutrition, and General Legislation held a field hearing in Pennsylvania titled “BioSecurity
Coordination.”38 Ten panelists from government, academia, and industry discussed preparedness
and coordination issues.
33

Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, “The Agricultural Biological Weapons
Treat to the United States,” Oct. 27, 1999 http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/1999/e991027.htm.
34
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket, S.Hrg. 108-491,
Nov. 19, 2003, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:91045.wais.pdf.
35
For example, testimony by Peter Chalk, RAND, “Terrorism, Infrastructure Protection, and the U.S. Food and
Agriculture Sector” at the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management,
Restructuring, and the District of Columbia hearing on “Federal Food Safety and Security,” Oct. 10, 2001
http://www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT184/CT184.pdf.
36
House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment, “Evaluating the Threat of Agro-Terrorism,” Serial 109-16, May 25, 2005 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.128&filename=23605.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_house_hearings.
37
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, To Review Biosecurity Preparedness and Efforts to
Address Agroterrorism Threats, S.Hrg. 109-457, July 20, 2005, http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/
109hrg/22648.pdf.
38
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General
(continued...)

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Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188)
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (P.L. 107-188,
June 12, 2002) was enacted in response to vulnerabilities identified following September 11,
2001. Among many provisions affecting public health and general preparedness, the act
contained several provisions important to agriculture. These provisions accomplish the following:
•

Expand Food and Drug Administration (FDA) authority over food manufacturing
and imports (particularly in sections 303-307).

•

Tighten control of biological agents and toxins (“select agents” in sections 211213, the “Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002”) under rules by the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.

•

Authorize expanded agricultural security activities and security upgrades at
USDA facilities (sections 331-335).

•

Address criminal penalties for terrorism against animal enterprises (section 336)
and violation of the select agent rules (section 231).

Expanded FDA Authority over Food
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act responded to long-standing concerns about whether the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had the
authority to assure food safety. FDA was instructed to implement new rules for (1) registration of
food processors, (2) prior notice of food imports, (3) administrative detention of imports, and (4)
record-keeping. 39 Proposed rules began being issued in early 2003; the final set of rules was
published in December 2004.40

Registration of Food Processors
The act required FDA to establish a one-time registration system for any domestic or foreign
facility that manufactures, processes, packs, and handles food. All food facilities supplying food
for the United States were required to register with the FDA by December 12, 2003 (21 CFR
1.225 to 1.243). Registering involved providing information about the food products (brand
names and general food categories), facility addresses, and contact information. Restaurants,
certain retail stores, farms, non-profit food and feeding establishments, fishing vessels, and trucks
and other motor carriers were exempt from registration requirements. However, many farms had a
difficult time determining whether they needed to register based on the amount of handling or
processing they performed.

(...continued)
Legislation, Bio-Security Coordination, S. Hrg. 109-619, Jan. 9, 2006 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30234.pdf.
39
For greater detail about these rules, please see CRS Report RL31853, Food Safety Issues in the 109th Congress, by
(name redacted).
40
FDA, “FDA Actions on New Bioterrorism Legislation,” at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/fsbtact.html.

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Registration documents are protected from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). The registry provides, for the first time, a complete list of companies subject to FDA
authority, and will enhance the agency’s capability to trace contaminated food. Critics argued that
registration created a record keeping burden without proof that facilities will be able to respond in
an emergency.

Prior Notice of Imports
As of December 12, 2003, importers are required to give advance notice to FDA prior to
importing food (21 CFR 1.276 to 1.285). Electronic notice must be provided by the importer
within a specified period prior to arrival at the border (within two hours by road, four hours by
air or rail, and eight hours by water). With prior notice, FDA can assess whether a shipment
meets criteria that can trigger an inspection. If notice is not given, the food will be refused entry
and held at the port or in secure storage. Some critics are concerned that the administrative cost of
compliance may raise the price of food. Others have argued that perishable imports are subject to
increased spoilage if delays arise, or that certain perishables (especially from Mexico) are
not harvested or loaded onto trucks before the two-hour notification period. However,
implementation of the new system generally has not caused delays and most shippers have
been accommodated.
To facilitate compliance, FDA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) integrated their information systems to allow food
importers to provide the required information using CBP’s existing system for imports. In
December 2003, the two agencies agreed to allow CBP officers to inspect imported foods on
FDA’s behalf, particularly at ports where FDA has no inspectors.

Administrative Detention
Upon enactment of the act, FDA obtained the authority to detain food imports under certain
conditions. FDA procedures for making detention were issued on June 4, 2004 (21 CFR 1.377 to
1.406). To use the authority, the agency must show credible evidence that a shipment presents a
serious health threat. Food may be detained for 20 days and up to 30 days, if necessary. The
owners must pay the expense of moving any detained food to secure storage. Perishable foods
(e.g., fruits, vegetables, and seafood) are to receive expedited review.

Maintenance of Records
FDA published a proposed rule for record-keeping on May 9, 2003, and issued a corrected final
rule on February 23, 2005 (21 CFR 1.363 to 1.368). People or companies that manufacture,
process, pack, transport, distribute, receive, hold, or import food (with the exception of farms,
restaurants and certain others) must establish and maintain records for up to two years. In the
event of a suspected food safety problem, the regulation provides FDA access to records
including the facility’s immediate supplier, and the immediate customer. Companies can keep the
information in any form and use existing records.
The rule limits access to records that may contain trade secrets and prevent disclosure of such
confidential information if records are reviewed. FDA is allowed to reduce the record-keeping
requirements for small businesses and to exempt farms, restaurants, and fishing vessels not
engaged in processing.

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Tighter Security for Biological Agents and Toxins
In December 2002, the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) issued
regulations to reduce the threat that certain biological agents and toxins could be used in domestic
or international terrorism. APHIS determined that the “select agents” on the list have the potential
to pose a severe threat to agricultural production or food products.
The select agent regulations (9 CFR 121 for animals, 7 CFR 331 for plants) establish the
requirements for possession, use, and transfer of the listed pathogens. The rules affect many
research institutions including federal, state, university, and private laboratories, as well as firms
that transport such materials. The laboratories have had to assess security vulnerabilities and
upgrade physical security, often without additional financial resources. Some have been
concerned that certain research programs may be discontinued or avoided because of regulatory
difficulties in handling the select agents.
Extensive registration and background checks of both facilities and personnel were to be
conducted in 2003. However, due to delays at the FBI in processing security clearance
paperwork, provisional registrations were issued to laboratories that had submitted paperwork
by established deadlines.

Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296)
The main purpose of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296, November 25, 2002) was
to create the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), primarily by transferring parts or all of
many agencies throughout the federal government into the new cabinet-level department. In
doing so, the law made two major changes to the facilities and functions of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture. The Homeland Security Act transferred:
•

personnel and responsibility for agricultural border inspections from USDA to
DHS (specifically, from the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) to DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP)), and

•

possession of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York from USDA
to DHS.

Transferring Agricultural Border Inspections
Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 APHIS
border inspection personnel to DHS. As of March 1, 2003, approximately 2,680 APHIS
inspectors became employees of DHS in the Bureau of Customs and Border Inspection
(CBP). Because of its scientific expertise, USDA retains a significant presence in border
inspection, as described below.
Historically, the APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program was considered the
most significant and prominent of agricultural and food inspections at the border. Because of this
prominence, AQI was one of the many programs selected for inclusion when DHS was created.
Some drafts of the bill creating the new department would have transferred all of APHIS
(including, for example, animal welfare and disease eradication) to DHS. Concerns from many
farm interest groups about the impact this might have on diagnosis and treatment of naturally

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occurring plant and animal diseases prompted a legislative compromise that transferred only the
border inspection function and left other activities under USDA.
DHS-CBP personnel now inspect international conveyances and the baggage of passengers for
plant, animal, and related products that could harbor pests or disease organisms. They also inspect
ship and air cargo, rail and truck freight, and package mail from foreign countries.
Although the border inspection functions were transferred to DHS, the USDA retains a significant
presence in border activities. APHIS employees who were not transferred continue to pre-clear
certain commodities, inspect all plant propagative materials, and check animals in quarantine.
APHIS personnel continue to set agricultural inspection policies to be carried out by DHS border
inspectors, and negotiate memoranda of understanding to assure that necessary inspections are
conducted. APHIS manages the data collected during the inspections process, and monitors
smuggling and trade compliance. USDA is also statutorily charged in section 421(e)(2)(A) of P.L.
107-296 to “supervise” the training of CBP inspectors in consultation with DHS.
This separation of duties is designed to allow for consolidated border inspections for
intelligence and security goals, but preserve USDA’s expertise and historical mission to set
agricultural import policies.

Adding Agriculture Specialists
Under the CBP cross-training initiative in 2003 (also known as “One Face at the Border”), CBP
inspectors from the former customs, immigration, and agriculture agencies were to be trained to
perform inspections in all three areas equally, without specialization,—customs, immigration, and
agriculture. However, due to criticism from USDA, inspection unions, and the agricultural
industry, DHS created another class of inspectors called “agriculture specialists.” Agriculture
specialists work mainly in secondary inspection stations in passenger terminals and are deployed
at cargo terminals. The cadre of agriculture specialists include former APHIS inspectors who
decided not to convert to CBP generalist inspectors plus new graduates from the agricultural
specialist training program.
Before DHS was created, APHIS trained its inspectors in a nine-week course that had science
prerequisites. The initial DHS cross-training program announced in 2003 had only 12-16 hours
for agriculture in a 71-day course covering customs, immigration, and agriculture. This difference
in training was one of the reasons DHS was forced to add the agricultural specialist position.
DHS now has an eight-week (43-day) training program for agriculture specialists. The course is
taught by CBP and APHIS instructors at a USDA training facility in Frederick, Maryland.
Agriculture specialists also receive two weeks of law enforcement training, and can exercise law
enforcement authority similar to regular CBP officers. However, CBP does not necessarily allow
agriculture specialists to use the full extent of their law enforcement powers.41 The first class of
agriculture specialists graduated in July 2004.

41

Agriculture specialists do not carry firearms like regular CBP officers. CBP is still deciding whether agriculture
specialists will carry mace, batons, or firearms.

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Regular CBP officers receive about 12-16 hours of agricultural training during their multi-week
program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Georgia. The agriculture
module was developed by APHIS and provided to DHS.
Although DHS is training new agriculture specialists, the future size of the agricultural specialist
corps is not certain, given the eventual attrition of former APHIS inspectors. Also, details are not
available as to how these inspectors will be deployed and how many ports of entry will be staffed
with agriculture specialists (compared with the APHIS deployment prior to DHS). Without
agriculture specialists, primary agricultural inspections—the first line of defense for agricultural
security—may be conducted by cross-trained inspectors with limited agricultural training.
Congressional agriculture committees have been concerned about whether enough attention will
be devoted to agricultural inspections by DHS, and whether the United States will be as safe from
the introduction of foreign pests as it was under the previous inspection system. Inspection
statistics from the fall of 2003 indicate that 32% fewer insect infestations were found (under
DHS) than in the previous year (under APHIS). APHIS officials cite unfilled agricultural
inspector positions and difficulty in adequately cross-training former customs and immigration
officers to conduct agricultural inspections. 42
The FY2007 DHS appropriations act supports the cross-training initiative under One Face at the
Border (H.Rept. 109-699):
The conferees recognize the benefits of cross-training legacy customs, immigration, and
agricultural inspection officers as part of CBP’s ‘One Face at the Border Initiative’ and direct
CBP to ensure that all personnel assigned to primary and secondary inspection duties at ports
of entry have received adequate training in all relevant inspection functions.

A report by the Government Accountability Office in May 2006 found that only 21% of
agricultural specialists always receive urgent alerts for agricultural inspection priorities in a
timely manner. Moreover the number of canine units (inspection dogs, “beagle brigade”) has
declined from 140 to 80 since the transfer to DHS, and 60% of 43 canine teams that were tested
failed a proficiency test. In a follow-up memorandum, the GAO analyzed a survey of morale
among agricultural specialists and found many more negative responses than positive comments.
(See “GAO Studies,” below.)
For more information about inspection statistics and the new border inspection arrangement that
combines the previously separate customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections, please see
CRS Report RL32399, Border Security: Inspections Practices, Policies, and Issues.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center
Section 310 of the Homeland Security Act transferred the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to
DHS. Prior to June 1, 2003, Plum Island was a USDA facility jointly operated by APHIS and
ARS (Agricultural Research Service). This transfer includes only the property and facilities of
Plum Island; both APHIS and ARS personnel continue to perform research and diagnostic work at
the facility, but DHS also may conduct other research at the facility as well.

42

Chicago Sun Times, “Short-Staffed Port Inspectors Missing Insect-Infested Food,” Aug. 6, 2004.

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Plum Island and DHS’s plans for a new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility are discussed
later in this report under “Laboratories and Research Centers.”

Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374)
The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374, Nov. 27, 2006) was enacted to expand
criminal consequences for damaging or interfering with the operations of an animal enterprise.
The Bioterrorism Preparedness Act (P.L. 107-188, Sec. 336) contained less extensive penalties for
animal enterprise terrorism.
P.L. 109-374 prescribes penalties and restitution in Title 18 of the U.S. Code for varying levels of
economic damage and personal injury involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage,
criminal trespass, harassment, or intimidation. The act covers enterprises that use, sell, or raise
animals (or animal products) for profit or educational purposes. With this broad definition, the
law applies to both bioterrorism (from foreign sources) and eco-terrorism (from domestic animal
rights activist groups).

GAO Studies
Since 2002, six reports from GAO have found gaps in federal controls for protecting agriculture
and food. Findings from the first four reports are summarized in testimony for the Senate hearing
on agroterrorism on November 19, 2003.43
In the first report, following the European outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 2001, a 2002
GAO study found insufficient guidance for border inspectors and an overwhelming volume of
passengers and cargo for inspectors to process.44
Regarding prevention of BSE (“mad cow disease”), a 2002 GAO report found shortcomings in
documentation for imports and enforcement of federal feed ingredient bans.45
A 2003 GAO study on security improvements at food processing companies found that federal
agencies, particularly the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), did not have authority to impose
requirements or assess security flaws.46
Regarding livestock disease research at USDA’s Plum Island lab in New York, a 2003 GAO
report47 found that people without adequate background checks had access to secure areas, and
that security personnel on the island had limited authority. In response to GAO’s security
concerns about Plum Island, DHS announced that armed Federal Protective Service personnel
would supplement security on the island beginning in June 2004.
43

GAO, Bioterrorism: A Threat to Agriculture and the Food Supply, GAO-04-259T, Nov. 19, 2003.

44

GAO, Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues,
GAO-02-808, July 26, 2002.
45
GAO, Mad Cow Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas Would Strengthen U.S.
Prevention Efforts, GAO-02-183, Jan. 25, 2002.
46
GAO, Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, But Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess
Their Implementation, GAO-03-342, Feb. 14, 2003.
47
GAO, Combating Bioterrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Security at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, GAO(continued...)

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A 2005 GAO report summarized the issues of agroterrorism and what federal agencies are doing
to prepare.48 It found numerous vulnerability assessments and working groups had been prepared
to prioritize and oversee activities. Efforts at interagency coordination were also underway, but
some were seen to be in the early stages with more coordination necessary. The report also cited a
lack of veterinarians trained in foreign animal diseases and response capacity, lack of rapid
diagnostic tools, and lack of rapid vaccine deployment and protocols.
In the conference agreement for the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447,
H.Rept. 108-792), conferees expressed concern over agricultural border inspections and research
at Plum Island following the transfer of these activities in 2003 from USDA to DHS. They
requested a GAO report on interagency coordination between USDA and DHS regarding
agriculture inspections.
The conferees are aware of ongoing concerns within the agriculture sector that the transfer of
these responsibilities [border inspection and research] may shift the focus away from
agriculture to other priority areas of DHS. In order to ensure that the interests of U.S.
agriculture are protected ... the conferees request the Government Accountability Office to
provide a report ... on the coordination between USDA and DHS (H.Rept. 108-792).

Accomplishments in interagency coordination that GAO cited in the 2006 report49 include
training of both agricultural specialists and cross-training of regular border protection officers.
Agriculture specialists now have access to classified data systems, allowing better targeting of
agriculture inspections. DHS also created “agriculture liaisons” in district field offices to assure
agriculture issues are heard, and improve operations at ports of entry.
However, problems in coordination or inspection performance were cited in several areas. DHS
had not developed performance measures for agriculture inspections, but was still using USDAAPHIS measures which did not reflect all DHS activities. Staffing and related staffing
performance measures were also lacking. Agriculture specialists are not always notified of urgent
inspection alerts issued by APHIS; a survey suggests only 21% of agriculture specialists always
receive alerts in a timely manner. The number of canine units (inspection dogs, “beagle brigade”)
has declined from 140 to 80 since the transfer to DHS, and 60% of 43 canine teams that were
tested failed an APHIS proficiency test. Several financial management issues also were
problematic. While user fees were less than program costs, DHS was unable to provide APHIS
with information of actual costs by type of activity, and USDA was sometimes slow to transfer
user fees to DHS.

(...continued)
03-847, Sept. 19, 2003.
48
GAO, Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain, GAO05-214, Mar. 8, 2005.
49
GAO, Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and
Disease, GAO-06-644, May 19, 2006.

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In a follow-up memorandum, GAO analyzed a the open-ended questions in survey of morale
among agricultural specialists.50 GAO found many more negative responses than positive
comments. About 60% of agricultural specialists surveyed thought they were doing fewer
inspections than before the transfer to DHS, and 29% were concerned that the agricultural
mission is declining. An estimated 64% thought their DHS managers did not respect their work,
and 29% expressed concern about working relationships with non-agriculture inspectors.

Executive Branch Responses
Shortly after September 11, 2001, USDA created a Homeland Security Staff in the Office of the
Secretary to develop a department-wide plan to coordinate agroterrorism preparedness plans
among all USDA agencies and offices. Efforts have been focused on three areas: food supply and
agricultural production, USDA facilities, and USDA staff and emergency preparedness.51 The
Homeland Security Staff also has become the department’s liaison with Congress, the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), and other governmental agencies on terrorism issues.
The White House’s National Security Council weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness
group, formed by Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) in 1998, included agriculture,
especially in terms of combating terrorism. Many observers note that, as a latecomer to the
national security table, USDA has been invariably overshadowed by other agencies.
In addition to the following Presidential directives and actions, many departments and agencies in
the executive branch have undertaken efforts to improve preparedness for agroterrorism. Many of
these actions are discussed later in this report under “Countering the Threat.”

HSPD-7 (Protecting Critical Infrastructure)
In terms of protecting critical infrastructure, agriculture was added to the list in December 2003
by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), “Critical Infrastructure Identification,
Prioritization, and Protection.”52 This directive replaces the 1998 Presidential Decision Directive
63 (PDD-63) that omitted agriculture and food. Both of these critical infrastructure directives
designate the physical systems that are vulnerable to terrorist attack and are essential for the
minimal operation of the economy and the government.
These directives instruct agencies to develop plans to prepare for and counter the terrorist
threat. HSPD-7 mentions the following industries: agriculture and food; banking and finance;
transportation (air, sea, and land, including mass transit, rail, and pipelines); energy (electricity,
oil, and gas); telecommunications; public health; emergency services; drinking water; and
water treatment.

50

GAO, Homeland Security: Agriculture Specialists’ Views of Their Work Experiences After Transfer to DHS, GAO07-209R, Nov. 14, 2006.
51
USDA Homeland Security Staff, “Homeland Security Efforts,” May 2004, at http://www.usda.gov/
homelandsecurity/factsheet0504.pdf; and National Research Council, Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism, 2003,
p. 150.
52
HSPD-7: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-5.html.

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HSPD-9 (Defending Agriculture and Food)
More significant recognition came on January 30, 2004, when the White House released
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), “Defense of United States Agriculture and
Food.”53 This directive establishes a national policy to protect against terrorist attacks on
agriculture and food systems.
HSPD-9 generally instructs the Secretaries of Homeland Security (DHS), Agriculture (USDA),
and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate their
efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from an agroterrorist attack. In
some cases, one department is assigned primary responsibility, particularly when the intelligence
community is involved. In other cases, only USDA, HHS, and/or EPA are involved regarding
industry or scientific expertise.
The directive instructs agencies to develop awareness and warning systems to monitor plant
and animal diseases, food quality, and public health through an integrated diagnostic system.
Animal and commodity tracking systems are included, as is gathering and analyzing international
intelligence. Vulnerability assessments throughout the sector help prioritize mitigation
strategies at critical stages of production or processing, including inspection of imported
agricultural products.
Response and recovery plans are to be coordinated across the federal, state, and local levels. A
National Veterinary Stockpiles (NVS) of vaccine, antiviral, and therapeutic products is to be
developed for deployment within 24 hours of an attack. A National Plant Disease Recovery
System (NPDRS) is to develop disease and pest resistant varieties within one growing season of
an attack in order to resume production of certain crops. The Secretary of Agriculture is to make
recommendations for risk management tools to encourage self-protection for agriculture and food
enterprises vulnerable to losses from terrorism.
HSPD-9 encourages USDA and HHS to promote higher education programs that specifically
address the protection of animal, plant, and public health. It suggests capacity-building grants for
universities, and internships, fellowships and post-graduate opportunities. HSPD-9 also formally
incorporates USDA and agriculture into the ongoing DHS research program of university-based
“centers of excellence.”
As a presidential directive, HSPD-9 addresses the internal management of the executive branch
and does not create enforceable laws. Moreover, it is subject to change without Congressional
consent. While Congress has oversight authority of federal agencies and may ask questions about
implementation of the directive, a public law outlining an agroterrorism preparedness plan would
establish the statutory parameters for such a plan, and, as a practical matter, might result in
enhanced oversight by specifically identifying executive branch entities responsible for carrying
out particular components of such a plan.54

53

HSPD-9: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2.html.
For a related discussion on the role of Congress with respect to executive actions, see CRS Report RS20846,
Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation.
54

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In implementing HSPD-9, the USDA Homeland Security Staff and other agencies are drawing
upon HSPD-5 (regarding the national response plan) and HSPD-8 (regarding preparedness).
Implementing many of the HSPD-9 directives depends on the executive branch having sufficient
appropriations for those activities.

National Response Plan (NRP)
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) called for a National Response Plan (NRP)
to coordinate federal bureaucracies, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and
all-hazards approach to manage domestic incidents, both for terrorism and natural disasters. The
National Response Plan, developed by DHS, was unveiled in December 2004.55
The NRP addresses agriculture and food in two annexes at the end of the plan. The first is in
terms of emergency support. The Emergency Support Function (ESF) annexes to the NRP seek to
coordinate federal interagency support by describing the roles and responsibilities of departments
and agencies. USDA is the coordinator and primary responding agency for ESF #11, the
“Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex,” which addresses:
•

Provision of nutrition assistance by determining nutrition assistance needs in
disaster areas, obtaining appropriate food supplies, arranging for delivery of the
supplies, and authorizing disaster food stamps,

•

Control and eradication of animal and plant pests and diseases,

•

Assurance of food safety and food security, including food safety inspection at
processing plants, distribution, retail sites, and ports of entry; laboratory analysis
of food samples; food borne disease surveillance; and field investigations, and

•

Protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties.

The NRP also contains “incident annexes” that more specifically address hazard situations
requiring special attention. The incident annexes describe the overarching policies, situations,
general operating procedures, and responsibilities most relevant when responding to a particular
type of incident.
The 10-page “Food and Agriculture Incident Annex”56 was first published in July 2006, about
18 months after the NRP was first released. The annex identifies roles for federal involvement,
particularly when first responders at the state and local levels are overwhelmed by multiple
incidents, for example. It establishes USDA and HHS as the primary agencies for coordination
and notification when incidents and outbreaks affect food and agriculture, but law enforcement
agencies are to be notified immediately through the FBI if the incident appears to be intentional.
HHS is the coordinating agency for food inspected by the FDA beyond the farm gate (all
domestic and imported food except meat, poultry and egg products), animal feed, and animal
drugs. USDA is the coordinating agency for food inspected by the Food Safety Inspection Service
(FSIS) such as processed meat, poultry and egg products, and for coordinating the response to
55

Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, December 2004, updated 2006 http://www.dhs.gov/nrp.
Department of Homeland Security, “Food and Agriculture Incident Annex” to the National Response Plan, July 17,
2006 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nrp_foodagincidentannex.pdf
56

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animal and plant diseases and pests. EPA is identified in the annex to provide expedited assistance
for approving particular types of pesticide applications, and to provide technical assistance for
decontamination and disposal efforts. DHS appears to be involved to the extent that other parts of
the NRP are activated by the agriculture and food incident, especially when law enforcement,
investigative, or border inspection activities are involved.
The annex mentions the importance of laboratory networks for detection, diagnosis, confirmation,
and investigation of an incident, particularly through the DHS Integrated Consortium of
Laboratory Networks (ICLN). The “capacity of the ICLN derives from ... established laboratory
networks such as Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), the Laboratory Response
Network (LRN), the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and the National
Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN).” Each of these networks, discussed later in this section, feeds
its industry- and sector-specific information into the general homeland security network for
analysis and data sharing.
Specific response plans below the level of the NRP annex rest with USDA, HHS, and state and
local governments.

Public-Private Partnerships
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan was developed to unify and enhance the protection of
critical infrastructure through public-private partnerships. It provides a coordinated approach to
establish national priorities and goals. The sector partnership model encourages formation of
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) and Government Coordinating Councils (GCCs). DHS
provides guidance, tools, and support so that these groups can work together to develop and
coordinate a wide range of infrastructure protection activities. 57
Sector Coordinating Councils are self-organized, self-run, and self-governed organizations of
key stakeholders within a sector, serving as the government’s principal point of entry into each
sector. A Government Coordinating Council is the government counterpart to a SCC, comprised
of federal, state and local representatives, enabling coordinating across government agencies
and jurisdictions.
The Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council (FASCC) has seven sub-councils with
representatives from private corporations and associations, including:58
•

Agricultural production inputs and services

•

Animal producers

•

Plant producers

•

Processors and manufacturers

57
Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Draft 2.0, January 2006,
http://www.ni2ciel.org/NIPC/Revised-Draft-NIPP-v2.0.pdf.
58
Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council, http://cipp.gmu.edu/psprograms/FoodAgSCC.php.

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•

Restaurants and food service

•

Retail

•

Warehousing and logistics

The agriculture SCC has been successful among the early SCC’s, and is used by DHS as a model
for developing other sector councils. The FASCC’s recent accomplishments include reviewing
and commenting on drafts of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, developing a Food and
Agriculture Sector Specific Plan (SSP), sharing best practices, identifying gaps in security or
preparedness, and striving to improve communications and information sharing capabilities
among companies and government.

Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPAA)
The Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism initiative is another public-private partnership
to assess vulnerabilities in the agriculture and food industry. Four government agencies including
DHS, USDA, FDA, and FBI collaborate with private industry and states to conduct site surveys
of specific private industries within the agriculture industry.59 The intent is to:
•

Determine critical points in the food and agriculture system that may be the target
of a terrorist attack,

•

Identify early indicators and warnings that would signify planning and/or
preparation for an attack,

•

Develop a focus for intelligence collection strategies around these indicators and
warnings, and

•

Develop mitigation strategies for early detection, deterrence, disruption,
interdiction, and prevention.

In 2005, the SPPA began working with the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council and
the Government Coordinating Council to identify about 50 sites to visit in 2006-2007. The sites
are to span the entire food production cycle.

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
An Information Sharing and Analysis Center is an industry contact point to federal law
enforcement and intelligence community (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency). The objective to detect potential threats,
assess, prevent attacks, and investigate and respond to attacks against critical infrastructure.

59

Food and Drug Administration, “Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA) Initiative,” August 2005,
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/agroterr.html.

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The Food and Agriculture ISAC was created in February 2002. Members generate information on
many of food safety and bio-security related topics such as security threats, food system
vulnerabilities, product contamination, microbial isolates, and reports of consumer illness from
food. The information is shared confidentially with the law enforcement and intelligence
community, with the expectation that relevant intelligence will returned to the industry.60
The ISAC network is similar to an FBI program for public-private information sharing called
Infragard. In 2005, a new FBI program called AgGard was created to encourage members of the
agricultural community to use a secure internet connection to share information and alert each
other, state and local law enforcement, and the FBI of suspicious activity.

Laboratories and Research Centers
Since September 11, 2001, and the ensuing recognition of agroterrorism as a threat to critical
infrastructure, the United States has expanded its agricultural laboratory and diagnostic
infrastructure. New federal laboratories have been completed, existing facilities have been
upgraded, and networks of federal, state and university laboratories have been created to share
information and process samples.

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)
The Department of Homeland Security is proceeding with plans to replace the aging Plum Island
Animal Disease Center with a new “National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility” for research on
high consequence foreign animal diseases. Congress has appropriated funds for planning and site
selection. DHS is beginning the conceptual design process, and has reviewed submissions from
universities and other locations interested in hosting the new facility. 61 In August 2006, it selected
a long list of 18 sites in 11 states for further consideration.
Currently, the premier U.S. facility for research on foreign animal diseases is the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, located on an island off the northeastern tip of Long Island, NY. The
property of Plum Island was transferred from USDA to DHS in the Homeland Security Act (P.L.
107-296), although personnel from both USDA and DHS still conduct research there. Built in the
1950s, many experts agree that the 50-year old Plum Island facility is nearing the end of its useful
life and unable to provide the necessary capacity for current biosecurity research. Plum Island is
the only facility in the United States that is currently approved to study high-consequence foreign
livestock diseases, such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), because its laboratory has been
equipped with a specially designed BSL-3 bio-containment area for large animals that meets
specific safety measures.

60

Food and Agriculture Information Sharing and Analysis Center, http://www.fmi.org/isac.
DHS, “National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility,” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/
editorial_0762.xml.
61

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Live FMD virus may be used only at coastal islands such as Plum Island, unless the Secretary of
Agriculture specifically authorizes the use of the virus on the U.S. mainland (21U.S.C. 113a).
Because of this geographical restriction in statute, some observers question whether the proposed
NBAF should be built on the mainland or on an island similar to Plum Island. Locating the
facility in regions where cattle or other livestock are raised may pose too great a risk if security
features are breached by terrorism, critics say.
Biosafety levels (BSLs) are combinations of laboratory facilities, safety equipment, and
laboratory practices. The four levels are designated in ascending order, by degree of protection
provided to personnel, the environment, and the community. 62 BSL-1 laboratories handle
pathogens of minimal hazard. The highest level laboratories, BSL-4, handle high-risk, lifethreatening diseases with a high risk of aerosol transmission. Only a handful of BSL-4 labs exist
in the U.S., including a CDC lab in Athens, Georgia, and an Army lab in Ft. Dietrick, Maryland.
Agricultural BSL labs can house large animals for experiments, and thus are less common than
regular BSL laboratories. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center and the USDA National
Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, IA, are the only BSL-3 agriculture facilities in
the United States.
As the number and importance of zoonotic diseases increase (such as with the recent discovery
of Nipah and Hendra viruses, and the ongoing concern over foot and mouth disease), scientists
increasingly need BSL-4 laboratories to study zoonotic pathogens and BSL-4 agriculture
facilities to work with those pathogens in host animals. The U.S. currently has no BSL-4
agricultural facility; instead, scientists must conduct experiments at facilities in Winnipeg,
Canada, or Australia.63
The concept for the NBAF was first outlined in the FY2006 budget request for DHS. At that time,
the estimated design and construction cost was $451 million. The current time line calls for
construction to be completed in FY2013.64 DHS began the process in FY2005 by using $3 million
for a planning and feasibility study. In FY2006, Congress appropriated $23 million specifically
for the NBAF in the DHS appropriations act (P.L. 109-90). The FY2007 DHS appropriation (P.L.
109-295) furthers that commitment with a second installment of $23 million for pre-construction
activities.

62

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institute of Health (NIH), Biosafety in
Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th edition, 1999, http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/
bmbl4toc.htm.
63
James Roth, DVM. “Agroterrorism: Hazards to Livestock and Public Health,” presentation to International
Symposium on Agroterrorism, May 2005 http://www.fbi-isa.org/library/roth_files/frame.htm.
64
DHS, “NBAF Timeline” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NBAF_Timeline.pdf.

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With the FY2006 appropriation, DHS issued a request for “Expressions of Interest” (EOI) in
January 2006.65 Parties interested in hosting the facility (such as federal agencies, State and local
governments, private industry, and universities) were invited to reply by March 31, 2006.
Evaluation criteria for site selection include capacity for research, workforce availability,
construction and operation, and community acceptance. DHS received 29 expressions of interest
from 20 states and the District of Columbia. In August 2006, DHS released a subset of 18 sites in
11 states that will be considered further.66 By the end of 2006, DHS expects to narrow the list
further and initiate an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) analysis. A final location will be
chosen early in 2008.
Conceptual design began in April 2006 by soliciting architect and engineering firms. DHS plans
to award this contract later in 2006, with conceptual design to begin shortly thereafter. This level
of design is not site specific and can proceed concurrently with site selection and environmental
impact statements. The conceptual design process may update the current projected total cost of
$451 million. Construction is scheduled to begin in FY2010 and be completed in FY2013.

USDA Laboratories
Within USDA, several agencies have upgraded their facilities to respond better to the threat of
agroterrorism by expanding laboratory capacity and adding physical security. These programs
include the ARS research on foreign animal diseases at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in
New York (the physical facility is now managed and operated by DHS) and the ARS Southeast
Poultry Research Lab in Athens, Georgia.
Three major USDA laboratories are consolidating operations in a new BSL-3 agriculture facility
in Ames, Iowa, called the National Centers for Animal Health. These include the ARS National
Animal Disease Center (NADC), the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL),
and the APHIS Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB). The complex will be USDA’s largest
animal health center for research, diagnosis and product evaluation. The NVSL is especially
visible because it makes the final, official determination for the presence of most animal diseases
when samples are submitted for testing.
USDA also cooperates with other federal agencies on counterterrorism research and preparedness,
including the ARS and APHIS partnership with the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases at Ft. Dietrick, Maryland. The Ft. Dietrick site offers USDA access to
additional high-level biosecurity laboratories, including a BSL-4 laboratory. In the recent past,
USDA has conducted research on soybean rust at Ft. Dietrick.

65
DHS, “National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF): Notice of Request for Expression of Interest for Potential
Sites,” Federal Register, Vol. 71, p. 3107 http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NBAF_EOI.pdf.
66
The August 2006 subset of potential sites after the first cut include 18 locations in the following 11 states: California,
Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky/Tennessee, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and
Wisconsin. Other locations expressing interest but removed from consideration include Alabama, Arkansas/Louisiana,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, North Dakota, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia-based organizations
with sites in New Jersey, Florida, Texas, and California, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

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Laboratory Networks
Several laboratory networks have been created for animal, plant, food, and general bioterrorism
issues. The primary goals of these networks are to improve the diagnosis and detection of a
deliberate or accidental disease outbreak. Primary examples are the CDC-led Laboratory
Response Network (LRN), the USDA-funded National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) and its
sister group the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and the joint FDA/FSIS
Food Emergency Response Network (FERN).
•

Laboratory Response Network (LRN). 67 The Laboratory Response Network,
created by CDC, is a national and international network of about 140 laboratories
equipped to respond quickly to acts of chemical or biological terrorism, emerging
infectious diseases, and other public health threats and emergencies. The network
includes federal labs (CDC, USDA, FDA), state and local public health labs,
military labs, food labs, environmental labs, veterinary labs, and international
labs in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

•

National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN).68 The National Plant Diagnostic
Network is a collective of land grant university plant disease and pest diagnostic
facilities organized by USDA. The national network is led by five regional labs
(Cornell, Florida, Michigan State, Kansas State, and California at Davis) and one
support lab (Texas Tech). The NPDN facilitates the initial detection, positive
identification, national notification, and coordinated response to pests and
pathogens by intentional, accidental, or natural means. By using common
communications and laboratory testing protocols, the network allows efficient,
timely, and secure exchange of plant disease information.

•

National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN). This network,
created by USDA and the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory
Diagnosticians, augments federal resources with extensive state and university
laboratories to allow better detection and response to animal health emergencies.
These labs provide timely and consistent methods, and meet epidemiological
reporting standards. The USDA National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL)
serves as the central reference laboratory. State and university labs perform nonemergency surveillance testing, provide surge capacity during outbreaks, assist
with epidemiologic investigations, and conducting follow-up surveillance.

•

Food Emergency Response Network (FERN). The Food Emergency Response
Network was established jointly by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), and integrates at least 72
state and federal laboratories that analyze food samples implicated in threats,
terrorist events, or contamination. It links local, state, and federal information to
allow officials to prevent or respond to incidents of contaminated food.

67
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). “Facts About the Laboratory Response Network”
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp.
68
National Plant Diagnostic Network http://www.npdn.org.

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Another important network, albeit not a laboratory network, is the Extension Disaster Education
Network (EDEN).69 EDEN is sponsored by USDA, and links extension educators from various
states and disciplines to share resources. EDEN helps extension agents build relationships with
local and state emergency management networks, provide educational programs on disaster
preparation and mitigation to citizens and local leaders, train extension personnel for appropriate
roles during disasters, and collaborates during recovery.

DHS Centers of Excellence
In April 2004, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate announced the department’s first
university research grants for agriculture as part of its “centers for excellence” program. 70 The
University of Minnesota and Texas A&M will share $33 million over three years. Texas A&M’s
new Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Research will study high consequence
animal diseases. The University of Minnesota’s new Center for Post-Harvest Food Protection and
Defense will establish best practices for the management of and response to food contamination
events. Texas A&M is partnering with four universities and will receive $18 million; Minnesota is
partnering with ten universities and will receive $15 million.
The House Appropriations Committee addressed agroterrorism research in report language for the
FY2004 homeland security appropriations bill. The “centers for excellence” program appears to
fit the type of research the committee suggested.
Agro-terrorism research. The Committee is familiar with potential agro/bioterrorism
vulnerabilities, from animal and plant diseases to food chain introductions. While some agroterrorism research is already being done by the Department of Agriculture, the Committee is
aware of the need for more such research, particularly in the areas of threats to field crops,
farm animals, and food in the processing and distribution chain. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 provides for coordination of research between the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and other relevant federal agencies in various areas of research. Because the
Department of Agriculture (USDA) already possesses mechanisms, authorities, and
personnel to carry out needed agro/bioterrorism research, the Committee expects to see
effective coordination between the USDA and the DHS to move such research forward in an
effective and expeditious fashion. The Committee expects USDA to coordinate with DHS to
identify research gaps and develop a plan, to include research priorities, for proceeding to fill
such gaps. Further, the Committee expects that non-government entities selected to carry out
research will be ones with proven expertise in agriculture research, and strong familiarity
with USDA animal and plant diagnostic laboratories and practices (H.Rept. 108-193).

Federal Funding to Respond to Agroterrorism
This report treats federal funding for agroterrorism preparedness broadly, including
appropriations and user fees, both within USDA and DHS. However some general activities that
support agroterrorism preparedness, such as certain intelligence and warning functions performed
by the FBI and CIA, often cannot be identified exclusively as agriculture spending, and thus
cannot be included in this report. However, items that can be identified specifically to
agroterrorism preparedness within the budgets of USDA and DHS are included.
69
70

Extension Disaster Education Network http://www.eden.lsu.edu.
DHS press release, Apr. 27, 2004, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3515.

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The President’s annual budget request to Congress includes a government-wide cross-cutting
budget analysis of homeland security issues, as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(P.L. 107-296, section 889).71 The budget request includes details on the most recently passed
appropriations law and the previous fiscal year. Comprehensive details on agroterrorism funding
are difficult, if not impossible, to compute while appropriations bills are being debated in the
House and Senate. Legislative language rarely mentions specific amounts for agroterrorism, and
report language usually mentions only a few agroterrorism related items that the appropriations
committees wish to highlight. For a comprehensive accounting, analysts must wait until the
President’s budget is released.
In USDA, five agencies and three offices receive homeland security funding:
•

Agricultural Research Service (ARS)

•

Animal and Plant Health Inspection (APHIS)

•

Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES)

•

Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)

•

Economic Research Service (ERS)

•

Departmental Administration and Executive Operations (including Office of the
Secretary, Homeland Security Staff (HSS), and Office of Chief Information
Officer (OCIO)).

In the DHS, two directorates receive funding related to agroterrorism:
•

Customs and Border Protection

•

Science and Technology

Classifying spending on agroterrorism and homeland security requires judgments about which
programs are relevant, especially when some have dual purposes.72 This subjectivity introduces
discrepancies when agencies refine criteria or definitions, or change the way activities are
characterized in their homeland security mission. In such cases, the most recently available data
are used to update prior year data.
Examples of dual-use programs for agricultural homeland security are animal and plant health
programs. These programs, such as border inspection and disease surveillance existed before
September 11, 2001, and would be needed at some level due to natural and accidental disease
outbreaks. However, the scale and scope of these programs have been expanded primarily due
to agroterrorism.

71

Office of Management and Budget, FY2008 Budget of the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives, “3.
Homeland Security Funding Analysis,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/apers/crosscutting.pdf, and
“Appendix: Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,” at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf.
72
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Federal Funding for Homeland Security, July 20, 2005, at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdocs/65xx/doc6566/7-20-HomelandSecurity.pdf.

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For budget and accounting purposes, all or part of dual-use activities may be counted as
homeland security spending, depending on each agency’s criteria. For example, GAO reports that
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) attributes 100% of an activity’s budget
authority to homeland security if any of the following questions apply:73
•

Is this a new activity or program focus as a result of 9/11?

•

Has the bulk of the program activity changed as a result of 9/11?

•

Does the activity address international pest or disease outbreaks or other acts of
agro-bioterrorism?

•

Was the activity initiated with homeland security supplemental funds?

•

Did APHIS receive enhanced homeland security funds for the activity?

•

Is the activity needed in order to comply with one or more Homeland Security
Presidential Directives or the Bioterrorism Act of 2002?

By Year and Source
Prior to September 11, 2001, USDA spent between $45-60 million in regular annual
appropriations to combat terrorism, primarily through border inspections and research. User
fees for border inspection added about $180 million in FY2002, bringing the total funding
(regular appropriations plus user fees) to about $225-240 million in FY2002. This range can be
considered the starting baseline for homeland security funding for agriculture (the regular
FY2002 agriculture appropriations bill was outlined prior to September 11, 2001, even though it
was enacted about two months later.)

Appropriations
Appropriations and user fees for agriculture-related homeland security activities in USDA and
DHS have more than tripled from the $225 million “pre-September 11” baseline to $818 million
in FY2007.
Counting the supplemental appropriations in FY2002-FY2003, and regular annual appropriations
and user fees for both USDA and DHS, homeland security funding for agriculture has grown by
48% over five years, from $552 million in FY2002 to $818 million in FY2007. As a percentage
of non-defense budget authority for homeland security, agriculture receives about 2.1% of the
total. In FY2002, the ratio was 2%, which fell to 1.4% in 2003, and has since risen to between
2.1% and 2.3% currently (Table 1).

73

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data, GAO-06-161, Jan. 17, 2006,
p. 15-16 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06161.pdf.

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Table 1. Percent of Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture
(budget authority in millions of dollars)
Fiscal year
2002
actual

2003
actual

2004
actual

2005
actual

2006
actual

2007
est.

2008
request

Non-defense Homeland
Security Budget Authority

27,724

34,005

33,810

37,195

38,160

39,865

43,644

Homeland Security Funding
for Agriculture (Table 2)

552

485

639

807

861

818

1,018

2.0%

1.4%

1.9%

2.2%

2.3%

2.1%

2.3%

Percent

Source: CRS. Amounts for agriculture compiled by CRS; Non-defense total from Budget of the United States
Government: Analytical Perspectives, “3. Homeland Security Funding Analysis,” FY2005-FY2008,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/apers/crosscutting.pdf, and GAO, Combating Terrorism:
Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data, GAO-06-161, January 17, 2006, pp. 56-62, http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06161.pdf.

The regular appropriation devoted to preparing for agroterrorism has grown significantly since
FY2002, and supplanted the need for further supplemental funding (Figure 6). Regular annual
appropriations for homeland security in USDA increased more than three-fold from FY2002 to
FY2003, and by 60% in each of FY2004 and FY2005. In FY2006, the regular appropriation to
USDA for homeland security dropped by about 9%, and the estimate for FY2007 is another 19%
decrease. The Administration’s request for FY2008 calls for a 54% increase to make up for these
losses and to increase preparedness efforts even more.
Regular annual appropriations for agriculture in DHS are irregular and tied to particular
initiatives, such as university research grants or facility construction.

Supplemental Appropriations
Supplemental appropriations acts in 2002 and 2003, (P.L. 107-117 and P.L. 108-11) augmented
the regular appropriations acts, providing significant additional funds to rapidly increase the
response to agroterrorism vulnerabilities ($328 million and $100 million, respectively).

User fees
User fees to support agricultural border inspection have grown with passenger and cargo volume,
particularly in the immediate years following September 11, 2001, when passenger volume
dropped due to public concerns. In FY2002, user fees for agricultural border inspections totaled
$181 million. By FY2005, that amount grew by 87% to $339 million, and another 24% into
FY2006. User fees fund about half of the total amount available in FY2007 for homeland security
in agriculture.

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Figure 6. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Source
1,200

million dollars

1,000
800
600
400
200
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
request
fiscal year
User fees (for border inspection)
DHS appropriations
USDA supplem ental appropriation
USDA regular appropriation

Source: CRS.

By Agency
Figure 7 presents homeland security funding for agriculture by agencies in USDA and DHS.
APHIS (USDA) and CBP (DHS) conduct most of the activities related to homeland security in
agriculture. In FY2007, APHIS is expected to account for 51% of homeland security spending on
agriculture, and CBP about 33%. Research agencies in USDA (ARS and CSREES) account for
nearly 10%.
Much of the APHIS activity (about 43%) and all of the CBP activity in the agriculture homeland
security area have been for border inspections, predominantly funded through user fees rather
than appropriations. APHIS retains about 39% of the total user fees collected each year, and
transfers the rest to DHS for its Customs and Border Patrol agency (Table 2).

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Table 2. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Agency
(budget authority in millions of dollars)
Fiscal year
Department Agency

2002
actual

2003
actual

2004
actual

2005
actual

2006
actual

2007
est.

2008
request

194.0

313.5

338.7

417.9

454.6

494.1

-69.0

-194.0

-208.0

-240.5

-272.6

-299.6

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
APHIS:
User fees for
inspection

181.2

- less transfers to DHS
= AQI user fees
retained

181.2

125.0

119.5

130.7

177.4

182.0

194.5

Appropriation

88.8

77.5

183.6

232.5

243.7

233.5

309.2

Subtotal APHIS

270.0

202.5

303.1

363.2

421.1

415.5

503.7

ARS

175.0

154.6

31.3

151.2

93.8

33.5

106.8

31.6

39.2

39.7

40.6

40.8

52.2

CSREES
FSIS

15.0

8.7

13.1

19.5

17.4

17.4

39.1

Dept. Administration

92.0

18.5

23.8

21.0

23.7

14.5

16.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

1.0

292.0

464.9

420.2

340.7

524.3

ERS
Subtotal USDA
Regular
appropriation

42.8

180.9

Supplementals

328.0

110.0

User fees

181.2

125.0

119.5

130.7

177.4

182.0

194.5

Subtotal USDA

552.0

415.9

411.5

595.6

597.6

522.7

718.8

299.6

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - selected activities in agriculture
CBP: AQI user fees received

69.0

S&T: Research centers

194.0

208.0

240.5

272.6

3.0

23.0

23.0

33.0

S&T: New facilities
Subtotal DHS (selected items)

69.0

227.0

211.0

263.5

295.6

299.6

Total of above
User fees (AQI)

181.2

194.0

313.5

338.7

417.9

454.6

494.1

Appropriations

370.8

290.9

325.0

467.9

443.2

363.7

524.3

Total of above

552.0

484.9

638.5

806.6

861.1

818.3

1,018.4

Source: CRS. USDA figures for FY2003-FY2008 are from Budget of the United States Government: Analytical
Perspectives, “Appendix: Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,” FY2005-FY2008
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf; figures for FY2002 are from
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data, GAO-06-161, Jan. 2006, p. 44-45
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06161.pdf. AQI user fees from USDA “Explanatory Notes for Committee on
Appropriations,” various years. DHS figures were identified by CRS from DHS “Congressional Budget
Justification,” FY2006-FY2008.

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Figure 7. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Agency
FY2007, $818 million

S&T (DHS)
3%

CBP (DHS)
33%
APHIS (USDA)
51%
ERS (USDA)
0.1%
FSIS (USDA)
2%
Dept. Admin.
(USDA)
2%

CSREES
(USDA)
5%

ARS (USDA)
4%

Source: CRS. Includes USDA and selected DHS projects.

By Function for Homeland Security
For the President’s annual budget request, agencies throughout the federal government categorize
their funding based on six mission areas (functions), as defined in the National Strategy for
Homeland Security:
•

Intelligence and warning

•

Border and transportation security

•

Domestic counterterrorism

•

Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets

•

Defending against catastrophic threats

•

Emergency preparedness and response

Figure 8 and Table 3 present the funding information by homeland security function. As in every
year since 2002, border inspections are the largest homeland security activity for agriculture in
FY2007, conducted jointly by USDA-APHIS and DHS-CBP. Defending against catastrophic
threats is the next largest activity, particularly in APHIS, which includes monitoring, surveillance
and laboratory response capacity. Protecting critical infrastructure has been another large activity.

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Emergency preparedness and intelligence have received relatively less funding. Primary
intelligence gathering is viewed more appropriately as the responsibility of other federal agencies
such as the FBI and CIA. These agencies track and act upon bioterrorism information, sharing
relevant information with USDA, DHS, and other agencies.
Figure 8. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Function
FY2007, $818 million

Intelligence
1%

Critical
infrastructure
7%

Catastrophic
threats
28%

Border
security
58%
Emergency
preparedness
6%
Source: CRS. Includes USDA and selected DHS projects.

Table 3. Homeland Security Funding for Agriculture, by Function
(budget authority in millions of dollars, including user fees)
Fiscal year
2003
actual

2004
actual

2005
actual

2006
actual

2007
est.

2008
request

USDA

149.2

148.4

158.8

205.6

210.2

221.7

DHS

69.0

194.0

208.0

240.5

272.6

299.6

Subtotal

218.2

342.4

366.8

446.1

482.8

521.3

Homeland Security Mission Area
Border and transportation security

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Fiscal year
Homeland Security Mission Area

2003
actual

2004
actual

2005
actual

2006
actual

2007
est.

2008
request

203.3

36.8

150.6

90.7

31.2

64.1

3.0

23.0

23.0

Protecting critical infrastructure
USDA
DHS
Subtotal

203.3

36.8

153.6

113.7

54.2

64.1

11.8

168.2

222.7

238.3

226.0

343.6

50.8

57.3

57.2

57.8

50.1

67.1

Defending against catastrophic threats
USDA
Emergency preparedness and response
USDA
DHS

33.0

Subtotal

50.8

90.3

57.2

57.8

50.1

67.1

0.8

0.8

6.3

5.2

5.2

22.3

484.9

638.5

806.6

861.1

818.3

1018.4

Intelligence and warning
USDA
Total

Source: CRS. USDA figures from Budget of the United States Government: Analytical Perspectives, “Appendix:
Homeland Security Mission Funding by Agency and Budget Account,” FY2005-FY2008
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/ap_cd_rom/homeland.pdf and USDA Office of Budget and
Policy Analysis spreadsheets for FY2002. Border inspection user fees from USDA “Explanatory Notes for
Committee on Appropriations,” various years. DHS figures identified by CRS from DHS “Congressional Budget
Justification,” FY2006-FY2008, and categorized by CRS to be consistent with functions as in USDA.
Note: Does not include amounts which are not exclusive to agriculture, such as such as general intelligence and
warning functions in DHS or other agencies, or appropriations for border security in DHS (other than user fees)
which are not allocated by industry.

Chronology of Appropriations
The following list outlines appropriations acts that have provided funds for homeland security
related to agriculture and food since September 11, 2001.
•

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2001 (P.L. 107-38;
September 18, 2001). Within days of September 11, Congress approved $40
billion in emergency supplemental appropriations partitioned over three time
periods. USDA received no money for domestic homeland security programs in
the first two installments, but did receive an allocation in the final installment for
FY2002 (see FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Act below).

•

FY2002 Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-76; November 28, 2001).
This regular annual appropriations act was outlined prior to September 11, 2001,
and provides the baseline amount for homeland security functions in agriculture,
without any particular discussion of agroterrorism. The appropriation for
homeland security was not clearly defined, but was approximately $45-60
million. Together with user fees, the baseline for homeland security for
agriculture was about $225-240 million.

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•

FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 107-117; January 10, 2002).
Congress made the final $20 billion installment from the FY2001 supplemental
in Division B of the FY2002 Defense Department Appropriation (“Transfers
from the Emergency Response Fund [ERF] Pursuant to P.L. 107-38”). USDA
received $328 million for homeland security programs. This supplemental
appropriation, however, preceded the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, which resulted in some of the funds being moved to DHS when
border inspections and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center were transferred
DHS. USDA documents suggest about $220 million were for functions
transferred to DHS.

•

FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery (P.L. 107206; August 2, 2002). In this $28 billion supplemental appropriation, Congress
included about $123 million for USDA programs related to homeland security.
These amounts, however, were designated among $5.1 billion of “contingent
emergency spending” that President Bush chose not to use, and thus the
funds were not available to USDA and other departments (see CRS Report
RL31406, Supplemental Appropriations for FY2002: Combating Terrorism and
Other Issues.

•

FY2003 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-7; February 20, 2003). This
regular annual appropriations act provided $181 million to USDA for homeland
security activities.

•

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11;
April 16, 2003).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32521. Public record. Not legal advice.