# Military Helicopter Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32447

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** June 24, 2004
- **Citation:** RL32447

## Text

Order Code RL32447

CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web

Military Helicopter Modernization:
Background and Issues for Congress

June 24, 2004

name redacted
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
name redacted
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Military Helicopter Modernization: Background and
Issues for Congress
Summary
Recent military operations, particularly those in Afghanistan and Iraq, have
brought to the fore a number of outstanding questions concerning helicopters in the
U.S. armed forces, including deployability, safety, survivability, affordability, and
operational effectiveness. These concerns are especially relevant, and made more
complicated, in an age of “military transformation,” the “global war on terrorism,”
and increasing pressure to rein in funding for the military, all of which provide
contradictory pressures with regard to DOD’s large, and often complicated, military
helicopter modernization efforts. Despite these questions, the military use of
helicopters is likely to hold even, if not grow. This report includes a discussion of the
evolving role of helicopters in military transformation.
The Department of Defense (DOD) fields 10 different types of helicopters,
which are largely of 1960s and 1970s design. This inventory numbers approximately
5,500 rotary-wing aircraft, not including an additional 144 belonging to the Coast
Guard, and ranges from simple “utility” platforms such as the ubiquitous UH-1
“Huey” to highly-advanced, “multi-mission” platforms such as the Air Force’s MH53J “Pave Low” special operations helicopter and the still-developmental MV-22B
“Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft.
Three general approaches can be taken to modernize DOD’s helicopter forces:
upgrading current platforms, rebuilding current helicopter models (often called
recapitalization), or procuring new models. These approaches can be pursued alone,
or concurrently, and the attractiveness or feasibility of any approach or combination
of approaches depends largely on budgetary constraints and operational needs. In
some cases, observers argue that upgrades to helicopter sub-systems, especially radar,
communications, and targeting systems, are the most cost effective way to satisfy
current helicopter requirements. Others argue that while upgrades are cost effective
in some cases, today’s helicopters are sufficiently aged to require re-building, a more
involved modernization approach.
The modernization programs outlined in this paper suggest a number of issues
that may compete for congressional attention. These issues include 1) budgetary
concerns (Helicopter modernization plans and programs described in this paper
would account for approximately $34.6 billion in spending between FY2005 and
FY2009), 2) impact on overall force structure, 3) whether there is adequate
coordination among the Services, 4) how modernization may effect the helicopter
industrial base, and 5) a number of operational considerations such as whether the
envisioned programs will adequately improve operational shortcomings identified in
recent conflicts such as deployability, reliability, and survivability.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Helicopter Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Helicopters in the U.S. Armed Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
DOD Helicopter Modernization Plans and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SOCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Navy and Marine Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Conceptual Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Budgetary Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Force Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Coordination of Modernization Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
H-1 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
H-6 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Army and Air Force H-60 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Heavy Lift Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Industrial Base Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Operational Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Deployability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Reliability and Maintainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix I: Current Rotary-Wing Aircraft Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix 2: Estimated Helicopter Inventories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Military Helicopter Modernization:
Background and Issues for Congress1
Introduction
Recent military operations, particularly those in Afghanistan and Iraq, have
brought to the fore a number of outstanding questions concerning helicopters in the
U.S. armed forces, including deployability, safety, survivability, affordability, and
operational effectiveness. These concerns are especially relevant — and made more
complicated — in an age of “military transformation,” the “global war on terrorism,”
and increasing pressure to rein in funding for the military, all of which provide
contradictory pressures with regard to DOD’s large, and often complicated military
helicopter modernization efforts. In addition, military helicopters’ operational roles
and missions may also be challenged by the emergence of a number of significant
factors, including the increased use and capabilities of unmanned platforms,2 the
perception of increased vulnerability in combat situations, and the increased
effectiveness of fixed-wing aircraft equipped with precision munitions in the close
air support (CAS) role.3 Yet, emerging demands of homeland defense and stability
operations may increase helicopter applications.
The Department of Defense (DOD) fields 10 different types of helicopters,
which are largely of 1960s and 1970s design. This inventory numbers approximately
5,500 rotary-wing aircraft — not including an additional 144 belonging to the Coast

1

For the purposes of this report, the term “helicopter” will be used interchangeably with
“rotary-wing aircraft” as well as “rotorcraft” so that the V-22 Osprey — technically a
member of the latter categories of aircraft — may be included.

2

Various acronyms exist to describe these platforms: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), Unmanned Aerial Rotorcraft (UARs), and
Unmanned Combat Aerial Rotorcraft (UCARs).

3

“Close Air Support” is defined as ‘Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against
hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed
integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. See JP 1-02,
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Apr. 12, 2001 (as amended through Mar. 23,
2004), p. 90, online at [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf]. It is
interesting to note that the General Accounting Office, in a March 2003 report, included
only one helicopter platform as performing CAS in the U.S. armed forces, while including
such fixed-wing aircraft as the A-10, F-16, F-15E , B-52, AC-130, AV-8B, F/A-18, and the
F-14. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Readiness: Lingering Training and
Equipment Issues Hamper Air Support of Ground Forces (Washington: GAO, 2003),
specifically Appendix II, “Examples of DOD Aircraft That Perform Close Air Support,” pp.
32-33.

CRS-2
Guard 4 — and ranges from simple “utility” platforms such as the ubiquitous UH-1
“Huey” to highly-advanced, “multi-mission” platforms such as the Air Force’s MH53J “Pave Low” special operations helicopter and the still-developmental MV-22B
“Osprey” tilt-rotor aircraft. Also, there are a large and potentially confusing number
of types and variants of the same basic helicopter platform. For example, DOD has
so far acquired seven different types of the H-60 “Black Hawk” design: the CH-60,
EH-60, HH-60, MH-60, SH-60, UH-60, and the VH-60. These design types have, in
turn, multiple variants.5

Helicopter Classifications
Rotary-wing aircraft are described and classified in a number of different ways.
The most general method is according to gross weight although it should be noted
that there has yet to be universal agreement with regard to the specific thresholds.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this report, “light” will generally refer to those
rotary-wing aircraft weighing less than 12,000 lbs.; “medium” (or “medium-lift”) are
those weighing between 12,000 and 45,000 lbs.; and “heavy” (or “heavy-lift”) are
those which weigh more.6

4

The U.S. Coast Guard operates approximately 144 helicopters. This figure fluctuates
operationally due to maintenance schedules. Major missions performed by these aircraft
include Search/Rescue, Law Enforcement, Environmental Response, Ice Operations, and Air
Interdiction. The majority of the Coast Guard’s helicopters (94 total inventory) are HH-65
Dolphin short range recovery aircraft. The HH-65 is built by the French company
Aerospatiale, and are based at Coast Guard Air Stations in Michigan, Hawaii, Puerto Rico,
New Jersey, Texas, California, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Oregon, Washington, and
Georgia. The Coast Guard also operates 42 HH-60 Jayhawk medium range recovery
helicopters. The Jayhawk is built by Sikorsky, and based in Alabama, Alaska, California,
Florida, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Oregon. The MH-68A Stingray is the Coast
Guard’s short range armed interdiction helicopter. Built by the Italian company Augusta, the
Coast Guard’s eight Stingray helicopters are based in Jacksonville, Florida. For more
information on the Coast Guard, its missions, and its fixed and rotary wing aircraft, see
[http://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm]. The Coast Guard is planning to modernize 207 of its
aircraft, including its helicopter fleet, through its “Deepwater” program. For more
information about the Deepwater program and the specific mix of manned and unmanned
air vehicles to be procured, see CRS Report RS21019 Coast Guard Deepwater Program:
Background and Issues for Congress. Additionally, a number of agencies involved in
homeland security and border security (such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
Customs and Border Protection) operate older military utility and observation helicopters
(e.g. OH-6A, UH-1H, HH-60J) or civilian helicopters (e.g. Eurocopter AS-350B1, Hughes
500, Bell JetRanger, MD-500E, and MD-600N). Some of these helicopters are armed, and
most are equipped with forward-looking infrared sensors and search lights. See David
Hughes, “Homefront Security,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 15, 2004, for
more information.
5

See [http://globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/h-60-var.htm]. Many of these types
and variants have already been retired from the fleet or are in the process of being either
renamed or replaced to reflect new mission functions and/or capabilities.
6

Note that “light,” “medium” and “heavy” rotorcraft will often overlap with regard to
maximum gross weights as some variants of the same type may cross into another weight
range.

CRS-3
A more specific method of classification involves the specific lettering used to
identify different types of helicopters which are based on that platform’s primary
mission capability.7 Central to this classification system is the letter “H” (for
“helicopter”) which is immediately followed by a number indicating a specific design
(e.g., H-1, H-60, etc.). (The one significant exception is the tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey
which can be more accurately described as a hybrid aircraft, such as the AV-8 Harrier
“jump jet,” with a Vertical Take-Off and Landing — VTOL — capability.) Next in
importance is a single-letter prefix which indicates a particular mission capability or
mission-set for that helicopter design. These prefixes (and their meaning) have
included the following: “A” (Attack), “C” (Cargo), “E” (Electronic), “H”
(Hospital/Med-evac/Search and Rescue), “M” (Multi-Purpose), “O” (Observation),
“R” (Reconnaissance), “S” (Anti-Surface/Anti-Submarine), “U” (Utility), and “V”
(VIP/Staff). Single-letter suffixes are then added after the design numbers to
differentiate between variants, often indicating improved standards and/or
configurations of equipment (and/or armaments).

Helicopters in the U.S. Armed Forces
The Army has six different types of helicopters in service. Its central platform
is the medium-lift H-60 Black Hawk which serves primarily as a troop utility
transport in the air assault role. Complementing it are the slightly smaller H-1 Huey
and the much larger, heavy-lift CH-47 Chinooks. The active Army has two
attack-type helicopters, the first being the lighter reconnaissance/attack OH-58
Kiowa, and the second being the AH-64 Apache attack platform. The Army Reserves
and National Guard fly the AH-1S attack helicopter. Improved capability variants of
the Black Hawk and the Chinook are operated by the Army’s Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR), under Special Operations Command (SOCOM), along
with a different, light, multi-purpose/attack helicopter, the H-6 Little Bird.
The Navy and Marine Corps operate a total of five different types of rotary-wing
aircraft. The latter service fields the only true attack helicopter between the two in
the AH-1 Cobra. Troop transport and vertical replenishment missions are fulfilled by
a number of aircraft, including the medium-lift H-46 Sea Knight and H-60 Sea Hawk,
as well as the heavy-lift H-53 Sea Stallion (which is also used by the Navy in a mine
countermeasures role). New multi-purpose Sea Hawk variants are being introduced
to the fleet as is the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and are scheduled to replace all
of the older model helicopters performing standard transport and assault and roles,
respectively.
The Air Force fields three different types of helicopters. Its H-1 Huey performs
various utility missions while its H-60 variants are especially configured for Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR) missions. The specially-equipped H-53 Pave Low is used
as a CSAR helicopter by the Air Force and for extraction operations by SOCOM.

7

These capabilities — and therefore classifications — will frequently overlap as certain
missions, such as troop transport, cargo transport, and medical-evacuation (or “med-evac”)
do not necessarily require special modifications be made.

CRS-4

DOD Helicopter Modernization Plans and Programs
Three general approaches can be taken to modernize DOD’s helicopter forces:
upgrading current platforms, rebuilding current helicopter models (often called
recapitalization), or procuring new models. These approaches can be pursued alone,
or concurrently, and the attractiveness or feasibility of any approach or combination
of approaches depends largely on budgetary constraints and operational needs. In
some cases, observers argue that upgrades to helicopter sub-systems, especially radar,
communications, and targeting systems, is the most cost effective way to satisfy
current helicopter requirements.
Others argue that while upgrades are cost effective in some cases, today’s
helicopters are sufficiently aged to require re-building, a more involved
modernization approach. Upgrades often do not address reliability and readiness
challenges that can plague aging helicopters. Stripping and re-building the airframe
while adding new engines, transmissions and rotor assemblies is more cost effective
in the long run in many instances. In other cases, the need to replace legacy
helicopters with new models justifies the time and expense of research and
development and procurement programs. (However, as in the case of the recent
Comanche cancellation, new procurement programs can sometimes become too
expensive for the benefits offered.)
This section describes ongoing Service plans to modernize specific aircraft. The
following text focuses on the key issues for each modernization program. Those
readers seeking detailed budget information may refer to the footnotes. Those readers
seeking more background information can find a brief description of each aircraft
type in Appendix I. The current inventory of all aircraft models is found in Appendix
II.
SOCOM. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has its own budget
allocation for its relatively small, modern fleet of approximately 200 aircraft. Many
SOCOM modifications fall under a generic Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment
program which provides for ongoing survivability, reliability, maintainability, and
operational upgrades as well as sustainment costs for fielded rotary wing aircraft and
subsystems. Modifications involve avionics and navigation systems, sensor systems,
active and passive survivability systems for all or most Army Special Operations
Aircraft (ARSOA) as well as specific alterations to MH-60, MH-47, A/MH-6, and
MH-53 platforms; modifications to the Air Force’s CV-22 Osprey variant is funded
separately (see Air Force sub-section below).8
8

Budget breakdown: FY2005: $447.3M; FY2006: $225.5M; FY2007: $274.4M; FY2008:
$339.7M; and FY2009: $329.4M; Total After FY2004: $1,616.3M. See U.S. SOCOM,
“Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, Defense-Wide, Fiscal Year (FY)
2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37. For all H-6 “Little Birds,” H-47
“Chinooks,” and H-60 “Black Hawks,” modifications include the replacement of Mission
Processors, Multifunction Displays, and Modular Avionics, as well as the procurement of
a “next generation” FLIR system, a Low Probability of Intercept (LPI)/Low Probability of
Detection (LPD) radar altimeter, and color weather mode capability in Multi-Mode Radar.
For the MH-47 and MH-60 aircraft only, procurement includes (new) Obstacle Avoidance
(continued...)

CRS-5
Army. On February 23, 2004, the Pentagon, with backing from the White
House, announced the cancellation of the Army’s $39 billion RAH-66 “Comanche”
armed reconnaissance helicopter procurement program, mainly for cost reasons.9 As
this move “frees up” approximately $14.6 billion that had been allocated in future
spending, the Army has proposed a number of changes to its planned and ongoing
modernization programs, assuming the money from the Comanche program remains
within the purview of Army aviation. Estimated costs for terminating the contract
range from $450 million to $2.7 billion.10 It is generally expected that Congress will
approve the Comanche’s cancellation, which has already cost taxpayers nearly $7
billion over more than 20 years, with only two prototypes to show for the effort. This
report has therefore included the Army’s new Army Aviation Modernization Plan,
which plans for the Comanche cancellation and the subsequent use of Comanche
funds.11
The Army also has a number of ongoing modernization programs which apply
to almost every platform in the aviation fleet, although funding estimates are
calculated according to number of sub-systems procured rather than numbers of
platforms upgraded. They are grouped together under “Ground Support Avionics”
and “Other Support” sub-headings. The former consists of Aircraft Survivability
Equipment (ASE) and ASE Infrared Countermeasures while the latter includes
Airborne Command and Control, Avionics Support Equipment, Common Ground
Equipment, Aircrew Integrated Systems, Air Traffic Control, Industrial Facilities,
2.75 Rocket Launcher, and Airborne Communications.12

8

(...continued)
(OA)/Cable Warning (CW) systems and the Suite of Infrared Countermeasures (SIRCM).
More aircraft-specific modernizations (and their costs) are detailed below. (All of these
latter costs are included in the above total budget figures.)

9

‘The central issue to this difficult decision was that Comanche program growth accounted
for 40% of the current aviation budget and up to 47% in the Extended Planning Period
(EPP).’ See Statement by LTG Richard A. Cody, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States
Army, Before the Tactical Airland Subcommittee, Armed Services Committee, United States
Senate on United States Army Aviation, Second Session, 108th Congress, Mar. 30, 2004.

10

Anne Plummer, “Boeing Says Negotiations To End Comanche Deals Will Take Time,”
Inside the Army, May 3, 2004.
11

For a detailed outline of the Army’s new plans for its aviation forces, see DOD Briefing,
“Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,” Feb. 23, 2004, at
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/g040223-D-6570C.html]. Please note that very
little was outlined with regard to any new plans concerning Army special operations aviation
programs.
12

Department of the Army, Procurement Programs, Committee Staff Procurement Backup
Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft Procurement, Army, Feb. 2004, pp. 115-166 (Item
Nos. 23-32). Budget breakdown (‘Ground Support Avionics’: Item Nos. 23 and 24):
FY2005: $86.5M; FY2006: $111.1M; FY2007: $137.1M; FY2008: $194.0M; FY2009:
$171.3M; To Complete: $3,158.8M; Total Program: $3,519.4M; Total Remaining After
FY2004: $3,858.8M. Budget breakdown (‘Other Support’: Item Nos. 25-32): FY2005:
$155.0M; FY2006: $152.5M; FY2007: $155.1M; FY2008: $173.3M; FY2009: $157.0M;
Total Program: $3,076.1M; Total Remaining After FY2004: $792.9M.

CRS-6
Light Helicopters
UH-1 Divestiture/Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) Procurement — Before the
cancellation of the Comanche, the Army had planned to retire all of its remaining
Hueys by 2004 as part of an overall effort to switch ‘to an all Black Hawk fleet,’13
although an option to retain approximately 70 aircraft ‘at least through FY2008 for
designated support tasks’ was still being considered to allow enough time to phase
in a possible replacement.14 Indeed, with the cancellation of the Comanche in
February 2004, the Army has resurrected its inactive Light Utility Helicopter (LUH)
program as a possible replacement for the UH-1. The LUH would ‘provide utility
missions in other than wartime settings and free up for more critical operations the
Black Hawks currently being used.’15 The Army plans to purchase a total of 303
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) LUHs by 2020,16 possibilities for which include
upgraded Bell Hueys, Bell OH-58D Kiowas, and even Sikorsky UH-60s.17 While the
latter two competitors represent new-build platforms, Bell is planning to offer its
“new” 210 model helicopter conversion which would actually involve the
rebuild/remanufacture of UH-1H airframes, at $3 million apiece, with ‘a new
tailboom, overhauled engine, dual hydraulics and a zero-timed airframe18 which is
hoped to be more reliable and more powerful, while costing about 40 percent less to
operate.19 While the contractor for the LUH is expected to be announced in 2005,20
DOD has yet to provide any specific cost estimates for this acquisition program.21

13

Richard Aboulafia, “Bell UH-1/212/412 Huey,” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing
(Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Corporation, June 2003) p. 7.
14

Harold Kennedy, “Army’s Old Huey Choppers Getting a New Lease on Life,” National
Defense Magazine, Mar. 2004, at [http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id
=1362].
15

Robert Wall, “Appetite for Aviation: U.S. Army Juggles Operational Demands With
Desire to Overhaul, Buy New Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 5, 2004,
pp. 35-36.
16

DOD Briefing Slides, “Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,”
Feb. 23, 2004, at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/g040223-D-6570C.html].
17

“AUSA: Army Faces Aviation Bills,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 14 , 2004. See Richard
L. Aboulafia, “Bell 406/OH-58D,” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing (Fairfax, VA:
Teal Group Corporation, Dec. 2003), p. 4, for the ‘UH-1 Replacement Proposal’ involving
the OH-58D.
18

Wall, “Appetite for Aviation,” This article also mentioned that Sikorsky was considering
offering its S-76 model.
19

Bob Cox, “Bell Touts Plan to Retrofit Hueys,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Mar. 16, 2004.

20

Wall, “Appetite for Aviation,” p. 36.

21

See Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives from the White House, Mar. 5,
2004, which submits a number of FY2005 budget amendments, including one (FY2005
Budget Appendix, p. 276-277) that would ‘increase the [pending request for Aircraft
Procurement, Army] by $840 million to support the acquisition of high-priority aircraft
survivability equipment, purchase of additional CH-47, UH-60, and TH-67 aircraft, and the
start of a Light Utility Helicopter program. Funding also would allow the Army to transfer
(continued...)

CRS-7
A/MH-6 Mission Enhanced Little Bird (MELB) — This ongoing program aims
to complete the upgrade of approximately 50 A/MH-6J Little Bird variants to the 6M configuration. Changes include a more powerful engine, a six-bladed main rotor,
a four-blade tail rotor, a crashworthy fuel system and larger cargo door; a new
cockpit display with two large-format, full-color screens; Hellfire missiles and the
GeCAL 50 three-barrel 12.7mm Gatling gun.22 Additional improvements, which are
part of the SOCOM “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment” program, include
Avionics and Navigation Modifications, Sensor Modifications (including new FLIR
targeting system), Active Survivability System Modifications (including SIRFC and
SIRCM), and Passive Survivability System Modifications (including crew protection
from chemical and biological weapons). More specific A/MH-6 Modifications
include the same mission processors, multifunction displays, and software as the
MH-47 and MH-60 fleet of aircraft, additional external fuel tanks, and funding for
component miniaturization and spares.23 The Army also plans to buy 25 new Little
Birds between 2010 and 2015, although no cost estimates have been released.24
OH-58D Kiowa Warrior — At the time of the Comanche cancellation, the
Kiowa Warrior fleet was continuing two modernization programs. One is the Safety
Enhancement Program (SEP) which ‘incorporates upgraded engines and engine
barrier filters, crashworthy crew seats, cockpit airbags, enhanced digitization
capabilities, and improved weapons interface’ which are aimed at ‘enhancing crew
survivability’ and improving ‘system reliability and maintainability.’25 The new
aircraft, sometimes referred to as the OH-58DR, would permit direct communications
with digitally-equipped ground vehicles.26 The other program is the SEP Weight
Reduction initiative which will improve operational and auto rotational
characteristics as well as increase system reliability and lower support costs by
reducing operational gross weight by 300-400 pounds.27 While these modifications
21

(...continued)
Comanche-developed radar technology to APACHE Block III.’
22

Bill Sweetman, “High Dependency for Special Ops,” Jane’s International Defense
Review, Aug. 2003, p. 69. ‘The A/MH-6M is fully qualified for maritime operations.’
23

See U.S. SOCOM, “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, DefenseWide, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37. Costs specifically
attributable to A/MH-6 Little Bird modernization are difficult to estimate due to costs being
calculated according to numbers of ‘kits’ purchased/installed rather than number of
platforms modified.
24

Richard Aboulafia, “MD Helicopters MD 500/600N,” World Military & Civil Aircraft
Briefing (Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Corporation, July 2003), p. 3.
25

Department of the Army, “Kiowa Warrior,” Procurement Programs, Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book FY 2005 Budget Request, Aircraft Procurement, Army, pp. 89-93
(Item No. 18).
26

Robert Wall, “Combat-Ready: Distributed Helo Ops May Yield Enhanced Combat
Effectiveness,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 12, 2004, pp. 68-69. One further
modification includes the replacement of the 7.62mm three-barreled mini-gun with the .50
caliber machine gun which is more reliable and has a greater rate of fire.
27

Department of the Army, “Kiowa Warrior,” Procurement Programs, Committee Staff
(continued...)

CRS-8
are set to continue past FY2009, the Army, as part of its efforts to reallocate money
from the Comanche cancellation, is planning to procure a total of 368 armed
reconnaissance helicopters as replacements for the entire OH-58 fleet of
approximately 800 aircraft within the 2020 timeframe. These new aircraft are to be
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases.28 (See below for the Light Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter — LARH.)
Light Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (LARH) — This new program was
born from the Comanche cancellation. It aims to replace the aging OH-58 Kiowa
Warrior fleet, beginning in 2007. Reports indicate that the Army ‘will want an
aircraft that has a high degree of survivability, transportability and connectivity with
other forces...[as well as] a small logistics tail.’29 It appears that the sole front-runner
is the MH-6 Little Bird (see above) but other contenders include the Agusta A-129
and possibly rebuilt Kiowas.30 Although the latter option has been dismissed by a few
Army officials, the Kiowas’ performance in Iraq, where they logged more hours per
aircraft than any other helicopter and maintained monthly readiness rates of around
85 percent, suggests that the rebuild option may yet be considered.31
RAH-66 Comanche — As mentioned above, the Pentagon announced on
February 23, 2004, that it was cancelling this 20-year old, $39 billion project which
has resulted in only two flying prototypes (and six currently on the assembly lines).
The Army has planned for and requested that future funds for the Comanche,
amounting to approximately $14.6 billion, be reallocated to a number of ongoing
modernization programs and a few new ones as detailed throughout this report.32
Medium Helicopters
UH-60 Black Hawk (MYP) [Multi-Year Procurement] and UH-60M
Recap/Upgrade — While the former program primarily involves funding a total of

27

(...continued)
Procurement Backup Book FY 2005 Budget Request, Aircraft Procurement, Army, pp. 89-93
(Item No. 18). Budget breakdown: FY2005: $33.8M; FY2006: $22.4M; FY2007: $42.1M;
FY2008: $20.7M; FY2009: $15.3M; To Complete: $24.9M; Total Program: $3,488.0M;
Total Remaining After FY2004: $159.2M.
28

DOD Briefing Slides, “Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,”
Feb. 23,2004, at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/g040223-D-6570C.html] See
also Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mar. 5, 2004, p. 3.
29

Marc Selinger, “Army Wants New Helicopter To Be Survivable, Transportable,”
Aerospace Daily, Mar. 30, 2004.
30

Robert Wall, “Appetite for Aviation: U.S. Army Juggles Operational Demands with
Desire to Overhaul, Buy New Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 5, 2004,
p. 35.
31
32

Megan Scully, “Reliable Kiowas Face Retirement,” DefenseNews, Apr. 5, 2004, p. 38.

“Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,” op. cit. For details
concerning the funding reallocation as requested by the White House on behalf of the Office
of Management and Budget, see Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mar.
5, 2004, with attached FY2005 budget amendments.

CRS-9
91 new-build UH-60L aircraft from FY2005 onwards,33 the latter effort consists of
a number of recapitalizations/upgrades involving 906 UH-60A and 331 UH-60L
aircraft to convert them to UH-60M standards (formerly UH-60L+).34 Modifications
involve some or all of the following: strengthened fuselages, new propulsion systems,
new rotors, advanced digitized avionics and navigation systems, new Crashworthy
External Fuel Systems (CEFS), Ballistic Protection Systems (BPS), and the purchase
of new Medical Equipment Package (MEP) kits (to upgrade some new UH-60L
models to the HH-60M configuration),35 which include improved Forward Looking
Infrared (FLIR), High Performance (Rescue) Hoist (HPH), Personnel Locator System
(PLS), Environmental Control System (ECS), and improved avionics and medical
equipment. In addition, the upgrades are hoped to meet lift, range, survivability, and
interoperability requirements while addressing all top ten operations and support
(O&S) cost drivers and extending the useful life of these aircraft another 20 years.36
Due to the Comanche cancellation, the Army is planning to purchase 101 additional
new-build UH-60L and 80 additional (new-build) UH-60M aircraft. Ten of the latter
will receive the Army’s A2C2S command and control packages.37
In addition to the modifications made to all ARSOA aircraft (including all of its
H-60s — see above), SOCOM, which operates both MH-60K and MH-60L variants,
initiated a service life extension program (SLEP) in FY2004. This program will
convert the whole fleet of Black Hawks into a common MH-60M configuration.

33

Budget breakdown: FY2005: 8 aircraft for $124.5M; FY2006: 28 aircraft for $301.9M;
FY2007: 24 aircraft for $392.0M; FY2008: 10 aircraft for $202.1M; FY2009: 7 aircraft for
$164.7M; To Complete: 14 aircraft for $336.6M; Total Program: 1,688 aircraft for
$11,380.2M; Total Remaining After FY2004: 91 aircraft for $1,521.8M. See Department
of the Army, “UH-60 Blackhawk,” Procurement Programs, Committee Staff Procurement
Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft Procurement, Army, Feb. 2004, pp. 4-14
(Item Nos. 3 and 4). These figures include ‘production incorporation of the modifications
being developed in the UH-60 BLACK HAWK upgrade program (UH-60M) following
completion of the FY2002-06 airframe multiyear contract.’
34

Budget breakdown: FY2005: 5 aircraft for $137.8M; FY2006: 5 aircraft for $138.2M;
FY2007: 14 aircraft for $299.3M; FY2008: 58 aircraft for $677.1M; FY2009: 61 aircraft for
$693.1M; Total to Complete: 1,070 aircraft for $12,645.9M; Total Program: 1,213 aircraft
for $15,271.2M; Total Remaining After FY2004: 1,213 aircraft for $14,591.4M. See
Department of the Army, “UH-60 Mods,” Procurement Programs, Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft Procurement, Army, Feb.
2004, pp. 75-88 (Item Nos. 16 and 17).
35

‘One of the four UH-60M prototypes now in process will be completed in an HH-60M
Dust Off configuration [formerly UH-60Q variant]....[T]he UH-60M gives the Army a
higher-performance utility helicopter with a common integrated cockpit....The Dust
Off/CSAR avionics suite in the HH-60M supplements the digital cockpit of the UH-60M
with FLIR, Personnel Locator System and Tactical Air Navigation.’ Frank Colucci, “Joint
Mission, Different Strategies: Service Plan Upgrades for Life-Saving Helicopters,” Armed
Forces Journal, May 2003, p. 48.
36

Department of the Army, “UH-60M/HH-60M Recap/Upgrade,” Procurement Programs,
Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft
Procurement, Army, Feb. 2004, p. 82.

37

“Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,” op.cit.

CRS-10
Modifications include fly-by-wire flight controls, new engines, engine filters,
improved fuel management system, new rotor blades, and O&S cost saving
modifications.38 As part of the Integrated Defensive Armed Penetrators (IDAP)
program, SOCOM is budgeting a total of $53.4 million over four years for a weapons
system lifecycle upgrade for 10 existing Armed MH-60L helicopters and 10 new
IDAP kits.39
AH-64D Longbow Apache — The program to upgrade a total of 501 Apaches
to the AH-64D Longbow-radar-capable aircraft is continuing through its final stages,
mainly through TADS/PNVS Upgrades, and Airframe Modifications. Funds will also
be spent to develop, test, integrate, and produce a Second Generation FLIR for the
entire fleet of AH-64A and AH-64D aircraft.40
Due to the Comanche cancellation, the Army is planning to upgrade all 501 AH64D Longbow (radar-capable) Apaches to a Block III configuration which the Army
claims “offers all the capabilities that would have been provided by the...Comanche
Block Is, with the exception of low observability.”41 In addition to improvements to
rotor blades and powerplants, the Block III modifications include UAV connectivity
and Future Combat Systems compatibility.42 In addition, the Army plans to rebuild
the AH-64As operated by the National Guard43 which would bring to fruition a

38

See U.S. SOCOM, “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, DefenseWide, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37 (Exhibit P-3A,
Individual Modification, “MH-60 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)”). Cost
breakdown: FY2004: $52.4M; FY2005: $94.4M; FY2006: $24.4M; FY2007: $94.3M;
FY2008: $160.5M; FY2009: $135.7M; To Complete: $470.1M; Total Program: $1,031.9M;
Total Remaining After FY2004: $979.4M. Note that these costs have already been included
as part of the gross total figures outlined above in the SOCOM summary.
39

U.S. SOCOM, “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, Defense-Wide,
Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37 (Exhibit P-3A, Individual
Modification, “Defensive Armed Penetrator (MH-60 Helicopter)”). Budget breakdown:
FY2005: $14.9M; FY2006: $10.5M; Total Program: $53.5M; Total Remaining After
FY2004: $25.4M. Note that these costs have already been included as part of the gross total
figures outlined above in the SOCOM summary.
40

Department of the Army, “AH-64 Mods,” Procurement Programs, Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft Procurement, Army, Feb.
2004, pp. 28-35 (Item No. 8). Budget breakdown: FY2005: $37.2M; FY2006: $152.6M;
FY2007: $133.6M; FY2008: $84.3M; FY2009: $19.4M; Total Program: $1,327.2M; Total
Remaining After FY2004: $427.1M.
41

“Comanche Cancellation Frees Up Billions in U.S. Army Funding for Other Programs,”
Jane’s International Defense Review, April 2004, p. 10.
42

Richard Aboulafia, “Boeing AH-64 Apache,” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing,
December 2003, p. 10. ‘There could also be a Block IV mod, possibly with an external
refueling boom.’
43

“Comanche Cancellation Free Up Billions ...” op.cit. “Briefing on the Restructure and
Revitalization of Army Aviation,” op.cit. for a total of 213 AH-64As to remain after
FY2020.

CRS-11
previously proposed Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for 218 AH-64As in the
Army Reserve and Army National Guard.44
Heavy Helicopters
CH-47 Cargo Helicopter Modifications — This ongoing program centers
around the re-manufacture of the CH-47D fleet to the latest configuration through
safety and operational modifications. While improving overall capability,
maintainability, reliability, and crew/aircraft safety, the program also aims to reduce
O&M costs and extend operational life through 2033 (when the Chinook is scheduled
to be replaced by a new, yet-to-be-determined heavy-lift cargo helicopter).45 Major
modifications include engine and auxiliary power unit upgrades, an extended range
fuel system, an engine filtration system, a low maintenance rotor head, Ballistic
Protection Systems, and blade-folding kits (for maritime operations capabilities). In
addition, this program funds the conversion of 287 CH-47Ds to the CH-47F
Improved Cargo Helicopter (ICH) variant which includes the recapitalization of the
power train and the following systems: auxiliary, electrical/electronic, hydraulic,
pneumatic, structural, and power plant. The modernization program also includes the
conversion of 50 Chinook SOA (i.e. MH-47D and MH-47E) to the MH-47G
variant.46
The Army has proposed scaling back the total number of CH-47F variants to be
procured over the long term to 169 while retaining 259 CH-47D variants. The Army
also plans to buy 26 new Chinooks, 24 of which are to be transferred to SOCOM.47
However, a later report indicated a number of changes in the Army’s plans regarding
the Chinook. First, negotiations were underway with Boeing to produce basically allnew CH-47F Chinooks, rather than having to settle for refurbishment of much of the
aircraft. Second, the Army is buying seven new Chinooks in the near term, with an
expected total buy of 56 platforms. (These include both CH-47Fs and MH-47Gs.)
Lastly, the Army has decided to convert all of its CH-47Ds to the CH-47F
configuration, not just 300, which included the accelerated recapitalization of 19
platforms over the next five years.48

44

See Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA:
Jane’s Information Group, 2003), p. 559.

45

Ibid. p. 556.

46

See Department of the Army, “CH-47 Cargo Helicopter Mods,” Procurement Programs,
Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Request: Aircraft
Procurement, Army, Feb. 2004, pp. 36-53 (Item No. 9). Budget breakdown: FY2005:
$542.7M; FY2006: $605.5M; FY2007: $521.0M; FY2008: $538.5M; FY2009: $842.0M;
To Complete: $5,227.3M; Total Program: $13,858.8M; Total Remaining After FY2004:
$8,227.0M.
47

DOD Briefing Slides, “Briefing on the Restructure and Revitalization of Army Aviation,”
Feb. 23, 2004, at [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2004/g040223-D-6570C.html].
48

Robert Wall, “Almost New: Army Poised to Begin Operational Testing of Enhanced CH47F Chinook,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 5, 2004, p. 43.

CRS-12
MH-47G Special Operations Aircraft (SOA) — Led by SOCOM, this is an
ongoing SLEP which supplements the above-referenced CH-47 Modification
program. It involves a number of additional modifications to MH-47G aircraft
including long range fuel tanks, multimode radar, an IFR boom, special operation
unique communications/navigation systems, survivability equipment, and improved
weapons systems.49
Navy and Marine Corps. Similar to the Army, the Navy also has a few
“common” modernization programs which are applicable to almost every aviation
platform in the fleet, including some fixed-wing aircraft. They are divided into three
sub-headings, including Common Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) Equipment,
Common Avionics Changes, and ID Systems.50
Light Helicopters
H-1 Upgrade — This multi-phased program was initiated in the early 1990s
after the proposed Integrated Weapon System (IWS) was cancelled.51 Within the
2004-2014 timeframe, 100 UH-1N Hueys and 180 AH-1W Super Cobras are to be
re-manufactured into the UH-1Y and AH-1Z models, respectively,52 which will
effectively be “new” aircraft — scheduled to last ‘beyond 2020’ — as each model is
to receive a U.S. government approved 10,000 hour life-span.53 Major modifications
include a new 4-bladed rotor system with semiautomatic blade fold of the new
composite rotor blades, new performance matched transmissions, a new 4-bladed tail
rotor and drive system, upgraded landing gear, and pylon structural modifications.
Both aircraft will also incorporate common, modernized and fully integrated
cockpits/avionics that will reduce operator work load and improve situational

49

U.S. SOCOM, “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, Defense-Wide,
Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37 (Exhibit P-3a, Individual
Modification, “MH-47 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP)”). Budget breakdown:
FY2005: $152.8M; FY2006: $31.2M; FY2007: $31.2M; FY2008: $31.5M; FY2009:
$25.7M; To Complete: $189.1M; Total Program: $945.7M; Total After FY2004: $461.5M.
Note that these costs have already been included as part of the gross total figures outlined
above in the SOCOM summary.
50

See DON, “Common ECM Equipment,” “Common Avionics Changes,” and “ID
Systems,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Justification
of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume II: Budget Activity, Feb. 5, 2004, Item
Nos. 49-51. Budget breakdown (all three inclusive): FY2005: $212.3M; FY2006: $290.6M;
FY2007: $253.5M; FY2008: $234.9M; FY2009: $227.2M; To Complete: $2,018.9M; Total
Programs: $4,689.2M; Total Remaining After FY2004: $3237.4M.
51

See Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA:
Jane’s Information Group, 2003), p. 540.
52

Jason Sherman, “U.S. Marine Corps Will Expedite Utility Helo Buy,” DefenseNews, June
16, 2003, p. 34.
53

MJG, “H-1 Upgrades for U.S. Marines Enters LRIP,” Jane’s International Defense
Review, Jan. 2004, p. 29.

CRS-13
awareness and safety.54 While reducing safety deficiencies and improving operational
capabilities, this commonality of systems — estimated at 84% — also aims to reduce
life-cycle costs as well as logistical footprints, and increase overall maintainability
and deployability.55 Estimated costs per rebuilt platform (both AH-1 and UH-1)
amount to approximately $20.15 million, up from $16.5 million.56
With these upgrades, the overall capabilities of the AH-1Z and the UH-1Y over
the AH-1W and UH-1N, respectively, were estimated to improve as follows:
maximum gross weight increases of 25% and 76%; internal fuel capacity increases
of 32% and 90%; useful load increases up to 39% and 68%; and a 152% increase in
mission radius for the AH-1Z.57 The new AH-1Z will also have an expanded
weapons suite with twice the number of anti-armor missiles and an additional pair
of Stinger air-to-air missiles.58 Low-rate initial production (LRIP) batch of six UH1Ys and three AH-1Zs began in FY2004.59 Future funding requirements for total
numbers of H-1 rebuilds are as follows: 9 in FY2005; 12 in FY2006; 19 in FY2007;
21 in FY2008; 21 in FY2009; and 189 to completion.60 In addition, the Navy has an

54

DON, “UH-1Y/AH-1Z,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget
Activities 1-4, Item No. 7. ‘Additionally, the AH-1Z will upgrade the current Night
Targeting FLIR system to a 3rd generation, staring, focal plane array FLIR that will
significantly extend autonomous weapons engagement ranges.’ These aircraft do not have
radars installed but the ‘possibility exists that Longbow radar will eventually be fitted as a
so-called Cobra Radar System.’ See Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,
2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2003), p. 541.
55

[USMC], Concepts and Issues (Washington, DC: HQ USMC, [Jan/Feb] 2004), p. 174. See
also Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Department of Aviation, HQMC, Aviation
Implementation Plan (Washington, DC: HQ, USMC, n.d.), pp. B-7/8.
56

See DON, “UH-1Y/AH-1Z,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget
Activities 1-4, Item No. 7, for $20.15 million figure (average over life of program) and Katie
Fairbank, “Bell Helicopter to Expand in Amarillo,” The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 9,
2003, for $16.5 million figure.
57

Mark Hewish, “Hueys Transformed for the 21st Century,” International Defense Review,
18 January 2002. The UH-1Y will also be special operations capable. See Christian Lowe,
“Upgraded Huey Approved for Special Ops,” DefenseNews, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 34, and
[Unattributed], “Upgraded Marine Corps Huey Finishes Special Warfare Testing,”
Aerospace Daily, Nov. 25, 2003.
58

Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2003-2004, (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s
Information Group, 2003), p. 540. Upgraded ASE includes ‘AN/ALQ-144(V) IR
countermeasures set’; ‘AN/ALE-39 chaff system’; and a ‘AN/APR-39A(XE2) radar warning
receiver and...AN/AVR-2 laser warner and AN/AAR-47 plume detecting set.’ (see p. 541)
59

Christopher J. Castelli, “DOD Approves First Lot of Low-Rate Production for H-1
Upgrades,” Inside the Navy, Oct. 27, 2003; Jefferson Morris, “DAB Approves H-1 Upgrade
for Low-Rate Initial Production,” Aerospace Daily, Oct. 27, 2003. See Jason Sherman, “U.S.
Marine Corps Will Expedite Utility Helo Buy,” DefenseNews, June 16, 2003, p. 34, for the
original procurement schedule through 2014.
60

See DON, “UH-1Y/AH-1Z,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
(continued...)

CRS-14
ongoing upgrade program (“H-1 Series Modifications”) which includes the
installation of a Navigational Thermal Imaging System (NTIS) as well as a number
of Safety Upgrades, although most of the latter are in the last stages.61
Medium Helicopter
Executive Helicopter Modifications — This program aims to modernize 11 VH3D and eight VH-60N Executive Helicopters primarily through a communications
system upgrade to provide communications commonality between Executive
Helicopters, Air Force One, and N-Cap, Traffic Collision Avoidance System
(TCAS), VH-60 Maintenance Trainer, TACAN Upgrade, GPS Upgrade; and a
tailored electronic warfare (EW) suite. In addition, the VH-60 variants’ cockpits will
be altered to all-glass instrumentation while a further communications upgrade to all
aircraft will include satellite, FM, and high-frequency radio replacements as well as
new data-transfer capability.62
VXX (Executive Helicopter Replacement) — As mentioned previously, the 13
VH-3A/D and eight VH-60N executive transports — operated by the Marines and
the Navy — are scheduled to be replaced by one platform (dubbed the VXX)
beginning in 2008. Two competitors have submitted entries: Sikorsky, with its twinengine S-92 (VH-92) “Superhawk” design and a consortium of Lockheed Martin
Corp., Agusta-Westland (UK-Italy), and Bell Helicopter, with their three-engine US101. Approximately $1.6 billion has been estimated to purchase a total of 23 aircraft,
the first of which is expected to be operating in 2008.63 The Navy plans to buy five
VXX helicopters in FY-05, three in FY-07 and four in FY-08 after a funding transfer

60

(...continued)
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget
Activities 1-4, Feb. 2004, Item No. 7. Budget breakdown: FY2005: 9 aircraft for $250.9M;
FY2006: 12 aircraft for $367.1M; FY2007: 19 aircraft for $480.3M; FY2008: 21 aircraft for
$551.7M; FY2009: 21 aircraft for $454.6M; To Complete: 189 aircraft for $3,206.8M; Total
Program: 280 aircraft for $5,642.0M; Total After FY2004: $5,311.4M.
61

See DON, “H-1 Series Modifications,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005
Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume II:
Budget Activity 5, Feb. 2004, Item No. 32. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $3.5M; FY2006:
$7.4M; FY2007: $7.4M; FY2008: $6.0M; FY2009: $7.6M; To Complete: $27.5M; Total
After FY2004: $55.9M; Total Program: $179.3M. While indicating that there was also an
“AH-1 Series” modification program under Item No. 29, the data displayed was, in fact, an
exact copy of the “H-1 Series” information summarized above, so these figures are
incomplete.
62

See DON, “Executive Helicopter Modifications,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year
(FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume
II: Budget Activity 5, Feb. 2004, Item No. 43. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $21.8M;
FY2006: $17.4M; FY2007: $15.8M; FY2008: $16.2M; FY2009: $16.5M; To Complete:
$23.8M; Total Program: $280.4M; Total Remaining After FY2004: $111.5M.
63

Ron Laurenzo, “Lockheed Martin: U.S. Firms Would Keep US101 Data,” Defense Week
Daily Update, Feb. 5, 2004.

CRS-15
request was made by DOD to accelerate the VXX buy.64 However, this aggressive
plan has been delayed until the end of 2004 because the two competing proposals are
less technically mature than the companies advertised and the Navy expected.65
H/MV-22 Osprey — The V-22 entered Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in
May 1997 which has increased the total number produced to 48. Four have crashed,
however, resulting in 30 fatalities, which has brought the whole program under
repeated scrutiny and continued threats of cancellation. Still, funding to maintain an
absolute minimum production rate (11 or 12 aircraft per annum) has been
forthcoming with 11 aircraft each in FY2003 and FY2004 already appropriated. (Of
the 11 latter aircraft, two were slated for the Air Force for special operations
missions.) Numbers of aircraft still to be funded are estimated as follows: 11 (8
USMC and 3 USAF) in FY2005; 17 (15 and 2) in FY2006; 31 (29 and 2) in FY2007;
35 (30 and 5) in FY2008; and 39 (33 and 6) in FY2009; with 253 (225 and 28)
remaining through completion.66 These numbers assume that the full-rate production
decision — already delayed more than five years — will be approved in November
of 2005. However, doubts have already arisen due to problems discovered in March
2004 which threaten to delay the critical operational evaluation testing scheduled for
April 2005.67 The Navy has also budgeted some limited monies for an MV-22
Modification program (for Block A through C) which procures retrofit kits necessary
to correct discrepancies identified during initial flight testing as well as those
resulting from any redesign efforts.68

64

Jason Ma and Malina Brown, “Zakheim Requests Transfer of Money From MH-60R to
VXX Helicopter,” Inside the Navy, Mar. 8, 2004.
65

Christopher J. Castelli, “Young: Lack of Maturity in Proposals Drove White House Helo
Delay: Navy Seeks to Avoid Messy Protest,” Inside the Navy, Mar. 29, 2004. See also
Robert Wall, “Applying Brakes: Navy Wants More Time, Data, Before Choosing
Presidential Helo,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 29, 2004, p. 30.
66

See DON, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Justification
of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget Activities 1-4, Feb. 2004, Item
Nos. 5 & 6. Budget breakdown: FY2005: 8 aircraft for $1,036.7M; FY2006:15 aircraft for
$1,593.7M; FY2007: 29 aircraft for $2,286.9M; FY2008: 30 aircraft for $2,334.3M;
FY2009: 33 aircraft for $2,381.1M; To Complete: 225 aircraft for $15,353.3M; Total
Program: 408 aircraft for $32,234.9M; Total After FY2004: 340 aircraft for $26,414.196M.
See below for additional funding estimates required for the Air Force and SOCOM
procurement of the CV-22 special operations variant (with modifications). The Navy would
not begin procuring the V-22 until ‘around 2009, but that has remained questionable because
it was always outside the scope of the Navy’s long term budget.’ See Christoper J. Castelli,
“Asked About Navy Missions for V-22, Senior Official Hedges,” Inside the Navy, May 3,
2004.
67

Christopher J. Castelli, “V-22 Osprey Forced to Land in Georgia, Further Delayed by
‘Problem’,” Inside the Navy, Mar. 15, 2004, p. 1. See also Christian Lowe, “Osprey Passes
Test in Flight Deck Wind,” DefenseNews, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 34, and Marc Selinger, “V-22
Osprey Drawing More Interest From Foreign Militaries, Reps Say,” Aerospace Daily, Dec.
2003.
68

See DON, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Justification
of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume II: Budget Activity 5, Feb. 2004, Item No.
(continued...)

CRS-16
H-46 Series Helicopter — This program involves keeping the H-46 Sea Knight
operating until fully replaced by the H-60R. Modifications include upgrading critical
dynamic components, the engine control system, the electrical system, and the
engine; installing on-board vibration monitoring equipment; and replacing the
existing steel plate armor with lighter weight armor.69
Helicopter Master Plan (H-60) — This plan aims to phase out seven aging
helicopter models by 2015: the warship-based SH-60B, the Carrier-based SH-60F
and HH-60H, and amphibious ship-based CH-46D, and the shore-based UH-3H and
HH-1N Huey. Marine Corps officials are deciding whether to replace MH-53E
helicopters.70 The two helicopters slated to replace the aforementioned types are the
MH-60R and the MH-60S. Twelve of the former and eight of the latter will be
attached to a carrier wing, with the R-models operating off of carriers and surface
combatants and the S-models working from carriers and either oilers or other combat
logistics force ships. These aircraft will assume anti-surface warfare, combat searchand-rescue, special warfare and organic airborne mine countermeasures missions.71
MH-60R procurement initially began as a program to re-manufacture between
189 and 289 of the Navy’s SH-60Bs, SH-60Fs, and HH-60Hs into a new, more
capable and more common variant with the introduction of a next-generation
Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) system as well as the integration of
previously-planned “Block II” improvements, including an improved Electronic
Surveillance Measures (ESM) system and a new inverse synthetic aperture radar
(ISAR).72 In June 2001 the Navy reversed course and made the R-model a new-build
program. The stated reason was cost-effectiveness — rebuilt R-model airframes
would cost $17 million, while new aircraft would cost $21 million. Production will
shift to all-new airframes after the first batch of five rebuilds. Initial Operational
Capability (IOC) is scheduled for 2005, with first carrier deployments in 2007.

68

(...continued)
52. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $3.4M; FY2006: $19.1M; FY2007: $23.9M; FY2008:
$24.4M; FY2009: $24.9M; To Complete: $378.8M; Total After FY2004: $474.5M; Total
Program: $535.4M.
69

DON, “H-46 Series Helicopter,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume II: Budget
Activity 5, Feb. 2004, Item No. 28. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $71.2M; FY2006: $52.0M;
FY2007: $47.2M; FY2008: $5.5M; To Complete: $14.8M; Total Program: $822.2M; Total
Remaining After FY2004: $190.7M.
70

Jason Sherman, “U.S. Navy to Increase Helicopter Buys,” DefenseNews, June 9, 2003, p.
52.
71

David Brown, “Dual-Threat Duo,” Navy Times, June 9, 2003, p. 22. The MH-60R could
also be stationed on the future Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) due to its primary ASW [and
ASuW] capabilities.
72

Richard L. Aboulafia, “Sikorsky SH-60/MH-60 Seahawk,” World Military & Civil
Aircraft Briefing (Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Corporation, May 2003), pp. 7-8.

CRS-17
Current plans call for 243 rebuilds.73 In 2003, however, the program encountered
software problems serious enough to abort operational testing.74
The MH-60S (formerly CH-60S) is being procured for fleet combat support,
vertical replenishment and SAR roles. Its mission could be expanded through
airborne mine counter-measure (AMCM)75 and combat search and rescue (CSAR)
add-on kits.76 This aircraft was undergoing an operational assessment — begun in
June of 2003 and scheduled to continue through October 2005 — when it
experienced problems with software integration which not only caused the
assessment to be delayed until at least February of 2005 but also forced the Pentagon
Comptroller to deny a Navy proposal to accelerate the acquisition of MH-60R
variants. While disappointing, this incident apparently does not affect the Navy’s
desire to replace the Navy’s fleets of CH-46D Sea Knights, HH-60H Sea Hawks and
H-3 Sea Kings.77 In fact, it was reported that the 50th MH-60S helicopter was
delivered to the Navy in June of 2003 and that this variant is flying in five Navy
squadrons based in Guam, San Diego and Norfolk.78 Like the newer MH-60R,
however, this aircraft also seemed to have experienced difficulties during testing in

73

Richard L. Aboulafia, “Sikorsky SH-60/MH-60 Seahawk,” World Military & Civil
Aircraft Briefing (Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Corporation, May 2003), p. 8. See DON, “MH60R,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Justification of
Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget Activities 1-4, Feb. 2004, Item
No. 10, for a total of 252 platforms to be procured. Budget breakdown: FY2005: 8 aircraft
for $454.348M; FY2006: 15 aircraft for $688.299M; FY2007: 21 aircraft for $817.301M;
FY2008: 31 aircraft for $1,141.460M; FY2009: 31 aircraft for $1,168.135M; To Complete:
135 aircraft for $4,066.131M; Total Program: $9,191.991M; Total After FY2004:
$8,335.674M.
74

Robert Wall, “Report Card: Helicopter Vulnerability to Air Defenses Is Drawing The
Interest of the Pentagon’s Test Community,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Feb. 2,
2004, p. 55.
75

The first flight of the AMCM variant of the MH-60S occurred in late summer of 2003. See
Greg Couteau and Michele Savage, “New Helicopter Will Hunt Mines,” DefenseNews,
Aug. 4, 2003, p. 26.
76

‘The Navy plans to buy 52 armed helicopter/CSAR mission kits for delivery between
2003 and 2009. Plans call for 110 of the 237 MH-60S helicopters to be compatible with the
kits. The new CSAR-capable helicopters should replace all HH-60Hs in active-duty
squadrons by fiscal 2012.’ Frank Colucci, “Joint Mission, Different Strategies: Services
Plan Upgrades for Life-Saving Helicopters,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2003, pp. 47-48.
77

Amy Butler, “MH-60R Hits Snags in Operational Assessment, Acceleration Off the
Table,” Defense Daily [online], Jan. 15, 2004. While this article had a total number of 254
platforms to be procured, official documents budget for only 237 aircraft. See DON, “MH60S Vertical Replenishment (MYP),” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume I: Budget
Activities 1-4, Feb. 2004, Item No. 8. Budget breakdown: FY2005: 15 aircraft for
$419.392M; FY2006: 26 aircraft for $627.129M; FY2007: 30 aircraft for $690.496M;
FY2008: 30 aircraft for $661.289M; FY2009: 40 aircraft for $888.990M; To Complete: 18
aircraft for $357.010M; Total Program: $5,557.498M; Total Remaining After FY2004:
$3,644.306M.
78

Couteau and Savage, op.cit. p. 26.

CRS-18
late 2003 when testers determined that the MH-60S was not operationally suitable.
But the failing grade was linked less to the aircraft than to supply problems. The
helicopter itself was characterized as operationally effective and survivable.79
Heavy Helicopters
H-53 Modifications — While most of the individual programs in this upgrade
effort were last funded in FY2004, there are still three programs ongoing. These
include a new radio system to improve inter-communications with other services (for
all three types of H-53), engine housing improvements to reduce maintenance (for
the CH-53E and MH-53E variants), and the Helicopter Night Vision System for allweather capability (for the CH-53E variant).80
CH-53(X) Super Stallion Remanufacture — Although the Marine Corps had
been considering a major upgrade for the CH-53E fleet,81 it was reported in March
2004 that the Marine Corps was instead launching a program to replace its heavy-lift
helicopter fleet with a substantially redesigned version of the CH-53 Super Stallion.
The Marine Corps plans to buy 154 new CH-53s.The new CH-53(X)will look like
the current E variant but otherwise will be a new aircraft. This plan rescinds the
previous plan for a SLEP that would have kept the original airframes and replaced
the engines, rotor blades and cockpit, at approximately $43 million per aircraft, or
$6.6 billion for a 154-helicopter order. The decision to build new aircraft may be
based more on the existing aircraft’s reliability challenges, and the resulting
maintenance burden, than a need for a more capable aircraft. The new helicopter is
hoped to be twice as reliable and have a 10 percent smaller logistics footprint than
today’s CH-53E.82
Air Force. The Air Force operates DOD’s smallest helicopter fleet.
Light Helicopters
UH-1N Huey — This program, which centers on tail boom replacements for all
62 helicopters, also includes night vision instrumentation and other low cost
modifications. These alterations, plus others being completed in FY2004, are hoped
79

Robert Wall, “Report Card: Helicopter Vulnerability to Air Defenses Is Drawing The
Interest of the Pentagon’s Test Community,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, Feb. 2,
2004, p. 55.
80

DON, “H-53 Modifications,” Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget
Estimates, Justification of Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Volume II: Budget
Activity 5, Feb. 2004, Item No. 30. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $9.8M; FY2006: $9.0M;
FY2007: $7.7M; FY2008: $15.9M; FY2009: $16.2M; To Complete: $61.9M; Total
Program: $505.0M; Total After FY2004: $120.5M. There is also a FY2005 funding request
for $2.5M for the installation of two Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) kits on the CH53 variant. See Item 48, p. 4.
81

Frank Colucci, “Joint Mission, Different Strategies: Services Plan Upgrades for LifeSaving Helicopters,” Armed Forces Journal, May 2003, p. 48.
82

Christian Lowe, “U.S. Marines to Buy Redesigned CH-53,” DefenseNews, Mar. 1, 2004,
p. 34.

CRS-19
to enhance operational capability while improving flight safety, reliability, and
maintainability.83 According to an official source, the fleet of 62 aircraft is to be
sustained until a new Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP), is funded
and fielded.84 One report, however, indicated that the Air Force was also
considering leasing helicopters to replace its Hueys.85
Medium Helicopters
CV-22 Osprey — Funding for the first two Air Force CV-22s was appropriated
in FY2004. Plans for future production of the Air Force’s CV-22 variant include
funding for three aircraft in FY2005, two in FY2006, two in FY2007, five in
FY2008, six in FY2009 and another 28 in the out years to complete the planned
procurement of 48.86 In addition to procurement, the Air Force has a modification
program in place which consists of a few low cost modifications (and
reprogrammings) which were begun in FY2004 and a future upgrade, scheduled to
begin in FY2007.87 SOCOM also has a number of modifications planned for the CV22 variants once they are procured. These SOF- unique systems include such items
as ‘terrain following radar [and] electronic and infrared warfare suites as well as
additional support and training equipment.88
HH-60G Modifications — This program funds a number of ongoing
modifications — most of which are nearing completion — while initiating two new
ones. Included in the former are new FLIR systems for 48 aircraft, SLEPs for 10-12
aircraft, new Lightweight Airborne Recovery Systems for 11 aircraft, improved
communications and navigation systems and integrated electronic warfare systems
83

See USAF, “H-1,” Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget
Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Volume II, Feb. 2004, pp. 541-549 (Item No.
55). Budget breakdown: FY2005: $6.575M; FY2006: $8.668M; FY2007: $14.955M;
FY2008: $11.385M; FY2009: $11.371M; Total After FY2004: $52.954M. The alterations
being completed in FY2004 included reprogrammings and seat replacement.
84

Email, dated Dec. 19, 2003, sent to CRS by Lt. Col. Daniel K. Elwell, SAF/LLW, USAF.

85

Gail Kaufman, “U.S. May Seek Lease to Replace Hueys,” DefenseNews, Jan. 27, 2004,
p. 9.
86

See USAF, “CV-22 (Osprey),” Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005
Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Volume I, Feb. 2004, Item Nos. 10 and
11. Budget breakdown: FY2005: 3 aircraft for $360.0M; FY2006: 2 aircraft for $253.9M;
FY2007: 2 aircraft for $286.4M; FY2008: 5 aircraft for $517.0M; FY2009: 6 aircraft for
$523.8M; To Complete: 28 aircraft for $2,362.7M; Total Program: 48 aircraft for
$4,755.7M; Total Remaining After FY2004: 46 aircraft for $4,303.7M.
87

No details on these modifications were provided. See USAF, “CV-22,” Committee Staff
Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates, Aircraft Procurement, Air Force,
Volume II, Feb. 2004, p. 597 (Item No. 59). Budget breakdown: FY2005: $0.3M; FY2006:
$1.9M; FY2007: $4.3M; FY2008: $4.6M; FY2009: $4.8M; Total to Completion: $16.2;
Total Program: 16.2M; Total Remaining After FY2004: $15.8M.
88

U.S. SOCOM, Procurement, Defense-Wide, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb.
2004, Item No. 40. Budget breakdown: FY2005: $126.083M; FY2006: $122.299M;
FY2007: $162.419M; FY2008: $200.094M; FY2009: $160.503M; Total For FY2005FY2009 Period: $771.398M.

CRS-20
for all 105 aircraft, and new ASE for 82 aircraft. The latter include a new Dual
Engine Control Unit (to maximize power during emergency/constrained situations)
for 104 aircraft and gearbox, rotor-brake and [new] engines for 41 aircraft.89
Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV) — This program aims to procure up to 194
long-range helicopters to replace the Air Force’s 104 aging HH-60G Pave Hawks and
62 UH-1N aircraft for CSAR and security/VIP personnel transport missions,
respectively.90 Program documents have indicated that this aircraft is to have a
minimum combat radius of 325 nautical miles (~397 miles), a self-deployment
capability of 4,000 nautical miles (~4,603 miles), a 24-hour mission-readiness
capability, a high degree of information exchange interoperability, and significant
restrictions on the aircraft’s downwash so as to minimize interference with rescue
hoist operations while hovering.91 The program is expected to cost $6 billion, one of
the largest helicopter contracts in recent years.92 The Air Force expects to set up a
system program office, possibly as early as the end of FY2004, receive initial R&D
funding in FY2005, receive first production deliveries in FY2012, and attain initial
operating capability in 2014.93
Heavy Helicopters
MH-53Modifications — The Air Force completed funding for the replacement
of obsolete IFF systems for 36 aircraft in FY2004.94 SOCOM also completed funding
for conversion of the fleet from the -J to -M variant in FY2004 while planning to
complete funding of the Directed Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) system
procurement and installation in FY2005 for all aircraft.95 An official source indicated

89

See USAF, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates,
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Volume II, Feb. 2004, pp. 551-567. Budget breakdown:
FY2005: $95.1M; FY2006: $40.8M; FY2007: $10.5; FY2008: $8.4M; FY2009: $4.0M;
Total After FY2004: $158.8M; Total Program: $647.6M. These figures also include ‘Low
Cost Modifications’ which could consist of ‘gun mount and ammunition handling system[s]
(for .50 caliber and 7.62mm weapons); and interior and exterior lighting for use with NVS.’
See Gail Kaufman, “USAF Speeds Up Rescue Helicopter Contest,” DefenseNews, Mar. 22,
2004, p. 20.
90

Megan Scully and Gail Kaufman, “Battle Fatigue: U.S. Fleet to Get $1.4B Overhaul,”
DefenseNews, Mar. 22, 2004, p. 38. See email, dated Dec. 19, 2003, from Lt. Col. Daniel
K. Elwell, USAF, Secretary of the Air Force/Legislative Liaison, Weapons, to CRS.
91

Hampton Stevens, “Air Force Fleshes Out Personnel Recovery Vehicle Requirements:
Range, Deployability are Key,” Inside the Air Force, Apr. 26, 2004.
92

See Stevens, “Air Force...”, and Scully and Kaufman, “Battle Fatigue,” p. 38.

93

Staff Sgt. Melanie Streeter, USAF, “Replacements Sought for Aging Helicopters,” Air
Force Print News, Dec. 17, 2003. This program may actually become part of a future
“common helicopter” concept.
94

See USAF, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book, FY 2005 Budget Estimates,
Aircraft Procurement, Air Force, Volume II, Feb. 2004, pp. 569 and 575.
95

See U.S. SOCOM, “Rotary Wing Upgrades and Sustainment,” Procurement, DefenseWide, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates, Feb. 2004, Item No. 37. Budget breakdown:
(continued...)

CRS-21
that numbers of MH-53s would be reduced to 33 in FY2009, 26 in FY2010, 20 in
FY2011, 12 in FY2012, and 7 in FY2013 as the CV-22 comes online.96
Conceptual Programs. The programs described earlier in the modernization
section of this paper have been represented in past and current budget request
submissions. The following programs have not been included in procurement budget
requests, but may gain traction in what appears to be a turbulent helicopter
modernization environment.
Future Utility Rotorcraft (FUR) — This program was formerly known as the
UH-60X which was designated as the possible follow-on to the UH-60M variant. A
total of 256 were originally required but the program was unfunded and projected by
some to be unlikely to enter inventory until 2025.97 Due to the February 2004
cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche program, there was mention of a Joint
Multirole Helicopter program to begin around 2020 but the purpose of this helicopter
program and its relationship with current aircraft is unclear.98
Common Vertical Lift Aircraft (CVLA)/Joint Replacement Aircraft (JRA)
[USN/USMC] — The Navy’s Common Vertical Lift Aircraft [CVLA] may replace
the UH-1N and A[H]-1W. It may support the helicopter air-to-air and air-to-ground
mission, troop transport, and search and rescue function. It may also be a candidate
to incorporate tilt-rotor technology developed under the V-22 program, and
production start is projected for about the 2015 time frame.99
CH-47X Program — This is a proposed follow-on program to CH-47F in
response to diversion of funds from Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR) [see below].
Maximum take off weight would be near 31 tons (68,000 lb), which would require
a new engine, as well as new components, such as a four-blade rotor system.100 In
comparison, the largest Chinook so far envisaged would only be able to transport
13.5 tons approximately 500 kms, although it could be fielded as early as 2015 at an
estimated cost of $55 million a piece.101 This would fall far short of the desired
capabilities for the Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR) it was intended to replace.

95

(...continued)
FY2004: $77.797M; FY2005: $0.599M; Total After FY2003: $78.396M.
96

See email, dated Dec.19, 2003, from Lt. Col. Daniel K. Elwell, USAF, Secretary of the
Air Force/Legislative Liaison, Weapons, to CRS.
97

Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s
Information Group, 2003), p. 720.
98

See DOD briefing transcript, “Briefing on the Restructuring and Revitalization of Army
Aviation,” Feb. 23, 2004, at [http://www.DOD.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040223-0484.html]
99

John Pike, “Joint Replacement Aircraft [JRA] Common Vertical Lift Aircraft [CVLA],”
[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/jra.htm], Oct. 21, 2002.
100

Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World Aircraft, 2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s
Information Group, 2003), p. 556.
101

Andrew Koch and Jashua Kucera, “Pentagon Explores Joint Heavylift Aircraft Options,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 14, 2004.

CRS-22
Joint Transport Rotorcraft (JTR)/Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR)/Air
Maneuver Transport (AMT) — Originally called the Joint Transport Rotorcraft
(JTR), the Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR) was intended to replace the CH-47
Chinook as a centerpiece heavy-lift helicopter for transporting the Army’s 20-ton
Future Combat System (FCS) series of armored fighting vehicles. Deliveries are
supposed to begin by 2020 as the SLEPs for the CH-47s and CH-53Es are due to end
in the 2020-2025 time frame. Although it could have a strategic deployment
capability up to 2,100 nautical miles, it is likely to be primarily a tactical helicopter
with a combat radius of 500-1,000 kilometers. The FTR will be designed to carry a
10 to 20 ton internal combat payload or outsized external loads over its combat radius
in challenging conditions. It will carry loads up to the size of fully loaded 22.4 ton
containers over shorter distances, for logistics distribution and re-supply, recovery,
and logistics-over-the-shore operations.102 In January 2004, it was reported that the
DOD, through its Joint Vertical Airlift Task Force, was considering a number of
options for a heavy-lift FTR which included (a) a larger Chinook that could carry
only 13.5 tons (see above); (b) a new Air Maneuver Transport (AMT) rotorcraft that
could carry 20 tons, had a range of 500 km., and cost an estimated $91 million per
copy (although it was too slow to keep up with the U.S. Marine Corps’ V-22
Osprey); (c) a tilt-rotor version of the AMT — sometimes referred to as the
Advanced Theater Transport (ATT), built by Boeing — which would meet all
requirements at an estimated cost of $101 million per aircraft but not be ready for
fielding until 2025; and (d) a Quad Tilt-Rotor (QTR) aircraft — built by Boeing as
a larger version of its V-22 (and sometimes referred to as a V-44) — which would
also meet all requirements and cost an estimated $100-110 million per aircraft.103
Another concept involves the Sikorsky Super Heavy Lift Crane helicopter,
which is designed to carry as much as a 20 ton combat platform externally. The Super
Heavy Lift Crane could be mated with a high speed sealift ship to provide
expeditionary capabilities for the Army. This paper design resembles the Sikorsky
CH-54A Skycrane, but features a coaxial rotor system and small fuselage.With the
capacity to lift a 20 ton payload — the weight of an army Future Combat Systems
platform — as far as 500 nm, it would exceed the 15 ton capacity and 110 nm range
of the U.S. Marine Corps’ CH-53X upgrade.104 Another concept uses Reverse
Velocity Rotor (RVR) technology which allows helicopters to travel much faster than
conventionally possible, by using a hybrid eight-blade RVR helicopter with fixed
wings and two fuselage-mounted turboprop engines. The resulting aircraft would

102

Aviation Applied Technology Directorate [U.S. Army], “Future Transport Rotorcraft,”at
[http://www.aatd.eustis.army.mil/Business/FactSheets/FTR/FTR.asp].
103

Andrew Koch and Jashua Kucera, “Pentagon Explores Joint Heavylift Aircraft Options,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 14, 2004. See also Mike Hirschberg, “From the Past to the
Future of Heavy Lift, Part Three: Heavy Lift Helicopters,” Vertiflite, Spring 2002, at
[http://www.vtol.org/vertiflite/]; and Scott R. Gourley, “V-44,” Popular Mechanics, no date,
at [http://www.popularmechanics.com]. Provisional specifications for the V-44 include a
cargo capacity of 40,000 lbs. (i.e. one AH-64, AH-1, RAH-66, UH-1Y, or UH-60 helicopter;
or 90 troops; or three HMMWVs). See Paul Jackson (ed.), Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft,
2003-2004 (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 2003), pp. 541-2.
104

Kim Burger, “Unveiled: Helicopter, Sealift Combination for the Future,” Jane’s Navy
International, Sept. 1, 2003.

CRS-23
have cargo-carrying capacity equivalent to a C-130J transport aircraft.105 The course
for this platform is still undecided, although the latest performance goals seem to
revolve around a 20-24 ton carrying capacity, a 2,100 nautical mile range (~2,416
miles) with 20 minutes of hovering time, and a cruising speed of 170 knots (~195
mph).106
Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) [USMC] — As discussed above, the Army is
examining a heavy-lift helicopter replacement/procurement program which aims to
satisfy weight and range requirements in transporting the FCS (20 tons apiece) into
battle. While the Marines may have similar weight and range requirements, they must
also require a minimum speed in order to keep up with the MV-22B Osprey. As such,
of the aforementioned concepts for heavy-lift, VTOL-capable aircraft, only the QTR
seems to satisfy the speed requirement.
CH-53X Super Stallion Remanufacture — Over the next few years, the CH53D/E will undergo a Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP) which will most
likely result in a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). This is necessary to
maintain a heavy-lift capability past the time that the current Super Stallion fleet
begins to retire (i.e. FY2011-2012 and at least until the Heavy Lift Replacement
(HLR) has been developed. During this interim period, the MV-22B is scheduled to
replace the remaining CH-53Ds, thereby completely taking over the medium-lift
(troop) transport mission from the CH-53Es which have been operating in the multimission role.107

Issues for Congress
The modernization programs outlined above suggest a number of issues that
may compete for congressional attention. These issues include budgetary concerns,
whether there is adequate coordination among the Services, how modernization may
effect the helicopter industrial base, and a number of operational considerations such
as whether the envisioned programs will adequately improve operational
shortcomings identified in recent conflicts.

Budgetary Issues
The helicopter modernization plans and programs described in this paper
account for approximately $34.6 billion in spending between FY2005 and FY2009.

105

Andrew Koch, “Ship-to-Objective Lift Still A Key Issue, Says U.S. Study,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, Aug. 27, 2003, pp. 28-29.

106

Robert Wall, “Appetite for Aviation: U.S. Army Juggles Operational Demands With
Desire to Overhaul, Buy New Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 5, 2004,
pp. 35-36. For more information about the FTR and related concepts see Jon Grossman et
al., Vertical Envelopment and the Future Transport Rotorcraft: Operational Considerations
for the Objective Force (Santa Monica, CA: Arroyo Center, RAND, 2003).
107

Deputy Commandant for Aviation, USMC, Aviation Implementation Plan (Washington,
DC: HQMC, USMC, [2000]), pp. B-5/6.

CRS-24
Generally at issue is whether these planned expenditures are appropriate and
acceptable in light of current and projected federal and DOD budget constraints.
Second, DOD is facing what many both in DOD and in Congress have called a
budgetary “train wreck,” caused by too many programs vying for already scarce
funds.108 A review of DOD’s most recent estimates indicates that current aviation
acquisition programs total $563 billion in past, current, and anticipated costs.109
Additional budgetary complications competing in general with helicopter
modernization, are the mounting costs of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which
the administration estimates will require at least another $25 billion in supplemental
costs.110
The anticipated cost of helicopter modernization, especially in light of the
budget pressures described above, generate a number of questions that may arise in
the course of congressional oversight. For example, can and should the current plans
be modified to reduce costs? Are there cases where helicopter modernization can be
postponed? The Services, and their proponents are likely to argue that modernization
can’t be postponed. They would likely note that military helicopter deliveries were
cut almost in half during the 1990s,111 and that many 1970s era helicopters face block
obsolescence without modernization.
Can modernization methods that incur more costs in the near term, such as the
design and manufacture of new helicopters, be replaced by modernization approaches
that incur lower near term costs? Upgrades and Service Life Extension Programs
(SLEPs) are two potential examples. Can the services more aggressively pursue
technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that may (and some argue
may not) be cheaper than manned helicopter? For example, some questions could be
raised about the cost effectiveness of the proposed Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter
program. Some could contend that the Army already has existing platforms or
programs which, when augmented by technologies from the cancelled Comanche
program, would probably permit them to satisfy the armed reconnaissance
helicopter’s missions. Three examples include the Block III AH-64 Apache, the
additional reconnaissance capabilities in the Fire Scout unmanned aerial rotorcraft,
and the Extended-Range Multi-Purpose UAVs, although the latter itself might face

108

See, for example: John W. Douglass, “The Reports Of Our Demise Have
Been...”Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 26, 2004. Rep. Curt Weldon, quoted in
Lorenzo Cortes, “GAO Official Says Adding Ground Attack To F/A-22 Costs $8 Billion,”
Defense Daily, Mar. 26, 2004. Interview with Gen. (Ret.) Russell Dougherty, Aerospace
America, Oct. 2003, p. 14.

109

Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Summary Tables, Department of Defense OUSD
(AT&L) as of Sept. 30, 2003. pp.3-4.

110

For more information, see CRS Report RL32090, FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations
for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations &
Reconstruction Assistance.

111

“World Rotorcraft Overview,” World Military and Civil Aircraft Briefing, Teal Group
Inc., July 2003, p.8.

CRS-25
scrutiny as a new UAV program among the many that have been facing pressure to
consolidate.112
Another question is how much more reduction in force structure, or
consolidation in terms of the number of different aircraft types can be pursued as a
cost saving measure. Through consolidating its helicopter fleet from seven to only
two types of helicopters, the Navy hopes to realize operations and maintenance
savings estimated at $18 to $20 billion over a twenty year period.113 If inventory
numbers fall as part of this consolidation, however, does spending on readiness have
to increase to maintain the same capability? If so, how much would that defray O&M
savings? Could the Army field an “all Black Hawk force?” If so, what would be the
savings over a heterogeneous force?
Another issue is how the approximately $14.6 billion in procurement funds
resulting from the Comanche cancellation should be invested. The Army has
produced a plan for spending that $14.6 billion on modernizing most of the other
helicopters in its fleet and initiating new helicopter programs such as the LUH and
the armed reconnaissance helicopter. Yet, some question whether the funds made
available from the Comanche cancellation are sufficient to adequately subsidize the
Army’s stated aviation ambitions.114 The Office of Management and Budget
requested a reallocation of the $1.2 billion in requested Comanche FY2005 R&D
spending. These funds would be reallocated to purchase helicopter aircraft
survivability equipment, and additional helicopters, and to upgrade and accelerate
helicopter recapitalization.115 Yet, the Army would require additional funding
reallocation to fund other aviation objectives, such as accelerating tactical UAV
programs.
Some may find, however, that more urgent problems, either within Army (e.g.
funding the Future Combat System) or outside the Army (e.g. general war costs)
offer more compelling demands for these funds. It is currently not clear whether
Congress will reallocate some portion, or even all, of the funds made available by the
Comanche cancellation to programs outside of Army aviation.
A final question pertains to funding mechanisms. Might the budgetary tensions
presented above generate increased pressure for legislators to adopt new, or
previously controversial funding approaches to satisfy DOD’s helicopter
modernization plans? For example, leasing, rather than procuring military helicopters
may become more attractive to some legislators because a lease typically requires less
money “up front” than does a procurement contract. It may be, for example, that the

112

Emily Hsu, “FCS to Retain Initial Comanche Capabilities,” Inside the Army [online],
Mar. 29, 2004.

113

Email communication from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (LA 558) Naval Aviation
Programs to CRS, May 6, 2004.
114

One immediate problem is that terminating the Comanche program will incur cancellation
fees which could reduce the amount of anticipated savings.

115

Letter from Joshua B. Bolten, Director, Office of Management and Budget to Honorable
J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mar. 5, 2004.

CRS-26
lack of near-term budget in the Air Force procurement account was one factor that
stimulated policy makers to pursue the controversial lease of 100 Boeing KC-767
aerial refueling aircraft, instead of the more traditional procurement. Congress has
also traditionally demanded that DOD pursue a full funding principle in its
procurement programs, so not to “tie the hands” of future congresses. Yet, exceptions
to full funding, called incremental funding have been allowed in some circumstances,
such as the eventual KC-767 “20/80 compromise.” Incremental funding profiles
typically allow a more even authorization of funds over time than full funding
profiles, which can be advantageous in budget constrained environments.116 Critics,
however, note that this approach limits future flexibility and may foreclose future
options.

Force Structure
DOD’s current helicopter modernization plans may raise questions on future
force structure. The rationale behind the planned numbers for some future helicopter
inventories is unclear and may be subject to examination. For example, the current
aviation modernization plan indicates that the Army will procure approximately 456
fewer attack/reconnaissance helicopters than it currently fields. This is almost a 35%
decrease in the current force structure. It is likely that this smaller inventory is
anticipated to be as effective as the larger force due to helicopter improvements and
through the effective exploitation of UAVs. But, is this the case? Is this smaller force
enough to maintain or improve combat capabilities? Can the Army accurately predict
and quantifiably demonstrate that this smaller force is as or more lethal than the
larger force? If not, does the Army have a hedging strategy? If desired improvements
in future helicopter programs do not come to fruition, or if UAVs become more
difficult to exploit, or are not as effective as hoped, will the Army procure more
attack/reconnaissance helicopters?
Recent press reports describe some Army techniques for increasing the
effectiveness of smaller helicopter forces. These techniques include improvements
to radar, infrared sensors, and communications. Changes to doctrine and concepts of
operation may also be utilized. Training and experimentation with tactics and
doctrine has been conducted for the Korean peninsula, as one example, and these
lessons learned may be applicable elsewhere.
Operating in smaller formations would reduce the exposure of helicopters to air
defenses and allow the Army to overwhelm North Korean forces by attacking
from multiple directions....The goal would be to mass fires, not mass
formations....The concept of smaller formations is critical in Korea and other
mountainous environments [e.g. Afghanistan] where there is a limited number
of valleys helicopters can fly through to reach a target, making them more
vulnerable to air-defense traps. Because an adversary could probably not cover

116

See CRS Report RL31404, on the full funding principle, and CRS Report RL32056 on
the KC-767 lease.

CRS-27
every possible approach, splitting the force should allow at least some to engage
the enemy unimpeded.117

Conversely, the Navy appears to be adding, rather than reducing helicopter force
structure. The Navy currently plans to replace 386 legacy aircraft with 497 MH60R/S helicopters. What is the Navy’s justification for purchasing 111 more
multipurpose helicopters than are required today? Typically, more effective aircraft
are purchased in smaller quantities than the legacy aircraft they replace. Does the
Navy foresee the requirement for this kind of capability increasing?
The Army’s aviation modernization plan does not indicate how many Joint
Vertical Airlift Task Forces (JVATF) it will equip. The Army does indicate that 303
LUH platforms will be procured, but this is just one of several helicopters that will
populate the JVTAF. The apportionment of the various utility helicopters among the
JFATF’s is not currently clear. Congress may opt to inquire into this issue to
determine the depth and maturity of Army plans.
Finally, a question remains about force structure coordination. The Services are
making plans that may significantly alter the size of their individual helicopter
inventories over the coming decades. Are these plans, and their potential force
structure implications, being adequately coordinated and considered by the Joint Staff
or Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure maximum operational, economic, and
industrial benefit?

Coordination of Modernization Efforts
Diversity and competition among the armed services can often be positive.
Diversity can complicate our adversary’s planning, and the creative friction from
competition can lead to new and improved warfighting approaches. In weapons
acquisition and modernization, however, the savings and efficiencies derived by
coordination and jointness often are more beneficial than the fruits of diversity and
competition.
All the services are pursuing or have initiated helicopter modernzation
programs. Some of these plans are broad in scope and effect helicopter programs for
decades. At issue is whether there is sufficient coordination among these programs
to realize maximum benefit. Do opportunities exist for closer coordination? If so,
would this coordination save money or result in increased “jointness”?
As described in the previous section of this report, the services already fly many
of the same helicopters, and plans to consolidate the number of types of helicopters
will perpetuate this state of affairs. There appear to be, however, several
opportunities for increased consolidation that may be explored.
One possible approach to increased consolidation reflects the fact that all
helicopters in the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (formerly INS and

117

Robert Wall, “Combat-Ready: Distributed Helo Ops May Yield Enhanced Combat
Effectiveness,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr. 12, 2004, pp. 68-69.

CRS-28
Customs), Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard are now managed by the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). All told, the CBP fields at least six different types of helicopters, including
eight MH-68A Sting Rays (Agusta A-109E), a number of HH-60J Jayhawks, a
number of Coast Guard cutter-fielded HH-65A Dolphins, 26 Eurocopter AS-350B1s
(with four new AS-350B2s being purchased), some legacy OH-6As, one Bell UH-1H
Huey, and some legacy OH-6As as well as their modernized sister-ships, the MD500Es and MD-600Ns (with NOTAR systems).118 Would it be plausible and cost
effective to integrate helicopter purchases with another service or services in order
to consolidate the number of platforms being operated both on land and at sea?
H-1 Helicopters. As described in the background section, the Army and Navy
plan to divest themselves of their aging UH-1 fleets.119 The Army will either replace
UH-1 with a UH-60 variant or the LUH, and USN will replace its UH-1s with the
MH-60. The Marine Corps plans to upgrade its H-1 helicopters to last beyond 2020
and the Air Force will sustain its H-1 fleet until planned replacement in 2014 by a
version of the PRV.
These plans may prompt the following questions. First, why are the Army and
the Air Force pursuing two new and separate UH-1 replacement programs? Have the
services explored the efficacy of cancelling either the LUH or the Common Vertical
Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) and making the survivor a joint program? Along the
same line of inquiry, Congress may probe why the Army developing the LUH. Prior
to the announcement of the intended Comanche cancellation, the Army planned on
replacing the UH-1 with a UH-60 variant and creating an “all Blackhawk” fleet. A
homogenous fleet based on a proven platform — one that is flown by the Navy and
Air Force — appears to offer the potential for O&M savings.
Similarly, the Marine Corps could consider replacing its H-1 helicopters with
the MH-60S, as the Navy is doing, and achieve increased commonality with its sister
service. Alternatively, the Marine Corps could participate in the Army’s LUH, the
Air Force’s Common Vertical Lift Support Platform program, or preferably, a joint
program derived from either the Army or Air Force program.
There are a number of options that some observers maintain the Marines could
consider to replace the AH-1 Cobras sooner rather than later, and facilitate the
expedited retirement of H-1 airframes from DOD’s inventory. For example, the
Marine Corps could consider the AH-60 “Battlehawk,” developed by Sikorsky for
the Australian Army. If Congress decides to block the Comanche retirement and the
Army continues operating the OH-58D, the Marine Corps could consider that aircraft
as an alternative to the AH-1. Finally, the Marine Corps could consider replacing the
Super Cobra with the AH-64. The Apache’s mission has already been expanded to
include maritime missions. Apaches in South Korea are prepared to defeat North

118

David Hughes, “New Umbrella For a Variety of Enforcement Agencies Highlights Helo
Use in All Cases,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Mar. 15, 2004, pp. 48-51.

119

While Army plans indicate that UH-1s will be retired, it has also been reported that the
Bell 210 helicopter, essentially an overhauled UH-1, may be a contender for the LUH
program.

CRS-29
Korean special operations boats.120 The Marines and Army operate the same main
battle tanks, might there be both economic and operational opportunities inherent in
operating the same “main battle helicopters?”
H-6 Helicopters. The Army operates the only H-6 helicopters in DOD’s
inventory. While this small fleet (approximately 40 aircraft) is being upgraded, no
mention of it has been made as part of the Army’s new aviation modernization plan.
Are specialized observation/light attack helicopters still required in an era of
increased use of UAVs for this mission? If so, could the H-6’s be retired and replaced
by a variant of the Army’s LUH? Or, preferably, could the H-6’s be replaced by a
variant of a joint Army, and Air Force program? Conversely, some argue that the H-6
is an attractive candidate to replace OH-58s through the Army’s Light Armed
Reconnaissance Helicopter (LARH) program, which is expected to be fielded in 2007
with a total of 368 units procured.
Army and Air Force H-60 Helicopters. Another coordination issue
concerns the Air Force’s planned acquisition of up to 194 new aircraft, primarily to
replace its 101 aging HH-60G Pave Hawk CSAR helicopters (but also to replace its
62 UH-1N Hueys). Eighty seven percent of the HH-60G’s components are identical
to the Army’s primary troop/utility transport, the UH-60.121 Air Force long-range
planners claim that ‘it would be more cost-effective to buy the new aircraft than to
fly the HH-60G Pave Hawk, today’s CSAR aircraft, beyond 2011 or 2012.’122
However, the potential savings from continuing to operate the same aircraft across
services may outweigh the savings for one service in acquiring a new helicopter.
Heavy Lift Helicopters. Although it is a joint effort, the V-22 Osprey
program does not include all of DOD’s users of heavy lift helicopters. The Army is
noticeably absent from this program. The Army is planning to build a future heavylift helicopter to carry its Future Combat System (FCS). The Army has used a
number of names to describe this future heavy lifter, including the Joint Transport
Rotorcraft (JTR)/Future Transport Rotorcraft (FTR)/Air Maneuver Transport (AMT).
Might the V-22, if it successfully enters production, adequately fulfill the Army’s
future heavy lift requirements? Procuring a V-22 variant would amortize the sunk
R&D costs over a larger production run and reduce the per-unit cost. Additionally,
operating the same heavy-lift helicopter in three services could result in O&M
savings rather than operating heterogeneous heavy lift fleets.
The Navy and Marine Corps may be pursuing different solutions to its aging H53 fleets. The Navy is currently considering replacing its H-53 with the MH-60R/S.
The Marine Corps is considering a service life extension program for its H-53s, a
more comprehensive retrofit, and new production of the same design. Can a
combination of MH-60s and V-22’s satisfy the Marine Corps’ needs? Alternatively,

120

Robert Wall. “Better Defense, Better Offense,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Apr.
12, 2004, pp. 64-66.

121

Gail Kaufman, “USAF Speeds Up Rescue Helicopter Contest,” DefenseNews, Mar. 22,
2004, p. 20.

122

Ibid.

CRS-30
might the Navy cooperate with the Marine Corps in building a larger number of new
H-53s, and thus reduce per unit costs? What synergy might be derived from
participating in a new Army heavy lift program, as mentioned above?

Industrial Base Issues
The helicopter modernization programs outlined in this paper raise several
questions that pertain to the U.S. industrial base. What impact, if any, will planned
helicopter modernization have on jobs, growth, and competition? Conversely, how
much of a consideration should industrial base factors be in determining
modernization strategies?
Some industry observers predict “respectable growth” in military helicopter
production from 2003 to 2012 compared to the 1993-2002 period.123 Up to 8,700
helicopters worth $78 billion are projected to be built world wide. Would the
cancellation of the Comanche have a negative or positive impact on this projection?
Would it cut jobs or actually create jobs? Many observers assert that, if the
Comanche is cancelled, it will have negative near-term effects in terms of job loss.124
Sikorsky officials hope that modernization activity that will be pursued in lieu of the
Comanche will make up for most of these lost jobs. However, it does not appear that
the Army’s current plans to purchase an additional 80 UH-60s will offset the value
of the Comanches cancelled. This suggests that winning new contracts may be
important for this company to sustain its position in the helicopter industry. Other
large companies, such as Lockheed Martin, will continue to work on other projects,
such as Apache components and upgrades.
The cancellation of the Comanche could retard Sikorsky’s entry into the attack
helicopter market. How will this effect Sikorsky’s longer-term diversification and
competitiveness? Will this result in less competition for Boeing and Bell in terms of
producing attack helicopters and, in turn, reduce dynamism and creativity in attack
helicopter design?
Will helicopter modernization plans facilitate or retard the ability of U.S.
companies to compete with European helicopter manufacturers? Do upgrading
helicopters and performing SLEPs provide defense companies with the type of work
that challenges engineers and designers to develop new skills and to push the state
of their art? If not, do upgrades and SLEPs at least maintain the requisite skills
required to build new helicopters in the future? If not, might the increase in upgrades
and SLEPs also have a negative effect on the dynamism and creativity of the defense
helicopter industrial base?
What impact might current helicopter modernization plans have on industry
consolidation? Many argue that there is currently an overcapacity in the military
helicopter market: too many companies are chasing too little business. Some estimate
123

“World Rotorcraft Overview,” World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing, Teal Group, Inc.
Fairfax, VA, July 2003.
124

Greg Schneider, “Comanche’s Cancellation Brings Layoffs,” Washington Post, Mar. 26,
2004.

CRS-31
that most helicopter contractors are only operating at 50 percent capacity.125 While
much of the defense aviation industrial base has consolidated over the past 15 years
(e.g., only Boeing and Lockheed Martin today manufacture new fighter aircraft), the
helicopter industrial base has not followed suit. There are currently five large global
helicopter firms. These companies include Bell Helicopter, Boeing, and Sikorsky in
the United States, and Eurocopter and Augusta-Westland, in Europe.126
Some say that the planned cancellation of the Comanche program is likely to
hasten helicopter industry consolidation. It was difficult to purchase or sell
companies involved in the Comanche program, these observers argue, because
company valuation was too tenuous. Now that the Comanche appears likely to be
cancelled, Boeing may be more likely, and more able, to sell its military helicopter
business. United Technologies, the parent company of Sikorsky helicopters is one
potential buyer.127
Domestic helicopter manufacturers today appear to face increasing competition
from Eurocopter and Augusta-Westland. The European companies are spending
increasing amounts of money on R&D, and have increased their market share of sales
over the past 10 years.128 The European domestic market for military helicopters is
much smaller than that in the United States and many observe that the Europeans are
poised to increase their attempts to penetrate the U.S. defense market. The
competition for the U.S. presidential helicopter contract is one example. Some say
that expertise in domestic and military tilt-rotor technology is one advantage that
U.S. companies have over European companies. If true, to what degree should
supporting U.S. competitiveness be a factor in making decisions on the V-22
program?129
Noting the desire of European companies to more effectively penetrate the U.S.
defense market, some argue that a Bell Helicopter merger with Augusta-Westland is
another possibility. Current political tensions between the United States and many
European countries, however, as well as trade and competitiveness concerns may
make such an international merger more difficult than a national one. Also, the
potential vulnerability of the V-22 program could make mergers for both Bell and
Boeing difficult, for the same reason the Comanche program’s clouded future made
mergers difficult.

125

Renae Merle, “Comanche Cancellation May Reshape Industry,” Washington Post, Feb.
25, 2004.
126

Several other companies in the United States, Russia, China and elsewhere also produce,
or are capable of producing military helicopters, but are not in the same class, in terms of
size and scope, as the five mentioned here.

127

Telephone conversations between Morgan Stanley aerospace industry analysts and CRS.

128

Richard Aboulafia, “World Rotorcraft Overview,” World Military & Civil Aircraft
Briefing (Fairfax, VA: Teal Group Corporation, June 2003).
129

See CRS Report RL31384 on the V-22 program for more details.

CRS-32

Operational Issues
The final objective of DOD’s helicopter modernization efforts is to make
tomorrow’s military helicopters effective enough to meet combatant commanders’
needs and to achieve defense strategy goals. Do DOD’s modernization efforts put
today’s helicopter programs on a path to meet tomorrow’s challenges? Based on
experience with helicopters in a number of recent conflicts, it appears that
improvements in deployability, reliability, survivability, and safety might prove
particularly valuable.
Deployability. Before helicopters can contribute to the fight, they must get to
the fight. Unlike long-range aircraft, or even theater-range aircraft, helicopters’ range
is too short to allow them to self deploy across oceans. While this problem is largely
solved for Navy and Marine Corps helicopters by being based on aircraft carriers or
amphibious assault ships, Air Force and Army helicopters typically are transported
by air or sea to the theater of conflict.
An Army helicopter task force (“Task Force Hawk”) participating in the 1999
conflict in Serbia (Operation Allied Force) heightened awareness of the difficulties
sometimes associated with deploying helicopter forces to and around a theater of
conflict.130 In Kosovo, the Army was criticized for not being able to quickly deploy
and use Task Force Hawk, a group of 24 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters
accompanied by mechanized ground units. Critics emphasized that the task force had
grown into a 5,000-soldier force that required 500 C-17 sorties to deploy.
While many of the specific organizational and planning problems of Task Force
Hawk appear to have been addressed,131 deploying to subsequent operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq have heightened concerns about potential airlift shortfalls. It
may be that fighting a global war on terrorism could place even greater demand on
improved helicopter deployability. Do today’s helicopter modernization programs do
enough to improve deployability? Folding rotor-blades are one innovation that can
make it easier to fit helicopters into airlift aircraft. Are other techniques being
pursued? Increasing helicopter range can increase the number of installations at
which helicopters can be based and still reach the fight. Increasing helicopter
effectiveness through improving capabilities or by integrating the aircraft with UAVs
can lead to a reduction in force structure and organization, which in turn can improve
deployability. Changes in helicopter organization can help address deployability.
How much experimentation are the Services pursuing toward improved helicopter
deployability, and are such experiments adequately resourced?
Reliability and Maintainability. Past problems with helicopter reliability and
maintainability have been reported. In 2001, for instance, the GAO found critical
shortages among 90 pieces of equipment for high-maintenance attack and transport

130

See “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After Action Report,” Jan. 31, 2000, Report to
Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, pp. 42-43, 46, 59, 75-76.
131

U. S. General Accounting Office, “Kosovo Air Operations: Army Resolving Lessons
Learned Regarding the Apache Helicopter, “ GAO-01-401, Mar. 2001.

CRS-33
helicopters.132 The high operations tempo of the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq and a global war on terrorism may exacerbate maintenance challenges. The
Army’s deputy chief of staff for aviation. Lt.Gen. Richard Cody, commented on how
Army aviation is “stretched thin,” and that it would have to find “innovative ways”
to address readiness and maintenance challenges.133
Has the Army (and other Services) budgeted enough in terms of spare parts and
diagnostic equipment to address the high wear and tear caused by the combination
of high operations tempo and harsh environments? Some argue that current
helicopters suffer from maintainability and reliability problems in part because they
were not originally designed to operate in the harsh environments of Iraq and
Afghanistan.134 If true, will modernization be enough to improve maintainability and
reliability of legacy helicopters, or would new-build programs make more sense from
a reliability standpoint?
Do opportunities exist to more widely implement programs like the Marine
Corps Mod programs, which will result in more than 80% commonality among
major parts, equipment, and systems? Similarly, can procurement of multi-mission
kits, as part of modernization programs, be implemented to ease maintenance
challenges?
The Army Aviation Modernization Plan appears to emphasize more upgrades
to Army helicopters than was planned prior to the Comanche cancellation. The Army
has over 500 helicopters deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan alone. How will the Army
meet its operational and readiness challenges if it loses more and more aircraft to
upgrades and maintenance? Some Army leaders have expressed concerns, but have
not yet described a mitigation plan.135
Survivability. Recent conflicts have raised questions about how survivable
military helicopters are under a variety of conditions. Between October 2001 and
March 2004, the Army alone lost 44 helicopters (an additional 23 are pending repair
analysis) in hostile and non-hostile incidents and a total of 38 soldiers have died.136
While flying low to the ground can help helicopters avoid detection, it also puts
them within reach of a wide variety of enemy surface-based weapons. Many of these
weapons, such as small arms and rocket-propelled grenades, are not affected by
aircraft electronic and infrared countermeasures. Also, flying low to the ground can

132

Bernard Adelsberger, “Spare-Parts Shortages Threaten U.S. Readiness,” DefenseNews,
July 21, 2003, p. 50.
133

Marc Selinger, “Army Aviation Needs ‘Innovative Ways” to Sustain Force, Official
Says,” Aerospace Daily, Mar. 26, 2004.

134

Megan Scully, “Desert Dust, Scattered Enemy Formation Altered Apache Mission,”
Inside the Army, May 19, 2003.

135
136

Robert Wall, “Appetite for Aviation,” op. cit.

Statement of LTG Richard A. Cody (Dep. Chief of Staff, G-3, USA), in U.S. Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee, Tactical Airland Subcommittee, United States Army
Aviation, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., Mar. 30, 2004.

CRS-34
exacerbate the threat of environmental dangers such as power lines, fog and dust.
Some report that the biggest threat to special operations helicopters in Afghanistan
was the environment. Iraq presented a different set of environmental risks, including
towers and high-power wires, that were not found in Afghanistan.137
In Operation Allied Force, once Task Force Hawk was deployed to Albania, it
was not employed, primarily because commanders were concerned about
survivability. The Task Force also lost two aircraft during training missions. In
Afghanistan, a flight of eight A-model Apaches all took heavy small-arms fire during
Operation Anaconda in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in March 2002. Two were heavily
damaged by rocket propelled grenade hits to the tail and nose sections.
In the Iraq war, it was reported that helicopters encountered problems with
survivability. An attack on a Republican Guard division by 34 AH-64 helicopters
from the Army’s 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment has been described as a near
disaster. Every helicopter was hit by ground fire, one helicopter was lost, and 27 of
the 33 that returned to base were too damaged to fly again without repair.138 Some
observers suggest that, reminiscent of problems with Army helicopter operations in
Kosovo and Afghanistan, an Army failure to coordinate the Apache attack with
supporting Air Force and Navy aircraft operations may have played a significant role
in the poor outcome of this attack.139 By using different tactics and by more closely
integrating their efforts with fixed-wing attack aircraft and Army artillery, AH-64s
from the 101st Air Assault Division conducted a raid on the city of Karbala four days
later with much less damage.140 Helicopter supporters argue that this shows that
helicopter survivability is adequate.
One traditional role for Army attack helicopters is conducting close air support
(i.e., attacking enemy forces that are directly in contact with, or near contact with,
friendly forces). Early in the Iraq war, attack helicopter pilots complained that they
were being sidelined — that U.S. war planners were relying more on fixed-wing
aircraft (many armed with precision-guided weapons) than on helicopters for
performing close air support missions.141 This perceived preference for fixed-wing
aircraft, if accurate, may have been due in part to concerns regarding helicopter
survivability following results of the attack by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment.

137

Robert Wall, “Growing Pains: Finding Qualified Pilots for the Army’s New Helo
Operation Is Just One of the Potential Roadblocks,” Aviation Week & Space Technology,
Apr. 5, 2004, p. 38.
138

Rowan Scarborough, “Apache Operation a Lesson In Defeat,” Washington Times, Apr.
22, 2003, p.1. Eric Rosenberg, “Karbala Retreat Raises Questions About Choppers,” San
Antonio Express-News, Mar. 23, 2004.
139

Ibid.

140

Rick Atkinson, “A Flotilla of Army Helicopters Joint Attack on Karbala,” Washington
Post, Mar. 29, 2003, p. 23. See also Neil Baumgardner, “Apache Longbow Battalion
Destroyed Two Republican Guard Battalions During OIF,” Defense Daily, May 12, 2003.
p. 4.

141

Thomas Frank, “Back-Seat Role for Apaches,” Long Island Newsday, Apr. 15, 2003.

CRS-35
Army aviation leaders say that improving aircraft survivability is a high
priority142, but what is the best way to improve helicopter survivability? It does not
appear that Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) was a high priority for helicopter
modernization in the 1990s; in 2000 and 2001, a lack of funds further delayed
improvements to platforms.143 Senior Army aviation officials have called the state of
aircraft defenses a “travesty,” and promised to expedite the fielding of ASE.144 Do
current plans support this goal? How long will it take to implement on such a large
helicopter force? It has been reported that one currently fielded helicopter self
defense system, the AN/ALQ-144 countermeasures system, “routinely breaks down
in the desert and requires extensive maintenance.”145
Is fielding ASE the only, or the best, way to improve survivability? How much
effort is being spent on reducing helicopter’s infrared signature? Measures such as
suppressing the engine’s exhaust may prove more beneficial than, or as beneficial as,
fielding countermeasures. Also, as mentioned, electronic and infrared
countermeasures have no effect on small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades.
Much of helicopter survivability challenges may be caused by the challenging
operational environments recently encountered, such as deserts, mountains, or urban
topography. Reports indicate that the Army is pursuing a strategy to combat both the
technological and tactical/doctrinal deficiencies that have adversely affected manned
helicopters in Afghanistan and Iraq. Led by the Applied Aviation Technology
Directorate (AATD), the Army just finished revising a number of ‘smaller-scale road
maps’ in its major technology areas, including engines, airframes, rotor blades, and
maintenance systems. Part of this strategy will include the AATD returning its
efforts to manned platforms. In the past few years the Army has focused on
unmanned technologies, which were hoped to dominate aviation in the future.
Specific efforts include developing erosion protection and anti-icing, new field repair
capabilities for rotor blades, new air vehicle design that can self-detect damage, a
self-healing flight control system, and a GPS navigation system to help reduce
accidents while flying in brownout conditions.146 How efficacious are these
survivability enhancements, and how much weight should be placed on them vis-avis ASE?
How much effort are the services placing on improving helicopter concepts of
operations (CONOPs) to increase survivability in urban operations? The Army is
changing its flight school curriculum to reflect the unique desert and urban conditions

142

Joshua Kucera, “Aircraft Survivability is Top U.S. Army Priority,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, Mar. 31, 2004.

143

Sandra Erwin, “Army Rushes to Deploy Defensive Gear on Aircraft,” National Defense,
Mar. 2004.
144

Nathan Hodge, “Army Aircraft Defenses a ‘Travesty,’Top Aviator Says,” Defense Week,
Jan. 12, 2004.
145

Hearst Newspapers, “Helicopter Defense System Suffers Woes in Iraq,” Baltimore Sun,
Jan. 18, 2004.
146

Emily Hsu, “Army Forging Strategic S&T Plan to Mend Aviation Deficiencies: S&T
Focus to Shift to Manned Aircraft,” Inside the Army [online], Apr. 19, 2004.

CRS-36
found in Afghanistan and Iraq. Previous training efforts had focused on the European
battlefield and technological superiority. The new conditions, however, have forced
changes in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), for example, with regard to
‘evasive maneuver tactics’ and ‘running and dive fire tactics’ which take into account
hot weather and high altitude factors.147 Are efforts like these adequately resourced?
Some suggest that helicopters would be more survivable during operations if
they were better integrated into the joint air tasking order (ATO) and supported more
closely by fixed-wing aircraft operations. Are the services taking steps to address this
shortcoming? How much will the inc

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32447. Public record. Not legal advice.