# FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32336

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** August 4, 2004
- **Citation:** RL32336

## Text

Order Code RL32336

CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web

FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11,
2001: Issues and Options for Congress

Updated August 4, 2004

Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Todd Masse
Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Domestic Social Policy Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001:
Issues and Options for Congress
Summary
The Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), has been criticized for failing to warn of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
In a sweeping indictment of the FBI’s intelligence activities relating to
counterterrorism and September 11, the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, singled out the FBI in a significant manner for failing
to focus on the domestic terrorist threat; collect useful intelligence; analyze strategic
intelligence; and to share intelligence internally and with other members of the
Intelligence Community. The Joint Inquiry concluded that the FBI was seriously
deficient in identifying, reporting on, and defending against the foreign terrorist threat
to the United States.
The FBI is responding by attempting to transform itself into an agency that can
prevent terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of
this effort is restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into
a formal and integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new
operational practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the
organization’s 56 field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters
control over all counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also
established (1) an Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an
Office of Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI’s historically fragmented
intelligence elements; and (3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence.
Reactions to these FBI reforms are mixed. Critics contend the reforms are too
limited and have implementation problems. More fundamentally, they argue that the
gulf between law enforcement and intelligence cultures is so wide, that the FBI’s
reforms, as proposed, are unlikely to succeed. They believe the FBI will remain
essentially a reactive law enforcement agency, significantly constrained in its ability
to collect and exploit effectively intelligence in preventing terrorist acts.
Supporters counter that the FBI can successfully address its deficiencies,
particularly its intelligence shortcomings, and that the Director’s intelligence reforms
are appropriate for what needs to be done. In the most recent iteration of the debate,
the 9/11 Commission concluded that the FBI has made significant progress in
improving its intelligence capabilities, and generally endorsed Director Mueller’s
reforms, rejecting the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency.
This report identifies five options for Congress to consider, including the
creation of a domestic intelligence agency like Great Britain’s MI-5. Other options
include maintaining the status quo, transferring such responsibilities to the
Department of Homeland Security or to the Director of Central Intelligence, or
creating a national security intelligence service within the FBI. Meanwhile, for a
variety of reasons, the 9/11 Commission has recommended leaving counterterrorism

intelligence collection with the FBI, and creating an integrated national security
workforce within the bureau.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
FBI Intelligence Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Business Process Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Centralized Headquarters Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Organizational Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence
(EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
New Field Office Intelligence Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s) . . 10
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center . . . . . . . 11
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law
Enforcement Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
More Intelligence Analysts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Revamped Intelligence Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Improved Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and
State and Local Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening FBI
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help
Prevent Terrorism by Improving FBI’s Intelligence Program . . . 17
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question Whether
Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program . . . . . . . . 18
Skeptics Believe FBI’s Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove
Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making
Can Overcome FBI’s Lack of Intelligence Experience . . . . 19
Implementation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FBI Field Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics . . . 21
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform . . . 22
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce
Desired Results? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? . . . . . . . 29
Congressional Oversight Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Oversight Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Eliminating Committee Term Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Consolidating Oversight Under the Intelligence Committees . . . . . . . 38
Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Option 1: Status Quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Option 2: Creation of a National Security Intelligence Service within
the FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Option 3: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence
Program Resources to Department of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . 41
Option 4: Transfer of Existing FBI National Foreign Intelligence
Program Resources to the DCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Option 5: Creation of a New Domestic Security Intelligence Service . . . . . 43
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix 1: Definitions of Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix 2:The FBI’s Traditional Role in Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Appendix 3: The FBI’s Intelligence Programs — A Brief History . . . . . . . . . . . 49
FBI Excesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Oversight and Regulation: The Pendulum Swings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix 4: The Case File as an Organizing Concept, and Implications
for Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Appendix 5: Past Efforts to Reform FBI Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Appendix 6: Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Appendix 7: Relevant Legal and Regulatory Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix 8: 9/11 Commission Recommendations Regarding an Integrated
FBI National Security Workforce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

List of Figures
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FBI Intelligence Reform Since September
11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress
Introduction1
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have been labeled
as a major intelligence failure, similar in magnitude to that associated with the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.2 In response to criticisms of its role in this failure,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has introduced a series of reforms to
transform the bureau from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on
criminal investigations into a more mobile, agile, flexible, intelligence-driven3
agency that can prevent acts of terrorism.4
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III initiated changes that were sparked by
congressional charges that the Intelligence Community (IC),5 including the FBI,
missed opportunities to prevent, or at least, disrupt the September 11 attacks on New
York City and Washington. In a sweeping indictment of the FBI’s intelligence
activities relating to counterterrorism, the Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community

1

While the FBI initially provided the authors access to FBI officials and documents, it later
declined to do so, despite numerous requests. Although this paper would have benefitted
from continued cooperation, the authors note with gratitude that some FBI officials
continued to share their insights into the current reforms. Numerous current and former
employees of the FBI and Cental Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as state and local law
enforcement entities, were interviewed for this report. Some sources wish to remain
anonymous and, therefore, have not been identified by name in this report.

2

William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2003), p. 187.
3

For purposes of this report, intelligence is defined to include foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence and criminal intelligence. For a statutory definition of each see
Appendix 1. For a brief summary of the FBI’s traditional role in intelligence, see Appendix
2. Finally, Appendix 3 provides a brief history of FBI intelligence.

4

It is notable that the House-passed FY2004 Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Act
(H.R. 4754; H.Rept. 108-576) includes provisions that would authorized several FBI
personnel reforms.
5

The IC is comprised of 15 agencies: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the
National Reconnaissance Office; the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury; the
Department of Energy; the Coast Guard; the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State; and; the Department of Homeland Security.

CRS-2
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001,6 (JIC)
criticized the FBI for failing to focus on the terrorist threat domestically; collect
useful intelligence; strategically analyze intelligence,7 and to share intelligence
internally, and with the rest of the IC. According to the congressional inquiry, the
FBI was incapable of producing significant intelligence products, and was seriously
handicapped in its efforts to identify, report on8 and defend against the foreign
terrorist threat to the United States.9
Observers believe successful FBI reform will depend in large measure on
whether the FBI can strengthen what critics have characterized as its historically
neglected and weak intelligence program, particularly in the area of strategic analysis.
They contend the FBI must improve its ability to collect, analyze and disseminate
domestic intelligence so that it can help federal, state and local officials stop terrorists
before they strike. If the FBI is viewed as failing this fundamental litmus test, they
argue, confidence in any beefed up intelligence program will quickly erode.
Critics contend the FBI’s intelligence reforms are moving too slowly10 and are
too limited.11 They argue that the FBI’s deeply rooted law enforcement culture and
its reactive practice of investigating crimes after the fact,12 will undermine efforts to
6

See Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, a report of the U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 107-351;
H.Rept. 107-792, Dec. 2002, pp. xv, xvi, 37-39, 337-338. (Hereafter cited as JIC Inquiry)
7

An analyst conducts counterterrorism strategic intelligence analysis in order to develop a
national and international understanding of terrorist threat trends and patterns, as well as
common operational methods and practices. An analyst conducts tactical counterterrorism
analysis in order to support specific criminal or national security-oriented cases and
operations. While not mutually exclusive, each type of analysis requires a unique set of
analytical methodologies and research skills.
8

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

9

Ibid., p. 39.

10

See “Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States,” Dec. 8, 2003. MacGaffin testified, “In the domestic context, it is clear
that the FBI needs to improve greatly its intelligence collection so that there are meaningful
“dots” to connect and analyze. Some observers believe the FBI since 9/11 has made real
progress in this direction. I and many others do not.”
11

A former senior FBI official stated in an Aug. 21, 2003 interview that if FBI Director
Mueller was serious about achieving more than a limited reform, he would establish an
intelligence career path. To date the Director has not implemented fully an intelligence
career path for special agents.

12

Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Implementing the National Strategy, Dec. 15, 2002, pp. 43-44. (Hereafter cited as Gilmore
Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress.) Organizational culture
is a product of many factors, including, but not limited to, an organization’s history, mission,
self-image, client base and structure. According to William E. Odom, former Director of
the National Security Agency, however, organizational culture is principally the product of
(continued...)

CRS-3
transform the FBI into a proactive agency able to develop and use intelligence to
prevent terrorism (for a more detailed discussion of the FBI’s reactive “case file”
approach, see Appendix 4). While the British Security Service (MI-5) may or may
not be an appropriate organizational model for U.S. domestic intelligence for myriad
reasons, the primacy it accords to intelligence functions over law enforcement
interests may be worthy of consideration.13 In justifying their pessimism, critics cite
two previous failed attempts by the FBI to reform its intelligence program (for a more
detailed discussion, see Appendix 5).
Critics also question whether Director Mueller, who has an extensive
background in criminal prosecution but lacks experience in the intelligence field,14
sufficiently understands the role of intelligence to be able to lead an overhaul of the
FBI’s intelligence operation.15
Supporters counter that they believe the FBI can change, that its shortcomings
are fixable, and that the Director’s intelligence reforms are appropriate, focused and
will produce the needed changes.16 They also argue that a successful war against
terrorism demands that law enforcement and intelligence are closely linked. And
they maintain that the FBI is institutionally able to provide an integrated approach,
because it already combines both law enforcement and intelligence functions.17
In its July 2004 final report, the 9/11 Commission 18 recommended leaving
counterterrorism intelligence collection with the FBI, and creating an integrated
national security workforce within the bureau. Such an option has been often
referred to as “creating a service within a service.” For a variety of reasons, the 9/11
Commission rejected the option of creating a new domestic intelligence agency like

12

(...continued)
structural conditions. See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure
America, p. 3.
13

For an analysis of the applicability of Great Britain’s MI-5 model to the U.S., see CRS
Report RL31920, Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5
Model to the United States, by Todd Masse.
14

Director Mueller has headed the Department of Justice Criminal Division, served as U.S.
Attorney in San Francisco, and generally focused on criminal prosecution during his career.
15

Interview with a former senior FBI official, with an extensive intelligence background,
Aug. 21, 2003.
16

See statement of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United States, in U.S.
Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.
17
18

Ibid., pp. 16-17.

The 9/11 Commission is formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, and was created by law in late 2002 (P.L. 107-306, Nov. 27, 2003).
It was chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response
to the attacks. The Commission also was mandated to provide recommendations designed
to guard against future attacks.

CRS-4
Great Britain’s MI-5.19 These and other options are discussed in greater detail below
as well.
The 9/11 Commission, in its recent contribution to the debate, essentially
endorsed the FBI reforms, noting that the FBI, under Director Mueller, “has made
significant progress in improving its intelligence capabilities,”20 The commission
recommended that the FBI establish a specialized and integrated national security
workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who
are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained to ensure the development of an
institutional culture with a deep expertise in intelligence and national security.
The commission expressed concern that management in the field offices still can
allocate people and resources to local concerns that diverge from the national
security mission, and that this system could revert to a focus on lower-priority
criminal justice cases over national security requirements. To address this concern,
the commission recommended that each field office should have an official at the
field office’s deputy level for national security matters. This individual would have
management oversight and ensure that the national priorities are carried out in the
field.21
Following the release of the 9/11 Commission’s report, FBI Director Mueller
said the FBI embraced most of the commission’s recommendations. With regard to
the commission’s recommendation that each field office should have an official at
the deputy level to ensure that national security priorities are addressed, the FBI
stated in a July 22, 2004 press release:
Our Field Intelligence Groups currently report directly to an ASAC (Assistant
Special Agent in Charge). In some field offices, these ASACs have broader
responsibility for national security matters. We will look closely at this
recommendation.22

According to the FBI, ASACs at some field offices have responsibilities
broader than just national security matters, raising the question as to whether ASACs
in each instance will ensure that national security priorities are carried out.
A major role for Congress is whether to accept, modify, or reject the FBI’s
intelligence reforms. Whether lawmakers believe the FBI to be capable of
meaningful reform, and the Director’s reforms to be the correct ones, could
determine whether they accept or modify his changes, or eliminate them altogether

19

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, (Washington, 2004), pp. 423-428.
20

Ibid., p. 425.

21

Ibid., pp. 425-426.

22

See Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI Responds to Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” press release, July 22, 2004.

CRS-5
in favor of a new separate domestic intelligence agency entirely independent of the
FBI, as some have advocated.23
This report examines the FBI’s intelligence program and its reform.
Specifically, the section covers a number of issues that Congress might explore as
part of its oversight responsibilities, to develop and understanding of how well the
FBI is progressing in its reform efforts. The following section outlines the
advantages and disadvantages of several congressional options to make further
changes to the FBI’s intelligence program.24 Finally, a number of appendices
concerning contextual issues surrounding FBI intelligence reform are provided.

FBI Intelligence Reforms
The FBI is responding to the numerous shortcomings outlined by the JIC by
attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent terrorist acts, rather
than react to them as criminal acts. The major component of this effort is the
restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and
integrated intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational
practices, and the improvement of its information technology. FBI Director Robert
S. Mueller, III, has introduced reforms to curb the autonomy of the organization’s 56
field offices by consolidating and centralizing FBI Headquarters control over all
counterterrorism and counterintelligence cases. He has also established (1) an
Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) an Office of Intelligence
to exercise control over the FBI’s historically fragmented intelligence elements; and
(3) field intelligence groups to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence. The
FBI also has reallocated its resources in an effort to establish an effective and
efficient intelligence program.
The reforms are intended to address the numerous perceived shortcomings,
including those outlined by the JIC Inquiry, which concluded the FBI failed to
!

Focus on the domestic threat. “The FBI was unable to identify and
monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qaida and other
international terrorist groups operating in the United States.”25

!

Conduct all-source analysis.26 “... The FBI’s traditional reliance on
an aggressive, case-oriented, law enforcement approach did not
encourage the broader collection and analysis efforts that are critical

23

See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp.
43-44.
24

The Congressional Research Service has recently published a related report on the FBI.
For a history of the FBI, see CRS Report RL32095, The FBI: Past, Present and Future, by
Todd Masse and William Krouse.
25
26

See the JIC Inquiry, p. xv.

All-source intelligence analysis is that analysis which is based on all available collection
sources.

CRS-6
to the intelligence mission. Lacking appropriate personnel, training,
and information systems, the FBI primarily gathered intelligence to
support specific investigations, not to conduct all-source analysis for
dissemination to other intelligence agencies.”27
!

Centralize a nationally-coordinated effort to gain intelligence on
Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaida. “... The FBI’s 56 field offices
enjoy a great deal of latitude in managing their work consistent with
the dynamic and reactive nature of its traditional law enforcement
mission. In counterterrorism efforts, however, that flexibility
apparently served to dilute the FBI’s national focus on Bin Laden
and al-Qaida.”28

!

Conduct counterterrorism strategic analysis. “Consistent with its
traditional law enforcement mission, the FBI was, before September
11, a reactive, operationally-driven organization that did not value
strategic analysis ... most (FBI consumers) viewed strategic
analytical products as academic and of little use in ongoing
operations.”29

!

Develop effective information technology systems. The FBI relied
upon “... outdated and insufficient technical systems....”30

Business Process Changes
In an attempt to transform and upgrade its intelligence program, the FBI is
changing how it processes intelligence by formally embracing the traditional
intelligence cycle, a long-time practice followed by the rest of the IC. It also is
centralizing control over its national security operations at FBI Headquarters.
The Intelligence Cycle. FBI is attempting to formalize and discipline its
approach to intelligence by embracing the traditional intelligence cycle, a process
through which (1) intelligence collection priorities are identified by national level
officials, (2) priorities are communicated to the collectors who collect this
information through various human and national technical means, (3) the analysis
and evaluation of this raw intelligence are converted into finished intelligence
products,( 4) finished intelligence products are disseminated to consumers inside and
outside the FBI and Department of Justice, and (5) a feedback mechanism is created
to provide collectors, analysts and collection requirements officials with consumer
assessment of intelligence value. (See Figure 1, below). To advance that effort, the
Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I) has developed and issued nine
so-called concepts of operations, which essentially constitute a strategic plan
identifying those areas in which changes must be made. These changes are seen as
27

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 37.

28

Ibid., pp. 38-39.

29

Ibid., pp. 337-338.

30

Ibid., p. xvi.

CRS-7
necessary if the FBI is to successfully establish an effective intelligence program that
is both internally coordinated and integrated with its Intelligence Community
Figure 1: The Intelligence Cycle

counterparts.
Source: [http://www.fbi.gov], as altered by the Congressional Research Service

The FBI also is trying to improve and upgrade its functional capabilities at each
step along the cycle. Success may turn, in part, on the performance of the new Office
of Intelligence, which has the responsibility to “... manage and satisfy needs for the
collection, production and dissemination of intelligence” within the FBI and to
ensure requirements “levied on the FBI by national, international, state and local
agencies” are met.31
31

See Concept of Operations, FBI Intelligence Requirements and Collection Management
Process, prepared jointly by FBI Headquarters divisions, reviewed by FBI field office
representatives and coordinated by the FBI’s Office of Intelligence, Aug. 2003. The
(continued...)

CRS-8
FBI officials say their objective is to better focus intelligence collection against
terrorists operating in the U.S. through improved strategic analysis that can identify
gaps in their knowledge. As will be addressed later in the “Issues for Congress”
section, the FBI faces numerous challenges as it formalizes its activities in each
element of the intelligence cycle.
Centralized Headquarters Authority. Following September 11, Director
Mueller announced that henceforth, the FBI’s top three priorities would be
counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber crime, respectively.32 He signaled
his intention to improve the FBI’s intelligence program by, among other measures,
consolidating and centralizing control over fragmented intelligence capabilities, both
at FBI Headquarters and in the FBI’s historically autonomous field offices.33 He
restated that intelligence had always been one of the FBI’s core competencies34 and
organic to the FBI’s investigative mission,35 and asserted that the organization’s
intelligence efforts had and would continue to be disciplined by the intelligence cycle
of intelligence requirements, collection, analysis, and dissemination.

Organizational Changes
The FBI is restructuring to support an integrated intelligence program. The FBI
director has also created new intelligence-related positions and entities at FBI
Headquarters and across its 56 field offices to improve its intelligence capacity.

31

(...continued)
Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, reports to the Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence.
32

According to the FBI’s 1998-2003 Strategic Plan, issued in May 1998, the FBI, prior to
Sept. 11, had established three tiers of priorities: (1) National and Economic Security, aimed
at preventing intelligence operations that threatened U.S. national security; preventing
terrorist attacks; deterring criminal conspiracies; and deterring unlawful exploitation of
emerging technologies by foreign powers, terrorists and criminal elements; (2) Criminal
Enterprise and Public Integrity; and (3) Individuals and Property. Countering criminal
activities was a prominent feature of each tier. See Department of Justice, Office of
Inspector General, Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human Resource
Allocation, Audit Division, Sept. 2003, pp. 03-37.
33

See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Departments of
Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003.
34

Core competencies are defined as a related group of activities central to the success, or
failure, of an organization. In the private sector, core competencies are often the source of
a company’s competitive advantage. See C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel, “The Core
Competency of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review, Apr. 1, 2001.
35

See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, July 23, 2003.

CRS-9
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence
(EAD-I) and the Office of Intelligence. As part of his effort to centralize
control, Director Mueller established a new position — the EAD-I.36 The EAD-I
manages a single intelligence program across the FBI’s four investigative/operational
divisions — counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal, and cyber. Previously,
each division controlled and managed its own intelligence program. To emphasize
its new and enhanced priority, the Director also elevated intelligence from program
support to full program status, and established a new Office of Intelligence (OI). The
OI is responsible for implementing an integrated FBI-wide intelligence strategy,
developing an intelligence analyst career path, and ensuring that intelligence is
appropriately shared within the FBI as well as with other federal agencies.37 The
Office also is charged with improving strategic analysis, implementing an
intelligence requirements and collection regime, and ensuring that the FBI’s
intelligence policies are implemented. Finally, the office oversees the FBI’s
participation in the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).38
The OI, headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the EAD-I, is comprised
of six units: (1) Career Intelligence (works to develop career paths for intelligence
analysts), (2) Strategic Analysis (provides strategic analyses to senior level FBI
executives), (3) Oversight (oversees field intelligence groups), (4) Intelligence
Requirements and Collection Management (establishes and implements procedures
to manage the FBI intelligence process), (5) Administrative Support, and (6)
Executive Support.39
New Field Office Intelligence Groups. The FBI has established field
intelligence groups in each of its 56 field offices to raise the priority of intelligence
and ultimately to drive collection, analysis and dissemination at the local level. Each
field intelligence group is responsible for managing, executing and coordinating their

36

The FBI established the position of EAD-I in early 2003, and the position was filled in
April 2003, when Maureen Baginski, the former Director of Signals Intelligence, National
Security Agency, was appointed. It was another four months before EAD-I Baginski began
working in her new capacity, and an additional four months before Congress approved the
reprogramming action formally establishing the EAD-I position. Some critics date whatever
progress the FBI has made in upgrading intelligence to Baginski’s arrival, but contend that
because this critical position was left vacant for an extended period of time, the FBI made
little, or no progress, between September 11 and Baginski’s arrival almost one-and-a-half
years later.
37

See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before
the Joint Inquiry, Oct. 17, 2002.
38
39

The establishment of TTIC, and its mission, is addressed later in this section.

The Office of Intelligence has had an uneven, albeit short, leadership history since its
establishment. Although Director Mueller announced OI’s established in Dec. 2001, the
position of OI Assistant Director was vacant for one-and-a-half years, until Apr. 2003. The
selected individual served four months before being appointed to another FBI position. The
position then was vacant for almost five additional months before Michael Rolince, SpecialAgent-in-Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office, was appointed to lead the office on
an acting basis in mid-Dec. 2003.

CRS-10
local intelligence resources in a manner which is consistent with national priorities.40
A field intelligence group is comprised of intelligence analysts,41 who conduct largely
tactical analyses; special agents, who are responsible for intelligence collection; and
reports officers, a newly created position.42 Reports officers are expected to play a
key role by sifting raw, unevaluated intelligence and determining to whom it should
be disseminated within the FBI and other federal agencies for further processing.
With regard to counterintelligence, which is any intelligence about the
capabilities, intent, and operations of foreign intelligence services, or those
individuals or organizations operating on behalf of foreign powers, working against
the U.S., the FBI has established six field demonstration projects led by experienced
FBI retirees. These teams are responsible for assessing intelligence capabilities at six
individual field offices and making recommendations to correct deficiencies.43
New National (and More Regional) Joint Terrorism Task Force (s).
In July 2002, the FBI established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF),
which coordinates its nation-wide network of 84 Joint Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs).44 The NJTTF also coordinates closely with the FBI’s newly established
Counterterrorism Watch, a 24-hour operations center, which is responsible for
tracking terrorist threats and disseminating information about them to the JTTFs, to
the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Operations Center and,
indirectly, to state and local law enforcement. CT Watch is located at the FBI’s
24-hour Strategic Intelligence Operations Center (SIOC).45 With respect to regional
40

See FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations, Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

41

For the purposes of this report, intelligence analysts are defined as all-source analysts who
conduct tactical and strategic analysis. Until recently, the FBI had two categories of
analysts — Intelligence Research Specialists, who were responsible for all-source analysis,
and Intelligence Operations Specialists, who provided tactical analytic support for cases and
operations. The FBI is merging these two positions with the newly created “Reports
Officer” position, and re-titling the consolidated position as “intelligence analyst.” The FBI
says its purpose in doing so is to standardize and integrate intelligence support for the FBI’s
highest priorities. Within the intelligence analyst position, there are four “areas of interest”
— counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal; and three specific work
“functions” — all source, case support, and reports.
42

The number of individuals in a field intelligence group varies, depending upon the size
of the field office. See “FBI Field Office Intelligence Operations,” Concept of Operations,
Aug. 2003.
43

Funding was authorized under the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 108-177).
The legislation permits the FBI Director to “... enter into personal services contracts if the
personal services to be provided under such contracts directly support the intelligence or
counterintelligence missions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

44

JTTFs are FBI-led and are comprised of other federal, state and local law enforcement
officials. JTTFs serve as the primary mechanism through which intelligence derived from
FBI investigations and operations is shared with non-FBI law enforcement officials. JTTFs
also serve as the principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law
enforcement officials.
45

See statement of Larry A. Mefford, Executive Assistant Director — Counterterrorism and
(continued...)

CRS-11
JTTFs, the bureau has increased their number from 66 to 84, and the number of state
and local participants has more than quadrupled — from 534 to over 2,300,
according to the FBI.
Participation in the New Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
President Bush in his January 2003 State of the Union address announced the
establishment of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), which is to issue
threat assessments based on all-source intelligence analysis.46 The TTIC is a joint
venture comprised of a number of federal agencies with counterterrorism
responsibilities, and is directed by a CIA-named official, and a deputy director named
by the FBI.
The center, formally established in May 2003, employs 150, eight of whom are
FBI analysts. When fully operational, in May 2004, the center anticipates employing
300 professionals, approximately 65 (22%) of whom will come from FBI ranks. Of
300 total staff, 56 are expected to be strategic analysts.
New Position of Executive Assistant Director for Law Enforcement
Services. As will be discussed in more detail below, the FBI has been criticized for
failing to effectively share information with numerous consumer sets, including other
members of the Intelligence Community, and state and local law enforcement
authorities. In order to address these concerns Director Mueller established the EAD
for Law Enforcement Services and under this new position, created an Office of Law
Enforcement Coordination. Staffed by a former state police chief, the Office of Law
Enforcement Coordination, working with the Office of Intelligence, ensures that
relevant information is shared, as appropriate, with state and local law enforcement.

Resource Enhancement and Allocation Changes
There are numerous changes the FBI has made or is in the process of making to
realize its intelligence goals. With the support of Congress, the FBI’s budget has
increased almost 50% since September 11, from $3.1 billion in FY2000 to $4.6
billion in FY2004.47 The recently proposed FBI budget for FY2005 is $5.1 billion,
including an increase of at least $76 million for intelligence and intelligence-related
items.48 According to Maureen Baginski, EAD for Intelligence, this year the FBI

45

(...continued)
Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Science, Research and Development; and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security of the U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Sept. 4, 2003.
46

See CRS Report RS21283, Homeland Security: Intelligence Support, by Richard A. Best,
Jr.
47

See [http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2003summary/html/FBIcharts.htm] and Where the Money
Goes: Fiscal 2004 Appropriations, — House Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee,
Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives (House Conf. Rept. 108-401).
48

See U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Management Division, “2005 Budget and
(continued...)

CRS-12
plans to hire 900 intelligence analysts, mostly in FBI field offices.49 With the
existing infusion of resources, the FBI is beefing up its intelligence-related staff, as
well as functions which are integral to intelligence — such as intelligence training,
language translation, information technology, and intelligence sharing.
More Special Agent Intelligence Collectors. The FBI has increased the
number of field agents it is devoting to its three top priorities — counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and cyber crime. According to the General Accounting Office
(GAO),50 in FY2004 the FBI allocated 36% of its agent positions to support Director
Mueller’s top the three priorities — counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber
crime — up from 25% in FY2002. This represents an increase of approximately
1,395 agent positions, 674 of which were permanently reprogrammed from existing
FBI drug, white collar, and violent crime programs.51 From a recruitment

48

(...continued)
Performance Summary,” winter 2004, pp.113-122. Elements of this request include 1) $35
million in non-personnel funding to support collocation of a portion of the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division with the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and the interagency
Terrorist Threat Integration Center; 2) $13.4 million to launch the Office of Intelligence; 3)
$14.3 million to Counterterrorism FBI Headquarters program support, including intelligence
analysis; and 4) $13 million to launch the National Virtual Translation Center. Some
elements of the $46 million request for Counterterrorism Field Investigations and the $64
million request for various classified national security initiatives, also likely will be
dedicated to intelligence.
49

See Michelle Mittelstadt, “FBI Set to Add 900 Intelligence Analysts,” The Dallas
Morning News, Feb. 17, 2004. The near doubling of intelligence analysts in one year could
present the FBI with a significant absorption challenge.
50

The GAO has drafted two reports (GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003 and GAO-04-578T, Mar.
23, 2004) on the FBI reform efforts cited in this report. These GAO reports assess the FBI’s
transformation from a program management and results perspective, that is, the extent to
which the FBI is expending its resources and dedicating its management in a manner
consistent with its stated priorities. This CRS report focuses on the more policy-oriented
question of FBI intelligence reform and related policy options, as well as the ability of the
FBI to implement successfully its strategic plans related to intelligence.
51

FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges
Continue, GAO-03-759T, June 18, 2003. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General (OIG), periodically audits resource allocations, to determine if human
resources are being committed in a manner consistent with stated priorities and strategies.
In a recent report, the OIG found that since Sept. 11, the FBI “... continued to devote more
of its time to terrorism-related work than any other single area,” consistent with its postSept. 11 terrorism priority. To ensure that the FBI systematically and periodically analyzes
its programs, the OIG recommended that the FBI Director “... regularly review resource
utilization reports for the Bureau as a whole, as well as for individual investigative
programs, and explore additional means of analyzing the Bureau’s resource utilization
among the various programs.” See Federal Bureau of Investigation: Casework and Human
Resource Allocation, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Division, Audit Report 03-37), Sept. 2003. While the quantity of human resources must be
adequate, appropriate quality is essential. One asset developed by an experienced, welltrained FBI special agent could have a significant effect on U.S. national security.

CRS-13
perspective, the FBI recently established “intelligence” as a “critical skill need” for
special agent recruitment.52
More Intelligence Analysts. The FBI estimates that of the 1,156 analysts
employed as of July 2003, 475 of them were dedicated to counterterrorism analysis.53
Prior to September 11, the FBI employed 159 counterterrorism analysts.54 The FBI
requested and received an additional 214 analytical positions as part of its FY2004
funding.55 As mentioned above, in calendar year 2004, the FBI intends to hire 900
analysts, many of whom will be stationed across its 56 field offices. In an effort to
convey that the FBI is attaching greater importance to the role analysts play, the
Office of Intelligence has signaled to the FBI that analysts have a valid and valuable
role to play within the organization.56 The FBI, for the first time, is also attempting
to establish a dedicated career path for its intelligence analysts, and for the purposes
of promotion is now viewing its three types of analysts (formerly the Intelligence
Research Specialists and Intelligence Operations Specialists, with the addition of a
new category of employee, Reports Officers) all as generic intelligence analysts. As
will be discussed more in-depth below, theoretically, all intelligence analysts,
whether assigned to Headquarters or to a field office, will have promotion potential
to the grade of GS-15 (non-managerial). Until now, generally, at the non-managerial
level, analysts assigned to Headquarters had a promotion potential to the GS-14 level,
and those in the field were only allowed to reach the GS-12 level. New recruitment
standards, including the elimination of a requirement for a bachelor’s degree57 and
a new cognitive ability testing process, have been developed.

52

As currently structured, the FBI special agent recruitment procedure has five entry
programs, with numerous other areas defined as “critical skill needs.” Agents must be hired
under one of the five programs (law, accounting/finance, language, computer
science/information technology and diversified); yet, the FBI will establish priorities for
those having expertise in the critically needed skills. Unlike intelligence analysts, who are
not required to possess a bachelor’s degree, candidates for FBI special agent positions “must
possess a four-year degree from an accredited college or university ....” See
[https://www.fbijobs.com/jobdesc.asp?requisitionid=368].
53

See Concept of Operations, Human Talent for Intelligence Production, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Aug. 2003.

54

See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization,
National Academy of Public Administration, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, State,
Justice, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, June 18, 2003, p. 3.
55

See Making Appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 2004, and For
Other Purposes, U.S. House of Representatives, Conference Report (H.Rept. 108-401).
56
57

See “Human Talent for Intelligence Production,” FBI Concept of Operations, Aug. 2003.

In place of a bachelors degree, the FBI now allows a candidate for intelligence analyst to
substitute a minimum of one year of related law enforcement or military experience.

CRS-14
Revamped Intelligence Training.58 The FBI is revamping its training to
reflect the role of intelligence. The FBI has revised its new agent training,
established a College of Analytical Studies to train both new and more experienced
analysts and has plans to re-engineer its overall training program.59
Specifically, the FBI is providing more intelligence training for new special
agents. New special agents undertake a 17 week, 680 hour training program when
they enter the FBI. The amount of time agents devote to studying National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) topics60 — principally Counterintelligence and
Counterterrorism61 — in new agent training has increased from 28 hours (4.1% of
total training) to 80 hours (11.8% of total training).62 As part of this updated 680
hour curriculum for new agents, the FBI has instituted a two-hour block of training
devoted solely to intelligence. Notwithstanding these changes, FBI officials
recognize they have made relatively little progress in integrating intelligence into all
aspects of new agent training.
The new training is intended to expose new employees to the intelligence cycle
— requirements, collection, analysis, reporting and dissemination — and to how
intelligence advances national security goals. Agents also are taught how to use
strategic and tactical analysis effectively.63
All new analysts, or those new to the analytical function, are required to take an
introductory analytical training course when they assume analytical responsibilities
at the FBI. Historically, the curriculum for this course — recently renamed the
Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-I (ACES) so as to be “... more descriptive and
create a positive image for the training effort”64 — included a substantial amount of

58

The authors were unable to compare training, before and after Sept. 11, because the FBI’s
Office of Congressional Affairs denied requests for a copy of the training curriculum.
59

See statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General Accounting
Office, in U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropriations, House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 14.
60

The National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget includes a number of nationallevel intelligence programs, which are approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and
submitted to the President and Congress as a single consolidated program. The NFIP budget
funds those departments and agencies constituting the U.S. Intelligence Community.
Historically, the FBI’s NFIP has included the headquarters and field elements associated
with the following programs: 1) international terrorism, 2) counterintelligence, 3) security
countermeasures, and 4) dedicated technical activities.
61

Some observers have suggested that as part of its intelligence reform, the FBI should
consider re-integrating counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For an assessment of these
arguments, see Appendix 6.

62

Notwithstanding this increase in intelligence training, a new special agent collector, at
least early in his career, still is at a disadvantage, compared to a foreign intelligence officer,
or terrorist, who has likely received intensive clandestine operations training.
63

Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 15, 2004.

64

See “Human Talent for Intelligence Production,” the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
(continued...)

CRS-15
time dedicated to orienting the new analyst to the FBI. According to FBI officials,
this course has recently been re-engineered to focus more directly on intelligence,
asset vetting, reporting writing, the Intelligence Community, and various analytical
methodologies. According to FBI officials, more advanced intelligence analysis
courses — ACES II — are in development.
Finally, the FBI plans to enhance training standardization and efficiency by
consolidating all training in the FBI’s Training Division. Historically, the FBI’s
National Foreign Intelligence Program has developed and provided its own
substantive intelligence training programs. FBI analysts are also encouraged to avail
themselves of the many geographic and functional analytic courses taught by other
elements of the Intelligence Community.
Improved Technology. The FBI says it recognizes the critical importance
of improving its antiquated information technology system,65 so that it can more
effectively share information both internally and with the rest of the Intelligence
Community, and Director Mueller has made it one of his top ten priorities. But the
FBI’s technological center-piece — the three-stage Trilogy Project — continues to
suffer from delays and cost overruns. Although the FBI has installed new hardware
and software, and established local and wide area communications networks,66
Trilogy’s third, and perhaps most important component — the Virtual Case File
system (intended to give analysts access to a new terrorism database containing 40
million documents, and generally an improved ease of information retrieval) —
remains behind schedule and over budget.67
More Intelligence Sharing Within the FBI. In the wake of the 1960s
domestic intelligence scandals (for further discussion, see Appendix 3) various
protective “walls” were put in place to separate criminal and intelligence
investigations. As a result of these walls, information sharing between the two sets
of investigators was “sharply limited, overseen by legal mediators from the FBI and

64

(...continued)
Sept. 2003.
65

Numerous GAO studies, including the recent Information Technology: FBI Needs an
Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities (GAO Report 03-959, Sept.
25, 2003) have found substantial deficiencies in the FBI’s formal procedures to implement
recommended information technology changes. See also The Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations, U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36,
Sept. 2003).
66

See “FBI Director Says Technology Investments Are Paying Off,” Government Executive,
Apr. 10, 2003.
67

According to the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG), FBI officials originally
estimated the cost of the Virtual Case File system to be $380 million. The current actual
cost, according to the IG, exceeds $596 million. See also Wilson P. Dizard, “FBI’s Trilogy
Rollout Delayed; CSC Misses Deadline,” Government Computer News, Nov. 4, 2003.
Critics have attributed the FBI’s chronic information management problems to, among other
factors, deficient data mining capabilities, and the FBI’s continuing inability to effectively
upload information collected by field offices onto accessible FBI-wide databases.

CRS-16
Justice Department, and subject to scrutiny by criminal courts and the secret Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.”68 The FBI recently eliminated an internal barrier
to communication by allowing its criminal and intelligence investigators to physically
work together on the same squads. As part of a new so-called Model
Counterterrorism Investigations Strategy (MCIS), all counterterrorism cases will be
handled from the outset like an intelligence or espionage investigation.69
Improved Intelligence Sharing with Other Federal Agencies and
State and Local Officials. The FBI also has taken steps to improve its
intelligence and information sharing with other federal agencies as well as with state
and local officials. It has established an Executive Assistant for Law Enforcement
Services, who is responsible for coordinating law enforcement with state and local
officials through a new Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. The FBI also has
increased dissemination of weekly intelligence bulletins to states and localities as part
of an effort to educate and raise the general awareness of terrorism issues. And the
FBI is increasing its use of the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications
System and the National Criminal Information Center databases to disseminate threat
warnings and the identities of individuals the FBI has listed on its Terrorist Watch
List.70 Other information sharing enhancements — each addressed earlier — include
increasing the number of JTTFs and establishing the new position of Reports Officer.

Issues for Congress
Assessing the effectiveness of the FBI’s intelligence reforms raises several
potential issues for Congress. These include
The FBI’s new focus on centralized headquarters decision-making;
Implementation challenges, including those in each area of the
Intelligence Cycle;
! Adequacy of resources to support reforms; and
! Congressional oversight.
!
!

68

Dan Eggen, “FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance,” Washington Post, Dec. 13, 2003,
p. A1.
69

In addition to easing constraints on intelligence sharing, this change will allow
investigators to more easily employ secret warrants and other intelligence collection
methods permitted by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended. Those foreign
intelligence gathering tools cannot be used in traditional criminal probes. The change stems
from a Nov. 2002 intelligence appeals court ruling that upheld the USA PATRIOT Act
provisions that provided more latitude for the sharing of foreign intelligence between
criminal prosecutors and intelligence/national security personnel. See United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, In re: Sealed Case 02-001, Decided Nov. 18,
2002.
70

For information on terrorist watch lists, see CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated
Lookout Systems and Border Security Options and Issues, by William Krouse and Raphael
Perl.

CRS-17

The Role of Centralized Decision-Making in Strengthening
FBI Intelligence71
Some observers believe a major issue is whether the FBI’s new centralized
management structure will provide the organization with the requisite formal and
informal authority to ensure that its intelligence priorities are implemented effectively
and efficiently by FBI field offices. Historically, and particularly with respect to the
FBI’s law enforcement activities, field offices have had a relatively high degree of
autonomy to pursue locally determined priorities. A related issue is whether FBI
employees will embrace, or resist, FBI Headquarters’ enhanced management role and
its new emphasis on intelligence.
Supporters Contend Centralized Management Will Help Prevent
Terrorism by Improving FBI’s Intelligence Program. Supporters argue that
a centralized management structure is an essential ingredient of a counterterrorism
program, because it will enable the FBI to strengthen its intelligence program,
establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve headquarters-field
coordination.
According to proponents, FBI Director Mueller has centralized authority by
making four principal structural changes. He has established (1) a new position of
Executive Assistant Director for Intelligence (EAD-I); (2) created a new Office of
Intelligence to exercise control over the FBI’s historically fragmented intelligence
program; (3) established a National Joint Terrorism Task Force; and (4) established
intelligence units in each field office to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence
to FBI Headquarters.
Supporters contend that by centralizing decision-making, the FBI will be able
to address several critical weaknesses which the JIC Inquiry attributed to
decentralized management. First, a central management structure will enable the FBI
to more easily correlate intelligence, and thereby more accurately assess the presence
of terrorists in the U.S. Second, the FBI will be able to strengthen its analysis
capabilities, particularly with regard to strategic analysis, which is intended to
provide a broader understanding of terrorist threats and terrorist organization. Third,
FBI Headquarters will be able to more effectively fuse and share intelligence
internally, and with other IC agencies. Finally, centralized decision-making will
provide FBI Headquarters a means to enforce intelligence priorities in the field.
Specifically, it provide a means for FBI Headquarters to ensure that field agents
spend less time gathering information to support criminal prosecutions — a legacy

71

An organization’s structure and business processes influence its performance. Large
organizations with dispersed operations continually assess the appropriate balance between
decentralized and centralized elements of their operations. Although the mission of
National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) is unrelated to that of the FBI, it too
has dispersed operations. In a review of the causes of the 1986 Columbia shuttle accident,
the board investigating the accident found that “The ability to operate in a centralized
manner when appropriate, and to operate in a decentralized manner when appropriate, is the
hallmark of a high-reliability organization.” See Columbia Accident Investigation Report,
Volume I, Aug. 2003. [http://www.caib.us/news/report/volume1/default.html]

CRS-18
of the FBI’s law enforcement culture — and more time collecting and analyzing
intelligence that will help prevent terrorist acts.
Supporters contend that employees are embracing centralized management and
the FBI’s new intelligence priorities, but caution it is premature to pronounce
centralized management a success. Rather, they suggest that, “with careful planning,
the commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, progress should
be well along in three or four years,”72 but concede that, “we’re a long way from
getting there.”73
Skeptics Agree Strong Intelligence Essential, But Question
Whether Centralized Decision-Making Will Improve Program. Skeptics
agree that if the FBI is to prevent terrorism, it must strengthen its intelligence
program, establish intelligence as a priority at FBI field offices and improve
headquarters-field coordination.
But they question whether centralizing
decision-making at FBI Headquarters will enable the FBI to accomplish these goals,
and they cite two principal factors which they suggest will undermine the impact of
centralized decision making. They question whether any structural management
changes can (1) change a vested and ingrained law enforcement culture, and (2)
overcome the FBI’s lack of intelligence experience and integration with the
Intelligence Community.
Skeptics Believe FBI’s Law Enforcement Culture Will Prove
Impervious to Centralized Decision-Making. Skeptics assert that the FBI’s
entrenched law enforcement culture will undermine its effort to establish an effective
and efficient intelligence program by centralizing decision-making at FBI
Headquarters. They point to the historical importance that the FBI has placed on
convicting criminals — including terrorists. But those convictions have come after
the fact, and skeptics argue that the FBI will continue to encounter opposition within
its ranks to adopting more subtle and somewhat unfamiliar intelligence methods
designed to prevent terrorism. Former Attorney General Janet Reno, for example,
reportedly “leaned toward closing down surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA) if they hindered criminal cases.”74 As one observer said,
“law enforcement and intelligence don’t fit ... law enforcement always wins.”75
Some observers speculate that one reason law enforcement priorities prevail
over those of intelligence is because convictions that can disrupt terrorist planning
in advance of an attack often are based on lesser charges, such as immigration
violations. FBI field personnel therefore may conclude that they should focus more

72

See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization,
National Academy of Public Administration, U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies, June 118, 2003, p. 3.

73

Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

74

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

75

Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

CRS-19
effort on prosecuting criminal cases that result in longer jail terms.76 Observers also
suggest that because of the importance attached to successful criminal prosecutions,
to the extent intelligence is used, it will be used to support criminal investigations,
rather than to learn more about potential counterterrorism targets.77
Skeptics are convinced that the FBI’s law enforcement culture is too entrenched,
and resistant to change, to be easily influenced by FBI Headquarters directives
emphasizing the importance of intelligence in preventing terrorism. They cite the
Gilmore Commission, which concluded:
... the Bureau’s long-standing traditional organizational culture persuades us that,
even with the best of intentions, the FBI cannot soon be made over into an
organization dedicated to detecting and preventing attacks rather than one
dedicated to punishing them.78

Skeptics Also Question Whether Centralized Decision-Making Can
Overcome FBI’s Lack of Intelligence Experience. Skeptics assert that the
FBI’s inexperience in the intelligence area has caused it to misunderstand the role
intelligence can play in preventing terrorism, and they question whether centralized
decision-making can correct this deficiency.
Specifically, they contend the FBI does not understand how to collect
intelligence about potential counterterrorism targets, and properly analyze it. Instead,
skeptics argue that notwithstanding the FBI’s current efforts to develop detailed
collection requirements, FBI agents will likely continue to “gather” evidence to
support criminal cases. Moreover, skeptics argue, the FBI will undoubtedly “run
faster, and jump higher,” in gathering even more information at the urging of FBI
Headquarters to “improve” intelligence.79 Missing, however, according to critics, is
the ability to implement successfully a system in which intelligence is collected
according to a strategically determined set of collection requirements that specifically
target operational clandestine activity. These collection requirements in turn must
be informed by strategic analysis that integrates a broader understanding of terrorist
threats and known and (conceptually) unknown gaps in the FBI’s intelligence base.
Critics fear that FBI analysts, instead, will continue to spend the bulk of their time
providing tactical analytic support to FBI operational units pursuing cases, rather than
systematically and strategically analyzing all-source intelligence and FBI intelligence
gaps.

76

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 224.

77

See testimony of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, p. 4.

78

See the Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress, pp.
43-44.
79

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

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Implementation Challenges
The FBI is likely to confront significant challenges in implementing its reforms.
Its most fundamental challenge, some assert, will be to transform the FBI’s deeply
entrenched law enforcement culture, and its emphasis on criminal convictions, into
a culture that emphasizes the importance that intelligence plays in counterterrorism
and counterintelligence. Although observers believe that FBI Director Mueller is
identifying and communicating his counterterrorism and intelligence priorities, they
caution that effective reform implementation will be the ultimate determinant of
success. The FBI, they say, must implement programs to recruit intelligence
professionals with operational and analytical expertise; develop formal career
development paths, including defined paths to promotion; and continue to improve
information management and technology. These changes, they say, should be
implemented in a timely fashion, as over two and a half years have passed since the
attacks of September 11, 2001. They also contend the FBI must improve
intelligence sharing within the FBI and with other IC agencies, and with federal, state
and local agencies.
Technology. Inadequate information technology, in part, contributed to the
FBI being unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components prior to
September 11, according to the congressional joint inquiry.80 GAO and the
Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reports conclude that the FBI still
lacks an enterprise architecture, a critical and necessary component, they argue, to
successful IT modernization.81 In addition to lacking an enterprise architecture plan,
according to the GAO, the FBI has also not had sustained information technology
leadership and management. To demonstrate this point, a recent GAO report found
the FBI has had five Chief Information Officers in the last 2003-2004, and the current
CIO is temporarily detailed to the FBI from the Department of Justice.82
One important manifestation of the FBI’s historical problems with information
management is the deleterious effects it has had on analysis. For numerous
information technology reasons, it has historically been difficult for FBI analysts at
Headquarters, whose primary responsibility is to integrate intelligence from open
sources, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and other entities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, to retrieve in a timely manner intelligence which should be readily
available to them. Among other factors, this is the result of lack of appropriate
80

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 245.

81

Statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, General
Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 19. See also The Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s Implementation of Information Technology Recommendations,
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division (Audit report 03-36,
Sept. 2003), p. v.
82

See “FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and
Address Priorities,” statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and
Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and
Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 13.

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information management and technology tools and, to a lesser extent, the lack of
uniform implementation of policies relating to information technology usage.
Technology alone is not, however, a panacea. Existing information technology
tools must be uniformly used to be effective. One FBI official responsible for
intelligence analysis stated before the Joint Inquiry that “... Information was
sometimes not made available (to FBI Headquarters) because field offices, concerned
about security or media leaks, did not upload their investigative results or restricted
access to specific cases. This, of course, risks leaving the analysts not knowing what
they did not know.”83
As mentioned above, supporters say that Director Mueller recognizes the
important role technology must play in his reforms, and that despite setbacks to the
Trilogy technology upgrade, the Director is making important progress.84 However,
the third and arguably most important stage of the Trilogy technology update, the
deployment of the aforementioned Virtual Case File system, did not meet its
December 2003 deadline. Moreover, according to the Department of Justice Office
of Inspector General, as of January 2003, the FBI confirmed the Inspector General’s
assessment that an additional $138 million (over the then estimated requirement of
$458 million) would be necessary to complete the Trilogy project.85 This would
bring the total cost of the Trilogy update to $596 million.
FBI Field Leadership. An important issue is whether the FBI’s field
leadership is able and willing to support Director Mueller’s reforms. Critics argue
that the lack of national security experience among the existing cadre of Special
Agents-in-Charge (SACs) of the FBI’s field offices represents a significant
impediment to change. According to one former senior FBI official, “... over 90
percent of the SACs have very little national security experience ....”86 He suggested
that lack of understanding and experience would result in continued field emphasis
on law enforcement rather than an intelligence approach to terrorism cases.
Supporters counter that Director Mueller has made it inalterably clear that his
priorities are intelligence and terrorism prevention. Some SACs who have been
uncomfortable with the new priorities have chosen to retire. But critics also contend
that it will require a number of years of voluntary attrition before field leadership
more attuned to the importance of intelligence is in place.

83

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 358.

84

Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization,
National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies, June 18, 2003.
85

The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Implementation of Information Technology
Recommendations, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit Division
(Audit report 03-36, Sept. 2003), p. xiv.

86

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

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Lack of Specific Implementation Plans and Performance Metrics.
Another issue is whether the FBI is effectively implementing its reforms and has
established appropriate benchmarks to measure progress. Critics assert that although
the FBI developed various concepts of operations to improve its intelligence
program, in many cases it lacks specific implementation plans and benchmarks. The
Department of Justice Inspector General has recommended that “an implementation
plan that includes a budget, along with a time schedule detailing each step and
identifying the responsible FBI official”87 be drafted for each concept of operations.
Supporters say that the FBI recognizes the need for specific implementation
plans and is developing them. They cite as an example the implementation plan for
intelligence collection management, almost half of which they estimate is in place.88
Funding and Personnel Resources to Support Intelligence Reform.
Prior to September 11, FBI analytic resources — particularly in strategic analysis —
were severely limited. The FBI had assigned only one strategic analyst exclusively
to Al-Qaeda prior to September 11.89 Of its approximately 1,200 intelligence
analysts, 66% were unqualified, according to the FBI’s own assessment.90 The FBI
also lacked linguists competent in the languages and dialects spoken by radicals
linked to Al-Qaeda.91
Some supporters argue that appropriate resources now are being allocated to
reflect the FBI’s new intelligence priorities. “Dollars and people are now flowing to
the FBI’s most critical needs ... This trend is clearly reflected in the FBI’s requested
resources for FY2004,”92 according to former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh,
who said intelligence analytic support, particularly for counterterrorism, has
improved substantially.93 As mentioned above, the Department of Justice is
requesting at least $76 million in support of intelligence and intelligence-related
programs for FY2005.
Supporters of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform describe a “dramatic
increase” in intelligence analysts, both at headquarters and in the field — from 159
in 2001, to 347 planned in 2003, and that an initial cadre of about a dozen analysts

87

See The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence
and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.x.

88

Interview with an FBI official, Jan. 6, 2004.

89

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 337.

90

Ibid., p. 340. The vast majority of FBI analysts are located in the FBI’s 56 regional field
offices.
91

Ibid., p. 245.

92

See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization,
National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 3.
93

Ibid., p. 5.

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is supporting TTIC .94 Moreover, as mentioned above, the FBI intends to hire 900
intelligence analysts in 2004. Supporters also point to the Daily Presidential Threat
Briefings the FBI drafts, and 30 longer-term analyses and a comprehensive national
terrorist threat assessment that have been completed.95 But even supporters caution
that institutional change now underway at the FBI “does not occur overnight and
involves major cultural change.”96 They estimate that with careful planning, the
commitment of adequate resources and personnel, and hard work, the FBI’s
“transformation” will be well along in three to five years, though it will take longer
to fully accomplish its goals.97
GAO presents a more mixed assessment. According to GAO: “The FBI has
made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development of both a new strategic
plan and a strategic human capital plan, as well as its realignment of staff to better
address the new priorities.” Notwithstanding this progress, however, the GAO
concluded “...an overall transformation plan is more valuable...” than “cross walks”
between various strategic plans.98 GAO also reports that 70% of the FBI agents and
29 of the 34 FBI analysts who completed its questionnaire said the number of
intelligence analysts was insufficient given the current workload and priorities.99 As
a result, many field agents said they have no choice but to conduct their own
intelligence analysis. Despite a lack of analysts apparent before September 11, if not
after, the FBI did not establish priority hiring goals for intelligence analysts until
2003.100 According to GAO, the FBI was well on its way to meeting its target of 126
new analytic hires in 2003 — having hired 115 or 91%.101
The mix of analytic hires also is critical. But, according to GAO, the FBI lacks
a strategic human capital plan, making it difficult to determine whether the FBI is
striking an effective balance in its analytic core.102 It also is difficult to assess
94

Ibid., p. 4.

95

Ibid., p. 5.

96

Ibid., p. 3.

97

Ibid.

98

See “FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and
Address Priorities,” statement by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and
Justice Issues; and Randolph C. Hite, Director Information Technology Architecture and
Systems Issues, GAO-04-578T, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 33. A congressional requirement
concerning resource management was levied on the FBI by P.L. 108-199. By Mar. 15, 2004,
the FBI is to provide a report to the Committees on Appropriations a report which “...details
the FBI’s plan to succeed at its terrorist prevention and law enforcement responsibilities,
including proposed agent and support personnel levels for each division.”
99

Ibid., p. 14.

100

Ibid., p. 23.

101

Ibid., p. 22.

102

See “FBI Reorganization: Progress Made in Efforts to Transform, But Major Challenges
Continue,” statement by David M. Walker, Comptroller of the United States, General
Accounting Office, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
(continued...)

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whether the FBI is providing sufficient institutional support, the appropriate tools,
and incentive system for these resources to be harnessed effectively in pursuit of its
priority national security missions-counterterrorism and counterintelligence.
Skeptics of the ongoing FBI intelligence reform argue — and supporters
concede — that this is not the first time the FBI has singled out intelligence for
additional resources. The FBI did so in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, only to allow those resources to
revert to the FBI’s traditional priorities — violent and organized crime, drug
trafficking, and infrastructure protection. Additional intelligence analysts also were
hired, but they were viewed as poorly trained, limited in experience, and lacking in
needed information technology tools. They also were easily diverted to support the
FBI’s traditional anti-crime operations,103 even though efforts were made during the
intervening years to protect resources intended to support the agency’s national
security efforts, including intelligence.104
Changes in The Intelligence Cycle. As the FBI attempts to formalize its
intelligence cycle, it will likely face challenges in each element of the intelligence
cycle. Incomplete or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle
detracts from the overall system’s effectiveness.
Will the Changes in the Collection Requirements Produce Desired
Results? The FBI’s new Office of Intelligence is establishing an internal
intelligence requirements mechanism that will be part of an integrated IC national
requirements system. Supporters of establishing this mechanism maintain that the
FBI has outlined a rational process for managing collection requirements. According
to FBI officials, the FBI is developing for each of its investigative/operational
programs a detailed set of priority intelligence collection requirements. These
requirements will be disseminated to FBI field offices through a classified FBI
Intranet.
Skeptics question whether the FBI can overcome its historic lack of experience
with a disciplined foreign intelligence requirements process. The FBI, they argue,
traditionally has viewed domestic collection of foreign intelligence as a low priority
“collateral” function, unless it helped solve a criminal case. And dissemination of
any domestically collected foreign intelligence tended to be ad hoc.
Skeptics point to four hurdles that the FBI may have trouble surmounting. First,
given that traditional intelligence tasking from the Intelligence Community to the FBI
has generally been vague and voluminous; the FBI, they say, must be able to strike
a balance between directing its collectors to answer questions that are either too
102

(...continued)
on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary, June 18, 2003, p. 8.

103

See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Academy Panel on FBI Reorganization,
National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies, June 18, 2003, p. 4.

104

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

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nebulous or too specific. Questions that are overly vague can go unanswered for lack
of direction. On the other hand, collection requirements that are too specific risk
reducing intelligence to a formulaic science, when most analysts would agree the
intelligence discipline is more art than science. In the final analysis, while
appropriately drafted intelligence collection requirements are an essential element in
the intelligence cycle, there is no substitute for experienced intelligence professionals
who are capable of successfully collecting intelligence in response to the
requirements. Second, they say, the FBI will need to dedicate appropriate resources
to managing a requirements process that could easily overwhelm Headquarters and
field intelligence staff with overlapping and imprecise requests for intelligence
collection. Third, they say, the FBI will have to significantly upgrade its cadre of
strategic analysts, who will play a critical role in identifying intelligence gaps.
Fourth, they say, the FBI will have to support its requirements process with
incentives and disincentives for agent intelligence collectors so that requirements are
fulfilled. Enhanced performance of the intelligence requirements process depends
largely on the accumulated successes the FBI has in each of these areas. Incomplete
or ineffective implementation in any one element of the cycle detracts from the
overall system’s effectiveness.
Are Changes in Collection Techniques Adequate? Both supporters
and skeptics of the adequacy of FBI’s reforms agree that collecting intelligence by
penetrating terrorist cells is critical to disrupting and preventing terrorist acts.
Supporters argue that the FBI has a long and successful history of such penetrations
when it comes to organized crime groups, and suggest that it is capable of replicating
its success against terrorist cells. They assert that the FBI has had almost a century
of experience recruiting and managing undercover agents and informers, and that it
long ago mastered collection techniques such as electronic surveillance and witness
interviews. They also argue that the FBI can uniquely use both money and the threat
of prosecution to induce cooperation in recruiting human source assets.105 They also
cite as evidence of the FBI’s commitment to improving its human intelligence
collection the organization’s recent deployment of six teams to “...examine ways to
expand the FBI’s human intelligence base and to provide additional oversight.”106
Skeptics are not so certain. They say recruiting organized crime penetrations
differs dramatically from terrorist recruiting. As one former senior level intelligence
official put it, “It’s one thing to recruit Tony Soprano, yet quite another to recruit an
al Qaeda operative.”107 This official was alluding to the fact that terrorist groups may
have different motivations and support networks than organized crime groups.108
Moreover, terrorist groups may be less willing than organized crime enterprises to

105

See statement of William P. Barr, former Attorney General of the United States, before
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p.18.
106

See “FBI Creates Structure to Support Intelligence Mission,” U.S. Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, press release, Apr. 3, 2003. The results of these
examinations remain classified.

107
108

Interview with a former senior intelligence official, Oct. 15, 2003.

See William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence for a More Secure America, 2003, (Yale
University Press) p. 177.

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accept as members or agents individuals who they have not known for years and are
not members of the same ethnocentric groups, or whose bona fides are not directly
supported by existing members of the group.
As alluded to above, skeptics also argue that while the FBI is good at gathering
information, it has little experience collecting intelligence based on a policy driven,
strategically determined set of collection requirements.109 As one observer
commented:
While the FBI correctly highlights its unmatched ability to gather evidence and
with it information, there is nonetheless a National Security imperative which
distinguishes intelligence collection from a similar, but different, function found
in law enforcement. “Gathering” which is not driven [and] informed by specific,
focused, National Security needs is not the same as “intelligence collection”...
which means intelligence activities which are dictated by, and coupled to, a
policy driven, strategically determined set of collection requirements.110

Critics assert that the FBI’s criminal case approach to terrorism produces a
vacuum cleaner approach to intelligence collection. The FBI, they say, continues to
collect and disseminate interesting items from a river of intelligence when, instead,
it should focus collection on those areas where intelligence indicates the greatest
potential threat.111 But critics contend that there are few evident signs that the FBI
has adopted such an approach. “They are jumping higher, faster,” but not collecting
the intelligence they need, according to one critic.112 As a result, critics maintain, the
process turns on serendipity rather than on a focused, directed, analytically driven
requirements process. Another observer put it this way:
Using the metaphor “finding the needle in the haystack,” since September 11
government agencies have been basically adding more hay to the pile, not finding
needles. Finding the needles requires that we undertake more focused, rigorous
and thoughtful domestic intelligence collection and analysis not collect
mountains of information on innocent civilians.113

Skeptics also question whether the FBI is prepared to recruit the type of
individual needed to effectively collect and analyze intelligence. The FBI’s historic
emphasis on law enforcement has encouraged and rewarded agents who gather as
many facts as legally possible in their attempt make a criminal case. Because a
successful case rests on rules of criminal procedure, the FBI draws largely from the
top talent in state and local law enforcement agencies, and the military; in short,

109

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

110

See statement of John MacGaffin, III, before the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003.

111

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Aug. 21, 2003.

112

Ibid.

113

See statement of John J. Hamre before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003. Hamre is a former deputy secretary of defense.

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some say, those individuals who focus on discrete facts rather than on the
connections between them.114
Perhaps as fundamental to the collection of more targeted human intelligence
is the implementation of a formal asset vetting program to assess the validity and
credibility of human sources, according to informed observers, who note that only
three to four percent of the FBI’s human assets are vetted.115 They point out the
failure to effectively vet its human assets has contributed to serious problems in the
FBI’s criminal and national foreign intelligence programs.116
Supporters contend that the FBI is currently implementing its national
intelligence collections requirements concept of operations, and so it may be
premature to assess effectiveness. Critics contend, however, that it remains unclear
what specific performance metrics the FBI is employing to measure the effectiveness
of its collection. They say that when asked to assess its performance in the war on
terrorism, the FBI continues to cite arrests and convictions of suspected terrorists.117
They further contend that the FBI rarely cites the number of human sources recruited
who have provided information essential to counterterrorism or counterintelligence
as a performance metric.118
114

See Siobhan Gorman, Government Executive Magazine, FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart,
Aug. 1, 2003. See also Frederick P. Hitz and Brian J. Weiss, “Helping the FBI and the CIA
Connect the Dots in the War on Terror,” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence; volume 17, no. 1, Jan. 2004.
115

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Oct. 2, 2003.

116

Former FBI Special Agent John J. Connally, Jr., was recently convicted of racketeering
and obstruction of justice for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in the Boston,
Massachusetts area. See Fox Butterfield, “FBI Agent Linked to Mob is Guilty of
Corruption,” New York Times, May 29, 2002, p.14. Special Agent James J. Smith recently
was indicted on one count of gross negligence in handling national defense information
[Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 793(f)] and with four counts of filing false reports on an
asset’s reliability to FBI Headquarters [18 U.S. Code §§1343, 1346].
See
[http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/fbi/ussmith50703ind.pdf] It is alleged that Smith and
former Special Agent William Cleveland had sexual relationships with Katrina Leung, an
FBI operational asset informing the FBI on the intelligence activities of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). It is further alleged that Ms. Leung may have been a double agent
for the PRC. Leung has been charged with unauthorized access and willful retention of
documents relating to national defense [Title 18 U.S. Code, §793(b)].
See
[http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/fbi/usleung403cmp.pdf] James Smith has pleaded guilty
and his trial has been set for February 2005. Katrina Leung’s trial is scheduled for
September. In addition to appointing an Inspector-in-Charge to investigate the integrity of
the Chinese counterintelligence program in the FBI’s Los Angeles Field Office (the last FBI
Office of employment for Mr. Smith), the FBI has launched organizational and
administrative reviews to determine why its established accountability system for the
handling of intelligence assets apparently failed in this case. See FBI press release dated
Apr. 9, 2003.

117

See Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S.
Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 11, 2003.

118

For further information on how to assess performance of the FBI, and the U.S.
(continued...)

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Are Analytical Capabilities Sufficient? Some observers contend that the
FBI has made notable progress in professionalizing its analytical program since
September 11, and, indeed, over the past two decades. During this period, they assert
that the FBI’s analytic cadre, particularly at Headquarters, has evolved from a
disjointed group of less than qualified individuals into a group of professionals which
understands the role analysis plays in advancing national security investigations and
operations. The majority of intelligence analysts at Headquarters possesses advanced
degrees and has expert knowledge in various functional and geographic areas. Over
the last two decades, they also cite the FBI’s progress in internally promoting analysts
to analytic management positions.
Supporters of Director Mueller’s reforms also point to the new Office of
Intelligence, and maintain that it is implementing a number of initiatives focused on
improving the quality of analysis. They include a new promotion plan that will
provide analysts GS-15 promotion opportunities (they now are capped at GS-14);
new career development plans; an increased flexibility to continue working in their
areas of expertise or to rotate to other functional, geographic or management
positions; improved mid-career training; and improved and more standardized
recruitment practices. They assert that these efforts will improve retention rates, a
chronic problem.119
Critics, however, remain largely unpersuaded and argue that analysis remains
a serious FBI vulnerability in the war on terrorism. The Congressional Joint Inquiry
on September 11 urged the FBI, among other steps, to
... significantly improve strategic analytical capabilities by assuring qualification,
training, and independence of analysts coupled with sufficient access to
necessary information and resources.120

Although they applaud the FBI’s new focus on analysis, critics question its
effectiveness and point to a number of trends. For example, they cite the continuing
paucity of analysts in the FBI’s senior national security ranks, even more than two
years after the September 11 attacks. This, they say, reflects the FBI’s continuing
failure to treat analysis as a priority and more fundamentally to understand how to
leverage analysis in the war on terror.121 They also point to the FBI’s own internal
study that found 66 percent of its analytic corps unqualified and question whether the
FBI’s changes are sufficiently broad to address this legacy problem.122

118

(...continued)
Government in the war on terrorism, see Daniel Byman, “Measuring the War on Terrorism:
A First Appraisal,” in Current History, Dec. 2003.

119

The FBI has never experienced problems in recruiting educated analysts, at least at FBI
Headquarters. The FBI, however, has from suffered a retention problem.

120

See the JIC Inquiry, Recommendations Section Errata, p. 7.

121

See Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, p. 298. (Random
House).

122

See the JIC Inquiry, p. 340.

CRS-29
Critics support the new GS-15 promotion plan, but contend that implementation
is lacking and that it falls short of senior executive service promotion which they
advocate.123 According to an FBI official, there are currently no FBI intelligence
analysts at the non-managerial GS-15 grade level. They also are concerned that the
FBI has eliminated the requirement that all new intelligence analysts possess a
minimum of a bachelor’s degree, and substituted instead a less rigorous requirement,
in their view, of one year of analytic experience, or military or law enforcement
employment. They insist that a bachelor’s degree provides more formal and
necessary academic training in research methodologies, written and oral
communication and critical thinking. Moreover, according to some critics, the
collapsing of all functional and cross-disciplinary analysts into one intelligence
analyst position encourages a “one size fits all” approach to analysis that may
undermine a need for functional, geographic and target-specific expertise.124
Finally, critics are concerned that although the FBI says it is trying to strengthen
strategic analysis, it is failing to commit adequate resources. The new Office of
Intelligence has a Strategic Intelligence Unit, but more in name only, according to
some observers. Few analysts have been assigned to the unit, and those who have are
being forced to balance management and executive briefing responsibilities with
actually conducting strategic analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact
that tactical and strategic analysts still physically located in each of the FBI’s
operational divisions are now “matrixed” to the Office of Intelligence. That is, they
report both to their own divisions and to the Office of Intelligence. Therefore, they
potentially confront competing priorities — analysis largely composed of briefing
materials to support FBI executives, and tactical analyses to support ongoing cases.125
Are Efforts to Improve Intelligence Sharing Adequate? The FBI
continues to be criticized for not sharing information — a failure that variously has
been blamed on a variety of shortcomings, including culture, an absence of
information sharing strategy, technological problems, and legal and policy
constraints. Some of the legal and policy constraints were eliminated by the USA

123

Other IC agencies permit analysts to rise to the analytical equivalent of Senior Executive
Service, or Senior Intelligence Service. One such program, the Senior Analytic Service
(SAS), was established at the CIA in the late 1990s by CIA Deputy Director John
McLaughlin. The SAS track allows analysts to rise to the senior-most analytic level,
without assuming managerial responsibilities.

124

This approach is manifested in a recent intelligence analyst job announcement (04-FO0515). While the FBI used to recruit intelligence analysts according to the functional or
geographic area of need, it now asks potential candidates to identify one of four areas of
interest, choosing from: counterintelligence, counterterrorism, criminal or cyber. According
to the announcement, “... Applicants must identify the program area or interest, however,
this does not guarantee placement in the particular program....” See
[https://www.fbijobs.com/JobDesc.asp?src=001&requisitionid=1614&r=021811042620].

125

Although these types of analyses are not mutually exclusive, they serve two different sets
of consumers — the executive who is supporting policymakers, and the special agent who
is running an investigation or operation.

CRS-30
PATRIOT Act.126 And more recently, by a decision to allow criminal and
intelligence investigators to work side by side.127
FBI supporters give the FBI high marks since the September 11th attacks for
sharing threat information, building information bridges to the intelligence agencies
and state and local law enforcement, collaborating with foreign law enforcement
components, and opening itself up to external reviewers.128 But even supporters
believe that maintaining this commendable record will be a continuing management
challenge, one which will require constant reinforcement.129 They emphasize that the
traditional values of FBI agents as independent and determined must give way to
include values of information sharing and cooperation.130
Sharing within FBI: Some Improvements. Supporters argue that perhaps the
most significant change — a sea change, according to some — is a recent decision
to tear down the organizational wall that has separated criminal and intelligence
investigations since the spying scandals of the 1960s.131 As a result, criminal and
intelligence investigators will now physically work as part of the same squads on
terrorism investigations. All counterterrorism cases will be handled from the outset
like intelligence or espionage investigations, allowing investigators to more easily
use secret warrants and other methods that are overseen by the surveillance court and
are unavailable in traditional criminal probes. The FBI was able to do so as a result
of the USA PATRIOT Act, which allows counterterrorism intelligence and criminal
information to be more easily shared within the FBI.132
Supporters blame Congress for creating the wall in the first place. They assert
that in the wake of the 1960s spy scandals, Congress weakened the FBI’s domestic
intelligence capabilities by imposing stricter standards. The result, they argue, was

126

For a policy-oriented discussion of relevant legal and regulatory changes, see Appendix

7.
127

Dan Egan, The Washington Post, “FBI Applies New Rules to Surveillance,” Dec. 12,
2003, p. A-1. (Hereafter cited as Egan, FBI Applies New Rules.)

128

See statement of Richard Thornburgh, Chairman, Chairman, and Academy Panel on FBI
Reorganization, National Academy of Public Administration, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, State, Justice, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies, June 18, 2003, pp. 21-22.
129

Ibid., p. 22.

130

Ibid.

131

See Dan Egan, “FBI Applies New Rules.”

132

Ibid.

CRS-31
a dangerous lack of intelligence sharing.133 According to the FBI, the recent change
has resulted in the disruption of at least four terrorist attacks overseas and the
uncovering of a terrorist sleeper cell in the United States.134
Although these changes undoubtedly will improve intelligence sharing between
FBI’s criminal and intelligence components, the question remains whether the
information will be shared with other agencies and state and local law officials.
Some critics do not dispute that Director Mueller’s decision will enhance intelligence
sharing within the FBI. They agree it will. Rather, they are concerned that more
innocent people will become the targets of clandestine surveillance.135
Supporters Say Sharing, Internally and With Other Agencies, Is
Improving For Additional Reasons. Advocates assert intelligence sharing, both
internally and with other agencies is improving for other reasons — the FBI is better
training its personnel and providing them with improved sharing processes. In
addition, they point to the FBI’s new concept of operations for intelligence
dissemination that collapses a number of current and different production processes
into a single one that will be imbedded throughout the FBI.136 Supporters also point
favorably to Director Mueller’s decision to establish the position of “Reports
Officers,” whose responsibility will be to extract pertinent intelligence from FBI
collection and analysis and disseminate it to the widest extent possible. Supporters
who believe that sharing with state and local authorities has improved point out that
since September 11, the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are the
principal link between the Intelligence Community and state and local law
enforcement officials, has increased from 66 in 2001 to 84 in 2003. The number of
state and local participants has more than quadrupled from 534 to over 2,300,
according to the FBI.
Supporters also finally embrace Director Mueller for correctly emphasizing
technology that emphasizes horizontal, rather than vertical, flow of information to
produce better results. Director Mueller asserts that, “Our move to change the
technology in the next two or three years will have a dramatic impact on the way we
do business — eliminating a lot of the bureaucratic hang-ups, giving the agents the
tools they need to be interactive, pass among themselves the best ways of doing
things and we will free up the FBI in a substantial number of ways.”137
Critics Still Point to Number of Troubling Signs on Sharing. The FBI
concedes that although it “... has always been a great collector of information,” its

133

See statement of William P. Barr, former United States Attorney General, in U.S.
Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2003, p. 14.
134

Ibid.

135

See Dan Egan,”FBI Applies New Rules.”

136

See statement of Steven C. McCraw, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, July 24, 2003.
137

See statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State
and Judiciary June 21, 2002, transcript, p. 30.

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“sharing of information was primarily case oriented rather than part of an enterprise
wide activity.”138 Critics point to a number of troubling signs that they claim indicate
continuing problems. According to the Gilmore Commission, the Federal
government is far from perfecting a system of sharing national security intelligence
and other information. Moreover, the flow of information remains largely one way
— from the local and state levels to the FBI. The prevailing view, according to the
Commission, continues to be that the Federal Government likes to receive
information but is reluctant to share it completely. One local law enforcement
official said the FBI’s intelligence sharing practices remain essentially unchanged
since September 11. This official suggested that the FBI shares a great volume of
threat information, but little of real value that would help state and local officials
prevent terrorist attacks.139 Another state office said, “We don’t get anything (of
value) from the FBI.”140
Some skeptics argue that technology problems notwithstanding, willingness to
share intelligence, both within the FBI and with other Intelligence Community
agencies, remains a continuing problem. According to a recent report issued by the
Markle Foundation, there has been only marginal improvement in the past year in the
sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies, including the FBI.
The report states that sharing remains haphazard and still overly dependent on the ad
hoc network of personal relations among known colleagues. It is not the result of a
carefully considered network architecture that optimizes the abilities of all of the
players, according to the report.141
The Markle report argues that the existing system of counterterrorism
information sharing remains too centralized, federal government-centric, and bound
by increasingly tenuous distinctions in U.S. regulations and law regarding domestic
and foreign intelligence.142 In order to combat a decentralized terrorist threat more
effectively, Markle recommends a model of information sharing which runs counter
to the existing “hub and spoke” information sharing model the FBI is building.
Advocates envision a decentralized “peer-to-peer” network in which the various
federal, state, local and private sector entities systematically collecting information
relevant to counterterrorism, and according to established guidelines protecting civil
liberties and privacy, share that information directly with one another.143
138

See Statement of Assistant Director Steven C. McCraw, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
in U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism, July 24, 2003.
139

Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

140

Interview with a former senior FBI official, Nov. 13, 2003.

141

See “Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security,” The Markle Foundation, Dec.
2, 2003, p. 2.

142

See Creating a Trusted Network for Homeland Security, Second Report of the Markle
Foundation Task Force, Dec.2, 2003.
143

The Markle Foundation has recommended the creation of a System-wide Homeland
Analysis and Resources Exchange (SHARE) Network, in which the Department of
Homeland Security would assume a central role in working with federal, state, local and
(continued...)

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The Department of Justice’s Office of Inspector General, recently reported that
despite progress in terrorism information sharing, the FBI faces considerable
impediments in establishing an effective information and intelligence sharing
program, including changes to information technology constraints, ongoing analytical
weaknesses, agency origination control procedures,144 and lack of “... established
policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share
information and intelligence, either internally or externally.”145
Some State and Local Officials Also Remain Dissatisfied With Level of
Sharing. Some state and local law enforcement officials continue to criticize what
they characterize as FBI’s continuing unwillingness to share intelligence, while
expecting state and local law officials to share their information with them.
Nevertheless, some state and local law enforcement officials concede that there has
been some improvement in the sharing relationship since September 11. And there
also is a growing recognition among some state and local law enforcement officials
that “... there may be a mis-perception that the FBI has more detailed accurate or
confirmed information than it actually has.”146
While acknowledging some improvement, these officials insist the exchange of
information remains largely one-way.147 And although that hasn’t prevented them
from participating in their local JTTFs, one official said he believed that the FBI did

143

(...continued)
private sector organizations to establish a strategy and implementing mechanisms and
policies to share and analyze information in a decentralized manner. See Creating a Trusted
Network for Homeland Security, Exhibit A: “Action Plan for Federal Government
Development of the SHARE Network,” Dec. 2, 2003, p. 10.

144

Originator control, or ORCON, is a process designed to protect categories of (generally)
classified information from being sharing with unauthorized third parties. If an agency
wishes to share ORCON information it received from another agency, it must first request
ORCON release from the originating agency to share the information with a specific third
party consumer. In terms of providing security clearances to state and local law enforcement
officials with a “need to know,” the FBI has established a streamlined security process that
allows law enforcement officials to receive expedited “secret” clearances in about nine
weeks. See Dan Eggen, “Bridging the Divide Between FBI and Police,” The Washington
Post, Feb. 16, 2004, p. A25.

145

See The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Improve the Sharing of Intelligence
and Other Information, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General, Audit
Division, Audit Report 04-10, Dec. 2003, p.iv.
146

See Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin, Protecting Your Community from
Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement (Volume 1 — Local-Federal
Partnerships), Police Executive Research Forum, as supported by the U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing, Mar. 2003.

147

Many of the state and local law enforcement officials interviewed for this report also had
substantial experience at the federal level, both in the IC and in law enforcement. They said
they therefore well understand the inherent capabilities and limitations of intelligence and
the roles foreign intelligence and criminal intelligence play in preventing terrorism.

CRS-34
not consider him an intelligence consumer.148 According to another, the FBI has
shared information through the JTTF but made clear it was doing so because “...he
has a right to know, but not a need to know,” and that the FBI told him not to share
the information with anyone else in law enforcement or state government, including
the governor, who, he said, possesses a Top Secret clearance.149
Some state and local law enforcement officials complain that although JTTFs
are intended to be joint enterprises, combining federal, state and local law
enforcement resources, they characterize the relationship as more of one of
“co-habitation” where the FBI clearly is in charge and non-federal representatives are
viewed as second tier participants, despite often having greater knowledge of a
particular case.150
With respect to the case-orientation and law enforcement bias so often
mentioned as challenges for the FBI as it shifts to having a more preventative bias,
state and local law enforcement officials stated that notwithstanding recognition by
FBI leadership that the “intelligence is in the case,” the FBI agent on the street still
starts with a case and has a bias in the direction of law enforcement. Moreover, one
senior state law enforcement official stated that FBI leadership is “... still being led
by individuals who have a criminal law mindset.”151
Some States Have Suggested Alternate Sharing Procedures. Some state
and local law enforcement officials are sufficiently displeased with the current
sharing relationship that they have proposed that the Department of Homeland
Security establish regional intelligence centers through which classified raw and
finished foreign intelligence on terrorism could be disseminated.152 The centers

148

Interview with a local law enforcement official, Nov. 18, 2003.

149

Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

150

One local law enforcement official suggested that the JTTFs are where the investigative
expertise lies, and should be retained. However, he suggested that in order to be more
valuable in preventing terrorist acts domestically, the JTTFs should be reorganized around
the concept of “joint ness,” and cited the “Goldwater Nichols” Department of Defense
Reorganization Act as a model. The “joint ness” envisioned by this official would have
state and local law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and IC entities responsible for
counterterrorism, operate in an integrated and seamless environment. As envisioned by this
local law enforcement official, consistent with joint officers in the military, promotion to
senior level positions at the parent agency would be contingent upon a successful rotation
to the “Joint” Terrorism Task Forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433) integrated the operational capabilities of the
military services. For further information on Goldwater-Nichols, see
[http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/goldnich.html]. H.R. 3439, the “JTTF Enhancement
Act of 2003” proposes that 1) there be a greater degree of participation in the JTTFs from
DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials; and 2) a program be
established to detail state and local law enforcement officers to the CIA, or CIA personnel
to state and local law enforcement organizations.

151

Interview with a state law enforcement official, Nov. 13, 2003.

152

See “Blue Spies for City,” New York Post, June 29, 2003. The New York Police
(continued...)

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would be staffed by a cadre of Top Secret-cleared personnel drawn principally from
State Police and State DHS Offices and would serve as “... regional repository and
clearinghouse for terrorist related information gathered at the federal level, consisting
of trends, indicators, and warnings.”153 Through a pending arrangement with the
DHS, Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP), the
goal would be to “... create a national pipeline for pattern and trend analysis of
terrorism intelligence,”154 at the state level. DHS has not acted on the proposal.155

Congressional Oversight Issues
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives each established intelligence
oversight committees in the 1970s. The catalyst for the creation of these committees
was public revelations resulting from press coverage and congressional investigations
that the Intelligence Community had conducted covert assassination attempts against
foreign leaders, and collected information concerning the political activities of some
U.S. citizens during the late 1960s and early 1970s.156 Intelligence Committee
Members are selected by the majority and minority leadership of each chamber of
Congress, and serve terms of eight years on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence and six years on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
152

(...continued)
Department (NYPD), in what it describes as a substantial resource investment, has dedicated
more than 100 officers to the New York JTTF. According to NYPD officials, there has been
a steady improvement in the flow of information between the NY JTTF and the NYPD. But
there also have been occasions when police officials have requested information from the
FBI and the IC, but failed to receive a timely response. As result, the NYPD has stationed
several of its officers overseas to better protect the city’s security needs by collecting
information regarding terrorist activities. As one New York City official commented,
“We’re not looking to supplant anything that is being done by the Federal government.
We’re looking to supplement. We’re looking to get the New York question asked.”

153

See Northeast Regional Agreement Information Sharing Proposal, Sept. 22, 2003. The
states engaged in this effort include Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. These
proposed “centers” are distinct from the existing Homeland Security Information Network
(HSIN). The HSIN uses the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) to foster
communication among federal, state and local officials involved in counterterrorism
information. Currently, the system contains only information categorized as “sensitive but
unclassified.” See “Homeland Security Information Network to Expand Collaboration,
Connectivity for States and Major Cities,” Department of Homeland Security

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32336. Public record. Not legal advice.