# The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Four Years

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32267

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** March 10, 2008
- **Citation:** RL32267

## Text

Order Code RL32267

The War Powers Resolution:
After Thirty-Four Years

Updated March 10, 2008

Richard F. Grimmett
Specialist in International Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Four Years
Summary
This report discusses and assesses the War Powers Resolution, its application
since enactment in 1973, providing detailed background on a variety of cases where
it was utilized, or issues of its applicability were raised. It will be revised biannually.
In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed
Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from
Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continues to be a
potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995 the House defeated, by a vote of
217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution
that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law’s enactment
in 1973. In 1999, after the President committed U.S. military forces to action in
Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, Representative Tom Campbell used
expedited procedures under the Resolution to force a debate and votes on U.S.
military action in Yugoslavia, and later sought, unsuccessfully, through a federal
court suit to enforce Presidential compliance with the terms of the War Powers
Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) was passed over the veto of President
Nixon on November 7, 1973, to provide procedures for Congress and the President
to participate in decisions to send U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities. Section 4(a)(1)
requires the President to report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces into
hostilities or imminent hostilities. When such a report is submitted, or is required to
be submitted, section 5(b) requires that the use of forces must be terminated within
60 to 90 days unless Congress authorizes such use or extends the time period.
Section 3 requires that the “President in every possible instance shall consult with
Congress before introducing” U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or imminent
hostilities.
From 1975 through 2007, Presidents have submitted 123 reports as the result of
the War Powers Resolution, but only one, the 1975 Mayaguez seizure, cited section
4(a)(1) which triggers the time limit, and in this case the military action was
completed and U.S. armed forces had disengaged from the area of conflict when the
report was made. The reports submitted by the President since enactment of the War
Powers Resolution cover a range of military activities from embassy evacuations to
full scale combat military operations, such as the Persian Gulf conflict, and the 2003
war with Iraq, the intervention in Kosovo and the anti-terrorism actions in
Afghanistan. In some instances U.S. Armed Forces have been used in hostile
situations without formal reports to Congress under the War Powers Resolution. On
one occasion, Congress exercised its authority to determine that the requirements of
section 4(a)(1) became operative on August 29, 1983, through passage of the
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). In 1991 and 2002,
Congress authorized, by law, the use of military force against Iraq. In several
instances neither the President, Congress, nor the courts have been willing to trigger
the War Powers Resolution mechanism.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Provisions of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Purpose and Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Consultation Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Priority Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Interpretive Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Constitutional Questions Raised . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
War Powers of President and Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Legislative Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Automatic Withdrawal Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Major Cases and Issues Prior to the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation? . . . . . . . . . . 11
Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt: Is Consultation Always Necessary
and Possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent Hostilities? . . . . . . 12
Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training? . . . . . . . . . 14
Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers Resolution? . . . . . . 15
Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake in Response
to International Terrorism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not Raised? . . . . . . 21
Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War World: United Nations Actions . 22
Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers Resolution Relate to
the United Nations and a Real War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization Last? . . . . . . . . . . 28
Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require
Congressional Authorization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus Exists? . . . . . 32
Bosnia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Haiti: Can the President Order Enforcement of a U.N. Embargo? . . . . . . . 42
Terrorist Attacks against the United States (World Trade Center and
the Pentagon) 2001: How Does the War Powers Resolution Apply? . 45
Use of Force Against Iraq Resolution 2002: A Classic Application of the
War Powers Resolution? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Proposed Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Return to Senate Version: Enumerating Exceptions for Emergency Use . . 52
Shorten or Eliminate Time Limitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Replace Automatic Withdrawal Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Cutoff of Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Elimination of Action by Concurrent Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Expedited Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Consultation Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Judicial Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Change of Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
United Nations Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix A. Instances Reported under the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . 56
Appendix B. Instances Not Formally Reported to the Congress Under the
War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix C. Text of the War Powers Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

The War Powers Resolution:
After Thirty-Four Years
Introduction
Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the
President. Among other relevant grants, Congress has the power to declare war and
raise and support the armed forces (Article I, section 8), while the President is
Commander in Chief (Article II, section 2). It is generally agreed that the
Commander in Chief role gives the President power to utilize the armed forces to
repel attacks against the United States, but there has long been controversy over
whether he is constitutionally authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad
without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization.
Congressional concern about Presidential use of armed forces without
congressional authorization intensified after the Korean conflict. During the Vietnam
war, Congress searched for a way to assert authority to decide when the United States
should become involved in a war or the armed forces be utilized in circumstances
that might lead to hostilities. On November 7, 1973, it passed the War Powers
Resolution (P.L. 93-148) over the veto of President Nixon. The main purpose of the
Resolution was to establish procedures for both branches to share in decisions that
might get the United States involved in war. The drafters sought to circumscribe the
President’s authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities or potential hostilities
without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet provide enough
flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or other emergencies.
The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment has been mixed,
and after 30 years it remains controversial. Some Members of Congress believe the
Resolution has on some occasions served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by
Presidents, provided a mode of communication, and given Congress a vehicle for
asserting its war powers. Others have sought to amend the Resolution because they
believe it has failed to assure a congressional voice in committing U.S. troops to
potential conflicts abroad. Others in Congress, along with executive branch officials,
contend that the President needs more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy and
that the time limitation in the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional and
impractical. Some have argued for its repeal.
This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, actual
experience in its use from its enactment in 1973 through December 2007, and
proposed amendments to it. Appendix A lists instances which Presidents have
reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution, and Appendix B lists
representative instances of the use of U.S. armed forces that were not reported.

CRS-2

Provisions of the War Powers Resolution
(P.L. 93-148)
Title
Section 1 establishes the title, “The War Powers Resolution.” The law is
frequently referred to as the “War Powers Act,” the title of the measure passed by the
Senate. Although the latter is not technically correct, it does serve to emphasize that
the War Powers Resolution, embodied in a joint resolution which complies with
constitutional requirements for lawmaking, is a law.

Purpose and Policy
Section 2 states the Resolution’s purpose and policy, with Section 2(a) citing as
the primary purpose to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and
the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities
or in such situations.”
Section 2(b) points to the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution as
the basis for legislation on the war powers. It provides that “Under Article I, section
8, of the Constitution it is specifically provided that Congress shall have the power
to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its own
powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the
United States....”
Section 2(c) states the policy that the powers of the President as Commander in
Chief to introduce U.S. armed forces into situations of hostilities or imminent
hostilities “are exercised only pursuant to —
(1) a declaration of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization, or
(3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”

Consultation Requirement
Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution requires the President “in every
possible instance” to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. Armed Forces
into situations of hostilities and imminent hostilities, and to continue consultations
as long as the armed forces remain in such situations. The House report elaborated:
A considerable amount of attention was given to the definition of consultation.
Rejected was the notion that consultation should be synonymous with merely
being informed. Rather, consultation in this provision means that a decision is
pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are being asked by the
President for their advice and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their
approval of action contemplated. Furthermore, for consultation to be

CRS-3
meaningful, the President himself must participate and all information relevant
to the situation must be made available.1

The House version specifically called for consultation between the President and
the leadership and appropriate committees. This was changed to less specific
wording in conference, however, in order to provide more flexibility.

Reporting Requirements
Section 4 requires the President to report to Congress whenever he introduces
U.S. armed forces abroad in certain situations. Of key importance is section 4(a)(1)
because it triggers the time limit in section 5(b). Section 4(a)(1) requires reporting
within 48 hours, in the absence of a declaration of war or congressional
authorization, the introduction of U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”
Some indication of the meaning of hostilities and imminent hostilities is given
in the House report on its War Powers bill:
The word hostilities was substituted for the phrase armed conflict during the
subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat
broader in scope. In addition to a situation in which fighting actually has begun,
hostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been
fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict. “Imminent
hostilities” denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such
a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict.2

Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops “into the
territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except
for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such
forces.” According to the House report this was to cover
the initial commitment of troops in situations in which there is no actual fighting
but some risk, however small, of the forces being involved in hostilities. A
report would be required any time combat military forces were sent to another
nation to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S.
presence felt. Thus, for example, the dispatch of Marines to Thailand in 1962
and the quarantine of Cuba in the same year would have required Presidential
reports. Reports would not be required for routine port supply calls, emergency
aid measures, normal training exercises, and other noncombat military activities.3

Section 4(a)(3) requires the reporting of the introduction of troops “in numbers
which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already
located in a foreign nation.” The House report elaborated:

1

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 6.

2

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 7.

3

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 7.

CRS-4
While the word “substantially” designates a flexible criterion, it is possible to
arrive at a common-sense understanding of the numbers involved. A 100%
increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy — say from 5 to 10 —
clearly would not be an occasion for a report. A thousand additional men sent
to Europe under present circumstances does not significantly enlarge the total
U.S. troop strength of about 300,000 already there. However, the dispatch of
1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a complement of 4,000
would mean an increase of 25%, which is substantial. Under this circumstance,
President Kennedy would have been required to report to Congress in 1962 when
he raised the number of U.S. military advisers in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.4

All of the reports under Section 4(a), which are to be submitted to the Speaker
of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate, are to set forth:
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of United States
Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.
Section 4(b) requires the President to furnish such other information as
Congress may request to fulfill its responsibilities relating to committing the nation
to war.
Section 4(c) requires the President to report to Congress periodically, and at
least every six months, whenever U.S. forces are introduced into hostilities or any
other situation in section 4(a).
The objectives of these provisions, the conference report stated, was to “ensure
that the Congress by right and as a matter of law will be provided with all the
information it requires to carry out its constitutional responsibilities with respect to
committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.”5

Congressional Action
Section 5(a) deals with congressional procedures for receipt of a report under
section 4(a)(1). It provides that if a report is transmitted during a congressional
adjournment, the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate,
when they deem it advisable or if petitioned by at least 30% of the Members of their
respective Houses, shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in order
to consider the report and take appropriate action.
Section 5(b) was intended to provide teeth for the War Powers Resolution.
After a report “is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a)(1),

4

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 93-287, p. 8.

5

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 93-547, p. 8.

CRS-5
whichever is earlier”, section 5(b) requires the President to terminate the use of U.S.
Armed Forces after 60 days unless Congress (1) has declared war or authorized the
action; (2) has extended the period by law; or (3) is physically unable to meet as a
result of an armed attack on the United States. The 60 days can be extended for 30
days by the President if he certifies that “unavoidable military necessity respecting
the safety of United States Armed Forces” requires their continued use in the course
of bringing about their removal.
Section 5(c) requires the President to remove the forces at any time if Congress
so directs by concurrent resolution; the effectiveness of this subsection is uncertain
because of the 1983 Supreme Court decision on the legislative veto. It is discussed
in Part II of this report.

Priority Procedures
Section 6 establishes expedited procedures for congressional consideration of
a joint resolution or bill introduced to authorize the use of armed forces under section
5 (b). They provide for:
(a) A referral to the House Foreign Affairs [International Relations] or Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, the committee to report one measure not later
than 24 calendar days before the expiration of the 60 day period, unless the
relevant House determines otherwise by a vote;
(b) The reported measure to become the pending business of the relevant House
and be voted on within three calendar days, unless that House determines
otherwise by vote; in the Senate the debate is to be equally divided between
proponents and opponents;
(c) A measure passed by one House to be referred to the relevant committee of
the other House and reported out not later than 14 calendar days before the
expiration of the 60 day period, the reported bill to become the pending business
of that House and be voted on within 3 calendar days unless determined
otherwise by a vote;
(d) Conferees to file a report not later than four calendar days before the
expiration of the 60 day period. If they cannot agree within 48 hours, the
conferees are to report back in disagreement, and such report is to be acted on
by both Houses not later than the expiration of the 60 day period.
Section 7 establishes similar priority procedures for a concurrent resolution to
withdraw forces under section 5(c). For a recent use of these procedures see the
section on the legislative veto, below.

Interpretive Provisions
Section 8 sets forth certain interpretations relating to the Resolution. Section
8(a) states that authority to introduce armed forces is not to be inferred from any
provision of law or treaty unless it specifically authorizes the introduction of armed

CRS-6
forces into hostilities or potential hostilities and states that it is “intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution.”
This language was derived from a Senate measure and was intended to prevent a
security treaty or military appropriations act from being used to authorize the
introduction of troops. It was also aimed against using a broad resolution like the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution 6 to justify hostilities abroad. This resolution had stated that
the United States was prepared to take all necessary steps, including use of armed
force, to assist certain nations, and it was cited by Presidents and many Members as
congressional authorization for the Vietnam war.
Section 8(b) states that further specific statutory authorization is not required
to permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with
members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the
headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were established
prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the United
Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United States prior to such date.

This section was added by the Senate to make clear that the resolution did not
prevent U.S. forces from participating in certain joint military exercises with allied
or friendly organizations or countries. The conference report stated that the
“high-level” military commands meant the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
(NATO), the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and the United
Nations command in Korea.
Section 8(c) defines the introduction of armed forces to include the assignment
of armed forces to accompany regular or irregular military forces of other countries
when engaged, or potentially engaged, in hostilities. The conference report on the
War Powers Resolution explained that this was language modified from a Senate
provision requiring specific statutory authorization for assigning members of the
Armed Forces for such purposes. The report of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on its bill said:
The purpose of this provision is to prevent secret, unauthorized military support
activities and to prevent a repetition of many of the most controversial and
regrettable actions in Indochina. The ever deepening ground combat
involvement of the United States in South Vietnam began with the assignment
of U.S. “advisers” to accompany South Vietnamese units on combat patrols; and
in Laos, secretly and without congressional authorization, U.S. “advisers” were
deeply engaged in the war in northern Laos.7

Section 8(d) states that nothing in the Resolution is intended to alter the
constitutional authority of either the Congress or the President. It also specifies that
nothing is to be construed as granting any authority to introduce troops that would not
exist in the absence of the Resolution. The House report said that this provision was
to help insure the constitutionality of the Resolution by making it clear that nothing
in it could be interpreted as changing the powers delegated by the Constitution.
6

P.L. 88-408, approved August 10, 1964; repealed in 1971 by P.L. 91-672.

7

U.S. Congress. S.Rept. 93-220, p. 24.

CRS-7
Section 9 is a separability clause, stating that if any provision or its application
is found invalid, the remainder of the Resolution is not to be affected.

Constitutional Questions Raised
From its inception, the War Powers Resolution was controversial because it
operated on the national war powers, powers divided by the Constitution in no
definitive fashion between the President and Congress. Congress adopted the
resolution in response to the perception that Presidents had assumed more authority
to send forces into hostilities than the framers of the Constitution had intended for
the Commander-in-Chief. President Nixon in his veto message challenged the
constitutionality of the essence of the War Powers Resolution, and particularly two
provisions.8 He argued that the legislative veto provision, permitting Congress to
direct the withdrawal of troops by concurrent resolution, was unconstitutional. He
also argued that the provision requiring withdrawal of troops after 60-90 days unless
Congress passed legislation authorizing such use was unconstitutional because it
checked Presidential powers without affirmative congressional action. Every
President since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution has taken the position
that it is an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s authority as
Commander-in-Chief.

War Powers of President and Congress
The heart of the challenge to the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution
rests on differing interpretations by the two branches of the respective war powers
of the President and Congress. These differing interpretations, especially the
assertions of Presidential authority to send forces into hostile situations without a
declaration of war or other authorization by Congress, were the reason for the
enactment of the Resolution.
The congressional view was that the framers of the Constitution gave Congress
the power to declare war, meaning the ultimate decision whether or not to enter a
war. Most Members of Congress agreed that the President as Commander in Chief
had power to lead the U.S. forces once the decision to wage war had been made, to
defend the nation against an attack, and perhaps in some instances to take other
action such as rescuing American citizens. But, in this view, he did not have the
power to commit armed forces to war. By the early 1970s, the congressional majority
view was that the constitutional balance of war powers had swung too far toward the
President and needed to be corrected. Opponents argued that Congress always held
the power to forbid or terminate U.S. military action by statute or refusal of
appropriations, and that without the clear will to act the War Powers Resolution
would be ineffective.

8

United States. President (Nixon). Message vetoing House Joint Resolution 542, A Joint
Resolution Concerning the War Powers of Congress and the President. October 24, 1973.
H.Doc. 93-171.

CRS-8
In his veto message, President Nixon said the Resolution would impose
restrictions upon the authority of the President which would be dangerous to the
safety of the Nation and “attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities
which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200
years.”
The War Powers Resolution in section 2(c) recognized the constitutional powers
of the President as Commander-in-Chief to introduce forces into hostilities or
imminent hostilities as “exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2)
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” The executive
branch has contended that the President has much broader authority to use forces,
including for such purposes as to rescue American citizens abroad, rescue foreign
nationals where such action facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens, protect U.S.
Embassies and legations, suppress civil insurrection, implement the terms of an
armistice or cease-fire involving the United States, and carry out the terms of security
commitments contained in treaties.9

Legislative Veto
On June 23, 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, ruled unconstitutional
the legislative veto provision in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.10 Although the case involved the use of a one-House legislative veto, the
decision cast doubt on the validity of any legislative veto device that was not
presented to the President for signature. The Court held that to accomplish what the
House attempted to do in the Chadha case “requires action in conformity with the
express procedures of the Constitution’s prescription for legislative action: passage
by a majority of both Houses and presentment to the President.” On July 6, 1983, the
Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s decision striking down a provision in
another law11 that permitted Congress to disapprove by concurrent (two-House)
resolution.12
Since section 5(c) requires forces to be removed by the President if Congress so
directs by a concurrent resolution, it is constitutionally suspect under the reasoning
applied by the Court.13 A concurrent resolution is adopted by both chambers, but it
does not require presentment to the President for signature or veto. Some legal
analysts contend, nevertheless, that the War Powers Resolution is in a unique
9

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test of
Compliance relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation
of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1975. p. 69.

10

462 U.S. 919 (1983).

11

Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980.

12

Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983).

13

Celada, Raymond. J. Effect of the Legislative Veto Decision on the Two-House
Disapproval Mechanism to Terminate U.S. Involvement in Hostilities Pursuant to Unilateral
Presidential Action. CRS Report, August 24, 1983.

CRS-9
category which differs from statutes containing a legislative veto over delegated
authorities.14 Perhaps more important, some observers contend, if a majority of both
Houses ever voted to withdraw U.S. forces, the President would be unlikely to
continue the action for long, and Congress could withhold appropriations to finance
further action. Because the War Powers Resolution contains a separability clause in
section 9, most analysts take the view that the remainder of the joint resolution would
not be affected even if section 5(c) were found unconstitutional.15
Congress has taken action to fill the gap left by the possible invalidity of the
concurrent resolution mechanism for the withdrawal of troops. On October 20, 1983,
the Senate voted to amend the War Powers Resolution by substituting a joint
resolution, which requires presentment to the President, for the concurrent resolution
in section 5(c), and providing that it would be handled under the expedited
procedures in section 7. The House and Senate conferees agreed not to amend the
War Powers Resolution itself, but to adopt a free standing measure relating to the
withdrawal of troops. The measure, which became law, provided that any joint
resolution or bill to require the removal of U.S. armed forces engaged in hostilities
outside the United States without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization would be considered in accordance with the expedited procedures of
section 601(b) of the International Security and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,16
except that it would be amendable and debate on a veto limited to 20 hours.17 The
priority procedures embraced by this provision applied in the Senate only. Handling
of such a joint resolution by the House was left to that Chamber’s discretion.
House Members attempted to use section 5(c) to obtain a withdrawal of forces
from Somalia. On October 22, 1993, Representative Benjamin Gilman introduced
H.Con.Res. 170, pursuant to section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, directing the
President to remove U.S. Armed Forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994. Using
the expedited procedures called for in section 5(c), the Foreign Affairs Committee
amended the date of withdrawal to March 31, 1994, (the date the President had
already agreed to withdraw the forces), and the House adopted H.Con.Res. 170. The
Foreign Affairs Committee reported:18

14

Gressman, Prof. Eugene. In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. The
U.S. Supreme Court Decision Concerning the Legislative Veto. Hearings, July 19, 20, and
21, 1983. 98th Congress, 1st sess. Washington, U.S. GPO, 1983, p. 155-157. Buchanan, G.
Sidney. In Defense of the War Powers Resolution: Chadha Does Not Apply. Houston Law
Review, Vol. 22, p. 1155; Ely, John Hart. Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act that
Worked. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88, p. 1379 (see p. 1395-1398).
15

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Concerning the Legislative Veto, Hearings, p. 52.
16

P.L. 94-329, signed June 30, 1976.

17

Senate amendment to S. 1324. Section 1013, State Department Authorization Act for
FY1984, P.L. 98-164, approved November 22, 1983. Codified at 50 U.S.C. , sect.1546a
(1994).
18

H.Rept. 103-329, November 5, 1993, p. 2. See below for further discussion of the Somalia
case.

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Despite such genuine constitutionality questions, the committee acted in
accordance with the expedited procedures in section 7. The committee action
was premised on a determination that neither individual Members of Congress
nor Committees of Congress should make unilateral judgments about the
constitutionality of provisions of law.

Despite the use of the phrase “directs the President”, the sponsor of the
resolution and Speaker of the House Thomas Foley expressed the view that because
of the Chadha decision, the resolution would be non-binding. The March 31, 1994,
withdrawal date was later enacted as section 8151 of P.L. 103-139, signed November
11, 1993.

Automatic Withdrawal Provision
The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial
provision of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) requires the President to
withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities within 60-90 days after a report is submitted
or required to be submitted under section 4(a)(1). The triggering of the time limit has
been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents to report, or Congress to insist
upon a report, under section 4(a)(1).
Drafters of the War Powers Resolution included a time limit to provide some
teeth for Congress, in the event a President assumed a power to act from provisions
of resolutions, treaties, or the Constitution which did not constitute an explicit
authorization. The Senate report called the time limit “the heart and core” of the bill
that “represents, in an historic sense, a restoration of the constitutional balance which
has been distorted by practice in our history and, climatically, in recent decades.”19
The House report emphasized that the Resolution did not grant the President any new
authority or any freedom of action during the time limits that he did not already have.
Administration officials have objected that the provision would require the
withdrawal of U.S. forces simply because of congressional inaction during an
arbitrary period. Since the resolution recognizes that the President has independent
authority to use armed forces in certain circumstances, they state, “on what basis can
Congress seek to terminate such independent authority by the mere passage of
time?”20 In addition, they argue, the imposition of a deadline interferes with
successful action, signals a divided nation and lack of resolve, gives the enemy a
basis for hoping that the President will be forced by domestic opponents to stop an
action, and increases risk to U.S. forces in the field. The issue has not been dealt
with by the courts.

19

The Senate bill had a time limit of 30 days. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Foreign Relations. War Powers. Report to accompany S. 440. S.Rept. 93-220, 93d
Congress, 1st Session. p. 28.
20

Sofaer, Abraham D. Prepared statement in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on
Foreign Relations. The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a
Constitutional Impasse. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on War Powers. July
13-September 29, 1988. S.Hrng. 100-1012. p. 1059.

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Major Cases and Issues Prior
to the Persian Gulf War
Perceptions of the War Powers Resolution tended to be set during the Cold War.
During the 1970s the issues revolved largely around the adequacy of consultation.
The 1980s raised more serious issues of Presidential compliance and congressional
willingness to use the War Powers Resolution to restrain Presidential action. With
regard to Lebanon in 1983, Congress itself invoked the War Powers Resolution, but
in the 1987-1988 Persian Gulf tanker war Congress chose not to do so. Following
is a summary of major U.S. military actions and the issues they raised relating to the
War Powers Resolution from its enactment in 1973 to August 1990.21

Vietnam Evacuations and Mayaguez: What Is Consultation?
As the Vietnam war ended, on three occasions, in April 1975, President Ford
used U.S. forces to help evacuate American citizens and foreign nationals. In
addition, in May 1975 President Ford ordered the retaking of a U.S. merchant vessel,
the SS Mayaguez which had been seized by Cambodian naval patrol vessels. All four
actions were reported to Congress citing the War Powers Resolution. The report on
the Mayaguez recapture was the only War Powers report to date to specifically cite
section 4(a)(1), but the question of the time limit was moot because the action was
over by the time the report was filed.
Among the problems revealed by these first four cases were differences of
opinion between the two branches on the meaning of consultation. The Ford
Administration held that it had met the consultation requirement because the
President had directed that congressional leaders be notified prior to the actual
commencement of the introduction of armed forces. The prevailing congressional
view was that consultation meant that the President seek congressional opinion, and
take it into account, prior to making a decision to commit armed forces.22

Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt:
Necessary and Possible?

Is Consultation Always

After an unsuccessful attempt on April 24, 1980, to rescue American hostages
being held in Iran, President Carter submitted a report to Congress to meet the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, but he did not consult in advance. The
Administration took the position that consultation was not required because the

21

Appendix A lists in chronological order all reports to Congress related to the War Powers
Resolution from the first in 1975 through 2003. Appendix B lists representative instances
of the deployment to or use of armed forces in potentially hostile situations which were not
reported under the Resolution. Appendix C gives the complete text of the War Powers
Resolution.
22

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. War Powers: A Test of
Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, the Evacuation
of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident. Hearings, May 7 and June 4, 1975. Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. P. 3.

CRS-12
mission was a rescue attempt, not an act of force or aggression against Iran. In
addition, the Administration contended that consultation was not possible or required
because the mission depended upon total surprise.
Some Members of Congress complained about the lack of consultation,
especially because legislative-executive meetings had been going on since the Iranian
crisis had begun the previous year. Just before the rescue attempt, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had sent a letter to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requesting
formal consultations under the War Powers Resolution. Moreover, shortly before the
rescue attempt, the President outlined plans for a rescue attempt to Senate Majority
Leader Robert Byrd but did not say it had begun. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Frank Church stressed as guidelines for the future: (1)
consultation required giving Congress an opportunity to participate in the decision
making process, not just informing Congress that an operation was underway; and
(2) the judgment could not be made unilaterally but should be made by the President
and Congress.23

El Salvador: When Are Military Advisers in Imminent
Hostilities?
One of the first cases to generate substantial controversy because it was never
reported under the War Powers Resolution was the dispatch of U.S. military advisers
to El Salvador. At the end of February 1981, the Department of State announced the
dispatch of 20 additional military advisers to El Salvador to aid its government
against guerilla warfare. There were already 19 military advisers in El Salvador sent
by the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration said the insurgents were
organized and armed by Soviet bloc countries, particularly Cuba. By March 14, the
Administration had authorized a total of 54 advisers, including experts in combat
training.
The President did not report the situation under the War Powers Resolution. A
State Department memorandum said a report was not required because the U.S.
personnel were not being introduced into hostilities or situations of imminent
hostilities. The memorandum asserted that if a change in circumstances occurred that
raised the prospect of imminent hostilities, the Resolution would be complied with.
A justification for not reporting under section 4(a)(2) was that the military personnel
being introduced were not equipped for combat.24 They would, it was maintained,
carry only personal sidearms which they were authorized to use only in their own
defense or the defense of other Americans.
The State Department held that section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution was
not intended to require a report when U.S. military personnel might be involved in
training foreign military personnel, if there were no imminent involvement of U.S.
personnel in hostilities. In the case of El Salvador, the memorandum said, U.S.

23

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. The situation in Iran. Hearing,
96th Congress, 2nd session. May 8, 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. P. iii.
24

Congressional Record, March 5, 1981, V. 127, p. 3743.

CRS-13
military personnel “will not act as combat advisors, and will not accompany
Salvadoran forces in combat, on operational patrols, or in any other situation where
combat is likely.”
On May 1, 1981, eleven Members of Congress challenged the President’s action
by filing suit on grounds that he had violated the Constitution and the War Powers
Resolution by sending the advisers to El Salvador. Eventually there were 29
co-plaintiffs, but by June 18, 1981, an equal number of Members (13 Senators and
16 Representatives) filed a motion to intervene in the suit, contending that a number
of legislative measures were then pending before Congress and that Congress had
ample opportunity to vote to end military assistance to El Salvador if it wished.
On October 4, 1982, U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green dismissed the
suit. She ruled that Congress, not the court, must resolve the question of whether the
U.S. forces in El Salvador were involved in a hostile or potentially hostile situation.
While there might be situations in which a court could conclude that U.S. forces were
involved in hostilities, she ruled, the “subtleties of fact-finding in this situation
should be left to the political branches.” She noted that Congress had taken no action
to show it believed the President’s decision was subject to the War Powers
Resolution.25 On November 18, 1983, a Federal circuit court affirmed the dismissal
and on June 8, 1984, the Supreme Court declined consideration of an appeal of that
decision.26
As the involvement continued and casualties occurred among the U.S. military
advisers, various legislative proposals relating to the War Powers Resolution and El
Salvador were introduced. Some proposals required a specific authorization prior to
the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or combat in El Salvador.27 Other
proposals declared that the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces in El Salvador
necessitated compliance with section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution, requiring
the President to submit a report.28
Neither approach was adopted in legislation, but the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported that the President had “a clear obligation under the War Powers
Resolution to consult with Congress prior to any future decision to commit combat
forces to El Salvador.”29 On July 26, 1983, the House rejected an amendment to the
Defense Authorization bill (H.R. 2969) to limit the number of active duty military

25

Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982).

26

720 F. 2d 1355 (D.C.Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984).

27

On March 8, 1982, Senator Robert Byrd introduced the War Powers Resolution
Amendment of 1982 (S. 2179) specifically providing that U.S. armed forces shall not be
introduced into El Salvador for combat unless (1) the Congress has declared war or
specifically authorized such use; or (2) such introduction was necessary to meet a clear and
present danger of attack on the United States or to provide immediate evacuation of U.S.
citizens. Similar bills were introduced in the House, e.g. H.R. 1619 and H.R. 1777 in the
98th Congress.
28

H.Con.Res. 87, 97th Congress.

29

Report on S.J.Res. 158, Sec. III, S.Rept. 97-470, June 9, 1982.

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advisers in El Salvador to 55, unless the President reported any increase above that
level under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.30 Nevertheless, the
Administration in practice kept the number of trainers at 55.

Honduras: When Are Military Exercises More than Training?
Military exercises in Honduras in 1983 and subsequent years raised the question
of when military exercises should be reported under the War Powers Resolution.
Section 4(a)(2) requires the reporting of introduction of troops equipped for combat,
but exempts deployments which relate solely to training.
On July 27, 1983, President Reagan announced “joint training exercises”
planned for Central America and the Caribbean. The first contingent of U.S. troops
landed in Honduras on August 8, 1983, and the series of ground and ocean exercises
continued for several years, involving thousands of ground troops plus warships and
fighter planes.
The President did not report the exercises under the War Powers Resolution.
He characterized the maneuvers as routine and said the United States had been
regularly conducting joint exercises with Latin American countries since 1965. Some
Members of Congress, on the other hand, contended that the exercises were part of
a policy to support the rebels or “contras” fighting the Sandinista Government of
Nicaragua, threatening that government, and increased the possibility of U.S. military
involvement in hostilities in Central America.
Several Members of Congress called for reporting the actions under the War
Powers Resolution, but some sought other vehicles for congressional control. In
1982, the Boland amendment to the Defense Appropriations Act had already
prohibited use of funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua or provoke a
military exchange between Nicaragua or Honduras.31 Variations of this amendment
followed in subsequent years. After press reports in 1985 that the option of invading
Nicaragua was being discussed, the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986
stated the sense of Congress that U.S. armed forces should not be introduced into or
over Nicaragua for combat.32 In 1986, after U.S. helicopters ferried Honduran troops
to the Nicaraguan border area, Congress prohibited U.S. personnel from
participating in assistance within land areas of Honduras and Costa Rica within 120
miles of the Nicaraguan border, or from entering Nicaragua to provide military
advice or support to paramilitary groups operating in that country.33 Gradually the

30

Congressional Record, House, July 26, 1983, pp. 20924-20925.

31

The initial statutory restriction was contained in the Continuing Appropriations
Resolution for 1983, P.L. 97-377. This was followed by a $24 million ceiling on intelligence
agency support in FY1984.
32

Sec. 1451 of P.L.99-145, approved November 8, 1985. A similar provision was contained
in the defense authorization for 1988-1989, sec.1405 of P.L.100-180, approved December
4, 1987.
33

Continuing Appropriations Resolution, P. L. 99-591, approved October 30, 1986.
(continued...)

CRS-15
issue died with peace agreements in the region and the electoral defeat of the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in 1990.

Lebanon: How Can Congress Invoke the War Powers
Resolution?
The War Powers Resolution faced a major test when Marines sent to participate
in a Multinational Force in Lebanon in 1982 became the targets of hostile fire in
August 1983. During this period President Reagan filed three reports under the War
Powers Resolution, but he did not report under section 4(a)(1) that the forces were
being introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities, thus triggering the 60-90 day
time limit.
On September 29, 1983, Congress passed the Multinational Force in Lebanon
Resolution determining that the requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983.34 In the same resolution, Congress
authorized the continued participation of the Marines in the Multinational Force for
18 months. The resolution was a compromise between Congress and the President.
Congress obtained the President’s signature on legislation invoking the War Powers
Resolution for the first time, but the price for this concession was a congressional
authorization for the U.S. troops to remain in Lebanon for 18 months.
The events began on July 6, 1982, when President Reagan announced he would
send a small contingent of U.S. troops to a multinational force for temporary
peacekeeping in Lebanon. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Clement Zablocki wrote President Reagan that if such a force were sent, the United
States would be introducing forces into imminent hostilities and a report under
section 4(a)(1) would be required. When the forces began to land on August 25,
President Reagan reported but did not cite section 4(a)(1) and said the agreement
with Lebanon ruled out any combat responsibilities. After overseeing the departure
of the Palestine Liberation Organization force, the Marines in the first Multinational
Force left Lebanon on September 10, 1982.
The second dispatch of Marines to Lebanon began on September 20, 1982.
President Reagan announced that the United States, France, and Italy had agreed to
form a new multinational force to return to Lebanon for a limited period of time to
help maintain order until the lawful authorities in Lebanon could discharge those
duties. The action followed three events that took place after the withdrawal of the
first group of Marines: the assassination of Lebanon President-elect Bashir Gemayel,
the entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians
by Lebanese Christian militiamen.
On September 29, 1982, President Reagan submitted a report that 1,200 Marines
had begun to arrive in Beirut, but again he did not cite section 4(a)(1), saying instead

33

(...continued)
Continued in P.L. 100-202, approved December 22, 1987.
34

P.L. 98-119, approved October 12, 1983.

CRS-16
that the American force would not engage in combat. As a result of incidents in
which Marines were killed or wounded, there was again controversy in Congress on
whether the President’s report should have been filed under section 4(a)(1). In mid1983 Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act of 1983 requiring
statutory authorization for any substantial expansion in the number or role of U.S.
Armed Forces in Lebanon. It also included Section 4(b) that stated:
Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or suspend any of the
standards and procedures prescribed by the War Powers Resolution of 1983.35

President Reagan reported on the Lebanon situation for the third time on August
30, 1983, still not citing section 4(a)(1), after fighting broke out between various
factions in Lebanon and two Marines were killed.
The level of fighting heightened, and as the Marine casualties increased and the
action enlarged, there were more calls in Congress for invocation of the War Powers
Resolution. Several Members of Congress said the situation had changed since the
President’s first report and introduced legislation that took various approaches.
Senator Charles Mathias introduced S.J.Res. 159 stating that the time limit specified
in the War Powers Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the
forces to remain in Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the
60-day period. Representative Thomas Downey introduced H.J.Res. 348 directing
the President to report under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. Senator
Robert Byrd introduced S.J.Res. 163 finding that section 4(a)(1) of the war powers
resolution applied to the present circumstances in Lebanon. The House
Appropriations Committee approved an amendment to the continuing resolution for
FY1984 (H.J.Res. 367), sponsored by Representative Clarence Long, providing that
after 60 days, funds could not be “obligated or expended for peacekeeping activities
in Lebanon by United States Armed Forces,” unless the President had submitted a
report under section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. A similar amendment
was later rejected by the full body, but it reminded the Administration of possible
congressional actions.
On September 20, congressional leaders and President Reagan agreed on a
compromise resolution invoking section 4(a)(1) and authorizing the Marines to
remain for 18 months. The resolution became the first legislation to be handled
under the expedited procedures of the War Powers Resolution. On September 28,
the House passed H.J.Res. 364 by a vote of 270 to 161. After three days of debate,
on September 29, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 159 by a vote of 54 to 46. The House
accepted the Senate bill by a vote of 253 to 156. As passed, the resolution contained
four occurrences that would terminate the authorization before eighteen months: (1)
the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, unless the President certified
continued U.S. participation was required to accomplish specified purposes; (2) the
assumption by the United Nations or the Government of Lebanon of the
responsibilities of the Multinational Force; (3) the implementation of other effective

35

P.L. 98-43, approved June 27, 1983.

CRS-17
security arrangements; or (4) the withdrawal of all other countries from participation
in the Multinational Force.36
Shortly afterward, on October 23, 1983, 241 U.S. Marines in Lebanon were
killed by a suicide truck bombing, bringing new questions in Congress and U.S.
public opinion about U.S. participation. On February 7, 1984, President Reagan
announced the Marines would be redeployed and on, March 30, 1984, reported to
Congress that U.S. participation in the Multinational Force in Lebanon had ended.

Grenada: Do the Expedited Procedures Work?
On October 25, 1983, President Reagan reported to Congress “consistent with”
the War Powers Resolution that he had ordered a landing of approximately 1900 U.S.
Army and Marine Corps personnel in Grenada. He said that the action was in
response to a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States which had
formed a collective security force to restore order in Grenada, where anarchic
conditions had developed, and to protect the lives of U.S. citizens.
Many Members of Congress contended that the President should have cited
section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which would have triggered the 60-90
day time limitation. On November 1, 1983, the House supported this interpretation
when it adopted, by a vote of 403-23, H.J Res. 402 declaring that the requirements
of section 4(a)(1) had become operative on October 25. The Senate did not act on
this measure and a conference was not held. The Senate had adopted a similar
measure on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20, but on November 17 the provision was
deleted in the conference report on the debt limit bill to which it was attached.37
Thus both Houses had voted to invoke section 4(a)(1), but the legislation was not
completed.
On November 17, White House spokesman Larry Speakes said the
Administration had indicated that there was no need for action as the combat troops
would be out within the 60-90 day time period. Speaker Thomas O’Neill took the
position that, whether or not Congress passed specific legislation, the War Powers
Resolution had become operative on October 25. By December 15, 1983, all U.S.
combat troops had been removed from Grenada.
Eleven Members of Congress filed a suit challenging the constitutionality of
President Reagan’s invasion of Grenada. A district judge held that courts should not
decide such cases unless the entire Congress used the institutional remedies available
to it.38 An appellate court subsequently held that the issue was moot because the
invasion had been ended.39

36

P.L. 98-119, signed October 12, 1983.

37

U.S. Congress. H.Rept. 98-566 on H.J.Res. 308; Senate amendment numbered 3.
Congressional Record November 17, 1983, p. H10189.
38

Conyers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 323 (D.D.C. 1984).

39

Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

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Libya: Should Congress Help Decide on Raids to Undertake
in Response to International Terrorism?
The use of U.S. forces against Libya in 1986 focused attention on the
application of the War Powers Resolution to use of military force against
international terrorism.
Tensions between the United States and Libya under the leadership of Col.
Muammar Qadhafi had been mounting for several years, particularly after terrorist
incidents at the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985. On January 7,
1986, President Reagan said that the Rome and Vienna incidents were the latest in
a series of brutal terrorist acts committed with Qadhafi’s backing that constituted
armed aggression against the United States.
The War Powers issue was first raised on March 24, 1986, when Libyan forces
fired missiles at U.S. aircraft operating in the Gulf of Sidra. In response, the United
States fired missiles at Libyan vessels and at Sirte, the Libyan missile site involved.
The U.S. presence in the Gulf of Sidra, an area claimed by Libya, was justified as an
exercise to maintain freedom of the seas, but it was widely considered a response to
terrorist activities.
Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing of a discotheque in West
Berlin occurred and an American soldier was killed. On April 14 President Reagan
announced there was irrefutable evidence that Libya had been responsible, and U.S.
Air Force planes had conducted bombing strikes on headquarters, terrorist facilities,
and military installations in Libya in response.
The President reported both cases to Congress although the report on the
bombing did not cite section 4(a)(1) and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the
War Powers Resolution at all. Since the actions were short lived, there was no issue
of force withdrawal, but several Members introduced bills to amend the War Powers
Resolution. One bill called for improving consultation by establishing a special
consultative group in Congress.40 Others called for strengthening the President’s
hand in combating terrorism by authorizing the President, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, to use all measures he deems necessary to protect U.S. persons
against terrorist threats.41

Persian Gulf, 1987: When Are Hostilities Imminent?
The War Powers Resolution became an issue in activities in the Persian Gulf
after an Iraqi aircraft fired a missile on the USS Stark on May 17, 1987, killing 37
U.S. sailors. The attack broached the question of whether the Iran-Iraq war had made
the Persian Gulf an area of hostilities or imminent hostilities for U.S. forces. Shortly

40

S.J.Res. 340, introduced May 8, 1986. The bill was not acted upon, but the proposal was
later incorporated in other proposed amendments. See below, section on amendments.
41

S. 2335 and H.R. 4611, Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, introduced April 17, 1986. Not acted
upon.

CRS-19
afterwards, the U.S. adoption of a policy of reflagging and providing a naval escort
of Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf raised full force the question of
whether U.S. policy was risking involvement in war without congressional
authorization. During 1987 U.S. Naval forces operating in the Gulf increased to 11
major warships, 6 minesweepers, and over a dozen small patrol boats, and a
battleship-led formation was sent to the Northern Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean to
augment an aircraft carrier battle group already there.
For several months the President did not report any of the deployments or
military incidents under the War Powers Resolution, although on May 20, 1987, after
the Stark incident, Secretary of State Shultz submitted a report similar to previous
ones consistent with War Powers provisions, but not mentioning the Resolution. No
reports were submitted after the USS Bridgeton struck a mine on July 24, 1987, or
the U.S.-chartered Texaco-Caribbean struck a mine on August 10 and a U.S. F-14
fighter plane fired two missiles at an Iranian aircraft perceived as threatening.
Later, however, after various military incidents on September 23, 1987, and
growing congressional concern, the President began submitting reports “consistent
with” the War Powers Resolution and on July 13, 1988, submitted the sixth report
relating to the Persian Gulf.42 None of the reports were submitted under section
4(a)(1) or acknowledged that U.S. forces had been introduced into hostilities or
imminent hostilities. The Reagan administration contended that the military incidents
in the Persian Gulf, or isolated incidents involving defensive reactions, did not add
up to hostilities or imminent hostilities as envisaged in the War Powers Resolution.
It held that “imminent danger” pay which was announced for military personnel in
the Persian Gulf on August 27, 1987, did not trigger section 4 (a)(1). Standards for
danger pay, namely, “subject to the threat of physical harm or danger on the basis of
civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions,” were broader than for
hostilities of the War Powers Resolution, and had been drafted to be available in
situations to which the War Powers Resolution did not apply. 43
Some Members of Congress contended that if the President did not report under
section 4(a)(1), Congress itself should declare such a report should have been
submitted, as it had in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution. Several
resolutions to this effect were introduced, some authorizing the forces to remain, but
none were passed.44 The decisive votes on the subject took place in the Senate. On
September 18, 1987, the Senate voted 50-41 to table an amendment to the Defense
authorization bill (S. 1174) to apply the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
The Senate also sustained points of order against consideration of S.J.Res. 217,
which would have invoked the War Powers Resolution, on December 4, 1987, and
a similar bill the following year, S.J.Res. 305, on June 6, 1988.

42

For the reports, see list above under section on reporting requirements.

43

Questions submitted to Department of State and responses thereto, March 30, 1988, in
War Powers Resolution, Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, p. 97-99.
44

Bills to this effect in the House included H.J.Res. 387, introduced October 22, 1987,
which also authorized the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf.

CRS-20
The Senate opted for a different approach, which was to use legislation to assure
a congressional role in the Persian Gulf policy without invoking the War Powers
Resolution. Early in the situation, both Chambers passed measures requiring the
Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress prior to the implementation of
any agreement between the United States and Kuwait for U.S. military protection of
Kuwaiti shipping, and such a report was submitted June 15, 1987. Later, the Senate
passed a measure that called for a comprehensive report by the President within 30
days and provided expedited procedures for a joint resolution on the subject after an
additional 30 days.45 The House did not take action on the bill.
As in the case of El Salvador, some Members took the War Powers issue to
court. On August 7, 1987, Representative Lowry and 110 other Members of
Congress filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asking the
court to declare that a report was required under section 4(a)(1). On December 18,
1987, the court dismissed the suit, holding it was a nonjusticiable political question,
and that the plaintiffs’ dispute was “primarily with fellow legislators.”46
Compliance with the consultation requirement was also an issue. The
Administration developed its plan for reflagging and offered it to Kuwait on March
7, 1987, prior to discussing the plan with Members of Congress. A June 15, 1987,
report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense stated on the reflagging policy, “As
soon as Kuwait indicated its acceptance of our offer, we began consultations with
Congress which are still ongoing.”47 This was too late for congressional views to be
weighed in on the initial decision, after which it became more difficult to alter the
policy. Subsequently, however, considerable consultation developed and the
President met with various congressional leaders prior to some actions such as the
retaliatory actions in April 1988 against an Iranian oil platform involved in minelaying.
With recurring military incidents, some Members of Congress took the position
that the War Powers Resolution was not being complied with, unless the President
reported under section 4(a)(1) or Congress itself voted to invoke the Resolution.
Other Members contended the Resolution was working by serving as a restraint on
the President, who was now submitting reports and consulting with Congress.48 Still
other Members suggested the Persian Gulf situation was demonstrating the need to
amend the War Powers Resolution.

45

Byrd-Warner amendment to S.J.Res. 194, adopted by Senate October 21, 1987.

46

Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987). See also CRS Report RL30352, War
Powers Litigation Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution, by David M.
Ackerman.
47

Weinberger, Caspar W. Secretary of Defense. A Report to the Congress on Security
Arrangements in the Persian Gulf. June 15, 1987, p.14.
48

When asked about abiding by the War Powers Resolution, President Reagan said “we are
complying with a part of that act, although we do not call it that. But we have been
consulting the Congress, reporting to them and telling them what we’re doing, and in
advance...” Press conference of October 22,1987. The New York Times, October 23, 1987,
p. A8.

CRS-21
As a result of the Persian Gulf situation, in the summer of 1988 both the House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which
established a Special Subcommittee on War Powers, undertook extensive
assessments of the War Powers Resolution. Interest in the issue waned after a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq began on August 20, 1988, and the United States reduced
its forces in the Persian Gulf area.

Invasion of Panama: Why Was the War Powers Issue Not
Raised?
On December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered 14,000 U.S. military forces to
Panama for combat, in addition to 13,000 already present. On December 21, he
reported to Congress under the War Powers Resolution but without citing section
4(a)(1). His stated objectives were to protect the 35,000 American citizens in
Panama, restore the democratic process, preserve the integrity of the Panama Canal
treaties, and apprehend General Manuel Noriega, who had been accused of massive
electoral fraud in the Panamanian elections and indicted on drug trafficking charges
by two U.S. Federal courts. The operation proceeded swiftly and General Noriega
surrendered to U.S. military authorities on January 3. President Bush said the
objectives had been met, and U.S. forces were gradually withdrawn. By February 13,
all combat forces deployed for the invasion had been withdrawn, leaving the strength
just under the 13,597 forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion.
The President did not consult with congressional leaders before his decision,
although he did notify them a few hours in advance of the invasion. Members of
Congress had been discussing the problem of General Noriega for some time. Before
Congress adjourned, it had called for the President to intensify unilateral, bilateral,
and multilateral measures and consult with other nations on ways to coordinate
efforts to remove General Noriega from power.49 The Senate had adopted an
amendment supporting the President’s use of appropriate diplomatic, economic, and
military options “to restore constitutional government to Panama and to remove
General Noriega from his illegal control of the Republic of Panama”, but had
defeated an amendment authorizing the President to use U.S. military force to secure
the removal of General Noriega “notwithstanding any other provision of law.”50
The Panama action did not raise much discussion in Congress about the War
Powers Resolution. This was in part because Congress was out of session. The first
session of the 101st Congress had ended on November 22, 1989, and the second
session did not begin until January 23, 1990, when the operation was essentially over
and it appeared likely the additional combat forces would be out of Panama within
60 days of their deployment. Moreover, the President’s action in Panama was very
popular in American public opinion and supported by most Members of Congress
because of the actions of General Noriega. After it was over, on February 7, 1990,
the House Passed H.Con.Res. 262 which stated that the President had acted

49

P.L. 101-162, signed November 21, 1989.

50

Amendments to National Drug Control Strategy bill, S. 1711, October 5, 1989.

CRS-22
“decisively and appropriately in ordering United States forces to intervene in
Panama.”

Major Cases and Issues in the Post-Cold War
World: United Nations Actions
After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the United States began to move away
from unilateral military actions toward actions authorized or supported by the United
Nations. Under the auspices of U.N. Security Council resolutions, U.S. forces were
deployed in Kuwait and Iraq, Somalia, former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/, and Haiti. This
raised the new issue of whether the War Powers Resolution applied to U.S.
participation in U.N. military actions. It was not a problem during the Cold War
because the agreement among the five permanent members required for Security
Council actions seldom existed. An exception, the Korean war, occurred before the
War Powers Resolution was enacted.51
The more basic issue — under what circumstances congressional authorization
is required for U.S. participation in U.N. military operations — is an unfinished
debate remaining from 1945. Whether congressional authorization is required
depends on the types of U.N. action and is governed by the U.N. Participation Act
(P.L. 79-264, as amended), as well as by the War Powers Resolution and war powers
under the Constitution. Appropriations action by Congress also may be
determinative as a practical matter.
For armed actions under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter,
Section 6 of the U.N. Participation Act authorizes the President to negotiate special
agreements with the Security Council “which shall be subject to the approval of the
Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution”, providing for the numbers and
types of armed forces and facilities to be made available to the Security Council.
Once the agreements have been concluded, further congressional authorization is not
necessary, but no such agreements have been concluded.
Section 7 of the United Nations Participation Act, added in 1949 by P.L. 81341, authorizes the detail of up to 1,000 personnel to serve in any noncombatant
capacity for certain U.N. peaceful settlement activities. The United States has
provided personnel to several U.N. peacekeeping missions, such as observers to the
U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine since 1948, that appear to fall
within the authorization in Section 7 of the Participation Act. Controversy has arisen
when larger numbers of forces have been deployed or when it appears the forces
might be serving as combatants.

51

In that case, the Soviet Union had absented itself from the Council temporarily, and the
Security Council requested members to supply the Republic of Korea with sufficient
military assistance to repel the invasion of North Korea. President Truman ordered U.S. air,
naval, and ground forces to Korea to repel the attack without authorization from Congress.
Senator Robert Taft complained on January 5, 1951, “The President simply usurped
authority in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea to carry
out the resolution of the United Nations in an undeclared war.”

CRS-23
The War Powers Resolution neither excludes United Nations actions from its
provisions nor makes any special procedures for them. Section 8(a)(2) states that
authority to introduce U. S. Armed Forces into hostilities shall not be inferred from
any treaty unless it is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the
introduction and stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of the War Powers resolution.52 One purpose of
this provision was to ensure that both Houses of Congress be affirmatively involved
in any U.S. decision to engage in hostilities pursuant to a treaty, since only the Senate
approved a treaty. 53
From 1990 through 1999, Congress primarily dealt with the issue on a case by
case basis, but Members also enacted some measures seeking more control over U.S.
participation in future peacekeeping actions wherever they might occur. The Defense
Appropriations Act for FY1994 stated the sense of Congress that funds should not
be expended for U.S. Armed Forces serving under U.N. Security Council actions
unless the President consults with Congress at least 15 days prior to deployment and
not later than 48 hours after such deployment, except for humanitarian operations.54
The Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 required a report to Congress by April
1, 1994, including discussion of the requirement of congressional approval for
participation of U.S. Armed Forces in multinational peacekeeping missions,
proposals to conclude military agreements with the U.N. Security Council under
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, and the applicability of the War Powers Resolution
and the U.N. Participation Act.55 In 1994 and 1995, Congress attempted to gain a
greater role in U.N. and other peacekeeping operations through authorization and
appropriation legislation. A major element of the House Republicans’ Contract with
America, H.R. 7, would have placed notable constraints on Presidential authority to
commit U.S. forces to international peacekeeping operations. Senator Dole’s, S. 5,
The Peace Powers Act, introduced in January 1995, would have also placed greater
legislative controls on such operations. General and specific funding restrictions and
Presidential reporting requirements were passed for peacekeeping operations
underway or in prospect. Some of these legislative enactments led to Presidential
vetoes. These representative legislative actions are reviewed below as they apply to
given cases.56

52

Such a statement was made in the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq
Resolution, P.L. 102-1, signed January 14, 1991, and in S.J.Res. 45, authorizing the use of
force in Somalia for one year, as passed by the Senate on February 4, 1993, and amended
by the House on May 25, 1993; a conference was not held.
53

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. War Powers; report to
accompany S. 440. June 14, 1973. S.Rept. 93-220.
54

Sec.8153, Department of Defense Appropriation Act for FY1994, H.R. 3116, P.L. 103139, signed November 11, 1993.
55

Sec. 1502 (11), Defense Authorization Act for FY1994, P.L. 103-160, signed November
30, 1993.
56

For background see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.

CRS-24

Persian Gulf War, 1991: How Does the War Powers
Resolution Relate to the United Nations and a Real War?
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops under the direction of President Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait, seized its oil fields, installed a new government in Kuwait
City, and moved on toward the border with Saudi Arabia. Action to repel the
invasion led to the largest war in which the United States has been involved since the
passage of the War Powers Resolution. Throughout the effort to repel the Iraqi
invasion, President Bush worked in tandem with the United Nations, organizing and
obtaining international support and authorization for multilateral military action
against Iraq.
A week after the invasion, on August 9, President Bush reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that he had deployed U.S. armed forces
to the region prepared to take action with others to deter Iraqi aggression. He did not
cite section 4(a)(1) and specifically stated, “I do not believe involvement in hostilities
is imminent.”
The President did not consult with congressional leaders prior to the
deployment, but both houses of Congress had adopted legislation supporting efforts
to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, particularly using economic sanctions and
multilateral efforts. On August 2, shortly before its recess, the Senate by a vote of
97-0 adopted S.Res. 318 urging the President “to act immediately, using unilateral
and multilateral measures, to seek the full and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi
forces from Kuwaiti territory” and to work for collective international sanctions
against Iraq including, if economic sanctions prove inadequate, “additional
multilateral actions, under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, involving air,
sea, and land forces as may be needed...” Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Pell stressed, however, that the measure did not authorize unilateral U.S.
military actions. Also on August 2, the House passed H.R. 5431 condemning the
Iraqi invasion and calling for an economic embargo against Iraq.
The United Nations imposed economic sanctions against Iraq on August 7, and
the United States and United Kingdom organized an international naval interdiction
effort.57 Later, on August 25, the U.N. Security Council authorized “such measures
as may be necessary” to halt shipping and verify cargoes that might be going to Iraq.
Both Houses adopted measures supporting the deployment, but neither measure
was enacted. On October 1, 1990, the House passed H.J.Res. 658 supporting the
action and citing the War Powers Resolution without stating that Section 4(a)(1) had
become operative. The resolution quoted the President’s statement that involvement
in hostilities was not imminent. Representative Fascell stated that H.J.Res. 658 was
not to be interpreted as a Gulf of Tonkin resolution that granted the President open-

57

On August 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of State Robert M. Kimmitt sent a formal letter to
Congress (not mentioning the War Powers Resolution) stating, “It is not our intention or
expectation that the use of force will be required to carry out these operations. However,
if other means of enforcement fail, necessary and proportionate force will be employed to
deny passage to ships that are in violation of these sanctions.”

CRS-25
ended authority, and that it made clear that “a congressional decision on the issue of
war or peace would have to be made through joint consultation.” The Senate did not
act on H.J.Res. 658.
On October 2, 1990, the Senate by a vote of 96-3 adopted S.Con.Res. 147,
stating that “Congress supports continued action by the President in accordance with
the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with United
States constitutional and statutory processes, including the authorization and
appropriation of funds by the Congress, to deter Iraqi aggression and to protect
American lives and vital interest in the region.” As in the House, Senate leaders
emphasized that the resolution was not to be interpreted as an open-ended resolution
similar to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The resolution made no mention of the War
Powers Resolution. The House did not act on S.Con.Res. 147. Congress also
supported the action by appropriating funds for the preparatory operation, called
Operation Desert Shield, and later for war activities called Operation Desert Storm.
Some Members introduced legislation to establish a special consultation group,
but the Administration objected to a formally established group. On October 23,
1990, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell announced that he and Speaker Foley had
designated Members of the joint bipartisan leadership and committees of jurisdiction
to make themselves available as a group for consultation on developments in the
Persian Gulf. By this time U.S. land, naval, and air forces numbering more than
200,000 had been deployed.
After the 101st Congress had adjourned, President Bush on November 8, 1990,
ordered an estimated additional 150,000 troops to the Gulf. He incurred considerable
criticism because he had not informed the consultation group of the buildup although
he had met with them on October 30. On November 16, President Bush sent a
second report to Congress describing the continuing and increasing deployment of
forces to the region. He stated that his opinion that hostilities were not imminent had
not changed. The President wrote, “The deployment will ensure that the coalition has
an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our
common goals.” By the end of the year, approximately 350,000 U.S. forces had been
deployed to the area.
As the prospect of a war without congressional authorization increased, on
November 20, 1990, Representative Ron Dellums and 44 other Democratic Members
of Congress sought a judicial order enjoining the President from offensive military
operations in connection with Operation Desert Shield unless he consulted with and
obtained an authorization from Congress. On November 26, 11 prominent law
professors filed a brief in favor of such a judicial action, arguing that the Constitution
clearly vested Congress with the authority to declare war and that Federal judges
should not use the political questions doctrine to avoid ruling on the issue. The
American Civil Liberties Union also filed a memorandum in favor of the plaintiffs.
On December 13, Judge Harold Greene of the Federal district court in Washington
denied the injunction, holding that the controversy was not ripe for judicial resolution
because a majority of Congress had not sought relief and the executive branch had

CRS-26
not shown sufficient commitment to a definitive course of action.58 However,
throughout his opinion Judge Greene rejected the Administration’s arguments for full
Presidential war powers.
On November 29, 1990, U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized
member states to use “all necessary means” to implement the Council’s resolutions
and restore peace and security in the area, unless Iraq complied with the U.N.
resolutions by January 15, 1991. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait
neared, President Bush indicated that if the Iraqi forces did not withdraw from
Kuwait, he was prepared to use force to implement the U.N. Security Council
resolutions. Administration officials contended that the President did not need any
additional congressional authorization for this purpose.59
After the 102nd Congress convened, on January 4, 1991, House and Senate
leaders announced they would debate U.S. policy beginning January 10. A week
before the January 15 deadline, on January 8, 1991, President Bush, in a letter to the
congressional leaders, requested a congressional resolution supporting the use of all
necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678. He stated that
he was “determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America’s security” and
that he could “think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the
President at this critical time.” It is noteworthy that the President’s request for a
resolution was a request for congressional “support” for his undertaking in the
Persian Gulf, not for “authority” to engage in the military operation. In a press
conference on January 9, 1991, President Bush reinforced this distinction in response
to questions about the use of force resolution being debated in Congress. He was
asked whether he thought he needed the resolution, and if he lost on it would he feel
bound by that decision. President Bush in response stated: “I don’t think I need it...I
feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions.” He
added that he felt that he had “the constitutional authority — many attorneys having
so advised me.”60
On January 12, 1991, both houses passed the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution” (P.L. 102-1).61 Section 2(a) authorized the President
to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to
achieve implementation of the earlier Security Council resolutions. Section 2(b)
required that first the President would have to report that the United States had used
58

Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).

59

Statement by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee
on Armed Services. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and
Implications. September 11-December 3, 1990, S.Hrg. 101-1071, pp. 701-2.
60

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 14, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 2, pp.1718; pp. 24-25.
61

The House passed H.J.Res. 77 by a vote of 250 to 183. The Senate passed S.J.Res. 2 and
then considered H.J.Res. 77 as passed. The Senate vote was 52 to 47. The bill became P.L.
102-1, signed January 14, 1991. On January 12, to emphasize the congressional power to
declare war, the House also adopted by a vote of 302 to 131 H.Con.Res. 32 expressing the
sense that Congress must approve any offensive military actions against Iraq; the Senate did
not act on the measure.

CRS-27
all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq
with the Security Council resolution and that those efforts had not been successful.
Section 2(c) stated that it was intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 3
required the President to report every 60 days on efforts to obtain compliance of Iraq
with the U.N. Security Council resolution.
In his statement made after signing H.J.Res. 77 into law, President Bush said the
following: “As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for
congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any
change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the
President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S.
interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” He added that he
was pleased that “differences on these issues between the President and many in the
Congress have not prevented us from uniting in a common objective.”62
On January 16, President Bush made the determination required by P.L. 102-1
that diplomatic means had not and would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
On January 18, he reported to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution”
that he had directed U.S. forces to commence combat operations on January 16.
After the beginning of the war Members of Congress strongly supported the
President as Commander-in-Chief in his conduct of the war. On March 19, 1991,
President Bush reported to Congress that the military operations had been successful,
Kuwait had been liberated, and combat operations had been suspended on February
28, 1991.
Prior to passage of P.L. 102-1, some observers questioned the effectiveness of
the War Powers Resolution on grounds that the President had begun the action,
deployed hundreds of thousands of troops without consultation of Congress, and was
moving the Nation increasingly close to war without congressional authorization.
After the passage of P.L. 102-1 and the war had begun, Chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Fascell took the position that “the War Powers
Resolution is alive and well”; the President had submitted reports to Congress, and
Congress, in P.L. 102-1, had provided specific statutory authorization for the use of
force. In his view, the strength and wisdom of the War Powers Resolution was that
it established a process by which Congress could authorize the use of force in
specific settings for limited purposes, short of a total state of war.
The question is sometimes raised why Congress did not declare war against Iraq.
Speaker Foley told the National Press Club on February 7, 1991, that “The reason we
did not declare a formal war was not because there is any difference I think in the
62

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. January 21, 1991. Vol. 27, No. 3, pp.4849. Subsequently, on June 20,1992, during remarks to the Texas State Republican
Convention in Dallas, Texas, President Bush said: “Some people say, why can’t you bring
the same kind of purpose and success to the domestic scene as you did in Desert Shield and
Desert Storm? And the answer is: I didn’t have to get permission from some old goat in the
United States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. That’s the reason.” Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. June 29, 1992. Vol. 28, No. 26, pp.1120-1121.

CRS-28
action that was taken and in a formal declaration of war with respect to military
operations, but because there is some question about whether we wish to excite or
enact some of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration of war — seizure
of property, censorship, and so forth, which the President neither sought nor desired.”

Iraq-Post Gulf War: How Long Does an Authorization Last?
After the end of Operation Desert Storm, U.S. military forces were used to deal
with three continuing situations in Iraq. These activities raised the issue of how long
a congressional authorization for the use of force lasts.
The first situation resulted from the Iraqi government’s repression of Kurdish
and Shi’ite groups. U.N. Security Council Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991,
condemned the repression of the Iraqi civilian population and appealed for
contributions to humanitarian relief efforts. On May 17, 1991, President Bush
reported to Congress that the Iraqi repression of the Kurdish people had necessitated
a limited introduction of U.S. forces into northern Iraq for emergency relief purposes.
On July 16, 1991, he reported that U.S. forces had withdrawn from northern Iraq but
that the U.S. remained prepared to take appropriate steps as the situation required and
that, to this end, an appropriate level of forces would be maintained in the region for
“as long as required.”
A second situation stemmed from the cease-fire resolution, Security Council
Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, which called for Iraq to accept the destruction or
removal of chemical and biological weapons and international control of its nuclear
materials. On September 16, 1991, President Bush reported to Congress that Iraq
continued to deny inspection teams access to weapons facilities and that this violated
the requirements of Resolution 687, and the United States if necessary would take
action to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Council’s decisions. He reported similar
non-cooperation on January 14, 1992, and May 15, 1992.
On July 16, 1992, President Bush reported particular concern about the refusal
of Iraqi authorities to grant U.N. inspectors access to the Agricultural Ministry. The
President consulted congressional leaders on July 27, and in early August the United
States began a series of military exercises to take 5,000 U.S. troops to Kuwait. On
September 16, 1992, the President reported, “We will remain prepared to use all
necessary means, in accordance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, to assist the
United Nations in removing the threat posed by Iraq’s chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons capability.”
The third situation was related to both of the earlier ones. On August 26, 1992,
the United States, Britain, and France began a “no-fly” zone, banning Iraqi fixed
wing and helicopter flights south of the 32nd parallel and creating a limited security
zone in the south, where Shi’ite groups were concentrated. After violations of the
no-fly zones and various other actions by Iraq, on January 13, 1993, the Bush
Administration announced that aircraft from the United States and coalition partners
had attacked missile bases in southern Iraq and that the United States was deploying
a battalion task force to Kuwait to underline the U.S. continuing commitment to
Kuwait’s independence. On January 19, 1993, President Bush reported to Congress

CRS-29
that U.S. aircraft had shot down an Iraqi aircraft on December 27, 1992, and had
undertaken further military actions on January 13, 17, and 18.
President Clinton said on January 21, 1993, that the United States would adhere
to the policy toward Iraq set by the Bush Administration. On January 22 and 23,
April 9 and 18, June 19, and August 19, 1993, U.S. aircraft fired at targets in Iraq
after pilots sensed Iraqi radar or anti-aircraft fire directed at them. On September 23,
1993, President Clinton reported that since the August 19 action, the Iraqi
installation fired upon had not displayed hostile intentions.
In a separate incident, on June 28, 1993, President Clinton reported to Congress
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that on June 26 U.S. naval forces at his
direction had launched a Tomahawk cruise missile strike on the Iraqi Intelligence
Service’s main command and control complex in Baghdad and that the military
action was completed upon the impact of the missiles. He said the Iraqi Intelligence
Service had planned the failed attempt to assassinate former President Bush during
his visit to Kuwait in April 1993.
The question was raised as to whether the Authorization for the Use of Force in
Iraq (P.L. 102-1) authorized military actions after the conclusion of the war. P.L.
102-1 authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security
Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of previous Security Council
Resolutions relating to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The cease-fire resolution, Security
Council Resolution 687, was adopted afterwards and therefore not included in
Resolution 678.
Congress endorsed the view that further specific authorization was not required
for U.S. military action to maintain the cease-fire agreement. Specifically, section
1095 of P.L.102-190 stated the sense of Congress that it supported the use of all
necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being
consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.
Section 1096 supported the use of all necessary means to protect Iraq’s Kurdish
minority, consistent with relevant U.N. resolutions and authorities contained in P.L.
102-1. The issue of Congressional authorization was debated again in 1998. On
March 31, 1998, the House passed a Supplemental Appropriations bill (H.R. 3579)
that would have banned the use of funds appropriated in it for the conduct of
offensive operations against Iraq, unless such operations were specifically authorized
by law. This provision was dropped in the conference with the Senate.
A more broad-gauged approach to the issue of Congressional authorization of
military force was attempted in mid-1998. On June 24, 1998, the House passed H.R.
4103, the Defense Department Appropriations bill for FY1999, with a provision by
Representative David Skaggs that banned the use of funds appropriated or otherwise
made available by this Act “to initiate or conduct offensive military operations by
United States Armed Forces except in accordance with the war powers clause of the
Constitution (Article 1, Section 8), which vests in Congress the power to declare and
authorize war and to take certain specified, related actions.” The Skaggs provision
was stricken by the House-Senate conference committee on H.R. 4103.

CRS-30
As events developed, beginning in late 1998, and continuing into the period
prior to the U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States conducted
a large number of ad-hoc air attacks against Iraqi ground installations and military
targets in response to violations of the Northern and Southern “no-fly zones” by the
Iraqi, and threatening actions taken against U.S. and coalition aircraft enforcing these
“no-fly” sectors. Congressional authorization to continue these activities was not
sought by the President, nor were these many incidents reported under the War
Powers Resolution. The “no-fly zones” activities were terminated following the
2003 War with Iraq.

Somalia: When Does Humanitarian Assistance Require
Congressional Authorization?
In Somalia, the participation of U.S. military forces in a U.N. operation to
protect humanitarian assistance became increasingly controversial as fighting and
casualties increased and the objectives of the operation appeared to be expanding.
On December 4, 1992, President Bush ordered thousands of U.S. military forces
to Somalia to protect humanitarian relief from armed gangs. Earlier, on November
25, the President had offered U.S. forces, and on December 3, the United Nations
Security Council had adopted Resolution 794 welcoming the U.S. offer and
authorizing the Secretary-General and members cooperating in the U.S. offer “to use
all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.” The resolution also called on member
states to provide military forces and authorized the Secretary-General and the states
concerned to arrange for unified command and control.
On December 10, 1992, President Bush reported to Congress “consistent with
the War Powers Resolution” that on December 8, U.S. armed forces entered Somalia
to secure the air field and port facility of Mogadishu and that other elements of the
U.S. armed forces were being introduced into Somalia to achieve the objectives of
U.N. Security Council Resolution 794. He said the forces would remain only as long
as necessary to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations and
would then turn over responsibility for maintaining this environment to a U.N.
peacekeeping force. The President said that it was not intended that the U.S. armed
forces become involved in hostilities, but that the forces were equipped and ready to
take such measures as might be needed to accomplish their humanitarian mission and
defend themselves. They would also have the support of any additional U.S. forces
necessary. By mid-January, U.S. forces in Somalia numbered 25,000.
Since the President did not cite Section 4(a)(1), the 60-day time limit was not
necessarily triggered. By February, however, the U.S. force strength was being
reduced, and it was announced the United States expected to turn over responsibility
for protecting humanitarian relief shipments in Somalia to a U.N. force that would
include U.S. troops. On March 26, 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution
814 expanding the mandate of the U.N. force and bringing about a transition from a
U.S.-led force to a U.N.-led force (UNOSOM II). By the middle of May, when the
change to U.N. control took place, the U.S. forces were down to approximately 4,000

CRS-31
troops, primarily logistics and communications support teams, but also a rapid
deployment force of U.S. Marines stationed on Navy ships.
Violence within Somalia began to increase again. On June 5, 1993, attacks
killed 23 Pakistani peacekeepers, and a Somali regional leader, General Aidid, was
believed responsible. The next day the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
837 reaffirming the authority of UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against
those responsible for the armed attacks. On June 10, 1993, President Clinton reported
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” that the U.S. Quick Reaction Force had
executed military strikes to assist UNOSOM II in quelling violence against it. On
July 1, President Clinton submitted another report, not mentioning the War Powers
Resolution, describing further air and ground military operations aimed at securing
General Aidid’s compound and neutralizing military capabilities that had been an
obstacle to U.N. efforts to deliver humanitarian relief and promote national
reconstruction.
From the beginning, a major issue for Congress was whether to authorize U.S.
action in Somalia. On February 4, 1993, the Senate had passed S.J.Res. 45 that would
authorize the President to use U.S. armed forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 794. S.J.Res. 45 stated it was intended to constitute the specific statutory
authorization under Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. On May 25, 1993,
the House amended S.J.Res. 45 to authorize U.S. forces to remain for one year.
S.J.Res. 45 was then sent to the Senate for its concurrence, but the Senate did not act
on the measure.
As sporadic fighting resulted in the deaths of Somali and U.N. forces, including
Americans, controversy over the operation intensified, and Congress took action
through other legislative channels. In September 1993 the House and Senate adopted
amendments to the Defense Authorization Act for FY1994 asking that the President
consult with Congress on policy toward Somalia, and report the goals, objectives, and
anticipated jurisdiction of the U.S. mission in Somalia by October 15, 1993; the
amendments expressed the sense that the President by November 15, 1993, should
seek and receive congressional authorization for the continued deployment of U.S.
forces to Somalia. 63 On October 7, the President consulted with congressional
leaders from both parties for over two hours on Somalia policy. On October 13,
President Clinton sent a 33-page report to Congress on his Somalia policy and its
objectives.
Meanwhile, on October 7 President Clinton said that most U.S. forces would be
withdrawn from Somalia by March 31, 1994. To ensure this, the Defense
Department Appropriations Act for FY1994, cut off funds for U.S. military
operations in Somalia after March 31, 1994, unless the President obtained further
spending authority from Congress.64 Congress approved the use of U.S. military
forces in Somalia only for the protection of American military personnel and bases
and for helping maintain the flow of relief aid by giving the U.N. forces security and
logistical support; it required that U.S. combat forces in Somalia remain under the
63

Section 1512, P.L. 103-160, signed November 30, 1993.

64

Sec. 8151 of P.L. 103-139, signed November 11, 1993.

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command and control of U.S. commanders under the ultimate direction of the
President.
Earlier, some Members suggested that the U.S. forces in Somalia were clearly
in a situation of hostilities or imminent hostilities, and that if Congress did not
authorize the troops to remain, the forces should be withdrawn within 60 to 90 days.
After a letter from House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Minority Member
Benjamin Gilman and Senate Foreign Relations Committee Ranking Minority
Member Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman replied on July 21, 1993,
that no previous Administrations had considered that intermittent military
engagements, whether constituting hostilities, would necessitate the withdrawal of
forces pursuant to Section 5(b); and the War Powers Resolution, in their view, was
intended to apply to sustained hostilities. The State Department did not believe
congressional authorization was necessary, although congressional support would be
welcome. On August 4, 1993, Representative Gilman asserted that August 4 might
be remembered as the day the War Powers Resolution died because combat broke out
in Somalia on June 5 and the President had not withdrawn U.S. forces and Congress
had “decided to look the other way.” On October 22, 1993, Representative Gilman
introduced H.Con.Res. 170 directing the President pursuant to section 5(c) of the
War Powers Resolution to withdraw U.S. forces from Somalia by January 31, 1994.
The House adopted an amended version calling for withdrawal by March 31, 1994.65
The Senate did not act on this non-binding measure.
However, the Defense Appropriations Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed
September 30, 1994) prohibited the use of funds for the continuous presence of U.S.
forces in Somalia, except for the protection of U.S. personnel, after September 30,
1994. Subsequently, on November 4, 1994, the U.N. Security Council decided to end
the U.N. mission in Somalia by March 31, 1995. On March 3, 1995, U.S. forces
completed their assistance to United Nations forces evacuating Somalia.
Another war powers issue was the adequacy of consultation before the dispatch
of forces. On December 4, 1992, President Bush had met with a number of
congressional leaders to brief them on the troop deployment. In his December 10
report, President Bush stressed that he had taken into account the views expressed in
H.Con.Res. 370, S.Con.Res. 132, and P.L. 102-274 on the urgent need for action in
Somalia. However, none of these resolutions explicitly authorized U.S. military
action.

Former Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo: What If No Consensus
Exists?
Bosnia. The issue of war powers and U.S. participation in United Nations
actions was also raised by efforts to halt fighting in the territory of former
Yugoslavia, initially in Bosnia. Because some of the U.S. action has been taken
within a NATO framework, action in Bosnia has also raised the issue of whether
action under NATO is exempt from the requirements of the War Powers Resolution
or its standard for the exercise of war powers under the Constitution. Article 11 of
65

For additional discussion of H.Con.Res. 170, see section on Legislative Veto, above.

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the North Atlantic Treaty states that its provisions are to be carried out by the parties
“in accordance with their respective constitutional processes,” inferring some role for
Congress in the event of war. Section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution states that
authority to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities is not to be inferred from any treaty,
ratified before or after 1973, unless implementing legislation specifically authorizes
such introduction and says it is intended to constitute an authorization within the
meaning of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(b) states that nothing in the War
Powers Resolution should be construed to require further authorization for U.S.
participation in the headquarters operations of military commands established before
1973, such as NATO headquarters operations.
On August 13, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 770 calling
on nations to take “all measures necessary” to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to Sarajevo. Many in Congress had been advocating more assistance to
the victims of the conflict. On August 11, 1992, the Senate had passed S.Res. 330
urging the President to work for a U.N. Security Council resolution such as was
adopted, but saying that no U.S. military personnel should be introduced into
hostilities without clearly defined objectives. On the same day, the House passed
H.Res. 554 urging the Security Council to authorize measures, including the use of
force, to ensure humanitarian relief.
During 1993 the United States participated in airlifts into Sarajevo, naval
monitoring of sanctions, and aerial enforcement of a “no-fly zone.” On February 10,
1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that under President Clinton,
the United States would try to convince the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats to pursue a
diplomatic solution and that if an agreement was reached, U.S. forces, including
ground forces, would help enforce the peace. On February 28, 1993, the United
States began an airdrop of relief supplies aimed at civilian populations, mainly
Muslims, surrounded by fighting in Bosnia.
On March 31, 1993, the U.N. Security Council authorized member states to take
all necessary measures to enforce the ban on military flights over Bosnia, the “no-fly
zone”. NATO planes, including U.S. planes, began patrolling over Bosnia and
Herzegovina on April 12, 1993, to enforce the Security Council ban, and the next
day, President Clinton reported the U.S. participation “consistent with Section 4 of
the War Powers Resolution.”
Conflict continued, but the situation was complicated and opinion in Congress
and among U.N. and NATO members was divided. President Clinton consulted with
about two dozen congressional leaders on potential further action on April 27 and
received a wide range of views. On May 2, the Administration began consultation
with allies to build support for additional military action to enforce a cease-fire and
Bosnian Serb compliance with a peace agreement, but a consensus on action was not
reached.
On June 10, 1993, Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States
would send 300 U.S. troops to join 700 Scandinavians in the U.N. peacekeeping

CRS-34
force in Macedonia.66 The mission was established under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 795 (1992), which sought to prevent the war in Bosnia from spilling over
to neighboring countries. President Clinton reported this action “consistent with
Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution” on July 9, 1993. He identified U.S. troops
as part of a peacekeeping force, and directed in accordance with Section 7 of the U.N.
Participation Act.
Planning for U.N. and NATO action to implement a prospective peace
agreement included the possibility that the United States might supply 25,000 out of
50,000 NATO forces to enforce U.N. decisions. This possibility brought proposals
to require congressional approval before the dispatch of further forces to Bosnia. On
September 23, 1993, Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole said he intended to offer
an amendment stating that no additional U.S. forces should be introduced into former
Yugoslavia without advance approval from Congress. Assistant Secretary of State
Stephen Oxman said on October 5 that the Clinton Administration would consult
with Congress and not commit American troops to the implementation operation for
a peace agreement without congressional support, and that the Administration would
act consistent with the War Powers Resolution. Congress sought to assure this in
Section 8146 of P.L. 103-139, the Defense Appropriation Act for FY1994, stating the
sense of Congress that funds should not be available for U.S. forces to participate in
new missions or operations to implement the peace settlement in Bosnia unless
previously authorized by Congress. This provision was sponsored by the Senate by
leaders Mitchell and Dole.
At the NATO summit conference in Brussels on January 11, 1994, leaders,
including President Clinton, repeated an August threat to undertake air strikes on
Serb positions to save Sarajevo and to consider other steps to end the conflict in
Bosnia. On February 17, 1994, President Clinton reported “consistent with” the War
Powers Resolution that the United States had expanded its participation in United
Nations and NATO efforts to reach a peaceful solution in former Yugoslavia and that
60 U.S. aircraft were available for participation in the authorized NATO missions.
On March 1, 1994, he reported that on the previous day U.S. planes patrolling the
“no-fly zone” under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shot down 4
Serbian Galeb planes. On April 12, 1994, the President reported that on April 10 and
11, following shelling of Gorazde, one of the “safe areas,” and a decision by U.N.
and NATO leaders, U.S. planes bombed Bosnian Serbian nationalist positions around
Gorazde. On August 22, 1994, President Clinton similarly reported that on August
5, U.S. planes under NATO had strafed a Bosnian Serb gun position in an exclusion
zone. On September 22, 1994, two British and one U.S. aircraft bombed a Serbian
tank in retaliation for Serb attacks on U.N. peacekeepers near Sarajevo; and on
November 21 more than 30 planes from the United States, Britain, France, and the
Netherlands bombed the runway of a Serb airfield in Croatia.
As the conflict in Bosnia continued, leaders in Congress called for greater
congressional involvement in decisions. Senator Dole introduced S. 2042, calling for

66

The name of this area is in dispute. The provisional name, which is used for its
designation as a member of the United Nations, is “The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia.” This report uses the term “Macedonia” without prejudice.

CRS-35
the United States to end unilaterally its arms embargo, conducted in accordance with
a U.N. Security Council Resolution, against Bosnia and Herzegovina. On May 10,
1994, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell introduced an amendment to
authorize and approve the President’s decision to carry out NATO decisions to
support and protect UNPROFOR forces around designated safe areas; to use
airpower in the Sarajevo region; and to authorize air strikes against Serb weapons
around certain safe areas if these areas were attacked. The Mitchell amendment
favored lifting the arms embargo but not unilaterally; it also stated no U.S. ground
combat troops should be deployed in Bosnia unless previously authorized by
Congress. The Senate adopted both the Dole proposal, as an amendment, and the
Mitchell amendment on May 12, 1994, by votes of 50-49. The less stringent Mitchell
amendment passed on a straight party line vote. Yet thirteen Democrats voted for the
Dole amendment, indicating a sentiment in both parties to assist the Bosnians in
defending themselves. The Senate then adopted S. 2042 as amended. The House did
not act on the measure.
The Defense Authorization Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-337, signed October 5,
1994) provided, in Section 1404, the sense of the Congress that if the Bosnian Serbs
did not accept the Contact Group proposal by October 15, 1994, the President should
introduce a U.N. Security Council resolution to end the arms embargo by December
1, 1994; if the Security Council had not acted by November 15, 1994, no funds could
be used to enforce the embargo other than those required of all U.N. members under
Security Council Resolution 713. That sequence of events occurred and the United
States stopped enforcing the embargo. In addition, Section 8100 of the Defense
Appropriations Act, FY1995 (P.L. 103-335, signed September 30, 1994), stated the
sense of the Congress that funds made available by this law should not be available
for the purposes of deploying U.S. armed forces to participate in implementation of
a peace settlement in Bosnia unless previously authorized by Congress.
On May 24, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” that U.S. combat-equipped fighter aircraft and other aircraft continued
to contribute to NATO’s enforcement of the no-fly zone in airspace over BosniaHerzegovina. U.S. aircraft, he noted, are also available for close air support of U.N.
forces in Croatia. Roughly 500 U.S. soldiers were still deployed in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as part of the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force
(UNPREDEP). U.S. forces continue to support U.N. refugee and embargo operations
in this region.
On September 1, 1995, President Clinton reported “consistent with the War
Powers Resolution,” that “U.S. combat and support aircraft” had been used beginning
on August 29, 1995, in a series of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb Army
(BSA) forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were threatening the U.N.-declared safe
areas of Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Gorazde.” He noted that during the first day of
operations, “some 300 sorties were flown against 23 targets in the vicinity of
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Mostar.”
On September 7, 1995 the House passed an amendment to the FY1996
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2126), offered by Representative
Mark Neumann (R-WI.) that prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds
provided by the bill for any operations beyond those already undertaken. However,

CRS-36
in conference the provision was softened to a sense-of-the-Congress provision that
said that President must consult with Congress before deploying U.S. forces to
Bosnia. The conference report was rejected by the House over issues unrelated to
Bosnia on September 29, 1995 by a vote of 151-267. The substitute conference
report on H.R. 2126, which was subsequently passed and signed into law, did not
include language on Bosnia, in part due to the President’s earlier objections to any
provision in the bill that might impinge on his powers as Commander-in-Chief. On
September 29, the Senate passed by a vote of 94-2 a sense-of-the-Senate amendment
to H.R. 2076, the FY1996 State, Commerce, Justice Appropriations bill, sponsored
by Senator Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) that said no funds in the bill should be used for the
deployment of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless Congress approves
the deployment in advance or to evacuate endangered U.N. peacekeepers. The
conference report on H.R. 2076, agreed to by the House and the Senate, included the
“sense of the Senate” language of the Gregg amendment.
In response to mounting criticism of the Administration’s approach to Bosnian
policy, on October 17-18, 1995, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense
Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili testified before House and
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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32267. Public record. Not legal advice.