# Foreign Terrorist Organizations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32223 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** February 6, 2004 - **Citation:** RL32223 ## Text Order Code RL32223 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Foreign Terrorist Organizations February 6, 2004 name redacted Specialist in Terrorism Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Huda Aden, name redacted, and name redacted Research Associates Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Foreign Terrorist Organizations Summary This report analyzes the status of many of the major foreign terrorist organizations that are a threat to the United States, placing special emphasis on issues of potential concern to Congress. The terrorist organizations included are those designated and listed by the Secretary of State as “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” (For analysis of the operation and effectiveness of this list overall, see also The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, CRS Report RL32120.) The designated terrorist groups described in this report are: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Armed Islamic Group (GIA) ‘Asbat al-Ansar Aum Supreme Truth (Aum) Aum Shinrikyo, Aleph Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) Hizballah (Party of God) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) Kahane Chai (Kach) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK, KADEK) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) National Liberation Army (ELN — Colombia) Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Al Qaeda Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Nuclei Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC)] Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path or SL) United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC) Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. (Some spellings have been altered.) Contents Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 ‘Asbat al-Ansar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 HAMAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Hizballah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Al-Jihad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Kahane Chai (Kach) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 National Liberation Army (ELN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Real IRA (RIRA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Revolutionary Nuclei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November, N17) . . . . . . . . 96 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (RPLP/F) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, SL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Foreign Terrorist Organizations Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Name(s). Fatah — Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Black June and Black September. Goals and Objectives. ANO’s goal is to destroy the state of Israel and establish a Palestinian state. Brief History. The ANO was founded in 1974 by Sabri al- Banna whose nom de guerre, Abu Nidal, means “father of the struggle.” Abu Nidal was a high-ranking official in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and served as PLO representative to several Arab states. Abu Nidal bitterly opposed the idea of a Palestinian state co-existing with an Israeli state and after the PLO began leaning towards reconciliation with the Jewish state, he split with the group to form the ANO. The ANO was once one of the most feared transnational terrorist organizations in the world.1 Its operations, which included kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings, have killed approximately 900 people and injured several hundred more across three continents and 20 countries.2 Over the years, Iraq, Syria, and Libya each reportedly harbored Abu Nidal and often hired the ANO to execute attacks that were in their interests.3 As a result, the ANO’s selection of targets has been diverse and inconsistent, depending largely on the demands of the state sponsor. The ANO has targeted Jews both inside and outside of Israel, but also targeted moderate Palestinians and Arabs who supported peace talks with Israel. ANO is responsible for the assassinations of senior Jordanian diplomat Naeb Imran Maaytah outside the embassy in Beirut in 1994,4 Abu Iyyad, the PLO’s second-in-command in 1991, and Abu el-Hol, commander of the Western Sector forces of Fatah in 1991.5 The group is also known for simultaneous attacks on Israeli airline counters in Rome and Vienna which killed 18 people and injured 111. In August 2002 Abu Nidal reportedly killed himself in his apartment in Baghdad where he was being treated for leukemia. However, the multiple gunshot wounds to his head leave unanswered 1 Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Abu Nidal Organization (ANO),” Center for Defense Information, October 9, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/ano-pr.cfm]. 2 “Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002 3 Alan Philips, “Mystery End for Abu Nidal,” The Daily Telegraph, Aug. 20, 2002. 4 “Chronology of Abu Nidal’s Major Attacks,” The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 20, 2002. 5 “Abu Nidal Shot Himself in the Mouth,” Agence France Presse, Aug. 21, 2002. CRS-2 questions surrounding his apparent suicide.6 The extent to which the ANO is still active is under debate. Favored Tactics. Its operations include kidnapping, murders, bombings and hijackings. Anti-American Activities. While the ANO sometimes targeted Western interests, there is only one incident in which it directly targeted a U.S. interest. On July 22, 1985, ANO attempted to bomb the U.S. embassy in Cairo but failed. Primary Area(s) of Operation. From1974-1980, ANO headquarters were based in Baghdad, where the group reportedly took direction from the Iraqi administration to carry out attacks against primarily Syrian and PLO targets. The ANO later relocated to Syria, then Libya, and finally Lebanon.7 Today, ANO militants reportedly reside in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, but over the years, the group’s activities have reached far beyond the confines of its state sponsors.8 When the ANO was active in the 1970s and 1980s, it executed attacks in 20 countries, including Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sudan, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the ANO consists of a few hundred members.9 Connections with Other Groups. The ANO does not appear to be connected with any other group. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The ANO received funding and logistical assistance from several state supporters throughout the 1970s and 1980s, including Iraq, Syria and Libya.10 Originally Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. October 8, 1997. Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Interest to Congress. The mysterious circumstances of Abu Nidal’s death beg some questions. If it was a murder, published speculation spans from the killers being agents of Saddam Hussein seeking to eliminate any ties the regime may have had to terrorist groups, to the murderers being henchman of Yasir 6 “Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002. 7 “Abu Nidal was ‘bin Laden’ of his Time,” Reuters, Aug. 19, 2002 8 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, at [http://www.periscope1.com]. 9 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 120. Also accessible at [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/]. 10 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-3 Arafat carrying out revenge for the murders of PLO officials by Abu Nidal.11 In addition, the viability of ANO as a terrorist organization is up for debate; some might question whether it should continue on the designated foreign terrorist organization list. Third, it is unclear what impact the sanctions imposed on the ANO had or are having on state sponsorship for the group. Other CRS Products. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated June 10, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. 11 “Death of a Terrorist,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 6, 2002. CRS-4 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Names(s). Abu Sayyaf Group, Abu Sayyaf, ASG Goals and Objectives. Abu Sayyaf Group is a radical Islamic group in the Philippines. Its stated goal is to establish a separate Islamic state for the minority Muslim population of the Philippines, which is predominantly located in the southern islands of Mindanau and the Sulu Archipelago. Most claim, however, that since the late 1990s ASG has essentially become a violent gang of bandits seeking financial gain.12 Brief History. The original leader of ASG, Abubakar Janjalani, fought in the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Returning to the Philippines in 1990, he founded Abu Sayyaf on the island Mindanao, the traditional home of Philippine Islamic radicalism, to continue the cause there.13 In 1998, Janjalani was killed in a shootout with police in Basilan. Since then, a single strong leader has not emerged, and the ASG has become more a confederation of loosely coordinated commands led by the personal power of individual leaders. Khaddafi Janjalani, Abubakar’s brother, is the head of one such command in the Basilan province and the closest thing the overall ASG is believed to have to a leader.14 In the early 1990s, the group conducted bombings, kidnappings, and executions of Filipino Christians. In 2000, the group apparently changed focus and began to kidnap foreigners, including tourists, journalists, and others to extract ransom payments.15 In April 2000, a $25 million ransom payment for three French journalists was reportedly funneled from European governments through Libya.16 In May 2000 Khaddafi Janjalani led a speedboat raid some 300 miles across the Sulu Sea to kidnap 20 tourists from a Palawan island resort, including three Americans (see below). In October 2001, the U.S. sent military observers to Mindanao to assess the ASG. In November, President Bush extended $93 million in military aid to President Arroyo and offered direct military assistance.17 In January 2002, the U.S. sent 650 12 Emily Clark,”In the Spotlight: Abu Sayyaf,” Center for Defense Information, updated March 5, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sayyaf.cfm], accessed July 15, 2003. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102. 13 CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p.1. 14 Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. See also “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003. 15 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31263, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3. 16 Ibid. 17 “U.S.-Philippines Sign Military Logistics Support Pact,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, (continued...) CRS-5 troops (150 special forces and 500 support forces) to the Philippines to operate under strict rules of engagement negotiated in June. Troop strength rose to around 1,300 at the height of operations. The results of Filipino-U.S. cooperation include increased security cooperation with Philippine forces, the apparent erosion of ASG strength from an estimated 850 fighters to around 450, the expulsion of much of ASG from Mindanao to the Sulu island group, the death of ASG leader Abu Sabaya, the rescue of Gracia Burnham, and an apparent decrease in the local population’s support for ASG as a result of U.S. led civic action projects.18 The majority of U.S. forces withdrew by July 31, 2002. Favored Tactics. The group is renowned for its brutality. It has conducted bombings, kidnappings, and extortion, as well as massacres and beheadings. Anti-American Activities. In May 2000, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped a group of 20 foreigners that included three Americans, Guillermo Sobero of Corono, California and Martin and Gracia Burnham, Christian missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. In June 2001, Abu Sayyaf announced that Abu Sabaya, who was holding Sobero, had beheaded him. In June 2002, the Philippine military launched a rescue mission based on American intelligence. Martin Burnham and a Filipino nurse, Ebidorah Yap, were killed, but Gracia Burnham was rescued.19 The three Americans were apparently held for ransom rather than for ideological or political reasons. The Bush Administration reportedly facilitated a $300 million ransom payment to ASG from the Burnham family. The couple was not released after the payment was made.20 Areas of Operation. ASG is based in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao and the Sulu island group and conducts most of its activities there. In 2000, the group abducted tourists and journalists in Malaysia, demonstrating an extended reach. However, since joint U.S.-Philippine operations, most of ASG has been forced off Mindanao and southward to Jolo and other Sulu islands.21 Strength and Composition. The group is comprised of Filipino Muslim radicals. The State Department estimates that ASG has between 200 and 500 17 (...continued) 2002. 18 CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 9-13. 19 Bradley Graham, “Hostage Dies, Wife Is Freed In Rescue; U.S. Missionaries Held 1 Year by Rebels,” The Washington Post, June 8, 2002. 20 Raymond Bonner and Eric Schmitt, “Philippine Officials Detail the Trap, Set with U.S. Help, that Snared a Rebel Leader,” The New York Times, September 22, 2002, p. NE16; and Mark Lerner, “Hostage’s Father Says Abu Sayyaf Broke Deal,” The Washington Times, April 26, 2002, p. A15; cited in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003, p. 11. 21 CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 12. CRS-6 members.22 According to the Philippine government, the group’s strength reached 1,000 in 2001 as a result of successful kidnappings and the influx of ransom money.23 That number has dropped as a result of the post-9/11 government crackdown and military assistance from the United States to around 450.24 The group maintains its own fleet of speedboats to carry out their abductions and move quickly between island bases. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Links between ASG and Al Qaeda are the subject of debate. It is generally believed that the group received funding from Al Qaeda in the early 1990s through Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden. Al Qaeda collaborator Ramzi Yousef operated in the Philippines in the mid-1990s and reportedly trained Abu Sayyaf fighters. However, there is little information about recent cooperation between Al Qaeda and ASG. Some have claimed that Abu Sayyaf is subordinate to Al Qaeda, but others contend that because of the group’s blatant use of ransom and extortion for profit, a close association between the two is unlikely.25 The 2002 edition of the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism does not mention any ties to Al Qaeda.26 Though Janjalani’s first recruits were dissidents from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), radical Islamic groups in the Philippines, such as the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MNLF, deny having links with Abu Sayyaf. Both distance themselves from ASG because of its attacks on civilians and its profiteering. The Philippine military, however, has claimed that elements of both groups provide support to Abu Sayyaf.27 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The group obtains most of its financing through ransom and extortion. One report estimated its revenues from ransom payments in 2000 alone between $10 and $25 million.28 According to the State Department, it may also receive funding from radical Islamic benefactors in the Middle East and South Asia.29 “Libya was a conduit for ransoms paid to Abu Sayyaf and other Filipino Muslim groups...[Libya] also offered money 22 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 102. 23 CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 3. 24 Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Group Resists Military Pressure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Sept. 1, 2003. 25 See “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Abu Sayyaf Group,” The Council on Foreign Relations, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/abusayyaf2.html], accessed on July 15, 2003. 26 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002,pp. 101-102. 27 CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 6. 28 Ibid., p. 3. 29 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 102. CRS-7 for ‘livelihood projects’ in its role in the 2000 hostage negotiations...this raises the possibility that Libyan money gets channeled to Abu Sayyaf.”30 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines might raise questions for Congress over their cost, the scope of the war on terrorism, and the rules of engagement for American troops in assisting foreign counter-insurgency campaigns in the context of the war on terrorism. Congressional oversight of the role of the United States in fighting this group may be important. Some have questioned whether this group is appropriately classified as a terrorist group or whether it might be better considered a criminal gang of thugs. If the latter, then its place in the post-9/11 war on terrorism is open to question. The issue of the ASG’s ties to Al Qaeda is also relevant here. The role of Libya in providing ransom money to this group may be relevant to future debates about whether Libya should be removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(as amended)). Finally, the relationship between Abu Sayyaf and both the MILF and MNLF is ambiguous and controversial. Given the importance of the Philippines as an ally to the United States, this group will bear watching. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by (name redacted), October 21, 2003. CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), Huda Allen, (name edacted), r updated August 8, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, (name re dacted), updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003. 30 CRS Report RL31263, “Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003, p. 5. CRS-8 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade Name(s). al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade; al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion Goals and Objectives. Al-Aqsa aims to expel Israeli soldiers and settlers from the West Bank and Gaza, and to establish a Palestinian state. Brief History. Al-Aqsa is an offshoot of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah, and emerged just after the start of the second Intifada in September 2000. The organization’s goals are to create a Palestinian state and eliminate the presence of Israeli soldiers and settlers in the Palestinian- occupied territories. The group is secular in theory, but has been known to recruit young militants espousing Islamic fundamentalism.31 Unlike Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Aqsa does not claim to be intent on destroying the state of Israel.32 Initially, al-Aqsa militants exclusively attacked Israeli Defense Force and Israeli settlers, but experts say that by early 2002 al- Aqsa began targeting civilians in Israel.33 This shift may have been due to the heightened intensity of the Intifada, including the increased death toll of Palestinians and what al- Aqsa militants believe to be Israel’s “targeted killing” of the group’s West Bank leader, Raed Karmi, on January 14, 2002.34 Since then, al-Aqsa’s attacks have become more severe, and in January 2002 the group introduced the use of female suicide bombers.35 In January 2003, al-Aqsa militants conducted two suicide bombings in downtown Tel Aviv that killed 23 people and wounded approximately 100. Since the start of the second Intifada, al-Aqsa militants have executed more attacks than even Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad36. While other Palestinian groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Fatah agreed to observe a cease-fire in June 2003, al-Aqsa refused to do so. Less than 24 hours after the other groups declared the cease-fire, al-Aqsa killed a Romanian worker on a settlement road near Jenin in the West Bank.37 Favored Tactics. Al-Aqsa uses many tactics, including suicide bombings (including by women), knifings, shootings, and kidnappings. 31 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 32 “Palestinian Militant Groups 101,” CNN, June 18, 2003. 33 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 34 “ a l -A q s a M a r t yr s B r i ga d e , ” C o u n c i l o n F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , [http://www.terrorismanswers.org /groups/alaqsa_print.html], accessed July 14, 2003. 35 Matthew Kalman, “Terrorist says orders come from Arafat; Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade leader says group is integral to Palestinian chief’s Fatah,” USA Today, March 14, 2002. 36 Dan Rothem, “In the Spotlight: al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” Center for Defense Information, June 10, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism.aqsa-pr.cfm], accessed July 14, 2003. 37 “Foreign Worker Killed in West Bank,” Associate Press, June 30, 2003. CRS-9 Anti-American Activities. Al-Aqsa does not directly target U.S. interests. However, the State Department has said that at least one U.S. citizen and four U.S.Israeli dual citizens have been killed in al-Aqsa attacks.38 Primary Area(s) of Operation. Al-Aqsa operates in Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The group’s bases are said to be in Nablus and Ramallah.39 Strength and Composition. According to the State Department, the number of members in al-Aqsa is unknown. Some experts estimate that the group consists of a few hundred young men and women.40 Connections with Other Groups. Al-Aqsa’s connection with Yasir Arafat’s Fatah — the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization — is murky. Some Israeli experts and the government itself assert that al- Aqsa is clearly linked with Yasser Arafat and Fatah.41 They cite as proof Israeli intelligence acquisition of an apparent al- Aqsa invoice, addressed to the Palestinian Authority (PA) chief financial officer. In their view, this intelligence suggests that al- Aqsa militants are “on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, [al-Aqsa’s] activities are financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks are carried out with the knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.”42 Al-Aqsa has sometimes cooperated operationally with both Hamas and Palestinian Jihad.43 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The source of alAqsa’s funding is unclear. The sophistication of al- Aqsa attacks suggests that the group is well funded. Israeli forces claim to have recovered an invoice from a raid on PLO head Yasir Arafat’s compound in April 2002 that outlines the disbursing of funds from the PLO to the al-Aqsa Brigades. Israel claims that the invoice conclusively proves Yassir Arafat’s money supports for the group. However, Arafat 38 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.102. 39 “Martyrs of al-Aqsa,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 14, 2003 . 40 “Israel 1991 to Present; al-Aqsa Martyrs [http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003. Brigade,” Palestine Facts, 41 Yehuda Lancry, “Letter dated 16 January 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” January 16, 2002, accessible at [http://domino.un.org]. 42 Yael Shahar, “The al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade: A political tool with an edge,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, March 24, 2002. 43 “Israel 1991 to Present; al- Aqsa Martyrs [http://www.palestinefacts.org], accessed July 14, 2003. Brigade,” Palestine Facts, CRS-10 has dismissed the “invoice of terror” as a forgery.44 Yasser Arafat has neither “officially recognized nor openly backed” al- Aqsa.45 Originally Designated as an FTO. March 27, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. Since early 2002, this group has killed a significant number of civilians in Israel. Its use of suicide attacks has been particularly frequent and deadly. The question of whether or not Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority provide money for this group (see above) will continue to be controversial. This group’s violent activities, and the Israeli response to them, may continue to affect the viability of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated June 10, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted), updated October 22, 2003. 44 Lee Hockstader, “Israel Says Document Links Arafat, Terror,” The Washington Post, April 3, 2002 45 “Profile: al- Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade,” BBC News. CRS-11 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) Name(s). Armed Islamic Group, GIA Goals and Objectives. GIA is a loose-knit radical Islamic organization in Algeria. While it is unclear whether the group has a central authority or is a collection of smaller affiliated bands, it apparently seeks to overthrow the secular government of Algeria and replace it with a fundamentalist state based on Islamic law. Brief History. GIA formed in early 1993 after the secular Algerian government cancelled elections apparently because the Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win. (GIA split from Islamic Salvation Army, the armed wing of FIS.) Returning Algerian veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union united with disparate radical Islamic groups to form GIA. Since 1993, the group has attacked the government and the military, but also conducted brutal massacres of civilians and foreigners in Algeria, sometimes slaughtering entire villages. On December 31, 1997, the group reportedly killed 400 Algerian civilians in a small town in the space of a few hours.46 Several recent accounts allege, however, that some massacres may have been conducted by, or with the complicity of, the Algerian government.47 The group’s activity has diminished because of a military crackdown and widespread popular revulsion to the killing of civilians. Since 1998, GIA has apparently been eclipsed by the better organized though smaller offshoot called Salafist Group For Call and Combat (GSPC, see below). Favored Tactics. GIA is best know for slitting the throats of its victims, but it has employed a variety of other methods, including bombs, targeted assassinations, and airline hijackings. Anti-American Activities. Although GIA targeted French and other European interests in both Europe and Algeria, there is only one instance where the group has directly threatened U.S. interests. In 1999, Ahmed Ressam, a supposed member of the GIA, was arrested while on route from Canada to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport.48 Areas of Operation. GIA operates mainly within the borders of Algeria. It has reportedly raised funds and conducted attacks in Western Europe through Algerian expatriate communities. In 2002, a French court convicted two GIA members for a series of bombings that took place in France in 1995. Strength and Composition. GIA’s membership is predominantly Algerian Islamic militants. It is difficult to estimate the size of GIA because it is less cohesive 46 “New Bloodletting in Algeria,” Newsday, January 5, 1998. 47 See, for example: Habib Souaidia, The Dirty War and Nesroulah Youh, Who Killed in Bentalha: Chronicle of a Forecasted Massacre. 48 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. Se e also Elaine Ganley, “Ahmed Ressam Followed Familiar Road Map to Terror,” Associated Press, Dec. 18, 2001. CRS-12 than many other organizations. The group’s strength has apparently decreased substantially from its peak in the mid-1990s, but there is disagreement about the current number of members. The State Department estimates that the group’s strength is now “probably fewer than 100.”49 The International Institute for Strategic Studies puts its overall strength at “less than 1,500,” divided into cohorts of 50-100.50 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. There is evidence of connections between GIA and Al Qaeda. In mid-2002, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Hayat cited Algerian sources alleging that an Al Qaeda operative visited Algeria to arrange cooperation between GIA and GSPC.51 In September 2002, a captured GIA leader stated that in the mid-1990s, Osama bin Laden provided financial assistance to GIA.52 It is possible that many Algerian members of Al Qaeda are or have been associated with GIA. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, GIA has no known sources of external support.53 As noted above, captured GIA members have asserted that bin Laden provided funding to GIA in the mid-1990s. The group reportedly receives aid from Algerian expatriates in Western Europe and Canada.54 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-Designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The apparent connections between GIA and Al Qaeda make this group of particular importance to the United States in the war on terrorism. The flow of funding to GIA from expatriates in Western Europe and Canada raises questions of whether or not efforts to counter terrorist financing are succeeding. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted), updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), updated January 17, 2002. 49 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103. 50 Ibid. 51 “Al Qa’idah reportedly Trying to Unite Algeria’s Armed Islamic Groups,”BBC Monitoring Middle East, June 8, 2002. 52 “Former Islamist Chief Says bin Laden Offered to Help Topple Algerian Government,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, September 12, 2002. 53 54 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS-13 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003. CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues, by (name redacted), updated May 30, 2003. CRS-14 ‘Asbat al-Ansar Name(s). ‘Asbat al-Ansar, also spelled ‘Osbat al-Ansar or ‘Usbat al-Ansar, meaning the “League of Partisans.” Goals and Objectives. ‘Asbat al-Ansar aims to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon and to eliminate anti-Islamic and U.S. influences in Lebanon and elsewhere. Brief History. Established in the 1990s, ‘Asbat al-Ansar is a small, relatively new, but highly active Sunni extremist group based primarily in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in the southern port of Sidon, Lebanon. Its leader is AbdelKarim al-Saade or Abou Mohjen and the group opposes Lebanon’s representative government, seeking to replace it with an Islamic state governed by Shari’a law.55 Its constituents, primarily Palestinian refugees, reject peace with Israel.56 ‘Asbat al- Ansar targets interests and people that it perceives as “un-Islamic,” including both soldiers and civilians, Arabs and Westerners. Churches, bars, nightclubs, theaters, liquor stores, and casinos have all been attacked by ‘Asbat alAnsar militants — as have members of rival militant groups and moderate government officials. In 1999, ‘Asbat al-Ansar assailants sprayed gunfire and hurled grenades at a courthouse in Sidon, killing four Lebanese judges. In an attack against an atypical target, in January 2000, militants launched a rocket-propelled grenade at the Russian embassy in Beirut, reportedly as a gesture of solidarity with the Chechen rebels.57 Favored Tactics. ‘Asbat al-Ansar militants primarily use small bombs and grenades to launch attacks against their targets. Anti-American Activities. In 2002, ‘Asbat al-Ansar stepped up its attacks and rhetoric against U.S. targets. The group is a suspect in the November 2002 killing of Bonnie Penner, an American missionary in Sidon.58 ‘Asbat al-Ansar is similarly suspected in a string of bombings against U.S. restaurants in Lebanon.59 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The group is based in Lebanon, primarily in the ‘Ain al- Helweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. To a large extent, ‘Asbat alAnsar is able to reign freely in Lebanon’s refugee camps — without repercussions from the Lebanese government — because of an Arab League law that stripped 55 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 56 “Portraits of Groups U.S. Links to Terror,” Agence France Presse, September 25, 2001. 57 “Hundreds Attend Funeral of Palestinian Attacker of Russian Embassy in Beirut,” Associated Press, January 7, 2000. 58 Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003. 59 “Presumed Leader of Anti-U.S. Terror Group Arrested in Lebanon,” Agence France Presse, October 18, 2003. CRS-15 Lebanon of governmental jurisdiction over the camps. Hence, the camps — where several militant and guerilla group such as Fatah and ‘Asbat al- Nour are also said to be operating — are “off-limits” to Lebanese law enforcement and security officials.60 ‘Asbat al-Ansar’s attacks have so far been limited to targets in Lebanon. Strength and Composition. The group consists of approximately 300 militants, mostly Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.61 Connections with Other Groups. Experts suspect that ‘Asbat al-Ansar is affiliated with Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.62 The allegation hinges on the connection of an Australian of Lebanese origin named Bilal Khazal who apparently forms a link between Asbat al-Ansar, the Tripoli Cell, and Al Qaeda. Khazal heads Australia’s Islamic Youth Movement that is accused of recruiting Islamic fundamentalists. The CIA claims that “the Al Qaeda leadership has allegedly delegated responsibility”63 to Khazal, and the Australian press claims “Bilal Khazal has been linked to an alleged Spanish Al Qaeda operative Abu Dahdah, who is accused of having strong links with one of the brains behind the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”64 A group known as the Tripoli Cell attempted to assassinate U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Vincent Battle in January 2003. Arrested members of the Tripoli Cell admitted to also being Asbat al-Ansar members and reportedly told a military court in Beirut that the group’s leader, Mohammed Ka’aki “received at least $1,800 from Khazal.”65 Some experts believe, then, that Khazal may have formed the linchpin between Asbat al-Ansar, through the Tripoli Cell, to Al Qaeda, although this is subject to dispute. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The State Department says that ‘Asbat al- Ansar likely receives aid from extremist Sunni groups as well as Osama bin Laden and the al- Qaeda network.66 Date added to the FTO list. March 27, 2002. 60 Nicholas Blanford, “Lebanon Targets Islamic Radicals,” The Christian Science Monitor, May 20, 2003. 61 “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 62 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103. 63 Jonathan Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar,” Analysis of Near East Policy from the Scholars and Associates of the Washington Institiute, Policywatch #79, October 3, 2003. 64 Sarah Smiles and Linda Morris, “Islamic Youth Leader Charged with Terrorist Links,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 13, 2003. 65 Schanzer, “New Evidence of Wider Threats from Lebanon’s Asbat al-Ansar.” 66 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 103. CRS-16 Issues of Concern for Congress. This group threatens the Lebanese government, rejects peace with Israel and also reportedly tried to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon (see above). It may also have ties to Al Qaeda. Within the context of the war on terrorism, it bears watching in future months. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted), updated May 23, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark, updated November 19, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, (name redacted), October 22, 2003. The Middle East Peace Talks, updated CRS Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001. CRS-17 Aum Shinrikyo (Aum) Name(s). Aum Supreme Truth (Aum), Aum Shinrikyo (means “teaching the supreme truth” on the “powers of destruction and creation in the universe”), Aleph Goals and Objectives. Aum aimed to control Japan and the world, and subsequently create a global utopian society. Brief History. Established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, an eccentric, half-blind intellectual, Aum reflects an eclectic and twisted blend of Tibetan Buddhist, Hindu, Taoist and Christian thought. It focuses on spiritual existence in a world that its adherents view as increasingly hedonistic, superficial and materialistic. Asahara claimed that the state of the world indicated that apocalypse was nearing and would begin with a U.S. weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack on Japan. His group sought to hasten that apocalypse, take over Japan and the globe, and herald a new order from chaos.67 To this end, Aum sought to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities.68 On June 27, 1994 Aum released the nerve agent, sarin, over a district in central Japan, killing seven people and injuring hundreds. In its deadliest and most infamous attack, on March 20, 1995, ten Aum followers punctured bags of diluted sarin in five subway stations located under government offices and the National Police Agency’s headquarters. Twelve people were killed and up to 6,000 were injured.69 In response, Japanese security forces arrested Aum followers, including Asahara, and closed laboratories and production facilities. Nine members of the group have since been sentenced to death and Asahara continues to stand trial. A verdict is expected in Asahara’s trial in February 2004. The group has renamed itself “Aleph,” meaning beginning, and is under the new leadership of Fumihiro Joyu.70 It has issued a public apology and promised at least $2.5 million in reparations for victims of the attack.71 It has also renounced violence in the political and spiritual processes. Although the group has not been associated with any terrorist act since 1995, Japanese officials are still concerned, saying that it is ‘no less dangerous than it was seven years ago.’72 Security forces closely monitor the group’s activities, and under new legislation, are permitted to conduct 67 Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003. 68 Steven Strasser, “Tokyo Grabs Doomsday Guru,” Newsweek, v.125 No. 22, May 29, 1995. 69 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104. 70 “New Aum Title Riles Namesakes,” Mainichi Daily News, January 21, 2000. 71 Hiroshi Matsubara, “Aum grows again, guru still revered,” The Japan Times, Aug. 8, 2002. 72 Ibid CRS-18 raids of Aum facilities. The group has reportedly renewed its recruiting activities, disseminating videos and posting web pages in Japanese, English and Russian.73 Favored Tactics. Aum has used chemical weapons against civilian and government targets. In 1993 the group attempted to spread anthrax from one of its facilities in Tokyo, and in 1995 Aum punctured bags of sarin with umbrellas in the Tokyo subway that killed 12 and injured up to 6,000.74 According to one source, “Members had tried on no fewer than eight different occasions between 1990 and 1995 to aerosolize anthrax bacteria and botulinum toxin at locations around Tokyo.”75 According to some experts, Aum produced or acquired enough sarin to kill an estimated 4.2 million people.76 Anti-American Activities. Aum has not targeted Americans or U.S. interests in the past. However, Asahara often preached anti-American rhetoric to his constituents, including the sentiment that the United States was at fault for Japan’s economic and social ills.77 Primary Area(s) of Operation. Aum has solely attacked targets in Japan, but its followers and its administrative offices extend beyond Japan. Analysts suspect that Aum once maintained offices in Australia, Germany, Russia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Ukraine, and the United States.78 There are still reportedly a large number of members of Aleph in Russia. Strength and Composition. The State Department estimates that Aum currently consists of 1,500 to 2,000 followers.79 Some experts say that at its peak, the group had 60,000 followers, including 10,000 in Japan, as many as twenty to thirty thousand in Russia, and an additional ten to twenty thousand worldwide.80 As recently as August 2003, the Russian Orthodox Church has claimed there are more Aum members in Russia than in Japan.81 Aum’s spiritual message has appealed to 73 For this and other information about the cult’s activities, see David E. Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, edited by Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 225-226 74 “Aum Released Anthrax Virus in Tokyo in 1993,” Japan Economic Newswire, July 25, 1995; and U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104. 75 “Filthy Wars: Japan’s Aum Shinrikyo Sect,” Sunday Herald Sun, April 19, 1999. 76 Shawn Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo,” Center for Defense Information, July 23, 2003, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/AumShinrikyo-pr.cfm], accessed July 25, 2003. 77 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press: New York, p. 123. 78 Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.” 79 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 104. 80 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 122. 81 “Russia has more Aum Shinrikyo Members than Japan, Orthodox Bishop Says,” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 3, 2003. CRS-19 young, well-educated individuals characterized as “alienated by society’s preoccupation with work, success, technology and making money.”82 Connections with Other Groups. Unknown. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Reportedly owning nearly $1.4 billion in assets, Aum has proven itself to be a wealthy and self-reliant group.83 It operates a computer store that reportedly generates annual sales of approximately 7 billion yen (about $63 million).84 It has been reported that Aum’s computer businesses have been highly lucrative because dedicated cult followers work for little or no wages, allowing Aum to undersell its competitors. The sophisticated technical capabilities of many members of Aum give this group the ability to generate robust sources of funds. In addition to high-tech goods, the cult generates revenue through sales of publications and spiritual goods.85 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. Aum was the first terrorist group to have used so-called weapons of mass destruction. The group’s willingness to use chemical and biological weapons makes it of special concern, especially considering that Japanese authorities are still very wary of the group’s intentions and that it continues to exist. With a reportedly large contingent of followers in Russia and the group’s past record of recruiting educated scientists, attention might be focused on whether Aum/Aleph is seeking to use its Russian members to acquire more weapons and resources from Russian facilities. Other CRS Products. CRS Report RS20412, Weapons of Mass Destruction-The Terrorist Threat, by Steven Bowman, updated December 8, 1999. CRS Report RL31831, Terrorist Motivations for Chemical and Biological Weapons Use: Placing the Threat in Context, by (name redacted), March 28, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB97004, Richard Cronin, Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, updated November 14, 2003. CRS Report RL31609, Japan’s Economic and Security Challenges, by Richard Nanto, updated October 16, 2002. 82 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 122. 83 Choy, “In the Spotlight: Aum Shinrikyo.” 84 “Aum’s True Colors,” Mainichi Daily News, Oct. 2, 1999. 85 Kaplan, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p. 226. CRS-20 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Name(s). Basque Fatherland and Liberty; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, ETA Goals and Objectives. ETA aims to establish a Basque homeland based on Marxist principles in the ethnically Basque areas in northern Spain and southwestern France. Brief History. ETA was founded in 1959 by Basque Marxist rebels incensed by the efforts of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco to suppress the Basque language and culture. Since then the group has carried out numerous attacks in Spain and some in France. More than 800 people have been killed in ETA attacks since its founding.86 The group is best known for assassinating high level Spanish officials. In 1973, the group assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, the heir apparent to Franco, and in 1995 Spanish politician and now president Jose Maria Aznar narrowly escaped an attack. Spanish King Juan Carlos was also the target of an unsuccessful plot. In addition, the group has targeted lower-level officials, journalists, and civilians.87 In the past two years, the Spanish government has made important breakthroughs against ETA, arresting over 120 suspected members and accomplices, seizing assets, and disrupting planned operations. France has also recently arrested a number of suspected members. ETA apparently does not enjoy broad support among Basques: often its attacks are followed by anti-violence demonstrations, and moderate political parties that reject violence do much better at polls than do parties supportive of ETA.88 In general, ETA seems to be declining: the number of attacks and killings has fallen (from 43 in 2001 to 20 in 2002), its financial assets appear to have been squeezed through international cooperation, and its reported IRA collaboration has been hurt by the Irish group’s cease fire.89 Favored Tactics. ETA has conducted bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Anti-American Activities. ETA has not been known to target Americans or U.S. interests. Areas of Operation. ETA operates mainly in the Basque regions of Spain and France which include Alava, Guipuzcoa, Navarra and Vizcaya. The group has also carried out attacks throughout Spain. 86 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105. 87 “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/eta.html], accessed on July 25, 2003. 88 89 Support for the ETA does exist; however, it has been severely weakened. Ibid. Keith B. Richburg, “Long Basque Rebellion Losing Strength: International Effort Squeezes Underground Separatist Group,” The Washington Post, December 11, 2003, p. A1. CRS-21 Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates ETA’s strength at several hundred members, plus supporters.90 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The group apparently has links to the Irish Republican Army, and some believe that it has often followed the IRA’s lead in terms of tactics and operations.91 Terrorism experts believe that ETA may also have helped Colombian terrorists to bomb a social club in Bogota in early 2003.92 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. ETA members have reportedly received training in Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Nicaragua, as well as sanctuary in Cuba. The ETA finances itself through kidnappings, robberies, and extortion.93 The group has been known to rob banks, traffic in drugs, and extort money from businesses in the Basque regions.94 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The measures taken by the United States and its allies to freeze ETA resources have apparently had an effect upon funding for the group. While some Basques in the United States have sympathy for Basque selfdetermination, it does not appear that expatriates in the U.S. are providing resources for the violent activities of the ETA. Some terrorism experts point to Spanish government measures in dealing with the ETA, especially in recent years, as a case study of effective state counterterrorism, although not all would agree. Others are concerned about the very hard political line that has been taken against further Basque autonomy, including against moderates who are not engaged in violence. Recent cooperation between France and Spain in dealing with the ETA, as well as measures instituted by the European Union, are arguably an example of effective transnational counterterrorism. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist Efforts since September 11: Political Will and Diverse Responses, (name redacted), coordinator, October 17, 2002. 90 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 105. 91 David Trimble, “In Northern Ireland, A Question of Trust,” The Washington Post, November 30, 2002. 92 Tim Johnson, “Hand of Irish or Basque Terrorists Seen in Deadly Colombian Bombing,” San Diego Union-Tribune, February 12, 2003. 93 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, pp. 105. 94 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-22 Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army Name(s). Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA). Goals and Objectives. To establish a Marxist state in the Philippines via a violent uprising against the Philippine government. Brief History. The New People’s Army (NPA) is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. It was established in 1969 by Jose Sison and is recognized as Southeast Asia’s longest-running Marxist insurgency.95 This Marxist group has remained active over the course of 34 years in spite of major shifts in global politics, including the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new ideological players such as Al Qaeda. In June 2003, the NPA executed its deadliest attack in more than a decade when 200 of its militants raided a Philippine army camp, killing 17 people.96 In response, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo condemned the attack and ordered an urgent crackdown on the group. Prior to this attack, the Philippine government had tried twice to engage the group in peace talks. Peace talks were in progress in 2001, but were halted after the NPA assassinated two Philippine congressman. Talks were resumed in 2003, but NPA rebels rejected a peace accord with the government, claiming that they are under extreme duress after being listed on European and U.S. terrorist lists.97 Favored Tactics. The NPA primarily targets Philippine citizens and interests. It has been known to use a variety of methods, including kidnapping, assassinations, and arson. It also has front groups in the labor and university sectors of Philippine society. Anti-American Activities. The NPA was responsible for attacks against U.S. military interests in the Philippines prior to the closure of the U.S. military bases there (Clark and Subic) in 1992. Since then, the NPA has continued to oppose the presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines and has demanded that the U.S. military stay out of domestic affairs. In 2002, the NPA objected to being designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and threatened retaliatory attacks against Americans and U.S. interests. In 2003, the NPA threatened to target U.S. troops in the Philippines who have been participating in a joint military exercise to train Philippine soldiers with the skills to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group.98 95 “One Philippine soldier killed, eight injured in clash with communist rebels,” Associated Press, April 17, 2003. 96 Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003. 97 “Philippine Exploratory Peace Talks Halted,” Xinhua News Agency, Feb. 20, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press, March 30, 2003. 98 Lee Peart, “Philippines — NPA Vows to Target US Troops in Philippines,” WMRC Daily Analysis, March 28, 2003. CRS-23 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The NPA operates solely in the Philippines, particularly in rural Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. It also reportedly has cells in Manila.99 Strength and Composition. The NPA consists of 10,000 to 13,500 members.100 According to the State Department, the group had reached an armed strength of over 25,000 in mid-1985. The NPA went into a steep decline due to Corazon Aquino’s restoration of democracy, more effective Philippine military operations, and, perhaps most decisive, internal divisions and purges within the Communist Party in the context of the international decline of their ideology. By 1993-94, NPA strength fell to an estimated 5,000. Since then, however, there has been slow growth up to an estimated 11,000 members. The reasons for the resurgence appear to be continued economic hardships in the rural areas and the restoration of a more monolithic leadership of the Communist Party (CPP) under the exiled Jose Sison.101 Sison and other CPP leaders are living in the Netherlands. Connections with Other Groups. Unknown. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. NPA raises money through several mechanisms. It reportedly collects “revolutionary taxes” from rural communities by taxing food and other items.102 The group also raises money by engaging in criminal activities such as extortion. Philippine officials estimate that the group gathers about $1.8 million each year. Originally Designated as an FTO. August 9, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is a threat to a major U.S. ally, the Philippines. It has threatened to renew attacks against U.S. citizens and it may be growing in numbers. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31263, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003. 99 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106. 100 Ibid. See also Teresa Cerojano, “Arroyo orders action against communist rebels following deadly attack,” Associated Press, June 27, 2003. 101 CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updatedNovember 18, 2003. See also Jim Gomez, “Philippine troops and communist rebels clash near Manila, 24 killed,” Associated Press, March 30, 2003. 102 Honesto C. General, “Is CPP/NPA a terrorist organization?,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 18, 2002. CRS-24 al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG) Name(s). al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, also spelled al- Jama’a al-Islamiyya, (Islamic Group, IG). Goals and Objectives. The IG aims to overthrow the secular Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic state, governed by Shari’a law and devoid of “un-Islamic” influences. Brief History. Established in the late-1970s, the IG, an Islamic militant group, was one of the largest and most active Islamic groups in Egypt. Several key events and phenomena served as catalysts for the group’s formation and the beginning of its violent attacks. The most notable event occurred in 1978 when Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat’s leadership, became the first Arab country to sign a peace accord with Israel (the Camp David Accords). At about the same time, Sadat introduced progressive social legislation, including measures to strengthen the rights of women. Sadat also began cracking down on and imprisoning members of militant Islamic groups — a shift in policy from years of practicing a more tolerant approach towards them. These policies prompted the IG’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Omar Abdel al- Rahman,103 to issue a fatwa calling for the assassination of Sadat, who was killed in 1981.104 Although another Egyptian group, al- Jihad, was primarily responsible for the assassination, several IG militants were involved and were convicted in connection with the crime.105 The IG is likewise suspected of a 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while traveling in Addis Ababa.106 In general, the organization has targeted people and interests that they believe obstruct its vision of an Islamic state, including government personnel, police officers, tourists, Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals, and employees in banks, video stores, and theaters. The Egyptian government blames the group for the deaths of over 1,300 people.107 In recent years, the IG is probably best known for the 1997 massacre of 58 foreign tourists at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt.108 Since the Luxor 103 Sheikh Rahman is also a conspirator in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, for which he has been serving life in prison since 1995. 104 William Farrell, “Egypt Reports Plot to Kill Aides at Sadat’s Funeral,” The New York Times, Oct. 31, 1981 105 Lamia Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 29, 2003. 106 “Ethiopia Announces Arrests in Mubarak Assassination Bid,” Agnence France Presse, Aug. 2, 1995. 107 108 Radi, “Egypt Frees Islamic Militant Leader Jailed for Sadat Murder.” “Egypt Arrest 45 Militants after Identifying One of the Luxor Attackers,” Agence France Presse, Nov. 21, 1997. CRS-25 attack, the IG has split unofficially into two different ideological camps.109 The goal of both groups remains the attainment of an Islamic state. However, one faction, led by Rifa’i Taha Musa, condones the use of violence to achieve these ends, and the other, led by Mustafa Hamza, condemns the use of violence.110 The IG has not apparently engaged in a terrorist attack inside Egypt since 1998.111 Favored Tactics. The IG employs several different tactics, using car bombs, suicide bombs, and gunfire. Anti-American Activities. The IG has not directly targeted U.S. citizens or interests, although the assassination of Sadat was considered a severe blow to U.S. foreign policy interests in the region. However, the group has previously threatened violence against American interests and reportedly considered kidnapping Americans to use as leverage to win the freedom of its leader Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.”112 In 1998, the group’s current operational leader, Rifa’i Taha Musa, signed Osama bin Laden’s proclamation that calls for attacks against U.S. citizens.113 Primary Area(s) of Operation. The IG is based in southern (Upper) Egypt, primarily in the regions of al- Minya, Assiut, Qina, and Sohaj. The organization reportedly has some support in Cairo and Alexandria, and also boasts a presence in Afghanistan, Austria, Sudan, United Kingdom, and Yemen.114 Strength and Composition. The IG has an unknown number of followers, but at its peak it consisted of several thousand militants. Experts suspect that the group has lost members since the 1990s, a phenomenon that may be attributable to a 1999 cease-fire, as well as a government crackdown on militant groups since the 1997 attacks on tourists at Luxor and the September 11 attacks.115 The group has tended to attract disenfranchised university graduates who may be frustrated by widespread unemployment in the country. Connections with Other Groups. The IG allegedly maintains close contact with the Egyptian Islamic extremist group, al- Jihad. The two groups share members and reportedly jointly planned and carried out the assassination of Sadat and the attempted assassination of Mubarak.116 IG may also have a connection with Osama 109 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.106. 110 “Most Jamma Leaders Favor End to All Attacks,” Agence France Presse, Dec. 11, 1997. 111 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.106 112 “Urgent,” Agence France Presse, Apr. 21, 1996. 113 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106. 114 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 115 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p 106. 116 “In the Spotlight: al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya - Islamic Group,” Center for Defense (continued...) CRS-26 bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network. Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, a leader within the IG and al-Jihad movement, is a close associate of bin Laden (see al-Jihad below). Considering the close connections between al-Jihad and the IG, Zawahiri provides a key link between IG and Al Qaeda. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the Egyptian government, the IG receives aid from Iran, bin Laden and Afghan militant groups.117 The organization may also receive some funding from Islamic nongovernmental organizations.118 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group’s potential threat to the Egyptian government and murky funding sources (see above) make it a serious concern in the war on terrorism. Its link to Al Qaeda make it a potential threat to the United States. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31247, Africa and the War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), updated January 17, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93087, Egypt-United States Relations, by Clyde Mark, updated October 10, 2003. 116 (...continued) Information, December 2, 2002, [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/algamaa-pr.cfm], accessed July 28, 2003. 117 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p 106. 118 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-27 HAMAS Name(s). Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia; Islamic Resistance Movement; HAMAS; Hamas. Goals and Objectives. Hamas is a radical Islamic Palestinian organization that initially sought to expel Jews and the state of Israel from Israel/Palestine, and to establish an Islamic Palestinian state based on Islamic law. These goals appear to have been moderated somewhat in recent years, however, with indications that the group would likely accept a favorable Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Brief History. Hamas split off from the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization in 1987, taking a much more militant line than its parent organization in terms of both Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in Israel/Palestine. The group maintains both a social services wing that reportedly runs “clinics, kindergartens, orphanages, colleges, summer camps and even sports clubs,”119 and a terrorist wing that carries out attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. Its social services wing has been very popular and important among Palestinians. Hamas has carried out scores of bombings and has been among the most vigorous participants in the first (1987-1990)and second (2000-present) Intifadas (or Palestinian uprisings against Israel). The group has opposed the Middle East peace process and has positioned itself as a challenger to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip, which it criticizes for making concessions to Israel and for corrupt and ineffective government.120 Recently, Ariel Sharon’s government has become much more aggressive in targeting Hamas leaders for assassination, including Hamas founder Sheikh Salah Shehada (killed July 2002), bomb-maker Muhammed Deif (killed September 2002), Abdel Aziz Rantisi (June 2002) and most notably spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin (September 2002).121 Yassin and Rantisi are still alive. Favored Tactics. Since 1994, the primary terrorist tactic of Hamas has been suicide bombings.122 Hamas bombers have not generally fit the expected profile, sometimes including older men and people with relatively well-paying jobs and families. The group has also employed car bombings, mortar attacks, and assassinations.123 Anti-American Activities. According to the State Department, the group has not targeted U.S. interests. Several U.S. citizens have died as a result of Hamas 119 Khaled Abou Toameh, “Cradle to Grave,” The Jerusalem Post, Sept. 4, 1997. 120 PR Kumaraswamy, “Hamas Emerges as Winner in Cairo Talks,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, March 1, 2003. 121 Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Unsuccessful Israeli strike on top Hamas leaders highlights difficulty of targeted killings,” Associate Press Sept. 7, 2003. 122 Samuel Katz, “Policing Israel’s Front Line,” The Washington Times, Sept. 22, 2002. 123 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-28 bombings in Israel, although Americans do not appear to have been intentional targets.124 Most notably, five American citizens were among 65 killed in a series of four joint Hamas-Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ, see entry below) bombings in 1996. Areas of Operation. Hamas operates in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but is strongest in the latter. The group also has presences in Syria, Lebanon, and the Gulf States.125 Strength and Composition. The members of Hamas are Palestinian Islamic radicals. The number of official members is unknown. According to some estimates, the group has “tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers” for its uncompromising anti-Israel position and its attacks against Israel, its opposition to corruption in the Palestinian Authority, and its network of social services.126 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. Hamas’ closest ally is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ-See below). Initially, PIJ and Hamas did not maintain ties; in fact, some analysts viewed them as rivals.127 Since 1994, the two groups have apparently collaborated on several fronts: they have conducted joint attacks and planned simultaneous bombings. In 2000, Time Magazine reported that Hamas and the PIJ were being courted by Iran to coordinate their efforts and derail the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Time also reported that Hizballah, a group deeply connected to Iran, was the intermediary that facilitated this process.128 There have also been numerous reports that Hamas members received training and logistical support from Hizballah facilities in southern Lebanon.129 In June 2003, PIJ and Hamas published a joint statement declaring a cease-fire to end attacks on Israelis and Israeli interests. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Hamas reportedly receives some aid from Iran (10% of its budget by some estimates) but apparently derives most of its financing from Palestinian expatriates around the world, private 124 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107. 125 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 107. 126 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. See also Michael Donovan, “In the Spotlight: Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement),” Center for Defense Information, updated June 23, 2003. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org], July 14, 2003. 127 “Palestinian Islamic Jihad,” International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism, [http://www.ict.org.il], accessed July 11, 2003. 128 Massimo Calabresi, “A Hidden Hand in the Breakdown of Peace,” Time Magazine, Feb. 28, 2000. 129 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2003. See also “Hizballahland,” Commentary from the American Jewish Committee, No. 1, Vol. 116, July 1, 2003, pg 56. CRS-29 sympathizers in Arab states, and legitimate businesses in Palestinian controlled areas.130 The Bush Administration accuses Syria and Iran of harboring and supporting Hamas.131 Both states are opposed to Israel and the peace process, and both claim that Hamas and other Palestinian groups opposed to Israel are legitimate freedom fighters.132 During the Second Intifada, which began in late 2000, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein reportedly gave money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, including Hamas members. Furthermore, Israel has accused Saudi Arabia of allowing money raised in state-run telethons to go to support Hamas.133 Secretary of State Colin Powell implied sympathy for that allegation by stating, “There are some troubling aspects as to how that telethon money would be distributed.”134 Hamas reportedly also runs money-generating businesses in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and abroad.135 Finally, Hamas is known to acquire money from charities operating in the West, reportedly including The Palestinian Relief Development Fund (U.K.); the Holy Land Foundation (U.S.-assets currently frozen); Al Aqsa Foundation (Germany with branches in Holland and Belgium); and Comite de Bienfaisance et Solidarite avec la Palestine (France).136 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group apparently has significant financial resources and extensive international ties. The combination of strong social services and brutal terrorist attacks makes Hamas highly influential and dangerous. Hamas is crucial to the future prospects of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Recent U.S. efforts at curtailing terrorist financing have targeted charitable foundations that help support the activities of Hamas. The role of Saudi Arabian citizens in supporting Hamas, directly or indirectly, has been subject to much scrutiny and criticism in the United States. 130 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. 131 T. Christian Miller, “Near Iraq, Syria Reportedly Still Quietly Backs Militants,”Los Angeles Times, August 12, 2003. 132 See for example, “Again, Bush Warns Iran, Syria on Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, July 22, 2003. 133 Steve Weizman, “Israel Accuses Saudis of Helping Palestinian Terror Attacks,” Associate Press, May 6, 2002. 134 Barry Schweid, “Powell Says He Has No Evidence that Israel Massacred Palestinians in Refugee Camp,” Associate Press, Apr. 24, 2002. 135 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. 136 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-30 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name r edacted), updated October 23, 2003. CRS Report RS21235, The PLO and its Factions, by (name redacted), updated June 10, 2002. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted), updated October 22, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB93113, Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations, by Alfred Prados, updated November 14, 2003. CRS-31 Harakat ul Mujahidin (HUM) Name(s). Jamiat ul-Ansar; Party of the Volunteers; Movement of Holy Warriors; formerly Harakat -ul-Ansar. Goals and Objectives. HUM is a Pakistan-based Islamic militant organization that seeks to wrest Jammu and Kashmir from Indian control and create an Islamic state encompassing Pakistan and these territories. Brief History. Founded by Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the HUM was initially founded to fight the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union in the 1980’s. After the Soviet pullout, HUM turned its focus on Kashmir, where it has carried out attacks against Indian interests in the Indian-controlled territory of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1998, Khalil signed Osama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on Americans and other Western targets. In December 1999, HUM hijacked an Indian airliner which resulted in the release of Maulana Masood Azhar, who had been imprisoned by India since 1994 for association with HUM attacks.137 After his release, Ahzar broke with the HUM and formed the new Jaish-eMuhammad, taking many HUM members with him (Jaish-e-Muhammad, see below). In recent years, HUM activities have decreased significantly, and crackdowns on Islamic militants in Pakistan have left the group under-funded and undersupported.138 In February 2000, longtime leader Khalil handed control of the group over to Farooq Kashmiri Khalil, and in 2001, after the HUM was banned by President Pervez Musharraf, Khalil renamed the group Jamiat ul-Ansar.139 Favored Tactics. HUM has attacked Indian military, government, and civilian targets in Kashmir with bombs and various other means. The group has also highjacked airliners. Anti-American Activities. Despite signing Osama bin Laden’s 1998 declaration against the United States, the group has not been known to target U.S. interests primarily. HUM remains focused on Kashmir and Jammu. However, in 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested three members of an HUM subgroup, the alAlmi faction, which admitted to the June 14, 2002 bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi that killed 11 people.140 Areas of Operation. HUM is based in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and conducts insurgent and terrorist operations in Indian-controlled Jammu 137 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108. 138 Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm], July 15, 2003. 139 “Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003. 140 Kahn, Zarar. “Pakistan sentences men to death for bomb that killed French engineers.” Associated Press. June 30. 2003. CRS-32 and Kashmir. In the past, the group has operated training camps in Afghanistan.141 Members of HUM have reportedly participated alongside other Islamic militants in operations in Central Asia, Bosnia, and Burma. Strength and Composition. HUM is comprised of Islamic radicals from Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as some Arab veterans of the Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The group is believed to have several thousand armed supporters. The group lost much of its strength in 2000 in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM, see below), and its activities have decreased since.142 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. The leader of HUM signed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against American soldiers and civilians. The group is believed to have maintained ties with bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but the nature of these ties is unclear.143 HUM has also cooperated with other Islamic militant groups operating in Kashmir and Pakistan. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. HUM receives financial support from sympathizers not only in Pakistan and Kashmir, but also in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.144 The group allegedly also raises funds among Pakistani and Kashmiri expatriates in Europe, primarily Britain.145 Its fund-raising in Pakistan has been largely curtailed since the government crackdown on extremists following 9/11. The government of India has long accused Pakistan of supporting and encouraging militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir, to include HUM. Originally Designated. as an FTO October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. An important concern for the United States in its war on terrorism is the apparent cooperation between HUM and Al Qaeda. The convergence of a local, territorially-based agenda aimed at Jammu and Kashmir with a global, anti-American, “international jihad” focus is worrisome. Having its major locus of operations in Pakistan, a nuclear state that is allied with the United States but potentially unstable, is also a serious concern. Finally, attacks by the HUM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war. 141 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108. 142 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. See also Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 109. 143 CRS Report RL31119,, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003, p. 18. 144 145 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p. 108. Dan Rotham, “In the Spotlight: Harakat ul Mujaheddin (HUM),” Center for Defense Information, updated July 8, 2002. Accessed at [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/harakat.cfm], July 15, 2003. CRS-33 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),, updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted), updated May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), updated March 8, 2004. CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by (name r edacted), updated March 28, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), , updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted), updated September 30, 2002. CRS-34 Hizballah Name(s). Hezbollah, Party of God, Islamic Jihad, The Revolutionary Justice Organization, The Islamic Resistance, Organization for the Oppressed on Earth. Goals and Objectives. According to its manifestos, Hizballah is dedicated to the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel, and the ultimate establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon.146 Brief History. Established in 1982 by Lebanese Shiite clerics and ideologically inspired by the Iranian revolution, Hizballah was formed in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The group was the principal supporter of antiWestern and anti-American terrorism in the 1980’s and is directed by its Majlis alShura, or Consultative Council. Since 1992, Hizballah has participated in Lebanon’s political system and currently holds 12 seats, with its allies, in parliament.147 Other terrorist activities include the highjacking of TWA Flight 847 (1985), the detention of 18 American hostages in Lebanon throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the bombing of Israel’s Embassy in Argentina (March 1992), and the bombing of the ArgentineJewish Mutual Association in Bueno Aires (July 1994).148 During its 15-year military insurgency campaign against Israeli and Israeli-aligned forces in Southern Lebanon, Hizballah carried out rocket attacks that killed Israeli civilians.149 Favored Tactics. Hizballah has engaged in kidnappings, bombings, and highjackings, as well as rocket strikes against Israeli settlements and the firing of surface-to-air missiles at Israeli jets.150 Anti-American Activities. Hizballah’s most active period of anti-American targeting occurred during the 1980’s and resulted in a very large number of U.S. casualties. Under the alias Islamic Jihad,151 Hizballah has been implicated in or is known to have carried out the truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut (April 1983), the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983, killing 220 Marine, 18 Navy, and 3 Army personnel), and the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut (September 1984).152 Hizballah also claimed responsibility for an April 1984 bombing that killed 18 people in Torrejon, Spain. An additional 82 persons, including 15 Americans, 146 “Hezbollah’s Manifesto,” available at [http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/Hiz_letter.htm]. See also U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108 147 Hezbollah holds ten seats and its allies hold two. 148 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 149 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2002. 150 “Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com]. 151 CIA report on Islamic Jihad. Central Intelligence Agency. Issue Date: Oct 4, 1984. Date Declassified: Mar 01, 1987. 6 page(s). Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale Group, 2003. 152 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2002. CRS-35 were wounded. Of their strictly terrorist acts between 1994 and 2002, however, none has been directly targeted at U.S. citizens or assets. However, some experts believe there may be a resurgence in anti-American activity. For example, Singapore’s Internal Security Department claims to have foiled a Hizballah plot to attack U.S. shipping interests in the 1990’s.153 Moreover, Hizballah has pledged retaliation for the death of Ali Hussein Saleh, a Hizballah security official, for which the group blames both the United States and Israel.154 Finally, some experts have warned of Hizballah’s potential for “wreaking havoc” in post-war Iraq, although there is no direct evidence of a Hizballah role there so far.155 Primary Areas of Operation. Hizballah operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa valley, and southern Lebanon. It has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North American, and Asia.156 Strength and Composition. The group is believed to have two to five thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.157 Connections with Other Groups. Saudi and Bahraini investigations claim that Hizballah maintains connections with other Shiite groups bent on anti-regime activity throughout the Gulf region. Furthermore, portions of the U.S. government’s indictment against bin Laden for the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 state that “Al Qaeda also forged alliances with... Hezbollah (variant spelling), for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies in the West, particularly the United States.”158 State Sponsors and Other Sources of Funding. Iran supports Hizballah with financial, political, and organizational aid, while Syria provides diplomatic, political, and logistic support.159 In May 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified that Iran provides “up to $100 million a year in the case of Hezbollah [sic].”160 153 “Singapore Says Hizballah Tried to From Terror Cell,” Reuters, Jun. 8, 2002. See also “Hezbollah had plans to attack US, Israeli ships in Singapore,” Agence France Presse, Jun 9, 2002. 154 “Hizbullah Vows to Retaliate,” The Daily Star, Aug. 4, 2003. Available at [http://www.hizbollah.org/english/frames/index_eg.htm] 155 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs, November-December 2003, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 54-67. 156 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 108 157 “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 158 “Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001. 159 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p.108. 160 Martin Sieff, “U.S. to Keep Pressure on Iran,” Washington Times May 26, 1996. See also (name redacted), “ Terrorism: Near East Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, CRS Report RL31119, updated February 13, 2002. CRS-36 The group also seeks financial aid from overseas, as evidenced by the U.S. arrest in 2002 of Chawki and Muhamod Hammoud, who are accused of using a cigarette smuggling operation to generate funds for Hizballah.161 Originally Designated as an FTO. October 8, 1997. Re-designated. October 8, 1999, October 5, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. The U.S. approach to Hizballah is complex. Hizballah has adopted a political role within Lebanon and is represented in the Lebanese Parliament, with 12 seats (with its allies) out of 128. Apparently mainly because it forced Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Hizballah is popular in the Arab world. Hizballah is a designated foreign terrorist organization and has global assets. The Lebanese government has refused to freeze the financial assets of Hizballah. Hizballah has killed a large number of Americans, especially during the 1980s, and has apparently cooperated with Al Qaeda on training and logistics;162 however, it has apparently not carried out attacks directly against Americans in recent years. Some experts claim that the group is a growing threat to the United States, potentially comparable to Al Qaeda; others dispute this assessment and argue that failing to distinguish between the groups will increase their incentives to cooperate, ultimately increasing the threat to the United States.163 Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name r edacted), updated October 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB89118, Lebanon, by Clyde Mark,,updated October 21, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB92052, Palestinians and the Middle-East: Issues for the United States, by Clyde Mark, updated November 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by (name redacted), updated October 22, 2003. CRS Report RL31078, “The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and its Implications,” by Alfred Prados, updated August 7, 2001. 161 Gary Wright and Eric Frazer, “Trial Starts for Two Accused of Hizballah Tie,” The Charlotte Observer, May 20, 2002. 162 “Iran, Syria, and bin Laden,” The Washington Times, November 29, 2001. 163 Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” CRS-37 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Name(s). Islamic Party of Turkestan. Goals and Objectives. The IMU is a radical Islamic organization seeking to overthrow secular rule in Uzbekistan. The group reportedly also seeks Islamic rule in other Central Asian countries and to fight against those it deems enemies of Islam.164 Brief History. The IMU was formed in Afghanistan by radical Islamic opponents of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who is accused of brutally repressing opposition to his rule and suppressing Islam. However the roots of the IMU go back as far as December 1991, when the mayor of the eastern city of Namangan refused to grant a group of young Muslims land on which to build a Mosque, and the men seized the Communist Party headquarters. The men were led by Tohir Abdouhalilovitch Yuldeshev, and Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovitch Khojaev (alias Juma Namangani). Yuldeshev was a 24-year-old college drop-out and mullah in the Islamic underground movement. Khojaev was a former Soviet paratrooper who apparently had his Muslim faith revitalized while fighting against the mujahidin while he served in Afghanistan.165 Under intense government pressure, Yuldashev fled Uzbekistan, was given refuge in Afghanistan by the Taliban, and began networking with Islamic groups. Namangani made a name for himself as a bold fighter in the Tajik civil war.166 In 1996, the two men announced the formation of the IMU, and reportedly helped the Taliban against the Northern Alliance, even leading troops in battle. From bases in Tajikistan, the group launched a terror campaign against the Uzbek government. Because of tight security, the group has generally been unable to operate in Uzbekistan and has been more active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the group’s leaders, including Namangani, were killed or captured during the U.S.-led war against the Taliban in 2001.167 Favored Tactics. The IMU has primarily used bombings and armed guerilla warfare. Anti-American Activities. In August 2000, the IMU kidnapped four American mountain climbers, who escaped after pushing their IMU guard off a 164 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109. 165 “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003. 166 “Terrorism Database.” Periscope, USNI Database. [http://www.periscope1.com]. 167 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109. CRS-38 cliff.168 The IMU also fought alongside the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in late 2001. Areas of Operation. The IMU operates throughout Central and South Asia, especially in the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge.169 The group is known to have operated in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan.170 Strength and Composition. The U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, estimates that the IMU probably now has fewer than 1,000 militants.171 Before the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, which badly hurt the group, the IMU was believed to have had closer to 2,000 members.172 Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. IMU leaders are believed to have formed ties to Al Qaeda while both were based in Afghanistan in the late 1990s.173 IMU members are believed to have trained at Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban. State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. The IMU received support from other Islamic extremist groups as well as from sympathizers in the Middle East and South Asia. Before the post-9/11 crackdown, Al Qaeda is believed to have been a major supporter of the IMU.174 The group is reportedly heavily involved in the Central Asian opium trade; by one account, the group handles 70 percent of opium trafficking in the region.175 Originally Designated as an FTO. September 25, 2000. Re-designated. September 25, 2002. 168 Audrey Cooper, “American Hostages Push Guard Off Cliff to Escape Militants,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 25, 2000. 169 Mark Burgess, “In the Spotlight: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.” Center for Defense Information. [http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/imu.cfm]. Updated Mar. 25, 2002. Accessed Oct. 27, 2003. 170 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 109. 171 Ibid 172 “The Military Balance,” Institute for International and Strategic Studies, Vol. 103. [http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/current/]. Table 41. 173 Raffi Khatchadourian, “Militants on the Steppes,” The Nation, May 20, 2002. 174 Ibid 175 Prepared Testimony of Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, InterPol General Secretariat Before for the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, “The Threat Posed by the Convergence of the Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism,” December 13, 2000. CRS-39 Issues of Concern for Congress. This group could play a role in impeding the success of the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the future stability of a postTaliban state. Although the IMU was seriously damaged during military hostilities against the Taliban regime, its role in the drug trade is of growing concern, as are its very close ties to Al Qaeda. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by (name redacted), May 23, 2003. CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), upda ted February 13, 2003. CRS Report RL31213, China’s Relations with Central Asian States and Problems with Terrorism, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), updated October 7, 2002. CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted), updated November 6, 2003. CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted), updated April 3, 2003. CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests, by (na me redacted) and (name redacted), updated January 9, 2003. CRS Report RS21041, Taliban and the Drug Trade, by Raphael Perl, updated October 5, 2001. CRS-40 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Name(s). Army of Mohammed; Khaddam ul-Islam.176 Goals and Objectives. The JEM aims to end Indian rule in disputed Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), expel Indian security forces from the region, and unite J&K with Pakistan. Brief History. The JEM is a Pakistan-based, militant Islamic group founded by Maulana Masood Azhar in March 2000. Indian authorities arrested Azhar in February 1994 in connection with terrorist activities perpetrated by Harakat-ulMujahideen (HUM).177 Azhar was released from prison in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hostages aboard an Indian plane that had been hijacked by HUM militants.178 Azhar established JEM shortly after his release from prison in India with the express purpose of attacking Indian targets and liberating J&K from Indian rule. The JEM has targeted Indian officials, government buildings, and soldiers as well as non-Muslim civilians in Pakistan and in J&K.179 The JEM is suspected of executing a suicide bomb attack outside the J&K state assembly building on October 1, 2001, killing up to 38 people.180 The group initially claimed credit for the attack, but later denied involvement. The Indian government has also accused the JEM, in conjunction with Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, of carrying out a deadly attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.181 Armed with explosive materials and firearms, five assailants stormed the Parliament and “fired indiscriminately,” killing nine security guards and one civilian bystander.182 In January 2002, the government of Pakistan banned JEM and several other groups (see also Lashkar-e-Tayyiba entry, below). The JEM is viewed by some as the “deadliest” and “principal terrorist organization in Jammu and Kashmir.”183 As of September 2003, crackdowns on the JEM have resulted in the deaths of 555 militants so far this year, including Gazi Baba, operations chief of the group (Aug 30, 2001), and Nasir Mehmood Ahwan, 176 “Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Ansar Change Names,” The Press Trust of India, March 12, 2003. 177 Azhar was previously the leader of Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), which was renamed Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) and then again renamed HUM in October 1997 when the HUA was designated a FTO. See B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper 332.html], accessed July 31, 2003. 178 Zahid Hussein, “Freed Militant Arrives in Paksitan,” Associated Press, Jan. 6, 2000. 179 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. 180 “Jaish: Taliban’s Twin, Harakat’s New Avatar,” Indian Express, Oct. 2, 2001. 181 Neelesh Misra, “India Police Finger Attack Sponsors,” Associated Press, Dec. 16, 2001. 182 “Masood Azhar masterminded Parliament attack,” Hindustan Times, May 15, 2002. 183 B. Raman, “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) — A Backgrounder,” South Asia Analysis Group, October [http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper332.html], accessed July 31, 2003. CRS-41 second in command (September 17, 2003).184 After President Musharraf outlawed the group in January 2002, JEM changed its name to Khaddam-ul Islam. At the same time, JEM’s leader and founder, Azhar, was placed under house arrest, but then he was released in December 2002.185 Favored Tactics. Experts describe JEM strategies and attacks as fidayeen (suicide terrorist) in nature.186 In this type of operation, a terrorist launches an attack with the intention to kill as many people as possible and the expectation of being killed at the scene of the attack in retaliation.187 In this fashion, JEM militants allegedly stormed the Indian Parliament building, proceeded to engage the security personnel in a firefight, and killed 10 people. All five terrorists in this attack were killed. The JEM use a variety of firearms, including light and heavy machine guns, and assault rifles. JEM assailants have also used mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket grenades.188 Anti-American Activities. The JEM was implicated in the February 2002 kidnapping and execution of journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl, 38, worked as the South Asia Bureau Chief for the Wall Street Journal. He was on assignment in Karachi to interview members of militant groups and trace their possible links with alleged shoe-bomber Richard Reid.189 (See also Lashkar I Jhangvi entry, below.) Primary Area(s) of Operation. The JEM is based in Pakistan and Pakistancontrolled Kashmir. Most of its supporters are in Azad, Kashmir, Pakistan and India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions. The JEM primarily launches attacks in Indian-controlled J&K. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 is the only recorded instance in which the JEM attacked a target outside of the J&K. Strength and Composition. The JEM consists of several hundred armed supporters.190 Most of its members are Kashmiris and Pakistanis. By some accounts, up to 75% of JEM are former HUM members.191 The JEM is said to have supporters and sympathizers in Afghanistan, including former Taliban associates and Arab 184 Mujtaba Ali Ahmad, “2 Top Rebel Commanders Killed in Kashmir,” Associated Press, Sept. 17, 2003. 185 Husain Haggani, “Pakistan Frees Terrorist Leaders,” Asian Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2003. 186 “Jaish-e-Mohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jaish_e_moh ammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003. 187 See CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted),, August 28, 2003. 188 “Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ world/para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003. 189 Paul Haven, “A Year After Pearl’s Abduction, Questions Remain,” Associated Press, Jan. 22, 2003. 190 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110. 191 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-42 veterans of the Afghan war. Until the fall of 2001, the JEM reportedly “maintained training camps in Afghanistan.”192 Connections with Other Groups. The JEM is reportedly linked with the former Taliban regime and is believed to receive funding from Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network.193 The connection with the Taliban was apparently established and maintained through madrassahs (religious schools) in Karachi and Afghanistan. JEM leader Azhar has reportedly met with leaders and key figures in both the former Taliban and Al Qaeda. Analysts believe that JEM maintains ties with other Sunni Muslim groups in Pakistan, including Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar I Jhangvi (LIJ), and Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).194 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. Experts believe that JEM has received some monetary support from bin Laden and Al Qaeda as well as HUM and Harakat ul-Jihad al- Islami (HUJI).195 Indian officials claim that the JEM has also received support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in an attempt to undermine Indian security forces and bolster Pakistan’s position in the dispute over Kashmir. Those claims remain in dispute.196 Originally Designated as an FTO. December 24, 2001. Issues of Concern for Congress. This group is potentially a serious threat to stability in South Asia. Its ties to Al Qaeda and the former Taliban regime make it a significant concern for the United States. Its murder of Daniel Pearl and targeting of U.S. facilities may indicate that JEM will continue to target other American citizens and interests in the future. Attacks by JEM exacerbate the tensions between India and Pakistan, two nuclear states apparently often on the brink of war. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasahs: Background, by Febe Armanios, updated October 29, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. 192 “Jaish-e-Mohammed,” Global Security, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ para/jem.htm], accessed July 31, 2003. 193 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110. 194 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110; “Jaish-eMohammed Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_ outfits/jaish_e_mohammed_mujahideen_e_tanzeem.htm#], accessed August 8, 2003. 195 196 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Rama Lakshmi, “New Delhi Lays Blame,” The Washington Post, December 29, 2001. CRS-43 CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by (name redacted), updated February 13, 2003. CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted), updated November 3, 2003. CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), updated March 8, 2004. CRS Report RL31624, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, by (name r edacted), updated March 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31587, Kashmiri Separatists: Origins, Competing Ideologies, and Prospects for Resolution of the Conflict, by (name redacted), updated September 30, 2002. CRS-44 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Goals and Objectives. Jemaah Islamiya is a radical Islamic group that aims to create a strict Islamic state in place of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippine islands, and southern Thailand. Brief History. The group’s roots trace back to Darul Islam, a violent Islamic group that opposed Dutch rule in Indonesia in the 1940s. After the Dutch left, the movement opposed the new independent government of Sukarno for being too secular. The name Jemaah Islamiya (JI) emerged in the 1970s, during the Suharto era, but it is unclear whether the name referred to an organized group or an informal gathering of anti-government Islamic militants.197 The co-founders of JI, clerics Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, established a boarding school in Solo, on the main island of Java. Many suspected JI activists have been alumni of that school.198 In 1985, the two co-founders fled to Malaysia, where they began to send Indonesians and Malaysians to Afghanistan, initially to fight the Soviet occupation and then to train in Al Qaeda camps.199 Apparently some time in the mid-1990s, Baasyir and Sungkar merged their evolving network into Al Qaeda and began preparing for attacks in Southeast Asia. Bombings in Jakarta, Manila, and Thailand started in 2000.200 JI is linked to a wave of attacks in December 2000 against Christian churches in Indonesia, for example, and aborted plots to bomb Western embassies in Singapore. The group is most infamous for the October 12, 2002 suicide bombing of a night club on the Indonesian island of Bali that killed 200 people, many of them young Australian tourists. Abu Bakar Bashir, arrested one week after the Bali bombing, is believed to be the group’s spiritual leader, though he denies it. An Indonesian court convicted Bashir of plotting to overthrow the government, but dropped more serious charges. His four-year jail sentence was later reduced to three years by an appellate court. Riduan bin Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, is reportedly JI’s chief of operations and was arrested in mid-August 2003 in connection with the Bali bombing. The CIA has dubbed Hambali “Asia’s bin Laden.”201 Other specific evidence of JI’s shared origins with Al Qaeda has come out in the aftermath of the Bali tragedy. During the trial of Bali bomber Ali Gufron (also known as Mukhlas), the defendant claimed that he had fought alongside Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the Battle of the Lion’s Den (Battle of Jaji), which occurred in 1987 during the war against the Soviet Union. It is known that Osama bin Laden’s recruitment center (Maktab al-Khidmat - see below) provided logistical support for 197 “Terrorism: Questions and Answers,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003. 198 CRS Report RL31772, Terrorism in Southeast Asia,Mark Manyin, by Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted), updated November 18, 2003, p. 5. 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 “Terrorism Database,” Periscope, USNI Database, [http://www.periscope1.com]. CRS-45 non-Afghan mujahedin, including Indonesians, during that period; and Mukhlas has testified that he met bin Laden while the Saudi was leading troops at Jaji.202 Building on Mukhlas’ testimony, further specific research has shown that the senior leadership of JI, including Hambali, camped, trained, and got their education in the Afghan war against the Soviets.203 Authorities in the region state that JI has continued to plot attacks against Western targets in Southeast Asia.204 On August 5, 2003, JI militants are suspected of having bombed a J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta killing 14 and wounding 148.205 Favored Tactics. Most of Jemaah Islamiya’s attacks have involved bombings of varying degrees of sophistication. Anti-American Activities. In December 2001, JI was linked to plans to bomb the U.S. embassy and other locations frequented by American businesspeople and military personnel in Singapore. In mid-2002, a captured Al Qaeda operative revealed a joint Al Qaeda/Jemaah Islamiya plot to attack U.S. interests in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Cambodia with car bombs on the anniversary of 9/11.206 On August 5, 2003, Jemaah Islamiya was linked to a car bombing at a J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta that killed 14 and injured 148.207 Areas of Operation. JI operates throughout Southeast Asia, although Indonesia has traditionally been its primary area of operation. The group has also operated in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and possibly the Philippines. It may also have a presence in neighboring Southeast Asian countries and in Australia. Strength and Composition. The numerical strength of JI is unknown. Some believe that the majority of JI leaders were either part of a close group which traces their relationship back to fighting the Soviets together in Afghanistan,208 or former trainees of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who got to know each other in the 202 Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003. 203 “Jemaah Islamiyah in East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 63, Aug. 26, 2003. Additional information about the Bali bombing and other recent attacks is available in CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (name redacted),, updated November 18, 2003, pp.6-8. 204 Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, pp.7-8. 205 “Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003. 206 Romesh Ratnesar, “Confessions of an Al-Qaeda Terrorist,” Time, September 23, 2002; cited in Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6. 207 208 “Indonesia Points to Jemaah over Marriott Attack,” Reuters, Aug. 8, 2003. Shawn Donnan, “Terror Group May Have Been Born out of Afghan Jihad,” Financial Times, Aug. 27, 2003. CRS-46 terrorist camps in southern Philippines.209 Some intelligence reports say that up to 700 Indonesians trained in the camps from 1997 to 98.210 The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002 estimates that the group probably has several hundred operatives, but also cites Singaporean officials who put the group’s strength around 5,000.211 It is unclear how crackdowns on the group in various countries since 9/11, and especially since the Bali nightclub bombing, have affected the group. Connections With Other Terrorist Organizations. JI is alleged to have extensive ties to Al Qaeda, but the precise nature of those ties is in dispute. Some contend that the group is essentially subordinate to Al Qaeda, while others argue that Al Qaeda acts more like a funding agency that approves grants for independent JI proposals.212 Captured Al Qaeda operatives have reportedly asserted that JI leaders have been involved in various Al Qaeda plots.213 Two of the 9/11 hijackers and imprisoned accused operative Zacarias Moussaui allegedly visited Malaysia and met with JI members in 2000, and JI members reportedly sent money to them.214 Furthermore, in January of 2003, Singapore’s Internal Security Department released a report based on interviews with detained JI militants that outlines the close operational links between JI and Al Qaeda.215 Furthermore, the 13 suspects arrested in Singapore for the foiled plot against U.S. shipping interests in December 2001 are also believed to be connected to Al Qaeda.216 JI is also believed to have operational links to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines and the Malaysian Kampulan Mujihhedin Malaysia (KMM).217 209 Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on Philippine Island,” The Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2003. 210 John McBeth, “Indonesia-Easy Does It,” The Far Eastern Economic Review, July 17, 2003. 211 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, p. 110. 212 “Jemaah Islamiyyah: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 63, Jakarta/Brussels, Aug. 26, 2003. 213 “Terrorism: Questions and Answers: Jemaah Islamiyah,” The Council on Foreign Relations and the Markle Foundation, [http://www.terrorismanswers.org/ groups/jemaah.html], accessed on July 10, 2003. 214 Manyin, Cronin, Niksch, and Vaughn, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, p. 6. 215 “Singapore Government Reveals Extent of Islamic Terrorist Threat to South East Asia,” Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Center, January 1, 2003. See also “Jemaah Islamiah Report Released,” Radio Australia, available at [http://abc.net.au/ra/asiapac/programs/ s760988.htm]. 216 “Worldwide arrests to root out alQaeda since September 11, 2001” Agence France Presse, Sept. 14, 2002. 217 “Moro Rebels Topple Down Electric Posts,” Financial Times Information Global News Wire, May 16, 2003. See also Anthony Davis, “Blast Suggests MILF-JI Links,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May, 1, 2003. CRS-47 State Supporters and Other Sources of Funding. According to the U.S. State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2002, JI receives funding and logistical help from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Al Qaeda. The group also raises funds from sympathizers in the Southeast Asian region. Originally Designated as an FTO. October 23, 2002. Issues of Concern for Congress. Although there have been important arrests of JI members, some terrorism experts worry that Jemaah Islamiya is still a serious threat to stability in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. Members of the group continue to plot against Americans and American interests, as well as the citizens and assets of U.S. allies. Jemaah Islamiya’s apparently extensive ties to Al Qaeda make it a particular concern for the United States. Indonesia’s reluctance to crack down on JI for domestic political reasons could complicate U.S. policy if another anti-Western attack occurs. Additionally, the growing evidence of ties between JI and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a radical Islamic separatist group in the Philippines),218 may soon force the United States and the Philippines to decide whether they must confront the MILF militarily. Other CRS Reports. CRS Report RL31152, Foreign Support of the U.S. War on Terrorism, by (name redacted), Huda Allen, (name redacted), updated August 8, 2003. CRS Report RL32058, Terrorists and Suicide Attacks, by (name redacted), updated August 28, 2003. CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Mark Manyin, Richard Cronin, Larry Niksch, and (na me redacted), updated November 18, 2003. CRS Report RL31265, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” by Larry Niksch, updated April 8, 2003. CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by Larry Niksch, updated September 25, 2002. 218 For additional information about the MILF see the Abu Sayyaf entry, above. CRS-48 Al-Jihad Name(s). Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest. Goals and Objectives. Al-Jihad is committed to the violent overthrow of the Egyptian government, to the establishment of an Islamic regime in Egypt, and to attacking American and Israeli interests in Egypt. Brief History. Founded in the late 1970s, al-Jihad is a violent offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious and political organization founded in 1928 by Hasan al Banna seeking a return to the original precepts of the Qu’ran and opposed to the secular rule and Western influence. Known for high profile assassinations and bombings, al-Jihad is responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (October 1981), the death of the People’s Assembly Speaker Rifaat elMahgoub (October 1990), and attempts on the lives of Interior Minister Al-Alfi (August 1993), Prime Minister Atef Sedky (November 1993), and President Hosni Mubarak (1995).219 In the early 1980s, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ruthlessly cracked down on al-Jihad, forcing a split in the group.220 One faction, led by the imprisoned Abbud al-Zumar, has called for peaceful negotiation; but his faction has apparently withered. The other faction, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, became even more violent, and around 1987 moved al-Jihad’s base of operations to Afghanistan.221 Al-Zawahiri has moved further away from the Egyptian cause and has embraced Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda quest to target American interests directly. In 1998 al-Jihad joined, and alZawahiri reportedly leads, Al Qaeda’s so-called International Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. Then, in 2001, al-Jihad apparently merged with Al Qaeda. There have been no attacks inside Egypt attributed to al-Jihad since 1998.222 Favorite Tactics. Al-Jihad has engaged in assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks.223 Anti-American Activity [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL32223. Public record. Not legal advice.