# Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL31946

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** June 4, 2003
- **Citation:** RL31946

## Text

Order Code RL31946

Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web

Iraq War: Defense Program
Implications for Congress

June 4, 2003

Coordinated by Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Contributors

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Richard A. Best, Jr.
(name redacted)
(name redacted)
(name redacted)
(name redacted)
(name redacted)
Ronald O’Rourke

Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress
Summary
The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs
of interest to Congress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and
will be updated periodically as new information becomes available. Three cautionary
notes associated with post-conflict “lessons-learned” reports apply to this report:
Information about the Iraq war is incomplete and imperfect, so early lessons are
subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observers should avoid
“overlearning” the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derive
lessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces,
possibly devaluing U.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons
or organizations offering purported lessons of the Iraq war may have a financial,
institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.
Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration’s
vision for defense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The
issue is potentially significant because implementing the Administration’s vision
could affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, and because the
Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to help justify or seek rapid
congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals that could
affect Congress’ role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war may
influence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to
carry out current U.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be
placed on forces that are less dependent on access to in-theater bases.
One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war –
and potentially one of those most significantly influenced by the war – concerns the
future size and composition of the active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents
of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army divisions may find support in the Iraq
war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponents of the current Army
plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number of
lighter and more mobile units.
The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with
precision-guided weapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for
investing in specific aircraft and munitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce
support generated by the war in Afghanistan for increased investment in U.S. special
operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerning reserve combat
divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers of
reserve forces.
The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations
and timely battlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological
operations. It appears to have confirmed the importance of preparing for urban
combat. The war offered a limited real-world test of the Patriot missile defense
system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies for reducing
friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling
capabilities, and increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Scope of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Deriving “Lessons” of the War: Some Cautionary Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Organization of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Defense Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Size of Military Needed For National Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Overseas Base Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Army Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Combat Aircraft and Precision-Guided Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Network-Centric Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Urban Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Ballistic Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Friendly Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Psychological Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Chemical-Biological Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Airlift and Aerial Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Sealift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for
Congress
Introduction1
The recent war against Iraq, known formally as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),
was the largest U.S. military operation since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and may
have implications for various defense programs of interest to Congress. This report,
which is similar to one that CRS prepared following the 1991 Persian Gulf war,2
surveys some of those potential implications. It will be updated periodically as new
information becomes available.

Scope of Report
This report focuses on how the Iraq war may affect defense programs that
Congress may address in acting on defense authorization and appropriation bills for
FY2004 and subsequent fiscal years. It does not cover broader defense policy issues
such as U.S. national security strategy or Congress’ role in declaring war. Nor does
it cover the post-war occupation and reconstruction efforts in Iraq or the potential
impact of the war on U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. role in the world. Issues like
those are covered in other CRS products.

Deriving “Lessons” of the War: Some Cautionary Notes
Although the Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations customarily
produce “lessons learned” reports following the conclusion of a major military
operation like the Iraq war, this report for the most part avoids using the term
“lessons” because it can imply the making of recommendations – something that
CRS reports do not do. Even so, certain cautionary notes associated with “lessonslearned” reports apply to this report. These include the following:
! Information is imperfect; early lessons are subject to change. Public

information about the Iraq war is currently incomplete, and will likely remain
so for some time. Although certain aspects of the war, such as the operations
of U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces moving from Kuwait to
Baghdad, received extensive press coverage, many details of these operations
are not known. Other aspects of the war, such as coalition air operations, were
reported in less detail. And some aspects of the war, such as the activities of

1
2

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS Report 91-421 F, Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress,
coordinated by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 1991. (May 15, 2001) 82 p.

CRS-2
special operations forces, have received very little press coverage. Knowledge
about the war at this point is thus fragmentary and unbalanced. Historically,
moreover, early information that is publicly available about a war often proves
to be inaccurate. Attempts to identify lessons should be tempered by an
appreciation for gaps and imperfections in the available information. As
information becomes more complete and accurate with time, early lessons
may need to be modified or dropped.
! Each war is unique; avoid “overlearning” the lessons of this war.

Particularly for U.S. military forces, which fight conflicts in different parts of
the world against various adversaries, each war is characterized by a unique
combination of variables such as geographic setting, pre-conflict warning and
preparation time, U.S. and enemy war aims, the size and composition of
enemy military forces, the quality of enemy military training and leadership,
the amount and kind of military assistance that the United States or the enemy
receives during the war from other governments or groups, the enemy
government’s degree of popular support among its own population, and the
presence or absence of factional divisions within the enemy country’s
population due to ethnic differences or other factors. Given how at least some
of these factors usually change for the United States from one war to the next,
it has long been a staple of U.S. lessons-learned reports to note that lessons
from one conflict may not necessarily apply to the next, might need to be
applied with caution, or might contradict lessons of previous conflicts. Some
of the lessons of the Iraq war, for example, may differ from lessons of the
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 or the U.S. military operation in
Kosovo in 1999. In short, the lessons of the Iraq war should not be
“overlearned” because the Iraq war in some ways might not serve as an
accurate template for future conflicts.
! Non-U.S. observers derive lessons as well, possibly devaluing U.S.-

perceived lessons. The United States is not the only country that derives
lessons from U.S. military operations; observers in other countries do so as
well. Non-U.S. observers keenly observe the U.S. way of war and draw
conclusions about its strengths and weaknesses. These conclusions, if correct,
can be applied by potential U.S. adversaries to improve their ability to contest
U.S. forces in a future conflict. Serbia, for example, observed the 1991
Persian Gulf war and drew lessons from it on how to counter the effects of
U.S. air power. These lessons were applied with some success by Serbian
forces in Kosovo in 1999. In short, lessons that U.S. observers reach about a
given U.S. military operation can be devalued by lessons that potential
adversaries draw from that same operation. This is another reason to avoid
“overlearning” the lessons of a given U.S. military operation.
Numerous persons or organizations may offer what they contend are the lessons
of the Iraq war. In evaluating purported lessons offered by various sources, one
factor to consider is whether those sources have a potential financial, institutional,
or ideological stake in the issue. Persons or organizations identifying the lessons of
a war can be influenced, perhaps strongly, by such a stake. Indeed, some persons or
organizations may deliberately identify and publicize purported lessons with the aim
of influencing policy decisions on defense programs in a way that promotes their own

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interests. Although lessons offered by persons or organizations with a stake in the
issue in many cases may be reasonable or correct, policymakers may wish to take
such interests into account in evaluating lessons put forward by such sources.

Organization of Report
The remainder of this report consists of a series of discussions on various
defense program issues that might have been affected in one way or another by the
Iraq war. The discussions are designed to be fairly self-contained, so that readers
may browse topics using the Table of Contents and read those of interest. A footnote
at the start of each discussion identifies the CRS analyst who prepared that section.

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Issues for Congress
Defense Transformation3
Iraq War Viewed As A Test. In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, many
observers anticipated that the conflict would serve as a test of the administration’s
vision for defense transformation – its concept for overhauling the U.S. military to
exploit new technologies and counter 21st-Century security threats.4 Following the
war, many of these observers concluded that the war validated this vision, or at least
major parts of it, and also strengthened Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
authority to implement this vision over the objections of persons or organizations
opposed to parts of it. Some observers speculated that the war may encourage the
administration to increase the scope of its planned defense transformation or
implement it more quickly.5
3

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

4

Defense transformation generally refers to large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly
disruptive changes in military weapons, organization, and concepts of operations (i.e.,
approaches to warfighting), that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the
emergence of new and different international security challenges. For more on defense
transformation, see CRS Reports RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization:
Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); RS20859,
Air Force
Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); RS20851,
Naval Transformation: Background and Information for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,
RL31922, Military Transformation: Issues for Congress and Status of Effort, by Lloyd D.
DeSerisey, and RL31425, Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance, by Judy G. Chizek.

For examples of pre-war articles anticipating that the war would test the administration’s
vision for defense transformation, see Cooper, Richard T., and John Hendren. Strategy
Boiled Down To Light Vs. Heavy. Los Angeles Times, March 19, 2003; Gordon, Michael
R. A Sequel, Not A Rerun. New York Times on the Web, March 18, 2003 (Dispatches: A
Web-Exclusive Column); Towell, Pat. The War Agenda: Military Operations.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2001: 601; Ricks, Thomas E. War Plan For
Iraq Largely In Place. Washington Post, March 2, 2003: 1; Barry, John, and Evan Thomas.
Boots, Bytes And Bombs. Newsweek, February 17, 2003; Sinnreich, Richard Hart. War
Could Test Transformation The Hard Way. Lawton (Oklahoma) Constitution, February 16,
2003; Jaffe, Greg. Getting U.S. Forces Together Poses Challenge For War Plan. Wall
Street Journal, February 11, 2003: 1; Thompson, Mark, and Michael Duffy. Pentagon
Warlord. Time, January 27, 2003; Jaffe, Greg. War Plan Aims To Balance Roles Of
Ground Forces, New Weapons. Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2002: 1.
5

See, for example, Jonson, Nick. Cebrowski: Emerging Global Threats Require New
Methods Of Operation. Aerospace Daily, May 14 2003; Scarborough, Rowan. ‘Decisive
Force’ Now Measured By Speed. Washington Times, May 7, 2003: 1; Hanson, Victor
Davis. Don Rumsfeld, Radical For Our Time. National Review, May 5, 2003; Moniz, Dave,
and John Diamond. Rumsfeld Is Perched At ‘Pinnacle Of Power.’ USA Today, May 1,
2003: 10; Stern, Seth. Pentagon Iconoclasts. Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 2003:1;
Burlas, Joe. ‘Iraqi Freedom’ Proves Transformation Concepts. Army News Service, April
28, 2003; Schlesinger, Robert. War May Provide Ammunition For Rumsfeld To Pursue
Vision. Boston Globe, April 25, 2003: 18; Whittle, Richard. Military Mulls Lessons Of
(continued...)

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Potential Significance for Congress. These conclusions and speculations,
if correct – and not all observers agree with them6 – are potentially of great
significance to Congress, for at least two reasons:
! Implementing the Administration’s vision for defense transformation could

substantially affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, shifting defense
funding toward defense programs that are judged to be transformational and
away from defense programs that are judged to be non-transformational or
“legacy.” Such shifts could significantly affect revenues and employment
levels at companies associated with the affected programs.
! The Administration may be encouraged to invoke the theme of transformation

to help justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative
proposals affecting DoD that may or may not be transformational, depending
on one’s definition of transformation, including proposals which could, if
implemented, affect Congress’ role in conducting oversight of U.S. defense
activities. A potential case in point is the “Defense Transformation for the 21st
Century Act,” a 205-page legislative proposal that the administration
submitted to Congress on April 10, 2003 that would, among other things,
permit DoD to establish its own policies for hiring, firing, and compensating
its civil service employees; change the terms in office for certain senior
generals and admirals; give DoD increased authority to transfer funds between

5

(...continued)
War. Dallas Morning News, April 22, 2003; Ricks, Thomas E. Rumsfeld Stands Tall After
Iraq Victory. Washington Post, April 20, 2003: 1; Purdy, Matthew. After The War, New
Stature For Rumsfeld. New York Times, April 20, 2003; Knickerbocker, Brad. Iraq War As
A Blueprint For Next One. Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2003: 1; Bowman, Tom.
U.S. Demonstrates ‘New Style Of War’ In Iraq. Baltimore Sun, April 13, 2003; Cooper,
Richard T., and Peter Pae. Battle For Military’s Future Unresolved. Los Angeles Times,
April 12, 2003; Squeo, Anne Marie, and Greg Jaffe. War’s Early Lessons May Curb
Enthusiasm For Older Weapons. Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2003; Jaffe, Greg.
Rumsfeld’s Vindication Promises A Change In Tactics, Deployment. Wall Street Journal,
April 10, 2003; Knickerbocker, Brad. War Boosts Rumsfeld’s Vision Of An Agile Military.
Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2003; Cushman, John H. Jr., and Thom Shanker. War
In Iraq Provides Model Of New Way Of Doing Battle. New York Times, April 10, 2003;
Bender, Bryan. Maturing Approach Called Guide. Boston Globe, April 9, 2003; Jenkins,
Holman W., Jr. Two Wars Of CEO Rumsfeld. Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2003; Bender,
Bryan, and Robert Schlesinger. Arms And The Man: The Rumsfeld Vision. Boston Globe,
April 6, 2003. See also Trimble, Stephen. Cebrowski: Iraq War Offers Clues For
Transformation Agenda. Aerospace Daily, April 23, 2003.
6

For examples of articles that take issue in varying degrees with the conclusion that the Iraq
war validated the administration’s transformation vision, see Stern, Seth. Military
‘Transformation’ May Not Mean Smaller Forces. Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 2003;
Helprin, Mark. Analyze This: Civilian Officials Reached A Point Of Sufficiency Only
Because They Were Pushed To It. National Review, May 5, 2003; O’Hanlon, Michael. A
Reality Check For The Rumsfeld Doctrine. London Financial Times, April 29, 2003: 13;
Arkin, William M. It Ain’t Broke After All. Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2003.

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DoD budget accounts; and eliminate many DoD reporting requirements that
were instituted to assist Congress in conducting oversight of DoD activities.7
The Administration’s Transformation Vision. The administration
identified defense transformation as a major goal for DoD soon after taking office
and has since worked to define its transformation vision. In general, that vision calls
for shifting U.S. military planning away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer
firepower, military services operating in isolation from one another, and attritionstyle warfare,8 and toward a greater reliance on speed and agility, stealth, precision
application of firepower by widely distributed forces, information technology, joint
(i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, and effects-based warfare.9 Some
transformation advocates characterize these changes as shifting from an Industrial
Age approach to war to an Information Age approach. Transforming the military
along these lines, the administration and its supporters argue, will permit the United
States to apply military power more rapidly and flexibly in distant parts of the world,
outpace enemy decisionmaking on the battlefield, more effectively counter so-called
asymmetric military threats,10 and generally achieve U.S. military combat goals with
fewer forces, more quickly, and at lower cost. The Administration’s transformation
vision also includes proposals for changing DoD’s business practices, particularly
with an eye toward streamlining those practices so as to accelerate the fielding of new
weapons and generate savings that can be used to invest in them.

7

See, for example, Donnelly, John M. Hill Rebuffing Rumsfeld Plan To Kill Reports To
Congress. Defense Week Daily Update, May 15, 2003; Liang, John. House Democrats
Object To DOD Transformation Legislation. InsideDefense.com, May 14, 2003; Matthews,
William, and Gopal Ratnam. Transformation Act Draws U.S. Lawmakers’ Fire.
DefenseNews, May 5, 2003: 1; and Korb, Lawrence. Pentagon Independence.
DefenseNews, June 2, 2003: 29.
8

Attrition-style warfare refers to a traditional warfighting strategy that focuses on seeking
out the enemy’s military forces, wherever they might be, and then using firepower to destroy
them piece by piece, through a process of gradual attrition, until the enemy is no longer
capable of fighting effectively.

9

Effects-based warfare, also called effects-based operations, refers to a warfighting strategy
that has been proposed as an alternative to traditional attrition-style warfare. Rather than
focusing on seeking out and destroying enemy forces wherever they might be, effects-based
operations focuses on attacking selected key elements of the enemy’s ability to fight in a
coordinated manner. Under an effects-based strategy, U.S. forces might attack the enemy’s
military leadership, its military command-and-control systems, and the most politically and
militarily significant elements of the enemy’s fielded military forces while bypassing less
significant enemy military forces. The goal of effects-based warfare is to create specific
effects on the enemy that lead to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s willingness and ability to
fight, without having to go through a time-consuming and potentially costly effort to destroy
the bulk of the enemy’s military forces through a gradual process of attrition.

10

Asymmetric threats refer to military capabilities that adversaries may field as part of a
strategy to avoid directly attacking perceived U.S. strengths and instead attack perceived
U.S. weaknesses. Potential asymmetric strategies include terrorism, use of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons, and development of so-called anti-access/area-denial
forces that are intended to prevent U.S. forces from establishing an initial foothold in a
contested overseas area of military operations.

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Transformational vs. Legacy Programs. Within the discussion on
defense transformation, there has been significant debate over which programs
qualify as transformational and which do not. Advocates of various defense
programs have argued that their programs should be viewed as transformational, or
at least not as legacy – a label that in some eyes has become synonymous with
obsolescence and suitability for reduction or termination.
Defense program areas that have frequently been identified as closely associated
with the administration’s transformation vision include the following:
! precision-guided air-delivered weapons,
! lighter and more mobile Army ground forces,
! special operations forces,
! unmanned vehicles,
! smaller and faster Navy surface ships,
! space systems and missile defense,
! forces for countering terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and
! C4ISR systems that link U.S. and coalition military units into highly

integrated networks possessing superior battlespace awareness.11
Defense program areas that have been identified by various observers, correctly
or not, as non-transformational or legacy include the following:
! unguided weapons,
! heavy armored forces for the Army,
! manned tactical aircraft,
! large, slower-moving Navy surface ships, and
! weapons and associated C4ISR systems that operate in an isolated, stand-

alone manner rather than as part of a network.
The Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, the Administration had identified
transformational programs as a high defense investment priority. In submitting its
proposed FY2004 defense budget to Congress in February 2003, the Administration
stated that the request was the first to fully reflect its transformation vision and
included more than $24 billion in acquisition funding for transformational programs.
Some transformation advocates outside the administration argue that the
administration, though rhetorically supportive of transformation, has continued to
place too much emphasis on legacy programs and not enough on transformational
programs. They argue, for example, that the administration’s defense budget plans
devote too much funding to manned tactical aircraft programs and not enough
funding to programs for upgrading or replacing the Air Force’s long-range bombers
11

C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance. C4ISR systems include things such as ground-based,
airborne, and spaced based sensors for locating, identifying and tracking friendly and enemy
forces, and computers, datalinks, and networking software for rapidly processing and
sharing information among networked friendly forces. Battlespace awareness refers to
having a real-time understanding of the location, identity, and movement of friendly and
enemy forces within a military area of operations.

CRS-8
(which can deliver large numbers of precision-guided weapons) or for acquiring
unmanned vehicles.
In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, some observers speculated that the
conflict would test important elements of the Administration’s transformation vision,
including its increased reliance on precision-guided air-delivered weapons, special
operations forces, unmanned vehicles, and joint operations; the use of advanced
C4ISR systems for networked operations and improved battlespace awareness;
reduced reliance on massed ground forces; and a war plan reflecting an effects-based
approach more than traditional attrition-style warfare. Pre-war speculation that the
conflict would test the Administration’s transformation theories was strengthened by
reports that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had played a strong role in shaping the
war plan to make it more in keeping with the Administration’s transformation vision,
particularly in terms of reducing the planned number of conventional ground forces
to be used in the invasion.
Debate Following the Iraq War. Those who support the idea that the Iraq
war validated the Administration’s transformation vision, or at least important
elements of it, could argue one or more of the following:
! The U.S.-led war effort, which produced a quick victory with low casualties,

featured a significant and successful use of precision-guided air-delivered
weapons, special operations forces, unmanned vehicles, joint operations, and
advanced C4ISR systems. It also employed a strategy that avoided attritionstyle warfare where possible and focused more on effects-based operations
directed against the key leadership and command-and-control targets and the
most politically and militarily significant elements of the enemy’s fielded
military forces.
! The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force was
not only fairly small compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but even smaller
than the administration had planned, due to Turkey’s decision not to permit
the Army’s 4th Infantry Division to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq from
the north and the administration’s decision to begin the war before this
division was redeployed to Kuwait.
! The speed and precision of the U.S.-led war effort significantly reduced Iraq’s
ability to mount a coordinated response, leading to scattered and largely
ineffective Iraqi defensive efforts and to many instances of Iraqi military units
in the field that were hopelessly uninformed about the location and
movements of U.S. forces.
! Lighter and more air-mobile Army forces, which the Army is currently
developing as part of the Administration’s transformation plan, would have
been useful, following Turkey’s decision, for quickly establishing a more
significant U.S. ground presence in northern Iraq.
Those taking a more skeptical view on whether the war validated the
Administration’s transformation vision could argue one or more of the following:
! The U.S. military force employed in the war was largely a product of

investment decisions made prior to the Bush administration. Although the
force incorporated some elements of the administration’s transformation plan,

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it represented only a partial or embryonic version of the administration’s
vision for a transformed force. A more fully transformed force would have
featured, for example, more (and more capable) unmanned vehicles, a more
completely networked C4ISR environment, and the use of lighter, more
mobile Army forces that are now in development. The war thus did not
provide a pure test of a force fully transformed along the lines of the
administration’s vision.
! Iraq’s military was significantly inept in mounting a defense of the country.12
In light of Iraqi military ineptness, it is not clear that the war amounted to a
serious test of the Administration’s transformation plan. A more traditional
U.S.-led war effort, or an effort reflecting a transformation plan significantly
different from the Administration’s, might also have succeeded.
! The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force was
greater, according to some press reports, than some transformation advocates
had proposed during the early stages of planning for the Iraq war. And the
larger force that was used came close to being insufficient: If Iraqi forces had
mounted a more effective effort to cut the extended and thinly defended
supply lines linking U.S. ground forces to supply areas further south, the
invasion might have experienced a significant setback. In this sense, the
relatively small ground invasion force may have introduced greater risk into
the war plan than anticipated.
! Although heavy armored ground forces are not closely associated with the
Administration’s transformation plan and have been characterized as legacy
forces, the war underscored the value of heavy armored ground forces. Heavy
armored units were successful both in breaking through Iraqi defenses in the
south and in urban combat operations in Baghdad and other cities. They were
largely invulnerable to Iraqi rocket-propelled grenades and other light arms
and, in drawing fire from such weapons, proved valuable in uncovering the
locations of hidden Iraqi fighters, who could then be killed. More lightly
armored ground forces like those being developed by the Army as part of the
12

Among other things, Iraq’s air force did not take to the air; important bridges in most cases
were not destroyed; armored units were left out in the open, where they would be vulnerable
to U.S. air attack (repeating a mistake made from the 1991 Persian Gulf war); ineffective
human-wave tactics were used to attack U.S. armored vehicles; and few apparent
preparations were made to mount an organized defense of Baghdad. In addition, Iraq did
not make use of options that might have complicated U.S. and coalition operations, such as
attacking the buildup of U.S. and British forces in Kuwait, igniting large numbers of oil
wells, blowing dams to flood likely invasion routes, and employing any available chemical
weapons.
An alternative but similar argument is that Iraq’s response to the invasion reflected not Iraqi
military ineptness, but rather a decision by Iraq’s leaders to forego making a serious attempt
to resist the invasion in favor of a strategy of allowing the invasion effort to succeed, going
into hiding, and then reemerging after the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces to win
back control of the country through the efforts of a reorganized Baath party. This scenario
is consistent with the sudden and apparently planned disappearance of much of Iraq’s top
leadership as U.S. forces entered Baghdad. For articles discussing this possibility, see Sale,
Richard. CIA Reported To Believe Saddam Is Alive. UPI.com, June 2, 2003; Saddam
Plotting Return To Power, Ex-Generals Say. New York Times on the Web, May 19, 2003.
(Reuters wire service story)

CRS-10
Administration’s transformation plan would have been more vulnerable to fire
from the kinds of weapons used by Iraqi defenders.
! Even if Iraqi military operations had been better planned and executed, the
war could not provide a major test of certain elements of the Administration’s
transformation plan. For example, although Iraq laid mines in the Persian
Gulf and may have attempted to fire antiship cruise missiles at coalition naval
forces, Iraq’s military capabilities and geographic options for countering
enemy naval forces were very limited. The war therefore could not pose a
significant test of the Administration’s programs for transforming U.S. naval
forces so as to make them effective against significant enemy maritime antiaccess/area-denial forces.
A potential intermediate view would combine arguments from both sides of the
debate. This view, while noting the success of the war effort and its significant use
of force elements associated with the Administration’s plan, would also acknowledge
that the U.S. force used in the war represented only a partial fulfillment of the
administration’s transformation plan, that Iraqi military ineptness was a significant
factor, that the war may offer mixed evidence concerning the Administration’s plan
for transforming Army forces, and that the war did not significantly test other
elements of the Administration’s transformation plans.
It should also be noted that observers who take a skeptical view on whether the
war validated the Administration’s transformation vision are not necessarily opposed
to that vision. They may support the vision but conclude that the war did not happen
to offer a clear validation of it.
An additional potential implication concerns asymmetric military threats. By
demonstrating to the world the formidable capabilities of conventional U.S. military
forces, the Iraq war may encourage other countries to place increased emphasis on
developing asymmetric means of countering the United States, including terrorism,
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, cyberwarfare against U.S. military and
civilian computer systems, and anti-access/area-denial weapons (such as theaterrange ballistic missiles) that are intended to prevent U.S. forces from gaining a
foothold in an overseas operating area. In this sense, the success of the U.S.-led war
effort, it might be argued, may strengthen the need for U.S. defense transformation
to focus on developing capabilities for countering such asymmetric threats.13
Some of the program areas mentioned above, including Army ground forces,
special operations forces, and unmanned vehicles, are discussed in more detail in
subsequent sections of this report.

Size of Military Needed For National Military Strategy14
Concern Regarding Size of U.S. Forces. Prior to the Iraq war, some
observers had expressed concern that active-duty U.S. military forces are
13

See, for example, Tiboni, Frank. War Game Stuns U.S. Strategists. DefenseNews, May
12, 2003: 1.
14

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-11
insufficiently sized to execute the administration’s national military strategy, at least
not without placing an undue strain on military personnel and equipment or taking
undue risks in time of war. The Administration and its supporters argued in response
that U.S. forces were of sufficient size to carry out the strategy.
Administration’s Military Strategy. The administration’s military strategy
is sometimes called the 1-4-2-1 strategy because it calls for maintaining U.S. military
forces sufficient for:
! [1] “protect[ing] the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical

defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S.
borders,”
! [4] “maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in
[the four regions of] Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the
Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and
deter aggression against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends,”
! [2] “swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two
theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes,” and
! [1] “decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S.
forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing America’s will
and removing any future threat it could pose. This capability will include the
ability to occupy territory or set the conditions for a regime change if so
directed.”15
Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, those who were concerned about
whether U.S. forces were sufficiently sized to carry out this strategy pointed to the
high operational tempo that certain parts of the military have maintained in recent
years, the large number of reserve forces that have been activated since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 (and the extended length of certain reserve-unit tours
of duty since that time), the interest among certain Army officers for increasing the
Army’s active-duty end strength so as to better support ongoing commitments in
various locations, gaps in forward deployments of Navy ships to certain overseas
regions, and the relationship of the total number of active air wings, divisions, and
ships to the potential requirements of fighting two regional wars in overlapping time
frames.
Some observers expressed concern that going to war in Iraq would stretch
certain active-duty U.S. forces too thinly. They argued that a war with Iraq could
reduce forces available for pursuing the global war on terrorism or leave the United
States with insufficient forces to deter or respond to potential aggression by North
Korea. Forces that were cited as at risk of being in short supply in the event of a war
with Iraq included special operations forces, certain kinds of aircraft (cargo planes,
tankers, jamming aircraft, surveillance aircraft, and battle-management aircraft), and

15

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2001.
(September 30, 2001) p. 17-21. The quoted passages are taken from pages 18, 20, and 21.
The strategy also calls for the United States “to maintain and prepare its forces for smallerscale contingencies in peacetime, preferably in concert with allies and friends.” (page 21)

CRS-12
specialized infantry vehicles, combat-support troops, and support gear for the Army.16
These concerns continued as the Iraq war began.17
Force Commitments During the War. Fighting the Iraq war while also
performing other duties – including war-on-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, regional-deterrence operations, and homeland-defense operations –
resulted in the following commitments of active-duty U.S. forces:
! Army: A large fraction of the Army’s 10 active-duty divisions and additional

independent combat units were deployed or stationed outside the United
States. Three divisions (the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division,
and the 4th Infantry Division), parts of two other divisions (the 82nd Airborne
Division and the 10th Mountain Division) and one or two independent combat
units (the 173rd Airborne Brigade and possibly the 2nd Cavalry Regiment) were
deployed to Iraq, part of a division (the 82nd Airborne Division) was deployed
to Afghanistan, two divisions (the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry
Division) were stationed in Germany, and most of another division (the 2nd
Infantry Division) was stationed in Korea.
! Air Force: A high percentage of the Air Force’s cargo aircraft, tankers, and
certain other specialized aircraft, and a high percentage of the military’s radarjamming aircraft (which are operated by the Navy and Marine Corps), were
deployed to Iraq.
! Marine Corps: About 67% of the Marine Corps’ operating forces were
forward-deployed in Iraq and elsewhere, and almost 80% were either forwarddeployed, forward-based, or forward stationed. Two of the Marine Corps’
three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadrons were committed to the
Iraq war. On April 2, 2003, General Michael Hagee, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps reportedly stated: “So, what we have done is we have provided,
in my opinion, sufficient combat power to do what needs to be done in Iraq....
We have sufficient forces positioned to swiftly defeat the effort if North Korea
decides to do something. And what are we doing in the other areas – we are
taking risks.”18
! Navy: The Navy put to sea 67%-68% of its ships (54% or 55% in deployed
status and another 13% in non-deployed operations),19 including 7 or 8 of its

16

See, for example, Tyson, Ann Scott. If More Duty Calls, Can US Military Deliver?
Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 2002; Richter, Paul. Two-War Strategy Faces
Test. Los Angeles Times, February 13, 2003.
17

See, for example, Infield, Tom. War Leaves Little In Reserve For Military. Philadelphia
Inquirer, April 3, 2002.
18

As quoted in Brown, Malina. Hagee: Marine Corps ‘Taking Risks’ In Areas Other Than
Iraq, N. Korea. Inside the Navy, April 7, 2003.
19

On March 24, 2003, 167 of the Navy’s 305 ships were at sea. The figures for April 1,
2003 were 164 of 303 ships. Non-deployed status can include training operations and other
short-term operations. Normally, about 40%-45% of the Navy is at sea, including 25%-30%
in deployed status and the remainder in non-deployed operations.

CRS-13
12 aircraft carriers,20 7 of its 11 carrier air wings,21 25 to 29 of its 38
amphibious ships22 and, within the amphibious-ship total, 9 or 10 of the
Navy’s 12 “large-deck” amphibious assault ships.23 Admiral William Fallon,
the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, testified on March 18, 2003, on the eve
of the war, that “today’s surge [in deployments] has put a significant strain on
every Navy resource.”24
! Special Operations Forces (SOF): A very high portion of the country’s
10,000 or so combat SOF personnel25 were committed to either Iraq,
Afghanistan, or other overseas locations.
In addition to these active-duty forces, 62% of the Military Sealift Command’s
prepositioning and surge sealift ships were involved in supporting the Iraq war.26
Post-War Debate. Supporters of the view that active-duty U.S. military
forces are sufficiently sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue the following:
! Even while U.S. forces were preparing for and fighting the Iraq war, the

military was able to augment its forces in Korea and the Western Pacific for
purposes of deterring possible North Korean aggression.
! Had a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula occurred while the Iraq war was
in progress, substantial additional combat forces were available for use there,
including Air Force bombers and tactical aircraft, Navy carriers and other
ships, Marine forces, and Army forces. Available Marine forces included
units based in Okinawa and Hawaii and the Marine Corps’ third MPS
squadron, which is based in the Western Pacific. Available Army units
included the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 1st Cavalry Division in
Texas, the remaining part of the 2nd Infantry Division in Washington, and the
remaining parts of the 10th Mountain Division in New York, plus one or more
independent combat units based in other U.S. locations.
! The quick and relatively low-cost victory gained by the relatively small U.S.led force in the Iraq war, together with further technological improvements
planned for U.S. military forces planned in the future, suggests that future
regional conflicts on average might require fewer U.S. forces than currently

20

Five of these carriers were used to fight the Iraq war. A sixth was on its way to the Persian
Gulf to replace one of the carriers operating in the Gulf, a seventh was deployed to the
Western Pacific, in part to deter potential aggression by North Korea, and an eighth was for
a time at sea apparently for training purposes.
21

The Navy has 10 active-duty carrier air wings and 1 reserve carrier air wing.

22

Twenty-eight on March 24, 2003; 29 on April 1, 2003; 25 on April 7, 2003.

23

Ten ships on March 24 and April 1, 2003, 9 on April 7, 2003.

24

As quoted in Infield, Tom. War Leaves Little In Reserve For Military. Philadelphia
Inquirer, April 3, 2002.

25

U.S. SOF forces total about 47,000 personnel. About 10,000 of these personnel are
combat forces; the rest are civil-affairs and support forces.
26

Information provided to CRS by Military Sealift Command via e-mail and telephone , May
23, 2003.

CRS-14
planned. If so, the current size of U.S. forces might be more than sufficient
for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames.
! Post-war demands for peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq, while
substantial, are not permanent and can be met in part by forces from allied and
friendly countries. Some countries have already offered to provide such
forces.27
Those skeptical of the view that active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently
sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue the following:
! Fighting the Iraq war while performing other duties left the country with a

reduced capability for responding to an additional major emergency on the
Korean Peninsula or elsewhere, particularly with regard to specialized Air
Force aircraft, Navy carriers and air wings, Navy amphibious ships and
Marine Forces, and special operations forces.
! While sufficient ground forces may have been available for fighting an
additional conflict in Korea, transporting those forces to Korea in a timely
manner might have been very difficult, given the large commitment of U.S.
airlift and sealift assets to the Iraq war.
! Iraqi military ineptness contributed to the quick and relatively low-cost victory
of the U.S.-led war effort. Future adversaries may not be as inept, and may
learn and apply their own lessons from the Iraq war, suggesting that future
regional conflicts on average might require U.S. forces at least as large as
those used in the Iraq war. If so, the size of U.S. forces needed in the future
to fight two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames might be larger than
suggested by the Iraq war.
! In February 2002, the Air Force was forced to begin making exceptions to the
rotational cycle for its 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) so as to
meet overseas demands for Air Force personnel in certain career fields. As a
result, some Air Force personnel have had to deploy longer or more frequently
than the AEF standard.
! The Iraq war has created a post-war demand for maintaining tens of thousands
of Army soldiers in Iraq for peacekeeping and constabulary purposes,28 adding
to existing demands for Army peacekeeping and constabulary forces in
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other locations. Maintaining significant
numbers of peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq and elsewhere might
require the Army to use large numbers of activated reserve forces for extended
periods of time – a signal that the active-duty force is not sufficiently sized.
The Iraq war, coming at a time of elevated tensions on the Korean Peninsula,
may highlight the difference between conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames
vs. those that occur simultaneously. U.S. strategy is to have forces sufficient for
winning two major regional conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames, but not

27

Bowman, Tom. Few Allies Offer Help On Policing In Iraq. Baltimore Sun, May 31, 2003;
Squitieri, Tom. Relief For U.S. Troops Lacking. USA Today, May 30, 2003: 1.
28

Moniz, Dave. Ex-Army Boss: Pentagon Won’t Admit Reality In Iraq. USA Today, June
3, 2003: 1; Gordon, Michael R. How Much Is Enough? New York Times on the Web. May
30, 2003.

CRS-15
necessarily for winning two such conflicts that occur simultaneously. The
distinction, though important, is often overlooked in popular descriptions of U.S.
strategy.
The requirement for winning two conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames
refers in part to an assumption that the second conflict will start some number of
weeks after the first, and that certain U.S. forces that are needed primarily or most
urgently in the early stages of a regional conflict – such as certain airlift and sealift
forces, some kinds of aircraft, cruise-missile-armed Navy ships, and perhaps Marine
amphibious forces – can therefore be rotated from the first conflict to the second.
Such forces are sized closer to the requirements for fighting one conflict rather than
two. If this assumption proves incorrect – if the second conflict begins before such
forces can be rotated from the first conflict to the second – the U.S. ability to
prosecute the second conflict successfully or at acceptable cost could be reduced.
The combination of the Iraq war and the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula
provides policymakers with a potential case study for reviewing the planning
assumption of overlapping time frames and the potential risks of planning U.S. forces
on that basis.

Overseas Base Access29
Uncertain Access as a Planning Issue. The Iraq war, like the war in
Afghanistan in 2001-2002, appears to have underscored how, in the post-Cold War
era, U.S. access to foreign bases and territory in time of war can be uncertain and,
when provided, can come with restrictions from host nations on how the bases and
territory can be used. This is potentially significant, because some military analysts
have argued that U.S. defense programs must take uncertain access to foreign bases
into account in planning U.S. military forces.
War in Afghanistan. In the war in Afghanistan, few air bases in countries
close to Afghanistan were made available to support U.S. military operations, and
bases in Pakistan that were made available had to be used in a low-profile manner,
with a limited U.S. presence and a preference for conducting operations at night
rather than during the day. As a result of these limitations, sea-based forces operating
in the Northern Arabian Sea – carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, Marine
forces on Navy amphibious ships, and special operations forces deploying from a
Navy carrier – played a significant role in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan,
particularly in the earlier stages of the conflict.
Iraq War. In the case of the Iraq war, protracted negotiations with Turkey
ended with a decision by the Turkish government to deny U.S. ground forces and
aircraft the use of bases and territory in Turkey. Turkey’s decision forced significant
alterations to the U.S. war plan: The plan to have the Army’s 4th Infantry Division
invade northern Iraq from Turkey, and thereby confront Iraqi leaders with significant
ground invasions from both the north and south, had to be abandoned. The 4th
Infantry Division was instead redeployed to Kuwait, and the United States conducted
the war with a much smaller U.S. ground presence in northern Iraq that consisted
29

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-16
primarily of a few hundred U.S. special operations forces personnel and 2,000
personnel from the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade who parachuted into the area.
Fighting the war this way reportedly complicated the U.S. politically sensitive goal
of preventing Turkish forces from entering northern Iraq and may have broadened
escape options for Iraqi leaders fleeing from U.S. forces that were advancing into
Baghdad from the south.
Turkey’s decision not to allow its air bases to be used by U.S. combat and
support aircraft similarly complicated U.S. air operations during the war. Air Force
combat aircraft could not fly into northern Iraq directly from Turkish bases, forcing
them to fly into that area from more distant bases, and sorties of Navy aircraft flying
into Iraq from two carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean were reportedly reduced
because Air Force tankers needed to refuel the Navy planes had to fly from more
distant bases in Eastern Europe and consequently could provide them with less onstation in-flight refueling capacity.
U.S. war plans were also complicated by, among other things, Saudi Arabia’s
reported unwillingness to allow its air bases and its territory near Iraq to be used by
most types of U.S. strike aircraft30 and invading U.S. ground forces, its decision to
not permit its ports on the Persian Gulf to be used by U.S. military sealift ships
(which reportedly contributed to a bottleneck at Kuwaiti port facilities for unloading
equipment and supplies from those ships),31 and Jordan’s reported unwillingness to
allow its bases and territory to be used, at least overtly, by U.S. aircraft and regular
ground forces.
In the weeks leading up to the war, there was uncertainty about whether Saudi
Arabia would permit the United States to use the large U.S.-built air operations
command center at Prince Sultan Air Base south of Riyadh. Although the Saudi
government decided to permit the facility to be used, U.S. military planners, as a
hedge against the possibility that the Saudi government would decide otherwise,
quickly built, at substantial cost, a substitute facility at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha
in Qatar.
During the war, the failure of several Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles using
certain flight paths over Turkey and Saudi Arabia prompted a decision by both
countries to close down those flight paths for use by Tomahawk missiles for the
remainder of the conflict, possibly complicating U.S. planning for subsequent
Tomahawk cruise missile attacks.
Potential Program Implications. Analysts who stress uncertainties about
access to foreign bases argue that U.S. defense programs should be restructured to

30

Saudi Arabia reportedly did allow its air bases to be used by F-16CGs armed with weapons
for attacking Iraqi radar systems. Gertz, Bill, and Roman Scarborough. Inside the Ring.
Washington Times, April 25, 2003: 5. (Item entitled “Saudi versatility II”)
31

Josar, David. Transportation Groups Tackle Oversized Load. European Stars and Stripes,
April 8, 2003; Wilkinson, Jeff. U.S. Supply Loads Are Taxing Kuwait’s Ports, Airports.
Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 2003.

CRS-17
place greater emphasis on forces that are less dependent on such bases. Examples of
such forces that are usually cited include the following:
! manned and unmanned aircraft with long operating ranges, fuel-efficient

engines, and large payloads (i.e., aircraft that can operate from distant bases,
including bases in the United States, loiter over distant battlefields for long
periods of time, and attack many targets before having to return home, while
requiring a minimum amount of in-flight refueling),
! aircraft that can operate from short or austere airfields (which might be the
only kind of air bases available in certain locations),
! sea-based forces, such as Navy and Marine Corps forces, that can conduct intheater operations from nearby international waters; and
! long-range weapons such as cruise missiles and, potentially, directed-energy
weapons such as lasers, that can destroy targets hundreds of miles away.
Advocates of both long-range aircraft and naval forces have long cited their relative
independence from in-theater land bases as an important characteristic in their
favor.32
Some observers believe the experience with base access during the Iraq war may
lead to increased interest in a new operational concept (i.e., a new approach to
warfighting) referred to as sea basing, or more formally as enhanced networked sea
basing.33 Although Navy and Marine Corps forces have long been referred to as seabased forces, Navy and Marine Corps officials are now using the term sea basing
more specifically, to refer to a proposed new approach for launching, directing and
supporting expeditionary military operations directly from ships at sea.34 Navy and
Marine Corps officials began to discuss the sea basing concept at about the time of
the war in Afghanistan. Although the sea basing concept has been proposed
primarily by Navy and Marine Corps officials, it can be expanded into a joint concept
under which Army or Air Force units might also be staged from bases at sea. DoD
officials have expressed some interest in the concept.35 Restructuring U.S. forces in

32

Some advocates of defense transformation argue that in-theater land bases, even if made
available to U.S. forces, might become vulnerable in the future to attack by enemy theaterrange ballistic missiles. For this somewhat different reason, they argue that DoD plans
should place less emphasis on forces requiring access to in-theater land bases, and more
emphasis on forces that are less dependent on access to such bases.
33

See, for example, Hodge, Nathan. Iraq War Seen As Test of Sea Basing. Defense Week,
April 21, 2003: 6; Brown, Malina. Navy, Marine Officials Argue Iraq War Validates Need
For Sea Basing. Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003: 1.
34

Under the sea basing concept, U.S. forces based at sea, rather than beginning an
expeditionary operation by first establishing or gaining control of an intermediate land base
somewhere in the theater of operations, would instead launch, direct and support the
operation directly from the ships at sea. Functions normally performed from the
intermediate land base – including command and control, indirect fire support, and logistics
support – would instead be performed from the ships at sea, while the expeditionary force
proceeds directly from the ships to the inland objective.
35

MacRae, Catherine. Aldridge Wants Top Defense Scientists To Study Future Of
(continued...)

CRS-18
accordance with the sea basing concept could lead to numerous changes in DoD ship,
aircraft, and weapon acquisition programs.
Other observers argue that the issue of overseas base access, while a concern,
has been exaggerated. They could argue that although the United States encountered
challenges with base access in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States in both cases
was able to secure sufficient base access to support its operations, in part by
capturing air bases inside both countries. They can also note that, following the 1991
Persian Gulf war, many observers argued that Iraq had erred by allowing the U.S.-led
coalition to build up forces in the Persian Gulf for 6 months without challenge, and
that U.S. adversaries in the future would not repeat this mistake. In the Iraq war, they
could argue, this expectation proved inaccurate, as Iraq once again allowed U.S. and
British forces several months to build up forces in the Persian Gulf. Observers who
believe the base-access issue has been exaggerated can also note that, other things
held equal, long-range systems can be more expensive than short-range systems.
They could argue that given the cost of long-range systems and the likelihood that the
United States will be able to gain at least some access to in-region bases, DoD should
maintain its current mix of long- and short-range capabilities.

Army Forces36
A Pre-War Controversy. One of the most significant defense-program
debates going into the Iraq war – and potentially one of those most significantly
influenced by the war – concerns the future size and composition of the active-duty
Army. Issues involved in this debate include, among other things:
! the number of active-duty Army divisions to be maintained in the future;
! programs for upgrading the Army’s M1 Abrams tanks and other heavily

armored vehicles; and
! the Army’s plan to shift to a mix of combat forces that includes fewer heavily

armored combat units and a greater number of lighter and more mobile
combat units.
The Army’s Transformation Plan. The Army currently includes 10 activeduty divisions, as well as some additional independent active-duty combat brigades.
Several of the divisions and independent brigades are heavily armored units.
The Army’s transformation plan, which was initiated in 1999 by Army Chief of
Staff Eric K. Shinseki, would leave the number of active-duty Army divisions
unchanged at 10 but shift the composition of the Army toward a mix featuring fewer
heavily armored units built around armored vehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and

35

(...continued)
Seabasing. Inside the Pentagon, November 14, 2002: 1; Castelli, Christopher J. DOD Panel
Mulls Seabasing Ideas, Including Mobile Offshore Bases. Inside the Navy, November 18,
2002: 1; Ma, Jason. Seabasing Concept Pursued As A Way To Support Entire Joint Force.
Inside the Navy, November 25, 2002.
36

This section prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-19
the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and a greater number of more-mobile Army combat
units built around more lightly armored combat vehicles.
The principal goal of the transformation plan is to significantly improve the
Army’s ability to rapidly deploy significant ground combat forces to conflicts in
distant areas. The plan was prompted by the 1999 U.S. military operation in Kosovo,
which exposed inadequacies in the Army’s ability to rapidly deploy heavy forces, and
by the Army’s initial reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In the
latter instance, the Army was able to quickly deploy some lightly armed units, such
as the 82nd Airborne Division, to northeast Saudi Arabia to defend against a potential
Iraqi follow-on attack into that country,37 but some observers at the time said that
those forces would serve as little more than “speed bumps” in slowing down any
such attack.
The first step in the Army’s transformation plan is to create 6 new mobile
combat brigades over the next few years. These brigades are to be built around the
lightly armored Stryker wheeled combat vehicle and consequently are called Stryker
Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) or simply Stryker Brigades. The 6 Stryker Brigades
would constitute the core of the Army’s “Interim” transformation force.
The second step in the Army’s transformation plan would be to create a group
of more technologically advanced mobile combat units that would be the eventual
successors to both the legacy force38 and the Stryker Brigades. These more high-tech
combat units would be built around the Future Combat System (FCS), a collection
of advanced combat vehicles and supporting systems that is now in development.
The first FCS-equipped unit is to enter service in FY2008. Army units built around
the FCS would constitute the Army’s longer-term “Objective” transformation force.
To help finance programs for the Interim and Objective forces, funding has been
reduced for many programs related to the Army’s current “Legacy” force, including
programs for upgrading some of the Army’s M1 tanks and other armored vehicles.
Reported Tensions with OSD. Although the intent of the Army’s
transformation plan – shifting toward forces with greater mobility – appears broadly
consistent with the Administration’s vision for defense transformation, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reportedly is dissatisfied with Army transformation
efforts, believing them to be insufficiently aggressive. OSD is widely rumored in the

37

Immediately following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. officials were concerned that Iraqi
forces might continue their advance into northeastern Saudi Arabia so as to seize important
Saudi oil fields and port facilities located there. If they had done so, it would have given
Iraq control over a major source of oil and significantly complicated for U.S. military
planners the task of mounting a counter-offensive to expel Iraqi forces from territory they
had seized.
38

The Army uses “legacy force” as a neutral term for referring to Army units built around
weapons and equipment procured in previous years. Although, as mentioned earlier in the
report, the term “legacy” has become synonymous in some eyes with obsolescence and
suitability for reduction or termination, the Army’s use of the term does not carry that
meaning.

CRS-20
defense trade press to be interested in reducing the total number of Army active-duty
divisions from 10 to 8. OSD also expressed interest last year in reducing the number
of Stryker Brigades from 6 to 4, in part to make more funding available for programs
for the Objective force.
There have been numerous press reports of tension between OSD and the
Army’s senior leadership over the future size and composition of the active-duty
Army. Many observers believe that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s
announcement in early 2002 of his preferred choice for General Shinseki’s successor,
which was made more than a year before the end of Shinseki’s term as Army Chief
of Staff, reflected this tension and was intended to prematurely turn Shinseki into a
lame duck. Some observers believe that OSD’s views on Army transformation
efforts are conditioned by a general OSD preference for air power over ground
power. Others believe OSD’s perceived tepid support for the Army’s transformation
plan is due in part to the fact that it was initiated in 1999, during the Clinton
Administration.39
Pre-War Debate Over the Plan. Independent of reported tensions between
OSD and the Army’s leadership, the Army’s transformation plan has generated
significant debate among military analysts.
Merits of Maintaining 10 Divisions. Supporters of the Army’s intention
to maintain 10 active-duty divisions have argued that this is the correct number for
carrying out the Army’s portion of the U.S. national military strategy. Ten activeduty Army divisions, together with 3 active-duty Marine Corps divisions, will be
sufficient, they have argued, for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time
frames while carrying out additional responsibilities in other areas. If additional U.S.
ground forces are needed, they have argued, they can be mobilized from the Army
and Marine Corps reserves.
Some opponents of the 10-division figure have argued that it is insufficient to
carry out the Army’s portion of the national military strategy. The high operational
tempo of active-duty Army forces in recent years, and the need to mobilize large
numbers of Army reserve personnel for extended periods of active duty since
September 11, 2001, they have argued, is evidence that a 10-division force is
insufficient to carry out the Army’s various ongoing duties around the world,
particularly after 9/11. Other opponents of the 10-division figure (including,
reportedly, officials within OSD) argue that a 10-division force is larger than what
the Army will need in the future to carry out its portion of the national military
strategy. They argue that advances in U.S. warfighting technology, and changes in
U.S. military doctrine, might permit the Army to be reduced to as few as 6 activeduty divisions – 2 divisions for each of 2 overlapping regional conflicts, and 2 more
divisions for carrying out smaller-scale operations elsewhere.

39

For recent examples of articles reporting tension between OSD and the Army, see
Bowman, Tom. Rumsfeld Conducting War On Army. Baltimore Sun, May 7, 2003;
Caldwell, Robert J. Rumsfeld Vs. The Army. San Diego Union-Tribune, May 4, 2003.

CRS-21
Merits of Planned Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army’s plan
to shift to a greater reliance on lighter forces have argued that it represents a good
strategy for making the Army more mobile and responsive. They have argued that
Stryker vehicles can be transported to distant locations aboard Air Force airlift
aircraft much more easily than the Army’s current heavily armored vehicles, that
Stryker-equipped units will derive their survivability on the battlefield from superior
situational awareness, stand-off capabilities, and agility rather than from armor, that
Stryker vehicles would be more useful than heavily armored vehicles for
maneuvering through countryside featuring poor roads and bridges, and that they
would be highly effective for combat operations in congested urban areas.
Opponents of the Army’s plan for shifting to lighter forces have questioned the
survivability in combat of more lightly armored vehicles like the Stryker. The
Stryker Brigades, they argue, could prove to be a good way for rapidly deploying
Army personnel into combat situations where they will be defeated by opposing
forces. Opponents of the Army’s transformation plan have also expressed doubts
about the technical feasibility of the FCS, which is to be significantly more mobile
than the Army’s current heavily armored vehicles while at the same time offering a
degree of protection against enemy fire similar to that of heavily armored vehicles.
Even using new technology, opponents have argued, it will not prove possible for the
FCS to offer both things at the same time.40
Army Operations in the Iraq War. Active-duty Army combat units, along
with Marine Corps and British combat units, played a central role in the Iraq war.
Major Army units involved in the war included the 3rd Infantry Division
(Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne
Division, and (in northern Iraq) the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Army’s main
fighting forces for most of the war thus totaled less than 3 full divisions. U.S. war
plans originally called for an additional Army unit, the 4th Infantry Division
(Mechanized), to invade Iraq from Turkey. Following Turkey’s decision not to allow
its territory to be used by U.S. forces for staging an invasion of Iraq, this division was
redeployed to Kuwait and participated in a few combat operations toward the end of

40

For more on the Army’s transformation plan, see CRS Report RS20787, Army
Modernization and Transformation: Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name red
acted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.

CRS-22
conflict.41 Thousands of additional Army special operations forces were also
involved in the war (see the section on special operations forces.)
The Iraq war demonstrated that U.S. ground forces are highly capable on the
battlefield in conflicts against opposing ground forces. The U.S. and British ground
campaign benefitted from well-trained soldiers and Marines, good equipment,
effective air support from Air Force and Navy, and superior situational awareness.
U.S. and British ground forces appeared to have achieved some tactical surprise at
the start of the war, in spite of the lengthy pre-war buildup, by starting their attack
before the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Kuwait and before the start of extensive
U.S. air attacks. Once the invasion was underway, U.S. and British ground forces
achieved further tactical surprise through their high speed of advance, which
involved bypassing some Iraqi towns and military units, and their use of unexpected
routes. The flexible battle plan and rapid maneuvers used by U.S. ground forces kept
Iraqi forces off-balance. Some ground engagements involved fierce fighting, but
most weapons used by Iraqi forces were no match for the Army’s M1 tanks and M2
Bradley fighting vehicles.
Potential Program Implications.
Number of Active-Duty Army Divisions. Following the Iraq war, those
who support reducing the Army to less than 10 active-duty Army divisions could
argue that the relatively small number of Army divisions used for most of the war –
the equivalent of less than 3 full divisions – and the dominance achieved by those
units in combat, demonstrate that the Army can safely be reduced to less than 10
active-duty divisions while still retaining a capacity, in conjunction with Marine
Corps divisions, for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames and
performing additional duties elsewhere. The Iraq war, they could argue, is consistent
with the planned path of U.S. defense transformation, which envisages the United
States fighting future conflicts with less reliance on massive ground forces like those
assembled for the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

41

On March 21, 2003 the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID) and the Marine Corp’s
1 Expeditionary Force (I MEF) entered Iraq from Kuwait and began their drive north to
Baghdad while British forces concentrated on southern Iraq, including the city of Basrah.
On March 28, the 101st Airborne Division joined the attack. On April 4, U.S. ground forces
were more than 300 miles into Iraq, and 3ID captured Saddam International Airport on the
outskirts of Baghdad. That same day, the Iraqi Republican Guard Nida Division was
declared combat ineffective and the Republican Guard Baghdad Division surrendered 2,500
soldiers to I MEF. On April 7, 3ID conducted a raid into the center of Baghdad with about
70 Abrams Tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles. On April 9, U.S. Central Command
announced that Saddam Hussein’s regime no longer controlled Baghdad. By April 15, the
4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was engaged in combat operations north of Baghdad and
U.S. special operations forces, Marines, and U.S. Army airborne forces occupied various
cities in northern Iraq, including Kirkuk and Tikrit. On April 15, 25 days after the ground
attack began, U.S. Central Command declared major combat to be over. At that point,
another two Army armored divisions and an Army armored cavalry regiment were still
deploying into the theater.
st

CRS-23
Those who support the idea of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army
divisions could argue, following the war, that the original U.S. war plan called for
using an additional division (the 4th Infantry Division) throughout the war, that Army
supply lines were stretched to the breaking point and thinly defended as a result of
the rapid advance to Baghdad, that the number of U.S. ground forces needed for the
invasion was reduced by the contribution of an additional division by a coalition
partner (Britain), which is something the United States cannot count on happening
in future conflicts, that about 148,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve
members were activated to help fulfill Army commitments during the war, and that
the commitment of Army forces for the Iraq war exacerbated an ongoing situation of
high worldwide operational tempo for both active and reserve Army units.42
Programs for Upgrading Armored Vehicles. Supporters of reinstituting
funding for upgrading the Army’s M1 tanks and other heavily armored vehicles
would argue that the Iraq war dramatically demonstrated the continuing value of
heavy armor in modern warfare, not only for defeating enemy forces in open terrain,
as many expected, but for conducting combat operations in urban areas, which many
observers did not anticipate. Given the importance of operations by heavily armored
units in the Iraq war, they could argue, the United States should ensure that all of its
armored forces are fully upgraded, particularly for fighting two regional conflicts in
overlapping time frames against capable enemy forces. They could also argue that
upgrading all the Army’s armored vehicles will provide more time to develop the
FCS, and thus reduce technical risk in the FCS development program.
Opponents of reinstituting funding for armor upgrades could argue that the war
demonstrated that U.S. armored units are already vastly superior to enemy forces and
that expending funds on further upgrades would therefore be unnecessary and
wasteful. They can note that the armored vehicles that were used successfully by the
Army and Marine Corps for most of the war are not the most upgraded versions in
the U.S. inventory, and that the Army already has a substantial number of more
highly upgraded versions that can be used, if needed, to fight more capable enemy
forces in the future.43 In light of this, they might argue, the Army can successfully
rely on its current plan to maintain a force that includes a mix of highly upgraded and
somewhat less upgraded (but still very capable) armored vehicles.
Plan to Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army’s plan to shift to
a mix of forces including fewer heavily armored combat units and a greater number
of lighter and more mobile combat units could argue that the battlefield dominance
achieved by the relatively small number of Army and Marine Corps armored units

42

For an article discussing this issue in the context of the Army’s post-war constabulary
responsibilities in Iraq, see Gordon, Michael R. How Much Is Enough? New York Times
on the Web. May 30, 2003.
43

The main Army and Marine Corps units involved in the Iraq war, such as the 3rd Infantry
Division and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, were not equipped with the most upgraded
armored vehicles in the U.S. inventory. The Army’s most upgraded armored vehicles
belong to the 4th Infantry Division, which was redeployed from the Eastern Mediterranean
to Kuwait while the war was underway and did not participate in combat operations until
the final days of the conflict.

CRS-24
in the Iraq war demonstrated that the United States currently has more than enough
heavily armored combat units to fight future conflicts. They might also argue that
lighter and more mobile units like the planned Stryker Brigades would have been
valuable during the Iraq war in helping the United States establish a more formidable
ground presence in northern Iraq following Turkey’s decision not to allow its
territory to be used as a staging area for U.S. forces. From their perspective, in the
days following the end of major fighting in the war, Stryker vehicles would have
been useful in Iraqi cities for helping to reestablish civil order. The effectiveness of
the M1 tank in combat operations in Baghdad, they could argue, resulted in part from
Baghdad’s broad avenues and sizeable public plazas and other open areas, which
gave the M1s room to maneuver and long lines of sight. Future urban combat
situations, they are likely to maintain, may take place in cities and towns with
narrower roads and shorter lines of sight, which could make M1s less effective and
potentially more vulnerable to enemy attack.
Opponents of the Army’s plan to shift the mix of its forces could argue that the
Iraq war, by demonstrating the continued value of heavy armor in modern combat,
suggests that the United States should think twice about reducing the number of
Army armored units, particularly given the requirement for being able to fight two
regional conflicts in overlapping time frames. They could also argue that Stryker
vehicles would have been vulnerable to some of the weapons that Iraqi forces used
ineffectively against M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and that the war
thus demonstrated the inadvisability of shifting the Army toward more lightly
armored combat units. In particular, they might argue that the Army should be
cautious in its planning for the FCS to use situational awareness as compensation for
less armor protection. They may also argue that, although heavily armored units are
more difficult to transport, the United States was able to deploy sufficient numbers
of them to start the war in a reasonable amount of time, and that given the potential
vulnerability to enemy fire of lightly armored vehicles, the need to improve the
Army’s rapid-response capability should be met not by lightening Army forces, but
by investing in improved airlift and sealift capabilities, such as wing-in-ground
aircraft44 and very high-speed sealift ships (see sections on air mobility and sealift).

Combat Aircraft and Precision-Guided Munitions45
Program Issues Going Into the War. The Iraq war occurred as Congress
was considering a number of significant issues relating to programs for combat
aircraft and precision-guided munitions, including the following:
! the degree to which air power can substitute for ground forces in future

conflicts;
! the balance of funding for manned aircraft vs. unmanned air vehicles (UAVs);
! the balance of funding for shorter-ranged tactical aircraft vs. long-ranged

bombers;

44

Wing-in-ground aircraft are aircraft that fly very close to the surface so as to reduce drag,
increase lift, and thereby transport heavy loads more efficiently.
45

This section prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-25
! funding for specific tactical aircraft programs, including the F/A-22 fighter,

the F/A-18E/F strike fighter, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft; and the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program;
! funding for specialized combat-support aircraft;
! funding for specific UAV programs, including the Global Hawk and Predator
UAVs; and
! funding for various precision-guided munition programs.
Combat Aircraft Operations in the Iraq War. The Iraq war was the latest
in a series of U.S. military operations dating back to the 1980s where the United
States has thoroughly dominated the air war.46 U.S. and British combat aircraft
played a central role in the Iraq war, as expected, destroying thousands of Iraqi
targets of various kinds. Unlike the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when some Iraqi aircraft
flew against U.S. and coalition aircraft, Iraq in this conflict, with one reported
exception,47 apparently did not put any manned aircraft into the air.48
An Air Force statistical summary of the war states that a total of about 1,801
U.S., British, Australian and Canadian aircraft (excluding U.S. Army helicopters)
were involved in the conflict. These aircraft flew a total of 41,404 sorties (excluding
sorties by special operations and Army helicopters, and “coalition sovereignty
flights”).49 At the height of the war, roughly 1,500 to 2,000 sorties, including roughly

46

In addition to the Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and the operation in
Kosovo in 1999, this series includes operations in Bosnia in 1995, the 1991 Persian Gulf
war, the operation in Panama in 1989, strikes against targets in Libya in 1986, and the
operation in Grenada in 1983.
47

According to one report, “At least two Iraqi ultralight aircraft flew over a patch of desert
Friday [March 28, 2003] where thousands of U.S. soldiers and several command and control
facilities are located.... Both of the small, prop-driven aircraft spotted here evaded a tight
air defense system and flew over an assembly area packed with helicopters, tanks, Bradley
fighting vehicles and other military equipment. They flew off before the anti-aircraft crews
could get permission to shoot them down.... The aircraft were probably being flown by
pilots drawn from one of the paramilitary forces loyal to the Hussein regime, or by Iraqi
special forces, [one officer] said....Although none could be certain, officers here believe this
is the first time an enemy aircraft has flown over American ground forces since the Korean
War. (Naylor, Sean D. Iraqi Ultralights Spotted Over U.S. Troops. ArmyTimes.com, March
29, 2003.)
48

Various theories have been advanced as to why the Iraqi Air Force did not fly during the
war, including the following: (1) Few Iraqi aircraft were in condition to fly, and rapid U.S.
attacks at the start of the war prevented these aircraft from taking to the air before being
destroyed or pinned down. (2) Iraqi officials decided that attempting to put their aircraft
into the air to contest U.S. and British aircraft would be pointless or was not necessary to
the success of their military strategy, which relied on contesting U.S. and British forces in
cities, in which case it was better to preserve the aircraft for potential post-war use following
the hoped-for defeat of U.S. and British forces. (3) Iraqi officials feared that Iraqi pilots, if
allowed to fly, might in some cases fly their aircraft to Iran (as some did in the 1991 Persian
Gulf war) or turn against their own leaders and attack Iraqi leadership targets.
49

U.S. Department of Defense. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers.
(Assessment and Analysis Division, USCENTAF, T. Michael Moseley, Lt Gen, USAF
(continued...)

CRS-26
750 to 1,000 strike sorties, were reportedly flown each day. Coalition forces dropped
or fired a total of 29,199 bombs and missiles. Of these, about 19,948, or about 68%,
were precision guided – about the same as the 69%-share in the war in Afghanistan,
and many times higher than the 9%-share in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but less than
the 90%-share that some observers had predicted prior to the Iraq war. The total of
19,948 precision-guided weapons includes 802 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by
U.S. Navy surface combatants and submarines.50
Preliminary DoD estimates are that aircraft-delivered precision-guided weapons
found their targets as much as 98% of the time, and that the percentage of Tomahawk
missiles that found their targets might be almost as high.51 Past experience, however,
suggests that as combat records are reviewed in more detail, these percentages may
well be revised downward. The success rate for the Tomahawk missile in the 1991
Persian Gulf war, for example, was reduced significantly after the results of
Tomahawk attacks in that war were reviewed in detail.
As expected, U.S., British, and Australian combat aircraft in the Iraq war
attacked various kinds of targets in Iraq, including leadership targets, command-andcontrol facilities, air-defense systems, and fielded military forces. Perhaps more
surprising to some, fixed-wing aircraft armed with precision-guided weapons proved
useful in providing close air support to U.S. and British ground forces engaged in
urban combat operations.52 Perhaps more than the public realized at the time, U.S.
air power decimated key Iraqi Republican Guard divisions defending the southern
approaches to Baghdad, facilitating the rapid advance to the city by U.S. ground
forces.53 U.S. and British air operations benefitted from networking technology that
permitted information about Iraqi targets to be passed quickly from surveillance
aircraft to strike aircraft.
DoD reports that 7 aircraft – 1 A-10 Warthog attack plane, 4 AH-64 Apache
helicopters, and 2 AH-1W Cobra helicopters – were shot down by Iraqi ground fire.
Another 13 aircraft were lost due to other causes, including 2 fighters (1 U.S. and 1

49

(...continued)
Commander, April 30, 2003, Unclassified) 16 p.
50

Operation Iraqi Freedom - By The Numbers, op cit.

51

See, for example, Capaccio, Tony. Raytheon Tomahawks Miss Few Iraqi Targets, Navy
Says. Bloomberg.com, April 12, 2003; Weisman, Jonathan. Pentagon Says Some Missiles
Strayed. Washington Post, March 30, 2003: 23.
52

See, for example, Lowe, Christian.
DefenseNews, April 21, 2003: 19.
53

Urban Combat Role Grows For Airstrikes.

Some air power supporters are concerned that the relatively low amount of wartime
reporting on air operations in the Iraq war compared to the extensive wartime reporting on
ground operations could disadvantage air power programs in post-war deliberations on U.S.
defense programs. (Scott, William B. Out Of Sight. Aviation Week & Space Technology,
April 21, 2003: 24; Cooper, Christopher, and David Cloud. Branches Of U.S. Military Fight
Over Media Attention In Iraq. Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2003.)

CRS-27
British) lost in friendly-fire incidents and several aircraft lost due to accidents.54 The
small number of aircraft lost due to enemy fire was consistent with U.S. experience
in other recent military operations.55
U.S. and British strike operations were supported by a variety of specialized
combat-support aircraft, including Air Force E-3 Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) aircraft, Navy E-2C Airborne Early Warning aircraft (the Navy’s
analogue to the E-3), Air Force E-8 Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance
System (JSTARS) ground-surveillance aircraft, and Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B
radar-jamming aircraft.
The United States used more than 10 kinds of UAVs in the Iraq war,56 compared
with 3 kinds in the war in Afghanistan and a single kind in the 1991 Persian Gulf
war. UAVs proved especially valuable in providing persistent (i.e., round-the-clock)
overhead surveillance of Iraqi forces, something that cannot be done with satellites
and might be too risky to attempt with manned surveillance aircraft. UAVs were
used to draw attention from Iraqi air defense systems, permitting those systems to be
located and attacked. Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), which are UAVs
armed with weapons, were used to attack targets on the ground.

54

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers, op cit. An Air Force F-15E fighter was
also lost, but whether due to Iraqi ground fire or some other cause is still unknown. It was
also reported that a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was possibly lost to enemy fire.
McIntyre, Jamie. U.S. Crew Missing After F-15 Goes Down. CNN.Com, April 17, 2003;
U.S. Army Helicopter Shot Down; 7 Killed, New York Times, April 3, 2003; Sack, Kevin.
Accidents Chief Foe For Allied Aircraft, Los Angeles Times, April 3, 2003.
55

Despite flying tens of thousands of combat sorties in military operations dating back to the
1980s, U.S. aircraft losses per conflict generally have either been zero or in single digits.
An exception is the 1991 Persian Gulf war, in which 33 coalition aircraft were lost to enemy
fire. No U.S. military aircraft has been shot down by an enemy aircraft since 1991. All
aircraft losses in subsequent conflicts have been to surface-based air defenses. For more
information on losses of U.S. aircraft in recent military operations, see CRS Report
RS21124, Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): Assessing Future Needs,
by (name redacted). Washingt
on, 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.
56

Among the types of UAVs used in the Iraq war were the Army’s Hunter, Pointer, and
Shadow, the Air Force’s Global Hawk, Predator, Desert Hawk, and Force Protection
Surveillance System, and the Marine Corps’ Dragon Eye, Pioneer, and Silver Fox. For an
article listing all of these but Desert Hawk and Silver Fox, see Selinger, Marc. U.S. Using
More Than 10 Types of UAVs In Iraq War, Official Says. Aerospace Daily, March 27,
2003. The article said that in addition to the UAV systems it named, “several other small
systems are supporting specialized requirements.” For an article mentioning Desert Hawk,
see Kirsner, Scott. Eye In The Sky. Boston Globe, March 24, 2003: B9. For articles
mentioning Silver Fox, which was originally used to spot whales before starting Navy
exercises, see Brown, Malina. Cohen Expects To Draw Lessons From Iraq on Unmanned
Drones. Inside the Navy, April 21, 2003; Sagara, Eric. New, Tucson-Made Drone Scans
Mideast. Tucson Citizen, April 16, 2003; Morris, Jefferson. Four New Silver Fox UAVs
Deployed For Iraq. Aerospace Daily, April 14, 2003; Brown, Malina. Marines Receive
New Silver Fox UAV For Surveillance Missions In Iraq. Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003.

CRS-28
Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war has potential implications
for several issues relating to the Air Force as a whole, combat and combat-support
aircraft programs, and precision-guided weapon programs.
Size and Structure of the Air Force. The recent war in Iraq has raised
questions regarding whether the U.S. Air Force is appropriately sized and organized
for meeting operational demands. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the Air Force deployed approximately 7,000 personnel globally to meet
worldwide commitments. By December 2002, that figure had increased to about
24,000.57 Continued U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, stabilization efforts in
Iraq, anti-terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and in South East Asia, deterrence
operations in North East Asia, and unforseen disaster relief and humanitarian
assistance scenarios suggest that this deployment level may not subside soon.
In 1999, the Air Force reorganized itself into a service composed of 10
Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). The purpose of the reorganization was to
create an organizational structure and rotational deployment schedule that would
permit the Air Force to effectively meet worldwide contingency demands without
placing undue strains on equipment and personnel. Each AEF includes
approximately 175 aircraft and 20,000 people from both the active and reserve
components.58 The 10 AEFs rotate on a 15-month training and deployment cycle,
during which they may be deployed for up to 90 days. The Air Force wants to be
able to deploy an AEF in 48 hours, and up to 5 AEFs within 15 days. Each AEF is
tailored to the regional commander’s needs.
Prior to the Iraq war, signs emerged that the Air Force was being tasked to do
more than its reorganized force structure would easily allow. In February 2002, it
was reported that Air Force leaders had begun making exceptions to the AEF
deployment schedule to meet overseas demands for personnel in certain career fields,
and that as a result some Air Force personnel would have to deploy longer or more
frequently than the AEF standard.59 In September 2002, it was reported that the Air
Force plans to modify the AEF structure by embedding personnel and materiel from
two on-call air wings in the 10 AEFs while expeditionary combat-support assets from
throughout the Air Force are “leveled.”60 In January 2003, the Air Force again made
exceptions to the AEF rotational scheme by deploying indefinitely several aircraft
squadrons of various types (bombers, fighters, helicopters, UAVs) to augment AEFs

57

Rolfsen, Bruce. Deployment Outlook. Air Force Times, April 28, 2003: 14.

58

The 10 AEFs, together with two newly created rapid-reaction Aerospace Expeditionary
Wings, form the heart of what Air Force officials now refer to as the Expeditionary Air
Force (EAF). The EAF also includes airlift and aerial refueling aircraft, and so-called highdemand/low-density (HD/LD) forces such as U-2 surveillance aircraft and E-8 Joint
Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (JSTARS) aircraft.

59

Dougherty, Tim. Air Force Remains Committed to AEF Rotation Cycles. Air Force Print
News, February 5, 2002.
60

Elliot, Scott. Major AEF Changes Coming in June.” Air Force Print News, September 23,
2002.

CRS-29
7 and 8, which were deploying to the Persian Gulf.61 Normally, Air Force personnel
are not allowed to serve temporary duty of more than 180 days in one location. In
April 2003, however, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche issued a blanket waiver
authorizing all Air Force personnel supporting contingency operations to exceed
the180 day limit.
What do these recent events suggest for the size and organization of the Air
Force? Should Air Force end strength be increased to more easily satisfy demands
for personnel in certain career fields? If so, what changes, if any, need to be made
to Air Force recruitment, training, and retention programs? Are there alternatives to
increasing Air Force end strength? Could more cooperation with other services help
alleviate this shortfall? Air Force military policemen (MPs), for example, have
reportedly been in high demand. Could increased numbers of Army personnel be
used to help guard Air Force air bases?62
When conceived, the AEF concept was lauded as the key organizational
component to the Air Force’s transformation strategy. Do the recent exceptions to
the AEF rotational schedule suggest that the AEF concept is broken? If so, how
should the AEF concept be modified?
Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Aircraft. Five Navy aircraft carriers and
a total of 408 Navy aircraft (almost all of them operating from the carriers) were
involved in the Iraq war. Another 372 Marine Corps aircraft (many operating from
Navy amphibious ships) were also involved. The combined naval (i.e., Navy and
Marine Corps) total of 780 aircraft represented about 43% of the 1,801 aircraft
(excluding Army helicopters) used in the war. Naval aircraft flew 13,893, or about
34%, of the 41,404 sorties (excluding sorties by special operations and Army
helicopters, and “coalition sovereignty flights”) in the war.63 The contribution of
naval aircraft to U.S. air operations in the war in Afghanistan was even more
pronounced. Supporters of aircraft carriers and sea-based aircraft could argue that
the Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan, demonstrated the value of aircraft carriers
and carrier-based aircraft for conducting U.S. military operations where access to intheater land bases is limited.
Balance of Air and Ground Forces. Some observers argued that a primary
lesson of the U.S. military operation in Kosovo in 1999 was that air power alone
could now be used to defeat U.S. adversaries. They argued that while air power in
previous U.S. military operations had supported ground operations, the U.S.

61

Chapman, Suzanne. USAF to Exceed AEF Rotations. Air Force Magazine. February
2003: 15.

62

Some Army MPs are already used for this purpose. See Hafemeister, Rod, and Jim Tice.
Army Guard To Secure Air Force Bases. Army Times, December 30, 2002: 10.
63

In the 1991 Persian Gulf war, only a small percentage of carrier-based combat aircraft
were equipped to drop precision-guided munitions, and a lack of proper electronic links
forced the air tasking order (ATO) to be sent each day from the land-based air operations
center to the aircraft carrier in physical rather than electronic form. In the Iraq war, in
contrast, all Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based strike fighters were equipped to use
precision-guided weapons, and the ATO could be transmitted to the carriers electronically.

CRS-30
operation in Kosovo had demonstrated that air power by itself could achieve U.S. war
aims.64 Air power advocates argued that the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, which
employed few ground forces relative to air forces, reinforced this argument.
Debate following the Iraq war over the relative value of air power vs. “boots on
the ground” has been muted to date. The prominent use and success of U.S. heavy
ground forces appears to have suppressed arguments from air power advocates that
air power “can do it all.” Even so, analysts may debate the relative contributions of
air operations and operations by U.S. armor and artillery in destroying Iraq’s army.
This debate could influence views on how much air power can or should replace
armor and artillery in future conflicts, and thus views on how much funding to invest
in each area.
Reports suggest that U.S. and British air strikes severely weakened Iraq’s
Republican Guard Divisions – Iraq’s toughest ground forces – making them easy prey
for advancing Army and Marine Corps divisions. Some observers estimate that the
Republican Guard divisions lost half their tanks, armored personnel carriers and
artillery before their first encounter with U.S. ground forces on April 1, 2003.65
Other observers estimate that by April 4, U.S. air power had reduced Republican
Guard Divisions to between 18 and 44 percent of their full strength.66
Other observers, however, caution that the effectiveness of air operations in
destroying Iraqi ground forces is still being assessed. They note that many of the
early assessments of the effectiveness of air operations against Iraqi ground units in
the 1991 Persian Gulf war were later downgraded. Some analysts, for example, now
estimate that coalition aircraft were responsible for only 17 percent of the Iraqi tanks
that were destroyed in the 1991 war.67 These observers also point out that even
though Iraqi ground forces in the Iraq war were destroyed by U.S. and British air
strikes, U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces still encountered stiff resistance from
some Iraqi units.
Armor, artillery, ammunition, and fuel are among the most challenging military
materiel to transport long distances. Some observers argue that if U.S. ground forces
begin relying more on combat aircraft than on armor and artillery, U.S. forces in the
future could be more rapidly deployable and remain just as lethal. Advocates of
shifting to a greater reliance on aircraft note that the Marine Corps fields fewer large
artillery pieces than does the Army, and relies more on Marine Corps combat aircraft
(AV-8B attack planes and F/A-18 strike fighters) for fire support. Those skeptical
of substituting aircraft for Army armor and artillery note that unlike aircraft, the

64

Other analysts demurred, arguing that the enemy leaders capitulated only when ongoing
air operations were joined by a threat to introduce ground forces, or when it became clear
to the enemy leaders that Russia would not support their effort.
65

Scarborough, Rowan. Rulers of the Air. Washington Times, April 27, 2003: 1.

66

Graham, Bradley, and Vernon Loeb. An Air War of Might, Coordination and Risks.
Washington Post, April 27, 2003: 1.
67

Wheeler, Winslow. Iraq War: Drop the Myths, Learn the Lessons. Defense Week, April
28, 2003.

CRS-31
availability and effectiveness of artillery is not degraded by adverse weather. Recent
combat in the mountains of Afghanistan, they could argue, suggest that ground forces
might have been more effective and might have suffered fewer casualties if they were
supported by artillery rather than solely combat aircraft.
Close Air Support (CAS) vs. Other Missions. The military strategy
pursued in the Iraq war may add fuel to a long-running discussion on the relative
balance, within U.S. air power operations, between close air support (CAS) missions
vs. attacking more strategic targets in attempts to topple enemy governments and
power centers. Was the Iraqi regime toppled by the strategic bombing that destroyed
key regime targets in Baghdad, or because of CAS missions that contributed to the
rapid destruction of Iraqi military forces in the field? Views on this debate could
influence decisions on the kinds of aircraft and associated systems DoD should
acquire in coming years.
Long-Range Bombers.68 Long-range B-1, B-52, and B-2 bombers played
a significant role in the Iraq war, as they did in the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002.
In both conflicts, relatively small numbers of bombers dropped large numbers of
precision-guided bombs and traditional unguided bombs, destroying many enemy
ground targets,69 and were able to loiter over the battlefield for extended periods of
time, which made them readily available for attacking so-called time-sensitive targets
– targets that emerge suddenly and remain susceptible to attack for only short periods
of time. For example, the B-1 bomber that carried out the April 7, 2003 bombing
attack on a building in Baghdad where Saddam Hussein and his close associates were
thought to be located had been loitering above Iraq waiting for just such an emerging
target, and dropped its bombs just 12 minutes after being given the coordinates.
The performance of long-range bombers in the Iraq war and the war in
Afghanistan may influence a long-simmering the debate on the balance of funding
for bomber programs vs. tactical aircraft. Specific questions relating to this debate
include the following:

68

For more on long-range bomber programs, see CRS Report RL31544, Long-Range
Bombers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Pierre Bernasconi and (name redac
ted). Washington, 2002. (August 22, 2002) 44 p.
69

In the Iraq war, for example, Air Force B-1s, reportedly flew only about 2% of total
aircraft sorties, but dropped 50% of all the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped
by aircraft in the war. (Fulghum, David, and Robert Wall. Baghdad Confidential. Aviation
Week & Space Technology, April 28, 2003.) The B-1 bomber was a major contributor to the
U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan; some observers have called it the “workhorse” of that
conflict. B-1s flew only 5% of all aircraft sorties in the conflict, but accounted for 40% of
the ordnance that was dropped from all aircraft. Observers have also lauded the B-52's
performance in the war in Afghanistan. Operating from Diego Garcia, B-52s were able to
loiter for extended periods over Afghanistan, and dropped many precision-guided weapons
on targets that had been designated by ground forces, destroying Taliban positions and
providing air cover for outnumbered Northern Alliance troops. The fall of Taliban/al Qaeda
forces at the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif has been attributed by some observers
in large part to the B-52s’ support of pro-U.S. Northern Alliance fighters.

CRS-32
! What is the best mix of long-range bombers and shorter range tactical combat

aircraft?
! Should bombers be emphasized more in the overall structure of the Air Force?
! Is DoD shortchanging bomber modernization to finance its tactical combat
aircraft programs?
! Should planned early retirements of B-1s be slowed, or even reversed?70
! Should the Air Force implement a proposal it is now considering to replace
the engines on its B-52s?
Prior to the Iraq war, bomber supporters argued that programs for modernizing
the bomber force are underfunded relative to tactical aircraft programs in DoD
budgets,71 that DoD’s current plan to retire certain B-1 bombers early is unwise,72 and
that the current DoD plan for developing a next-generation bomber to replace the
aging bombers in the current fleet is not sufficiently aggressive.73 Supporters of
current DoD plans argued that the force-structure and modernization needs of the
bomber force are properly reflected in DoD planning and budgeting.
Bomber supporters could argue that the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan
demonstrated that the value of bombers in combat operations has been significantly
enhanced by the advent of precision-guided weapons. They could also argue that the
two conflicts underscored the value of bombers for reducing the need for in-theater
bases and for maintaining aircraft with precision-guided weapons over the battlefield
for long periods of time. In light of the enhanced role of bombers, they could argue,
DoD should place greater emphasis on bomber programs in its plans and budgets.
Supporters of DoD’s current plans for modernization of the bomber force could
argue the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan show that the United States has
enough, or more than enough, long-range bombers for fighting regional conflicts,
particularly given how precision-guided weapons have multiplied the number of
targets that each bomber can attack during a single sortie. They could also argue that
the good reviews given to bomber operations in both of these wars shows that these
aircraft are receiving sufficient amounts of modernization funding and that there is
no urgent need to develop and procure a next-generation bomber. Rather than
devoting funding to maintaining a larger bomber force or developing a new bomber
design now, they could argue, the successful use of bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan
shows that funding should instead be used to maintain the readiness of the currently
70

Many bomber supporters argue that in light of the B-1's contributions in the Iraq war and
the war in Afghanistan, B-1 retirements should be truncated so as to maintain a force of
about 70 B-1s.
71

For decades, DoD funding levels for tactical combat aircraft have been much greater than
funding levels for bombers. In FY04, for example, DoD is requesting $363.2 million in
bomber funding and $100.3 billion in funding – 276 times as much money – for tactical
aviation programs. (U.S. Department of Defense. Comptroller. Program Acquisition Costs
by Weapon System. Washington, 2003. [Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years
2004/2005, February 2003])
72

In 2001, the Air Force began retiring B-1 bombers, reducing the fleet from 92 aircraft to
60 aircraft.
73

Current DoD plans don’t call for a new bomber to be fielded until 2037.

CRS-33
planned bomber force and increase its effectiveness by funding additional
improvements to precision-guided weapons and associated targeting systems.
Tactical Fighter Aircraft in General.74 Prior to the Iraq war, proponents
of DoD’s three main tactical aircraft modernization programs – the F/A-22 Raptor,
the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – have argued that
proceeding with all three programs as currently planned represents the best way to
guarantee continued U.S. air dominance in future conflicts. They have argued that
the successful operations of current U.S. aircraft in recent military operations does
not imply that they would achieve similar success in future conflicts. Air-defense
technology, they have argued, is developing and proliferating rapidly, making
tomorrow’s adversaries potentially more capable than yesterday’s. Stealthy, agile
tactical aircraft with advanced avionics, they have argued, will be required in the
future for successful operations against adversaries armed with highly-capable airdefense systems such as the Russian-built long-range SA-10 and SA-12 surface-to-air
missile systems. The F/A-22, F/A-18E/F, and JSF, they have also argued, will field
flexible technologies that will permit these aircraft to take on new capabilities, if
needed, for responding to changes in the international security environment. For
example, they have argued, if cruise-missile defense becomes a much more
prominent mission for tactical aircraft, these new aircraft will be well suited to
incorporate this mission.
Critics of DoD’s tactical aircraft modernization program have argued that DoD
simply cannot afford to proceed with all three tactical aircraft programs as now
planned, at least not without requiring significant cutbacks in other critical DoD
programs. They have argued that the tremendous success in recent U.S. military
operations of current U.S. aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 fighter demonstrate that
the margin of U.S. superiority in air operations is so significant that it is likely to last
for some number of years.75 They have also argued that with the growing importance
to U.S. air operations of precision-guided weapons, associated surveillance and
targeting systems, and technologies for networked air operations, investing in new
tactical aircraft designs is now less critical for insuring future success in U.S. air
operations than investing in these other air-related technologies. In optimizing
investments in future air power capability, they have argued, DoD should move away
from its traditional “platform-centric”focus on developing new aircraft designs, and
toward a “system-of-systems” approach that more fully recognizes the importance of
these supporting technologies in contributing to total U.S. air power capability.
F/A-22 Program.76 As the most capable, most expensive, and most air-to-air
oriented aircraft in DoD’s tactical aircraft modernization plan, the F/A-22 has often
been at the center of the debate over the merits of DoD’s tactical aircraft
74

For more on tactical fighter aircraft programs in general, see CRS Issue Brief IB92115,
Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 15 p.
75

See, for example, Montgomery, Dave. Critics: Iraq War Shows New Jets Aren’t Needed.
Miami Herald, May 5, 2003.
76

For more on the F/A-22 program, see CRS Report RL31675, F/A-22 Raptor, by
(name redacted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 18 p.

CRS-34
modernization plan. Following the Iraq war, critics of the F/A-22 program could
argue that the degree of U.S. air dominance in the Iraq war and other recent conflicts
demonstrates that the F/A-22 program has become the “Seawolf of the sky” – i.e., a
program, like the Navy’s Seawolf submarine program, that was initiated in the 1980s
with the goal of producing an expensive, high-capability platform for addressing a
projected Soviet military threat that never materialized.77 Successful U.S. air
operations in the Iraq war and previous conflicts, they could argue, demonstrate that
today’s tactical combat aircraft are more than sufficiently effective, and that upgrades
to these aircraft can therefore maintain DoD’s air power dominance until lessexpensive manned aircraft such as the JSF or unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UCAVs) are fielded. As a result, they could argue, the F/A-22 program can either
be terminated or procurement of the aircraft can be reduced from the currently
planned total of about 276 to a smaller “silver bullet” force of no more than 100
aircraft.
Supporters of procuring 276 or more F/A-22s could argue that the air-to-air
capabilities of Iraq, like those of Afghanistan and enemy Serbian forces operating in
Kosovo, were known to be virtually nonexistent, and that none of these wars
consequently do anything to invalidate the projected future threat for which the F/A22 will be needed – an enemy equipped with modern, highly capable fighters and
surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, F/A-22 supporters could argue, the F-22
was recently redesignated the F/A-22 to reflect the fact that it is no longer a pure airsuperiority fighter, but a rather strike fighter that can also perform valuable air-toground strike missions like those conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.78
F/A-18E/F and F-35 (JSF) Programs.79 Some observers, including
Admiral Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, argue that the Iraq war, like
the war in Afghanistan, has underscored the need for the Navy to replace its shorterranged F/A-18C/D strike fighters with longer-ranged F/A-18E/F strike fighters and
F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Clark and others have
argued, Navy F/A-18C/Ds performing long-range, long-duration missions (including
missions in which aircraft orbit over target areas while waiting for targets of

77

The Seawolf-class submarine is a large, powerful attack submarine designed by the Navy
in the 1980s to counter advanced Soviet submarines that were projected to enter service in
the 1990s and beyond. A total procurement of 29 or more Seawolf submarines was
originally planned. In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, DoD halted the
Seawolf program after procuring 3 boats and shifted to developing and procuring the
Virginia-class attack submarine, a smaller and less expensive design. For more on the
Seawolf and Virginia-class programs, see CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine
Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2000.
(June 1, 2000) 37 p.
78

For more on debate on the F/A-22 program following the Iraq war, see Kaufman, Gail.
Iraq War Arms Both Sides Of F/A-22 Debate. DefenseNews, April 28, 2003: 13.
79

For more on the F/A-18E/F and F-35 JSF programs, CRS Reports RL30624, Military
Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted). (Updated periodically) 15 p., and RL30563,
Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues, by (name redacted). (Updated
periodically) 25 p.

CRS-35
opportunity to emerge) required multiple in-flight refuelings per sortie. F/A-18E/Fs
or F-35s, he and others argue, can perform such missions with fewer in-flight
refuelings or none at all, reducing the Navy’s need for aerial refueling, which was in
short supply in the Iraq war. During the Iraq war, the number of strike sorties flown
from carriers was reduced in some instances due to insufficient in-flight refueling
assets. Replacing F/A-18C/Ds with F/A-18E/Fs and F-35s, they now argue, will
reduce the chances of such problems occurring in future operations.
V-22 Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.80 Current DoD plans call for procuring a total of
458 V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, mostly for use by Marine Corps forces as replacement for
aged Marine Corps transport helicopters. Supporters of the V-22, which has
experienced considerable controversy over the years due in part to fatal crashes
during testing, argue that the V-22 offers numerous operational advantages over
helicopters, including a higher cruising speed for transporting Marine personnel and
equipment from ship to operating area.
Supporters of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft could argue that in both the Iraq war
and the war in Afghanistan, Marine forces conducted ground combat operations 350
or more miles from shore, and perhaps 450 or more miles away from their Navy
amphibious ships at sea. These are much longer operating distances than Marine
forces have traditionally experienced. V-22 supporters could argue that the Marines’
deep-inland operations in Iraq and Afghanistan could be repeated in future conflicts,
which would underscore the value of replacing the Marine Corp’s aged helicopters
with faster-flying V-22s. V-22 supporters could also argue that difficulties
experienced in the Iraq war with maintaining the readiness of the aged heavy-lift
helicopters underscores the need to proceed with V-22 procurement.
Other observers could argue that although the V-22 can be of value in replacing
aged heavy-lift helicopters and in supporting deep-inland Marine Corps operations,
the Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan, does nothing to alter the need for the strict
testing program for the V-22 DoD established in the wake of fatal V-22 crashes.
They could argue that although there may be a need, even an urgent need, for the V22, this V-22 program’s past development difficulties resulted in part from efforts to
rush its development. If the V-22 is to serve as an effective replacement for today’s
helicopters, they could argue, the V-22 testing program must continue to proceed as
planned.
Helicopters. The Iraq war is the third consecutive major U.S. military
operation, following the operation in Kosovo in 1999 and the war in Afghanistan in
2001-2002, where helicopter performance was mixed. In Kosovo, the Army was
criticized for not being able to quickly deploy and use Task Force Hawk, a group of
24 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. Critics emphasized that the task force had
grown into a 5,000-soldier force that required 500 C-17 sorties to deploy, and that the
Army had kept its helicopter operations separate from the daily air tasking order
(ATO) – the document issued each day by the air operations center that coordinated
the operations of most U.S. aircraft. Keeping Army helicopters out of the ATO,

80

For more on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor
Aircraft, by (name redacted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 20 p.

CRS-36
critics argued, made Army helicopter operations in Kosovo less integrated with the
operations of other U.S. forces and thereby reduced helicopter effectiveness.81
In Afghanistan, critics noted a similar lack of coordination between Army
helicopter operations and the operations of other U.S. forces, especially during a
combat operation in March 2002 called Operation Anaconda.82 In addition, the high
elevation of the Afghanistan theater of operations made some helicopter operations
difficult, and U.S. special operations forces experienced a shortfall in MH-47 heavylift helicopters, leading some observers to argue more strenuously in favor of the V22 Osprey as one potential solution to both of these problems.
In the Iraq war, helicopters encountered problems with survivability and
maintainability. With regard to survivability, an a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL31946. Public record. Not legal advice.