# China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background and Analysis

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30700

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** November 6, 2001
- **Citation:** RL30700

## Text

Order Code RL30700

Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions:
Background and Analysis

Updated November 6, 2001

Shirley Kan (Coordinator)
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
(name redacted)
Analyst in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions:
Background and Analysis
Summary
This CRS Report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that
China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with particular attention
to implications for U.S. security concerns. It is not the assumption of this report that
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), will engage in conflict with
other forces in Asia. Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing
concern about China’s assertiveness in Asia and military buildup against Taiwan.
Since 1990, China has acquired or sought to acquire select types and modest
quantities of modern foreign weapons, primarily from Russia. These include: Mi-17
helicopters, Il-76 transports, Su-27 fighters, S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM)
systems, Kilo submarines, Tor-M1 SAM systems, Sovremenny destroyers (with
Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs)), A-50 airborne warning and control
systems (AWACS) (Israeli Phalcon system canceled in 2000), and Su-30 long-range
fighters.
The Su-27 and Su-30 represent significant upgrades in fighter aircraft capability
over China’s indigenous aircraft. The combination of the PLA’s imported AA-11
air-to-air missile and highly maneuverable aircraft could prove a vexing air-to-air
challenge to modern fighter aircraft of other forces in Asia. The Russian SAMs
represent marked improvements in China’s ability to target aircraft and missiles that
threaten its airspace. Nonetheless, the PLA’s ability to employ its modern
acquisitions is hampered by factors such as limited inventory, deficient maintenance,
inadequate pilot training, outdated air doctrine, rigid command, disparate
communications, and lack of supporting capabilities in the near term.
China’s navy has been primarily a coastal defense force built around ships based
largely on older or obsolete Soviet technology. China’s two Sovremenny-class ships
are considerably more technologically modern, complex, and capable than most other
PLA surface combatants. The SS-N-22/Sunburn anti-ship cruise missile, designed
to defeat the U.S. Navy’s Aegis air-defense system, is considered by many to be the
most threatening ship-launched ASCM in service today. Still, China’s Sovremennyclass ships, though fairly capable, would be vulnerable to air and submarine attack.
Although much attention has been paid to China’s procurement of Sovremenny-class
ships armed with SS-N-22s, the four quiet Kilos, with their potential for avoiding
detection and their potent torpedoes, might represent a greater threat to naval forces
in Asia. If well-maintained and proficiently-operated, the PLA Navy’s Kilo-class
submarines can launch attacks against ships and submarines operating in the region.
Kilos are, nevertheless, vulnerable to detection and attack.
China has made some significant qualitative upgrades through foreign
acquisitions, but it remains to be seen how these acquisitions will be expanded and
linked to other PLA improvements. The operational significance of China’s
conventional arms acquisitions will also depend on the PLA’s training to eventually
conduct effective joint military operations and the scenario in which the systems
might be used. These developments in PLA modernization will bear watching.

Contents
Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Congressional Concerns and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Scope of Report and Other Factors in PLA Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Major Foreign Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Objectives of the Middle Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Increasing Foreign Arms Acquisitions since 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Major Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Mi-17 Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Il-76 Transports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Su-27 Fighters and Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
S-300/SA-10 Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Kilo Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Tor/SA-15 Air Defense Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Sovremenny Destroyers and Sunburn Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A-50 AWACS and Canceled Phalcon Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Su-30 Fighters and Armaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Assessment of Air Power Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Platform Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Fighter/Attack Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Air-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Surface-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Force on Force Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Inventory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Maintenance/Spares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Pilot Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Mission Emphasis and Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Command, Control, and Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Supporting Aircraft/Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Assessment of Naval Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Scope of Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
China’s Navy in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Sovremenny-class Destroyers and Related Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
China’s Surface Combatant Force in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Sovremenny Class as a Soviet 1970s-era Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Intent of China’s Purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
China’s Ability to Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Comparison with Western Surface Combatants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Capability of SS-N-22 Against Surface Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Vulnerability of Sovremenny-class Design to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Potential Tactical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Kilo Class Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
China’s Submarine Force in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Kilo Class as a Late 1970s-era Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Intent of China’s Purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
China’s Ability to Operate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Comparison with Western Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Capability of Kilo Against Ships and Subs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Vulnerability of Kilo-class Design to Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Potential Tactical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Integrated Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

List of Tables
Table 1. Values of China’s Arms Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. China Among Top 10 Developing Arms Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 3. China’s Major Conventional Arms Acquisitions Since 1990 . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 4. Comparison of Fighter/Attack Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Table 5. Comparison of Air-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 6. Comparison of Surface-to-Air Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Table 7. Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key Systems . . . . . . 35

This analysis was originally prepared at the request of the Honorable Daniel Akaka,
and is being reprinted by CRS for general congressional distribution with his
permission.

China’s Foreign Conventional Arms
Acquisitions: Background and Analysis
Purpose and Scope1
Congressional Concerns and Actions
This CRS Report examines the foreign conventional arms acquisitions of
China’s military, collectively called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).2 The
purpose of this report is to provide information to Congress, using best available
unclassified data, on the PLA’s arms procurement, with assessments of implications
for regional security – particularly, U.S. security concerns.
It is not the assumption of this report that the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
will engage in conflict with other forces in Asia. This report does not examine the
likelihood or nature of a crisis or conflict that might involve PLA, other Asian, and/or
U.S. forces.
Nonetheless, since the mid-1990s, there has been increasing concern about the
PRC’s assertiveness in the Asian-Pacific region as well as military buildup
threatening Taiwan, with possible U.S. military involvement in the Taiwan Strait.
As the Secretary of Defense reported in June 2000, the PLA operates under the
doctrine of “fighting local wars under high-tech conditions,” calling for rapid
response by select pockets of excellence within the PLA to a range of contingencies
along China’s land and sea borders. Particularly, “China expects to encounter a more
technologically advanced foe, such as the United States or Japan, if conflicts
concerning its interests within this strategic envelope arise. Moreover, a cross-Strait
conflict between China and Taiwan involving the United States has emerged as the
dominant scenario guiding PLA force planning, military training, and war
preparation.”3 The George W. Bush Administration’s Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) report to Congress highlighted the “East Asian littoral” (a maritime region
from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal) as a “particularly
challenging area.”4
1

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Security Policy.

2

The “PLA” refers to all services and branches, including ground, air, and naval forces, and
the missile force (the Second Artillery).
3

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
According to the report, about 14 of perhaps 40 divisions [or approximately one-third] in
the PLA ground forces are considered “rapid reaction units.”

4

Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” September 30, 2001.

CRS-2
Since the 1990s, Members of Congress have increasingly expressed concerns
about the efforts of the PRC to modernize the PLA. While many countries upgrade
their militaries, the PLA’s modernization has prompted a debate about the extent to
which enhanced PLA capabilities challenge U.S. interests and stability in the AsiaPacific region. This debate has covered several areas of concern, including: PRC
assertiveness in the disputed maritime areas of the East and South China Seas, the
greater PLA missile threat to Taiwan as demonstrated by the missile “test-firings” in
1995 and 1996, persistent threats to use force in the Taiwan Strait, suspected
unauthorized acquisitions of U.S. missile technology (associated with satellite
launches) and nuclear weapon secrets, weapons proliferation, and rising arms
purchases (particularly from Russia).
Some Members have cited the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, as a
basis for congressional concern over the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The TRA left
the question of U.S. involvement somewhat ambiguous. Section 2(b)(4) states that
the United States will consider with “grave concern” any non-peaceful means to
determine Taiwan’s future. Nonetheless, in not wanting to pre-determine U.S.
actions, Members of Congress also adopted section 2(b)(6), declaring it to be U.S.
policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic
system, of the people on Taiwan.”5
Particularly since the PLA’s provocative missile “test-firings” in 1995 and 1996,
and U.S. deployment of two aircraft carriers close to Taiwan in March 1996,
Congress has required reports from the Clinton Administration on the PRC’s military
capabilities and strategy, and the situation in the Taiwan Strait. The Pentagon has
submitted these reports since 1997.6
As for legislation, the 106th Congress considered some bills generated by
concerns about the PLA’s arms purchases, including H.R. 1838 and S. 693 (the
“Taiwan Security Enhancement Act” introduced by Rep. Delay and Senator Helms),
and H.R. 4022 and S. 2687 (bills introduced by Rep. Rohrabacher and Sen. Robert
Smith banning U.S. forgiveness or rescheduling of debt owned by Russia unless it
stops transfers of Sunburn anti-ship cruise missiles to China).
In the 107th Congress, the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (Section
1203 of H.R. 2586) passed by the House on September 25, 2001, would require that
the Pentagon’s annual report on PRC military power (required by section 1202 of the

5

See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy – Key
Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, by (name redacted).
6

Department of Defense, “Selected Military Capabilities of the People’s Republic of China
(Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1305 of the FY97 National Defense Authorization
Act),” April 1997; “Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People’s Republic of
China (Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1226 of the FY98 National Defense
Authorization Act),” July 1998; “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait (Report to
Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill),” February 1999; and “Annual Report
on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Report to Congress Pursuant to
the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act),” June 2000.

CRS-3
FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 106-65) add a section to discuss
arms transfers to China from the former Soviet Union (which would exclude other
countries, like Israel).

Scope of Report and Other Factors in PLA Modernization
This CRS Report examines the major, foreign conventional weapon systems that
the PLA has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990. Still, it is important
to note that there are other factors important to PLA modernization, besides having
foreign equipment. Separate CRS reports discuss the PLA’s modernization of its
missile force (especially the theater ballistic missile buildup against Taiwan),
including strategic nuclear-armed missiles and warhead modernization, largely
indigenous undertakings.7 Another CRS Report looks at the closer PRC-Russian
“strategic partnership.”8
In parallel with foreign procurement of equipment, the PRC has also sought
foreign technology to help its struggling defense industries. An example is reported
Russian cooperation in the PRC’s development of new submarines, including the
Song-class diesel-electric submarine (SS), Type 093 nuclear-powered attack
submarine (SSN), and Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN).9 Another example is Israel’s reported cooperation with China, perhaps
since 1991, in the development of a new F-10 (also called J-10) fighter, based on the
Lavi fighter project that was canceled in 1987 and was comparable to the F-16.10

7

CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by (name redacted); and CRS
Report 97-1022, Chinese Nuclear Testing and Warhead Development, by Jonathan Medalia.

8

CRS Report 97-185, Russian-Chinese Cooperation: Prospects and Implications, by (name
redacted) and (name redacted).
9

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997; “Russia Helping
China Develop New-Generation Attack SSN, SSBN,” Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and
Merchant Ships] (Beijing), October 1997, in FBIS; Secretary of Defense, “Report on the
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the
FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
10

Israel’s cooperation with the PRC in producing this next-generation fighter has been
reported in a number of sources, including: Kuang Chiao Ching [Wide Angle] (Hong Kong),
December 16, 1991, translated in JPRS-CAR-92-019, April 1, 1992; Washington Times,
October 13, 1993; Flight International, November 2-8, 1994; Los Angeles Times, December
28, 1994; Defense News, July 21-27, 1997; Flight International, October 15-21, 1997; Flight
International, May 20-26, 1998. As early as 1993, in answering questions from a hearing
of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
publicly confirmed that Israel’s “long history” of military technical cooperation with China
has included work on “China’s next generation fighter.” More recently, the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) issued a report in 1996 that said China has acquired U.S. technology
“through Israel in the form of the Lavi fighter.” In 1996 and 1997, ONI reported that the F10's design was based “heavily” on the canceled Israeli Lavi program and has benefitted
from “substantial direct external assistance, primarily from Israel and Russia, and with
indirect assistance through access to U.S. technologies,” according to Worldwide Challenges
to Naval Strike Warfare.

CRS-4
In-flight refueling aircraft is a third example of new important capabilities
developed by China reportedly with significant foreign assistance. The PLA has
sought in-flight refueling capability at least since the 1980s, reportedly from various
foreign sources (United Kingdom, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia).11 By 1996, a
news story cited a classified Pentagon report as saying that China had produced five
in-flight refueling tankers, converted from B-6 (H-6) bombers, and planned to have
at least 20 tankers to support indigenous F-8 fighters (15 of which had been equipped
with aerial refueling probes), F-10s, and FB-7 fighters under development.12 At the
October 1, 1999 military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 50th anniversary of
the PRC’s founding, the PLA’s aerial refueling tankers flew publicly for the first
time, according to China’s official media. China billed the tankers as indigenously
produced and said that “gone are the days” when the PLA’s aircraft could not be
refueled in the air, and what is of “strategic importance is that the flying tankers have
boosted the air force’s long-range [combat capability].”13 Nonetheless, reports do not
say the PLA can perform aerial refueling of the imported advanced Su-27 fighters,
and the Pentagon reported in 2000 that the PLA Air Force’s aerial refueling program
remains behind schedule.14
There are still other considerations that are important to PLA modernization,
and PRC leaders appear to recognize that simply having more modern systems does
not necessarily mean the PLA would be able to utilize them effectively. PRC leaders
have sought to reform, streamline, and restructure the PLA based on high technology
and quality (rather than quantity), requirements for the absorption of modern
weapons acquired from abroad. The PLA has pursued improvements in nonhardware aspects necessary for modernization, such as professionalization, training,
logistics, leadership, maintenance, doctrine, and strategy.15 In the 1996 exercise

11

Andrew Slade, “USA Pushing to Block UK Sale to Chinese,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
September 17, 1988; Far Eastern Economic Review, February 21, 1991; Nayan Chanda,
“China Poses New Threat to Contested Islands,” Asian Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1992;
Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Obtains Aerial-Refueling Technology,” New York Times,
August 23, 1992; Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far Eastern Economic Review,
September 3, 1992;
12

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Arms Buildup Increases Attack Range,” Washington Times, March
12, 1996.
13

“Chinese-Made Aerial Refuellers Debut in Military Parade,” Xinhua [New China News
Agency] (Beijing), October 1, 1999, in FBIS. A PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong
reported that the refueling tankers were modified H-6 bombers (based on the Soviet Tu-16
bomber) and asserted that “the presence of these tanker planes indicates that China has
already mastered the technique” (“Article Reviews China’s New Weapons,” Ta Kung Pao
(Hong Kong), October 2, 1999).
14

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
15

On multifaceted aspects of PLA modernization, see, for example: “Special Issue: China’s
Military in Transition,” China Quarterly, June 1996; James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs
(editors), Crisis in the Taiwan Strait (Washington: American Enterprise Institute and
National Defense University Press, 1997); James C. Mulvenon, Professionalization of the
Senior Chinese Officer Corps: Trends and Implications, Rand, 1997; James C. Mulvenon
and Richard H. Yang (editors), The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa

CRS-5
involving the three separate services, the PLA showed its intent to eventually have
the ability to carry out joint operations.16 The Secretary of Defense has reported that
a possible PLA attack on Taiwan would likely include naval blockades, missile
strikes, special operations, air attacks, and airborne and amphibious invasions.17
Russian training has accompanied the PLA’s hardware acquisitions. In October
1999, Russian and PLA naval forces took the first steps in holding what they called
“military exercises” together in the East China Sea near Shanghai.18 PRC leaders
have also tried to curb corruption in the PLA, with President Jiang Zemin’s ban on
businesses in the PLA (announced in July 1998). In addition, strategic thinkers of
the PLA have examined changes in warfighting, including information warfare, the
revolution in military affairs (RMA), and asymmetric warfare.19

Major Foreign Arms Acquisitions20
Objectives of the Middle Kingdom
Leaders in Beijing have pursued a historical quest for a modern China that is
prosperous and strong, presuming the country as rightfully the most powerful among
Asian countries and one among great powers of the world. Many analysts in and
outside government believe that, since economic reforms began in 1979, China’s
leaders have placed their top priority on economic growth as the requirement for
social stability, political control, national unification, and world standing.
Nonetheless, Beijing has pursued military modernization as a secondary, but
important, component of building comprehensive national strength. China pursues
military modernization in order to ensure that it is the preeminent power in Asia so
that any significant action undertaken by any other country in Asia must first consider

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1999); James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (editors),
China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1999);
Susan M. Puska (editor), People’s Liberation Army After Next (Army War College, 2000).
16

Office of Naval Intelligence, Chinese Exercise, Strait 961: 8-25 March 1996, 1996.

17

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress
Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999.
18

“Russian Navy to Conduct First Joint Exercise with PRC,” Sing Tao Jih Pao (Hong
Kong), in FBIS; “Russia, China to Hold Military Exercises Early Oct,” Voice of Russia
(Moscow), October 1, 1999, in FBIS; “Russian Warships Complete Visit to Shanghai,” RIA
(Moscow), October 6, 1999, in FBIS; “Sino-Russian Naval Exercise Reviewed,” Yazhou
Zhoukan [Asiaweek] (Hong Kong), October 11-17, 1999, in FBIS.
19

For a study that examined PLA modernization with an emphasis on strategic aspects, such
as the targeting of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
systems with missiles and information warfare, see: Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic
Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle, PA: Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999). For some published PLA writings on future warfare, see:
Michael Pillsbury (editor), Chinese Views of Future Warfare and China Debates the Future
Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, 1997 and 2000).
20

Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Security Policy.

CRS-6
China’s interests.21 Over the last two decades, discussion of China’s interests and
challenges to regional stability has shifted from its role in the Cold War to domestic
repression and instability (e.g., Tiananmen crackdown) to claims over the South
China Sea to tensions over Taiwan (and the potential involvement of U.S. and
Japanese forces).
Especially since the mid-1990s, China has viewed its top security problem as
preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation and securing unification as “one China.”
This focus has catalyzed PLA modernization, including procurement of advanced
foreign military equipment. In the longer-term, experts believe that China also aims
to preclude Japan’s rise as the strongest Asian power, ensure PRC influence over the
Korean peninsula, support PRC claims in the East and South China Seas, subdue
India’s quest for power, and counter American might in the region.

Increasing Foreign Arms Acquisitions since 1990
In the early 1990s, a number of changes in the world contributed to the PRC’s
renewed arms procurement from the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia – the
PLA’s source of arms in the 1950s, before the Sino-Soviet split. Israel has been cited
as another source of weapons technology, in secondary importance.22 After the
Tiananmen crackdown in June 1989, the United States imposed sanctions that have
included a suspension of arms sales to the PRC.23 Previously, the PRC had looked
to the United States for some weapons technology, including a military aircraft
modernization program called “Peace Pearl.”24 The rationale for U.S.-PRC
cooperation during the Reagan Administration stemmed from the Cold War, the end
of which in 1991 removed the strategic basis for U.S. arms sales to China. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the dire economic situation of Russia also
brought Moscow and Beijing together in renewing their arms trade. Initially for
domestic security reasons, PRC leaders began to pay greater attention to the PLA, as
indicated by double-digit increases in the public defense budget, beginning with a
real increase in 1990 that was the first since the early 1980s.25 Moreover, by the early
1990s, the PRC’s economic reforms, expanded foreign trade, and earnings from
tourism had spurred significant jumps in its foreign exchange holdings. As an
indicator, with about $43 billion in foreign reserves in early 1992, the PRC held the

21

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
22

Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A Quest for “Superb
and Secret Weapons,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report
No. 11 (Oxford University Press, 1995).
23

U.S. sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen crackdown were enacted in section 902 of
the Foreign Authorization Act for FYs 1990 and 1991 (P.L. 101-246).
24

As announced by the State Department on December 22, 1992, the Bush Administration
decided to close out the four suspended Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, which involved
an avionics upgrade for the F-8 fighter, equipment for munitions production, four antisubmarine torpedoes, and two artillery-locating radars.
25

Central Intelligence Agency, The Chinese Economy in 1989 and 1990: Trying to Revive
Growth While Maintaining Social Stability, July 1990.

CRS-7
6th largest foreign exchange reserves in the world, part of which was available for
arms.26
U.S. victory in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 also altered perceptions of world
power relations and dramatically demonstrated to PRC leaders the obsolescence of
PLA equipment. PRC leaders quickly learned lessons from that war, driving them
to upgrade the PLA for modern warfare.27 Lastly, after pursuing quiet, unofficial ties
since 1979, reportedly including several billion dollars in defense sales, the PRC and
Israel established diplomatic relations in 1992.28 In short, Beijing had greater
motivation, resources, and opportunity to acquire modern arms from abroad.
Thus, in the 1990s, as a result of the turn to major foreign military equipment
to modernize the PLA, the PRC ranked among the top ten leading arms buyers
among developing nations. As an indicator of its arms purchases from abroad, in the
period 1993-2000, China ranked 3rd in arms transfer agreements with a total value of
$12.6 billion, behind Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). In the
same 8-year period, China received a total value of $6.2 billion in arms deliveries.
Russia has been the primary source of China’s arms. Estimated values of China’s
acquisitions, in current U.S. dollars, are shown in Table 1 below.29

26

Central Intelligence Agency, The Chinese Economy in 1991 and 1992: Pressure to Revisit
Reform Mounts, July 1992.
27

Sheryl WuDunn, “War Astonishes Chinese and Stuns Their Military,” New York Times,
March 20, 1991; “Leaders Reach Consensus on Hi-Tech Development,” Ta Kung Pao
(PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong), April 27, 1991; “CPC Leadership on Technological
Development,” Wen Wei Po (PRC-owned newspaper in Hong Kong), May 21, 1991.
28

Clyde Haberman, “Israeli Aide’s Trip Linked to China Ties,” New York Times, January
9, 1992; DCI Woolsey’s answers to questions from a hearing of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, “Proliferation Threats of the 1990s,” February 24, 1993; Amnon
Barzilai, “Bringing Down the Chinese Wall,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 1999.
29

CRS Report RL31083, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000,
August 16, 2001, by (name redacted).

CRS-8

Table 1. Values of China’s Arms Acquisitions
Period

Agreements

Deliveries

1993-1996

$ 7.1 billion

$ 2.9 billion

1997-2000

$ 5.5 billion

$ 3.3 billion

1993-2000

$12.6 billion

$ 6.2 billion

In comparison, some other governments in the developing world acquired more
arms than the PRC, which ranked 8th among top recipients of arms deliveries.
According to the same CRS Report, in the 8-year period, Saudi Arabia (ranking 1st)
received $65.9 billion in arms deliveries; and Taiwan (ranking 2nd), $21.0 billion.
Table 2 shows China’s ranking among the top 10 recipients of arms, excluding
developed powers (United States, Russia, European nations, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand).

Table 2. China Among Top 10 Developing Arms Recipients
Rank

Recipient

Value of Deliveries,
1993-2000

1

Saudi Arabia

$65.9 billion

2

Taiwan

$21.0 billion

3

Egypt

$10.7 billion

4

South Korea

$9.7 billion

5

U.A.E.

$7.9 billion

6

Kuwait

$7.6 billion

7

Israel

$7.6 billion

8

China

$6.2 billion

9

Iran

$4.2 billion

10

Malaysia

$4.1 billion

Major Arms Acquisitions
Since embarking on foreign procurement for steady military modernization in
1990, the PLA has acquired or committed to acquire (with preliminary agreements
or contracts) select types and modest quantities of weapon systems, as described
below using public sources of information. Table 3 summarizes these major
acquisitions. Following this discussion on what the PLA has been acquiring, the next
two sections will assess the implications of these acquisitions for upgrading PLA air
and naval capabilities and the challenges they may pose for other forces in Asia.

CRS-9

Table 3. China’s Major Conventional Arms Acquisitions Since
1990
Qty.

Year
of Sale

Year of
Delivery

Mi-17
helicopters

60

1990-97

1991-99

from Russia

Il-76 transport
aircraft

10

1990-92

1991-93

from Russia

Su-27 fighters

26
22
<200

1991
1995
1996

1992
1996
1998-?

S-300/SA-10
SAM
regiments

4

1991-99

1993-00

Kilo-class
submarines

4

1994

1995-98

Tor-M1/SA-15
SAM
regiments

2

1995-99

1997-00

Sovremennyclass
destroyers

2

1996

1999-00

A-50 AEW
aircraft

4

1996;
2000

Su-30 fighters

38

1999

Item

Value
($ mil)

1,000
710
2,500

from Russia; armed
with AA-10 and AA11 AAMs; up to 200
(called J-11) to be coproduced under
license with Russian
help over perhaps 15
years
from Russia; similar
to U.S. Patriot air
defense system

700

from Russia; 2 Type
877, 2 Type 636
from Russia

1,000

800

2000-01

Comment

2,000

from Russia; equipped
with 3M-80 Moskit
(SS-N-22 Sunburn)
ASCMs, Uragan (SAN-7 Gadfly) SAMs,
and Ka-27 and Ka-28
ASW helicopters.
from Russia; for
PLAAF; 1st Israeli
Phalcon radar deal
canceled in 2000
from Russia;
armaments could
include Python-4
AAMs (Israeli), KR-1
anti-radiation AAMs,
air-launched Moskit,
R-77 (AA-12) AAMs.

CRS-10
Mi-17 Helicopters. In the first purchase of military equipment from Moscow
after the Sino-Soviet split ended with rapprochement in the late 1980s, the PLA
purchased 24 Mi-17 transport helicopters for army troops in 1990 and received them
by 1991.30 One source reported that the PLA ordered 30 Mi-17s in 1995 which were
delivered by 1997, when the PLA ordered five more, for a total of about 60 Mi-17
helicopters by 1999.31 The Mi-17s were assigned to the army aviation corps.32
Il-76 Transports. Beijing also procured from Moscow three Il-76TD
transport aircraft in 1990, and PRC official media confirmed the arrival of the planes
in 1991.33 In 1992, the PLA ordered seven Russian Il-76s in a deal worth $200
million that was paid 40 percent in hard currency and 60 percent in barter goods.34
Thus, the PLA Air Force is believed to have acquired 10 Il-76 transports by 1993.35
The Pentagon confirmed that the PLA Air Force has about a dozen Il-76 heavy lift
aircraft.36 The Il-76 transports were assigned to the PLA Air Force’s 13th Air
Division near Wuhan, Hubei province, to support the airborne troops (15th Airborne
Army).37
Su-27 Fighters and Armaments. Beijing’s first controversial order in the
renewed arms procurement relationship with Moscow involved the Su-27, the first
fourth-generation fighter for the PLA Air Force. China bought 48 Russian Su-27s.38
The PRC and the Soviet Union began high-level negotiations over fighters in
1990,39 later reported to be for two dozen Su-27 fighters.40 The Soviets demonstrated
several fighters, including the Su-27, in Beijing in March 1991.41 Beijing signed the

30

Far Eastern Economic Review, October 11, 1990; Gill and Kim.

31

International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1999-2000.

32

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st
Century, Rand, 1995.
33

Xinhua [New China News Agency], September 26, 1991, translated in FBIS; Far Eastern
Economic Review, October 7, 1993.

34

Tai Ming Cheung, “Arms Reduction,” Far Eastern Economic Review, October 14, 1993.

35

IISS, 1999-2000; Gill and Kim.

36

Secretary of Defense, “The Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant
to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999; and “Report on the Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense
Authorization Act, June 2000.
37

Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st
Century, Rand, 1995.
38

Office of Naval Intelligence, “Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare,” 1996.

39

“China Seeking Soviet Fighters,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 21, 1990; Tai Ming
Cheung, “A Sale is in the Air,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 6, 1990.
40

Tanjug [Yugoslav News Agency], November 9, 1990, in FBIS; Far Eastern Economic
Review, February 14, 1991.

41

People’s Daily (overseas edition), March 15, 1991; Xinhua, March 22, 1991; in FBIS.

CRS-11
contract later in 1991.42 By 1992, Russia delivered 26 Su-27s, including two for
free.43 Reporting to the United Nations (U.N.), both Russia and China confirmed that
it received 26 Russian combat aircraft in 1992, and Russia added that six of them
were training aircraft.44 The two countries also reported a transfer of 144 missiles.
These were believed to be AA-10 air-to-air missiles (AAMs) to arm the Su-27s.45
The value of this first Su-27 package eventually reached about $1 billion, with
payment involving 60 percent in hard currency and 40 percent in barter goods.46
After showing interest in 1993 in buying a second order of Su-27s, the PRC
ordered 22 of the fighters in 1995 in a deal worth about $710 million, with perhaps
50-100 percent in hard currency.47 In reporting to the U.N., both China and Russia
confirmed that the transfer of 22 aircraft took place in 1996.48
China’s Su-27s, a version called Su-27SKK, reportedly have been based in
southeastern China, with the first group at Wuhu, Anhui province (under the Nanjing
Military Region), and the second at Suixi, in Guangdong province (under the
Guangzhou Military Region).49 AAMs equipped on the SU-27s include the AA10/Alamo as well as the AA-11/Archer infrared AAM.50 The total number of these
AAMs cannot be established through open sources.

42

Flight International, April 3-9, 1991; Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1991.

43

Far Eastern Economic Review, August 20, 1992, December 17, 1992.

44

United Nations General Assembly, “United Nations Register of Conventional Arms,
Report of the Secretary-General,” October 11, 1993.
45

Gill and Kim.

46

Far Eastern Economic Review, May 23, 1991; Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far
Eastern Economic Review, September 3, 1992; “‘Made in China’ Deal is Forged for Su27s,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Aleksandr Koretskiy, “China Will Be
Manufacturing Russian Airplanes on Its Own,” Kommersant Daily (Moscow), translated by
FBIS.
47

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993;
“‘Made in China’ Deal is Forged for Su-27s,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995;
“Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 10,
1997.
48

U.N. Register of Conventional Arms for 1996; Paul Lewis, “China Receives Su-27 Batch
and Discusses Third Order,” Flight International, October 23-29, 1996.
49

“China Prepares for Local Production of Sukhois,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997;
Federation of American Scientists ([http://www.fas.org]). The Secretary of Defense said
in the June 2000 report that a PLA operation against Taiwan would include air and ground
force units under the Nanjing and Guangzhou Military Regions.
50

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997;
Douglas Barrie, “Russia and Israel Prepare for Dogfight Over Chinese Missile,” Flight
International, September 24-30, 1997; Alexander A. Sergounin and Sergey V. Subbotin,
“Russian Arms Transfers to East Asia in the 1990s,” SIPRI Research Report No. 15 (Oxford
University Press, 1999); IISS, Military Balance 1999-2000; Jane’s; Secretary of Defense,
“The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99
Appropriations Bill, February 1999.

CRS-12
China’s Su-27s are not believed to have an in-flight refueling capability.51
Moreover, a 1996 press account cited a classified Pentagon report as saying that
China’s converted B-6 tankers support the indigenous F-8 fighter, and perhaps also
the FB-7 and/or F-10 fighters under development, but the report did not mention
aerial-refueling of Su-27s.52
As agreed in principle in 1995, Russia consented in 1996 to allow China to coproduce perhaps as many as 200 Su-27s under license, initially consisting of
assembly from Russian kits, eventually leading to full production in China over a
period of perhaps 15 years.53 This deal was worth around $2.5 billion, including
$450 million for the license to produce and up to $2 billion for co-production.54 The
PRC has designated the PRC version, produced at the Shenyang Aircraft Factory, as
the J-11 (or F-11).55 With the help of over 100 Russian engineers, China assembled
the first two kits in 1998 and flight-tested the planes in December 1998, but the
aircraft had to be rebuilt afterwards.56 By 2000, with initial production problems and
the schedule falling behind, Russia planned to deliver at least 20 already-assembled
Su-27s as part of the deal.57
S-300/SA-10 Air Defense Systems. China has sought to upgrade its air
defense capability with the purchase of the Russian S-300/SA-10 Grumble area
defense system (similar to the U.S. Patriot system). According to a 2000 Pentagon
report to Congress, China has procured limited numbers of “state-of-the-art” Russian
surface-to-air (SAM) systems, namely, the SA-10b, SA-10c, and SA-15.
(Procurement of the SA-15 is discussed below.) The SA-10b (S-300PMU) missile
has a range of 90 km (56 mi); the SA-10c (S-300PMU1), 150 km (93 mi).58
According to the report, these Russian air defense systems provide only a

51

According to Piotr Butowski, “Dominance by Design: the Reign of Russia’s ‘Flankers’,”
Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1999, the Su-27, unlike the Su-30, has no standard
provision for in-flight refueling.
52

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Arms Buildup Increases Attack Range,” Washington Times, March
12, 1996.
53

Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Barbara Opall, “China Mulls Production of CarrierBased Su-27,” Defense News, November 18-24, 1996; “China Prepares for Local Production
of Sukhois,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 16, 1997.
54

“Russian-Chinese Trade May Triple Due to Energy, Military Links,” Interfax (Moscow),
April 16, 1997; “Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
December 10, 1997; Pyotr Yudin, “Russia’s Sukhoi Plans Aircraft Technical Center in
India,” Defense News, February 23-March 1, 1998.
55

Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

56

“Beijing Builds Su-27 Fighters from Russian Kits,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 10,
1998; “Test Flights of 1st Domestically Made Su-27 Fighters,” Voice of Russia (Moscow),
December 31, 1998, in FBIS; “China-assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly, February 24, 1999; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.
57

Robert Sae-Liu, “Russia to Make Up China’s ‘Flanker’ Fighter Shortfall,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, June 14, 2000.
58

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1996-97.

CRS-13
“rudimentary” and “limited” defense against aircraft and cruise missiles, as China
tries to further fill the gaps in its air defense structure by building its own systems
using purchased technology. Moreover, the assessment said that “China’s groundbased air defense forces reportedly can provide no better than point defense; there is
no comprehensive, integrated national air defense network.”59
By 1998, China reportedly acquired two S-300 regiments (each with perhaps
four to six batteries to surround a defensive area) and began negotiations to acquire
two more S-300 regiments for other areas.60 The PRC first purchased four to six S300PMU batteries in 1991 and acquired them in 1993, with an initial batch of
perhaps 60-100 missiles and 120 more missiles in 1994.61 The PLA Air Force first
deployed the long-range S-300 batteries around Beijing to protect this major political
and economic site.62 By 1999, China also reportedly deployed several S-300 batteries
to a second area in Fujian province across the strait from Taiwan (at Longtian, near
Fuzhou). In addition, the PLA began to prepare for the deployment of additional S300 batteries at two more areas across the strait from Taiwan (near the coastal cities
of Xiamen in Fujian province and Shantou in Guangdong province). The S-300
batteries near Xiamen were expected to be operational in early 2000.63 While the
operational status of the 3rd and 4th S-300 regiments is uncertain, it appears that the
PLA Air Force has been acquiring four S-300 regiments (with plans to defend the
four areas of Beijing, Longtian, Xiamen, and Shantou).
Public reports do not provide the total number of S-300 launchers or missiles
the PLA has deployed. An estimate of the number of S-300 missiles deployed by the
PLA Air Force would depend on the number of batteries in each regiment and the
number of launchers in each battery. Each S-300 system consists of a towed launcher
with four launch tubes (towed by a heavy wheeled tractor) or a mobile launcher (a
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)) with four launch tubes to fire reloadable
missiles.64 One S-300 regiment has several batteries, and the regimental command
post can control up to six batteries. A typical S-300 battery consists of up to four

59

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000;
China’s acquisition of the SA-10c is also reported in: Office of Naval Intelligence,
Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 1997.
60

“China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 2, 1998.

61

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993;
Steven J. Zaloga, “‘Grumble:’ Guardian of the Skies – Part 2,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
April 1997; “Russian Area Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group
Corporation, February 2000.
62

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997; John
Pike, “S-300PMU,” Nuclear Fores Guide, Federation of American Scientists
([http://www.fas.org]); Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air
Force Enters the 21st Century, Rand, 1995.
63

Bill Gertz, “Chinese Bases Near Taiwan Sport Defense Missiles,” Washington Times,
March 28, 2000.
64

“Russian Area Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Corporation,
February 2000.

CRS-14
launchers, a command and control vehicle, a radar vehicle, additional missiles for
reloads, and maintenance equipment.65 The PLA’s initial procurement of four to six
S-300 batteries may have comprised one regiment. If assuming four TELs (each with
four launch tubes) in each battery and four to six batteries in each regiment, one
regiment in the PLA Air Force would have 16-24 TELs that could fire 64-96 missiles
(with further reloads) to protect one area.
Kilo Submarines. In addition to equipping the PLA Air Force, the PRC also
placed priority on acquiring modern weapon systems for the PLA Navy. By 1993,
Beijing had begun negotiations with Moscow on the purchase of perhaps four Kiloclass diesel-electric submarines (SS).66 China finalized an agreement with Russia by
November 1994 to acquire four Kilo-class submarines for about $700 million.67 In
October 1994, a PLA submarine’s vulnerability to tracking by anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) aircraft of the U.S. Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle group in the Yellow Sea
may have strengthened the PLA Navy’s resolve to quickly acquire advanced Russian
submarines rather than waiting for new indigenous submarines.68
According to their reports to the U.N., China acquired a Russian warship, likely
the first Kilo, in 1994, and another warship in 1995.69 It was in February 1995 that
Russia shipped the first Kilo to China aboard a cargo ship, and Russia delivered the
second Kilo in October 1995.70 The PLA’s first two Kilos are the older Type
877EKM model. In 1997, China received its third Kilo, the first of two of the more
advanced Type 636 model that had been supplied only to the Russian navy.71
According to a Russian marketing brochure, the Type 636, or Project 636, submarine
is one of the quietest submarines in the world. It can operate up to 400 miles
submerged and remain at sea for up to 45 days.72 With the Kilos, the PLA Navy
acquired updated sonar design and quieting technology, and wake-homing and wireguided acoustic homing torpedoes.73 Russia transferred to the PLA its second Project
65

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1996-97; Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

66

Tai Ming Cheung, “China’s Buying Spree,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 8, 1993.

67

Robert Karniol, “China to Buy Russian ‘Kilo’ Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
November 19, 1994; “Russian Imports Step in to Fill the Arms Gap,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, December 10, 1997.
68

Jim Mann and Art Pine, “Faceoff Between U.S. Ship, Chinese Sub is Revealed,” Los
Angeles Times, December 14, 1994; Barbara Starr, “‘Han Incident’ Proof of China’s Naval
Ambition,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 7, 1995. According to press reports, although
U.S. ASW aircraft tracked the PLA submarine and the PRC scrambled fighters to within
sight of the U.S. aircraft, neither side fired shots in this encounter. However, the PLA later
warned a U.S. military attache in Beijing that China may use force in a future confrontation.

69

U.N., “Register of Conventional Arms.”

70

Barbara Starr, “USA Keeps an Eye on Slow ‘Kilo’ to China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
February 25, 1995; Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges, 1997.
71

“China Should Receive Its Third ‘Kilo’ by November,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 30,
1997.
72

Rosvoorouzhenie, “Project 636 Diesel-Electric Submarine,” marketing brochure, 1996.

73

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges, 1997.

CRS-15
636 Kilo in late 1998.74 While China did not report its arms transfers to the U.N.
after 1997, Russian reports confirmed that it transferred a warship to China in 1997
and another in 1998.75 China may seek two or three more Kilos, as well as upgraded
weapons to arm the Kilos, including the Russian 3M54 Club anti-ship cruise
missile.76
The Secretary of Defense has confirmed the PLA Navy’s acquisition of the
Kilos, saying that the Kilos, along with more ASW training, are expected to improve
the capability of the PLA’s submarines to conduct ASW operations. He wrote,
“China’s submarine fleet could constitute a substantial force capable of controlling
sea lanes and mining approaches around Taiwan, as well as a growing threat to
submarines in the East and South China Seas.”77
Tor/SA-15 Air Defense Systems. In addition to the S-300 area defense
system, the PLA has also acquired the shorter-range Russian Tor (SA-15) air defense
system, whose missile has a range of 12 km (7 mi) against aircraft and 5 km (3 mi)
against cruise missiles.78 China initially acquired one Tor-M1 regiment by 1998 and
began negotiations on an additional regiment.79 Each regiment is believed to include
16 Tor-M1 systems, and the PLA has acquired perhaps 35 Tor-M1s. A PLA Tor-M1
regiment appears to match the Russian organization of having four batteries, each
with four launch vehicles (each firing eight missiles).80 China first ordered 13-15
systems in 1995, which were delivered in 1997, and purchased 20 more systems in
1999, with deliveries in 2000.81 The cost of the Tor-M1 systems has been unclear,
since Moscow delivered the second order in partial payment for debts to Beijing.82
China may secure a license to produce 160 launchers.83
74

Moscow TV Shows PRC, Iranian Crews Receiving Submarines,” NTV (Moscow),
December 30, 1998, in FBIS; “China Gets Second Sub from Russia,” Pacific Stars and
Stripes, December 31, 1998.
75

U.N., “Register of Conventional Arms.”

76

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and
Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Yihong Zhang, “China
Negotiates to Buy Advanced Russian Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August
9, 2000.
77

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
78

Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

79

“Russian Point Defense SAMs,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Corporation,
February 1997; “China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
September 2, 1998.

80

“SA-15 ‘Gauntlet’,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, 2000.

81

Military Balance 1999-2000; Nikolai Novichkov, “Tor-M1s Help to Pay Debt to Beijing,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 15, 2000; Yihong Zhang, “China In Talks with Russia to
Produce Tor-M1 SAM,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 19, 2000.

82
83

Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 2, 1998, March 15, 2000.

Yihong Zhang, “China In Talks with Russia to Produce Tor-M1 SAM,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, July 19, 2000.

CRS-16
Sovremenny Destroyers and Sunburn Missiles. PRC and Russian
leaders began talks on destroyers in 1994, but in late 1996, after U.S. deployment of
two carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan in March 1996 during provocative
PLA military and missile exercises, Russia and China agreed on the sale of two
Sovremenny-class destroyers. Each destroyer would be armed with 8 powerful (660lb high-explosive or 200-kt nuclear warhead), over-the-horizon (range of 86 nautical
miles, or 100 statute miles), supersonic (Mach 2.5), low-flying 3M-80 Moskit (SS-N22/Sunburn) anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Each destroyer cost around $400
million, and the total package, with weapons systems, was valued at about $1 billion,
marking the first Russian arms sale to China in all hard currency. In December 1996,
then PRC Premier Li Peng visited Moscow and signed a military cooperation
agreement that apparently included the destroyers.84
On December 25, 1999, the first of the two Sovremenny destroyers for the PLA
Navy carried out sea trials in the Baltic Sea and was transferred to the PLA Navy
(PLAN) at the St. Petersburg shipyard.85 PLA and Russian naval crews then sailed
the destroyer, named the Hangzhou, to China in February 2000.86 As confirmed by
the Pentagon, it joined the PLAN’s East Sea Fleet, after sailing through the
Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait.87 The second
destroyer began sea trails in June 2000 that included firings of Sunburn ASCMs.88
On November 25, 2000, the PLAN accepted the second Sovremenny in St.
Petersburg and sailed it to China where it joined the other Sovremenny at Dinghai

84

“Russia: Officials Sign Trade, Military, Finance Agreements,” Interfax (Moscow),
December 27, 1996, in FBIS; “China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly, January 15, 1997; Bill Gertz, “Pentagon Says Russians Sell Destroyers to
China,” Washington Times, January 10, 1997; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1997-98'; Russian
Destroyers for China to Carry Moskit Missiles,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), November 26,
1997, in FBIS; “Russian Kamovs Set to Boost Chinese ASW,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
March 4, 1998.
85

“Russian-Made PRC Destroyer Starts Baltic Sea Trials,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow),
August 5, 1999, in FBIS; Trevor Hollingsbee, “Delivery of First Russian Destroyer Boosts
Firepower of Navy,” South China Morning Post, December 22, 1999; Bill Gertz, “China
Will Get Russian Ship This Week,” Washington Times, December 23, 1999.
86

Robert Karniol, “China’s First Sovremenny Sets Sail for Home,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
January 19, 2000.
87

Craig S. Smith, “New Chinese Guided-Missile Ship Heightens Tension,” New York Times,
February 9, 2000; Pentagon, news briefing, February 10, 2000; “China’s Destroyer Purchase
from Russia Discussed,” Zhongguo Tongxun She [China News Agency] (Hong Kong),
February 12, 2000, in FBIS.
88

Bill Gertz, “Russia Readies Warship for China,” Washington Times, July 12, 2000;
Nikolai Novichkov, “Second Chinese Destroyer Tested,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 26,
2000.

CRS-17
naval base (near Shanghai) in January 2001.89 In addition, China may acquire two
or more Sovremenny-class destroyers.90
The Pentagon confirmed that the PLAN planned to receive two Sovremennys
by 2000, armed with the SS-N-22 Sunburn supersonic ASCM.91 China initially
ordered about 50 Sunburn missiles, and the first shipment of 24 missiles arrived in
China in the spring of 2000.92 In addition, the PLA also acquired Uragan (SA-N-7
Gadfly) surface-to-air (SAM) missiles and eight Ka-27 and Ka-28 ASW
helicopters.93 In 2000, the Secretary of Defense’s report to Congress confirmed that
the PLA was acquiring the SA-N-7 SAM system equipped on the Sovremennys and
wrote that the SA-N-7 “is a modern, medium-range naval SAM system; however, it
will have only a limited capability against cruise missiles.”94
A-50 AWACS and Canceled Phalcon Deal. To more effectively utilize
its advanced fighters, the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy have long required airborne
early warning (AEW) aircraft, with each service originally seeking perhaps ten AEW
systems from European, Russian, or Israeli sources, to supplement unsuccessful PRC
developmental efforts.95 The PLA would acquire potential new capabilities, ranging
from AEW aircraft (largely radars in the sky) to airborne early warning and control
systems (AWACS) aircraft (an airborne command post that detects enemy targets and
provides battle management by coordinating attacks among air, naval, and ground
forces). The roles of these aircraft could be defensive (detecting aircraft and cruise
missiles) or offensive (control of fighters). Moreover, the implications of the PLA’s
AEW acquisitions would also depend on how well they are used in conjunction with
other acquisitions, such as fighters and naval vessels.

89

Interfax (Moscow), November 25, 2000; Kommersant (Moscow), November 28, 2000;
Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 17, 2001.
90

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and
Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Nikolai Novichkov, “Four
Sovremennys in Total for Beijing,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 15, 2000; “Russia-China
Destroyer Deal Detailed,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), March 15, 2000.
91

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
92

“Russia to Export More ‘Sunburn’ Anti-Ship Missiles to PRC,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow),
September 25, 1998, in FBIS; Simon Saradzhyan, “Russians Tout Anti-ship Sunburn Missile
for Chinese,” Defense News, October 12-18, 1998; Bill Gertz, “Russia Sends Cruise
Missiles to China for New Warships,” Washington Times, May 19, 2000.
93

“Russia Delivers Eight Anti-Sub Helicopters to China,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), December
10, 1999, in FBIS; “China Receives Russian Equipment,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January
5, 2000.
94

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.
95

G. Jacobs, “China’s Changing Doctrine,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10, 1990; “West
Briefs China on AEW,” Flight International, August 25-31, 1993; Robert Karniol, “China
Chose ‘Careless’ Platforms,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 6, 1995; Jason Glashow and
Vivek Raghuvanshi, “China Seeks AEW To Guard Su-27s,” Defense News, March 18-24,
1996.

CRS-18
By 1992, China had begun talks with Russia about purchasing perhaps three
modified Il-76 AEW aircraft.96 Later, talks involved acquisition of an Israeli radar
system. Three-way negotiations that began in 1994 considered four AEW aircraft for
$1 billion. However, China, Russia, and Israel reached initial agreement in 1996 on
a $250 million deal to supply one AEW aircraft to the PLA Air Force by installing
an Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Phalcon phased-array radar with 360 degree
coverage on a modified Russian Il-76 plane.97 The Phalcon system could be similar
in capability to U.S. E-3 AWACS on Boeing 707s. One source said that the Phalcon
could track up to 60 targets at the same time and guide a dozen fighters in allweather, day and night operations,98 while another report credited the Phalcon as
being able to track 100 targets simultaneously.99 Meanwhile, China also looked to
Britain’s GEC-Marconi Avionics to equip up to four Il-76s with an AEW system, and
Russia wanted to supply its own AEW system.100
At about the same time that the PLA Air Force looked at procuring the A-50
AEW aircraft in 1996, China reportedly signed a contract with a British firm, Racal
Thorn Defense of Racal Electronics, to buy six to eight Searchwater maritime
reconnaissance radars to equip Y-8 aircraft of the PLA Navy, in a deal valued at
about $62 million.101 However, it appears that both sides did not conclude the sale,
and there are no reports that the PLA Navy has deployed the new system. Indeed, the
Pentagon’s report to Congress on China’s military power, submitted in June 2000,
did not mention such acquisitions by the PLA Navy.102
The Phalcon deal became an increasingly controversial issue between the United
States and Israel. After military tensions in the Taiwan Strait that included PLA
“test-firings” of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles (in 1995 and 1996) and U.S.
deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups (in March 1996), U.S. officials,
including Defense Secretary William Perry, expressed concerns to Israeli officials
about the pending AEW sale.103 In May 1997, Israel and Russia reached agreement
on modifying one Il-76, as a Beriev A-50I Mainstay, for $250 million, with the

96

Tai Ming Cheung, “Loaded Weapons,” Far Eastern Economic Review, September 3,
1992.
97

Ari Egozi, “Israel Presses Russia in Bid to Clear Way for China AEW Deal,” Flight
International, July 17-23, 1996.
98

O’Sullivan, Arieh, “Israel Mum on China Defense Ties,” Jerusalem Post, November 17,
1999.
99

Chaisson, Kernan, “Airborne Surveillance Takes Command,” Journal of Electronic
Defense, January 1999.
100

“China Poised to Seal AWACS Deal with British Firm,” AFP, October 8, 1996, in FBIS.

101

Barbara Opall and Michael J. Witt, “China Pits U.K. vs. Israel in AEW Quest,” Defense
News, August 5-11, 1996.

102

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

103

“U.S. ‘Concern’ Sparks ‘More Circumspect’ Approach to PRC,” Jerusalem Post, October
31, 1996, in FBIS; Steve Rodan, “Israel Pushes China Aircraft Deal Despite U.S., Russian
Objections,” Defense News, January 6-12, 1997.

CRS-19
option of three more AEW systems for a total cost of $1 billion.104 Russia secured
about 20 percent of the deal.105
After some delay, in October 1999, Russia transferred an Il-76 transport plane
to Israel for the installation of the Phalcon AEW radar by IAI. Pentagon
spokesperson Ken Bacon confirmed the arrival of the IL-76 in Israel and stated that
Defense Secretary William Cohen “has repeatedly raised his concerns with Israel
about the transfer of technology to China.”106
The Clinton Administration voiced stronger objections to the sale and urged
Israel to cancel the sale of the Phalcon, saying it is a system comparable to the U.S.
AWACS and could collect intelligence and guide aircraft from 250 miles away.107
President Clinton confirmed that the United States raised the issue with Israel. While
acknowledging that “the facts are in dispute,” Clinton said that “whenever any of our
friends sell sophisticated equipment that might be American in origin that is
inconsistent with the terms under which the transfer was made, then we raise that.”108
Nonetheless, U.S. objections were based not only on the question of whether
Israel would transfer U.S. technology to China, but also based on concerns about
Israeli upgrades to PLA capabilities that would affect the security situation in Asia.
Dov Zakheim, a former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense, wrote that “what matters
is that Israel should not be in the business of complicating America’s already delicate
position vis-a-vis China and Taiwan, one that led to a major crisis in the Taiwan
Strait only three years ago. Nor should Israel help to unbalance the equally delicate
relationship between China and America’s major regional allies, notably Japan and
the Republic of Korea.”109 By late 1999, some Members of Congress also objected
to the sale, including Senator Helms, who wrote to the Israeli Ambassador in
Washington that U.S. security “will be put at risk by the Phalcon and other Israeli
sales to Beijing.”110

104

“Russia Agrees Il-76 Sale to IAI for AEW,” Flight International, March 19-25, 1997;
Douglas Barrie and Ari Egozi, “Il-76 Deal Raises Israeli Hopes in Bid for China AEW
Contract,” Flight International, May 21-27, 1997; Steve Rodan, “Israel, Russia to Team on
Early Warning Platform for China,” Defense News, May 19-25, 1997; “Russia, Israel to
Make Spy Planes,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1997.
105

Steve Rodan, “Il-76 AEW Upgrade Bolsters Israeli, Russian Industry Ties,” Defense
News, July 21-27, 1997.

106

“Israel to Convert Russian Spy Plane for China,” Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), November 2,
1999, in FBIS; Barbara Slavin, “Israel-China AWACS Deal Worries U.S.,” USA Today,
November 4, 1999.
107

Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Seeks to Curb Israeli Arms Sales to China,” New York Times,
November 11, 1999.
108

White House, “Remarks by the President on Education and the Budget,” November 11,
1999.

109

Dov S. Zakheim, “Get Real on China,” Jerusalem Post, November 22, 1999.

110

Senator Jesse Helms, letter to Zalman Shoval, Embassy of Israel, November 17, 1999.

CRS-20
According to the Pentagon, the United States expressed opposition to the sale
as early as 1996,111 but in 2000, U.S. opposition to Israel’s transfer of the Phalcon
AEW/AWACS system to China mounted openly. Speaking in Jerusalem at a news
conference with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak on April 3rd, Defense Secretary
Cohen called on Israel to cancel the “counter-productive” sale. Cohen said, “I have
indicated before that the United States does not support the sale of this type of
technology to China because of the potential of changing the balance in that region,
with the tensions running high as they are between China and Taiwan.”112
There was also bipartisan opposition in Congress. On April 6, 2000,
Representative Sonny Callahan, chairman of the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs,
sought to withhold $250 million, equivalent to the value of the Phalcon sale, from the
almost $3 billion in economic and military aid, if Israel transfers the plane to China.
Representative David Obey, the ranking Democrat on the Appropriations Committee
supported the effort.113
The Pentagon’s 1999 report to Congress on Taiwan security had expected that
the PLA would procure “several” Phalcon AEW systems and noted that the PRC
“conceivably could have fully operational AEW platforms by 2005.”114 The 2000
report, however, noted that the PLA Air Force’s AEW program remained behind
schedule. The report noted the expectation that the PLA Air Force would achieve the
incorporation of both aerial refueling and AEW/airborne command and control
capabilities later in the decade. Such capabilities would provide a significant “force
multiplier,” but only for a relatively small number of aircraft at one time.115
By May 2000, Israel had nearly completed work on the AEW aircraft.116
However, on July 11, 2000, during peace talks at Camp David, MD, Prime Minister
Barak told President Clinton that Israel canceled the Phalcon sale in a letter delivered
to PRC President Jiang Zemin the day before.117
Many observers have expected Russia to complete the sale of AWACS aircraft
to China, with existing A-50s from the Russian Air Force and/or, later, an advanced
A-50E version, that would bring Russia more earnings than the original deal
involving Israel. The A-50E is designed to guide up to 30 aircraft and track 300

111

Pentagon, news briefing, April 11, 2000.

112

Pentagon, news briefing with Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, April 3, 2000.

113

Eric Pianin, “Israel-China Radar Deal Opposed,” Washington Post, April 7, 2000.

114

Secretary of Defense, “The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” Report to Congress
Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999.
115

Secretary of Defense, “Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,”
Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2000.

116
117

Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, May 19, 2000.

Pauline Jelinek, “Israel Cancels Arms Sales to China in Midst of U.S. Summit,”
Associated Press, July 12, 2000; Jane Perlez, “Israel Drops Plan to Sell Air Radar to China
Military,” New York Times, July 13, 2000.

CRS-21
targets as far as 250 miles away.118 As announced in October 2000 by visiting
Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov in Beijing, Russia and China reportedly agreed
on the sale of four A-50E AWACS aircraft. The contract was said to be signed
during Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s visit to Beijing in early November 2000.
The four A-50Es will cost about $800 million.119
Su-30 Fighters and Armaments. By 1996, China and Russia had begun
negotiations over the Su-30 long-range fighter.120 By August 1999, China and Russia
signed a preliminary agreement (letter of intent) on the transfer of Su-30MKK
fighters for the PLA Air Force, an initial deal that included 38 fighters valued at
about $2 billion.121
Delivery of the Su-30s to the PLA Air Force began sooner than originally
expected, with the first 10 fighters landing at Wuhu air base (near Nanjing) in
December 2000.122 By the summer of 2001, Russia had already delivered 29 of the
Su-30s, with some based at Cangzhou air base in Hubei province. Delivery was
expected to be completed by the end of year.123
There also are indications that China has sought an additional 38 Su-30s, and
another contract worth about $2 billion was reportedly signed for this second batch
in July 2001.124 China reportedly has sought an aerial refueling capability with the

118

Ivan Safronov, “Israel Will Help Us,” Kommersant (Moscow), July 14, 2000, in FBIS;
Simon Saradzhyan, “China to Explore Buy of Russian Early Warning Aircraft,” Defense
News, July 31, 2000.

119

ITAR-TASS (Moscow), October 31, 2000, December 13, 2000; Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(Moscow), November 1, 2000; Washington Post, November 19, 2000.
120

“China Expands Reach with Russian Destroyers,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 15,
1997; Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia and China Tighten Links on Military Projects,” Jane’s
Defense Weekly, August 19, 1998; John Pomfret, “China, Russia Forging Partnership,”
Washington Post, November 21, 1998; Christiaan Virant, “China, Russia Hammer Out Arms
Deals,” Reuters, October 22, 1998; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

121

Barbara Opall-Rome, “China Sets Sights on 50 Su-30s,” Defense News, July 5, 1999;
“Russia, China Conclude Deal to Produce Fighter Jets,” Interfax (Moscow), August 6, 1999,
in FBIS; Robert Sae-Liu, “Su-30MK Purchase on Chinese Agenda,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
August 11, 1999; Philip Finnegan and Simon Saradzhyan, “New Capabilities Heighten
Asian Tensions,” Defense News, August 23, 1999; “Klebanov: Russia to Sell Su-30s to
China,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), August 24, 1999, in FBIS; Piotr Butowski, “Dominance by
Design: the Reign of Russia’s ‘Flankers’,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, November 1999;
“Overview of Russia-PRC Military-Technical Cooperation,” ITAR-TASS (Moscow), January
16, 2000, in FBIS.

122

Itar-Tass, December 18, 2000; Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey, December 20, 2000;
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 21, 2000.
123

Robert Sae-Liu, “PLAAF Develops New Airbases,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September
26, 2001.

124

Jonathan Brodie, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships, and
Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999; Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey
(Moscow), July 18, 2001, via FBIS; Washington Post, July 20, 2001; Zhongguo Tongxun

CRS-22
Su-30MKK, but its converted H-6 tankers cannot be used for the Russian fighters.125
China has negotiated to buy 4 Russian Il-78 refueling tankers for the Su-30
fighters.126
One question involved the armaments China has acquired for the Su-30 fighter.
The PRC and Israel have negotiated, since at least 1997, on the transfer of Python-4
beyond-visual-range AAMs.127 China and Russia have co-developed the KR-1 antiradiation missile, a variant of the Kh-31P (AS-17 Krypton) that has been added to a
version of the Su-30.128 The talks in 1998 included whether the Su-30 would be
armed with the newly-developed 3M-80EA anti-ship missile, the air-launched
version of the Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) equipped on the Sovremenny destroyers,
although the missile had not yet undergone flight tests.129 There have been increasing
indications that the Su-30 fighter sold to the PLA Air Force may be equipped with
the R-77 (AA-12), a medium-range AAM (similar to the U.S. AIM-120 Advanced
Medium-Range Air-to-Air- Missile, or AMRAAM) or a version of which Russia may
sell to or co-produce with China.130 In January 2001, China reportedly received some
weapons for the Su-30s, including the Kh-59ME (AS-18 “Kazoo”) TV commandguided air-to-surface missile, the Kh-29T (AS-14 “Kedge”) TV- guided air-to-surface
missile, the KAB-500Kr TV-guided bomb, and the Kh-31P anti-radiation missile.131

She [China News Agency], August 2, 2001.
125

Robert Sae-Liu, “Refueling Go-Ahead by China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 25,
1999.

126

Robert Sae-Liu, “PLAAF Develops New Airbases,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September
26, 2001.

127

Douglas Barrie, “Russia and Israel Prepare for Dogfight Over Chinese Missile,” Flight
International, September 24-30, 1997; Paul Lewis, “Israel/Russia Compete to Arm F-10
Fighter,” Flight International, October 15-21, 1997; “U.S. To Question Israel on China
Tech Transfers,” Defense News, December 8-14, 1997.
128

Douglas Barrie, “China and Russia Combine on KR-1,” Flight International, December
10-16, 1997; Barbara Opall-Rome, “China Sets Sights on 50 Su-30s,” Defense News, July
5, 1999; Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2000-2001.

129

Simon Saradzhyan, “Russians Tout Antiship Sunburn Missile for Chinese,” Defense
News, October 12-18, 1998.
130

Paul Lewis, “Russia Reviews Chinese Sales,” Flight International, September 17-23,
1997; Paul Lewis, “Israel/Russia Compete to Arm F-10 Fighter,” Flight International,
October 15-21, 1997; Tim Butcher, “Russia and China ‘are Developing Super-Fast
Missile’,” London Daily Telegraph, January 3, 2000; Steven Mufson and Thomas E. Ricks,
“Pentagon Won’t Back Taiwan Deal,” Washington Post, April 17, 2000; Jane’s All the
World’s Aircraft 2000-2001; Duncan Lennox, “China, India Close in On Russian ‘Adder’
Sale,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 6, 2000. In April 2000, the Pentagon decided to
support a sale of AMRAAMs to Taiwan, with the missiles to be kept in the United States
where Taiwan personnel would be trained to use them. The missiles would be transferred
to Taiwan, if the PLA acquired the similar Russian missile. On September 28, 2000, the
Pentagon announced that it approved the sale of 200 AIM-120C AMRAAMs to Taiwan.
131

Yihong Chang, “China Gets Second Batch of Su-30MKKs,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
August 29, 2001.

CRS-23
The above discussion of PRC efforts to acquire foreign advanced conventional
weapons raises questions regarding the effect of those systems on PLA capabilities
and implications for regional security. The following two sections will assess the
PLA’s air power and naval capabilities in light of the acquisitions.

Assessment of Air Power Acquisitions132
Platform Comparisons
The following section compares the capabilities of the fighter aircraft, AAMs,
and SAMs that China has imported to those produced indigenously by China as well
as to those found in some other Asian militaries and U.S. forces based in the region.
This comparison does not provide a complete picture of PLA air power capabilities.
It is, however, a necessary first step for further assessment. A platform-to-platform
comparison of these systems indicates that China’s imported systems appear to be
notably more capable than indigenous systems and are roughly on-par with Western
aircraft, AAMs, and SAMs.
Fighter/Attack Aircraft. Indigenous PLA fighter and attack aircraft have
been described by various analysts as obsolete and antiquated. There is consensus
in U.S. defense circles that the PLA Air Force is beset with many weaknesses. The
foremost weakness “...is that the PLAAF is currently saddled with over 2,000 aircraft
of 1950s-era Soviet design comparable to outdated U.S. fighters like the F-100, F-8,
and B-47.”133
The Su-27 and Su-30 represent significant upgrades in fighter aircraft capability
over indigenous PLA aircraft. Making simple performance comparisons, it is clear
that the Russian fighters fly farther and faster than indigenous PRC fighters. The Su27 and Su-30 are more maneuverable, and carry more and better armament than
domestic PRC aircraft. According to some analysts, the Su-27and Su-30 that China
has sought from Russia are roughly comparable to the U.S. F-15C air superiority
fighter.134 Indeed, the information in Table 4 below suggests that the Su-27 is in
many ways comparable to the best fighters in other Asian and U.S. inventories. The
Su-27's flight profile and armament are similar to those of the F-14, F-15, F-16, F/A18C/D, Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) (of Taiwan), and Mirage 2000. The Su-27
may be more maneuverable than the best Western fighters. The Russian fighter has
been described by observers as having “unbelievable agility” and being able to
perform maneuvers that “no Western fighter can emulate.”135
132

Prepared by (name redacted)

, Analyst in National Defense.

133

Tirpak, John, “Can the Fighter Force Hold Its Edge?” Air Force Magazine, January 2000:
27. and Fisher, Richard D., “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the
U.S.,” Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.

134

Fisher, Richard D., “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.,”
Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.
135

Lake, Jon, “Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker,” World Air Power Journal, Aerospace Publishing
Ltd. London. 1994: 6.

CRS-24
There are, however, additional fighter/attack aircraft characteristics that are
important measures of performance. These factors – including radar cross section
and electronic countermeasures, for instance – are difficult to quantify or compare
in the unclassified milieu. A comparison of these factors would provide a clearer
picture of how the Su-27 measures up to the Western fighter aircraft.
Radar Cross Section. An aircraft’s radar cross section has a significant
effect on its survivability. Aircraft that incorporate stealth materials and design
techniques to reduce their radar cross sections are more difficult to detect, track, and
engage than aircraft that have larger radar cross sections. The general design of
indigenous PRC aircraft and their lack of composite materials strongly suggest they
have large radar cross sections. By comparison, the Russian fighters use modern
designs that, while not stealthy on the scale of aircraft designed specifically to be
stealthy, reduce their radar cross sections appreciably relative to indigenous PRC
fighters. A U.S. Air Force assessment asserts that the Su-27's radar cross section is
“on par” with the F-15C’s, but it does not provide data to substantiate this
assessment.136 Lacking the supporting data on radar cross section, it is impossible to
make definitive statements regarding how stealthy the Su-27 is relative to Western
fighter aircraft. However, some observations can be made that suggest that the U.S.
fighter aircraft based in Asia may have lower radar cross sections than the Su-27.

136

Tirpak, John, “Can the Fighter Force Hold its Edge?” Air Force Magazine, January 2000.

783

1,187

N/A

4 AAM
2 500 lb
bombs

Max Speed
(nm/hour)

Max Range
w/tanks (nm)

+G limit (M.09)

Missiles &
Bombs

36 Air-air
rockets
2 300 lb
bombs

7

1,203

648

1966

J-7

PL-7
AAMs
unguided
AA rocket
bombs

4.8

1,188

701

1969

J-8

5 500 lb
bombs
4-7 AS
rocket

7.5

982

643

1965

Q-5

10 AAM in
AA role
unguided
bombs

9

1,985

1,350

1982

SU-27

10 AAM in
AA role
unguided
bombs

9

2,800
(w/refuel)

1,350

1988

Su-30

Russian Aircraft

6 AIM54,
AGM84/88

-

1735

1,210

1989

F-14

8 AIM-120
3 AGM
hard point

9

2,200

1,610

1979

F-15C

6 AAM
or 7
AGM-65

9

1,740

>1,290

1981

F-16D

6 AIM120, 4
AGM-65

7.5

1,333

>1,160

1986

F/A18C/D

6 hard
point

9

1,200

1,160

1994

IDF

Other Asian and U.S. Aircraft in Asia

9 hard
point

9

1,800

1,420

1991

Mirage
2000

Sources for all tables in this assessment: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense, Jane’s Strategic Weapon
Systems, Jane’s Air Launched Weapons, World Military & Civil Aircraft Briefing (Teal Group Inc), World Missile’s Briefing (Teal Group Inc), Aerospace Source
Book 2000 (Aviation Week & Space Technology),The World’s Missile Systems (General Dynamics, Inc.), and conversations with U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air
Force Offices of Legislative Affairs. Unclassified information on the capabilities of Russian and PRC weapon systems is often inconsistent and contradictory. When
information was found to be contradictory, the most conservative estimate was recorded in these tables.

1953

IOC

J-6

PRC Aircraft

Table 4. Comparison of Fighter/Attack Aircraft

CRS-25

CRS-26
First, it can be observed that while Russia does possess the ability to incorporate
stealth materials and designs in its military aircraft, it has not yet advanced to the
level of the United States in this technology. Furthermore, the United States
continues to refine its stealth technologies by developing a third generation of
stealthy aircraft: the F-22 Raptor. As the U.S. defense establishment improves its
knowledge of stealth while working on programs like the F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter, it identifies radar deflecting or absorbing techniques that can be employed
on existing aircraft.137
Another observation that suggests that the Su-27 radar cross section may be
inferior to that of U.S. aircraft is that the Su-27s operated by China are export
aircraft. It is usually (but not always) the case that an export variant of a given
aircraft does not incorporate the latest and most potent components. Thus, it would
be a very common practice for Russia to eliminate radar reducing elements of the Su27 exported to China, if feasible. Furthermore, materials and technologies that
improve an aircraft’s stealthiness are often costly and difficult to maintain. In light
of China’s maintenance shortcomings that will be outlined below, the PLAAF may
have difficulty maintaining any stealth capabilities that its Su-27s may possess.
Electronic Countermeasures. The effectiveness of an aircraft’s electronic
countermeasures (ECM) is a strong determinant of its survivability. In an era of
sophisticated radar and infrared (IR) guided surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, and
radar guided anti-aircraft artillery, modern fighter aircraft rely on a variety of
countermeasures to survive in hostile airspace. These systems include radar warning
receivers, self-protection jamming pods, towed radar and IR decoys, chaff dispensers,
and flare dispensers.
Information on the range, power, frequency, and other characteristics of
electronic warfare (EW) systems and ECM are as jealously guarded as is information
on stealth capabilities. Unclassified information on Russian aircraft EW and ECM
typically include nothing more informative than a NATO-generated code name, the
suspected manufacturer, the approximate physical dimensions of the device, and the
aircraft on which it has been observed. Another factor complicating the comparison
of Russian aircraft EW/ECM and Western aircraft EW/ECM is that these devices are
very portable. They are often based in under-wing pods and can be installed or
removed from an aircraft with relative ease.
It appears that Russia’s EW and ECM capabilities are roughly comparable to the
United States’. During the 1999 war in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force), for
instance, NATO military planners expressed strong concern over Serbia’s EW/ECM
capabilities – largely based on imported Russian equipment – even though “the
alliance didn’t face the most sophisticated Russian electronic warfare equipment

137

In the B-2 program, gold paint was found to significantly reduce the radar reflection from
cockpit canopies and was subsequently applied to F-16 and helicopter canopies in the US
inventory. Browne, Malcolm, “Will the Stealth Bomber Work?” New York Times, July 17,
1988; Cook, Nick, “The Disappearing Helicopter,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 28, 1999.

CRS-27
available.”138 China’s ability to optimally operate and maintain the EW/ECM
systems that are found on their Su-27s is another factor that is important, but difficult
to assess reliably.
Air-to-Air Missiles. PRC-manufactured AAMs are analogous in capability
to the indigenous fighters on which they are employed. They are, or are based on,
first generation weapon systems that trace their lineage to 1960s era designs. The PL2, -5, -7, -8, and -9 are short-range AAMs (3-5 km; 2-3 mi) and depend on IR
guidance. The oldest systems (PL-2, -4, -7) can only engage targets from the rear,
which limits their flexibility and constrains the aircraft’s pilot.
China’s imported AA-10 and AA-11 represent as great an improvement over
indigenous AAMs as do the Russian fighters over indigenous PRC fighters. These
missiles are effective to much longer ranges than the PRC AAMs, which adds to their
operational effectiveness and increases launch-aircraft survivability. The Russian
AAMs – especially the AA-11 – are highly maneuverable missiles, a feature that
increases their lethality.
Although the PLA Air Force has not yet acquired the Russian AA-12 or Israeli
Python 4 AAMs, it has reportedly sought them. If successfully acquired, these
systems will also represent a significant improvement in the PLA’s AAM capability.
The AA-12 has been called the “AMRAAMski,” indicating its similarities to the
premier U.S. medium-range (75 km; 47 mi) air-to-air missile. The Python 4's range
of 15 km (9 mi) is more in keeping with the range of PRC missiles. However, this
missile is extremely maneuverable, and it incorporates advanced seeker technology
that increases the missile’s lethality and increases launch-aircraft survivability.
Table 5 provides information that can be used to compare domestic PRC AAMs
to imported Russian AAMs as well as other Asian and U.S. AAMs. Russian AAMs
have been described generally as being of “high technical quality.”139 One analyst
has described the AA-10, for instance, as “generally comparable to the American
AIM-7M Sparrow missile...”140
Similar to the case of assessing fighter aircraft, air-to-air missiles possess
additional characteristics that bear strongly on their effectiveness. These
characteristics – including seeker discrimination capability and susceptibility to
electronic countermeasures, for instance – are very difficult to assess due to
classification and complexity. Even experts in the U.S. missile industry write that
“Evaluation of missile intercept performance involves so many nonlinear functions
that only sophisticated analytical modeling can reliably predict results.”141

138

Asker, James, “NATO Insecurities,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 26,
1999:27.

139

Zaloga, Steven, “Russian Air-to-Air Missiles,” World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Inc.,
February 2000.

140
141

FAS, [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/row/aa-10.htm].

Gurvine, Jeff, and Edwin Stauss. Fundamentals of Tactical Missiles. Raytheon Missile
Systems Company. Tucson, AZ. 1997: 8-39.

1981

3

11

IR

Tail
aspect
attacks
only
no off
boresight

IOC

Range km

Warhead
kg

Guidance

Misc

PL-2B

> off
boresight
than
PL2/3

IR

9

3

1982

PL-5

10 ft
lethal
radius.
tailaspect
attacks
only

IR

13

3

1987

PL-7

Based on
Python 3

IR

11

5

1990

PL-8

PRC Missiles

High
Altitude
(69k
ft)

IR

10

5

1991

PL-9

8G
intercept

INS, IR,
SAR

44

80-110

1985

AA-10

12 G
intercept
Helmet
mounted
cueing

INS, IR

7.4

20-30

1987

AA-11

Russian Missiles

All Wx
All aspect

SAR

39

45

1988

AIM-7

Helmet
mounted
sight

IR

10

8

1982

AIM9M

Home
on jam

SAR,
Inertial
and
active
radar

60

150

1985

AIM54C

All Wx,
All
aspect,
fire and
forget

Command
inertial,
active
radar

22

50

1991

AIM120

Other Asian and U.S. Missiles

Table 5. Comparison of Air-to-Air Missiles

CRS-28

Thrust AIM120 like

Command
inertial
active
or
imaging
IR

12

80

1996

Mica

All
aspect,
AIM-9
like

IR

~10

5

1993

Sky
Sword

CRS-29
Nonetheless, some observations can be made regarding two additional
characteristics that shed light on the utility of the AA-10 and AA-11 acquired by the
PLA Air Force vis-a-vis Western AAMs. These characteristics are “fire-and-forget”
capability and the missile’s “off-boresight” launch envelope. These two
characteristics are central to air superiority operations, because they often determine
which aircraft achieves the first shot during aerial combat.
“Fire-and-Forget” Capability. Shorter-range AAMs can effectively use IR
guidance. Once an IR missile is launched, the host aircraft’s role in missile guidance
is complete, and the aircraft can prepare another missile for launch, initiate evasive
action, or target another hostile aircraft. In essence, the aircraft can fire and forget
the missile. However, as range increases, the effectiveness of IR-guided missiles
diminishes.
Radar guided missiles operate more effectively at longer ranges than do IR
missiles. Active radar missiles use a radar transmitter to autonomously track targets
at short- and medium-ranges. Semi-active radar missiles require the host aircraft’s
radar to illuminate the target until missile impact. Generally speaking, AAMs that
employ active radar guidance, such as the AIM-54C, AIM-120, and Mica, fly more
independently after launch than do AAMs that employ semi-active radar guidance,
such as the AA-10 and AIM-7R. Thus, the AA-10 is not a fire-and-forget missile and
thus not as attractive from an aircraft survivability perspective as, say, an AIM-120.
However, the AA-10 “has a lock-on range of 30 km [20 mi] against typical fighter
aircraft targets...,”142 which may make up partially for this disadvantage.
“Off-Boresight” Capability. Traditionally, AAMs are launched by pointing
the host aircraft directly at the hostile aircraft and using a sight to line up the target.
The requirement to fire from this position gives advantage to the most maneuverable
aircraft or the pilot with the greatest tactical flying skill. The ability to fire a missile
from “off boresight” also proves advantageous, either by contributing by extension
to an aircraft’s maneuverability or by countering an adversary’s maneuverability.
The AA-11's most distinguishing characteristic is its high maneuverability and
its off-boresight capability. The AA-11 is the first effective “helmet-sighted” air-toair missile. With this system, a pilot can aim his weapon by turning his head and
does not have to line up the aircraft with the target. The first generation of AA-11s
can be fired 45 degrees off the aircraft’s forward line-of-direction, or off-boresight.
The second generation of this AAM has increased range and can be fired 60 degrees
off-boresight. The AIM-9M Sidewinder, by comparison, can acquire targets only
27.5 degrees off the forward line of sight and has a shorter range.143 Some analysts
assert that the AIM-120's long range and fire-and-forget capability confer much of
the same tactical flexibility as the AA-11.”144

142

Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Jane’s Information Group Ltd., 1997, London.

143

The next generation of the AIM-9, to be deployed in 2003, is expected to achieve 90
degree off-boresight launches.

144

Fisher, Richard D, “China’s Purchase of Russian Fighters: A Challenge to the U.S.,”
Asian Studies Center Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, July 31, 1996.

CRS-30
The combination of the PLA’s AA-11 AAM and highly maneuverable aircraft
imported from Russian could prove a vexing air-to-air challenge to current day
fighter aircraft of other Asian and U.S. forces. The Russian MiG-29 has been flown
against U.S. aircraft in Red Flag exercises at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. At
longer distances, the U.S. aircraft were found to have the advantage versus the
Russian plane due to superior avionics. As the distance between aircraft closed,
however, the MiG’s high maneuverability and the AA-11's off-boresight capabilities
defrayed the U.S. aircraft’s advantage. Observers noted that, at a distance of
approximately five miles, the Russian aircraft enjoyed a significant advantage.145 The
Su-27 is also a highly maneuverable aircraft, and the combination of it and the AA11 will likely prove as dangerous a combination as the MiG-29 and AA-11.
Surface-to-Air Missiles. China manufactures five different SAM systems.
Two of them – the HN-5 and QW-1– are short-range, man-portable systems. Based
on the 1960s era Russian SA-7, the HN-5's utility is limited by a primitive IR seeker
that often cannot differentiate between an aircraft’s engine signature, the sun, or heat
radiating off the ground. While the QW-1 IR seeker is much improved over the HN5's, this missile’s engagement envelope is even more limited than its predecessor’s.
China’s HQ-2 SAM is effective to a much greater altitude and range than the
manportable SAMs, but it is based on Russia’s first generation, 1950s era SA-2
SAM, and is the oldest technology in China’s inventory. The HQ-2 employs a liquid
fueled second stage rocket motor, which requires time-consuming preparation and
cumbersome handling equipment. This SAM has been described by at least one
analyst as “antiquated.”146 By reverse engineering foreign SAMs, China was able to
incorporate some improvements in the PL-9 and HQ-7 SAMs not found in earlier
PRC systems. These improvements include better seekers that allow off-axis launch
and reportedly electronic countermeasures such as “home on jam.” However, these
systems and the less advanced HQ-61 are still short-range SAMs designed to defend
against low-to-medium altitude aircraft.
The Russian SAMs acquired by China – the SA-15 and especially the SA-10 –
represent marked improvements in China’s ability to target aircraft that threaten its
airspace. The SA-15's range and intercept altitude are similar to China’s most
modern indigenous SAMs. However, the SA-15 features a number of characteristics
that make it a more effective system. For instance, the SA-15 can use its surveillance
and tracking radars and can fire missiles while moving. It can fire two missiles
simultaneously at two different targets. Perhaps more significantly, this system can
engage cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It has also been
reported that the SA-15 may have some capability against short-range ballistic
missiles.147 None of these features is found on indigenous PRC SAMs.

145

“German MiG-29s in Red Flag Exercise,” Aviation Daily, August 1, 2000.

146

Zaloga, Steven. World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group Inc., Fairfax, VA, November 1999.

147

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998; World Missiles Briefing, Teal Group,
February 2000; “China Seeks S-300 and Tor-M1 Systems,” Jane’s Defense Weekly,
September 2, 1998.

a

35

27

120

130

No

Based on
SA-2?

Max Range
(km)

Max Altitude
(km)

Surveill. Radar
Range (km)

Warhead (kg)

TBM Capable

Misc

Copy of
SA-7

No

1.1

-

2

3.6

1966

HN-5

HN-5
up-grade

No

1.5

-

0.4

0.5

1994

QW-1

CSA-N2 marinized
version

No

42kg?

-

8

10

1991

HQ-61

Crotale
copy?

No

14

20

5.5

12

1991

HQ-7

The Patriot PAC-3 has a range of 15 km against tactical ballistic missiles.

1967

IOC

HQ-2

Indigenous PRC Missiles

Python 3
copy?

No

10

>15

5

5.5

1991

PL-9

Yes

143

300

30

90

1992

SA-10
S-300
PMU

12 G
intercepts.
Fire on the
move

Some

15

>25

6

12

1988

SA-15

Imported Russian
Missiles

13 G
intercept

Yes

84

170

25

>105

ATBM
optimized

Yes

142

N/A

All Wx,
Day/
Night

No

75

560

18

40

15a

>15

1960

2001

Hawk

Improved
guidance,
ECM

Yes

75

560

18

40

1973

I-Hawk

Other Asian and U.S. SAMs
Patriot
PAC 2 PAC3
1991

Table 6. Comparison of Surface-to-Air Missiles

CRS-31

Based
on
Patriot

No

90

150

24

80

1995

Sky
Bow 2

CRS-32
The SA-10 SAM system is considered similar to the U.S. Patriot system. It is
most distinguished by its very long range and very high intercept altitude. With a
range of up to 150 km (93 mi), a handful of SA-10s potentially could cover large
volumes of PRC airspace; protecting cities, airfields, and potential attack corridors.
The SA-10's very long range surveillance radar is also a significant improvement
over indigenous PRC systems. With its ability to detect aircraft up to 300 km (186
mi) away, the SA-10s could provide China with earlier warning of attacking aircraft
and more effective, integrated air defenses. Additionally, the SA-10 has the ability
to attack cruise missiles and perhaps limited defense against some ballistic missiles.
Table 6 contains information that can be used to compare China’s most
advanced imported surface-to-air missiles to those used by other Asian and U.S.
forces. This information suggests that the SA-10 and SA-15 are in many ways on par
with U.S. and similar SAMs in the region. However, the most useful level of
comparison for these systems is not between the PLA’s SAMs and those other
SAMs, but between the PLA’s SAMs and Western aircraft.
The effectiveness of the PLA’s SAMs against U.S. and other aircraft in the
region depends on a variety of technological and operational factors. On the
technological side, the aircraft’s speed, maneuverability, radar cross section, and
electronic countermeasures (ECM) capabilities are important factors to consider.
Operationally, the aircraft’s flight profile, and the employment of electronic warfare
(EW) and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft, also contribute to or
detract from survivability vis-a-vis enemy SAMs. Also, the rules of engagement
(ROE), which political and military leaders impose on operational forces, have a
strong influence on which tactics, techniques, and procedures can be employed.
To definitively assess the effectiveness of China’s SA-10 and SA-15 force
against aircraft flown in Asia requires campaign-level analysis using high fidelity
analytical models and simulation to accurately measure the factors described above.
However, instructional observations can be made regarding specific SAM measures
of effectiveness and recent operational experience. In addition to the features
discussed in the previous part of this assessment (on missile and surveillance radar
range), SAM system characteristics that will challenge regional aircraft include
mobility, certain command and control factors, and resistance to ECM.
Mobility. Both the SA-10 and SA-15 are mobile systems. Because it is
currently difficult for other Asian and U.S. forces to detect and track most mobile
systems, this feature both increases the SAM’s survivability and also contributes to
its effectiveness. Mobility gives the adversary greater potential for surprise, as the
SAMs can be deployed to unexpected areas. The SA-15's launch vehicle’s maximum
speed is 40 mph, and the entire system can be readied for launch in as little as 18
minutes.148 The SA-15 is based on a tracked vehicle, which gives it the ability to
move well in rough terrain. The long-range SA-10 SAM is also a mobile system.
China’s S-300 PMU variant was designed specifically to improve system mobility

148

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London; Zaloga,
Steven, “Russian Point Defense SAMs,” World Missile Briefing, Teal Group Inc., February
2000.

CRS-33
and reportedly can be ready for firing within five minutes of arrival at an un-surveyed
site.149 Like the SA-15, the larger SA-10 is mounted in a vehicle that gives it off-road
capability. While current estimates report that the PLA has plans to deploy its SA10s around four areas (Beijing and areas across the strait from Taiwan), this system’s
inherent mobility suggests that it could be speedily moved to protect other PRC
assets if desired.
Command and Control. The SA-10 and SA-15 are modern systems and thus
incorporate command, control, and communications capabilities that increase their
effectiveness against other Asian and U.S. aircraft in Asia. These modern command
and control features may enable the PLA to network otherwise disparate air defense
units and meld them into an integrated system.
The SA-15's digital fire control computer processing system can automatically
perform threat evaluation on up to 48 targets. Automatic track initiation can be
performed on the 10 most dangerous targets, and two targets can be simultaneously
engaged in all weather, day or night “irrespective of enemy ECM operations.”150
Although it is an autonomous system, it can be interfaced into an air defense network
as it carries a special coded datalink for such purposes.
The S-300 system provides the PLA with even greater capability for air defense
integration. The radar can track up to 180 targets simultaneously. A battery can
engage up to 6 targets with 12 missiles in severe ECM environments.151 Multiple S300 regiments can be coordinated by a universal command, control, and
communications system to integrate several air defense systems together and share
target allocations. It is believed that SA-10 systems can now be netted with SA-5
and SA-12 systems and interoperate with fighter air defense zones controlling around
70 to 80 SAM launchers covering a front line of around 600 km (375 mi).152

Force on Force Considerations
The above discussion compared indigenous PRC and imported systems on a
platform-to-platform level. However, aircraft, SAMs, and other platforms do not
operate singly, but in conjunction with other components of an air force. This part
of the assessment will build on the previous one, by describing some of the factors
that may contribute to, or detract from, China’s ability to translate their recent
imports into effective combat power at the force-on-force level. The factors
discussed in this part include inventory, maintenance, pilot training, air doctrine,
command, control, and communications, and support from other aircraft (i.e.,
refueling, surveillance, and electronic warfare).

149

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London.

150

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London.

151

Jane’s Land-Based Air Defense 1997-1998, Jane’s Information Group, London, 137.

152

Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems. 1997, Jane’s Information Group, London.

CRS-34
Inventory. The aphorism that “quantity has a quality all its own” holds true
for China’s imported systems. While their quality is important, the operational
utility of these systems is diminished if they cannot be employed in large numbers.
Generally speaking, attackers tend to require greater numbers than defenders.
In planning ground operations for instance, a 3:1 ratio of attackers to defenders is
traditionally considered the minimum required for success. Recent military
operations illustrate the value of mass in air operations. In the 1991 war in the
Persian Gulf (Operation Desert Storm), the U.N. coalition generated 132,029 air
sorties in five months. During Operation Allied Force (the 1999 conflict in Kosovo),
37,225 combat sorties were flown in 78 days. In contrast, it will be difficult for the
PLA Air Force to generate even hundreds of sorties (let alone thousands of sorties)
with its modern aircraft (only around 48 Su-27s) against targets at a distance from the
nearest PLA airbase. In its 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, for instance, it took
the PLAAF 45 days to move 700 aircraft to the theater of operations. Once there, the
PLAAF achieved an average operational tempo of only one flight for each aircraft
every four days. China did not fly a single sortie over Vietnamese airspace.153
Having about 48 Su-27s will not make a great difference in China’s inability to
generate numerous offensive sorties.
Table 7 compares the key platforms in the inventories of the PRC, Taiwan,
Japan, and U.S. air forces stationed in the region. This table illustrates that Taiwan,
for instance, has seven times more modern fighter aircraft than does the PRC.
(Taiwan and Japan also have AEW and EW forces which the PLA does not. The
implications of the PLA’s deficiency in this regard will be discussed below.)
Disregarding arguments about the Su-27's technological capabilities and assuming
a rough parity between the Su-27 and modern Western fighter aircraft, the numerical
inequity between the PRC’s modern fighters (48) and Taiwan’s modern airforce (340
fighters) brings into question the PLAAF’s ability to mount effective offensive action
in this scenario. However, a force of about 48 Su-27s is enough to make a tangible
impact on the PRC’s ability to conduct defensive operations, especially when
integrated with modern air defenses.
China’s procurement of four SA-10 regiments appears sufficient to make an
immediate operational impact. An estimated 16-24 batteries capable of launching
over 250 long-range missiles could significantly augment China’s existing air
defenses or enable the defense of additional assets. Also, because it is a defensive
system, the SA-10 enjoys advantages over attacking aircraft, such as the ability to
prepare staging and re-supply areas, and pre-survey launch sites. These advantages
suggest greater operational effectiveness, which in turn, puts the pressure on the
attacker to increase their numbers vis-a-vis the defenders.

153

Fulghum, David, “Israel Builds China’s First AWACS Aircraft,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, November 29, 1999.

CRS-35

Table 7. Comparison of Key PLAAF Systems with Other Key
Systems
U.S. Air Forces in Asia
PRC

Taiwan

Japan
CVBG*

Korea**

Japan

Modern
Fighters/
Attack
Aircraft

48 Su-27

150 F-16
130 IDF
60 Mirage
2000

160 F15J/DJ

14 F-14
36 F/A18C/D

72 F-16

36 F-16
54 F15C/D

AAMs

AA-10
AA-11

AIM-9J/P
Matra Mica
Sky Sword
I/II

AIM-7
AIM-9

AIM-7
AIM-9
AIM-54
AIM-120

AIM-9
AIM-120

AIM-7
AIM-9
AIM-120

AEW/
AWACS

0

4 E-2T

10 E2-C
4 E-3

4 E-2C

0

2 E-3

EW

0

2 C-130HE
2 CC-47

EP-3
1 EC-1
10 YS11E

4 EA-6B

0

0

0

0

2 KS-3B

0

15 KC135

Patriot 24/6
I-Hawk
240/78
Sky Bow
465/115

Patriot
128/32
I-Hawk
200/66

0

0

0

Aerial
Refueling
Long Range
SAMs
missiles/
launchers
(estimates)

SA-10
256-384/
64-96

* Yokosuka, Japan, is home port for 1 U.S. aircraft carrier, 6 surface combatants.
**U.S. Aircraft in Korea can self-deploy without refueling to Japan.
Source: The Military Balance1999-2000, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

Maintenance/Spares. Self-sufficiency has been a goal of PRC aerospace for
50 years. Yet, there is doubt even today whether China can adequately maintain the
advanced aerospace systems that it has imported. Even PRC officials have claimed
that the PLA Air Force “is not currently capable of flying or maintaining
sophisticated foreign aircraft.”154 Clearly, the ability to maintain imported aircraft,
surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles is central to their overall effectiveness. Poorly
maintained equipment often does not work, does not work up to requirements, or
worse yet, can severely damage itself, other equipment, or personnel. Inability to
maintain modern aircraft will result in high attrition rates and exacerbate the
inventory issues articulated above.
It has been reported that PRC aerospace industry is “struggling to cope with the
advanced technology and industrial management methods needed to produce a state-

154

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st
Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA: 1995): 141.

CRS-36
of-the-art fighter within the assembly process.”155 At least during the initial coproduction of Su-27s, sub-standard work resulted in the first two aircraft
manufactured by China to be abruptly reassembled after their first flights.
One analyst claims that China’s difficulties in maintaining advanced technology
result in part from poor manufacturing processes. Lacking the tight tolerances
required to manufacture identical parts, PRC aircraft are literally one of a kind. “The
implication is that there is no interchangeability of parts between two unique
airframes of the same type of aircraft. This can be a tremendous maintenance
headache involving grounding of aircraft in case of even minor unserviceabilities
until inoperative parts are repaired or replacements manufactured to tailor-made
specifications.”156
China appears to have a particular deficiency in maintaining aircraft engines.
Unable to maintain them in-country, the PLA has been forced to send the AL-31F
engines which power both the Su-27 and the locally developed F-10 fighter to Russia
for repair. China is trying to purchase from Russia a turn-key repair and maintenance
facility.157 Despite the structural obstacles in China’s aircraft industry, however,
Russian assistance may prove to be an important difference in the eventual full
production of capable Su-27s in China.
Pilot Training. Learning how to safely and effectively operate a supersonic
fighter aircraft in a modern warfare environment takes a good deal of time, resources,
and effort. The standard minimum training for fighter pilots in NATO, for instance,
is 180 hours a year.158 U.S. pilots typically log more than 200 hours of in-cockpit
training. Additionally, U.S. fighter pilots spend up to 70 hours a year in high quality
simulators where they develop advanced skills and hone complex tactics. Western
fighter pilots fly in dynamic “many versus many” engagements. They train against
“aggressor squadrons,” dedicated adversary pilots that fly enemy aircraft with enemy
weapons and employ enemy tactics. Western pilots fly in combined arms exercises
(i.e., with ground- and sea-based forces) and with multinational allies.
Many analysts criticize China’s pilot training. They note that pilots spend too
few hours in the cockpit and that the training they do undergo does not adequately
prepare them for real combat. The PLA Air Force’s Su-27 pilots have flown just 60100 hours per year.159 This figure is well below the NATO standard and just barely

155

“China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February
24, 1999.

156

Sachdev. A.K., “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force,” Strategic Analysis, Institute
for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, September 1999.
157

“China-Assembled Su-27s Make Their First Flights,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, February
24, 1999.
158

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st
Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1995): xix.
159

Allen, Kenneth W., “PLAAF Modernization: An Assessment,” in Crisis in the Taiwan
Strait, edited by James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, American Enterprise Institute and
National Defense University Press, 1997.

CRS-37
enough training to ensure that the pilots can operate the aircraft safely.160 Moreover,
after losing several Su-27s to training accidents, each Su-27 aircraft is flown only
about 10 hours monthly.161 A major RAND study concludes that “advanced
operational techniques and tactics are simply impossible to learn in so little time.”162
The quality of the training that PLA pilots do receive has been questioned.
Some have noted the heavy scripting of PLA pilot training and called it unrealistic.163
The standard training syllabus consists of stereotyped engagements against single,
non maneuvering targets. Consistent with this observation are others who claim that
“almost 80-85 percent of the flying consists of plain and simple navigation sorties
with marginal tactical value.”164 Finally, it appears that for all intents and purposes,
once out of the cockpit, the PLA pilot’s training ends. “There is virtually no
simulator training, except on very rudimentary systems.”165 This lack of training
affects more than the fighter pilots; it affects the quality of the whole PLA Air Force.
Some have suggested that “the PLA Air Force has no capability to perform some
missions, such as close air support, that are commonly assigned to the air arms of
other nations.”166
While there is consensus that PLA pilot training is below Western standards, it
is unclear how far behind they really are and how long it will take them to catch up.
For example, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, testified in January 2000 that China has made improvements in its pilot
training program that have resulted in much greater proficiency.167
Mission Emphasis and Doctrine. In many ways, China faces the same
crisis that Western military planners have grappled with after the Soviet Union
disintegrated. After decades of preparing to withstand a land invasion by the Soviets,
China must now develop a new doctrinal underpinning that focuses its military on
relevant roles and missions, currently centered on what it sees as its top security
problem, namely, Taiwan. While there have been discussions of a new doctrine

160

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades.”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.
161

Brodie, Jonathan, “China Moves to Buy More Russian Aircraft, Warships and
Submarines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999.

162

Mann, Paul. “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

163

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

164

Sachdev. A.K., “Modernization of the Chinese Air Force,” Strategic Analysis, Institute
for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, September 1999.

165

Allen, Kenneth, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan Pollack. China’s Air Force Enters the 21st
Century (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1995): xix.
166

Mann, Paul. “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.
167

Wall, Robert, “CIA: China-Taiwan Clash Possible Soon,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 7, 2000.

CRS-38
(called “local war under high-technology conditions”) in military circles in China, the
PLA has yet to fully develop and implement reforms.
Many analysts comment that while China has purchased new technology, it has
not developed new doctrine or concepts of operation that are required to realize the
potential of these new weapon systems. For instance, the same RAND study claims
that “China is as far behind the West doctrinally as technologically. When a PLA Su27 pilot is being trained only in one-on-one tail chase intercepts against nonmaneuvering targets, he is being trained to waste his airplane. New equipment
implies new concepts, and the PLA will need to foment a doctrinal revolution to
complement the technological one if the billions to be spent on modern weapons are
to pay off.”168
Command, Control, and Communications. Western air power concepts
of operation emphasize centralized planning but de-centralized decision making and
execution. Initiative is fostered at low levels of command. Squadron commanders
and individual pilots are allowed great freedom to improvise during operations. The
success of air power in operations such as Operation Allied Force and Operation
Desert Storm suggests that this philosophy has merit. In contrast, the PLAAF
emphasizes centralized execution. The PLAAF has been described as “...rigid, with
little flexibility for command initiative.”169 PLAAF deployment of its surface-to-air
missile systems, for instance, has remained conservative and consistent over time,
despite improvements in SAM capability. Almost 100 percent of PLA SAMs ring
population and military centers with no attempt to aggressively cover large swaths
of PRC territory. Even though recently acquired systems make new employment
concepts capable, the RAND study notes “China has shown no inclination to extend
its SAM coverage beyond its traditional boundaries.”
The PLA’s ability to command and control its air forces and air defenses
effectively is influenced strongly by the quality of its communications technology.
Communications systems are used to give orders, issue warnings, share information
on an adversary or situation, request guidance, and generally to coordinate offensive
and defensive operations.
The quality and utility of military communications systems varies considerably.
At the low end of the spectrum, radios are used to broadcast voice communications
between aircraft and surface based command and control assets. Digitized
communications – often called data links – pass information at a faster rate, of greater
quality and fidelity, and under more secure and jam resistant conditions than do voice
communications. This increased capability, however, comes at the cost of increased
complexity. Generally speaking, any UHF radio can communicate with another UHF
radio. However, digitized communications have unique protocols and standards that
must be synchronized throughout a force.

168

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.
169

Mann, Paul, “U.S. Military Technology Forecast to Outpace China’s for Decades,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2000.

CRS-39
Similar to EW systems, China’s communications equipment is difficult to
catalogue with a high degree of confidence via open sources. Technical capabilities
of communications systems are jealously guarded to hamper adversary
communications warfare efforts. Furthermore, communications hardware tends to
be physically inconspicious and relatively easy to swap-out. However, some
information is available in the unclassified realm and general comments on the
PLAAF’s communications capabilities can be made.
Many analysts comment that China currently lacks the skills and information
technology required for a modern integrated air operations system. China’s
communications equipment appears limited in capability, and the PLA has been slow
to digitize. Recent ac

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30700. Public record. Not legal advice.