# China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30341

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 5, 2015
- **Citation:** RL30341

## Text

China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China”
Policy—Key Statements from Washington,
Beijing, and Taipei
(name redacted)
Specialist in Asian Security Affairs
January 5, 2015

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL30341

China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy

Summary
Despite broadly consistent statements, the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan remains
somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what
the policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions
and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy.
This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, analyzes the “one China” policy since
U.S. Presidents began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Taiwan calls itself the Republic of China (ROC) and does not recognize the PRC. There
are three sets of issues: sovereignty over Taiwan; PRC use of force or coercion against Taiwan;
and cross-strait dialogue. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has
maintained non-diplomatic engagement with Taiwan after recognition of the PRC in 1979. The
State Department claims an “unofficial” relationship with Taiwan. The United States did not
explicitly state Taiwan’s status in the U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
The United States “acknowledged” the “one China” position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Since 1971, U.S. Presidents—both secretly and publicly—have articulated a “one China” policy
in understandings with the PRC. Congressional oversight has watched for any new agreements
and any shift in the U.S. stance closer to that of Beijing’s “one China” principle—on questions of
sovereignty, arms sales, or dialogue. Not recognizing the PRC’s claim over Taiwan or Taiwan as a
sovereign state, U.S. policy has considered Taiwan’s status as unsettled. With added conditions,
U.S. policy leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of the strait: a
“peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and without unilateral changes. In short,
U.S. policy focuses on the process of resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. policy in the absence of a
diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. The TRA stipulates the expectation that the future of
Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among
the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” to
the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of “grave concern” to the United States; “to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United
States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social
or economic system of Taiwan’s people. The TRA provides a congressional role in determining
security assistance “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
President Reagan also offered “Six Assurances” to Taipei in 1982, partly to continue arms sales.
Policy makers have continued to face unresolved issues, while the political and strategic context
of the policy has changed dramatically since the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, U.S. interests in
the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy have been challenged by the
PRC’s military buildup (particularly in missiles) and potential coercion, moves perceived by
Beijing for Taiwan’s de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s)
president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to investing in
self-defense. After the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou became President in May 2008, Taipei and Beijing
reduced tension and resumed talks—beyond seeking detente. With President Obama since 2009, a
rhetorical convergence emerged about “peaceful development” of cross-strait ties. However,
disagreements remain about the PRC’s goal of political talks for unification, Taiwan’s status,
Taiwan’s self-defense, and U.S. arms sales and other cooperation with Taiwan. On September 23,
2014, 29 Members of the House sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for a new
Taiwan Policy Review (after 20 years) to examine expanded engagement with Taiwan.

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Contents
Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China” ................................................................................................. 1
Historical Background ............................................................................................................... 1
Congressional Concerns ............................................................................................................ 2
Key Statements and Ambiguity ................................................................................................. 6
Has U.S. Policy Changed?......................................................................................................... 8
Overview of Issues .................................................................................................................. 30
Part II: Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei ................................... 32
Statements During the Nixon Administration.......................................................................... 32
Statements During the Ford Administration ............................................................................ 35
Statements During the Carter Administration.......................................................................... 35
Statements During the Reagan Administration........................................................................ 39
Statements During the George H. W. Bush Administration .................................................... 46
Statements During the Clinton Administration........................................................................ 48
Statements During the George W. Bush Administration ......................................................... 66
Statements During the Obama Administration ........................................................................ 79

Tables
Table 1. Visits by Cabinet-Rank Officials to Taiwan After 1979..................................................... 5
Table 2. Summary of Cross-Strait Agreements (2008-2014) ......................................................... 82

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 83
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 83

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Part I: U.S. Policy on “One China”
Historical Background
Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC
set up in 1912 after the revolution that started on October 10, 1911, in China to overthrow the
Qing Dynasty. The ROC uses October 10 to commemorate the national day, celebrated as
“Double Ten.” The ROC does not recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) founded in
Beijing by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949. The PRC claims that the ROC ceased to
exist in 1949 and that Taiwan is a province of “one China.” (The Qing Empire had incorporated
Taiwan as a full province in 1885-1895, when more settlers moved from China to the island.) The
PRC and ROC do not recognize each other or two Chinas. The ROC refers to the other side of the
strait as the “mainland.” The PRC opposes recognition of the ROC and seeks unification of
Taiwan with the mainland as a part of “one China,” without renouncing the use of force. In any
case, since 1949, the ROC has governed only on Taiwan, and the PRC has ruled mainland China.
Previously called Formosa, Taiwan never has been ruled by the CPC or as a part of the PRC, and
until 1945, had never been ruled by the ROC. In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or
“Retrocession Day,” marked the ROC’s claim of “recovering” Formosa from Japan. However,
upon Japan’s surrender, that was the first time that the ROC’s military forces had occupied the
island of Formosa. When the Qing Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty
of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not yet in existence. Moreover, the colony’s people did not
have a say in self-determination of their status or identity. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist
Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August
1945, with no country challenging the island’s status. The ROC under KMT forces led by Chiang
Kai-shek retreated to Taipei in 1949, when the Communist forces led by Mao Zedong took over
mainland China. Taiwan’s people have faced social, ethnic, linguistic, and political issues of
whether to identify with Taiwan or China, with two major groups of local “Taiwanese” and
“Mainlanders” (people who retreated to Taiwan with the KMT forces and their descendants).
One of the first major powers to support reforms and the new republic of progressive leaders in
early 20th century China, the United States recognized the ROC from 1913 until the end of 1978.1
The United States then shifted to recognize the PRC, with its capital in Beijing, under the U.S.
“one China” policy. By the early 1970s, the United States had looked to switch the diplomatic
recognition to the PRC, while figuring out a framework to sustain engagement with Taiwan.
Since 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed policy toward Taiwan.
Paying particular attention to congressional influence on policy, Part I of this CRS Report
discusses the U.S. “one China” policy concerning Taiwan since the United States (under President
Nixon) began in 1971 to reach understandings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
government in Beijing, which has insisted on its “one China” principle. Part II comprehensively
reviews the evolution of policies as affected by legislation and articulated in key statements by
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. On an overview of U.S. policy on Taiwan, see CRS Report
R41952, U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues. On U.S. security assistance to
Taiwan, see CRS Report RL30957, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990.

1

Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (W. W. Norton & Company, 1990); President Woodrow Wilson’s
telegram, dated May 2, 1913, to ROC President Yuan Shih-Kai (TECRO’s display, Twin Oaks, October 8, 2014).

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Congressional Concerns
Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U.S. military
intervention), U.S.-Taiwan engagement, and U.S.-PRC contacts. In the 1990s, some Members in
Congress pushed for changes in policy toward Taiwan. Questions about the “one China” policy
arose again after Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui characterized cross-strait relations as “special
state-to-state ties” on July 9, 1999. Beijing responded vehemently with calls for Lee to retract the
perceived deviation from the “one China” position and reiterated long-standing threats to use
force if necessary to prevent a declaration of independence by Taiwan. The PRC also opposed
U.S. military intervention. The Clinton Administration responded that Lee’s statement was not
helpful and reaffirmed the “one China” policy.2 Some questioned whether the TRA requires U.S.
defense of Taiwan against an attack from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military.
Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, at a July 21, 1999, hearing,
said that Lee “created an opportunity to break free from the anachronistic, Beijing-inspired oneChina policy which has imprisoned U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan for years.”
Representative Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the International Relations Committee, wrote in a
September 7, 1999, letter to Clinton that it is a “common misperception” that we conceded
officially that Beijing is the capital of the “one China” that includes Taiwan. He wrote, “under no
circumstances should the United States move toward Beijing’s version of ‘one China.’”3
Since 2001, some congressional leaders have stressed continuity in maintaining the “one China”
policy. During the George W. Bush Administration, leaders of the House and Senate stressed
support for Taiwan as a democracy, rather than its independent status. Moreover, Members voiced
concerns about cross-strait tension arising from actions taken by both Beijing and Taipei.
Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote in May 2001 that
“for many years, successive U.S. administrations have affirmed that there is one China and that
the people on Taiwan and the people of China should work out a plan for peaceful unification.”
He also referred to a debate on the nature of the U.S. obligation to “defend democracy in Taiwan”
and to prevent a “forceful military unification of Taiwan and China.”4 Representative Henry
Hyde, chairman of the International Relations Committee, spoke in Beijing in December 2002
and dismissed notions that U.S. support for Taiwan was geared toward containing or dividing
China. He said that “the bedrock of the very strong support for Taiwan in the U.S. Congress” is
the shared experience as democracies. Moreover, Hyde highlighted Taiwan’s significance as a
model of a “Chinese democracy” that proved democracy is compatible with Chinese culture.5
U.S. views were shaped by developments in Taiwan and concern about cross-strait tension. On
August 3, 2002, President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gave a
speech using the phrase “one country on each side” of the strait, surprising Washington even
before the first anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Leading up to the
presidential election on March 20, 2004, Chen advocated holding the first referendums (on the
2
Department of State, Press Briefing by James Rubin, July 15, 1999; Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s remarks
on visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, July 20, 1999.
3
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, hearing chaired by Senator Craig Thomas
on “Chinese-Taiwanese Relations,” July 21, 1999; Mary Dalrymple, “Taiwanese President’s Comment Inspires GOP to
Renew Attack on Clinton’s ‘One China’ Policy,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, July 24, 1999; and Letter from
Representative Benjamin Gilman to President Clinton, September 7, 1999.
4
Richard Lugar, “Timely Exit for Ambiguity,” Washington Times, May 17, 2001.
5
Henry Hyde, “Remarks at Tsinghua University,” Beijing, December 10, 2002.

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same day as the election) and drafting a new constitution with a timetable. Though symbolic
steps, Beijing reacted with alarm and warnings.
On the eve of his visit to Washington, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao warned on November 22, 2003,
that China would “pay any price to safeguard the unity of the motherland.”6 On November 29,
President Chen surprisingly announced that he would use one provision in the referendum law
passed by the opposition-dominated legislature two days earlier and hold a referendum on
China’s threats on the day of the presidential election. During his meeting with Premier Wen in
the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, President Bush stated that he opposed Chen’s efforts to
change the status quo, drawing criticisms that Bush sided with Beijing’s belligerence. The Taiwan
Caucus in the House wrote a letter to President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the
authoritarian regime of the PRC at the expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.7
On the TRA’s 25th anniversary, the House International Relations Committee held a hearing on
April 21, 2004. After congratulating President Chen Shui-bian on his re-election in March 2004,
the Administration further clarified U.S. policy toward Taiwan and warned of “limitations” in
U.S. support for constitutional changes in Taiwan. At that hearing on the TRA, Representative
James Leach, chairman of the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, stated that Taiwan has the unique situation in which it can have de facto selfdetermination only if it does not attempt to be recognized with de jure sovereignty. He urged
Taiwan’s people to recognize that they have greater security in “political ambiguity.” He called
for continuity, saying that “together with our historic ‘one China’ policy,” the TRA has
contributed to ensuring peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.8 In his second inaugural address
on May 20, Chen responded to U.S. concerns, excluding sovereignty issues and a referendum
from his plan for a new constitution by 2008. Leach represented the United States at Chen’s
inauguration. At a subcommittee hearing on June 2, 2004, Leach praised Chen’s address as
“thoughtful, statesmanlike, and helpful” as well as “constructive” for dialogue with Beijing.9
Later, to mark the 25th anniversary of the TRA on April 10, 2004, the House voted on July 15,
2004, to pass H.Con.Res. 462 (Hyde) to reaffirm “unwavering commitment” to the TRA.10
Some in Congress also had concerns about challenges to U.S. interests in reducing tensions and
fostering dialogue across the strait. In March 2005, China adopted an “Anti-Secession Law.” On
March 16, the House passed (424-4) H.Con.Res. 98 (Hyde) to express grave concern about the
“Anti-Secession Law,” and the House Taiwan Caucus heard a briefing by Taipei’s Representative.
On April 6, 2005, the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific held a
hearing on China’s “Anti-Secession Law.” President Chen announced on February 27, 2006, that
he will “terminate” the National Unification Council and Guidelines. Senator John Warner,
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, told Admiral William Fallon, Commander of the
Pacific Command, at a committee hearing on March 7, 2006, that “if conflict were precipitated by
just inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I’m not
entirely sure that this nation would come full force to their rescue if they created that problem.”11
6

Interview with the Washington Post, published November 23, 2003.
Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler, “Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges
President Bush to Reconsider Position on Taiwanese Referendum,” December 11, 2003.
8
House International Relations Committee, hearing, “The Taiwan Relations Act: the Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.
9
House International Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, Hearing on U.S. Policy in East Asia and
the Pacific, June 2, 2004.
10
The vote was 400 yeas, 18 nays, 4 present, and 11 not-voting.
11
Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the FY2007 Defense Department Budget, March 7, 2006.
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In July 2007, Representative Tom Lantos, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said
that it was impractical for Taiwan to seek membership in the U.N.
A convergence emerged rhetorically among the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States on crossstrait “peaceful development” after Ma Ying-jeou became president in Taiwan in May 2008 and
cross-strait tension reduced (partly due to a resumption of dialogue). As Taiwan and the PRC
became closer, U.S.-Taiwan engagement strengthened. Congressional concerns included issues
about whether and how the United States and Taiwan might strengthen political, defense, and
economic cooperation, partly to sustain U.S. interests in security, democracy, and prosperity in
Taiwan and its international space. On March 24, 2009, the House passed (by voice vote)
H.Con.Res. 55 (Berkley), and 30 Senators sent a letter to President Barack Obama to mark the
TRA’s 30th anniversary. On June 16 and October 4, 2011, the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
chaired by Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, held hearings on “Why Taiwan Matters.” At the
latter hearing with an official panel, Ros-Lehtinen stressed adherence to President Reagan’s Six
Assurances to Taipei. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campell
used his testimony for a rare reaffirmation of the Six Assurances, reiterating in particular the
assurance of not having any prior consultation with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The
Administration and Congress supported Taiwan’s inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).
Congress passed legislation in support of Taiwan’s participation in the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign
Relations Committees, Representative Ed Royce and Senator Robert Menendez, introduced bills
to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan at ICAO.
Signed by President Obama, H.R. 1151 (Royce) became P.L. 113-17 on July 12, 2013.
Among other legislation for consideration, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced, on September 14, 2011, the Taiwan Policy Act
(H.R. 2918) to enhance ties with Taiwan in comprehensive ways. On August 1, 2013, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013, H.R. 419 (Ros-Lehtinen).
On March 14, 2014, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing to mark the 35th
anniversary of the enactment of the TRA. On April 3, the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs held a hearing on the TRA. In response to
Senator Marco Rubio, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel
Russel did not clearly reaffirm the Six Assurances. After the hearing, Russel clarified to reporters
that the Administration remained committed to the Six Assurances as well as the TRA and three
Joint Communiques.12 On April 7, the House agreed (by voice vote) to pass H.R. 3470, which
combines H.Res. 494 (to affirm the TRA) and the Naval Vessel Transfer and Arms Export Control
Amendments Act (to authorize the transfer by sale of up to four excess U.S. Navy Perry-class
frigates to Taiwan, among other stipulations). On April 9, 52 Senators, led by Senators Menendez
and James Inhofe, sent a letter to President Obama to mark the TRA.
Broad policy issues include whether to review U.S. policy in view of significant changes since
the last Taiwan Policy Review in 1994. Some observers have said that the improved cross-strait
engagement and reduction of tension since 2008 help U.S. attention to shift to expanding
cooperation with a rising China. Others have argued that the self-imposed restrictions on the
relationship with Taiwan go beyond the TRA (which did not stipulate “unofficial” ties), the reality
of official contacts, or the U.S.-PRC joint communiques. They also have concerns that the
12
House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Promise of the Taiwan Relations Act,” March 14; Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Evaluating U.S. Policy on Taiwan on the 35th Anniversary of the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),” April 3; “U.S. Offers Reassurances on Commitment to Taiwan,” CNA, April 4, 2014.

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restrictions undermine critical communication with and denigrate Taiwan, undermining U.S.
leverage and interests. An overall issue is whether to pursue further normalization of the
relationship and expand engagement with Taiwan, including in the defense, diplomatic, and
economic domains. Congress could examine the State Department’s restrictions on contacts
between Executive Branch officials and Taiwan’s officials in the “Guidelines on Relations with
Taiwan” to carry out an “unofficial” relationship. A related issue has been whether to resume and
continue visits by Cabinet-rank officials to Taiwan.
On the 20th anniversary of the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994, Representative Ed Royce,
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, led a total of 29 Members to send a letter, on
September 23, 2014, to Secretary of State John Kerry, calling for expanding engagement with
Taiwan. The Members stated that “in view of the fact that there is now a fully free and democratic
Taiwan, we feel strongly that there is a need today to undertake a new and thorough Taiwan
Policy Review, laying the basis for further expanding relations with Taiwan and thereby
enhancing continued peace and stability in the region.” The State Department, on October 14,
acknowledged that, under the TRA, the United States maintains commercial, cultural, and other
ties with Taiwan’s people, dropping an insistence of the State Department that the bilateral
cooperation is “unofficial.” The Department’s letter cited the “one China” policy as based on the
three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques and the TRA but did not cite the Six Assurances. The State
Department acknowledged that it continually reviews and improves the interactions with Taiwan
but did not refer to specific ways of improving cooperation.13
Table 1. Visits by Cabinet-Rank Officials to Taiwan After 1979
1992

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Carla Hills

1994

Secretary of Transportation Federico Pena

1996

Small Business Administrator Phil Lader

1998

Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson

2000

Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater

2014

Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Gina McCarthy

Source: U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, sponsor of economic conferences; and AIT.

The Obama Administration’s strategic “rebalancing” of comprehensive diplomatic, defense, and
economic priorities to the Asia-Pacific raised issues about Taiwan’s roles and whether the strategy
considers Taiwan’s security role narrowly in the Taiwan Strait or more broadly in the region. At a
hearing in October 2011, Assistant Secretary of State Campbell testified that the United States
sought a “rebalancing” of comprehensive priorities to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region. He
stated that “a critical part of that overarching strategy is building a comprehensive, durable, and
unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan.” Campbell stressed that “the
bedrock of that relationship is our security relationship.” After not mentioning Taiwan in an
article in Foreign Policy on “America’s Pacific Century” in October 2011, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton gave a speech on the same subject the next month in Honolulu and added that the
United States has a strong relationship with Taiwan as an “important security and economic
partner.” At a conference of defense ministers in Singapore in June 2012, Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta discussed the strategic refocus to Asia and mentioned Taiwan by saying that the United
States strongly supports the efforts of both the PRC and Taiwan to improve the cross-strait
13

Department of State, letter to Chairman Edward Royce, House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 14, 2014.

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relationship. He added that “we have an enduring interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait.” Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Jose Fernandez visited
Taipei in August, and he spoke about economic exchanges with Taiwan in the context of the
rebalancing toward Asia.14
In sum, Congress has exercised important roles in legislating and overseeing the TRA of 1979, as
Congress and the President have recalibrated the U.S. “one China” policy over the decades. Since
the early 1990s, U.S. interests in the military balance as well as Taiwan’s security and democracy
have faced continued challenges due to the PRC’s military modernization, moves perceived by
Beijing as promoting de jure independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s
president (2000-2008), and resistance in Taiwan by the Kuomintang (KMT) party to raising
defense spending and strengthening self-defense. Moreover, since 2000, political polarization in
Taiwan has raised the importance of U.S. policy toward Taiwan for fostering U.S. interests there.
These interests include sustainable stability, U.S.-PRC engagement, Taiwan’s democracy, peace,
and prosperity (with a global impact), and economic ties with a major trading partner—ultimately
a “peaceful resolution” of the dispute over Taiwan. At the same time, the dominance of partisan
politics in Taiwan has reduced U.S. leverage to advance some U.S. priorities. The United States
also has monitored how the KMT and DPP in Taipei have handled disputes with the Communist
Party of China (CPC) in Beijing over Taiwan’s status, “one China,” and cross-strait ties.

Key Statements and Ambiguity
Five key documents stand out among U.S. policy statements on Taiwan. Among these, since
1979, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) has had bipartisan support in guiding policy with a firm
foundation and flexible framework for the maintenance of the relationship with Taiwan.
•
•
•
•
•

Shanghai Communique of 1972
Normalization Communique of 1979
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) (P.L. 96-8) of 1979
Six Assurances to Taipei of 1982
August 17 Communique (on arms sales) of 1982.

(See excerpts of these and other statements in Part II of this CRS report.)
Despite apparently consistent formal statements and closed-door assurances since the end of
World War II (and the end of Taiwan’s status as a colony of Japan that began in 1895), the “one
China” question has been left somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations among
Washington, Beijing, and Taipei. The concept of “one China” has been complicated by the coexistence of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan since 1949, while they have not
recognized each other. Taiwan was never ruled by the CPC or as part of the PRC.

Changing Context
Moreover, the political and strategic context of those key statements has experienced significant
changes. After political liberalization began in 1986, Taiwan became a democracy, with a new
basis for the government’s legitimacy and greater say by voters about Taiwan’s status. The PRC’s
14

House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing on “Why Taiwan Matters,” October 4, 2011; Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011; Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Remarks
at the Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, June 2, 2012; and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business
Affairs Jose Fernandez, “The Future of U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations,” Taipei, August 7, 2012.

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Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 dramatically proved the limits to liberal change on the mainland.
The original strategic rationale for U.S.-PRC rapprochement faded with the end of the Cold War.
In May 2000, the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian became President of the ROC, ousting the KMT as the
ruling party in Taiwan for the first time in 55 years. Under the DPP, the government in Taipei
made greater use of the name “Taiwan” (vs. “ROC”).15 The KMT reemphasized “ROC” in 2008
and pursued closer ties with “mainland China.” The two sides held the first formal meeting since
1949 between officials in charge of cross-strait affairs on February 11, 2014. Taipei’s Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC) Minister Wang Yu-chi met with Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO)
Director Zhang Zhijun in Nanjing, the ROC’s capital before KMT forces retreated to Taiwan.

Definitions
There are complications about the language in the key statements. First, “China” was not defined
in the three joint communiques. In the Normalization Communique, the United States recognized
the PRC government as the sole legal government of China, but the PRC has never ruled Taiwan
and other islands under the control of the ROC government. The PRC’s late paramount leader
Deng Xiaoping’s 1984 proposal of “one China, two systems” sought to define Taiwan as a
Special Administrative Region under the PRC after unification. On the other hand, “Taiwan” was
defined in Section 15(2) of the TRA essentially to be the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores,
plus the people, entities, and governing authorities there.

Unsettled Status
Second, there has been disagreement as to whether Taiwan’s status actually was resolved or
determined. In secret talks in 1972, President Nixon assured PRC Premier Zhou Enlai that the
United States viewed the status of Taiwan as “determined” to be part of one China. The PRC’s
December 1978 statement on normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States said
that the Taiwan question “has now been resolved between the two countries.” However, the U.S.
statement of December 1978 on normalization stated the expectation that the Taiwan question
“will be settled” peacefully by the Chinese themselves. The TRA of 1979 also stipulated the U.S.
expectation that the future of Taiwan “will be determined” by peaceful means. A Representative
who managed the legislation for the TRA as the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Lester Wolff, wrote that “in no sense of the word,
through the TRA and/or other relevant documents including the Shanghai Communique, has
Congress of the United States ever attempted, except to support self-determination for the people
of Taiwan, to determine the final destiny of Taiwan.”16
President Reagan’s 1982 statement on arms sales to Taiwan declared that “the Taiwan question is
a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.” Under U.S. policy,
“settlement” or “resolution”—not stated as “unification” or “reunification”—of the Taiwan
question is left open to be determined peacefully and with a shift to stress a resolution by both
sides of the strait (rather than involving the United Nations (U.N.) or another country). In a rare
public statement on this U.S. stance, in August 2007, a National Security Council official said
15

Such as: the addition of “Taiwan” in the title of the ROC Yearbook; the addition of “Taiwan” in English on ROC
passports beginning on September 1, 2003; changing the title of a government publication, Taipei Review, to Taiwan
Review beginning with the March 2003 issue; and requests to use “Taiwan” instead of “Taipei” in the names of
representative offices in the United States and other countries. In April 2007, Taiwan unsuccessfully applied for
membership in the World Health Organization under the name “Taiwan.”
16
Lester Wolff, Jon Holstine, John Brady III, A Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, Vol. 4, March 2004.

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that “the position of the United States Government is that the ROC—Republic of China—is an
issue undecided ... for many, many years.”17

Peaceful Settlement
Third, the questions of the PRC’s possible use of force, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and possible
U.S. help in Taiwan’s self-defense were left contentious and critical for U.S. interests.
Washington consistently has stated its strong interest that there be a peaceful settlement, but the
PRC has not renounced its claimed sovereign right to use force if necessary. Washington has not
promised to end arms sales to Taiwan, although the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 was
terminated on December 31, 1979.18 In the surprise announcements of December 1978 on
diplomatic recognition, the United States stated its interest in a peaceful resolution, but the PRC
countered that Taiwan is China’s internal affair. President Reagan agreed to the 1982
Communique on reducing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan—premised on the PRC’s declared policy of
peaceful unification. In the early 1990s, the PLA began to build up its theater missile force and to
acquire modern arms, especially from Moscow.
The 1979 TRA states that the United States will provide necessary defense articles and services to
Taiwan for its sufficient self-defense, and will consider with “grave concern” any non-peaceful
means to determine Taiwan’s future. In deciding on that language in 1979, Members of Congress
debated whether the wording on U.S. military intentions was clear or ambiguous. Since the mid1990s, a new debate has arisen over how to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait, including whether
ambiguity or clarity in U.S. statements about a possible military role serves U.S. interests in
preventing conflict or provocations from either Beijing or Taipei.19 There have been issues about
whether and how U.S. statements of intentions might be clarified to specify the conditions under
which the U.S. military might help to defend Taiwan and the U.S. stance on Taiwan’s sovereignty
or efforts to change its declared political status.20 Questions also have persisted about the extent
of the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, given President Clinton’s 1996 deployment of two
aircraft carriers near Taiwan, President Bush’s initial statement in 2001 of doing “whatever it took
to help Taiwan defend herself,” and Taiwan’s budgetary limitations in self-defense capabilities.

Has U.S. Policy Changed?
Apart from questions about the language in the key statements on “one China,” policy questions
have arisen about whether successive Administrations have changed the U.S. position since 1971
to adapt to changing circumstances and whether such shifts have advanced U.S. interests.21
17

Dennis Wilder, Senior Director for Asian Affairs, NSC, White House, “Press Briefing on the President’s Trip to
Australia and the APEC Summit,” August 30, 2007.
18
Article 10 of the Mutual Defense Treaty allowed for its termination one year after notice is given by either side (on
January 1, 1979).
19
In the 106th Congress, the House International Relations Committee debated this issue of “ambiguity” and other
issues in the markup of H.R. 1838, “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act,” on October 26, 1999.
20
See for example: Joseph Nye, Jr., “A Taiwan Deal,” Washington Post, March 8, 1998; Heritage Foundation and
Project for the New American Century, “Statement on the Defense of Taiwan” by 23 conservatives, including Richard
Armitage and Paul Wolfowitz, August 20, 1999; Thomas Christensen, “Clarity on Taiwan,” Washington Post, March
20, 2000; Richard Bush, “American Ambiguity on Taiwan’s Sovereignty Increases the Island’s Safety,” Insight
Magazine, December 10, 2002.
21
While this report discusses U.S. policy since the first understanding with the PRC in 1971, some say that the U.S.
position on “one China” dates back to World War II. (See Henry Kissinger, “Storm Clouds Gathering,” Washington
Post, September 7, 1999.) In Taiwan after World War II, October 25, 1945, or “Retrocession Day,” marked the
Republic of China (ROC)’s claim of “recovering” Taiwan (then called Formosa) from Japan. However, that was the
(continued...)

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Successive Administrations have generally maintained that “long-standing” U.S. policy has been
consistent. Some in Congress and others, however, have contended that U.S. policy has changed
in some important areas. There also are issues as to whether any elements of the “one China”
policy should be reviewed for modification. The “one China” policy has evolved to cover three
issue areas: sovereignty, use of force, and cross-strait dialogue.

Issue Area 1: Sovereignty
One issue area for U.S. policy concerns sovereignty, including Taiwan’s juridical status, future
unification vs. independence, referendums, a new constitution, and international participation.
The U.S. “one China” policy has differed from the PRC’s principle on “one China,” and there
have been questions about whether U.S. policy is one of support, non-support, or opposition to
unification or independence. In short, U.S. policy has stressed the process (peaceful resolution,
cross-strait dialogue, with the assent of Taiwan’s people, and no provocations or unilateral
changes by either side) rather than the outcome (e.g., unification, independence, confederation).
At the same time, the ROC, or Taiwan, has continued to assert its sovereignty, seeking
membership or observership in the United Nations or other international organizations.
Even while recognizing the ROC government and its “jurisdiction” over Taiwan, on the eve of the
Nixon Administration’s contacts with PRC leaders in Beijing, the State Department testified to
Congress in 1969 and 1970 that the juridical matter of the status of Taiwan remained
undetermined. The State Department also wrote that
In neither [the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 nor the Treaty of Peace between the
Republic of China and Japan of 1952] did Japan cede this area [of Formosa and the
Pescadores] to any particular entity. As Taiwan and the Pescadores are not covered by
any existing international disposition, sovereignty over the area is an unsettled question
subject to future international resolution. Both the Republic of China and the Chinese
Communists disagree with this conclusion and consider that Taiwan and the Pescadores
are part of the sovereign state of China. The United States recognizes the Government of
the Republic of China as legitimately occupying and exercising jurisdiction over Taiwan
and the Pescadores.22

(...continued)
first time that the ROC’s forces had been on Formosa to occupy the colony, upon Japan’s surrender. When the Qing
Empire ceded in perpetuity Formosa to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the ROC was not in existence.
Moreover, the colony’s people did not have a say in determining their status. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist
Party of China, has contended that the ROC claimed Formosa at Japan’s surrender in August 1945, with no country
challenging the island’s status. (See Stephen Chen, former ROC representative to Washington in 1997-2000, “Taiwan
Belongs to the Republic of China,” paper given to author in March 2008). Following the ROC government’s retreat to
Taiwan in 1949 and the start of the Korean War, the U.S. stance shifted on sovereignty over Taiwan. On January 5,
1950, President Harry Truman stated that the United States would not get involved in the civil conflict in China. After
the Korean War started, however, President Truman declared on June 27, 1950, that “the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing
their lawful and necessary functions in that area.” The President said that he ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack
on Formosa and also called upon the ROC government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the
mainland. President Truman added that “the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.” (Quoted in: Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, record of hearing on
November 24, 1969; and Alan Romberg, Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice, Stimson Center, 2003).
22
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, hearings on the
Republic of China, November 24, 25, 26, 1969, and May 8, 1970. Also: State Department memorandum on the legal
status of Taiwan, July 13, 1971, a copy of which Nat Bellochi, former chairman of AIT, provided.

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However, accounts of President Nixon’s secret talks with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai in China in
1972 reported that Nixon made promises on the question of Taiwan in return for diplomatic
normalization that went beyond the communique issued at the end. The Carter Administration
later called the promises: “Nixon’s Five Points.”23 Also, according to Assistant Secretary of State
Stanley Roth’s March 1999 testimony, Nixon pledged no U.S. support for Taiwan independence
(second time after Kissinger’s 1971 promise): “We have not and will not support any Taiwan
independence movement.”24 With the release on December 11, 2003, of declassified memoranda
of conversation of the secret talks between Nixon and Zhou, there was confirmation that Nixon
stated as first of Five Principles that “there is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will
be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of
Taiwan is undetermined.”
The United States did not explicitly state its own position on the status of Taiwan in the three
U.S.-PRC Joint Communiques. In 1972, while still recognizing the ROC, the Nixon
Administration declared that it “acknowledges” that “all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait” maintain that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States
did not challenge that position. After shifting diplomatic recognition to the PRC, the United
States, in 1979 and 1982, again “acknowledged the Chinese position”25 of one China and Taiwan
is part of China. However, the 1982 communique further stated that the United States has no
intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan,” while President
Reagan’s accompanying statement said that “the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese
people, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, to resolve.” The TRA did not discuss the “one China”
concept. In 1994, the Clinton Administration stated after its Taiwan Policy Review that the United
States had “acknowledged” the Chinese position on one China and that “since 1978, each
Administration has reaffirmed this policy.”
Despite these apparent similarities in U.S. policy statements, some contend that the U.S. position,
since originally formulated in 1972, has adopted the PRC’s “one China” principle—rather than
steadily maintaining neutrality and equal distance from Beijing and Taipei. In 1982, Senator John
Glenn criticized both the Carter and Reagan Administrations:
The ambiguous formulation agreed upon in the 1979 joint communique went
considerably further in recognizing the PRC’s claim to Taiwan. Although the word
“acknowledged” remained, the object of our acknowledgment shifted noticeably. We no
longer just acknowledged that both Chinas asserted the principle that there was one
China, but instead acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China. By
dropping the key phrase “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain” one
could interpret that we had moved from the position of neutral bystander noting the
existence of a dispute, to a party accepting the Chinese assertion that there is one China.
Clearly, this was the PRC’s interpretation.... More recently, Peking’s threats to
downgrade relations with the United States, unless Washington agreed to end all arms
sales to Taiwan, prompted President Reagan to write to China’s Communist Party
23
James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), p. 46; Harding, Harry, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 43-44. According to Holdridge, Nixon reiterated the position against an
independent Taiwan that Kissinger told Zhou in July 1971.
24
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on United States-Taiwan Relations: The 20th Anniversary of the
Taiwan Relations Act, March 25, 1999, written response to Senator Helms’ question about precedents for President
Clinton’s June 1998 “Three Noes” statement, citing a Memorandum of Conversation, Tuesday, February 22, 1972, 2:10
pm-6:00 pm (declassified version).
25
The Chinese text said “recognized China’s position.”

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Chairman, Hu Yaobang, in May 1982, and assure him that, “Our policy will continue to
be based on the principle that there is but one China.... ” We now assert that it is our
policy, U.S. policy, that there is but one China, and although not stated, indicate
implicitly that Taiwan is a part of that one China. The use of the qualifier
“acknowledged” has been dropped altogether.... I do not believe that anyone can dispute
that the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan has changed dramatically over the last 10
years. Let me reiterate one more time, in 1972, we acknowledged that the Chinese on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained that there was but one China. Today it is U.S.
policy that there is but one China. Despite this remarkable shift over time, the State
Department, at each juncture, has assured us that our policy remained essentially
unchanged.26

President Clinton’s “Three Noes”
In August 1995 (earlier than the first public statements showed in 1997), President Clinton sent a
secret letter to PRC President Jiang Zemin to state that the United States: (1) would “oppose”
Taiwan independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas” or one China and one Taiwan; and (3)
would not support Taiwan’s admission to the U.N.27 The opposition to Taiwan independence
seemed to go beyond the promises made by former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
and President Nixon in 1971 and 1972 of no U.S. support for Taiwan independence. Later, that
wording was apparently changed from opposition to a neutral stance of non-support. This letter
reportedly formed the basis of what were later known publicly as the “Three Noes.”
At the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit in Washington, the two leaders issued a joint statement which
included a U.S. position: “the United States reiterates that it adheres to its ‘one China’ policy and
the principles set forth in the three U.S.-China joint communiques.” While that joint statement did
not include the “Three Noes,” the Administration designated the State Department’s spokesperson
to say two days later that “we certainly made clear that we have a one-China policy; that we don’t
support a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We don’t support a two-China policy. We don’t support
Taiwan independence, and we don’t support Taiwanese membership in organizations that require
you to be a member state.” While in China for a summit in June 1998, President Clinton chose an
informal forum to declare: “I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t
support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe
that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”
Some questioned whether the “Three Noes,” especially as it was publicly declared by the U.S.
President while in the PRC, was a change in U.S. policy.28 U.S. non-support for a one China, one
Taiwan; or two Chinas can be traced to the private assurances of the Nixon Administration in the
early 1970s. However, the Clinton Administration, beginning with its Taiwan Policy Review of
1994, added non-support for Taipei’s re-entry into the U.N., which became an issue after Taipei
launched its bid in 1993. In response to President Clinton’s “Three Noes,” concerned Members in
26

Statement of Senator John Glenn on China-Taiwan Policy, July 22, 1982, in: Lester Wolff and David Simon,
Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act (New York: American Association for Chinese Studies, 1982).
27
Garver, John W., Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (University of Washington
Press, 1997); James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to
Clinton (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).
28
For example: Stephen J. Yates, “Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan,” Heritage Foundation, July 10, 1998; Ted
Galen Carpenter, “Let Taiwan Defend Itself,” Policy Analysis, Cato Institute, August 24, 1998; Stephen J. Yates,
“Promoting Freedom and Security in U.S.-Taiwan Policy,” Heritage Foundation, October 13, 1998; James Lilley and
Arthur Waldron, “Taiwan is a ‘State,’ Get Over It,” Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1999; Harvey J. Feldman, “How
Washington Can Defuse Escalating Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Heritage Foundation, August 19, 1999.

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both the Senate and the House nearly unanimously passed resolutions in July 1998, reaffirming
the U.S. commitment to Taiwan.
The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, argued that the “Three Noes” did not represent a change
in policy. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 25, 1999, Assistant
Secretary of State Stanley Roth stated that “every point made there [in the “Three Noes”] had
been made before by a previous Administration and there was no change whatsoever.” In a
written response to a question from Senator Helms, Roth cited as precedents for the “Three Noes”
a 1971 statement by Kissinger, a 1972 statement by Nixon, a 1979 statement by Deputy Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, and President Reagan’s 1982 Communique.

President Bush on Taiwan’s Independence, Referendums, Constitution
On April 25, 2001, when President George W. Bush stated the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an
obligation to use “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself,” he also said that “a declaration
of independence is not the one China policy, and we will work with Taiwan to make sure that that
doesn’t happen.” Visiting Beijing in February 2002, Bush said that U.S. policy on Taiwan was
unchanged, but he emphasized U.S. commitment to the TRA and a peaceful resolution, along
with opposition to provocations by either Beijing or Taipei. After Taiwan President Chen Shuibian said on August 3, 2002, that there is “one country on each side” of the Taiwan Strait, the
U.S. National Security Council (NSC) stated, in a second response, that “we do not support
Taiwan independence.” With Jiang Zemin at his side at a summit in Crawford, TX, in October
2002, President Bush himself stated that “we do not support independence.”
However, there have been questions about whether the Bush Administration adjusted U.S. policy
after President Chen Shui-bian surprised the United States in August 2002 with a speech on “one
country on each side” and a call for a holding referendums. Specifically, there was the issue of
whether President Bush gave assurances, at closed meetings starting at that summit in October
2002, to PRC President Jiang Zemin and later President Hu Jintao that the United States was
“against” or “opposed” (vs. non-support of) unilateral moves in Taiwan toward independence
and/or the status of Taiwan independence, in the interest of stability in the Taiwan Strait.29 A
position in “opposition” to Taiwan independence would represent a shift in policy focus from the
process to the outcome and go beyond President Nixon’s “Five Principles,” which expressed the
neutral stance of “non-support” for Taiwan independence. But U.S. opposition to Taiwan
independence would be consistent with President Clinton’s secret letter reportedly sent in 1995 to
PRC leader Jiang Zemin, as the basis for the “Three Noes.” U.S. opposition would also conflict
with the stance of the government of Taiwan, which, under the DPP, argued that Taiwan is already
independent, as evident since the first democratic presidential election in 1996.30
After Chen, during campaigns for Taiwan’s presidential election in March 2004, advocated
holding referendums and adopting a new constitution by 2008—moves that could have
implications for Taiwan’s sovereignty and cross-strait stability, the Bush Administration called on
Chen to adhere to his pledges (“Five Noes”) in his inaugural address of 2000 (including not
29

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (April 22, 2004), President Bush met with his AIT officials, Therese
Shaheen and Douglas Paal, in the summer of 2003 on policy toward Taiwan, and Bush said “I’m not a nuance guy—
’Do not support.’ ‘Oppose.’ It’s the same to me.”
30
Chen Ming-tong, a Vice Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan, spoke at a conference of the Global
Alliance for Democracy and Peace in Houston, TX, on October 31, 2003, and contended that Taiwan is already a
sovereign, democratic country that is in a “post-independence period” and does not need to declare independence.
Joseph Wu, Deputy Secretary General of the Presidential Office of Chen Shui-bian, wrote in Taipei Times on January
6, 2004, that Taiwan’s independence is the “new status quo.”

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promoting a referendum to change the status quo). On September 28, 2003, Chen started his call
for a new constitution for Taiwan (with a draft constitution by September 28, 2006; a referendum
on the constitution on December 10, 2006; and enactment of the new constitution on May 20,
2008). National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on October 14, 2003, that “nobody
should try unilaterally to change the status quo.”31 A White House official said in an interview on
November 26, 2003, that “Taiwan shouldn’t be moving towards independence; and mainland
China shouldn’t be moving towards the use of force or coercion.”32 Then, Chen announced on
November 29—two days after the opposition-dominated legislature passed a restrictive law
authorizing referendums—that he would still use one provision to hold a “defensive referendum”
on election day.33 Chen argued that the referendum would be a way for Taiwan’s people to
express their opposition to the PLA’s missile threat and would have nothing to do with the
question of unification or independence.
Nonetheless, Administration officials had concerns about the volatile course of current and future
political actions in Taiwan (with elections, referendums, and a new constitution), reforms geared
for governance vs sovereignty, and unnecessary effects on stability, given U.S. commitments to
help Taiwan’s self-defense. The Administration added a new, clearer stance on December 1, 2003,
when the State Department expressed U.S. “opposition” to any referendum that would change
Taiwan’s status or move toward independence. On the same day, the Senior Director of Asian
Affairs at the NSC, James Moriarty, reportedly was in Taiwan to pass a letter from Bush to Chen
with concerns about “provocations.”34 Apparently needing a public, stronger, and clearer U.S.
message to Taiwan, Bush appeared next to visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House
on December 9, 2003, and stated an opposition to any unilateral decision by China or Taiwan to
change the status quo, as well as opposition to efforts by Taiwan’s President Chen to change the
status quo, in response to a question about whether Chen should cancel the referendum.
However, Bush did not make public remarks against the PRC’s threats toward democratic
Taiwan. Bush also did not counter Wen’s remarks that Bush reiterated “opposition” to Taiwan
independence. Bush raised questions about whether he miscalculated the willingness of Chen to
back down during his re-election campaign and risked U.S. credibility, since Chen responded
defiantly that he would hold the “anti-missile, anti-war” referendums as planned and that his
intention was to keep Taiwan’s current independent status quo from being changed.35
American opinions were divided on the Bush Administration’s statements toward Taiwan. Some
saw Chen as advancing a provocative agenda of permanent separation from China while trying to
win votes, and supported Bush’s forceful stance against Chen’s plan for referendums.36 Others
31
Previously, Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in May 1996—two months after President Clinton deployed
two aircraft carriers near Taiwan and days before an inauguration address by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui—that
“we have emphasized to both sides the importance of avoiding provocative actions or unilateral measures that would
alter the status quo or pose a threat to peaceful resolution of outstanding issues.”
32
Background interview with Senior White House Official, Phoenix TV, November 26, 2003.
33
Article 17 of the referendum law passed on November 27, 2003, in the Legislative Yuan authorizes the president to
initiate a referendum on national security issues “if the country suffers an external threat that causes concern that
national sovereignty will change.”
34
Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, December 1, 2003; New York Times, December 9, 2003.
35
Chen Shui-bian responded to Bush in a meeting with visiting Representative Dan Burton on December 10, 2003,
reported Taipei Times, December 11, 2003; and Chen’s meeting with author and others at the Presidential Palace,
Taipei, December 11, 2003.
36
Wall Street Journal, “The End of Ambiguity,” December 10, 2003; Ross Munro, “Blame Taiwan,” National Review,
December 18, 2003; Peter Brookes (Heritage Foundation), “Why Bush Acted on Taiwan,” Far Eastern Economic
Review, December 25, 2003; Michael Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

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criticized President Bush for being one-sided in appeasing a dictatorship at the expense of
Taiwan’s democracy while failing to warn against and even possibly inviting aggression from
Beijing.37 The co-chairmen of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus in the House wrote a letter to
President Bush, criticizing his stance as a victory for the authoritarian regime of the PRC at the
expense of Taiwan’s democratic reforms.38 Some critics argued for a new approach, saying that
the “one China” policy became “irrelevant” and that there were national security interests in
preventing the “unification” of Taiwan with China.39 In contrast, another opinion advocated the
continuation of arms sales to Taiwan with no position on its independence and staying out of any
conflict in the Taiwan Strait.40
Still, uncertainty remained about the Bush Administration’s implementation of U.S. policy on
questions such as options to recalibrate policy in exercising leverage over Taipei or Beijing;
capacity to maintain the delicate balance in preventing provocations by either side of the strait
rather than swerving to one side or another; perceptions in Taipei and Beijing of mixed messages
from Washington; the U.S. stance on referendums and a new constitution in Taiwan; definition of
“status quo”; deference to democracy in Taiwan; Taiwan’s long-standing, de facto independence
from China; stronger separate national identity in Taiwan; a proactive U.S. political role (such as
urging dialogue, facilitating talks, or mediating negotiations) in addition to proactive pressures on
defense; the extent of the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense; the increasing PLA
threat; and U.S. worries about Taiwan’s defense spending, acquisitions, and the will to fight.41
On January 16, 2004, Chen gave the wording for the two questions, saying that the referendums
will ask citizens (1) whether the government should acquire more missile defense systems if the
Chinese Communists do not withdraw missiles and renounce the use of force against Taiwan, and
(2) whether the government should negotiate with the Chinese Communists on a framework for
cross-strait peace and stability. Chen also promised that if re-elected, he will maintain “the status
quo of cross-strait peace.”42 On the election day of March 20, 2004, the two referendums failed to
be considered valid when 45% of eligible voters cast ballots (less than the 50% needed).
After the election in March 2004, the White House sent the Senior Director for Asian Affairs,
Michael Green, to Taiwan to urge President Chen to exclude sovereignty-related issues from
constitutional changes.43 In testimony by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly on April 21,
2004, the Administration warned Chen of “limitations” in U.S. support for constitutional changes.
In his inaugural address on May 20, 2004, Chen responded to a number of U.S. concerns.

37
For example, William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt (Project for the New American Century), “U.S.-ChinaTaiwan Policy,” December 9, 2003; Washington Post, “Mr. Bush’s Kowtow,” editorial, December 10, 2003; and
Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “Stand by Taiwan,” Weekly Standard, December 22, 2003.
38
Sherrod Brown, Steve Chabot, Dana Rohrabacher, and Robert Wexler, “Congressional Taiwan Caucus Urges
President Bush to Reconsider Position on Taiwanese Referendum,” December 11, 2003.
39
For example, conference at the Heritage Foundation, “Rethinking ‘One China’,” February 26, 2004; and Thomas
Donnelly, “Taiwan: Test Case of the Bush Doctrine,” AEI, National Security Outlook, April 2004.
40
Ted Galen Carpenter, “President Bush’s Muddled Policy on Taiwan,” CATO Institute, Foreign Policy Briefing,
March 15, 2004.
41
Based in part on the author’s visit to Taiwan, December 5-13, 2003. Also, for critiques in a longer-term context, see
for example: Bates Gill (Center for Strategic and International Studies), “Bush Was Correct but Clumsy on Taiwan
Policy,” Financial Times, December 12, 2003; Kenneth Lieberthal (University of Michigan), “Dire Strait: The Risks on
Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 8, 2004.
42
President of the Republic of China, news releases (in Chinese and English), January 16, 2004. Chen’s use of the
phrase “the status quo of cross-strait peace” was translated simply as “status quo” in the official English version.
43
Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 2004.

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In President Chen’s second term, President Bush did not support Taiwan’s independence or
membership in the U.N. and opposed unilateral changes to the “status quo.” Leading up to
Taiwan’s presidential election on March 22, 2008, Bush Administration officials expressed
opposition to referendums on Taiwan’s membership in the U.N. that were held on the same day.

Visits (or “Transits”) by Taiwan’s President
One issue has concerned the appropriate U.S. response to requests from Taiwan’s president to
enter the United States for visits or transits; to visit Washington, DC; to hold public events; and to
meet with Executive Branch officials and Members of Congress. Congress has expressed strong
support for granting such visits. Since 1994, the U.S. response has evolved from initially denying
Lee Teng-hui entry into the United States to relaxing restrictions on “transits” for stops by Chen
Shui-bian, and back to strict conditions for Chen’s transits in May 2006.
In May 1994, the Clinton Administration allowed President Lee Teng-hui to make a refueling stop
and rest in Hawaii but denied him a visa. In 1995, Lee received a visa to visit Cornell University,
his alma mater. (Beijing responded with PLA exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996.)
The Administration acknowledged that Congress’s view was an important factor in the reversal.
In August 2000, the Clinton Administration allowed the newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian
to transit in Los Angeles, but, according to Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry, Washington and Taipei had
an understanding that Chen would not hold public events. Representative Sam Gejdenson
organized a meeting between Chen and about 15 Members of Congress (some of whom were in
town for the Democratic National Convention), but Chen told them he was “unavailable.”44
In 2001, in granting President Chen “private and unofficial” transits through New York (May 2123) and Houston (June 2-3) en route to and from Latin America, the Bush Administration took a
different position on such meetings. As the State Department spokesperson said, “we do believe
that private meetings between Members of Congress and foreign leaders advance our national
interests, so [Chen] may have meetings with Members of Congress.”45 On the night of May 21,
2001, 21 Representatives attended a dinner with Chen in New York, and Representative Tom
DeLay later hosted Chen in Houston.
In 2003, while considering his safety, comfort, convenience, and dignity, the Bush Administration
again granted President Chen’s requests for transits to and from Panama through New York
(October 31-November 2) and Anchorage (November 4-5).46 Some Members of Congress
personally welcomed Chen, including 16 Members who were already in New York and met with
him. No Administration officials met with Chen, other than AIT officials based in Washington.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver reportedly canceled a planned meeting with
Chen in New York, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage talked with Chen by phone.47
Chen Shui-bian enjoyed extended transits through Honolulu and Seattle in August-September
2004, though these were less high-profile than that in New York. In January 2005, Chen stopped
in Guam on the way back to Taiwan from Palau and the Solomon Islands. In September 2005, the
Bush Administration allowed Chen to stop one day in Miami on his way to Latin America and in

44

CNA, August 9, 2000; “Taiwan Leader Stops in Los Angeles,” Washington Post, August 14, 2000; Sam Gejdenson,
“Taiwan Deserves Better: Why We Should Have Met with President Chen,” Washington Times, August 21, 2000.
45
Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, May 14, 2001.
46
Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, October 7, 2003.
47
Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 2003.

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San Francisco on his return to Taiwan. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus, via
teleconference, awarded Chen a human rights award while he was in Miami.
However, in May 2006, the Bush Administration was not pleased at repeated statements from
President Chen Shui-bian and responded by tightening restrictions on his proposed U.S. stops so
that they would be strict transits (with no activities), conditions similar to those for Lee Teng-hui
in 1994. Chen requested stops in San Francisco and New York for his visit to Latin America, but
President Bush countered with transits in Honolulu and Anchorage, and Chen refused those U.S.
cities. Representatives Thomas Tancredo and Dana Rohrabacher sent a letter on May 5, 2006, to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, questioning the decision’s consistency with legislation;
possible linkage to ties with Beijing; use of “humiliating” conditions on the transits; reversal of
policy despite President Bush’s affirmation of a consistent policy; impact on future U.S. stops;
and implication for “playing politics” given the contrast with Deputy Secretary of State Robert
Zoellick’s high-level meeting in Washington with the opposition KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou,
two months earlier. In September 2006, the Administration allowed Chen to stop in Guam, but he
had to switch to a civilian aircraft instead of his “Air Force One” that flew him to Palau.
In January 2007, the Administration allowed President Chen to stop overnight in San Francisco
and to refuel in Los Angeles on his way to and from Nicaragua. In response to restrictions on
Chen’s transits, Representative Dana Rohrabacher and 14 other Members wrote a letter to House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi on January 12, 2007, calling for the removal of all restrictions on bilateral
high-level visits with Taiwan. A week later, Representative Tancredo criticized (in extension of
remarks) Mexico’s ban of Chen’s plane from Mexican airspace on his way to Los Angeles, a
move similar to U.S. treatment toward Taiwan. In August 2007, the Administration restricted
Chen’s transits to 50-minute refueling stops in Anchorage on his way to and from Central
America, with no overnight stays. For his last U.S. transit in January 2008, the Bush
Administration allowed Chen to stop in Anchorage for two hours to refuel and rest.
After Ma Ying-jeou won the election on March 22, 2008, he expressed a desire to visit the United
States before his inauguration in May (after which U.S. policy would allow only transits). But the
Bush Administration denied his request. President Ma later “transited” in the United States, where
he sometimes met with Members of Congress and joined public activities (in Los Angeles,
Austin, and San Francisco in 2008; in San Francisco and Honolulu in 2009; in San Francisco and
Los Angeles in 2010; in New York and Los Angeles in 2013; in Los Angeles in January 2014; and
Honolulu and San Francisco in June-July 2014).

“International Space” and International Organizations
The United States, with congressional backing, has voiced some support for Taiwan’s quest for
“international space” (representation at international organizations), including “meaningful
participation” in certain international organizations on transnational issues. Some advocates view
such participation as preserving a democratic government’s international presence and promoting
the interests of Taiwan’s people, while others support Taiwan’s separate identity or independence.
The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review promised to support Taiwan’s
membership in organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and to support opportunities
for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible.
The focus of Taiwan’s international participation was at the World Health Organization (WHO),
and the annual meetings in May in Geneva of its governing body, the World Health Assembly
(WHA). On May 11, 2001, President Bush wrote to Senator Frank Murkowski, agreeing that the
Administration should “find opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations in order
to make a contribution, even if membership is impossible,” including concrete ways for Taiwan to

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benefit from and contribute to the WHO. On April 9, 2002, Representatives in the House formed
a Taiwan Caucus, and, as its first action, it wrote a letter on April 19, 2002, to the President,
seeking support for Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. With worldwide attention on the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy
Thompson expressed support for Taiwan in a speech at the WHA on May 19, 2003, saying that
“the need for effective public health exists among all peoples” and “that’s why the United States
has strongly supported Taiwan’s inclusion in efforts against SARS and beyond.”
By the meeting of the WHA in 2005, Taiwan lamented that the United States did not speak up and
that the WHO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the PRC to govern the
WHO’s technical exchanges with Taiwan.48 Still, the Bush Administration “applauded” the WHO
and China for taking steps in 2005 to increase Taiwan’s participation in WHO conferences.49
Taiwan did not gain observer status at the WHA in May 2008, even as the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou
was inaugurated as President after Chen Shui-bian’s terms ended. In January 2009, the WHO
included Taiwan in the International Health Regulations (IHR) which entered into force in 2007.
President Ma shifted Taiwan’s focus to the WHA meeting (rather than the WHO). In its required
report submitted to Congress on April 1, 2009, the State Department stated that it supported
Taiwan’s observership in the WHA and welcomed the decrease in politicization over Taiwan’s
participation in the WHO due to improvements in cross-strait ties over the past year. Taiwan’s
Minister of Health participated for the first time as an observer at the WHA in May 2009.
However, there are concerns that the invitation required the PRC’s approval, came under the
WHO-PRC MOU, and was ad hoc (only for a KMT President). Indeed, the State Department’s
report to Congress in April 2010 acknowledged that the WHA invited Taiwan in 2009 after the
PRC “agreed to Taiwan’s participation.” The State Department also expressed support, assessing
that Taiwan’s participation in the WHA was a “positive development” and could provide a model
for Taiwan’s participation as an “observer” in other U.N. bodies. In its report to Congress of April
2011, the State Department stated that it worked for Taiwan’s observership at the WHA again in
2010 and has sought regular invitations from the WHO to Taiwan every year. However, in May
2011, a secret WHO Memorandum dated September 14, 2010, came to light, showing that the
WHO had an “arrangement with China” to implement the IHR for the “Taiwan Province of
China.” That month in Geneva, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius
protested to the WHO that no U.N. body has a right to determine unilaterally Taiwan’s status.
President Ma decided to be more flexible than his DPP predecessor in pressing Taiwan’s bid to
rejoin the U.N., which it left in 1971 (as the ROC). On August 14, 2008, Taiwan submitted
instead a letter (via some countries with which Taiwan has diplomatic relations) to allow Taiwan
to “participate meaningfully” in U.N. specialized agencies.50 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
David Shear stated in March 2010 that “the United States is a strong, consistent supporter of
Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.” He also stated that “Taiwan
should be able to participate in organizations where it cannot be a member, such as the World
Health Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and other important
48

In May 2007, the Formosan Association of Public Affairs (FAPA) released the “Implementation of the Memorandum
of Understanding between the WHO Secretariat and China.”
49
Melody Chen, “Support for WHO Bid Dries Up,” Taipei Times, May 18, 2005; State Department, “Taiwan: The
World Health Assembly,” May 19, 2006. In November 2005, Taiwan’s Center for Disease Control participated in a
WHO conference on bird flu.
50
United Nations General Assembly, A/63/194, “Need to Examine the Fundamental Rights of the 23 Million People of
the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Participate Meaningfully in the Activities of the United Nations Specialized
Agencies,” dated August 22, 2008.

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international bodies whose activities have a direct impact on the people of Taiwan.” Taiwan has
sought status as an observer in the WHO, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Visa Waiver Program (VWP)
Under President Obama, on December 22, 2011, the State Department nominated Taiwan as a
candidate for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), though there is no diplomatic recognition of
Taiwan. On October 2, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Taiwan in the VWP,
effective on November 1. Taiwan’s citizens may travel to the United States for business or
tourism for up to 90 days without a visa. Taiwan became the 37th country to join the VWP. For
implementation of domestic laws, Section 4(b)(1) of the TRA provides that “whenever the laws
of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar
entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.”

Select Major Legislation
During the 103rd Congress, Congress passed and President Clinton signed (on April 30, 1994) the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia,
directed the State Department to register foreign-born Taiwanese-Americans as U.S. citizens born
in Taiwan (rather than China); and called for the President to send Cabinet-level officials to
Taiwan and to show clear U.S. support for Taiwan in bilateral and multilateral relationships.
After the Administration denied President Lee Teng-hui a visa in May 1994, the Senate, from July
to October, passed amendments introduced by Senator Brown to ensure that Taiwan’s President
can enter the United States on certain occasions. Two amendments (for S. 2182 and H.R. 4606)
that passed were not retained, but the amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994 was enacted. Upon signing it into law (P.L. 103-416) on October 25,
1994, President Clinton said that he construed Section 221 as expressing Congress’s view. Later,
Congress overwhelmingly passed the bipartisan H.Con.Res. 53 expressing the sense of Congress
that the President should promptly welcome a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui to his alma
mater, Cornell University, and a transit stop in Anchorage, Alaska, to attend a conference. The
House passed the resolution by 396-0 on May 2, and the Senate passed it by 97-1 on May 9, 1995
(with Senator Johnston voting Nay and Senators Moynihan and Warner not voting).
During the 106th Congress, in 1999, Congress legislated a requirement for semi-annual reports on
such U.S. support, in Section 704 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2000 and
2001 (P.L. 106-113). Also in 1999, Congress passed legislation (P.L. 106-137) requiring a report
by the Secretary of State on efforts to support Taiwan’s participation in the WHO. In January
2000, the State Department submitted the report, saying that the United States does not support
Taiwan’s membership in organizations, such as the U.N. or WHO, where statehood is a
requirement for membership, but that it supports any arrangements acceptable to the WHO
membership to allow for Taiwan to participate in the work of the WHO.51 In October 2000, the
House and Senate passed H.Con.Res. 390, expressing the sense of Congress that the State
Department’s report failed to endorse Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and
that the United States should fulfill the commitment of the Taiwan Policy Review to more
actively support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
51

Department of State, “Report Required by P.L. 106-137, Fiscal Year 2000, Taiwan Participation in the World Health
Organization (WHO),” January 4, 2000.

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In the 107th Congress, on May 17, 2001, Members agreed without objection to H.Con.Res. 135
to welcome President Chen Shui-bian upon his visit. Congress enacted legislation, P.L. 107-10,
authorizing the Secretary of State to initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the
annual summit of the WHA in May 2001 in Geneva. Then, Representative Sherrod Brown and
Senator Torricelli introduced H.R. 2739 and S. 1932 to amend the law to target the May 2002
meeting. H.R. 2739 was passed and enacted as P.L. 107-158 on April 4, 2002.
As enacted on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L.
107-228) authorized—at the Bush Administration’s request—U.S. departments or agencies
(including the Departments of State and Defense) to assign or detail employees to the American
Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the non-profit corporation (with offices in Washington and Taipei) that
has handled the U.S.-Taiwan relationship in the absence of diplomatic ties since 1979 under the
TRA. (Personnel at AIT were technically “separated” from government service for a period of
time, raising issues about employment status, benefits, recruitment, etc.) The legislation also
expressed the sense of Congress that AIT and the residence of its director in Taipei should
publicly display the U.S. flag “in the same manner as United States embassies, consulates, and
official residences throughout the world.”
In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed S. 243 to authorize the Secretary of State to
initiate a U.S. plan to obtain observer status for Taiwan at the WHA in May 2003. Upon signing
the bill as P.L. 108-28 on May 29, 2003, President Bush stated that “the United States fully
supports the overall goal of Taiwan’s participation in the work of the WHO, including
observership” but considered the act to be consistent with the “one China” policy. On October 30,
2003, the House passed H.Con.Res. 302 (416-0) to welcome President Chen to the United States.
On April 21 and May 6, 2004, the House and Senate passed H.R. 4019 and S. 2092 in support of
Taiwan’s efforts to gain observer status in the WHO and to make it an annual requirement to have
an unclassified report from the Secretary of State on the U.S. plan to help obtain that status for
Taiwan. An implication of this change was the end of annual focused congressional statements
and votes. In signing S. 2092 into law (P.L. 108-235) on June 14, 2004, President Bush stated that
the United States fully supported the participation of Taiwan in the work of the WHO, including
observer status. However, he also declared that his Administration shall construe the reporting
requirement by using his authority to “withhold information” which could impair foreign
relations or other duties of the executive branch.
While the State Department initially stopped short of publicly supporting Taiwan’s observership
in ICAO, Congress supported that goal. In July 2010, the House passed H.Con.Res. 266
(Berkley) to express the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be accorded observer status in
ICAO. In the 112th Congress, in September 2011, the Senate agreed to S.Con.Res. 17 (Menendez)
with the same sense of Congress. The House also agreed to S.Con.Res. 17 in September 2012.
In the 113th Congress, on June 18 and 19, 2013, the House and Senate, respectively, passed H.R.
1151 (Royce) and S. 579 (Menendez), to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to
obtain observer status for Taiwan at the triennial ICAO Assembly next held in September-October
2013 in Montreal, Canada. The House passed H.R. 1151 (by 424-0). The Senate passed H.R. 1151
(by unanimous consent) on June 27. President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 113-17) on
July 12. He issued a statement of support for Taiwan’s participation at ICAO, while construing
the act to be consistent with the “one China” policy. On August 28, the State Department
submitted a report as required by Section 1(c) of the legislation. The State Department told
Congress of U.S. support for “observer status” for Taiwan in all of the meetings of ICAO. The
report pointed to the ICAO Council, which meets regularly, in contrast to the ICAO Assembly,
which meets triennially. The State Department noted that U.S. support for Taiwan in ICAO is
consistent with the “one China” policy and the TRA.

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Issue Area 2: Use of Force
The PRC has never renounced its claimed right to use force in what it sees as an internal problem
and, moreover, has voiced more explicitly and demonstrated clearly its willingness to use force
for political if not military objectives—despite its announced policy of “peaceful unification.”
Since the early 1990s, the PRC has purchased advanced arms from the Soviet Union/Russia and
built up its missile force. In December 1992 and March 1993, top PRC ruler Jiang Zemin and
Premier Li Peng warned of “drastic” or “resolute” measures to prevent Taiwan’s independence.
Jiang reportedly ordered the PLA in January 1993 to win “high-tech local wars” focused on the
Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense reported that the CPC’s Central Military
Commission (CMC) decided at a meeting in June 1993 to focus the PLA against Taiwan.52
In the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, the PRC launched provocative military exercises,
including missile “test-firings,” to express displeasure with President Lee Teng-hui’s private visit
to the United States and to intimidate voters before Taiwan’s first democratic presidential
election. President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan in March 1996.
The United States believed that the PLA accelerated its buildup since the crisis. The PRC raised
tension again in 1999, after Lee said the cross-strait relationship was “special state-to-state ties.”
In February 2000, on the eve of another presidential election in Taiwan, the PRC issued its second
White Paper on Taiwan, reaffirming the peaceful unification policy but adding a new precondition
for the use of force. As one of “Three Ifs,” the PRC warned that even if Taiwan indefinitely
refuses to negotiate a peaceful settlement, the PRC would be compelled to use force to achieve
unification. No deadline was issued. The White Paper warned the United States not to sell arms to
Taiwan or pursue any form of alliance with Taiwan, including cooperation in missile defense.
Before the presidential election in 2004, a PRC official on Taiwan affairs who was a PLA major
general issued a threat, on November 18, 2003, to use force against what Beijing perceives as the
“open promotion of Taiwan independence.” Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
responded by saying that “there’s an election and campaign going on in Taiwan, and I think one
shouldn’t over-emphasize comments that are made in the heat of an election” and that the United
States “has full faith that the question of Taiwan will be resolved peacefully.”53
Concerned about the PRC’s provocations, President Bush did not support DPP President Chen
(2000-2008) nor Taiwan’s independence or membership in the U.N. President Bush also opposed
referendums on membership in the U.N. during Taiwan’s presidential election on March 22, 2008.
For that election, President Bush sent two aircraft carriers near Taiwan, whose largely symbolic
referendums were nonetheless targets of the PRC’s belligerent condemnation. The referendums
failed to be valid, and the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou won as president. (See CRS Report RL34441,
Security Implications of Taiwan’s Presidential Election of March 2008, by Shirley Kan.)

52
The PRC’s Military Strategic Guideline of 1993 for “Winning Local Wars Under High Technology Conditions” has
focused the PLA on preparations for potential operations against Taiwan. See John Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making
China’s Nuclear War Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2012 (citing Jiang Zemin); and Hsu Shao-hsuan, “PRC’s
Preparations to Attack Taiwan Accelerate,” Taipei Times, July 19, 2010. In its 2005 book, The Science of Military
Strategy, the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS) assessed Taiwan’s strategic significance that “if Taiwan
should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime defense system would lose its depth, opening a
sea gateway to outside forces, but also a large area of water territory and rich reserves of ocean resources will fall into
the hands of others.”
53
“Taiwan Office’s Wang Zaixi: Taiwan Independence Means War, Use of Force is Difficult to Avoid,” Xinhua,
November 18, 2003; Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC, November 18, 2003.

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Commitment to Help Taiwan’s Self-Defense
Since the 1950s, the United States government, with a critical congressional role, has expressed
the consistent position for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. Implementation of U.S.
policy included the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty of 1954 and the Formosa Resolution, P.L. 84-4.54
After termination of the treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed the TRA of 1979,
adding U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense and a potential U.S. role in maintaining
peace in the strait. The TRA left the U.S. obligation to help defend Taiwan somewhat ambiguous
and did not bind future U.S. decisions. Section 2(b)(4) states that the United States will consider
with “grave concern” any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future. The TRA also
excluded the islands off the mainland (e.g., Quemoy and Matsu) in its security coverage over
Taiwan. Nonetheless, the Section 2(b)(6) of the TRA declares it to be policy to maintain the U.S.
capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan [emphasis added].
In 1982, President Reagan signed the Joint Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but
he also stated in public and internal clarifications that U.S. arms sales will continue in accordance
with the TRA and with the full expectation that the PRC’s approach to the resolution of the
Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful. President George H. W. Bush decided in September
1992 to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan, citing concerns about the cross-strait military balance.
On March 10 and 11, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced decisions to deploy two
aircraft carrier battle groups to waters off Taiwan, after the PRC announced renewed PLA
exercises that would include further missile “test-firings” toward Taiwan and Congress introduced
legislation on helping to defend the ROC. President Clinton demonstrated that there might be
grave consequences, as well as grave concern, to non-peaceful efforts to determine Taiwan’s
future. However, the Joint Statement at the 1997 Clinton-Jiang summit did not mention the TRA.

54

Congress, in the 1950s, started to debate critical issues about whether to use U.S. military forces to defend the ROC
government on the island of Taiwan, whether to include the small off-shore islands close to the mainland in any
security coverage, and the role of Congress in such decision-making. After KMT forces, led by Chiang Kai-Shek,
retreated to Taiwan in 1949, President Truman stated in January 1950 that the United States would not interfere in
China’s civil war to defend Taiwan. After North Korea’s attack on South Korea in June 1950, however, Truman
ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent attacks by both sides across the Taiwan Strait. In March 1953, the ROC asked for a
mutual defense treaty, but the United States was concerned about extending any defense commitment to the off-shore
islands, changing the “no-defense policy.” PLA forces increased activities around the off-shore islands in mid-1953,
seizing some small islands. In August 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that there would be a
U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty (signed on December 2, 1954), and PRC bombardment and attacks on off-shore
islands started the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955. (See Ralph Clough, Island China, Harvard University Press,
1978; Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, University of North Carolina Press, 1996.) On January 24, 1955,
President Eisenhower, in a message to Congress, requested a resolution to authorize the use of force to protect
Formosa, the Pescadores, and “related positions and territories.” He said that he did not suggest that “the United States
enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting
ratification.” He also argued that it was important that Formosa remained in friendly hands and if in unfriendly hands,
the situation would create a breach in the “island chain” of the western Pacific for U.S. and allied security. The
President cited Communist firing of heavy artillery on Quemoy island that started in September 1954, followed by air
attacks against the Tachen islands and seizure of Ichiang island. After significant debate, Congress passed H.J.Res. 159
on January 29, 1955. The Formosa Resolution was enacted as P.L. 84-4. The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad held extensive hearings on November 24, 25, 26, 1969, and
May 8, 1970, to review “United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad with the Republic of China.”
Congress later repealed the Formosa Resolution in the Department of State and United States Information Agency
(USIA) Appropriations Authorization Act, enacted as P.L. 93-475 on October 26, 1974.

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In April 2001, President George W. Bush publicly stated the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an
obligation to do “whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” [emphasis added].55 Visiting
two allies then China in February 2002, the President, in Tokyo, cited the U.S. commitment to
Taiwan in the context of support for five regional allies (Japan, South Korea, Australia,
Philippines, and Thailand)—to applause from the Diet, or Japan’s legislature. Then, in Beijing,
Bush emphasized U.S. commitments to the TRA and a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan
question, while voicing opposition to provocations from either side.
However, indicating concerns about miscalculations of U.S. views in Taiwan, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-min in
February 2003 that, while the President said we will do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend
itself, Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.”56
In November 2003, with concerns about PRC threats and Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian’s
efforts to hold referendums, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that the TRA is not
a defense treaty. Armitage added that the TRA guides policy in providing Taiwan “sufficient
defense articles for her self-defense” and “also requires the United States to keep sufficient force
in the Asia Pacific area to be able to keep the area calm.” Armitage reaffirmed that the U.S.
commitment to assist Taiwan’s self-defense, with no defense treaty, “doesn’t go beyond that in the
Taiwan Relations Act, and we have good, competent military forces there.”57 President Bush
appeared with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the Oval Office on December 9, 2003, and stated U.S.
opposition to any unilateral decisions made by the leader of Taiwan to change the status quo.
In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly further clarified U.S. policy after Chen
Shui-bian’s re-election in March and warned Taiwan not to dismiss PRC statements as “empty
threats” and warned of “limitations” to U.S. support for constitutional changes in Taiwan. At the
same time, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman
warned Beijing that its attempt to use force would “inevitably” involve the United States.58
In September 2005, the Defense Department further clarified the mutual obligations under the
TRA and limits to the U.S. ability to assist Taiwan. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard
Lawless issued a speech, stressing the TRA’s focus on Taiwan’s self-defense. He declared that,
inherent in the intent and logic of the TRA is the expectation that Taiwan will be able to
mount a viable self-defense. For too long, the Taiwan Relations Act has been referenced
as purely a U.S. obligation.... Under the TRA, the U.S. is obligated to “enable” Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense, but the reality is, it is Taiwan that is obligated to have a
55

Assessments differed on the implications of Bush’s interpretation of the U.S. commitment. Congress expressed
mixed reactions. Senator Joseph Biden wrote that “we now appear to have a policy of ambiguous strategic ambiguity. It
is not an improvement.” (Washington Post, May 2, 2001.) Senator Richard Lugar contended that the President’s
statement “reflected a common-sense appraisal of the strategic situation in Asia.” (Washington Times, May 17, 2001.)
The Wall Street Journal (April 26, 2001) wrote that Bush sent a message to Beijing that Washington has a “strong
national interest in preserving Taiwan’s democracy” and there is “now less chance of a miscalculation by China’s
leaders.” Others, including Michael O’Hanlan (New York Times, April 27, 2001), said Bush departed from ambiguity,
which serves U.S. interests in preserving all options and in discouraging provocations by Taipei. A third argument was
that the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan should be limited to arms sales and that “preserving Taiwan’s de facto
independence” is not a vital U.S. security interest (Ted Galen Carpenter, “Going Too Far: Bush’s Pledge to Defend
Taiwan,” CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, May 30, 2001).
56
U.S.-Taiwan Business Council conference, San Antonio, TX, February 2003.
57
Richard Armitage, press availability, Exhibit Hall, Washington, DC, November 18, 2003.
58
Hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” held by the House International Relations Committee,
April 21, 2004.

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sufficient self-defense. There is an explicit expectation in the TRA that Taiwan is ready,
willing, and able to maintain its self-defense. Taiwan must fulfill its unwritten, but clearly
evident obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act by appropriately providing for its
own defense while not simply relying on the U.S.’ capacity to address a threat in the
Strait. The TRA requires both parties to do their part to deter aggression or coercion visa-vis Taiwan.59

Aside from the issue of whether the U.S. strategy on assisting Taiwan’s self-defense should be
ambiguous or clear in a policy seeking deterrence towards Beijing and Taipei, a third view
advocates the removal of any defense commitment (implicit or explicit) while continuing to sell
weapons for Taiwan’s self-defense.60

Arms Sales and Military Cooperation
Despite the absence of diplomatic and alliance relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been
significant. A related issue has been whether to pursue normalization of ties with Taiwan. After
tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996, the Pentagon under the Clinton Administration quietly
expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since 1979.
These broader exchanges reportedly have increased attention to so-called “software” (discussions
over strategy, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of an invasion of Taiwan).
The George W. Bush Administration continued and expanded the closer military ties at different
levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he would drop the 20-year-old annual arms sales
talks used with Taiwan’s military in favor of normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests
on an as-needed basis. Then, the Bush Administration granted a visa for ROC Defense Minister
Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to attend a private conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan
Business Council on March 10-12, 2002, in St. Petersburg, FL, making him the first ROC defense
minister to come to the United States on a non-transit purpose since 1979.61 Also in 2002, the
Bush Administration requested legislation to authorize the assignment of personnel from U.S.
departments and agencies to AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military
personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979. (See the discussion below of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY2003.) One objective was to select from a wider range of
personnel, without excluding those on active duty. The first active-duty defense attaché since
1979, an Army Colonel began his duty in Taipei in August 2005 with civilian clothes and a status
similar to military attaches assigned to Hong Kong, except that military personnel in Hong Kong
may wear uniforms at some occasions.62 While allowing military representatives in Taiwan, the
Administration maintained a ban on visits by U.S. general and flag officers to Taiwan, under the
State Department’s “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan.”

59
A DSCA official, Ed Ross, read the Defense Department’s speech on September 19, 2005, in San Diego, CA, at the
U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, while Lawless was delayed in Beijing
at the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons.
60
Ted Galen Carpenter (Cato Institute), America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan, 2005.
61
In December 2001, the ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, transited on his way to the Dominican Republic.
62
In addition to Colonel Al Willner, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) assigned Army Colonel Peter
Notarianni to oversee security assistance at AIT in Taipei. Department of Defense, notice, “DSCA contract awarded to
AIT to support DSCA active-duty military and civil service personnel,” September 24, 2005. In the past, from 1951 to
1979, the United States assigned to Taiwan the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). Ministry of National
Defense, U.S. MAAG – Taiwan: an Oral History, Taipei: 2008. One of the officers interviewed was retired Colonel
Mason Young, Jr., father of Stephen Young who served as AIT Director from 2006 to 2009.

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Although there has been much interest among U.S. academic circles and think tanks in pursuing
talks with China on its military buildup and increased U.S. security assistance to Taiwan,63 a
catalyst for this debate among policy makers arose out of the U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX,
on October 25, 2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen,
and reported in Taiwan’s media, PRC leader Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a freeze or
reduction in China’s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return for restraints in U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan.64 President Bush reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s linkage. Policy
considerations include the TRA (under which the United States has based its defense assistance to
Taiwan on the threat that it faces), the 1982 Joint Communique (which discussed reductions in
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC’s peaceful unification policy), and the 1982 “Six
Assurances” to Taiwan (which said the United States did not agree to hold prior consultations
with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). On April 21, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly testified to the House International Relations Committee that if the PRC meets its
stated obligations to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its rhetoric
with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to Taiwan, “it follows
logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change.”

Select Major Legislation
Since the 1990s, particularly given the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile launches in 19951996, Congress has asserted its role vis-a-vis the President in determining arms sales under
Section 3(b) of the TRA, and in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2(b)(6) on
the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
In the 103rd Congress, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY1994-FY1995 (P.L. 103-236) that, inter alia, declared that Section 3 of
the TRA (i.e., on arms sales) takes primacy over statements (i.e., the 1982 joint communique).
During the 104th Congress, in early 1996, Congress became increasingly concerned about
provocative PLA exercises held the previous summer and again on the eve of Taiwan’s
presidential election in March 1996 (with “test-firings” of M-9 short-range ballistic missiles to
target areas close to the two Taiwan ports of Kaohsiung and Keelung). Introduced by
Representative Chris Cox on March 7, passed by the House on March 19, and passed by the
Senate on March 21, 1996, H.Con.Res. 148 expressed the sense of Congress that the United
States should assist in defending the ROC. On March 13, 1996, during markup of H.Con.Res. 148
in the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Delegate Eni
Faleomavaega noted that House and Senate resolutions prompted the Clinton Administration to
deploy the USS Independence and USS Nimitz carriers. The resolution cited Section 3(c) of the
TRA, which directs the President to inform Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the
social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and to determine the U.S. response along with
Congress. However, on March 14, 1996, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs Winston Lord told the subcommittee that “however serious, the present situation does not
constitute a threat to Taiwan of the magnitude contemplated by the drafters of the Taiwan
63
See David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11th World,” Nixon
Center, August 2002; David Shambaugh’s remarks at conference held by the Carnegie Endowment, Stanford
University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on
“Taiwan and U.S. Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis?,” October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, “Reverse Course? The
Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief, February 2003; and David Lampton,
“The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,” National Interest, Fall 2003.
64
Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], November 22, 2002; Taipei Times, November 23, 2002.

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Relations Act” and that “if warranted by circumstances, we will act under Section 3(c) of the
TRA, in close consultation with the Congress.”
In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 105-261)
required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems that could protect and
could be transferred to “key regional allies,” defined in the conference report as Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan.65 In addition, the conference report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense
Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262) required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in
the Taiwan Strait, in both classified and unclassified forms.66
In the 106th Congress, the FY2000 NDAA (P.L. 106-65) enacted a requirement for the Pentagon
to submit annual reports on PRC military power and the security situation in the Taiwan Strait.
In asserting its role in decision-making on arms sales to Taiwan, Congress passed language,
introduced by Senator Lott, in the FY2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of
P.L. 106-113), requiring the Secretary of State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism
for congressional input in determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act (§581 of P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan Reporting
Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified basis with Congress 30 days prior
to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)
In addition to examining arms sales, Congress looked closer at U.S. military deployments. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) required a report on the operational
planning of the Defense Department to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about
PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.67
In the 107th Congress, the NDAA for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted December 28, 2001,
authorized the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan (§1011),
under Section 21 of the AECA. Also, Section 1221 of the act required a section in the annual
report on PRC military power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the PLA’s military
acquisitions and any implications for the security of the United States and its friends and allies.
The scope of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia and other former
Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).68
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115), as enacted on January 10,
2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the executive and legislative branches
on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573 required the Departments of State and Defense to provide
detailed briefings (not specified as classified) to committees (including those on appropriations)
within 90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002. The
briefings were to cover U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales of defense articles or services.
Some Members in the House and Senate called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations
with Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President Bush
announced on April 24, 2001, that he would drop the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in
favor of normal, routine considerations on an “as-needed” basis. Enacted as P.L. 107-228, the
65

Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture Options for the Asia-Pacific
Region,” May 1999.
66
Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, The Security Situation in the
Taiwan Strait,” February 1, 1999.
67
Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act,” December 2000.
68
Still, the Pentagon’s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China’s military acquisitions from states of the former
Soviet Union, and not other countries (e.g., Israel).

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Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 authorized—at the Bush Administration’s
request—the Department of State and other departments or agencies (including the Department of
Defense) to detail employees to AIT (Section 326); required that Taiwan be “treated as though it
were designated a major non-NATO ally” (Section 1206); required consultations with Congress
on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan every 180 days (Section 1263); and authorized the sale to
Taiwan of the four Kidd-class destroyers (Section 1701). Section 326, amending the Foreign
Service Act of 1980, had significant implications for the assignment of government officials to
Taiwan, including active-duty military personnel for the first time since 1979.
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a statement that
included his view of Section 1206 (on a “major non-NATO ally”). He said that “Section 1206
could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy of the United States when, in
fact, that U.S. policy remains unchanged. To the extent that this section could be read to purport
to change United States policy, it impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional
authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.” Nonetheless, the Acting Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to
Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally.”
The House-passed FY2003 NDAA contained Section 1202 seeking to require the Defense
Secretary to implement a comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of
senior officers with Taiwan’s military and to “enhance interoperability” with Taiwan’s military.
The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA)
proposed in the 106th Congress. The Senate’s version did not have the language. As enacted on
December 2, 2002, P.L. 107-314 contained a revised section (1210) requiring a Presidential report
180 days after the act’s enactment on the feasibility and advisability of conducting combined
operational training and exchanges of senior officers with Taiwan’s military. (Military exchanges
may take place in the United States, but U.S. flag/general officers may not visit Taiwan.)69
In the 110th Congress, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved, on September 26, 2007,
H.Res. 676 (Ros-Lehtinen) that noted the Bush Administration’s lack of response to Taiwan’s
interest in buying F-16C/D fighters and that urged the Administration to determine security
assistance “based solely” upon the legitimate defense needs of Taiwan (citing Section 3(b) of the
TRA). The House passed H.Res. 676 on October 2, 2007. The House also passed H.R. 6646 on
September 23, 2008. Some Members suspected that Bush had a “freeze” on arms sales to Taiwan
until notifications to Congress on October 3, 2008.
In the 111th Congress, Senator John Cornyn introduced on July 23, 2009, an amendment to the
NDAA for FY2010 to require President Obama to report on an assessment of Taiwan’s air force,
in examining Taiwan’s need for new F-16C/D fighters. In conference, the Senate Armed Services
Committee receded on the section to require in the legislation for a Presidential report on
Taiwan’s air force and U.S. options. Still, the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288) directed the
Defense Secretary to submit an assessment to Congress on Taiwan’s air defense. The bill was
enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009. Secretary Gates submitted an unclassified study to
Congress in February 2010. The Obama Administration later submitted on September 22, 2011,
the Defense Department’s comprehensive, classified report on Taiwan’s air power.
In the 112th Congress, Members passed the NDAA for FY2013 (P.L. 112-239) with Section 1281
to express the sense of Congress that the President should take steps to address Taiwan’s shortfall

69

Department of State, “Guidelines on Relations with Taiwan,” memo, February 2, 2001.

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in fighters, whether through the sale of F-16C/D aircraft or other aircraft of similar capability. The
conference report for the FY2013 NDAA required a briefing on Taiwan’s air force by April 15.
In the 113th Congress, the House, on June 14, 2013, passed H.R. 1960 (McKeon), the FY2014
NDAA, with Section 1265 to direct the President to sell 66 F-16C/D fighters (approved as
language offered by Representative Gerald Connolly for amendments en bloc). The Senate Armed
Services Committee’s report of June 20 (S.Rept. 113-44) for the FY2014 NDAA, S. 1197,
extended the deadline to July 15, 2013, for the Defense Department to brief on Taiwan’s air
power and requested a classified report on Taiwan’s air force by December 1. The briefing took
place on July 17. The House-Senate agreement on the NDAA of December 10 did not include
Section 1265, while calling on the President to continue to take steps to enable Taiwan’s air force
to contribute to a “sufficient” self-defense capability. The Defense Department delivered a
classified report on Taiwan’s air force to Congress on January 3, 2014.
On April 7, 2014, the House passed H.R. 3470 (Royce), which incorporated H.Res. 494 and was
renamed the Taiwan Relations Act Affirmation and Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2014 (which
would, inter alia, authorize transfers by sale of up to four excess U.S. Navy Perry-class frigates to
Taiwan). (H.Res. 494 (Royce) would affirm the importance of the TRA on its 35th anniversary of
enactment.) On December 4 and 10, respectively, the Senate and House passed S. 1683
(Menendez) to authorize transfers of frigates to Taiwan (by sale) and Mexico. S. 1683 became
P.L. 113-276 on December 18.
Representative Forbes introduced language in the House Armed Services Committee’s report on
the FY2015 NDAA, H.R. 4435 to direct the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to report by October
1, 2014, on any benefits and associated costs and security requirements of integrating Taiwan’s
early warning radar with other U.S. missile defense and sensor systems to improve U.S. missile
defense capabilities. In December 2014, Congress passed the FY2015 NDAA (H.R. 3979;
enacted as P.L. 113-291). Section 1256 retained the previous House-passed H.R. 4435’s
requirement for the Defense Secretary to report on Taiwan’s maritime capabilities but expanded
the scope of the report to cover its self-defense capabilities. The FY2015 NDAA also re

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30341. Public record. Not legal advice.