# Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30294

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** March 11, 2010
- **Citation:** RL30294

## Text

Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests
(name redacted)
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
March 11, 2010

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL30294

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Central Asia’s Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests

Summary
The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism, and faltering commitments to
economic and democratic reforms. However, cooperation among them remains halting, so
security in the region is likely in the near term to vary by country. Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s
futures are most clouded by ethnic and territorial tensions, and corruption in Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan could spoil benefits from the development of their ample energy resources.
Authoritarianism and poverty in Uzbekistan could contribute to a succession crisis. On the other
hand, Kyrgyzstan’s beleaguered civil society might eventually help the relatively small nation
safeguard its independence. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan might become regional powers able to
champion policy solutions to common Central Asian problems and to resist undue influence from
more powerful outside powers, because of their large territories and populations and energy and
other resources.
Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have a large impact on
Central Asian security. These developments include a more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an
economically growing China, instability in Iran and the South Caucasus region, and re-surging
drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the former Bush
Administration established bases and other military access in the region to support U.S.-led
coalition operations in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has highlighted U.S. interests in
such continued access as well as the long-term security and stability of the region. U.S. interests
in Central Asia include combating terrorism, drug production, and trafficking; assisting the
development of oil and other resources; and fostering democratization, human rights, free
markets, and trade. The United States also seeks to thwart dangers posed to its security by the
illicit transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies,
materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups, and to address threats posed to regional
independence by Iran. Some critics counter that the United States has historically had few
interests in this region, and advocate only limited U.S. contacts undertaken with Turkey and other
friends and allies to ensure U.S. goals. They also urge these friends and allies to enhance their
energy security by taking the lead in the development of diverse export routes for Central Asia’s
energy resources.
Most in Congress have supported U.S. assistance to bolster independence and reforms in Central
Asia. The 106th Congress authorized a “Silk Road” initiative for greater policy attention and aid
for democratization, market reforms, humanitarian needs, conflict resolution, transport
infrastructure (including energy pipelines), and border controls. The 108th and subsequent
Congresses have imposed conditions on foreign assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, based
on their human rights records. Congress has continued to debate the balance between U.S.
security interests in the region and interests in democratization and the protection of human
rights.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................1
Central Asia’s External Security Context .....................................................................................1
Security Problems and Progress ..................................................................................................2
Islamic Extremism and Terrorism..........................................................................................3
Terrorist Activities ..........................................................................................................4
Attacks in Uzbekistan .....................................................................................................5
Attacks in Kyrgyzstan .....................................................................................................7
Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan .....................................................................7
Civil War in Tajikistan.....................................................................................................8
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan ................................................8
Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere................................................ 10
Border Tensions .................................................................................................................. 11
Crime and Corruption ......................................................................................................... 14
Economic and Defense Security .......................................................................................... 15
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) .................................................... 17
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) ............................................................ 18
Water Resources ........................................................................................................... 20
Energy and Transport .................................................................................................... 21
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction............................................................... 26
Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking............................................................... 27
Implications for U.S. Interests ................................................................................................... 29
Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq .................................................................. 31
Designations of Terrorist Organizations............................................................................... 32
Military Cooperation........................................................................................................... 34
Closure of Karshi-Khanabad ......................................................................................... 36
Emphasis on Kazakhstan as Strategic Partner ................................................................ 36
The Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan ................................................................................. 37
The “Transit Center” Agreement ................................................................................... 38
The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan.................................................. 39
U.S. Security Assistance...................................................................................................... 40
Nonproliferation ........................................................................................................... 41
Counter-Narcotics Aid................................................................................................... 42
Military Assistance........................................................................................................ 44
Conditions on Assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ............................................... 45
Safety of U.S. Citizens and Investments .............................................................................. 46
Embassy Security.......................................................................................................... 47
Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................. 48
Should the United States Play a Prominent Role in Central Asia? ........................................ 48
What Are U.S. Interests in Central Asia? ............................................................................. 49
What Roles Should Outside Powers Play in the Region? ..................................................... 50
How Significant Are Regional Energy Resources to U.S. Interests? ..................................... 51
What U.S. Security Involvement is Appropriate?................................................................. 52
Should the United States Try to Foster Democratization?..................................................... 53

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Tables
Table A-1. Central Asia: Basic Facts.......................................................................................... 62
Table A-2. U.S. Government Cumulative Budgeted Security Assistance to Central Asia
FY1992-FY2008, FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets............................................ 64
Table A-3. Peace and Security Assistance and Total Budgeted Assistance to Central Asia
FY1992-FY2008, FREEDOM Support Act and Agency Budgets............................................ 66

Appendixes
Appendix. Selected Outside Players .......................................................................................... 55

Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 67

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Introduction
The Central Asian region—bordering regional powers Russia, China, and Iran—is an age-old
east-west and north-south trade and transport crossroads.1 After many of the former Soviet
Union’s republics had declared their independence by late 1991, the five republics of Central Asia
followed suit. Since this beginning of independence, surprising to most of the region’s population,
the Central Asian countries have taken some uneven steps in building defense and other security
structures and ties. In some respects, the states have viewed their exposure to outside influences
as a mixed blessing. While welcoming new trade, aid, and other ties, the leaders of Central Asia
have been less receptive to calls to democratize and respect human rights.
This report discusses the internal and external security concerns of the Central Asian states.
Security concerns faced by the states include mixes of social disorder, crime, corruption,
terrorism, ethnic and civil conflict, border tensions, water and transport disputes, the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and trafficking in illegal narcotics and persons. The
Central Asian states have tried with varying success to bolster their security forces and regional
cooperation to deal with these threats. The United States has provided assistance for these efforts
and boosted such aid and involvement after the terrorist attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, but questions remain about what should be the appropriate level and scope
of U.S. interest and presence in the region.

Central Asia’s External Security Context
Central Asia’s states have slowly consolidated and extended their relations with neighboring and
other countries and international organizations that seek to play influential roles in Central Asia or
otherwise affect regional security. These include the bordering or close-by countries of Russia,
Afghanistan, China, Iran, Turkey, and the South Caucasus states (see below, Appendix), and
others such as the United States, Germany, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, and Ukraine. In terms of ties with close-by states, Turkmenistan may be concerned more
about bordering Iran and Afghanistan than with non-bordering China, while Kazakhstan may be
concerned more about bordering Russia than with non-bordering Afghanistan. While soliciting
and managing ties with these states, the Central Asian countries also seek assistance through
regional and international organizations, including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund
(IMF), Economic Community Organization (ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC), the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), and NATO.
Outside powers, while sometimes competing among themselves for influence in Central Asia,
also have some common interests. After September 11, 2001, Russia, China, and the United
States cooperated somewhat in combating terrorism in the region. This cooperation has appeared
to ebb since then, but as the security situation in Afghanistan becomes more complicated,
1
Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan. For overviews, see CRS Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (nam
e redacted); CRS Report 97-690,
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); CRS Report 98-594,
Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); CRS Report 97-1055,
Turkmenistan: Recent
Developments and U.S. Interests, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RS21238,
Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and
U.S. Interests, by (name redacted).

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cooperation may improve. Cooperation is also needed to combat drug, arms, and human
trafficking, manage water resources, develop and deliver energy, and tackle infectious diseases.
Iran and Russia have collaborated since the latter 1990s to hinder the United States and Turkey
from further involvement in developing Caspian Sea oil and natural gas resources. Some
observers warn that increasing collaboration or similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and
China in countering the West and in attempting to increase their influence could heighten threats
to the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount such threats,
stressing the ultimately diverging goals of the three states.

Security Problems and Progress
The problems of authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, terrorism, and ethnic and civil tensions
jeopardize the security and independence of all the new states of Central Asia, though to varying
degrees. Kazakhstan has faced the potential of separatism in northern Kazakhstan where ethnic
Russians are dominant, although this threat has appeared to ebb in recent years with the
emigration of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians. Tajikistan faces threats from economic
mismanagement and the possibility of separatism, particularly by its northern Soghd (formerly
Leninabad) region. In Kyrgyzstan, northern and southern regional interests vie for influence over
central political and economic decision-making. Turkmenistan faces clan and provincial tensions
and widespread poverty that could contribute to instability. Uzbekistan faces escalating civil
discontent and violence from those whom President Islam Karimov labels as Islamic extremists,
from a large ethnic Tajik population, and from an impoverished citizenry. Ethnic Uzbeks and
Kyrgyz clashed in 1990 in the Fergana Valley. This fertile valley is divided between Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and contains about one-fifth of Central Asia’s population. All the
states are harmed by drug and human trafficking and associated corruption and health problems.
Despite these problems, Turkmenistan’s oil and gas wealth could contribute to its long-term
stability. Also, its location at a locus of Silk Road trade routes potentially could increase its
economic security. Uzbekistan’s large population and many resources, including oil, natural gas,
and gold, could provide a basis for its stable development and security. Kyrgyzstan’s beleaguered
civil society might eventually succeed in reducing authoritarianism and boosting entrepreneurial
activity and good governance, which eventually might permit the country to increase its
budgetary expenditures for defense and security.
It would seem that affinities among the current regional elites would facilitate cooperative ties.
Many of the officials in the states learned a common language (Russian) and were Communist
Party members. Religion (Islam) and ethnicity (Turkic or Persian) are other seeming grounds for
links among most in the region. In actuality, however, regional cooperation has been halting.
The vast majority of the people in the Central Asian states suffered steep declines in their quality
of life in the first few years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The gap widened between
the rich and poor, accentuating social tensions and potential instability. Social services such as
health and education, inadequate during the Soviet period, declined further. In the new century,
however, negative trends in poverty and health have been reversed in much of Central Asia,

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according to one World Bank report, although the quality of life remains far below that of
Western countries.2
Economic difficulties associated with the world financial crisis that began in 2008 could
exacerbate social tensions, separatism, and extremism, although large percentages of the states’
populations remain employed in the agricultural sector where economic gyrations have been
somewhat buffered. This sector has a surfeit of manpower, however, and cannot readily absorb
new workers as the populations continue to increase. In the past, substantial out-migration by
many workers to Russia and the return of remittances to relatives in Central Asia somewhat eased
poverty and tension and buttressed national GDPs. However, Russia’s economic problems have
caused these remittances to fall off and have forced many of these guest workers to return to their
countries of origin.3

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism
Calls for government to be based on Sharia (Islamic law) and the Koran are supported by small
but increasing minorities in most of Central Asia. Most of Central Asia’s Muslims appear to
support the concept of secular government, but the influence of fundamentalist Salafist and
extremist Islamic groups is growing. 4 Tajikistan’s civil conflict, where the issue of Islam in
political life contributed to strife, has been pointed to by Central Asian leaders to justify
crackdowns. They also point to Russia’s conflict with its breakaway Chechnya region and other
areas in Russia’s North Caucasus as evidence of the threat. In many cases, government
crackdowns ostensibly aimed against Islamic extremism have masked clan, political, and
religious repression. In some regions of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan’s portion of the Fergana
Valley, some Uzbeks kept Islamic practices alive throughout the repressive Soviet period, and
some now oppose the secular-oriented Uzbek government. Islamic extremist threats to the
regimes may well increase as economic distress fails to dissipate or widens as a result of the
global economic crisis. Heavy unemployment and poverty rates among youth in the Fergana
Valley are widely cited by observers as making youth more vulnerable to recruitment into
religious extremist organizations.5
Although much of the attraction of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is generated by factors such
as poverty and discontent, it is facilitated by groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and
elsewhere that provide funding, education, training, and manpower to the region. Some of these
ties were at least partially disrupted by the U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan and the U.S.
call for worldwide cooperation in combating terrorism.6

2

Asad Alam, Mamta Murthi, Ruslan Yemtsov, Edmundo Murrugarra, Nora Dudwick, Ellen Hamilton, and Erwin
Tiongson, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, The World Bank, 2005.
3
Michael Mihalka, “Counter-Insurgency, Counter-Terrorism, State-Building and Security Cooperation in Central
Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2006. pp. 131-151.
4
Most Central Asian Muslims traditionally have belonged to the Sunni branch and the Hanafi school of interpretation.
Islamic Sufiism has been significant, as have pre-Islamic customs such as ancestor veneration and visits to shrines.
5
Ahmad Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale: Yale University Press, 2002; T. Jeremy
Gunn, Sociology of Religion, Fall 2003, pp. 389-410; Pinar Akcali, Central Asian Survey, June 1998, pp. 267-284; Aziz
Niyazi, Religion, State & Society, March 1998, pp. 39-50.
6
Zeyno Baran, S. Frederick Starr, Svante E. Cornell, Islamic Radicalism in Central Asia and the Caucasus:
Implications for the EU, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2006.

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The Central Asian states impose several controls over religious freedom. All except Tajikistan
forbid religious parties such as the Islamic Renewal Party (Tajikistan’s civil war settlement
included the IRP’s legalization), and maintain Soviet-era religious oversight bodies, official
Muftiates, and approved clergy. The governments censor religious literature and sermons.
According to some analysts, the close government religious control may leave a spiritual gulf that
underground radical Islamic groups seek to fill.
Officials in Uzbekistan believe that the country is increasingly vulnerable to Islamic extremism,
and they have been at the forefront in Central Asia in combating this threat. Reportedly,
thousands of alleged Islamic extremists have been imprisoned and many mosques have been
closed. Restrictions were tightened when the legislature in 1998 passed a law on “freedom of
worship” banning all unregistered faiths, censoring religious writings, and making it a crime to
teach religion without a license. The Uzbek legislature also approved amendments to the criminal
code increasing punishments for setting up, leading, or participating in religious extremist,
separatist, fundamentalist, or other illegal groups. Public expressions of religiosity are
discouraged. Women who wear the hijab and young men who wear beards are faced with
government harassment and intimidation. As recommended by the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), then-Secretary Rice in November 2006 designated
Uzbekistan a “country of particular concern” (CPC), where severe religious and human rights
violations could lead to U.S. sanctions. Since 2000, USCIRF also has recommended that
Turkmenistan be designated as a CPC.7
Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have arrested many members of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT;
Liberation Party, a politically oriented Islamic movement calling for the establishment of Sharia
rule), sentencing them to lengthy prison terms or even death for pamphleteering, but HT
reportedly continues to gain adherents. Uzbekistan argues that HT not only advocates terrorism
and the killing of apostates but is carrying out such acts.8 Kyrgyz authorities emphasize the antiAmerican and anti-Semitic nature of several HT statements and agree with the Uzbek government
on designating the group as an illegal terrorist organization, but some prominent observers in
Kyrgyzstan argue that the group is largely pacific and should not be harassed. 9

Terrorist Activities
Terrorist actions aimed at overthrowing regimes have been of growing concern in all the Central
Asian states. Some analysts caution that many activities the regimes label as terrorist—such as
hijacking, kidnapping, robbery, assault, and murder—are often carried out by individuals or
groups for economic benefit or for revenge, rather than for political purposes. Also, so-called
counter-terrorism may mask repressive actions against religious or political opponents of the
regime.
7

U.S. Department of State. International Religious Freedom Report 2006, September 15, 2006. U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom. Annual Report, May 2, 2005; Annual Report, May 3, 2006; Annual Report, May 1,
2007; Annual Report, May 1, 2008; Annual Report, May 1, 2009. USCIRF first urged that Uzbekistan be designated a
CPC in its 2005 report.
8
Cheryl Bernard has argued that HT writings borrow heavily from Marxism-Leninism and rely much less on Islamic
principles. HT publications have stated that the movement “has adopted the amount [of Islam] which it needs as a
political party,” that the Islamic world is the last hope for establishing communism, and that terrorist acts against
Western interests are appropriate. Hizb ut Tahrir—Bolsheviks in the Mosque, RAND Corporation, nd.
9
HT literature has demanded the withdrawal of U.S.-led coalition forces and the closure of the coalition’s Manas
airbase in Kyrgyzstan. CEDR, March 13, 2003, Doc. No. CEP -104; CEDR, January 7, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-91.

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Terrorist activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and similar groups in the
region were at least temporarily disrupted by U.S.-led coalition actions in Afghanistan, where
several of the groups were based or harbored. 10 Many observers, however, warn that terrorist cells
have re-formed and are expanding in Central Asia and that surviving elements of the IMU and
other terrorist groups are infiltrating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.11 Ominously, the
IMU and its splinter group, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU; see below), have become even more
closely allied with international terrorist groups, particularly Al Qaeda. Moreover, the IMU and
IJU have expanded their activities beyond Central and South Asia to other areas of the globe.

Attacks in Uzbekistan
Several explosions outside government buildings in Tashkent on February 16, 1999, were
variously reported to have killed 13-28 and wounded 100-351 individuals. Uzbek officials
detained hundreds or thousands of suspects, including political oppositionists and HT members.
The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six receiving the death sentence. Karimov in
April 1999 alleged that Mohammad Solikh (former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the
banned Erk Party) was the mastermind of the plot, and had received support from the Taliban and
Uzbek Islamic extremist Tohir Yuldash. The 22 suspects were described in court proceedings as
receiving training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia (by Al Qaeda
terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and as led by Solikh and Yuldash and his ally Jama Namanganiy,
the latter two the heads of the IMU. Testimony alleged that Solikh had made common cause with
Yuldash and Namanganiy in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldash, Namanganiy, and others had
agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldash defense minister after Karimov was
overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek media report in early July 1999,
the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by Namanganiy and other Tajik rebels
transiting through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (see below).
Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of Solikh or
members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. In November 2000,
the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were tried in
absentia. The absent Yuldash and Namangoniy were given death sentences, and the absent Solikh
15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process during the trial.
Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or membership in the IMU.
Yuldsash too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings, but warned that more might occur if
Karimov does not step down.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks were launched in
Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. President Karimov asserted on March 29 that the violence was
aimed against his government, in order to “cause panic among our people, to make them lose
their trust in the policies being carried out.” An obscure Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan (IJG;
10

Also, Russia’s military operations in its breakaway Chechnya region after 1999 may have helped disrupt Al Qaeda
plans for Central Asia. The terrorist group was operating terrorist training camps in Chechnya in the late 1990s that it
planned to use in part as launching pads for establishing new cells and camps throughout Central Asia. Defense
Intelligence [Agency] Report Details al Qaeda’s Plans for Russia, Chechnya & WMD, Judicial Watch, Press Office,
November 16, 2004. The declassified Intelligence Information Report is dated October 1998.
11
CEDR, March 6, 2003, Doc. No. 217. In testimony in October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth
Jones stated that “there is a resurgence of the ability of the IMU to operate” in Central Asia and that it “represents a
serious threat to the region and therefore to our interests.” U.S. Congress. House International Relations Committee.
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, Hearing, October 29, 2003.

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Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, reportedly an alias of the IMU or a breakaway part of the IMU)
claimed responsibility for the violence.12 After the attacks, media censorship intensified. The first
national trial of fifteen suspects accused of attempting to overthrow the government ended in late
August 2004. They all confessed their guilt and received sentences of 11-16 years in prison. Some
of the defendants testified that they belonged to the IJG and were trained by Arabs and others at
camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU member Najmiddin Jalolov (one of
those convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of the IJG and linked him to Taliban head
Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin Laden. Over 100
individuals reportedly were convicted in various trials.
Suicide bombings occurred in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli
embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office. Three Uzbek guards reportedly were killed
and about a dozen people were injured. All U.S. and Israeli diplomatic personnel were safe. The
next day, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned the “terrorist attacks.” The IMU and
the IJG claimed responsibility and stated that the bombings were aimed against the Uzbek and
other “apostate” governments (see also CRS Report RS21818, The 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan:
Context and Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted)).
Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek
troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to
demand the end of a trial of 23 prominent local businessmen charged with belonging to an
Islamic terrorist group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held
and released hundreds of inmates. There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group
contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed mainly of the friends and families of the
accused. Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings. President
Islam Karimov flew to the city to direct operations and reportedly had restored order by late on
May 13. The United States and others in the international community have called for an
international inquiry, which the Uzbek government has rejected (see also CRS Report RS22161,
Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by (name redacted)).
On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took
place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial
district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,
although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly
claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,
shooting took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and the
apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had been
involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent. In early December
2009, the Andijon regional court reportedly convicted 22 individuals on charges of involvement
in the May 2009 events, and sentenced them to prison terms ranging from five to 18 years.

12
The IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in 2005. According to Uzbek reporter Aleksey
Volosevich, the group “was headed by Najmiddin Jalolov, born in Andijon in 1972, and his deputy, Mansur Sohayil,
whose nickname is Abu Huzaifa. Both of them are ethnic Uzbeks. They fell out with Tohir Yuldash unhappy with the
absence of active combat actions on the territory of Uzbekistan.... Jalolov managed to get the backing of Al Qaeda
regional leaders, after promising them to set up something like a Central Asian structural body of the organization.”
CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261.

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Attacks in Kyrgyzstan
In recent years there have been sporadic suicide bombings and other attacks seemingly aimed
against the government. One took place at the Oberon market in Bishkek in December 2002, one
at a currency exchange outlet in Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan in May 2003, and one in Bishkek
that targeted policemen in November 2004. The explosion at the Oberon market killed seven
Kyrgyz citizens and injured over 20 people. One person was killed in Osh. Five people, including
three Uzbeks, a Uighur citizen of China, and a Kyrgyz, were charged in July 2003 with
involvement in the first two bombings. Kyrgyz security officials claimed that they were IMU
members trained in Chechnya (by Al Qaeda’s Khattab) and Afghanistan and that they had also
planned to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek but were foiled by tight security around the
embassy.13 In contrast to these terrorist incidents, the former Bush Administration regarded the
March 2005 ouster of Akayev as a popular uprising.

Incursions into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
Several hundred Islamic extremists and others who fled repression in Uzbekistan and settled in
Tajikistan (some of whom were being forced out at Uzbekistan’s behest), and rogue groups from
Tajikistan that refused to disarm as part of the Tajik peace settlement, entered Kyrgyzstan in JulyAugust 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group. The guerrillas seized hostages,
including four Japanese geologists, and occupied several Kyrgyz villages, stating that they would
cease hostilities if Kyrgyzstan provided harborage and would release hostages if Uzbekistan
released jailed extremists. The guerrillas were rumored to be seeking to create an Islamic state in
south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. In mid-October 1999, Kyrgyzstan’s
defense minister announced success in forcing virtually all the guerrillas into Tajikistan (some
critics argued that the onset of winter weather played an important part in the guerrilla retreat).
Uzbek aircraft targeted several alleged guerrilla hideouts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, eliciting
protests from these states of violating airspace. Uzbek President Islam Karimov heavily criticized
Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Askar Akayev for supposed laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. The
Tajik government, which had mercurial relations with Uzbekistan, incensed it by allowing the
guerrillas to enter Afghanistan rather than wiping them out.
According to many observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorists in Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia (Chechnya and Dagestan) and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s
security forces in combating threats to its independence. Observers were split on whether this
terrorism was related more to Islamic extremism, or to efforts to control narcotics resources and
routes.
Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000,
in Kyrgyzstan taking foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of Kyrgyz fleeing the area.
Uzbekistan provided air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for
defeating the insurgents by late October 2000. In Uzbekistan, the insurgents launched attacks near
Tashkent and in the southeast that were defeated by Uzbek troops.
Limited engagements by Kyrgyz border troops with alleged insurgents or drug traffickers were
reported in late July 2001. According to some reports, the IMU did not engage in major attacks in
13

CEDR, February 16, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-237; June 23, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-178; and May 14, 2003, Doc. No. CEP443.

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2001 because of its increasing attention to bin Laden’s agenda, particularly after September 11,
2001, when IMU forces fought alongside bin Laden and the Taliban against the U.S.-led
coalition. The activities of the IMU appeared to have been dealt a blow by the U.S.-led coalition.

Civil War in Tajikistan
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements—largely consisting of members of
Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power—tried to take
over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia, launched a
successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000 casualties and
up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993,
the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan. These forces consisted of Russia’s 201st Rifle
Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the Kyrgyz and
Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).
Terrorist actions were carried out by both sides, and international terrorist groups provided some
support to the Tajik opposition. Reportedly, these groups included the IMU, Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards, and Al Qaeda.14 As the civil war wound down in the late 1990s, most of these forces left
Tajikistan.
After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994, the UNSC
established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in December 1994 with a
mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the
demobilization of Tajik opposition fighters, assist ex-combatants to integrate into society, and
offer advice for holding elections. In December 1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an executive body composed equally of government and
opposition members. On June 27, 1997, Tajik President Emomaliy Rakhman and opposition
leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhman
remained president but 30% of ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of
the peace process were largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel
forces, legalization of rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC
disbanded, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate
fulfilled in June 2000, but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in
Tajikistan remains fragile.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Pakistan and Afghanistan
According to some estimates, there are some 4,000 IMU fighters in Afghanistan. Pakistan
reported in November 2006 that it had arrested IJU members who had placed rockets near
presidential offices, the legislature, and the headquarters of military intelligence in Islamabad.
Reportedly, the IJU was targeting the government because of its support for the United States.15
Pakistani media reported in March-April 2007 that dozens of IMU members had been killed in
14
Osama bin Laden in mid-1991 began dispatching mujahidin to assist in overthrowing the then-communist regime in
Tajikistan. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report, July 23, 2004, pp. 58, 64.
15
BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 4, 2006.

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northern Pakistan when local tribes turned against them, possibly reducing their strength or
forcing them to move into Afghanistan and Central Asia. More alleged IMU and IJU members
were reported killed by Pakistani forces during fighting in North Waziristan in October 2007.
Indicating a widening of the IMU’s focus, Tohir Yuldash called in January 2008 for creating a
Shariah state in Pakistan.
Among other incidents:
•

In January 2008, an IJU website seemed to indicate that Abu Laith al-Libi—an al
Qaeda official who had been killed by the United States in Pakistan—had been
one of the leaders of the IJU. 16

•

In March 2008, an IJU website claimed that one of its members—the Germanborn Cunyt Ciftci (alias Saad Abu Fourkan)—had assisted Taliban forces in
Afghanistan by carrying out a suicide bombing that killed two Afghan and two
U.S. troops and wounded several others.17 According to the IJU website and other
sources, IJU is playing a more significant role in fighting in Afghanistan.

•

In June 2008, an IJU video claimed that one Uzbek IJU member had taken part in
the 1999 attack in Kyrgyzstan, and later had fought in Afghanistan against the
Northern Alliance and then against U.S. and NATO forces. Another Uzbek
member had been trained in Chechnya by Khattab in 1998 and also had fought
against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.18

•

In July and September 2009, ISAF and the Afghan military reportedly carried out
operations in the northern Konduz province against IMU terrorists who
supposedly had moved into the province after being forced out of Pakistan.

•

Tohir Yuldash allegedly was killed in Pakistan by a U.S. predator missile on
September 26, 2009. A Russian Tatar, Abdur Rakhman, allegedly became the new
leader of the IMU.

•

On October 11, 2009, 10 terrorists attacked the army headquarters in Rawalpindi,
resulting in 20 deaths. The government alleges that three of the attackers
belonged to the IMU.

•

In late October 2009, Pakistani armed forces reportedly were attacking an IMU
base in the town of Kaniguram in South Waziristan.

•

In February 2010, Pakistani media reported that a U.S. predator missile killed
several terrorists in North Waziristan, including four Uzbek citizens. The
terrorists were said to be linked to Al Qaeda.

•

In February 2010, alleged IMU terrorists attacked a police station in Bannu,
North West Frontier Province, Pakistan, killing 15 police and civilians.

16

Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda: The Islamic Jihad Union and the Internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism,
Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2008; U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Testimony of
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: The Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2008.
17
Guido Steinberg, A Turkish al-Qaeda; UPI, March 17, 2008.
18
CEDR, August 4, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-318001.

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Some officials in Central Asia have warned that the crackdown on the IMU and IJU in Pakistan
and Afghanistan may be forcing some of the terrorists to return to Central Asia. Other officials
have stated that a large-scale influx has not yet occurred.

Actions of the IMU and IJU in Germany and Elsewhere
Officials in Germany arrested four individuals on September 5, 2007, on charges of planning
explosions at the U.S. airbase at Ramstein, at U.S. and Uzbek diplomatic offices, and other targets
in Germany. The IJU claimed responsibility and stated that it was targeting U.S. and Uzbek
interests because of these countries’ “brutal policies towards Muslims,” and targeting Germany
because it has a small military base in Termez, Uzbekistan, which is used to support NATO
operations in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the suspects had received their orders from Gofir Salimov
(not apprehended), who is wanted in Uzbekistan in connection with the 2004 bombings. The
suspects were part of a larger IJU branch in Germany. In U.S. congressional testimony on
September 10, 2007, the then-Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, John Redd, and
the then-Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, stated that U.S. communications
intercepts shared with Germany had facilitated foiling the plot. In July 2009, German media
reported that the suspects had confessed that they were trained at an IJU terrorist training camp in
Afghanistan. The leader of the IJU was identified as Najmiddin Jalolov (mentioned above), a.k.a.
“commander Ahmad.” In testimony in September 2009, two of the defendants admitted that while
in Afghanistan in 2006, they had launched attacks against two U.S. military camps.19
Among other incidents:
•

In May 2008, French, German, and Dutch authorities reported that they had
detained 10 individuals for suspicion of running a network to funnel money to
the IMU in Uzbekistan.

•

In late September 2008, German authorities reported the arrest of two suspected
members of IJU and issued wanted posters for two other suspected members. The
four allegedly had received terrorist training in Pakistani IJU camps. German
authorities also arrested two people allegedly attempting to leave the country to
undergo terrorism training in Pakistan by the IJU (they later were released on the
grounds of inconclusive evidence).20

•

A video released by the IJU in late October 2008 stated that as long as Germany
supports NATO operations in Afghanistan, and uses a base in Uzbekistan to
support these operations, it is subject to IJU attacks.

•

A video was released by the IJU in January 2009 that threatened German
“occupation” troops in Afghanistan.

•

Turkish authorities arrested over three dozen alleged IJU members in April 2009.

19

Guido Steinberg has argued that several dozen recruits of various ethnic groups have travelled from Germany to
Pakistan for training in IMU and IJU camps. Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report, August 10, 2009, Doc. No.
EUP-72003.
20
Simon Sturdee, “German Commandos Arrest Two Terror Suspects on Aircraft,” Agence France Presse, September
26, 2008; Craig Whitlock, “Germany Pulls Two Suspected Terrorism Trainees from Plane,” Washington Post,
September 27, 2008, p. A14.

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•

German media reported in June 2009 that a video released by the IJU provided
more evidence that the terrorist organization was linked to al Qaeda.21

Border Tensions
Borders among the five Central Asian states for the most part were delineated by 1936, based
partly on where linguistic and ethnic groups had settled, but mainly on the exigencies of Soviet
control over the region. The resulting borders are ill-defined in mountainous areas and extremely
convoluted in the fertile Fergana Valley, parts of which belong to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. Over a dozen tiny enclaves add to the complicated situation, as does Soviet-era
decisions to build roads and railways with scant regard to intra-regional borders. Some in Central
Asia have demanded that borders be redrawn to incorporate areas inhabited by co-ethnics, or
otherwise dispute the location of borders.
Caspian Sea borders have not been fully agreed upon, mainly because of Iranian intransigence,
but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also have not resolved their mutual claims to undersea oil and
gas resources. In August 2009, Turkmenistan called for the issue of the disputed offshore
resources to be adjudicated, presumably by the International Court of Justice. In November 2009,
Senior Advisor to the US State Department in Eurasian Energy Affairs, Daniel Stein, reportedly
offered U.S. good offices to mediate the dispute, but stated that even if such a settlement is not
soon reached, the United States believed that trans-Caspian pipelines still could be built. Iran’s
foreign minister Manoucher Mottaki reportedly denounced the U.S. offer, asserting that the
littoral states will be the sole arbiters of the borders.22 Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on
delineation and shared exploitation of seabed oil resources.
China has largely settled border delineation with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan,
reportedly involving “splitting the difference” on many of the disputed territories, which are
usually in unpopulated areas. Popular passions were aroused in Kyrgyzstan after a 1999 ChinaKyrgyzstan border agreement ceded about 9,000 hectares of mountainous Kyrgyz terrain. Kyrgyz
legislators in 2001 opened a hearing and even threatened to try to impeach then-President
Akayev. He arrested the leader of the impeachment effort, leading to violent demonstrations in
2002 calling for his ouster and the reversal of the “traitorous” border agreement. Dissident
legislators appealed the border agreement to the Constitutional Court, which ruled in 2003 that it
was legal. In June 2006, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev visited China and assuaged
Chinese concerns by signing a joint declaration with Chairman Hu Jintao which re-affirmed that
“the parties will abide strictly by all the agreements and documents signed between the two
countries on the border issue.” In July 2009, the Kyrgyz Border Service reportedly rebutted
claims by some Kyrgyz legislators and others that some territory was being ceded to China and
confirmed that all border demarcation issues with China had been resolved. 23
The problem of delineating their 4,200 mile border has been an important source of concern to
Russia and Kazakhstan. During most of the 1990s, neither Russia nor Kazakhstan wished to push
border delineation, Russia because of concerns that it would be conceding that Kazakhstan’s
heavily ethnic Russian northern regions are part of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan because of
21

Open Source Center. Europe: Daily Report (hereafter EDR), June 5, 2009, Doc. No. EUP-85023.
Open Source Center. Iran: Daily Report, November 25, 2009, Doc. No. IAP-434001.
23
CEDR, February 28, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-284; March 9, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-27; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP950306; ITAR-TASS, July 14, 2009.
22

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concerns that delineation might inflame separatism. In 1998, Russia established border patrols
along its border with Kazakhstan for security reasons, and determined to delineate the border. By
late 2004, most of the Russian-Kazakh border had in principle been delimited, but the sides are
still involved in the placement of border signs and border posts.24 To head off separatist
proclivities in the north, Kazakhstan reorganized administrative borders in northern regions to
dilute the influence of ethnic Russians, established a strongly centralized government to limit
local rule, and moved its capital northward. These and other moves apparently contributed to
political resignation among many ethnic Russians, and many emigrated to Russia.
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed on the delimitation of about one-half of their 579 mile
shared border and pledged in September 2007 to peacefully settle contentious disputes involving
borders in the Fergana Valley. These disputes have resulted in some deaths and injuries. Tensions
have increased because of demographic shifts along the border. Some Kyrgyz allege that Tajiks
have moved into lands in Kyrgyzstan that have been vacated by Kyrgyz, who have moved to
cities or become migrant workers. Conversely, some Tajiks allege that Kyrgyz have moved into
their lands. 25 In January 2010, Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi stated that the
delineation of borders with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was “very complicated since quite often
the borderline crosses towns, cities, streets and even separate houses,” but that Russia recently
had provided archival information that might facilitate the settlement of border disputes.26
Uzbekistan has had contentious border talks with all the other Central Asian states. According to
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, about 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s 680-mile border with
Uzbekistan remains to be demarcated. 27 Legislators and others in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 vehemently
protested a border delineation agreement with Uzbekistan reached by the two prime ministers that
ceded a swath of the Kyrgyz Batken region, ostensibly to improve Uzbek access to its Sokh
enclave in Kyrgyzstan. Faced with this protest, the Kyrgyz government sent a demarche to
Uzbekistan repudiating any intention to cede territory. Similarly, in late 2004 Kyrgyz legislators
demanded that Uzbekistan’s Shohimardon enclave in Kyrgyzstan (ceded in the 1930s) be
returned.28 These and other contentious issues resulted in the cessation of border talks between
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan for five years until they resumed in December 2009.
Uzbekistan’s unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with Kazakhstan in the late
1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced
that delineation of their 1,400 mile border was complete, and some people in previously disputed
border villages began to relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their
“homeland.” However, many people continued to ignore the new border or were uncertain of its
location, leading to several shootings of Kazakh citizens by Uzbek border troops. In one case,
transit between the villages of Arnasay and Kostakyr in South Kazakhstan and the rest of
Kazakhstan was cut off when an area of the sole roadway from the towns was ceded to
24

ITAR-TASS, August 7, 2008.
CEDR, September 18, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950239; December 24, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950130; August 11, 2009,
Doc. No. CEP-950103; “Kyrgyzstan: Ambiguous Kyrgyz-Tajik Border Increases Risk Of Conflict,” Eurasia Insight,
February 2, 2009.
26
CEDR, January 19, 2010, Doc. No. CEP950107; ITAR-TASS, January 18, 2010.
25

27

CEDR, February 17, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088; September 8, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950162; December 13, 2007,
Doc. No. CEP-950238; January 12, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950025; May 14, 2008, Doc. No. CEP-950537; January 24,
2009, Doc. No. CEP-950013; December 29, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
28
CEDR, November 6, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-130.

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Uzbekistan. Residents complained that Uzbek border guards were constantly arresting them for
violating the border, while Kazakh officials called for the residents to relocate. 29
The Uzbek and Tajik presidents signed an accord in October 2002 delimiting most of their 720mile joint border. Contention has continued over about 15-20% of the border. In October 2006,
the head of the Tajik border guard service complained that demarcation was being hindered by
Uzbekistan’s peremptory placement of border markers, barbed wire and fences.30 Some Tajiks
have raised concerns that Uzbekistan wants to redraw borders in order to take possession of the
Farhod reservoir on the Syr Darya River. 31
Besides border claims, other problems revolve around whether borders are open or closed. Open
borders within the Central Asian states after the breakup of the Soviet Union were widely viewed
as fostering trafficking in drugs and contraband and free migration, so border controls
increasingly have been tightened in all the states.
Uzbekistan mined areas of its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 1999, intending to
protect it against terrorist incursions, but in fact leading to many civilian Kyrgyz and Tajik
casualties. Kyrgyzstan has demanded that Uzbekistan clear mines it has sown along the borders,
including some allegedly sown on Kyrgyz territory, but Uzbekistan has asserted that it will
maintain the minefields to combat terrorism. (Kyrgyzstan too has raised tensions by sowing
mines and blowing up mountain passes along its borders with Tajikistan.) Border tensions
between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also flared in late 2002, after Turkmenistan accused
Uzbek officials of complicity in the coup attempt. Uzbekistan’s economic problems led it in mid2002 to impose heavy duties on imports and at the beginning of 2003 to close its borders to
“suitcase trading” (small-scale, unregulated trading), heightening tensions with bordering states.
Sharp disagreements remain between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan on mine clearing, Uzbek
restrictions on Tajik transportation, clashes between Uzbek and Tajik border guards, and the
Uzbek visa regime with Tajikistan. In July 2009, Tajikistan began building a short railway spur to
link the capital more directly with the Qurghonteppa region to the south, to circumvent a longer
route through Uzbekistan that involved complicated customs requirements.32
After terrorists carried out several attacks in Uzbekistan in May 2009, Uzbekistan alleged that
they had entered the country from Kyrgyzstan, and built more concrete walls, trenches, and
ditches along the border. The Kyrgyz Border Service stated in June 2009 that Uzbekistan was
violating bilateral accords that stipulated that such border fortifications should not be built “until
the delineation and demarcation of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan state borders is completed.” Uzbek
officials reportedly alleged that they were forced to make unilateral decisions about the location
of borders while emplacing fortifications because Kyrgyzstan had refused to meet to demarcate
borders. One trench reportedly was moved to accommodate Kyrgyz concerns.33
29

CEDR, January 15, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950078.
CEDR, October 20, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950282. In the case of contention between the residents of the Batken
region in southern Kyrgyzstan and the bordering Soghd region in northern Tajikistan, the U.N. Development Program
has implemented initiatives to create mutual trust and the sharing of trans-border resources such as water. CEDR,
March 20, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950134; October 26, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950045.
31
Victoria Naumova, “Tajikistan, Uzbekistan to Hold Next Border Delineation Negotiations in Late April,” Asia-Plus,
April 18, 2009; CEDR, April 9, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950027; July 24, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950177.
32
CEDR, January 24, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950088.
33
CEDR, October 20, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950261; September 4, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950154.
30

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Iran’s intransigence in settling on Caspian Sea borders has contributed to the build-up of naval
forces and the failure to build trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines. In August 2002, Russia
conducted the largest naval maneuvers in its history in the northern Caspian. Kazakhstan
announced its intent to form a navy in early 2003, leading to protests from the Russian Foreign
Ministry, but Kazakh military officials emphasized their determination to proceed with plans to
protect their offshore oil fields and maritime borders. There reportedly were about 3,000 naval
personnel in late 2008. Turkmenistan’s dispute with Azerbaijan over sea borders and the
ownership of offshore oilfields also has stymied the development of trans-Caspian pipelines.

Crime and Corruption
Organized crime networks have expanded in all the Central Asian states, and have established ties
with crime groups worldwide that are involved in drug, arms, and human trafficking. All the
states serve as origin, transit, or destination states for human trafficking. Crime groups collude
with local border and other officials to transport people to the Middle East or other destinations
for forced labor or prostitution.34
Corruption is a serious threat to democratization and economic growth in all the states. The
increasing amount of foreign currency entering the states as the result of foreign oil and natural
gas investments, the low pay of most government bureaucrats, and inadequate laws and norms are
conducive to the growth of corruption. Perhaps most significantly, the weakness of the rule of law
permits the Soviet-era political patronage and spoils system to continue.
According to the World Bank:
•

in Kazakhstan, corruption showed relatively little change over the period from
1996-2008. The country was at the 16th percentile in 2008 (that is, 178 of 212
countries had better records in combating corruption);

•

in Kyrgyzstan, corruption increased over the time period 1996-2007, but declined
slightly in 2008. The country was at the 13th percentile in 2008;

•

in Tajikistan, corruption declined slightly over the time period 1996-2007, but
increased in 2008. The country was at the 14th percentile in 2008;

•

in Turkmenistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period
1996-2008. The country was at the 5th percentile in 2008;

•

in Uzbekistan, corruption showed relatively little change over the time period
1996-2008. The country was at the 11th percentile in 2008.35

Corrupt officials in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have been able to siphon off massive revenues
from oil and gas exports, according to some observers. The Turkmen president controls a
“presidential fund,” that receives 50% of gas revenues and is ostensibly used for economic
34

U.S. Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, June 12, 2007. In the 2006 and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan
was placed in “tier three,” among those countries that do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking and are not making significant efforts to do so. Tier three countries may be subject to U.S. aid restrictions.
35
The World Bank. Governance Matters 2009: Country Data Reports, online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/sc_country.asp. See also Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, online at
http://www.transparency.org/.

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development, though budgetary transparency is lacking on how the fund is used.36 Perhaps the
most sensational allegations of corruption have involved signing bonuses and other payments in
the 1990s by U.S. energy companies operating in Kazakhstan (or by their proxies) that allegedly
were funneled into Swiss bank accounts linked to Kazakh officials, allegedly including
Nazarbayev. U.S. officials concurred with a Swiss decision to freeze the funds and open
investigations in 1999-2000. The New York Times reported that Nazarbayev unsuccessfully raised
the issue of unfreezing some of these accounts during his visit with then-President Bush in
December 2001.37 Kazakhstan set up a National Fund in 2001 under the National Bank for receipt
of oil revenues that reportedly operates under strict international accounting standards.

Economic and Defense Security
The Central Asian states have worked to bolster their economic and defense capabilities by
seeking assistance from individual Western donors such as the United States, by trying to
cooperate with each other, and by joining myriad international organizations. Regional
cooperation has faced challenges from differential economic development and hence divergent
interests among the states, and from more nationalistic postures. Cooperation also is undermined
by what the states view as Uzbekistan’s overbearing impulses. Regional cooperation problems are
potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the CIS
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia,
the United States, and China, although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem
to provide motivation for cooperation.
All of the Central Asian states have been faced with creating adequate military and border forces
and have had vexing problems with military financing and training. At first dependent on the
contract service of Russian troops and officers in their nascent militaries, the states now rely little
on such manpower, but continue to depend heavily on training and equipment ties with Russia.
After September 11, 2001, the states benefitted from boosted U.S. military training and
equipment aid.
The capabilities of the military, border, and other security forces are limited, compared to those of
neighboring states such as Russia, China, or Iran. Military forces range in manpower from about
16,300 in Tajikistan (excluding Russians) to 87,000 in Uzbekistan (see Table A-1). The states
have variously solicited training and technical assistance from the United States, Turkey, China,
and other countries, have forged security ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) and NATO’s PFP, and cooperated in regional bodies such as SCO.
The global economic downturn that began in 2008 contributed to halting or even reversing the
growth of per capita income in the Central Asian states in 2008-2009, the first such lack of
36

The non-governmental organization Global Witness alleged in 2006 that the late Turkmen President Niyazov
personally controlled a vast portion of this gas wealth. The NGO raised concerns that organized crime groups were
involved in these exports and urged the European Union to limit trade ties with Turkmenistan. Global Witness. It’s a
Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, April 2006.
37
New York Times, December 11, 2002, p. A16; Interfax-Kazakhstan, February 5, 2003; Washington Post, June 10,
2002, p. A12; Financial Times (London), April 16, 2002, p. 12; Agence France Presse, September 24, 2001; PR
Newswire, January 10, 2001; Washington Post, September 25, 2000, p. A1; Peter Maass, “The Fuel Fixers,” The New
York Times, December 23, 2007; “Prosecutors Drop Some Charges Against Oil Dealer Giffen,” Platts Commodity
News, December 10, 2008..

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growth in several years. Reductions in remittances from migrant workers and rising food and fuel
costs account for some of the decline. Regional currencies depreciated against the dollar,
contributing to plummeting imports, and fluctuating world commodity prices contributed to
declining exports. The banking sectors were severely stressed by a jump in non-performing loans,
and banks cut back private sector lending. These economic stresses threaten government spending
on health, education, and other social programs. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been able to tap
sovereign wealth funds to support these programs and to partly ameliorate rising budget deficits.38
Kyrgyzstan has been able to somewhat cushion the economic blow by means of budgetary
support from Russia and the IMF, a large grain harvest, and its ample trade with China, much of
which is re-exported by Kyrgyzstan to other Central Asian states.
Economic cooperation among the Central Asian states began to develop by the mid-1990s,
leading to several initiatives, but results have been scant. Cooperation was stymied by
Uzbekistan’s price controls and restrictions on currency convertibility, tariffs levied by the states
on Kyrgyzstan because of its membership in the World Trade Organization, and border
restrictions that stifled trade.39 A customs union formed between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in
January 1994 (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan joined later) achieved some modest early success as a
regional forum. It was renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in July 1998.
Criticizing its scant achievements, Karimov in early 2001 proposed that it become a forum for
“wide-ranging” policy discussions, and it was renamed the Central Asian Cooperation
Organization in late 2001 (CACO). CACO suffered a serious blow in September 2003 when
Kazakhstan joined Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in proclaiming the building of a “common
economic space.” In October 2004, CACO abandoned its focus on creating a regional identity
separate from Russia by admitting Russia as a member. Finally, in October 2005, CACO
announced that its membership would be “integrated” into the Eurasian Economic Community
(EEC; a Russia-led economic cooperation group then consisting of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
and Tajikistan). In recent years, EEC members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have
concentrated on common customs tariffs, which are to come into effect in mid-2010. Uzbekistan
notified that EEC in October 2008 that it was suspending membership in the EEC.40
Among other regional economic cooperation initiatives, the Asian Development Bank in 1997
helped launch the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program (CAREC; members are
China, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia, and all the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan)
to improve living standards and reduce poverty in its member states through regional economic
collaboration. Also participating in CAREC are the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Islamic Development Bank,
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the World Bank. These institutions
provided about $2.0 billion in loans and grants to CAREC countries (excluding China) in 2008

38

CAREC. Presentation by David Owen, International Monetary Fund, Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on
CAREC Countries, October 16, 2009; The World Bank. The Crisis Hits Home: Stress-Testing Households in Europe
and Central Asia, 2010. Uzbekistan has claimed that its economy continued to grow in 2009, but some observers have
questioned this claim.
39
Analyst Martin Spechler has argued that the Central Asian region lacks the impetus to cooperation provided by a
perceived outside threat. Problems of Post-Communism, November/December 2002, p. 46.
40
Farkhad Tolipov, Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst, December 1, 2004; CEDR, November 2, 2005, Doc. No. CEP379002; November 9, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-27030.

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and $3.9 billion in 2009. The priority areas for grants and loans are transport, energy, and trade
development.41

The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
In 1992, Armenia, Russia, and most of the Central Asian states signed a Collective Security
Treaty that stated that the members would mutually defend against security threats and would not
join other security alliances. At an April 2003 summit, Armenia, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed a charter to create a Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) with a permanent secretariat for operational military planning and budget coordination
(Uzbekistan joined in 2006).42 It was stated that this secretariat would permit a quicker response
to threats to internal or external security. On internal security, Russian Gen. Nikolay Bordyuzha,
the secretary general of CSTO, has pledged that the organization would not intervene in political
conflicts, but only by consensus “to resolve military, local and border conflicts, as well as to
prevent ... terror acts of armed groups and to stop drug trafficking.... In addition, they will be used
to fulfill special tasks such as protection of pipelines,” or disaster relief.43 On external security,
Russia’s national security strategy, approved by President Medvedev in May 2009, has
proclaimed the CSTO as “the main instrument designed to counter ... challenges and threats of a
military-political and military-strategic nature” emanating from outside the member-states.44
Many observers have viewed the CSTO as a mainly Russian initiative to increase security
influence over member-states and to counter U.S. and other outside influence.45 Its possible
usefulness appeared sorely tested by the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005.
Although Bordyuzha allegedly urged intervention, Kyrgyzstan’s then-President Askar Akayev
vetoed his offers and fled the country. It also was not used during the unrest in Andijon in
Uzbekistan in May 2005 or during the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict.
In early 2009, the CSTO announced that an air-assault Collective Operational Reaction Force
(CORF) would be set up. However, Uzbekistan raised concerns about the vague character of the
force and balked at contributing troops. President Medvedev stated that the force was needed to
deal with rising tensions along CSTO borders and boasted that the force would “be as good as
that of NATO.”46 The main participants in CORF are Russia and Kazakhstan.
In early 2010, Bordyuzha announced that there were actually two CSTO rapid reaction forces.
The first, the new CORF, is composed of over 20,000 special operation troops and is focused on
defending Eurasian borders and undertaking international missions (see below), while an older
(founded in 2001) and largely moribund Collective Rapid Deployment Force of 4,000 troops is
being revitalized to respond to threats to Central Asia emanating from Afghanistan. According to
41
CAREC. Report of Senior Officials to the 8th Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Economic
Cooperation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, October 16, 2009.
42
Open Source Center. Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), April 29, 2003, Doc. No. CEP-96; April 29,
2003, Doc. No. CEP-132.
43
ITAR-TASS, March 2, 2009.
44
CEDR, May 13, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-557001. The Russian military doctrine similarly highlights the role of the
CSTO in deterring and preventing conflict. The Kremlin. President of Russia. The Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation, February 5, 2010.
45
Ibragim Alibekov and Sergei Blagov, Eurasia Insight, April 29, 2003.
46
ITAR-TASS, February 4, 2009.

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one Russian report, another objective of the latter force is the protection of energy resources and
transit routes in Central Asia that benefit Russia.47
Although most members of the CSTO have bilateral ties to NATO under the Partnership for Peace
program, the CSTO long has called for NATO to cooperate with it as an organization on counternarcotics, anti-terrorism, and other issues. However, the real purpose of such cooperative
overtures is to receive recognition by NATO of a Russian sphere of influence in Soviet successor
states, according to many observers. Bordyuzha claimed that he sent a letter to NATO in 2004
proposing cooperation, but NATO reportedly did not respond. Attempts by the CSTO to
encourage NATO to establish formal ties were set back in mid-2009 when Russia urged
Partnership for Peace members Armenia and Kazakhstan to boycott NATO’s Partnership for
Peace military exercises in Georgia. In October 2009, Foreign Minister Lavrov urged Secretary
Clinton to support NATO cooperation with the CSTO as an element of the “reset” of U.S.-Russia
relations.48
The CSTO also has attempted to play a role in global security analogous to that of NATO. Since it
became an observer organization at the U.N. General Assembly in December 2004, the CSTO has
urged the specialized U.N. agencies such as UNODC and the Terrorism Committee and its
Executive Directorate to cooperate more with it. The CSTO also has proclaimed that it has
created a “peacekeeping force” that the U.N. may use. In March 2010, the U.N. General
Assembly approved a resolution drawn up by Russia that called for greater U.N. cooperation with
the CSTO in “regional cooperation in such areas as strengthening regional security and stability,
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and combating illicit trafficking in drugs and weapons,
combating transnational organized crime, human trafficking, the fight against natural and manmade catastrophes.”49
President Medvedev stated in early 2009 that the CSTO would combat terrorism and offer other
support benefiting ISAF operations in Afghanistan, so that the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan—
which supported U.S. and NATO troop transport to and from Afghanistan—could be closed.50
Kyrgyzstan, however, decided to continue to permit U.S. troop transport by a renamed “Manas
Transit Center.” Although offering some assistance to ISAF, Lavrov and Bordyuzha have stressed
that the CSTO will not send troops to support ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai Treaty” with
China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in 1997 they
signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,000 mile former Soviet-Chinese border. In 2001,
Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The states
signed a Shanghai Convention on joint fighting against what President Jiang Zemin termed “the
forces of separatism, terrorism and extremism.” China has used the SCO to pressure the Central
Asian states to deter their ethnic Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s
Xinjiang province, and to get them to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In addition to security
47
48

CEDR, February 25, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950282.
CEDR, October 15, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-379001.

49

United Nations General Assembly. 64th Session. Plenary Meeting. Cooperation between the United Nations and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, A/RES/64/256, March 2, 2010.
50
CEDR, February 3, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950352 and Doc. No. CEP-25001. ITAR-TASS, February 3, 2009.

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cooperation, China stressed the “huge economic and trade potential” of regional cooperation. 51
Both Russia and China have encouraged the regional states to regard their security ties to the
United States as redundant to their ties with the SCO. In an interview explaining why Uzbekistan
joined, President Karimov seemed to indicate that the primary motive was to protect Uzbekistan’s
interests against any possible moves by the SCO. He appeared to stress the possible military aid
the SCO might provide to beef up the Uzbek armed forces and help it combat terrorism, and to
dismiss the capability of the SCO engaging in effective joint action. He also indicated that
Uzbekistan wished to forge closer relations with China.52
Although Karimov had criticized the SCO as ineffective, in August 2003 he insisted that
Uzbekistan host the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Appearing to return to his
earlier assessment, in April 2004 he criticized the SCO for failing to aid Uzbekistan during the
March-April 2004 attacks and concluded that Uzbekistan should “rely on its own power.” Some
observers argued that these vacillations reflected a policy of playing off the major powers to
maximize aid. This policy appeared to pay dividends at the June 2004 SCO summit, when China
reportedly proffered up to $1.25 billion in grants and loans to Karimov and Russia up to $2.5
billion in investment.
Indicating Uzbekistan’s closer ties after the 2005 events in Andijon (see below) with both Russia
and China, Karimov traveled to Shanghai in June 2006 to attend the SCO summit and endorsed a
communique criticizing U.S. foreign policy. In a speech just before leaving for the summit,
Karimov urged “joint action” by the SCO members to combat terrorism (seemingly contradicting
his 2001 speech; see above), rather than mere diplomatic statements. 53 In September 2006, the
first deputy head of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) became the leader of RATS, perhaps
indicating Russia’s growing role in the SCO. According to some reports, however, the Uzbek
security service closely oversees the work of RATS, reflecting Karimov’s distrust of Russia
despite the closer Russian-Uzbek security ties since the events in Andijon. In August 2007, an
SCO military exercise took place in Xinjiang and southern Russia, the first that included
representatives of all member countries (although Russian and Chinese forces predominated).
For the Central Asian states, the SCO is seen as balancing Russian and Chinese influence, since
the regional states also belong to the economic and security organizations that are part of the
Russia-led CIS.54 At the same time, according to some observers, regional leaders have preferred
the economic and security cooperation offered by the SCO over what they view as U.S. advocacy
of democratic “color revolutions.”55 It may also be the case that Central Asian leaders value the
SCO’s economic prospects more than its security prospects, given the history of the group. The
regional leaders may have devalued SCO as a security organization after September 11, 2001,
when U.S. and Western military activities in Afghanistan demonstrated the lack of effectiveness
of the SCO in combating terrorism. SCO members did not respond collectively to U.S. requests
for assistance but mainly as individual states. Further challenges to the prestige of the SCO as a
51

Open Source Center. China: Daily Report, September 10, 2002, Doc. No. CPP-131.
The Times of Central Asia, June 17, 2001.
53
CEDR, June 18, 2006, Doc. No. CEP-950084.
54
CEDR, August 22, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-25001; CDR, August 18, 2007, Doc. No. CPP-94003; Artyom Matusov,
“Energy Cooperation in the SCO: Club or Gathering?” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2007) pp.
83-99.
55
Konstantin Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: from Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia and the
Caucasus, No. 3 (2007), pp. 40-51.
52

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collective security organization occurred in 2005, when it failed to respond to the coup in
Kyrgyzstan or to civil unrest in Uzbekistan. 56

Water Resources
Growing demand for limited water resources may threaten the stability of the region and hinder
economic development (although more efficient water use would be ameliorative). The main
sources of water for Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and part of Kazakhstan are the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya Rivers that flow from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. During the Soviet period, dozens of
dams and reservoirs and thousands of irrigation canals and pumping stations were built regionwide to maximize cotton production. After the Soviet breakup, the Central Asian states wrangled
over operating and maintaining the inter-dependent facilities they inherited. Since Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan were poor in oil and gas but possessed ample water resources, they reached an
agreement with Uzbekistan in 1998 to exchange oil and gas for water. However, the agreement
foundered, in part because no oversight body was created, and relations between the upstream and
downstream states have suffered. Profligate wasting of water because of ill-designed and
deteriorating irrigation canals, lack of water meters, and efforts to boost cotton production
drained the Amu and Syr Darya Rivers so that ever-smaller amounts of water reached the Aral
Sea bordering Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Also, Kyrgyzstan endeavored to maximize its hydroelectricity generation, which contributed to downstream water shortages in the summer and
floods in the winter. Population growth in downstream countries is a looming problem. The
shrinking of the Aral Sea has exacerbated region-wide environmental problems. Kazakhstan has
built a dam between the northern and southern parts of the Aral Sea, which has resulted in rising
water levels in the northern part and the partial recovery of the local ecosystem. The dam has
stopped water inflow into the previously much larger Southern Aral Sea, however, and it may dry
up within a few more years.57
The lack of regional cooperation is illustrated by Tajikistan’s ongoing efforts to complete the
construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River (an upstream tributory
of the Amu Darya River). Uzbekistan alleges that the dam will limit water flows to its territory.
Perhaps in retaliation for Tajikistan’s efforts to finish the dam, Uzbekistan in late December 2008
cut off the transmission of electricity from Turkmenistan across its territory, contributing to a
power crisis in Tajikistan. The Tajik government protested against a statement by Russian
President Medvedev on January 23, 2009, that all the Central Asian states should agree before
dams are built on trans-border rivers, viewing the statement as support for Uzbekistan and against
Tajikistan’s dam building. In late 2009, Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of stealing electricity and
withdrew from the Unified (electrical) Energy System of Central Asia, an accusation that
Tajikistan denied. Tajikistan stated that the withdrawal mooted regional agreements to exchange
electricity for water, and announced that it would be forced to release more water in the winter for
power generation, which would mean that there would be less water in the summer for
downstream countries.
56

According to analyst Dru Gladney, security cooperation beyond pro forma exercises has mostly involved “the
occasional repatriation of suspected Uighur separatists.” U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission.
Hearing on China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder? Panel IV: China’s Involvement in the
SCO. China’s ‘Uighur Problem’ and the SCO, August 3, 2006.
57
“Dying Sea Makes Comeback,” Voice of America, Press Release, May 31, 2007; Rick Docksai, “Reviving the Aral
Sea,” The Futurist, March-April 2010, pp. 11-12; Kai Wegerich, “Hydro-Hegemony in the Amu Darya Basin,” Water
Policy, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, pp 71–88; Kai Wegerich, “The New Great Game: Water Allocation in Post-Soviet
Central Asia,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Summer/Fall 2009, pp. 117-123.

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Uzbekistan similarly opposes Turkmenistan’s planned diversion of water from the Amu Darya to
create a new 150 billion cubic meter lake (currently under construction), which could threaten
Uzbek cotton production. In 2003, Uzbekistan seized a part of the Karshinskiy Canal in
Turkmenistan, the only source of water for Uzbekistan’s Kashkardarya oblast, after bilateral
water-sharing talks broke down.
The need for even wider discussion of water resources is illustrated by China’s efforts to divert
waters of the Ili and Irtysh Rivers to its Xinjiang region, reducing such resources for the
downstream countries of Kazakhstan and Russia.58 Kazakhstan’s concerns led to the creation of a
China-Kazakhstan commission for trans-border rivers in 1999, but China deflected discussion of
water-sharing and only agreed to the exchange of information on pollution. A European
Parliament hearing in mid-2008 warned that China’s water diversion could reduce water flows by
these rivers to Kazakhstan by up to 40% by 2050, and could result in damage to Lake Balkhash in
western Kazakhstan.59 Wider discussion of water sharing also must include Afghanistan, which in
the future might divert a larger share of water from the Amu Darya River for economic
development.

Energy and Transport
The Caspian region is emerging as a notable source of oil and gas for world markets, although
many experts emphasize that regional exports will constitute only a small fraction of world
supplies. According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the region’s proven natural gas
reserves are estimated at 232 trillion cubic feet (tcf), comparable to Saudi Arabia.60 The region’s
proven oil reserves are estimated to be between 17-49 billion barrels, comparable to Qatar on the
low end and Libya on the high end. Kazakhstan possesses the region’s largest proven oil reserves
at 9-40 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 100tcf of natural gas. Kazakhstan’s
oil exports are about 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd). 61 Some U.S. energy firms and other private
foreign investors have become discouraged in recent years by harsher Kazakh government terms,
taxes, and fines that some allege reflect corruption within the ruling elite. Despite these concerns,
some foreign direct investment has continued. 62 Turkmenistan possesses about 100tcf and
Uzbekistan about 65tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE.63
Russia’s temporary cutoffs of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and January 2009 and a brief
slowdown of oil shipments to Belarus in January 2010 (Belarus and Ukraine are transit states for
oil and gas pipelines to other European states) have highlighted Europe’s energy insecurity. The
United States has supported EU efforts to reduce its overall reliance on Russian oil and gas by
58

CEDR, February 27, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-462002; October 29, 2004, Doc. No. CEP-338.
European Parliament. Hearing of the Working Group ‘C’ on Desertification: Socio-economic, Agricultural, and
Forestry Impacts and Their Political Consequences, May 15, 2008.
60
Including the countries of Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
61
U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, February 2008.
62
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) warned in late 2009 that Kazakhstan has prosecuted myriad foreign investors
for evading taxes and customs duties, for environmental pollution, and for other reasons, and can “demand changes in
the terms of contracts with private investors [such as Kashagan and Karachaganak oilfield investors] on the grounds of
national security.” Nonetheless, the EIU argued that “most foreign investors are maintaining or increasing their
involvement in the country, despite unattractive aspects of the business environment—albeit with delays or reservations
in some cases.” “Kazakhstan Economy: Investors Beware, the Rules Are Changing,” November 13, 2009.
63
U.S. Department of Energy. Energy Information Administration. Central Asia Country Analysis Brief, February
2008.
59

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increasing the number of possible alternative suppliers. Part of this policy has involved
encouraging Central Asian countries to transport their energy exports to Europe through pipelines
that cross the Caspian Sea, thereby bypassing Russian (and Iranian) territory, although these
amounts are expected at most to satisfy only a small fraction of EU needs.64
The Central Asian states long were pressured by Russia to yield large portions of their energy
wealth to Russia at prices below world norms, in part because Russia controlled most existing
export pipelines.65 Russia attempted to strengthen this control over export routes for Central
Asian energy in May 2007 when visiting former President Putin reached agreement in
Kazakhstan on supplying more Kazakh oil to Russia. Putin also reached agreement with the
presidents of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the construction of a new pipeline to transport
Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia. The first agreement appeared to compete with U.S. and
Turkish efforts to foster more oil exports through the BTC. The latter agreement appeared to
compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline to link to the
SCP to Turkey. The latter also appeared to compete with U.S. and EU efforts to foster building a
pipeline from Turkey through Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary to Austria (the so-called
Nabucco pipeline).
Seeming to indicate a direct challenge to these plans by Russia and the West, China signed an
agreement in August 2007 with Kazakhstan on completing the last section of an oil pipeline from
the Caspian seacoast to China, and signed an agreement with Turkmenistan on building a gas
pipeline to China (see also below).66 In March 2008, the heads of the national gas companies of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan announced that their countries would raise the gas
export price to the European level in future years. They signed a memorandum of understanding
on the price with Russia’s Gazprom state-controlled gas firm, which controls most export
pipelines. According to analyst Martha Olcott, “the increased bargaining power of the Central
Asian states owes more to the entry of China into the market than to the opening of [the BTC
pipeline and the SCP]. Russia’s offer to pay higher purchase prices for Central Asian gas in 2008
and 2009 came only after China signed a long-term purchase agreement for Turkmen gas at a
base price that was higher than what Moscow was offering.”67
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran export electricity to Afghanistan. Major foci of the
U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s (TDA’s) Central Asian Infrastructure Integration Initiative
(launched in 2005) and USAID’s Regional Energy Market Assistance Program (launched in
2006) include encouraging energy, transportation, and communications projects, including the
development of electrical power infrastructure and power sharing between Central Asia,
Afghanistan, and eventually Pakistan and India.68 In 2006, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
64

For details, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, by (name redacted). See also
International Crisis Group. Central Asia’s Energy Risks, May 24, 2007.
65
According to a plan published by Russia’s Institute of Energy Strategy covering the period 2007-2030, “Russian
control over a large share of Central Asian gas needs to be maintained.” See Minpromenergo (Ministry of Industry and
Energy), Institut energeticheskoi strategii, Kontseptsiya energeticheskoi strategii Rossii na period do 2030g., 2007. As
reported by Philip Hanson, “How Sustainable Is Russia’s Energy Power?” Russian Analytical Digest, No. 38 (2008).
66
An oil and gas conference involving Kazakh, Chinese, and Russian energy ministries and firms has met annually
since 2004 to “exchange views” on possible regional cooperation. ITAR-TASS, December 5, 2007.
67
Martha Olcott, “A New Direction for U.S. Policy in the Caspian Region.”
68

U.S. Trade and Development Agency. Press Release: USTDA Launches Central Asian Infrastructure Integration
Initiative, October 14, 2005; Joshua Kucera, “Washington Seeks to Steer Central Asian States Toward South Asian
Allies,” Eurasia Insight, April 28, 2006; Joshua Kucera, “USAID Official Outlines Plan to Build Central-South Asian
(continued...)

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approved $3 million for feasibility and project design studies of the potential for Afghanistan and
Pakistan to import electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In August 2008, an intergovernmental agreement was signed by the four countries to build a 500-kilovolt electric power
transmission line. The first phase is the construction of a 170-mile line from hydropower plants
on the River Vakhsh in Tajikistan to the Afghan border town of Sher Khan Bandar. The project
cost when all phases are completed is estimated to be $935 million to be provided by the World
Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the International Finance Corporation. About twothirds of the electricity would be provided to Pakistan and one-third to Afghanistan. Due
diligence work including environmental impacts is expected to be completed in 2010 and the
power line is planned to be completed by 2013. The ADB withdrew from the project in 2009,
however, because of concerns about the lack of cooperation among the Central Asian countries on
water-sharing, among other issues. The ADB still is funding smaller electricity projects. Among
these, the ADB financed a 220-kilovolt transmission line from Uzbekistan to Kabul, Afghanistan,
that was completed in May 2009.
Dissension among the Central Asian states on electric power transmission and hydro-electric
projects has increased. During 2009, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of illicitly
siphoning electricity from the Soviet-era Central Asian Unified Energy System grid (until
recently, members included these three states and Kyrgyzstan). Kazakhstan twice cut off energy
flows to the regional grid in 2009 in retaliation, but has not yet decided to withdraw completely
from the grid. Tajik officials have denied the Uzbek charges and accused Uzbekistan of illicitly
siphoning electricity. Uzbekistan cut itself off from the regional grid on December 1, 2009. The
cutoff severed the supply of electricity to Kyrgyzstan’s southern regions (since the lines cross
Uzbekistan) and to some parts of Tajikistan, and prevented Tajikistan from importing electricity
from Turkmenistan to address winter weather. One Tajik analyst called for the country to retaliate
against Uzbekistan by reducing cooperation in water-sharing. Another analyst warned that
another Tajik winter without adequate power supplies could further erode popular trust in the
Rahmon government. Tajikistan’s construction of the Roghun hydro-electric power dam on a
tributary of the Amu Darya River also has clouded its relations with Uzbekistan. The latter claims
that the dam will limit water flows downstream to its territory, while Tajikistan is spurred to
complete the power plant by Uzbekistan’s energy policies.
Kazakhstan. The main oil export route from Kazakhstan has been a 930-mile pipeline completed
in 2001—owned by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which Russian shareholders have
a controlling interest—that carries 265 million barrels per year of oil from Kazakhstan to Russia’s
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Lengthy Russian resistance to increasing the pumping capacity
of the pipeline and demands for higher transit and other fees, along with the necessity of
offloading the oil into tankers at Novorossiysk to transit the clogged Turkish Straits, spurred
President Nazarbayev to sign a treaty with visiting Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev in June
2006 to barge Kazakh oil across the Caspian Sea to Baku to the BTC pipeline. Kazakhstan began
shipping about 70,000 bpd of oil through the BTC pipeline at the end of October 2008. Another
accord resulted from a visit by President Nazarbayev to Azerbaijan in September 2009 that
provides that up to 500,000 bpd of oil will be barged across the Caspian to enter the BTC or the
Baku-Supsa pipeline. When the volumes exceed 500,000 bpd, a trans-Caspian pipeline may be
built.

(...continued)
Electricity Links,” Eurasia Insight, May 4, 2006.

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Apparently to counter Kazakh’s export plans via Azerbaijan, then-President Putin’s May 2007
agreement with Nazarbayev (see above) envisaged boosting the capacity of the CPC pipeline.
Despite this Russian pledge to increase the capacity of the CPC, Kazakhstan has proceeded to
upgrade its Caspian Sea port facilities and in May 2008, the Kazakh legislature ratified the 2006
treaty. Kazakhstan also barges some oil to Baku to ship by rail to Georgia’s Black Sea oil terminal
at Batumi, of which Kazakhstan became the sole owner in early 2008. Kazakhstan began barging
oil from Batumi to the Romanian port of Constantsa in late 2008 for processing at two refineries
it purchased. Some Kazakh oil arriving in Baku also could be transported through small pipelines
to Georgia’s Black Sea port of Supsa or to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, although in
the latter case Kazakhstan might be faced with high transit charges by Russia.69 In December
2009, the CPC finalized expansion plans for the pipeline, to approximately double its capacity by
2014.
In addition to these oil export routes to Europe not controlled by Russia, Kazakhstan and China
have completed an oil pipeline from Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang region of China
(a distance of about 597 miles). Kazakhstan began delivering oil through the pipeline in mid2006. As of the end of 2008, the pipeline reportedly had delivered about 92 million barrels (well
below initial capacity of 146.6 million barrels per year). At Atasu, it links to another pipeline
from the town of Kumkol, also in central Kazakhstan. On Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea border,
China has finished construction of an oil pipeline from the port city of Atyrau eastward to the
town of Kerkiyak. The last section of the route from the Caspian Sea to China, a link between the
towns of Kerkiyak and Kumkol, was completed in October 2009. Now that all sections of the
pipeline have been completed, it is expected to carry 200,000 bpd to China.
In November 2007, Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement permitting Russia to export 10.6
million barrels of oil per year from Atasu through the pipeline to China. According to Chinese
sources, Russia exported about 5.5 million barrels of oil through this pipeline in 2008. This is the
first Russian oil to be transported by pipeline to China.
At the end of October 2008, China and Kazakhstan signed a framework agreement on
constructing a gas pipeline from western Kazakhstan (near the Caspian Sea) to China that is
planned initially to supply 176.6 bcf to southern Kazakhstan and 176.6 bcf to China. Plans call
for pipeline construction to begin in 2010 and to be completed by 2015.
Kazakh officials have appeared to make contradictory statements about providing gas for the
prospective Nabucco pipeline. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Energy and Mineral Resources Minister Aset
Magaulov stated at a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in June 2009 that
Kazakhstan would not have a surplus of gas that it could send through the Nabucco pipeline. 70
President Nazarbayev appeared to support the possible transit of Kazakh gas through Turkey
when he stated on October 22, 2009, during a visit to Turkey, that “Turkey ... will become a
transit country. And if Kazakhstan’s oil and gas are transported via this corridor then this will be
advantageous to both Turkey and Kazakhstan.”71 In late October 2009, however, the Kazakh
Ministry of Energy reiterated that “the main problem for our country [regarding the supply of
natural gas to Nabucco] is the limited availability of gas” because of existing contracts for
69
ITAR-TASS, May 29, 2008; CEDR, December 11, 2007, Doc. No. CEP-950096; April 26, 2008, Doc. No. CEP950045.
70
ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2009.
71
CEDR, October 22, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950337.

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projected gas production. It suggested that Kazakhstan might be a potential supplier for Nabucco
if gas production exceeds expectations, but that Kazakhstan could not transport any gas via
Nabucco until the legal status of the Caspian Sea was resolved, which would permit building a
connection to Nabucco. 72
Turkmenistan. The late President Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with then-President Putin in
2003 on supplying Russia up to 211.9 billion cubic feet (bcf) of gas in 2004 (about 12% of
production), rising up to 2.83 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in 2009-2028 (perhaps then constituting an
even larger percentage of production). Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the end of
2004 in an attempt to get a higher gas price but settled for all-cash rather than partial barter
payments. Turkmenistan and Russia continued to clash in subsequent years over gas prices and
finally agreed in late 2007 that gas prices based on “market principles” would be established in
2009. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed accords in May and December 2007 on
building a new gas pipeline that was planned to carry 353 bcf of Turkmen and 353 bcf of Kazakh
gas to Russia. The Turkmen government appeared to have reservations about building another
pipeline to Russia, however. This stance may have changed by late 2009, when Turkmenistan
indicated some willingness to build this pipeline during negotiations with Russia on the renewal
of Turkmen gas exports (see below).
Seeking alternatives to pipeline routes through Russia, in December 1997 Turkmenistan opened
the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile gas pipeline
linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan provided 282.5 bcf of gas to Iran in 2006 and reportedly a larger
amount in 2007. At the end of 2007, however, Turkmenistan suddenly suspended gas shipments,
causing hardship in northern Iran. Turkmen demands for higher payments were the main reason
for the cut-off. Gas shipments resumed in late April 2008 after Iran agreed to a price boost. In
mid-2009, Turkmenistan reportedly agreed to increase gas supplies to up to 706 bcf per year.73 At
the end of 2009, a second gas pipeline to Iran was completed—from a field that until April 2009
had supplied gas to Russia (see below)—to more than double Turkmenistan’s export capacity to
Iran.
As another alternative to pipelines through Russia, in April 2006, Turkmenistan and China signed
a framework agreement calling for Chinese investment in developing gas fields in Turkmenistan
and in building a gas pipeline with a capacity of about 1.0 tcf per year through Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan to China. Construction of the pipeline began in August 2007 and gas began to be
delivered through the pipeline to Xinjiang and beyond in December 2009.
Perhaps an additional attempt to diversify gas export routes, Berdimuhammedow first signaled in
2007 that Turkmenistan was interested in building a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. Turkmenistan
signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2008 with the EU to supply 353.1 bcf of gas per
year starting in 2009, presumably through a trans-Caspian pipeline that might at first link to the
SCP and later to the proposed Nabucco pipeline. Berdimuhammedow also revived Niyazov’s
proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, but investment
remains elusive.

72

ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2009.
Iran: Daily Report, January 21, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-11017; January 24, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950014; April 26, 2008,
Doc. No. IAP-950049; and May 6, 2008, Doc. No. IAP-950052.; CEDR, July 12, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950097.
73

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On the night of April 8-9, 2009, a section of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Russia
exploded, halting Turkmen gas shipments. Russia claimed that it had notified Turkmenistan that it
was reducing its gas imports because European demand for gas had declined, but Turkmenistan
denied that it had been properly informed.74 After extended talks, visiting President Medvedev
and President Berdimuhamedow agreed on December 22, 2009 that Turkmen gas exports to
Russia would be resumed, and that the existing supply contract had been altered to reduce
Turkmen gas exports to up to 1 tcf per year and to increase the price paid for the gas.
Turkmenistan announced on January 9, 2010, that its gas exports to Russia had resumed. The
incident appeared to further validate Turkmenistan’s policy of diversifying its gas export routes.
At a late April 2009 Turkmen energy conference, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George
Krol reportedly stressed that Turkmenistan and other states should continue to diversify their
energy export routes.75 Turkmen President Berdimuhamedow pledged to continue such
diversification. At an EU energy summit in Prague in early May 2009, U.S. Special Envoy for
Eurasian Energy Richard Morningstar endorsed further development of the “southern corridor”
for the shipment of gas and oil to Western markets. However, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan balked at signing a communique pledging the states to back the Nabucco pipeline.
Despite this move, Berdimuhamedow asserted on July 10, 2009, that there are “immense volumes
of natural gas in Turkmenistan [that] make it possible for us to carry out certain work related to
the implementation of various [gas export] projects, including the Nabucco project.”76 In
September 2009, he further suggested that Turkmenistan could provide even more gas than
previously mentioned in 2008 for Nabucco—1.1 tcf per year—because an audit indicated that the
South Yoloten-Osman and Yaslar gas fields held vast reserves. Russia and Iran remain opposed to
trans-Caspian pipelines, ostensibly on the grounds that they could pose environmental hazards to
the littoral states.
Some observers argue that Turkmenistan’s construction of gas pipelines to Iran and China
indicate that it does not envisage a trans-Caspian pipeline to supply gas to Nabucco. Even in the
event that Iran eventually becomes a supplier to Nabucco, these observers maintain, it might
resist permitting Turkmenistan to have direct access to European customers via its pipelines.77

Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
International concerns over the proliferation risks posed by Central Asia’s nuclear research and
power reactors, uranium mines, milling facilities, and associated personnel have been heightened
by Western, Russian, and Central Asian media reports of attempted diversions of nuclear
materials to terrorist states or criminal groups. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear
fuel cycle facilities in the region often were only minimally guarded, and personnel were poorly
paid, creating targets of opportunity. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s
uranium reserves, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of yellow
74

Open Source Center. OSC Feature, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. FEA-844966; CEDR, April 14, 2009, Doc. No. CEP950339; ITAR-TASS, April 3, 2009; Sergey Blagov, “Turkmenistan: Ashgabat Wonders Whether Russia Still Has Deep
Pockets,” Eurasia Insight, March 26, 2009.
75
Alexander Vershinin, “U.S. Urges Central Asia to Boost Gas Export Routes,” Associated Press, April 24, 2009.
76
CEDR, July 11, 2009, Doc. No. CEP-950124.
77
Igor Naumov, “Turkmenistan No Longer Sees Russia as Reliable Partner,” Bizekon-Russica Izvestia, November 16,
2009; “Energy Agreement between Turkey and Iran Changes Essence of Nabucco Project: Chairman of CSS of
Turkey,” Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan), November 13, 2009.

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cake (low enriched uranium).78 Major customers for Kazakhstan’s yellow cake have included the
United States and Europe. Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at its Caspian port of Aktau, the
world’s only nuclear desalinization facility. Decommissioned in April 1999, it has nearly 300
metric tons of enriched uranium and plutonium spent fuel in ill-kept storage pools.
Kazakhstan’s Ulba metallurgical factory in Ust Kamenogorsk provides nuclear fuel pellets to
Russia and other countries with Soviet-type reactors, and is planning to expand production for
other types of reactors. In 2009, Kazakhstan offered some of its Ulba facilities to house a lowenriched uranium “fuel bank” under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to provide assurance of supply to commercial reactor customers.79
Uzbek’s Navoi mining and milling facility exports yellow cake through the U.S. firm Nukem.
Kyrgyzstan’s Kara Balta milling facility ships low-enriched uranium to Ulba and to Russia.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW) facilities
during the Soviet era, raising major concerns about possible proliferation dangers posed by
remaining materials and personnel.

Illegal Narcotics Production, Use, and Trafficking
The trafficking and use of illegal narcotics in Central Asia endanger the security, independence,
and development of the states by stunting economic and political reforms and exacerbating
terrorism, crime, corruption, and health problems. As a conduit, the region has been used as a
transit route by criminal groups smuggling narcotics from Afghanistan, mainly to markets in
Russia and Europe, although drug use within the region also is accelerating. The increased use of
shared needles for drug injection has contributed to rising rates of HIV/AIDS in the region.
Although the bulk of opiates from Afghanistan continue to be transported through Pakistan and
Iran, rising quantities—currently estimated at between 19%-25%—are trafficked through Central
Asia, mainly through Tajikistan.80 In February 2010, President Berdimuhamedow stated that drug
trafficking and drug addiction rates had become “alarming” in Turkmenistan, and called for an
“uncompromising” war on drugs. Despite this call for a punitive war, however, the State
Department reports that although “drug addiction is a prosecutable crime [in Turkmenistan] and
persons convicted are subject to jail sentences ... judicial officials usually sentence addicts to
treatment.”81

78

After the Soviet breakup, independent Kazakhstan was on paper one of the world’s major nuclear weapons powers,
but in reality these weapons were controlled by Russia. On April 21, 1995, the last nuclear warheads were transferred
to Russia.
79
During Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s April 2009 visit to Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev suggested
that a Kazakh ‘fuel bank” could assure supplies to Iran. In May 2009, Kazakhstan presented a position paper on the
proposal at the IAEA. Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Is Astana Aiming to Broker US-Iran Nuclear Deal?” Eurasia
Insight, April 8, 2009; Togzhan Kassenova, “Kazakhstan’s ‘Nuclear Renaissance,’” St. Antony’s International Review,
Vol. 4, No. 2, 2009, pp. 51-74; IAEA. Statement by Asset Magauov, Vice-Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of
the Republic of Kazakhstan at the 53rd Session of the IAEA General Conference, September 15, 2009; Humphrey
Hawksley, “International Nuclear Bank: Helping World Peace?” BBC News, January 8, 2010.
80
UNODC. World Drug Report 2009, June 24, 2009. In February 2010, Viktor Ivanov, the head of the Russian Drug
Control Service, complained that there were no obstacles to drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan, and that all
the Central Asia states served as routes for drug trafficking to Russia. ITAR-TASS, February 4, 2010.
81
CEDR, February 5, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950276; U.S. State Department. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, February 27, 2009.

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According to the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), drug trafficking in Central Asia
appears to involve many crime groups and drugs change hands several times before delivery to
Russian markets. In this sense, the trafficking is less organized than that involving Central
American drug trafficking to the United States. In the case of Central Asia, some organized crime
groups based in producer countries have been able to expand their influence into the region
because of poorly patrolled borders, lack of cooperation among the states, lawlessness, and
corruption among officials, police, and border guards. Also, ethnic Tajiks residing in northern
Afghanistan can more easily smuggle drugs into Tajikistan. Problems with traditional export
routes for Asian drugs have encouraged the use of Central Asia as a trans-shipment route.
Nigerian organized crime groups reportedly transport some Pakistani heroin through Central Asia
to Russian markets, and sell some in Central Asia. Even Latin American crime groups have
reportedly smuggled drugs into Central Asia destined for Russia, such as cocaine from Brazil.
These and other international organized crime groups are integrating smaller Central Asian crime
groups into their operations. 82
The Taliban, IMU, and other Islamic terrorist groups allegedly are also involved in trafficking
drugs in order to finance their operations. According to some observers, the IMU has been a
major smuggler of heroin through Central Asia, although U.S.-led coalition operations in
Afghanistan in late 2001 at least temporarily disrupted IMU trafficking.83 Some Tajik border
troops along the Tajik-Afghan border allegedly gain revenues from bribes from drug smugglers
from Afghanistan. In Kazakhstan, some police and security personnel reportedly vie to offer their
services to drug traffickers.84 In October 2009, Kyrgyzstan abolished its Drug Control Agency,
raising concerns among some observers about the government’s resolve to combat drug
trafficking.85
Counter-narcotics agencies in the Central Asian states are hampered by inadequate budgets,
personnel training, and equipment, but most have registered ever greater drug seizures. According
to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report:
•

The Kazakh government’s “DEA-like” Committee on Combating and
Controlling Narcotics within the Ministry of the Interior, established in 2004,
contributed to “considerable progress” by Kazakhstan in counter-narcotics
efforts, including drug seizures and tightening drug trafficking penalties. Kazakh
security agents reportedly cracked down on two new drug trafficking routes from
Afghanistan through Kazakhstan to end-users in Australia and Japan.
Nonetheless, Kazakhstan remains an “important transit country, especially for
drugs coming out of Afghanistan.”

82

Irina Adinayeva, “International Drug Trafficking and Central Asia,” in Building a Common Future, ed. by P.
Stobdan, New Delhi, 1999; Justine Walker, “Beyond Terrorism: the Real Impact of Afghan Drugs Trafficking on
Northern Neighbors,” Drugs and Alcohol Today, November 2005. pp. 39-41.
83
Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2002, p. 229; Svante Cornell and Niklas Swanström, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,”
Problems of Post-Communism, July/August 2006, pp. 10-27. According to analyst Jacob Townsend, the IMU is mostly
involved in drug dealing, and organized crime groups are involved in trafficking. “The Logistics of Opiate Trafficking
in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Volume 4, No. 1, 2006, pp. 69-91.
84
Martha Olcott, Kazakhstan, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2002, pp. 219-220.
85
Erica Marat and Den Isa, “Kyrgyzstan Relaxes Control Over Drug Trafficking,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, February 4,
2010. They allege that some government officials are involved in drug trafficking, and that “one of the president’s
brothers is allegedly involved in controlling most drug transit through Kyrgyz territory.”

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•

Some of the isolated mountain passes along Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Tajikistan
and China do not have guard posts that are manned throughout the year and these
passes are major drug routes. The State Department also reports that “the city of
Osh, in particular, is the main crossroads for road and air traffic and a primary
transfer point for narcotics into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and on to markets in
Russia, Western Europe and the United States.”

•

Tajikistan is “a major center for domestic and international drug trafficking
or

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30294. Public record. Not legal advice.