# Congressional Oversight Manual > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30240 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** Reports - **Published:** March 27, 2026 - **Citation:** RL30240 ## Text Congressional Oversight Manual Updated March 27, 2026 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL30240 SUMMARY Congressional Oversight Manual Congress’s legislative role does not end when it passes legislation. Oversight is fundamental to make sure that laws are working as intended and are being administered in an effective, efficient, and economical manner. The information that oversight can bring to Congress is essential as the body grapples with the complexities of American government and society. A fundamental objective of the Congressional Oversight Manual is to assist Members, committees, and legislative staff in carrying out this vital legislative function. It is intended to provide a broad overview of the procedural, legal, and practical issues that are likely to arise as Congress conducts oversight. This includes information on the mechanics of oversight practice based on House and Senate rules, common investigative techniques, and an inventory of statutes that impact oversight activity. In addition, the Manual discusses important legal principles that have developed around Congress’s oversight practice. The Manual is organized both to address specific questions and to support those seeking a general introduction to or broader understanding of oversight practice. RL30240 March 27, 2026 Ben Wilhelm, Coordinator Analyst in Government Organization and Management Todd Garvey, Coordinator Legislative Attorney Christopher M. Davis, Coordinator Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process CRS first developed the Congressional Oversight Manual more than four decades ago following a December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and CRS at the request of the bipartisan House leadership. CRS produced the Manual with the assistance initially of a number of House committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff and updated the Manual periodically. Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the oversight function, providing consultative support on matters ranging from routine oversight and basic information gathering to the most complex and highest profile investigations conducted by Congress. Given the size and scope of the modern executive establishment, Congress’s oversight role may be even more significant—and more demanding—than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant oversight of administration.” Congressional Research Service Congressional Oversight Manual Contents Introduction to Congressional Oversight and the Oversight Manual .............................................. 1 The Oversight Manual .............................................................................................................. 1 How to Use This Manual .......................................................................................................... 1 Defining Oversight .................................................................................................................... 2 The Oversight Toolbox ....................................................................................................... 3 Police Patrols and Fire Alarms ............................................................................................ 3 The Purposes of Oversight of the Executive Branch ................................................................ 4 Congress as an Oversight Body ....................................................................................................... 8 Authority to Conduct Oversight ................................................................................................ 8 Constitutional Provisions .................................................................................................... 9 Statutes and Oversight ...................................................................................................... 10 House and Senate Rules on Oversight .............................................................................. 10 Congressional Participants in Oversight ........................................................................... 14 Oversight and the Committee System ..................................................................................... 16 Identifying Relevant Committee Jurisdiction ................................................................... 17 General Techniques of Encouraging Oversight Coordination .......................................... 17 Development and Execution of Oversight Projects ................................................................ 17 Question 1: Which Issues Warrant Oversight? ................................................................. 18 Question 2: How to Get the Desired Information? ........................................................... 19 Question 3: What Can Be Done with This Information? .................................................. 20 Oversight Through Other Congressional Activities ................................................................ 21 Investigative Oversight.................................................................................................................. 26 Historical Background ............................................................................................................ 27 Constitutional Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigative Inquiries ........................... 29 The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose ..................... 30 Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President....................................... 34 Authority of Congressional Committees ................................................................................. 36 Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................ 37 Committee Rules............................................................................................................... 38 Legal Tools Available for Oversight and Investigations ......................................................... 39 Hearings ............................................................................................................................ 39 Deposition Authority......................................................................................................... 41 The Subpoena Power............................................................................................................... 42 Responding to Noncompliance: Subpoena Enforcement .................................................. 45 Criminal Provisions Protecting the Investigative Power......................................................... 52 Limitations on Congressional Authority ................................................................................. 53 Constitutional Limitations ................................................................................................ 53 Common-Law Privileges .................................................................................................. 59 Executive Privilege ........................................................................................................... 61 Statutory Limits on Congressional Access to Information ............................................... 66 Classified Material ............................................................................................................ 68 Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigations ................................ 71 The Seven Member Statute: 5 U.S.C. § 2954 ................................................................... 71 Specialized Investigations ....................................................................................................... 72 Select Oversight Tools and Techniques ......................................................................................... 75 Orientation and Periodic Review Hearings with Agencies ..................................................... 76 Congressional Research Service Congressional Oversight Manual Casework ................................................................................................................................. 77 Performance Audits by Inspectors General and GAO............................................................. 77 Monitoring the Federal Register ............................................................................................. 79 Monitoring the Unified Agenda............................................................................................... 79 Special Studies and Investigations by Staff, Support Agencies, and Others ........................... 79 Staff Investigations ........................................................................................................... 79 Support Agencies .............................................................................................................. 80 Outside Contractors, Consultants, and Detailees .............................................................. 80 Investigative Commissions ............................................................................................... 80 Communicating with the Media .............................................................................................. 80 Press Gallery Offices ........................................................................................................ 81 Resolutions of Inquiry ............................................................................................................. 81 Limitations and Riders on Appropriations .............................................................................. 82 Legislative Veto and Advance Notice ..................................................................................... 84 Independent Counsel ............................................................................................................... 86 Reporting, Testimony, Notice, and Consultation Requirements ............................................. 87 Testimony Requirements .................................................................................................. 89 Notice and Prior Consultation ........................................................................................... 89 Statutory Oversight Enablers ......................................................................................................... 89 Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Authority ........................................................... 90 Anti-Gag Legislation and Whistleblower Protection Laws for Federal Employees ......... 90 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13) ............................................................. 91 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601) ..................................................... 91 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-577) .............................................. 92 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510) ..................................................... 92 Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. ch. 10) ........................ 92 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344) .................. 92 Public Debt Limit Increase of 2010 (P.L. 111-139) .......................................................... 93 GAO Access and Oversight Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-3) ...................................................... 93 Indirect Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Capabilities ..................................................... 93 Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. Ch. 10) .................................... 94 Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 (P.L. 97-255) .................... 94 Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as Amended (P.L. 101-576, 31 U.S.C. ch. 9) ........ 95 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) (P.L. 103-62), as Amended by the GPRA Modernization Act (P.L. 111-352, 31 U.S.C. §1101 note) ............................ 95 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. ch. 35) ................................. 95 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106, 40 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.) ........................... 96 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act, as Amended by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (P.L. 109-282, 31 U.S.C. §6101 note) ............... 97 Statutory Offices of Inspector General .................................................................................... 97 Inspector General Act of 1978 .......................................................................................... 97 Purpose and Role .............................................................................................................. 98 Types and Categories ........................................................................................................ 99 Authorities and Responsibilities ....................................................................................... 99 Oversight Information Sources and Consultative Services ......................................................... 103 Congressional Research Service ........................................................................................... 103 Congressional Budget Office ................................................................................................ 104 Government Accountability Office ....................................................................................... 105 Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel ............................................. 106 Congressional Research Service Congressional Oversight Manual Senate Legal Counsel ...................................................................................................... 106 House General Counsel................................................................................................... 107 Office of Management and Budget ....................................................................................... 108 Budget Information ................................................................................................................ 110 Nonfederal Information Resources ........................................................................................ 112 Tables Table 1. Special Investigative Authorities Explicitly Provided to Selected Investigating Committees................................................................................................................................. 74 Table 2. Press Gallery Names and Websites .................................................................................. 81 Appendixes Appendix A. Illustrative Subpoena............................................................................................... 115 Appendix B. Example Congressional Oversight Letter .............................................................. 122 Appendix C. Examples of White House Response to Congressional Requests .......................... 125 Contacts Author Information...................................................................................................................... 128 Congressional Research Service Congressional Oversight Manual Introduction to Congressional Oversight and the Oversight Manual Writing in 1993, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress defined congressional oversight as the “review, monitoring, and supervision of the executive and the implementation of public policy.”1 This definition captures the functional core of Congress’s oversight of the executive branch. Nonetheless, it is the beginning, rather than an end, of understanding oversight as it has been practiced since the First Congress. As outlined in this manual, the purposes, practice, and tools of congressional oversight extend far beyond the confines of a simple definition. The Oversight Manual CRS has published the Congressional Oversight Manual since 1978. In that time, it has been one of the most comprehensive resources for information on congressional oversight and benefited from the experience and knowledge of dozens of CRS experts and attorneys. Since it was first published, the work of Congress and the resources available to conduct oversight have significantly changed. For instance, the spread of interconnected information technology systems and the development of the internet allow for more rapid and wide-scale collection and preservation of information about the activities of the government and have significantly increased the availability of that data to both the public and Congress. In addition, Congress has developed a wide array of management, oversight, and transparency laws that facilitate oversight, create internal controls within the executive branch, and bring more government data to the public eye.2 CRS’s primary goal with the Oversight Manual is to provide an overview of oversight practice that is useful to congressional stakeholders with various levels of experience. For those new to the Hill, the Oversight Manual serves as a broad introduction to the rules and techniques of effective oversight and the array of options available to Congress and its Members. For more experienced hands, the Oversight Manual’s broad coverage should make it a useful desk reference for existing oversight techniques and recent developments on relevant issues. How to Use This Manual The Oversight Manual is intended to be a guidebook for congressional oversight. To that end, CRS has organized the Oversight Manual for easy navigation from the table of contents. A large share of the Oversight Manual is devoted to a technical discussion of the legal and procedural parameters of Congress’s oversight activities and a survey of certain well-established techniques and tools. The initial sections provide a more general discussion of oversight, including its purposes and a high-level review of the oversight process. 1 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress: Final Report, committee print, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., December 1993, S.Rept. 103-215; H.Rept. 103-413 (GPO, 1993), p. 150. CRS has used an expanded version of this definition: “Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.” See, for example, CRS Report 97936, Congressional Oversight, by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (available to congressional clients on request). 2 See “Statutory Oversight Enablers” section below. Congressional Research Service 1 Congressional Oversight Manual This manual covers a wide variety of topics related to oversight, although it may not discuss every potential oversight issue or provide a precise answer to every question. This is particularly true when it comes to two topics that receive frequent attention. The first is what might be thought of as the “art” of oversight,3 including the selection of oversight priorities and strategies. Such decisions turn, in large part, upon the expert judgment of Members and committees as to how their time and other resources would be best spent. The second subject involves potential ways to adjust the laws and chamber rules governing oversight. The Oversight Manual focuses on current oversight practices. CRS experts and attorneys are available to answer specific questions related to any aspect of oversight, to support specific oversight activities, and to discuss potential adjustments to the rules and practices that enable oversight. Defining Oversight Oversight is an activity that can be defined in many different ways. For instance, CRS has defined congressional oversight as the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.4 This definition encompasses a wide variety of potential legislative activities and does not restrict the oversight function to particular purposes, goals, or strategies. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides a more formalist definition by directing that committees shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.5 This language could be taken to support a narrower view of what constitutes oversight that was common during that era.6 Today many observers would likely find this definition of oversight too limiting given the development of new channels for government information and public interest in accountability for public officials and agencies.7 Therefore, a slightly broader definition, such as the one offered by political scientist Joel D. Aberbach, might better reflect the modern understanding of the activities that make up congressional oversight. Aberbach defines oversight as congressional review of the actions of federal departments, agencies, and commissions and of the programs and polices they administer, including review during program and policy implementation as well as after the fact.8 3 See Project on Government Oversight, The Art of Congressional Oversight (Project on Government Oversight, 2015), https://docs.pogo.org/publication/2015/POGO_The-Art-of-Congressional-Oversight-Handbook.pdf. 4 See CRS Report 97-936, Congressional Oversight, by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (available to congressional clients on request). 5 60 Stat. 832, §136. 6 Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Anchor Books, 1964), p. 9. 7 See, for example, Jennifer L. Selin and Grace Moore, “Keeping Tabs on the Executive,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2 (June 2023), pp. 186-208. 8 Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 218. Congressional Research Service 2 Congressional Oversight Manual The next two parts of this section introduce two additional frameworks that readers may find useful when thinking about the variety of oversight techniques and strategies available to Congress. The Oversight Toolbox Much of the organization of the Congressional Oversight Manual is based on the idea that congressional oversight is a collection of tools and strategies that allow Congress to monitor the executive branch and gather information on its activities. This instrumental approach may make it particularly useful for identifying potential issues for oversight and developing and executing effective strategies for that oversight. In addition, while the Manual is oriented toward executive branch oversight, its lessons are also generally applicable to Congress’s oversight of other actors, including the judicial branch and private sector entities. For most practitioners, oversight is usually oriented to successfully investigating a specific issue or creating a general environment of accountability and transparency among Congress, the executive branch, and, ultimately, the public. Depending on the situation, it may be possible to achieve these goals through a variety of strategies, and their selection can be thought of as picking the best tool for the job. Police Patrols and Fire Alarms Writing in 1984, political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz proposed a model for organizing congressional oversight activities that remains a useful tool for understanding oversight as a practice.9 In their article, the authors define two broad categories of congressional oversight: “police patrols” and “fire alarms.” Police patrol oversight occurs when Congress, on its own initiative, “examines a sample of executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations.”10 This strategy involves regular and general oversight activity by Congress and is consistent with a classic understanding of legislative oversight being conducted directly by committees and Members. One example of this type of oversight is the agency budget hearings held on an annual basis by the appropriations subcommittees in both houses. Those hearings provide committee members an opportunity to question leaders about the performance of their agencies, plans for the future, and specific issues of concern. Fire alarm oversight, on the other hand, occurs when “Congress establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”11 Fire alarm oversight creates a system that fosters transparency and uses other stakeholders and experts to monitor more activities with greater depth than Congress could on its own. When potential problems are identified, the expectation is that Congress will be better able to respond by focusing attention on known issues and working from expert analysis that has already been conducted. An example of fire-alarm oversight is the 2014 response to disclosure of significant wait times for care in some Veterans Health Administration facilities and the deaths of veterans waiting for care 9 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-179. 10 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166. 11 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166. Congressional Research Service 3 Congressional Oversight Manual on those lists. Media outlets (including CNN12) as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General reported on these issues.13 Once Congress was aware of the severity of the issues, Members responded with broad, bipartisan investigations into the agency’s performance and passed legislation seeking to address key findings.14 The Purposes of Oversight of the Executive Branch Congress has engaged in oversight throughout its history. Investigating how the executive branch enforces laws, spends appropriations, and implements policies enables Congress to assess whether federal agencies and departments are operating in an effective, efficient, and economical manner and to gather information that may inform legislation. The expansion of the national government and bureaucracy has only increased Congress’s need for and use of oversight to check on and check the executive.15 This “checking” function serves to protect Congress’s policymaking role and its place under Article I in the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances. St. Clair’s Defeat: The First Congressional Investigation of the Executive Branch On November 4, 1791, a coalition of local American Indian tribes defeated a U.S. military contingent under the command of General Arthur St. Clair (who was also the governor of the Northwest Territory) in battle near what is now the Ohio-Indiana border. This battle, commonly referred to as St. Clair’s Defeat, was the subject of what is generally considered to be the first formal investigation by Congress. The House of Representatives of the Second Congress established a special committee to investigate the battle. The committee requested not only that General St. Clair and Secretary of War Henry Knox testify but also that the Washington Administration produce documents related to the incident. Only a few years removed from the debates of the Constitutional Convention and aware of the precedent-setting role of his Administration, President Washington and his Cabinet (which included, among others, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton) carefully considered the appropriate response to the House’s request. As recorded by Jefferson in his notes, Washington concluded that the executive branch should “communicate such papers as the public good would permit and ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public.” Washington then decided that, in the case of St. Clair’s Defeat, cooperation with Congress was appropriate. This case established two important precedents that continue to shape the relationship between Congress and the presidency to this day. First is the assumption that compliance with congressional request should be the default for presidential Administrations. Second is the argument that the President may decline to provide certain information in some circumstances if doing so would be in the public interest. The second point is directly related to the ongoing debate about the scope and nature of executive privilege.16 Congress’s oversight role is also significant because it shines the spotlight of public attention on critical issues, which helps both lawmakers and the general public to make informed judgments about executive performance. Woodrow Wilson, in his classic 1885 study Congressional Government, emphasized that the “informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.” He added that unless Congress conducts oversight of administrative 12 See CNN, “VA Hospital Investigation,” https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/va-hospitals. 13 See Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, Veterans Health Administration: Review of Alleged Patient Deaths, Patient Wait Times, and Scheduling Practices at the Phoenix VA Health Care System, 14-02603-267, August 26, 2014. 14 See CRS Report R43704, Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (H.R. 3230; P.L. 113-146), by Sidath Viranga Panangala et al. 15 See, for example, letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to President Donald Trump, June 7, 2017, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf. 16 Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege (Carolina Academic Press, 2004), pp. 10-11; and Richard H. Johnston et al., eds., Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), pp. 303-305. Congressional Research Service 4 Congressional Oversight Manual activities, the “country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important it should understand and direct.”17 Oversight occurs in virtually all the activities of Congress and its Members and through a wide variety of channels, organizations, and structures. These can include formal committee hearings and informal Member contacts with executive officials, as well as casework performed by Members, reviews and studies by staff and congressional support agencies, reports prepared by executive branch agencies, and studies prepared by nongovernmental entities such as academic institutions, private commissions, or think tanks. Former Representative Lee Hamilton succinctly stated that the purpose of oversight is to “determine what happens after a law is passed.”18 Some of the main purposes achieved in making that determination are outlined below. Ensure Executive Compliance with Statutory Requirements and Legislative Intent Congress delegates substantial discretionary authority to agency officials to engage in rulemaking and the management of the administrative state. To ensure that these officers faithfully execute laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken and regulations formulated by departments and agencies. The Congressional Review Act The Congressional Review Act (P.L. 104-121) is a tool that Congress may use to overturn regulations issued by federal agencies. It was enacted in 1996 and requires agencies to report on their rulemaking activities to Congress. The act was intended to reassert control over agency rulemaking by establishing a special set of expedited or “fast track” legislative procedures, particularly in the Senate, for considering legislation to overturn rules. For more information see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked Questions, by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report R45248, The Congressional Review Act: Determining Which “Rules” Must Be Submitted to Congress, by Valerie C. Brannon and Maeve P. Carey. Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient and effective program management and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of program goals. A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial operations and service delivery. Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to Congress and enhance program performance. Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, wasteful expenditures, incompetent management, and the subversion of governmental processes can provoke legislative and public interest in oversight. This work frequently benefits from the audits and investigations of other oversight officials in the federal government, including inspectors general and the Government 17 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 303. More recently, Professor Josh Chafetz, a scholar of Congress and its role in the federal government in the 21 st century, has referred to this function as “congressional overspeech.” Josh Chafetz, “Congressional Overspeech,” Fordham Law Review, vol. 89 (2020), p. 596. 18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops, committee print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, p. 10. Congressional Research Service 5 Congressional Oversight Manual Accountability Office (GAO), which have specific mandates from Congress to address waste, fraud, and abuse in agencies. Evaluate Program Performance Systematic program performance evaluation remains an evolving technique of oversight. Modern program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies—such as surveys, costbenefit analyses, and efficiency studies—to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs. Information about program performance may be useful to Congress as it makes decisions about the structure of government programs and the amount of funding they will receive. Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers Many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators state that Presidents and executive officials may ignore or misinterpret congressional intent in various areas, such as the impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers.19 Increased oversight—as part of the constitutional checks and balances system—can redress what many in the public and Congress might view as executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives. Gather Information for Potential Legislation One of the major functions of Congress involves developing, debating, and passing legislation. Congress gathers information to support its legislative work from a variety of sources, and information gathered from agencies in the process of oversight can be an important part of that process. Senator Sam Ervin described the importance of oversight to legislating as follows: The Constitution and statutes give Congress a solemn duty to oversee the activities of the executive branch. How else can Congress fully comprehend whether existing laws are adequate and properly administered? How else can Congress determine what specific additional laws are needed to guide the nation?20 Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Implement Program Objectives Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program objectives can be accomplished in various ways. Numerous laws require agencies to submit reports to Congress. Some of these are regular, occurring annually or semiannually, for instance, while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions. Reporting requirements may promote self-evaluation by the agency. Organizations outside of Congress— such as offices of inspector general, GAO, and expert commissions—also advise Members and committees on how well federal agencies are working. GAO’s High-Risk List Since 1990, GAO has operated its “High-Risk Program” to monitor and report on government operations that are at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Over this period, GAO has added and removed a number of programs and operations from what is commonly referred to as the High-Risk List based on evaluation criteria 19 See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate (University of Michigan Press, 2005); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 3rd ed. (University of Kansas Press, 2013); and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Living Presidency: An Originalist Argument Against Its Ever-Expanding Powers (Belknap Press, 2020). 20 Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., “Introduction,” in James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (Random House, 1976), p. xiii. Congressional Research Service 6 Congressional Oversight Manual developed by GAO. Typically, GAO publishes an update to its report on the High-Risk List every two years, coinciding with the start of a new Congress. The High-Risk List has become a popular tool for Congress to identify programs and other activities that may benefit from additional monitoring by committees.21 Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which provides the opportunity to assess agency and departmental expenditures in detail. Most federal agencies and programs are required to receive recurring reauthorizations—on an annual, twoyear, five-year, or other basis—giving authorizing committees the opportunity to review agency activities, operations, and procedures. As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds. Congress might also increase funding for effective programs. Protect Individual Rights and Liberties Congressional oversight can help safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others. By revealing abuses of authority, oversight hearings and other efforts can halt executive misconduct and help prevent its recurrence through, for example, new legislation or indirectly by heightening public awareness. Draw Public Attention to Issues Congressional oversight can provide Congress and its Members with the opportunity to highlight issues, activities of the government, and other events that they wish to bring to the attention of the public. Congress may believe that it will be better able to achieve a goal if public pressure or energy is directed to a particular matter and that oversight activities may be one way to generate that attention. Other Purposes The purposes of oversight can also be stated in more precise terms. Like the general purposes noted above, these more specific purposes unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and multifaceted dimensions of oversight. A brief list includes the following: • • • • • • • Review the agency rulemaking process Monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services Encourage cooperation between agencies and between the branches Promote accountability within agencies Appraise the administration of justice, including judicial and administrative proceedings Investigate constituent complaints and media critiques Signal priorities and demonstrate activity to constituents and interest groups 21 GAO, High-Risk Series: Heightened Attention Could Save Billions More and Improve Government Efficiency and Effectiveness, GAO-25-107743, February 25, 2025, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107743; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The Government Accountability Office’s 2025 High Risk List, 119th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 2025, https://oversight.house.gov/hearing/the-government-accountabilityoffices-2025-high-risk-list/. Congressional Research Service 7 Congressional Oversight Manual • Assess whether program design and execution are meeting the needs of service recipients Thoughts on Oversight and Its Rationales from... James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate Justice on the first Supreme Court: The House of Representatives … form the grand inquest of the state. They will diligently inquire into grievances, arising both from men and things. Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch: Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. John Stuart Mill (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), a British utilitarian philosopher: [T]he proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable. Congress as an Oversight Body This section lays out several key issues related to Congress’s role as a legislative body. It begins with a broad discussion of the constitutional sources of Congress’s oversight authority and then proceeds to more specific discussion about how Congress operates as an oversight organization. Next, the section considers oversight as a practice and lays out one way to model oversight as a process. Finally, the section concludes with a discussion of Congress’s working relationship with the executive branch. Authority to Conduct Oversight Congress’s authority to conduct oversight comes from the Constitution and is informed by Supreme Court decisions, federal laws, and House and Senate rules. Oversight is an implicit constitutional responsibility of Congress. According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “it was not considered necessary [by the Framers] to make an explicit grant of such authority. The power to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.”22 The investigative authority of Congress has been broadly interpreted by an array of Supreme Court decisions. For example, in Watkins v. United States,23 the Court stated that the “power of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed laws.” There are limits to Congress’s power to investigate, including some found in the Constitution itself (e.g., the protection accorded witnesses under the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination). 22 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Roger Burns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974, vol. 1 (Chelsea House, 1975), p. xiii. 23 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Congressional Research Service 8 Congressional Oversight Manual The Supreme Court on Congress’s Power to Oversee and Investigate McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 181-182 (1927): Congress, investigating the administration of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.” The “potential” for legislation was sufficient. The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry— with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975): Expanding on its holding in McGrain, the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.” Constitutional Provisions The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch activities from such explicit and implicit provisions as the following: • • • • The power of the purse. The Constitution provides: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”24 Each year the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies. The appropriations process allows Congress to exercise extensive control over the activities of executive agencies. Congress can define the precise purposes for which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures for certain purposes. The power to organize the executive branch. Congress has the authority to create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies. It has the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies and grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators. Congress, in short, exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally over policy.25 The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own enumerated powers as well as those of the executive branch. Article I grants Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money, regulate foreign and interstate commerce, declare war, provide for the creation and maintenance of armed forces, and establish post offices.26 Augmenting these specific powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”27 These provisions grant broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental activities established by law.28 The Senate’s power to confirm officers of the United States. The confirmation process not only involves the determination of a nominee’s suitability for an executive (or judicial) position but also provides an opportunity to examine 24 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 7. 25 U.S. Const. art. I, §9; see also U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 26 U.S. Const. art. I, §8. 27 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18. 28 See CRS Report R45442, Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, by Todd Garvey and Sean M. Stiff. Congressional Research Service 9 Congressional Oversight Manual • • the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and programs that the nominee intends to pursue.29 The power of investigation and inquiry. A traditional method of exercising the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and inquiries into executive branch operations. Legislators often seek to know how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public perceives the programs. The investigatory method helps to ensure a more responsible bureaucracy while supplying Congress with information needed to formulate new legislation. Impeachment and removal. Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior and to eliminate such misbehavior through the conviction and removal from office of the offending individuals.30 Statutes and Oversight There are also numerous laws that impact how Congress conducts oversight.31 Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,32 which required House and Senate standing committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their jurisdictions. Congress has also passed a number of laws, especially in the past half-century, that support its oversight function directly and indirectly. Some of these statutes were designed to make executive branch agencies more transparent. Others have established officials within agencies who are required to perform certain routine oversight functions, including audits and investigations of potential waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. In practice, a large amount of Congress’s oversight activity can be traced to information gathered or disclosed through these laws. In addition, Congress devotes significant attention to monitoring the effectiveness of these oversight-enabling statutes and considering amendments to improve their effectiveness. House and Senate Rules on Oversight The House and Senate have often amended their formal rules to encourage and strengthen committee oversight of the administration of laws. For example, House rules direct committees to create oversight subcommittees, undertake futures research and forecasting, and review the impact of tax expenditures within their respective jurisdictions. Senate rules require each standing committee to include regulatory impact statements in committee reports accompanying legislation. 29 See U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 30 See U.S. Const. art. II, §4. 31 For a detailed discussion, including specific examples of relevant statutes, see “Statutory Oversight Enablers” below. 32 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). Congressional Research Service 10 Congressional Oversight Manual House Rules House rules33 grant the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform a comprehensive role in the conduct of oversight. For example, the committee has the authority or responsibility to do the following: • • • • • • • “[R]eview and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President” (Rule X, clause 3). “[R]eceive and examine reports of the Comptroller General of the United States and submit to the House such recommendations as it considers necessary or desirable in connection with the subject matter of the reports” (Rule X, clause 4). “[S]tudy intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the States and municipalities and between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member” (Rule X, clause 4). “[A]t any time conduct investigations of any matter [notwithstanding language] conferring jurisdiction over the matter to another standing committee. The findings and recommendations of the committee in such an investigation shall be made available to any other standing committee having jurisdiction over the matter involved” (Rule X, clause 4). Report to the House “the authorization and oversight plans submitted by committees … together with any recommendations that [the committee], or the House leadership group described above, may make to ensure the most effective coordination of [these] plans” (Rule X, clause 2). Choose to adopt a “rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions by a member or counsel of the committee including pursuant to subpoena under clause 2(m) of Rule XI” (Rule X, clause 4). “[E]valuate the effect of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the Government” (Rule X, clause 4). House rules also provide authority for oversight by other standing committees as follows: • • • Each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall review and study “the application, administration, execution, and effectiveness of laws and programs addressing subjects within its jurisdiction” and determine whether they should be “continued, curtailed, or eliminated” (Rule X, clause 2). Committees have the authority to “review and study on a continuing basis the impact or probable impact of tax policies” on subjects that fall within their jurisdictions (Rule X, clause 2). Certain committees have special oversight authority (i.e., to review and study, on an ongoing basis, specific subject areas that are within the legislative jurisdictions of other committees). Special oversight is somewhat akin to the broad oversight authority granted to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act except 33 The rules of the House of Representatives are available at https://rules.house.gov/sites/evo- subsites/rules.house.gov/files/documents/houserules119thupdated.pdf. Congressional Research Service 11 Congressional Oversight Manual • • • • • that special oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3). Each standing committee “having more than 20 members shall establish an oversight subcommittee, or require its subcommittees to conduct oversight in their respective jurisdictions” (Rule X, clauses 2 and 5). Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately set out and clearly identified. Each report is also to include “a statement of general performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding” (Rule XIII, clause 3). “Each standing committee, or a subcommittee thereof, shall hold at least one hearing during each 120-day period following the establishment of the committee on the topic of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in Government programs which that committee may authorize.” Such hearings shall “include a focus on the most egregious instances of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in government programs as documented by any report the committee has received” from the Comptroller General or an inspector general. Committee and subcommittees shall also hold “at least one hearing on issues raised by reports issued by the [Comptroller General] indicating that Federal programs or operations that the committee may authorize are at high risk for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, known as the ‘high-risk list’ or ‘high-risk series’” (Rule XI, clause 2). The chair of each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall adopt in a public meeting an authorization and oversight plan for that Congress. Committee plans shall be submitted simultaneously to the Committees on Oversight and Government Reform and House Administration. Additionally, “the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform shall report to the House the authorization and oversight plans [of the committees] together with any recommendations that it, or the House leadership group … may make to ensure the most effective coordination of authorization and oversight plans and otherwise to achieve the[se] objectives” (Rule X, clause 2). “Each such plan shall include, with respect to programs and agencies within the committee’s jurisdiction, and to the maximum extent practicable— (A) a list of such programs or agencies with lapsed authorizations that received funding in the prior fiscal year or, in the case of a program or agency with a permanent authorization, which has not been subject to a comprehensive review by the committee in the prior three Congresses; (B) a description of each such program or agency to be authorized in the current Congress; (C) a description of each such program or agency to be authorized in the next Congress, if applicable; (D) a description of any oversight to support the authorization of each such program or agency in the current Congress; and Congressional Research Service 12 Congressional Oversight Manual (E) recommendations for changes to existing law for moving such programs or agencies from mandatory funding to discretionary appropriations, where appropriate” (Rule X, clause 2). • “Not later than January 2 of each odd-numbered year, a committee shall submit to the House a report on the activities of that committee. (2) Such report shall include— (A) “separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of that committee under [rules X and XI] during the Congress; (B) “a summary of the authorization and oversight plans submitted by the committee …; (C) “a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to [their authorization and oversight plans]; (D) “a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that committee and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon; and (E) “a delineation of any [oversight] hearings” (Rule XI, clause 1). In addition, the Speaker, with the approval of the House, may appoint special ad hoc oversight committees for the purpose of reviewing specific matters within the jurisdictions of two or more standing committees (Rule X, clause 2). The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis On April 23, 2020, the House adopted H.Res. 938, which created the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. Similar to previous select committees dedicated to specific issues, the select subcommittee was directed by the resolution to “conduct a full and complete investigation and study” and to issue a final report to the House on a number of specific issues related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the federal government’s response. (See H.Res. 935 for the operational text regarding the select subcommittee.) The select subcommittee, which was retained in the 117th Congress, held briefings and hearings, released reports, and requested information from the executive branch as the pandemic and the government’s response evolved. While a large number of committees and subcommittees in both chambers have oversight jurisdiction relevant to specific aspects of the pandemic and pandemic response, the House was able to both use and adapt its standing rules to create a subcommittee tasked with overseeing and investigating the issue as a whole. Senate Rules Under Senate rules,34 each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) shall “review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the legislative jurisdiction of that committee” (Rule XXVI, clause 8). In addition to this general oversight requirement, policy oversight responsibilities are granted to specified standing committees. This duty is similar to special oversight in the House. For example, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is authorized to “study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and hunger both in the United States and in foreign countries and rural affairs and report thereon from time to time” (Rule XXV, clause 1(a)). 34 The rules of the Senate are available at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate. Congressional Research Service 13 Congressional Oversight Manual All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to include regulatory impact evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule XXVI, clause 11). The evaluations are to include matters such as: • • • an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses that would be regulated, a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal privacy, and a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result from the regulations. The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs exercises oversight jurisdiction over government operations generally, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Selected oversight duties assigned to the committee under Rule XXV, clause 2(k), include: • • • • reviewing and studying on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all levels to determine their economy, effectiveness, and efficiency; receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General and submitting recommendations as it deems necessary to the Senate; evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive branches of the government; and studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the states and municipalities and international organizations of which the United States is a member. The Senate established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under the Committee on Government Operations on March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress) by adopting S.Res 189. The subcommittee was an outgrowth of the 1941 “Truman Committee” (named for its chair, Senator Harry Truman), which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war program. The Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chair of the Government Operations Committee transferred the functions of the Truman Committee to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Since then, this subcommittee (now a part of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs) has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste, fraud, and inefficiency.35 Congressional Participants in Oversight Committees The most common method of conducting oversight is through the committee system. Legislative history demonstrates that the House and Senate have long used their standing committees—as well as joint, select, or special committees—to investigate federal activities and agencies: • The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs have broad 35 For more information, see Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Historical Background,” September 11, 2025, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wpcontent/uploads/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Historical%20Background%20(for%20website)%20Jan%202015%20update.p df. Congressional Research Service 14 Congressional Oversight Manual • oversight jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government. They have been vested with broad investigatory powers over government-wide activities. Each standing committee of Congress has oversight responsibilities for reviewing government activities principally within its jurisdiction. These panels also have the authority to establish oversight and investigative subcommittees. The establishment of an oversight subcommittee does not preclude a panel’s legislative subcommittees from conducting oversight. Certain House and Senate committees have “special oversight” or “comprehensive policy oversight” of designated subject areas, as noted above. Members Oversight is generally considered a committee activity, but Members also have the ability to pursue oversight without working through a committee. Both casework and other project work conducted in Members’ personal offices, including in their district or state offices, can yield insights about bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation. These discoveries, in turn, can lead to the adjustment of agency policies and procedures and to changes in public law. Casework—responding to constituent requests for assistance with federal agencies36—provides an opportunity to examine bureaucratic activity and operations, if only in a selective way. Other constituent service activities, such as responding to inquiries about federal grants or projects or addressing concerns about program implementation or agency operations, may also provide Members with similar insights. The accessibility of government websites also allows interested constituents to monitor federal activities and expenditures and to share their findings or observations with Members, relevant committees, and legislative staff. Individual Members may also conduct their own investigations or ad hoc hearings or direct their staff to conduct oversight studies. While individual lawmakers lack the authority to use compulsory processes (e.g., subpoenas) or conduct official hearings, many other options are available.37 Members might also request GAO, an inspector general or other appropriate government official, a private research group, or some other entity to conduct an investigation. Members might choose to publicize this work by releasing staff reports with their findings; sharing information with their constituents, the media, and other stakeholders; or using what they learn to support additional oversight or legislation. Committee Staff As issues become more complex, the professional staff of House and Senate committees may provide the expertise required to conduct effective oversight and investigations. Committee staff are expected to have the experience, knowledge, and analytical skills to conduct proficient and thorough oversight for the committees and subcommittees they serve. Committees may also call upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, “borrow” staff from federal departments, or employ academics and others with specialized expertise. 36 See CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office, by R. Eric Petersen and Sarah J. Eckman. 37 See “Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigations” below. Congressional Research Service 15 Congressional Oversight Manual Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of oversight. Their informal contacts with executive officials at all levels constitute one of Congress’s most effective techniques for performing its “continuous watchfulness” function. Personal Staff Constituent letters, complaints, and requests for projects and assistance frequently bring issues and deficiencies in federal programs and administration to the attention of Members and their personal office staff. The casework performed by a Member’s staff for constituents can be an effective oversight tool. Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight and legislative interests of the Member. The relationship between casework and the oversight function is facilitated by a regular exchange of ideas among the Member, legislative aides, and caseworkers on problems brought to the office’s attention by constituents. Caseworkers may also become aware of certain issues through their interactions with agency employees. Telephone and email inquiries, reinforced with written requests, can focus agency attention on issues raised by caseworkers and Members’ constituents. Casework might also prompt legislative initiatives to resolve those problems. Caseworkers and other legislative staffers may seek to maximize service to their Member’s constituents by reaching out to the staff of the subcommittees and committees that handle the areas of concern to the Member’s constituents. Through this interaction, the staff of the pertinent standing committee(s) can be made aware of the problems with the agency or program in question, assess how widespread and significant they are, determine their causes, and recommend corrective action. Congressional Support Agencies and Offices Many of the other agencies and offices within the legislative branch may be able to support the overall operations of the House and Senate. Additional offices that might play a role in oversight include, among others, the House General Counsel’s Office, the House Parliamentarian’s Office, the Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, the House Clerk’s Office, the Secretary of the Senate’s Office, the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, the Senate and House Historian’s Office, and the Senate Library. For further detail on the role of GAO, CRS, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and these other offices, see “Oversight Information Sources and Consultative Services” later in this report. Oversight and the Committee System A persistent challenge for Congress in conducting oversight is coordination among committees— within each chamber as well as between the two houses. The final report of the House Select Committee on Committees of the 93rd Congress noted, “Review findings and recommendations developed by one committee are seldom shared on a timely basis with another committee, and, if they are made available, then often the findings are transmitted in a form that is difficult for Members to use.”38 Oversight coordination between House and Senate committees is also 38 U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Committees, Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 Part 2, Report of the Select Committee on Committees U.S. House of Representatives to Accompany H. Res. 988 Together with Supplemental Views, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1974 (GPO, 1974), p. 68. Congressional Research Service 16 Congressional Oversight Manual uncommon, and it occurs primarily in the aftermath of perceived major policy failures or prominent inter-branch conflicts, as with the Iran-Contra affair and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Inter-committee cooperation on oversight can be beneficial for a variety of reasons. For example, it can help minimize unnecessary duplication and conflict and inhibit agencies from playing one committee against another. There are formal and informal ways to achieve oversight coordination among committees. Identifying Relevant Committee Jurisdiction A basic step in conducting oversight involves identifying the committee(s) with jurisdiction over the policy matter or programs of interest. The committee jurisdictional statements in House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV specify the subjects that fall within each committee’s jurisdiction. In general, the rules do not address specific departments, agencies, programs, or laws but are stated in broad subject terms. Therefore, multiple committees may exercise some jurisdiction— especially in regard to oversight—over the same departments and agencies or over different elements of the same agency activities. While the House and Senate Parliamentarians are the sole definitive arbiters of committee jurisdiction, CRS can assist congressional staff with the identification of the potential committee(s) of jurisdiction for proposed oversight activities.39 General Techniques of Encouraging Oversight Coordination House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV provide broad authority to the standing committees of each chamber to investigate matters within their respective jurisdictions. Committees undertake oversight activities on their own initiative in the full committee or in one or more subcommittees. In some cases they may also coordinate their activities with other committees (for instance, by convening a joint hearing on a subject of mutual interest). Alternatively, to supplement the existing standing committee system, the House or Senate can establish select or special committees to probe issues and agencies, promote public understanding of national concerns, or coordinate oversight of issues that span the jurisdictions of multiple standing committees. Given the wide range of subjects each committee is responsible for, the creation of a select committee can enable greater sustained focus on a particular area of congressional concern. When developing oversight and authorization plans, committee chairs are directed to “coordinate with other committees of jurisdiction to ensure that programs and agencies are subject to routine, comprehensive authorization efforts.”40 Authorization and oversight plans assembled by the House’s standing committees are delivered to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and are printed as reports of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, along with that committee’s own recommendations.41 The Senate does not have a similar requirement. Development and Execution of Oversight Projects Congress’s oversight practice can range from day-to-day activities, such as assisting constituents in their interactions with agencies, to much more formal actions, such as impeachment 39 On House rules governing committee jurisdiction and referral, see CRS Report R46251, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the House, by Mark J. Oleszek. Jurisdiction and referral in the Senate is the subject of CRS Report R46815, Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate, by Mark J. Oleszek. 40 House Rule X(2)(d)(4). 41 See, for instance, U.S. Congress, Committee on Oversight and Reform, Authorization and Oversight Plan for All House Committees, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 2021, H.Rept. 117-17 (GPO, 2021). Congressional Research Service 17 Congressional Oversight Manual proceedings and special committees and subcommittees tasked with investigating specific issues.42 While oversight comes in a variety of forms, planning for and executing oversight actions can be laid out as a three-question process. While the process outlined within these questions appears to have a beginning, a middle, and an end, oversight may not always unfold in a typical, or even predictable, manner. Question 1: Which Issues Warrant Oversight? Any information that Members or their staff learn about activities of the executive branch might become the basis for oversight. Congress might receive information from constituents, agency officials (who may or may not be acting as whistleblowers), inspectors general, GAO, interest groups, or the media. Information can also come in other forms, including congressionally mandated reports and other government publications, agency responses to questions during or outside of committee hearings, or personal observations of executive branch activities. The decision about which potential oversight matters to pursue is based on the judgment and goals of congressional leaders, committees, and individual Members. These decisions may include factors that are outside the scope of the Oversight Manual.43 However, there are logistical and technical considerations that may be relevant to these discussions. Those considerations might include Congress’s authority to conduct particular oversight activities, the resources required to successfully complete an oversight project, and the anticipated outcome of successful oversight. Authority to Conduct Oversight While Congress’s authority to conduct oversight is expansive, it is not unlimited. Cases may arise where it is not entirely clear whether Congress has the authority to take a specific action or gather particular information. This can be a complicated question that involves contested questions of law and the appropriate separation of powers.44 Unresolved questions about the limits of Congress’s oversight authority might not dissuade Congress from conducting oversight in those areas. Nonetheless, understanding the issues that could arise might be useful when determining whether to proceed. Resources Oversight has costs. Of particular importance are Member and staff time, both of which can be scarce resources.45 Resource limitations might guide the decisions of Members and committees 42 For such a guide for investigative hearings, see Morton Rosenberg, “When Congress Comes Calling: A Study on the Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry,” Constitution Project, 2017, pp. 33-38, https://docs.pogo.org/report/2017/POGO_TCP_When_Congress_Comes_Calling.pdf. See also Project on Government Oversight, The Art of Congressional Oversight. 43 Political scientist Morris Ogul identifies seven “opportunity factors” that impact the likelihood of oversight. In Ogul’s discussion those factors are legal authority to conduct oversight, staff resources, the subject matter at issue, committee structure, status of the interested Members on the relevant committee, relations with the executive branch, and the priorities of Members. Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 11-22. 44 See “Investigative Oversight” below. 45 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, Final Report, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., October 2020, pp. 98-127, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-116hrpt562/pdf/GPO(continued...) Congressional Research Service 18 Congressional Oversight Manual regarding potential oversight opportunities and between oversight and other legislative activities. Available resources may also influence the scope of particular investigations and the products they produce. Anticipated Outcome Another practical question that might be considered is the probable outcome for a particular oversight action. It is not possible to know, in advance, the outputs or outcomes of oversight activity. With experience, though, Members and staff may develop a strong sense of how and where oversight projects are likely to go and how long they might take. Question 2: How to Get the Desired Information? Once the decision to investigate a particular oversight matter has been made and goals for that activity have been set, it is important to formulate a plan for conducting that oversight. Such a plan does not necessarily have to be complex or take any particular form. There are many cases when a telephone call to an agency contact or identification of publicly available documents could be enough to satisfy Congress’s oversight needs, while other matters have been litigated all the way to the Supreme Court. What Information Is Available and Who Has It? Having identified preliminary goals for an oversight action, it is useful to determine what relevant information may be available and which agency or official is likely to have it. For instance, when investigating an allegation of mismanagement within an agency, the agency’s own records and officials are likely to be a major source of information. It might not be obvious early in the process that certain information would be useful to Congress’s activities even if it is readily available. Moreover, it may be difficult to determine where documents or officials with relevant information can be found even if Congress has a good sense of the type of information it needs to complete its work. This is especially true when an issue involves the activities or jurisdiction of multiple agencies. The Watergate Investigation and President Nixon’s Oval Office Tapes Among the best known of all congressional oversight actions are the investigations of the Watergate break-in and the Nixon Administration that culminated in the resignation of President Richard Nixon on August 9, 1974. The most compelling information to come out of these investigations was taped conversations in the Oval Office involving President Nixon himself. White House advisor John Dean first raised the possible existence of a taping system in the Oval Office while testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. Committee investigative staff followed up on Dean’s comments, and another Administration official, Alexander Butterfield, confirmed the existence of the taping system. The discovery of these tapes, which played an important role in compelling President Nixon’s resignation, might never have occurred had Congress not already been investigating the Watergate break-in.46 CRPT-116hrpt562.pdf. Beginning in the 118th Congress, the Modernization Committee was succeeded by the Subcommittee on Modernization and Innovation of the Committee on House Administration. 46 U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, The Final Report of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974, S.Rept. 93-981 (GPO, 1974); and James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (Random House, 1976), pp. 23-26. Congressional Research Service 19 Congressional Oversight Manual How Can Congress Get the Information? Sometimes gathering information is the biggest challenge Congress faces when conducting oversight. Much of this manual is devoted to the variety of tools available to Congress to obtain information even in the face of resistance from the executive branch.47 In many other cases, information is already available to Congress either because disclosure is required by statute or because a federal agency, other organization, or individual has chosen to release the information to Congress or the public. Additionally, it is often possible to obtain information via direct communication between Members or staff and agency officials. There are strong incentives for agencies to engage with Congress, and they may provide information upon request in many instances.48 Question 3: What Can Be Done with This Information? Most would agree that oversight has the ability to “throw light on activities of government” and fosters an environment of increased accountability for officials.49 Oversight, especially oversight that includes “police patrol” strategies, is likely to have these benefits across the government, even though Congress does not have the capacity to directly monitor the activities of millions of federal employees and contractors.50 Oversight can directly support Congress’s legislative function. Oversight provides information on the state of the government that can be applied when Congress makes decisions on agency budgets and program authorizations and may lead to other legislation. How the knowledge gained from oversight can be applied in those other functions depends on the nature of that information and the priorities and preferences of Congress. More concretely, as discussed throughout this report, oversight can lead to a variety of specific products and other outputs. While oversight questions are often resolved when congressional stakeholders receive enough information to resolve their questions or concerns, many projects lead to public-facing actions such as committee hearings, the publication of investigative reports, and legislative responses. While it is not always possible to foresee where or how far particular oversight actions will go, an understanding of the benefits, costs, advantages, and disadvantages of these options may be useful when making other decisions throughout the process. In addition, one can also consider the form that the findings and conclusions in these products might take. Professor Kenneth Lowande identifies four classes of congressional oversight reports: 1. Finding: a conclusion of fact about past events 2. Evaluation: a judgment regarding a past event 3. Prediction: an expectation about a likely future outcome based on current conditions 47 For an extended discussion of how Congress can obtain information, see “Oversight Through Other Congressional Activities” below. 48 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben Wilhelm. 49 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops, committee print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, pp. 11-12 (remarks by Lee Hamilton). 50 See generally McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked.” Congressional Research Service 20 Congressional Oversight Manual 4. Recommendation: a proposal to make policy or other changes intended to produce a desired effect51 This typology may be a useful lens for both refining the goals for an oversight project and identifying strategies to achieve those goals. If, for instance, one goal of a particular oversight activity is to gather information to support future legislation, then it may be useful to pursue lines of inquiry that will inform legislative recommendations. Oversight Through Other Congressional Activities Congress’s constitutional functions also include consideration of legislation, appropriations, Senate confirmation of presidential nominees, and the exercise of the impeachment power. Oversight often has a symbiotic relationship with these other duties. For instance, oversight regularly helps Congress identify issues that it wishes to legislate upon and helps Congress design its proposals. This section identifies major areas of congressional activity and how they relate to and facilitate oversight. Congress has a central role in the development of the budget, the operations of agencies and general management of the executive branch, confirmation of appointees to senior positions across the government, and the consideration and approval of all legislation. The Legislative Process While oversight is frequently considered to be adjacent to legislative authority, there are important ways in which the two activities overlap. Oversight, for instance, can influence legislative priorities or identify areas of interest. In some cases, Congress establishes reporting and study requirements for GAO, inspectors general, and agencies that generate recommendations for agency or congressional action, which in turn provide both oversight information and ideas for potential legislation. As Congress has expanded its use of statutory tools that facilitate oversight, it has devoted more attention to developing such legislation, overseeing its implementation, and evaluating its effectiveness.52 The Budget Process53 The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,54 as amended, enhanced the legislative branch’s capacity to shape the federal budget. The act has had major institutional and procedural effects on Congress: 51 Lowande, Kenneth and Mark A. Weiss, “The Politics of Predicting the Future” (unpublished working paper, July 12, 2024). 52 One example of such legislation is the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352) which, among other things, updated the system for Congress and the executive branch to identify and consider the elimination of reporting requirements that are no longer useful. See CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass. 53 For a general overview of the budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, coordinated by James V. Saturno; and CRS In Focus IF11032, Budgetary Decisionmaking in Congress, by Megan S. Lynch. CRS also reports regularly on legislative activity on the budget and appropriations as well as actions that affect the budget process itself. See, for example, CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch; and CRS Report R47384, Changes to House Rules Affecting the Congressional Budget Process Included in H.Res. 5 (118th Congress), by James V. Saturno and Megan S. Lynch. 54 P.L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§607-688. Congressional Research Service 21 Congressional Oversight Manual • • Institutionally, Congress created three new entities: the Senate Committee on the Budget, the House Committee on the Budget, and CBO. Procedurally, the act established methods that permit Congress to determine budget policy as a whole; relate revenue and spending decisions; determine priorities among competing national programs; and ensure that revenue, spending, and debt legislation are consistent with the overall budget policy. The budget process coexists with the established authorization and appropriation procedures and significantly affects each: • • • On the authorization side, the act requires committees to submit their budgetary “views and estimates” on matters under their jurisdictions to the Committee on the Budget not later than six weeks after the President submits a budget or at such time that the Budget Committee might request. On the appropriations side, new contract and borrowing authority must go through the appropriations process. Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees are assigned financial allocations that determine how much may be included in the measures they report. (The tax and appropriations panels of each house also submit budgetary views and estimates to their respective Budget Committees.) In deciding spending, revenue, credit, and debt issues, Congress is sensitive to trends in the overall composition of the annual federal budget (expenditures for defense, entitlements, interest on the debt, and domestic discretionary programs).55 These reforms have the potential to strengthen oversight by enabling Congress to better relate program priorities to financial claims on the national budget. Each committee, knowing that it will receive a fixed amount of the total to be included in a budget resolution, has an incentive to scrutinize existing programs to make room for new programs or expanded funding of ongoing projects or to assess whether programs have outlived their usefulness. The Authorization Process Through its authorization power, Congress exercises significant control over government agencies. The entire authorization process56 may involve a host of oversight tools—hearings, studies, and reports—but the key to the process is the authorization statute. An authorization statute creates and shapes government programs and agencies, and it contains the statement of legislative policy for the agency. Authorization is the first lever in congressional exercise of the power of the purse. It usually allows an agency to be funded, but it does not guarantee financing of agencies and programs. Frequently, authorizations establish dollar ceilings on the amounts that can be appropriated. 55 See, for example, CRS Report R45941, The Annual Sequester of Mandatory Spending through FY2029, by Charles S. Konigsberg; and CRS Insight IN11148, The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit, by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch. 56 See CRS Report R46497, Authorizations and the Appropriations Process, by James V. Saturno. Congressional Research Service 22 Congressional Oversight Manual The authorization-reauthorization process is a significant oversight tool. Through this process, Members can become informed about the work of an agency and are given an opportunity to direct the agency’s effort.57 Expiration of an agency’s program can provide an opportunity for in-depth oversight. In recent decades, there has been a mix of permanent authorizations—which do not require regular reauthorization legislation—and periodic authorizations, which can be annual or multiyear. Periodic reauthorizations increase the likelihood that an agency will be scrutinized systematically. An agency’s understanding that it must come to the legislative committee for renewed authority increases the influence of the committee. This condition helps to account for the appeal of shortterm authorizations. The Congressional Budget Office’s “Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations” Report One resource that may be useful for determining potential oversight targets is CBO’s annual report Expired and Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations. By law, CBO is required to annually submit a report to Congress listing programs and activities funded during that fiscal year that do not have enacted authorizations and do not have authorizations enacted for the next fiscal year. The latest version of CBO’s report is available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61543. In addition, the authorization process gives committees an opportunity to exercise informal, nonstatutory controls over the agency. Nonstatutory controls used by committees to exercise direction over the administration of laws include statements made in: • • • • committee hearings, committee reports accompanying legislation, floor debate, and contacts and correspondence with the agency. If agencies fail to comply with these informal directives, the authorization committees can apply sanctions or move to convert the informal directive to a statutory command. The Appropriations Process The appropriations process is among Congress’s most significant forms of oversight. Its strategic position stems from the constitutional requirement that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”58 This “power of the purse” allows the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations to play a prominent role in oversight. The oversight function of the Committees on Appropriations derives from their responsibility to examine the budget requests of the agencies as contained in the President’s budget. The decisions of the committees are conditioned on their assessments of the agencies’ need for their budget requests as indicated by past performance. In practice, the entire record of an agency is fair game for the required assessment. This comprehensive overview and the “carrot and stick” of appropriations recommendations (i.e., the authority of the committees to withhold or reduce appropriations to uncooperative agencies) make the committees significant focal points of 57 See CRS Report R46107, FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, coordinated by Bryce H. P. Mendez. 58 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 17. For a more detailed discussion of Congress’s appropriations power, see CRS Report R46417, Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, by Sean M. Stiff. Congressional Research Service 23 Congressional Oversight Manual congressional oversight and are a key source of their power in Congress and in the federal government generally.59 Enacted appropriations legislation frequently contains at least five types of statutory controls on agencies: 1. It specifies the purpose for which funds may be used. 2. It defines the specified funding level for the agency as a whole as well as for programs and divisions within the agency. 3. It sets time limits on the availability of funds for obligation. 4. It may contain limitation provisions. For example, in Division A of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2022,60 Congress included the following condition: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be used for first-class travel by the employees or agencies funded by this Act in contravention of sections 301-10.122 through 301-10.124 of title 41, Code of Federal Regulations.”61 5. It may stipulate how an agency’s budget can be reprogrammed (shifting funds within an appropriations account) or transferred (shifted between appropriations accounts). Nonstatutory controls are a major form of oversight. Committee expectations and requirements may be conveyed through committee reports, hearings, letters to agency heads, and other communications. Agencies are not legally obligated to abide by nonstatutory recommendations, but failure to do so may result in a loss of funds and flexibility the following year. An Example of Nonstatutory Control of Agency Appropriations The conference report for the third Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) includes the following directive: Paper Reduction Efforts.—The Conferees urge the Department of the Interior, EPA, Forest Service, and Indian Health Service to work with the Office of Management and Budget to reduce printing and reproduction costs and direct each agency to report to the Committees within 90 days of enactment of this Act on steps being undertaken to achieve this goal and how much each agency expects to save by implementing these measures.62 The Confirmation Process By establishing a public record of the policy views of nominees, congressional hearings allow lawmakers to call appointed officials to account at a later time. Since at least the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,63 which encouraged greater scrutiny of nominations, Senate committees have set aside more time to probe the qualifications, independence, and policy views of 59 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben Wilhelm. 60 The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for FY2022. 61 P.L. 117-103, Division A, §710. 62 U.S. Congress, House Conference Committee, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, And for Other Purposes, Conference Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 31, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, H.Rept. 116-9 (GPO, 2019), p. 707. 63 P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. §§101 et seq. Congressional Research Service 24 Congressional Oversight Manual presidential nominees, seeking information on everything from their physical health to their financial assets. The confirmation process can assist in oversight in at least three ways: 1. The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”64 The consideration of appointments to executive branch leadership positions is a major responsibility of the Senate and especially of Senate committees, which review and hold hearings regarding the qualifications of nominees. 2. Confirmation hearings serve as an opportunity for senatorial oversight and influence beyond the consideration of a nominee’s qualifications and vision, providing a forum for the discussion of the policies and programs that would be under the nominee’s purview. The confirmation process as an oversight tool can be used to provide policy direction to nominees, inform nominees of congressional interests, and seek commitments on future behavior. 3. Once the Senate has confirmed a nominee, oversight includes following up to ensure that the nominee fulfills any commitments made during confirmation hearings. Subsequent hearings and committee investigations can explore whether such commitments have been kept. The President also has authority regarding a number of other appointments that do not require the advice and consent of the Senate, including, under certain circumstances, recess appointments65 and designations under the Vacancies Act.66 The Impeachment Process The impeachment power is a unique tool available to Congress under the Constitution. Impeachment applies to the President, the Vice President, and other federal civil officers in the executive and judicial branches.67 Impeachment offers Congress: • • an auxiliary constitutional method for obtaining information that might otherwise not be made available and an implied threat of removal for an official whose conduct exceeds acceptable boundaries. Impeachment procedures differ from those of conventional congressional oversight. The most significant procedural differences center on the roles played by each house of Congress. The House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach.68 A simple majority is needed in the House to approve articles of impeachment. The Senate has the sole power to try an 64 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 65 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 3. For more information on recess appointments, see CRS Report R44997, The Vacancies Act: A Legal Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon. 66 5 U.S.C. §§3345 et seq. For more information on the Vacancies Act, see CRS Report RS21412, Temporarily Filling Presidentially Appointed, Senate-Confirmed Positions, by Henry B. Hogue. 67 U.S. Const. art. II, §4. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. 68 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 5. See CRS Report R45769, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives, by Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene. Congressional Research Service 25 Congressional Oversight Manual impeachment.69 A two-thirds majority is required in the Senate to convict and remove the individual from office. Should the Senate deem it appropriate in a given case, it may, by majority vote, impose an additional judgment of disqualification from holding further federal offices of honor, trust, or profit.70 The impeachment process is infrequently used. The House has voted to impeach officials in at least 22 cases.71 The Senate has voted to convict in eight cases, all pertaining to federal judges.72 The most recent executive impeachment trial was that of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas in 2024, and the most recent judicial impeachment trial was that of U.S. District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. in 2010. A number of constitutional and procedural issues were addressed in the impeachment trials of President Bill Clinton and President Donald Trump, although the answers to some of these questions remain ambiguous. For example: • • • The impeachment process has been continued from one Congress to the next,73 although the procedural steps vary depending upon the stage in the process. The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment as “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”74 However, the meaning and scope of high Crimes and Misdemeanors remains in some dispute and depends on the interpretation of individual legislators.75 The Constitution provides for impeachment of the “President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States.”76 While the outer limit of the “civil Officers” language is not altogether clear, past precedents suggest that it covers at least federal judges and senior executive officers. Investigative Oversight77 This section provides an overview of some of the more common legal issues that committees may face in the course of conducting oversight and investigations. It begins by briefly describing the historical development of the legislative “power of inquiry” and follows with a general summary of Congress’s authority under the U.S. Constitution to perform oversight and investigations. It 69 U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. 7. See CRS Report R46185, The Impeachment Process in the Senate, by Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene. 70 While the Constitution does not speak to the vote threshold necessary for disqualification, this has been the practice of the Senate across history. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. 71 See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. In addition to the 21 instances identified in this report from 1789 to 2023, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas was impeached in February 2024. See H.Res. 863 (119th Congress). 72 See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. 73 For example, the House of Representatives impeached President Clinton on December 19, 1998, near the conclusion of the 105th Congress. Shortly after the 106th Congress convened on January 3, 1999, the Senate conducted a trial. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. 74 U.S. Const. art. II, §4. 75 CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey. 76 U.S. Const. art. II, §4. 77 This report is not intended to address all the legal issues that committees, Members, and staff may encounter when engaged in investigative activities. Congressional offices with legal questions on Congress’s investigatory powers may contact CRS legislative attorneys. Congressional Research Service 26 Congressional Oversight Manual then discusses the legal tools commonly used by congressional committees in conducting that oversight as well as the mechanisms used by Congress to enforce its demands for information. The section then briefly discusses possible legal limitations on the investigative power, including those arising from the Constitution, common law, and statutory restrictions. Historical Background The rich and varied history of legislative investigations, which can be traced from the English Parliament to American colonial legislatures and through to the U.S. Congress, has played a leading role in establishing the nature and contours of the congressional “power of inquiry.”78 This history supports the unmistakable conclusion that the power to investigate has long been considered an essential attribute of legislative bodies. It is difficult to identify with precision the emergence of Parliament’s protean investigatory powers. By the early 17th century however, Parliament had apparently recognized its power to investigate by requiring—on a case-by-case basis—the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents in furtherance of the body’s “duty to inquire into every Step of publick management.... ”79 These early investigations carried out by parliamentary committees focused on the king’s ministers, in order to oversee their execution of the law, as well as private parties.80 As the gathering of information relating to both the passage of new laws and the administration of existing laws became seen as an essential ingredient of the legislative process, compulsory investigatory powers were provided on a more general and permanent basis to established parliamentary committees of inquiry.81 This overarching historical notion of the power of inquiry as a necessary component of the legislative power was transported to America, where it was incorporated into the practice of colonial governments and, after independence, to U.S. state governments.82 The Constitutional Convention saw almost no discussion of Congress’s power to conduct oversight and investigations, although individual members of the convention appear to have understood Congress to clearly possess “inquisitorial” powers.83 A proposal to explicitly provide 78 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate.... ”). 79 13 R. CHANDLER, HISTORY & PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 172 (1743); ERNEST J. EBERLING, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 34 (1928) (noting that Parliament viewed the subpoena power as “too serious a matter for general delegation”). 80 James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 161–62 (1926). 81 Id. at 163–64. 82 Id. at 165–68 (highlighting examples of colonial and state legislatures engaging in investigations). While English Parliamentary practice often informs the powers of Congress, it is clear that the usefulness of parliamentary precedents in defining Congress’s investigatory powers is somewhat limited due to significant distinctions between the two legislative bodies. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested, Parliament’s investigatory and contempt powers were derived from the bodies’ authority to exercise a “blend[]” of both legislative and judicial powers. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 533 (1917) (concluding that the English contempt power “rested upon an assumed blending of legislative and judicial authority possessed by the Parliament”). Congress, under the separation of powers doctrine, exercises no judicial power. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192 (1880) (suggesting that “no judicial power is vested in the Congress”). Thus, unlike Parliament, any authority to investigate and subsequently enforce its orders must rest solely on legislative authority provided to the body by the Constitution. 83 See e.g., 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (1937) (remarks of George Mason) (Members of Congress “are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must meet (continued...) Congressional Research Service 27 Congressional Oversight Manual Congress with the power to punish for contempt—a power Parliament often used as a means to effectuate its investigatory powers—was made but not acted upon.84 Nevertheless, it is likely that the general view was that no express enumeration of the power of inquiry or the power to punish for contempt was considered necessary because the Framers’ conception of legislative power, based on centuries of consistent practice by both Parliament and colonial legislatures, included the ability to gather information relevant to the conduct of the House and Senate’s legislative functions.85 As one scholar has put it, the contemporary understanding of legislative power at the time of the adoption of the Constitution “possessed a content sufficiently broad to include the use of committees of inquiry with powers to send for persons and paper.”86 Long-standing and unbroken congressional practice confirms this view. Congress has exhibited a robust view of its own investigatory powers from its outset, especially in regard to the legislature’s role in overseeing the administration of government.87 During the First Congress, the House appointed five Members to investigate Senator Robert Morris’s prior activities as superintendent of finance under the Articles of Confederation.88 The House later established a special investigating committee in 1792 for the purpose of inquiring into Major General Arthur St. Clair’s disastrous military excursion into the Northwest Territory in which nearly 700 federal troops were killed by the Western Confederacy of American Indians.89 The act of authorizing such a committee set an important precedent in that adoption of the resolution was preceded by a debate over whether it was appropriate—and constitutional—for the House to investigate the matter or whether it was preferable to urge the President to carry out the inquiry.90 Although some asserted that the House lacked authority to inquire into executive operations, that position was defeated, and the investigating committee was established with clear authority to “call for such persons, papers and records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”91 The investigation itself also established important precedents for Congress’s authority to gather information from the executive branch, including in relation to sensitive military matters. After some discussion within Washington’s Cabinet of the President’s authority to withhold requested information from Congress, the special committee obtained documents from both the War Department and the Treasury Department as well as testimony from Cabinet officials Henry Knox and Alexander Hamilton.92 Congress also acted swiftly to use federal law and internal rules to strengthen its investigatory powers. In 1798, Congress enacted a statute recognizing its powers to not only obtain evidence through testimony but to do so from witnesses under oath.93 The statute specifically authorized frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices”); 3 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 219 (1804) (noting the traditional power of legislators to act as “grand inquisitors of the realm”). 84 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 80, at 340; JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 171 (2017). 85 Landis, supra note 77, at 169–70. 86 Id. at 169. 87 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444 (1960) (“The investigative function of [legislative] committees is as old as the Republic.”); EBERLING, supra note 76, at 33. 88 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1514 (1790); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 20 (1997) (“Thus, within a year of its first meeting, in the face of an explicit constitutional challenge, the House of Representatives flatly asserted a broad power to investigate the conduct of a former executive.... ”). 89 TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 17–19 (1974). 90 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490–94 (1792). 91 TAYLOR, supra note 86, at 22. 92 Id. at 23–24. 93 Act of May 3, 1798, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 554. Congressional Research Service 28 Congressional Oversight Manual the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and a chair of a select committee to administer oaths to witnesses testifying before Congress.94 During this same time period, both the House and the Senate began to delegate to ad hoc select committees the authority to call for papers or persons. Committee investigations have continued apace to the modern day, representing a pervasive and nearly ubiquitous aspect of the legislative function,95 as has Congress’s use of statutory provisions and internal chamber rules to support committee investigations. The investigatory power is therefore thoroughly rooted in history and stands on an equal footing with Congress’s other legislative powers.96 Constitutional Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigative Inquiries Although the “power of inquiry” was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has nonetheless described investigations as so central to the legislative function as to be implicit in Article I’s vesting of “legislative Powers” in the Congress.97 In the seminal case of McGrain v. Daugherty, a unanimous Supreme Court declared that “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”98 Congressional investigations are therefore properly characterized as an implied constitutional power of Congress.99 It is a power that serves both to ensure that Congress can make effective and informed legislative decisions and to check executive power, thereby sustaining Congress’s role in the United States’ constitutional scheme of separated powers.100 This power to gather information related to the legislative function is both critical in purpose, as Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information,” and extensive in scope, as Congress is empowered to obtain pertinent testimony and documents through investigations into nearly any matter properly before the body.101 In Eastland v. United States 94 Id. The power to administer oaths was expanded to all standing committee chairs in 1817. Act of Feb. 8, 1817, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 345. See also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 167 (1927). 95 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (noting that Congress has “assiduously” performed oversight “[f]rom the earliest times in its history”). 96 Id. at 187; WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (15th ed. 1913) (asserting that the “informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function”). See also J. William Fulbright, Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441 (1951) (describing the power of investigation as “perhaps the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative function”). 97 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (“The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”). 98 See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174. 99 Id.; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197 (concluding that the investigative power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process”). Although the Supreme Court has at times referred to the investigative power as an “inherent” power, id. at 187, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to it as an implied power. While an inherent power may not be tethered to a textual grant of authority, an implied power is derived by implication from an enumerated power. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2001). 100 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955) (“Without the power to investigate—including of course the authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively.”) (citations omitted). 101 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175 (“A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.”). Congress’s oversight function is subject to a variety of legal limitations. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“Although the power to investigate is necessarily broad it is not unlimited.... We have (continued...) Congressional Research Service 29 Congressional Oversight Manual Servicemen’s Fund, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that the “scope of [Congress’s] power of inquiry ... is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”102 Similarly, in Watkins v. United States, the Court emphasized that the “power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”103 “That power,” the Court established, “is broad” and “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”104 and “comprehends probes into departments of the federal government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.”105 Included within the scope of the power is the authority to initiate investigations, hold hearings, request testimony or documents from witnesses, and—in situations where either a government or private party is not forthcoming—compel compliance with congressional requests through the issuance and enforcement of subpoenas.106 The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed both the importance and breadth of Congress’s investigatory power in Trump v. Mazars.107 There, the Court observed, “Without information, Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively.’”108 As such, Congress’s investigatory powers must be understood to include “inquiries into the administration of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and ‘surveys of defects in our social, economic or political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.’”109 The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose Broad as the investigative power may be, it is not unlimited.110 The Supreme Court has cautioned that because the power to investigate derives from Article I’s grant of “legislative powers,” it may be exercised only “in aid of the legislative function.”111 No inquiry “is an end in itself” but instead “must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”112 The Supreme Court has generally implemented this principle by requiring that compulsory committee investigative actions—including subpoenas for documents or testimony—serve a valid legislative purpose. This “legislative purpose” requirement is generous, permitting investigations into any topic upon which legislation could be had or over which Congress may properly exercise authority.113 This made it clear [] that Congress is not invested with a ‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs.’ The subject of any inquiry always must be one ‘on which legislation could be had.’”) (citations omitted); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848, 862-63 (2020) (noting that the power to conduct investigations is “subject to several limitations” including those arising from “constitutional rights” [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3ARL30240. Public record. Not legal advice.