# Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR48364

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 23, 2025
- **Citation:** R48364

## Text

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent
Nuclear Fuel
January 23, 2025

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R48364

SUMMARY

Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent
Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear reactors generate about 20% of U.S. commercial electric power and almost half of the
nation’s low carbon electricity generation. However, nuclear reactors also produce highly
radioactive spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that results from the fission (splitting) of uranium nuclei in
the reactor fuel. SNF must be isolated from the environment for thousands of years to prevent
harm.

R48364
January 23, 2025
Lance N. Larson
Analyst in Environmental
Policy
Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy

About 91,000 metric tons of SNF is stored at nuclear plant sites around the United States,
awaiting consolidated storage and permanent underground disposal. The Nuclear Waste Policy
Act (P.L. 97-425), as amended, designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the only candidate site for a
national deep geologic repository for the disposal of SNF and other high-level nuclear waste. Political and legal opposition to
the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and operation of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.
Direct disposal of SNF, as currently planned in the United States, is called the “once through” fuel cycle. About 95% of SNF
consists of uranium from the fresh fuel that was originally loaded into the reactor and 1% consists of fissile plutonium
produced from irradiated uranium, both of which can be used in new fuel. The remaining 4% of SNF consists of highly
radioactive fragments of uranium and plutonium (fission products) that must be disposed of.
SNF can be reprocessed through chemical dissolution or melting to allow uranium and plutonium to be separated from the
fission products and made into new fuel. Repeated reprocessing of SNF is called the “closed cycle,” a major alternative to the
once-through cycle. Reprocessing is currently carried out in France, Russia, and a few other countries; however, there are no
commercial reprocessing operations in the United States. Reprocessed uranium and plutonium currently can be recycled only
once into new fuel for current reactor designs, as additional recycling would require advanced reactors, specifically fast
neutron reactors.
The United States developed technology for the reprocessing of SNF during World War II and for decades operated some of
the largest reprocessing facilities in the world, primarily for nuclear weapons material production purposes. Commercial
reprocessing activities in the United States ended during the 1970s and early 1980s because of rising costs and policy
concerns about the potential worldwide growth of stockpiles of weapons-usable plutonium.
Interest in reprocessing in the United States has renewed among some policymakers and stakeholders primarily because of its
potential for reducing the volume and toxicity of nuclear waste. In principle, indefinite reprocessing of SNF could eliminate
the need for permanent disposal of uranium and plutonium, which would be made into new fuel, and require permanent
disposal of only the fission products, which would be immobilized in glass or other insoluble materials. However, there are
potential waste-related disadvantages. The degree to which total waste volumes and long-lived toxicity would be reduced by
any future reprocessing and recycling remains uncertain—along with the costs—and largely dependent on future technology
development.
Congress has supported the Department of Energy’s reprocessing research and development program in recent years through
a funding authorization in the Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z of P.L. 116-260) and subsequent annual appropriations. The
Energy Act of 2020 and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58) authorized and appropriated more
than $2 billion for demonstrations of advanced reactors, including fast neutron reactors that could indefinitely recycle SNF
plutonium. In the 118th Congress, hearings on nuclear waste management and recycling were held in the House Energy and
Commerce and Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committees, and the House Appropriations Committee in report
language called for commercialization of reprocessing by 2033 (H.Rept. 118-580).

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Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
The U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle .................................................................................................... 2
Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel ......................................................................................... 4
Considerations for U.S. Reprocessing ............................................................................................. 5
U.S. Policy—History and Developments .................................................................................. 6
Nonproliferation ........................................................................................................................ 6
Regulatory Framework............................................................................................................ 10
Waste Management and Contaminant Remediation Issues ..................................................... 10
Economics ............................................................................................................................... 13
Congressional Action .................................................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle........................................................................................................... 3

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 16

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Considerations for Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Introduction
Nuclear reactors produce highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel (SNF) as a result of power
production. During reactor operation, some of the uranium in nuclear fuel is split (fissioned) to
produce energy. The resulting fission products are intensely radioactive and thermally hot. Some
of the uranium also is converted to plutonium. After several years, reactor fuel can no longer
efficiently sustain a nuclear chain reaction and is placed into storage as SNF.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,1 as amended, designated Yucca Mountain, NV, as the only
location where the Department of Energy (DOE) could construct a national high-level nuclear
waste repository for the permanent disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive waste. Political
and legal opposition to the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and
operation of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. As a result, currently SNF is stored at the
nuclear power plant where it was produced.
Reprocessing refers generally to the technical process of extracting uranium, plutonium, and
certain other elements from the SNF to be used as new fuel. Advocates of reprocessing cite two
major potential benefits: (1) extracting and reusing the fissile material (uranium-235 and
plutonium-239)2 to take advantage of the potential embedded energy value remaining after the
nuclear fuel has been “burned”3 and removed from a nuclear reactor, and (2) reducing the longlived radioactivity of nuclear waste to facilitate disposal options.
The United States developed technology for the reprocessing of SNF during World War II and for
decades operated some of the largest reprocessing facilities in the world to produce plutonium for
nuclear weapons. From 1966 to 1972, a reprocessing plant operated in West Valley, NY, to
separate uranium and plutonium for commercial reactor fuel. However, commercial reprocessing
was subsequently abandoned in the United States because of high costs and concerns about
nuclear weapons proliferation. Other countries, such as France, the United Kingdom, and Russia,
operate commercial reprocessing plants. Interest in reprocessing efforts in the United States has
renewed among some policymakers and stakeholders due to considerations pertaining to
alternative solutions for the management of high-level nuclear waste and the development of
“advanced” nuclear reactors, some of which would include a fuel cycle supported by reprocessed
SNF.
Some have argued for Congress to support reprocessing operations as an option to eliminate or
decrease the volume of nuclear waste required for a permanent repository, as well as to utilize
fuel that could be produced from SNF. On the other hand, others may argue that reprocessing
could lead to increased proliferation risks, waste management and disposal issues, and
1 P.L. 97-425, 42 U.S.C. §§10101 et seq.
2 In addition to these fissile materials, a variety of isotopes that are used in medical, industrial testing and scientific

activities can be extracted through chemical separations from spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In addition to producing energy
by reusing the fissile material, reusing the isotopes takes advantage of the energy and money invested in the original
front end of the nuclear fuel cycle for activities from mining, processing, and enrichment to create the fresh nuclear
fuel.
3 While the term burn is often used to refer to fission in a reactor, and the term high burnup reactors refers to the
process of increasingly making more efficient use of uranium, no combustion occurs and no combustion products (e.g.,
carbon dioxide [CO2], sulfur oxides [SOx], nitrogen oxides [NOx], or particulates) are emitted directly from nuclear
power production. Also, the reason for removing nuclear fuel from a reactor is not primarily the burnup or loss of
fission products (e.g., U-235), but rather the buildup of fission products that absorb neutrons and decrease the fuel’s
ability to generate heat cost-effectively. Much of the U-235, and hence the potential energy value, that is put into a
reactor as fresh fuel is later taken out as spent fuel, along with newly created fissile materials, such as plutonium, and
fission products that result from the splitting of uranium and plutonium nuclei. Reprocessing separates out these fission
products from fissile materials that can be reused for nuclear fuel.

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uncertainties about costs. This report describes reprocessing in the context of the nuclear fuel
cycle and provides general considerations regarding U.S. policy, nonproliferation, the regulatory
framework, waste management and disposal, environmental concerns, and economics. The final
section discusses recent congressional action involving reprocessing, high-level waste
management, and advanced reactors.

Background
The U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The U.S. nuclear fuel cycle includes the process of extracting uranium from the earth, enriching
the uranium to increase the concentration of the fissile form of uranium (U-235), fabricating the
enriched uranium into fuel rod assemblies capable of being used in nuclear reactors for generating
electric power, and managing the resulting SNF. Commercial civilian nuclear reactors in the
United States use low-enriched uranium (LEU) oxide fuel assemblies to generate nuclear power
through fission reactions.4 The fuel rods are bundled into fuel assemblies for placement in the
reactor core. These assemblies facilitate a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction that generates
heat, which is used to drive turbines to produce electric power. Approximately every 18-24
months, the reactor fuel becomes incapable of economically producing power and must be
replaced (i.e., it is considered “spent”). Fuel assemblies removed from the reactor following
power production are called SNF.5

4 Natural uranium has an isotopic composition of approximately 0.71% U-235, the fissile isotope of uranium. Civilian

nuclear power fuel is generally enriched to 3%-5% U-235. Until 2013, uranium enrichment in the United States was
largely performed using a gaseous diffusion technology. Currently, one uranium enrichment plant, which employs gas
centrifuge technology, operates in the United States.
5 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, defines SNF as the fuel assemblies “withdrawn from a nuclear
reactor following irradiation.” 42 U.S.C. §10101.

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Figure 1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel - Congressional Action Needed to
Break Impasse and Develop a Permanent Disposal Solution, GAO-21-603, 2021.

SNF is currently stored in one of two ways: in storage pools or dry casks. Immediately following
power production, SNF is discharged from the reactors and stored in pools of water on-site, as it
remains intensely radioactive and thermally hot. Wet pools provide regulated conditions allowing
the fuel to cool, while water is circulated and maintained to keep it from boiling off and
uncovering the fuel. In dry cask storage, the SNF is stored in sealed, steel canisters surrounded by
radiation shielding materials, such as steel, concrete, or other materials. Wet storage capacity for
SNF can be limited, prompting most reactor sites to store SNF using a combination of wet storage
and dry casks.6 As of December 2022, 91,000 metric tons of SNF were stored in the United
States, mostly at nuclear power plant sites, increasing by about 2,200 metric tons per year.7
The U.S. nuclear power industry is considered an “open fuel cycle” or “once-through fuel cycle,”
as new uranium as fuel must be mined and processed to replace the nuclear fuel used in reactors.
The once-through fuel cycle uses only a fraction of the 0.7% of U-235 found in natural uranium,
plus a small fraction of the dominant isotope U-238 that is converted to plutonium during reactor
operation. The vast majority of the initially mined uranium is planned for disposal.
In a “closed fuel cycle,” reprocessing of SNF would extract uranium, plutonium, and certain other
elements from the SNF to be used as new fuel. Plutonium is a particularly important fissile
6 In dry storage, spent fuel is placed in sealed containers filled with inert gas and cooled by natural air circulation. For

more information, see CRS Report RL33461, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal, by Mark Holt.
7 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Spent Nuclear Fuel and Reprocessing Waste Inventory, December 2024,
https://curie.pnnl.gov/system/files/
SNF%20and%20Rep%20Waste%20Inventory%20PNNL%2033938%20Rev.%201.1_0.pdf.

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material that can be used in nuclear reactor fuel instead of enriched uranium. Proponents of a
closed fuel cycle assert this cycle could continue indefinitely and be used to fuel some advanced
reactors so that only relatively short-lived fission products would need permanent disposal.8
High-level waste from reprocessing would initially be similar to spent fuel in heat and
radioactivity but would decay to near background levels after several hundred years because
plutonium and other long-lived radioactive materials would be removed and used as new fuel. In
addition, proponents assert the closed fuel cycle could extract from the fuel many times the
amount of energy that could be produced with the once-through cycle.9

Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel
In general, reprocessing of SNF involves separating uranium, plutonium, and minor actinides10
from the SNF for reuse in other purposes, such as nuclear warhead production or fuel for further
civilian use. Because separated plutonium is one of two materials that can be used to make a
nuclear weapon (the other being enriched uranium), international controls on spent fuel
reprocessing are a fundamental element in weapons nonproliferation policy. The United States
has long sought to discourage additional countries from building reprocessing facilities. The U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) defines reprocessing as “the processes used to separate
spent nuclear reactor fuel into nuclear materials that may be recycled for use in new fuel and
material that would be discarded as waste.”11
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), all commercial reprocessing facilities
operating in five other countries use the PUREX (plutonium-uranium extraction) technique,
although with some variation depending upon the fuel cycle needs.12 In general, the PUREX
technique involves a series of processing steps, including dissolving the SNF in nitric acid;
chemically separating uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) using various organic solvent extraction
methods; and finally converting the Pu and U to respective powder forms, plutonium oxide
(PuO2) and uranium oxide (UO2). In part to address issues experienced with potentially harmful
environmental releases, proliferation vulnerability, and costs, other reprocessing technologies
have been proposed, such as UREX (uranium extraction only) and UREX+,13 that would not fully
separate plutonium.14 Additionally, researchers have examined other reprocessing techniques,
such as pyroprocessing and electrometallurgical refining.15 Not all such processes for recycling
8 Argonne National Laboratory, Nuclear Fuel Recycling Could Offer Plentiful Energy, 2012, https://www.anl.gov/

article/nuclear-fuel-recycling-could-offer-plentiful-energy.
9 For example, see World Nuclear Association, “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/
information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.
10 Actinides are a group of elements on the periodic table from mass number 89 (actinium) to 103 (lawrencium). In the
context of SNF, minor actinides are typically americium, neptunium, and curium.
11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Reprocessing, https://www.nrc.gov/materials/reprocessing.html#background.
12 The World Nuclear Association (WNA) identifies five countries with facilities capable of commercial reprocessing:
France, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, and India. WNA, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, updated 2020,
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.
13 There have been many different proposed UREX+ designs with various products and waste streams. See ibid.
14 M. C. Regalbuto, “Alternative Separation and Extraction: UREX+ Processes for Actinide and Targeted Fission
Product Recovery,” in Advanced Separation Techniques for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste
Treatment (Woodhead Publishing, 2011).
15 World Nuclear Association, “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel,” updated December 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/
information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx. See section on
“Electrometallurgical ‘Pyroprocessing.’” Additional discussion of reprocessing technology can be found in Section
4.3.6 of National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM), Merits and Viability of Different
(continued...)

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SNF would result in fully separated plutonium, which is a weapons-usable material.16 If
plutonium is not fully separated from the highly radioactive fission products in SNF, it is
generally considered less attractive to be used as weapons material.
The volume and radiotoxicity of waste products from reprocessing depends on the separation
process employed, which affects both the extent to which SNF is separated and the degree of
transmutation17 of critical components.18 In general, the waste liquid remaining after reprocessing
SNF and separating Pu and U (which make up about 97% of the spent fuel) is considered highlevel waste (HLW), which is highly radioactive and thermally hot. The liquid HLW contains the
highly radioactive fission products and minor actinides that constituted about 3% of the spent fuel
before it was reprocessed.19 This liquid waste can be conditioned with certain dry materials in
order to convert (i.e., vitrify) it into a more stable borosilicate glass for long-term management.
U.S. reprocessing plants associated with defense activities stored liquid HLW in large
underground tanks where treatment and disposal remain pending. Data on existing waste
treatment technologies are available from currently operating plants such as DOE’s large HLW
glassification (i.e. vitrification) facility at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina (Defense
Waste Processing Facility), which started operating in 1996.
A 2023 study from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (referred to
in this report as the “NASEM study”)20 noted that reprocessing generates a wide variety of waste
streams: “Some of these waste streams are captured in waste forms for disposal in low-level
waste disposal facilities or a geologic repository, while others are released to the environment
either in liquid or gaseous forms.”21 For a future commercial reprocessing facility, any degree of
risk from emissions would be dependent upon NRC regulations governing these operations, and
compliance with those regulations.

Considerations for U.S. Reprocessing
The following sections discuss considerations associated with developing commercial
reprocessing operations in the United States. As noted above, reprocessing operations exist in five
other countries, but not in the United States. These sections provide general considerations
regarding U.S. policy, nonproliferation, the regulatory framework, waste management and
disposal, environmental concerns, and costs. These sections do not intend to address the technical
and/or economic viability of any proposed reprocessing or advanced reactor designs, nor do they
assume that any future reprocessing operations could not address these considerations.

Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023,
https://doi.org/10.17226/26500.
16 National Research Council, Review of DOE’s Nuclear Energy Research and Development Program, Washington,
DC, 2008, pp. 48-49.
17 Transmutation is a change in number of protons or neutrons in an atomic nucleus through nuclear reactions or
nuclear decay.
18 M. C. Regalbuto, “Alternative Separation and Extraction: UREX+ Processes for Actinide and Targeted Fission
Product Recovery,” in Advanced Separation Techniques for Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste
Treatment (Woodhead Publishing, 2011).
19 World Nuclear Association, Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel, 2020, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/
nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/processing-of-used-nuclear-fuel.aspx.
20 NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of
Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500.
21 See ibid., p. 136.

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U.S. Policy—History and Developments
U.S. policies that support commercial reprocessing have varied since reprocessing activities
began for defense activities during World War II. Fissile materials were first produced by the U.S.
government by enriching natural uranium to uranium-235 (Oak Ridge, TN) and reprocessing
irradiated uranium fuel and separating out the plutonium (Hanford, WA) during World War II
under the Manhattan Project.
In the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA), Congress defined “fissionable materials” to include
plutonium, uranium-235, and other materials determined to be capable of releasing substantial
quantities of energy through nuclear fission.22 Congress amended the AEA in 1954 to define
“special nuclear material” to supplant “fissionable materials,” and included uranium-233, material
determined to be special nuclear material, and any artificially enriched material.23 Additionally,
the AEA of 1954 authorized the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to license commercial
nuclear reactors and eased restrictions on private companies using special nuclear materials. The
U.S. government held the title to any special nuclear materials used or produced at a licensed U.S.
facility.
Interest in commercial reprocessing of SNF began in the 1950s. In 1966, the AEC granted a
commercial reprocessing permit to Nuclear Fuel Services for the West Valley facility, near
Buffalo, NY. The facility operated until 1972 when it shut down for upgrades to meet stricter
regulatory requirements and never operated again.24 During operation, 2,500 cubic meters (m3) of
HLW was produced, stored, and later vitrified.25 During roughly the same time, other commercial
reprocessing operations were proposed or partially constructed, but never operated.26

Nonproliferation
The reprocessing of SNF results in at least the partial separation of plutonium, a key material in
nuclear weapons. As a result, concern about nuclear weapons proliferation throughout the world
is a major element in the debate over reprocessing policy. Light water nuclear reactors (LWRs)—
the type of all commercial nuclear reactors operating in the United States—create plutonium
during operation when uranium-238 absorbs neutrons and undergoes radioactive decay to become
plutonium-239. Thus, SNF removed from a reactor includes various plutonium and uranium
isotopes. This plutonium poses relatively low proliferation risk unless it is separated from fission
products.27 Once separated through reprocessing, the plutonium could be used to produce fuel for
LWRs; fast neutron breeder reactors; or nuclear warheads, provided the availability of technical
expertise and specialized facilities.28 The 2023 NASEM study noted that “fuel cycles involving
22 P.L. 79-585.
23 P.L. 83-703.
24 Congressional Budget Office, Nuclear Reprocessing and Proliferation: Alternative Approaches and their

Implications for the Federal Budget, May 1977.
25 Qin-Hong Hu et al., “Sources of Anthropogenic Radionuclides in the Environment: A Review,” Journal of
Environmental Radioactivity (2010).
26 General Electric proposed a reprocessing plant at Morris, IL, and Allied-General Nuclear Services began
construction at a facility in Barnwell, SC.
27 National Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium (Washington, DC: The
National Academies Press, 1994), https://doi.org/10.17226/2345. The report proposed a “Spent Fuel Standard” as a
basis for comparing the risks to the fissile material “self-protected” in a spent fuel rod.
28 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of
Reactor-Grade Plutonium, https://www.osti.gov/opennet/forms?formurl=document/press/pc29.html; DOE,
(continued...)

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reprocessing and separation of fissile material that could be weapons usable pose greater
proliferation and terrorism risks than the once-through uranium fuel cycle with direct disposal of
spent fuel, as the separated fissile material would not be uniformly mixed with highly radioactive
fission products.”29 International safeguards against diversion of plutonium and enriched uranium
for weapons, as discussed below, can be a means of reducing proliferation risk.
Existing global stockpiles of plutonium and uranium, which are substantial, also pose a
proliferation concern. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, as of December
31, 2022, the global stockpile of separated plutonium was 560 metric tons (MT), of which 140
MT was available for weapons.30 The remaining 420 MT of plutonium stockpiles were
characterized as not suitable for weapons, because they were produced outside of weapon
programs, covered by obligations prohibiting the use in weapons, or not directly suitable for
weapons.31 The largest stockpiles of plutonium available for weapons were generally in countries
where reprocessing has occurred for defense or commercial purposes: Russia (88.0 MT), the
United States (38.4 MT), the United Kingdom (3.2 MT), France (6.0 MT), and China (2.9 MT).
Global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were 1,245 MT as of December 31, 2022,
and mostly located in Russia (55%) and the United States (39%), with lesser amounts held in
other countries.
These existing stockpiles of plutonium and HEU can be regarded as both an energy resource for
nuclear power plant reactor fuel as well as a liability due to the storage costs and proliferation
risk. A variety of domestic and international systems and institutions provide safeguards for these
stockpiles.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 to ensure that civilian
nuclear facilities and materials, such as those related to reprocessing, are not diverted for military
uses.32 Safeguards are designed to enable the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material
from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons uses.33 Increasing the stockpiles of separated fissile
materials through reprocessing would likely increase the requirements for IAEA technical staff
“Plutonium: The First 50 Years,” DOE/DP-0137, 1996; and Gregory S. Jones, “Reactor-Grade Plutonium and Nuclear
Weapons: Ending the Debate,” Nonproliferation Review, vol. 26 (2019), pp. 1-2, 61-81, https://doi.org/10.1080/
10736700.2019.1603497.
29 NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of
Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 13.
30 International Panel on Fissile Materials, Fissile Material Stocks, https://fissilematerials.org/#:~:text=
Fissile%20material%20stocks&text=
The%20global%20stockpile%20of%20separated,not%20directly%20suitable%20for%20weapons. Different countries
have different criteria for determining what material are available for weapons.
31 See ibid.
32 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an autonomous intergovernmental organization that has a
relationship agreement with the United Nations, has 172 member states, including the United States. The agency’s
missions include promoting nuclear power, nuclear safety, nuclear security, and nuclear technology for medical and
agricultural purposes, as well as implementing safeguards agreements in more than 180 countries.
33 IAEA safeguards are designed “to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material
and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses” (IAEA, The Safeguards System of the
International Atomic Energy Agency). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) requires nonnuclear-weapon states
parties to conclude comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. Such agreements apply safeguards “on all nuclear
material in all nuclear activities in a State” (IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International Nuclear
Verification Series No. 3). The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. All other countries are not nuclear weapon states. See also CRS Report
R41910, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth D.
Nikitin, and Mark Holt.

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and other resources to maintain these safeguards. The IAEA recognized in 2021 that it was
addressing a “growing gap between demand and resources … [with] increasing demands on the
Agency for support.”34
While domestic and international safeguards are intended to prevent the diversion of a sufficient
quantity and quality of fissile materials to fabricate a nuclear explosive device, some have
expressed concerns that these materials may be obtained by a politically unstable state or a
terrorist organization—a well-financed organization with the ability to hire or recruit the
necessary abilities to create a nuclear explosive device—if domestic reprocessing were to lack
sufficiently high security measures. Furthermore, reprocessing plants would require a high level
of security, with associated increased costs, to safeguard the materials stored at the facility.35
Another long-standing concern has been the policy signal potentially sent to other countries if the
United States resumes reprocessing. Any proposal to resume commercial reprocessing in the
United States to make reactor fuel may raise concerns about an increase in global commerce in
fissile material and undermine long-standing U.S. policy to discourage the development of
reprocessing and enrichment capacity in non-nuclear-weapon states.36
The use of plutonium-based fuel in nuclear power plants has been a recurring congressional issue.
When Congress deliberated funding for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) in 2008
(see “Reprocessing Policy History, In Brief” below), the House committee report accompanying
the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008, expressed
concern that too many GNEP partner countries wanted to be nuclear fuel suppliers (producing
enriched uranium and plutonium fuel for domestic use and export) rather than recipients.
According to the report,
At the recent DOE-sponsored international ministerial meeting on GNEP, the
Administration abandoned any pretext that GNEP will promote international nuclear
nonproliferation by relenting to partner demands that “partnership” countries can continue
to produce weapons-usable plutonium in their reprocessing activities. The Committee is
disappointed that the Administration would support any effort that leads to increased
availability of plutonium anywhere in the world.37

Reprocessing Policy History, In Brief
When the commercial nuclear power industry was under development in the 1950s and 1960s by the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, it was widely expected that SNF from power reactors would be reprocessed to separate the
remaining uranium and plutonium for new fuel. With up to 1,000 reactors expected to be built in the United
States by the end of the 20th century, reprocessing was considered essential for making the maximum use of what
were believed to be limited uranium resources. Early reactors were designed with relatively small spent fuel pools
to hold discharged SNF until it could be shipped to a commercial reprocessing plant. However, India’s diversion of
reprocessed plutonium from its nuclear power program to produce a nuclear explosive device in 1974 generated
worldwide controversy about the future expansion of commercial reprocessing, including in the United States.
In 1976, President Ford announced that “the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless
there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of
proliferation ... [and] that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce

34 IAEA, The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2022–2023, GC(65)/(2), 2021.
35 Mark Hibbs and Fred McGoldrick, “A Realistic and Effective Policy on Sensitive Nuclear Activities,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2013/10/a-realistic-and-effectivepolicy-on-sensitive-nuclear-activities?lang=en.
36 CRS Report RL34234, Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to
Nuclear Power, coordinated by Mary Beth D. Nikitin.
37 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008,
committee print, 110th Cong., H.Rept. 110-185 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 67.

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plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and
recycling in the future only if they are found to be consistent with our international objectives.” The following
year, President Carter announced a shift in policy: “We will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and
recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs.” In 1981, President Reagan announced that
he “was lifting the indefinite ban which previous administrations placed on commercial reprocessing activities in
the United States.” At the same time, however, federal funding for a commercial reprocessing plant in South
Carolina was terminated, and the project was abandoned.
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush announced in a statement on nuclear nonproliferation,
I have set forth today a set of principles to guide our nonproliferation efforts in the years ahead and
directed a number of steps to supplement our existing efforts. These steps include a decision not to
produce plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes and a number of
proposals to strengthen international actions against those who contribute to the spread of weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.
In 1993, President Clinton announced, “The United States does not encourage the civil use of plutonium and,
accordingly, does not itself engage in plutonium reprocessing for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive
purposes. The United States, however, will maintain its existing commitments regarding the use of plutonium in
civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.”
President George W. Bush in 2006 proposed to establish the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) with the
goal of addressing issues of nuclear proliferation and nuclear waste. Through the GNEP, countries with nuclear
fuel infrastructure, including the United States, would have supplied nuclear fuel and technologies to countries
without nuclear power capabilities. In turn, the countries using nuclear power would agree to return the SNF,
which would be reprocessed in the original country and be used as a source of fuel for reactors. In DOE’s
description, this aspect of GNEP would be nonproliferative because participating countries would be forgoing their
own enrichment and/or separations activities.
In 2009, President Obama ended work on the previous Administration’s programmatic environmental impact
statement for GNEP. The program was transformed into the International Framework for Nuclear Energy
Cooperation (IFNEC) under the Obama Administration and has continued as an international fuel cycle forum.
More recently, DOE continues to carry out reprocessing operations at various defense sites to manage SNF. For
commercial nuclear power plants, however, the 2023 NASEM study recommended that “the current U.S. policy of
using a once-through fuel cycle with the direct disposal of commercial spent nuclear fuel into a repository should
continue for the foreseeable future,” but also that “DOE should develop and implement a phased, long-range
research and development program that focuses on advanced separations and transmutations technologies.”
Sources:
•

U.S. President Gerald Ford, Presidential Documents, vol. 12, no. 44 (1976), pp. 1626-1627.

•

U.S. President Jimmy Carter, “Nuclear Power, Policy Statement by the President on His Decisions Following
a Review of U.S. Policy,” Presidential Documents, vol. 13, no. 15 (April 7, 1977).

•

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, “Announcing a Series of Policy Initiatives on Nuclear Energy,” October 8,
1981, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-announcing-series-policy-initiatives-nuclearenergy.

•

U.S. President George H. W. Bush, “Statement on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts,” Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: George H.W. Bush, 1992, Book I, pp. 1110-1111.

•

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy,”
September 27, 1993.

•

U.S. Department of Energy, Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan, GNEP-167312, 2007,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/GNEPStrategicPlanJan2007.pdf.

•

Geoff Brumfiel, “US Nuclear Recycling Faces the Axe,” Nature, July 2, 2009.

•

International Framework for Nuclear Cooperation website, https://www.ifnec.org/ifnec/jcms/j_6/home.

•

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Spent Nuclear Fuel Management,
Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Mission for H-Canyon, at the Savannah River Site,” 87 Federal Register 23504,
April 4, 2022.

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•

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles
and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects of Advanced Nuclear Reactors (Washington, DC: The National
Academies Press, 2023), p. 85.

Regulatory Framework
As discussed above, no commercial reprocessing facilities are currently operating in the United
States. If such a facility were proposed, it would be required to obtain an NRC license under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and would need to adhere to any other applicable
federal permitting requirements.38 The NRC has only regulated a single operational commercial
reprocessing facility, at West Valley, NY, which operated from 1966 to 1972. In June 2007, the
NRC commissioners directed NRC staff to conduct a regulatory gap analysis and identify
regulatory requirements necessary to license reprocessing facilities.39 In 2013, NRC staff
recommended a rulemaking for reprocessing facilities based on the findings of the gap analysis.
The rulemaking activities were suspended in 2016 due to “budgetary constraints and an apparent
lack of commercial interest in reprocessing.”40 On July 28, 2021, NRC discontinued the
rulemaking activity for spent fuel reprocessing “based on the estimated costs to conduct the
rulemaking and the limited interest expressed or expected from industry to submit an application
for any type of facility involving reprocessing technologies in the near-term.”41 NRC estimated
the rulemaking would cost $2.5 million to complete, and did not anticipate reviewing a license
application for a reprocessing facility within 10-20 years. In the event that commercial
reprocessing license applications are submitted to NRC prior to implementation of new
reprocessing regulations, the NRC stated it would license those facilities under current
regulations, typically used for licensing of nuclear reactors.42
On December 29, 2022, Oklo Inc. contacted NRC to begin pre-application activities to seek a
license for a commercial-scale spent fuel reprocessing facility.43 Reportedly, Oklo is working with
Argonne National Laboratory to develop electrorefining technology and to use spent fuel
elements to produce new nuclear fuel.44

Waste Management and Contaminant Remediation Issues
Reprocessing of SNF for defense and civilian uses in the past has resulted in extensive
environmental contamination and waste management challenges, particularly the treatment and
disposal of stored HLW. Thus, the management and disposal of wastes from future reprocessing
would be an important consideration for the operation of these facilities. While reprocessing SNF
would change the nature and composition of the nuclear waste, this option would raise multiple
technical, legal, and policy considerations regarding the long-term management and disposal
waste produced from reprocessing operations. Under current law, wastes produced from
38 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq.
39 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Staff Requirements—SECY-07-0081—Regulatory Options for Licensing

Facilities Associated with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), ML071800084, 2007.
40 Nuclear Energy Institute, NEI Comments on Spent Fuel Reprocessing Rulemaking, ML20154K554, 2020.
41 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Spent Fuel Reprocessing,” 86 Federal Register 40764, 2021.
42 See 10 C.F.R. Part 50 - “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.”
43 Oklo, Oklo Inc. Licensing Project Plan: Fuel Recycling Technologies (Initial), 2022,
https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML22363A080.
44 Jeff Beattie, “Eight Months After NRC’s Rejection, Oklo Applies Again to License Microreactor,” Nucleonics Week,
2022, p. 3.

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reprocessing would still require disposal in a permanent geologic repository at Yucca Mountain,
NV. This section discusses the history of the environmental problems resulting from past
reprocessing as well as technologies and regulations to reduce environmental risk at future
reprocessing plants.
U.S. government reprocessing facilities during and following World War II generally operated
prior to the establishment of regulatory requirements for nuclear waste management. Thus, the
ongoing remediation and waste management operations at sites where reprocessing activities
occurred in support of nuclear weapons production in the United States may not be analogous to
potential impacts of future commercial reprocessing operations. Historical activities at many of
these facilities resulted in the contamination of various soil, surface water, and groundwater.
Much of the understanding of the potential environmental impacts from the production of HLW
from reprocessing have stemmed from operational experiences at reprocessing facilities for U.S.
nuclear weapons production during and after World War II. Generally, the DOE Office of
Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for remediating these types of sites. The nature
of contaminants, areas affected, environmental and ecological issues, and remedial actions vary
widely at DOE-EM sites.45 Many of these DOE-EM sites require environmental remediation
activities that will remain ongoing for decades, and require long-term stewardship in perpetuity,
currently undertaken by DOE’s Office of Legacy Management, after the remedial activities are
complete. State and federal regulations for future commercial reprocessing facilities, and the
management of the associated wastes, would be required to prevent or minimize similar potential
impacts.
DOE manages HLW resulting from reprocessing SNF, generally from the historical production of
nuclear warheads. In the United States, some DOE-owned or -managed sites maintain HLW
inventories from reprocessing SNF, as well as material shipped there from commercial power
reactors in limited circumstances. In some instances, these DOE sites may store various types of
HLW and SNF.46 At these sites, DOE has vitrified some liquid HLW to be stored on-site until it
can be permanently disposed of in a future geologic repository. At some DOE sites, such as
Hanford, WA, and Savannah River Site, SC, considerable amounts of HLW remain in liquid form.
According to the Government Accountability Office,
DOE oversees the treatment and disposal of about 54 million gallons of radioactive and
hazardous waste at the Hanford Site in Washington State. Before treating the tank waste,
DOE plans to separate it into two streams: (1) a high-activity portion, which DOE estimates
will contain about 5 percent of the volume but more than 70 percent of the radioactivity;
and (2) a low-activity portion, which will contain about 95 percent of the volume.47

Additionally, the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board estimates the volume of vitrified HLW
to increase from 3,200 m3 to 26,300 m3 from 2012 to 2048.48

45 For examples, see F. W. Whicker et al., “Avoiding Destructive Remediation at DOE Sites,” Science, vol. 303, no.

5664 (2004); Joana Burger et al., “Assessing Ecological Resources for Remediation and Future Land Uses on
Contaminated Lands,” Environmental Management, vol. 34 (2004); Mark J. Peterson, Rebecca A. Efroymson, and S.
Marshall Adams, “Long-Term Biological Monitoring of an Impaired Stream: Synthesis and Environmental
Management Implications,” Environmental Management, vol. 47 (2011); Joanna Burger et al., “Role of Uncertainties
in Protecting Ecological Resources During Remediation and Restoration,” Journal of Toxicology and Environmental
Health, Part A, vol. 84, no. 12 (2021).
46 CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson.
47 Government Accountability Office, Hanford Cleanup: DOE Should Validate Its Analysis of High-Level Waste
Treatment Alternatives, GAO-23-106093, May 2023, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106093.pdf.
48 U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Six Overarching Recommendations for How to Move the Nation’s
Nuclear Waste Management Program Forward: A Report to the U.S. Congress and the Secretary of Energy, 2021.

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The origin of radioactive waste, rather than its radiologic characteristics, often determines its
classification and disposal requirements. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA)49 defines SNF as
being “withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation”50 and HLW as “highly radioactive
material from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.”51 Although they are quite different technically,
both fall under the broader definition of “high-level radioactive waste.”52 SNF is sometimes
referred to as “used” nuclear fuel.
The NWPA authorized DOE to site a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of SNF and
HLW. Congress amended the NWPA in 1987 to designate Yucca Mountain as the only location to
be considered by DOE to construct a national high-level nuclear waste repository. Political and
legal opposition to the project has indefinitely delayed the licensing, construction, and operation
of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. NWPA authorized DOE to enter into agreements with
nuclear utilities and other reactor owners to collect fees to pay for DOE’s disposal of the SNF.
However, because DOE had not begun operating a permanent repository as required by NWPA,
the federal government has paid roughly $10.6 billion to nuclear utilities and other reactor owners
pursuant to court settlements and final judgments as of September 30, 2023.53 Under current law,
without the availability of a long-term geologic repository or consolidated interim storage facility,
all SNF and HLW will remain on site at 80 facilities in the United States, which are
predominantly commercial nuclear power plants and DOE facilities.54
One of the main intended benefits of SNF reprocessing would be to decrease or eliminate the
disposal of plutonium, uranium, and long-lived fission products in the SNF. Some research
indicates that reprocessing SNF would decrease the surface footprint and volume required for a
geologic repository, as well as reduce the overall radiotoxicity of certain waste forms intended for
repository disposal.55 The degree to which reprocessing could affect the total required HLW
storage would depend on the types of reprocessing technologies employed and the waste
characterizations. Nevertheless, studies have generally found that any fuel cycle concept would
require some form of waste management in a geologic repository.
In the United States, wastes produced by commercial reprocessing would be regulated by NRC
under the AEA. HLW produced from reprocessing may include a mix of radiological and
chemical constituents. Depending upon the type of operation and the wastes produced, the facility
may require permitting under other federal environmental laws, such as the Clean Air Act or the
Clean Water Act. Discharges or emissions into the environment would also be subject to the terms
of the NRC license and other federal permits, and the federal agency issuing the license or permit
would be responsible for enforcing compliance with those requirements. The extent to which a
release of constituents would affect the environment would depend on the nature of the
49 P.L. 97-425.
50 42 U.S.C. §10101(23).
51 42 U.S.C. §10101(12).
52 See 42 U.S.C. §10101(23), 10 C.F.R. §60.2, 10 C.F.R. §63.2, and 40 C.F.R. §197.2. Under 42 U.S.C. §10101(12):

The term “high-level radioactive waste” means—
(A) the highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, including
liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid
waste that contains fission products in sufficient concentrations; and
(B) other highly radioactive material that the Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule
requires permanent isolation.
53 U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, FY2023.
54 CRS In Focus IF11201, Nuclear Waste Storage Sites in the United States, by Lance N. Larson.
55 Robin Taylor et al., “A Review of Environmental and Economic Implications of Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Part One Wastes and Environmental Impacts,” Energies, vol. 15, no. 1433 (2022).

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constituents, the duration of the release, the amount of the release, and the location of the
incident, among other factors.
In addition to the potential benefits described above, some stakeholders contend another benefit
of reprocessing may be the reduced need for uranium production and the associated
environmental impacts. For example, the 2023 NASEM study found that the “main advantage” of
SNF reprocessing and recycling of uranium and plutonium “is the conservation of uranium
resources at the front end of the fuel cycle and the associated reduction in the environmental
impact of uranium mining.”56

Economics
Economic costs and benefits are an important consideration for private and public investments in
commercial reprocessing. Currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants have faced economic
challenges due to increasing competition from power plants using natural gas and renewable
energy.57 For commercial reprocessing to be economically viable, it would need to produce
nuclear reactor fuel (made with reprocessed plutonium and/or uranium) at a price competitive
with existing uranium fuel, or reduce nuclear plants’ waste management costs. Given the
economic challenges already faced by some U.S. nuclear power plants and uncertainties
regarding costs of reprocessing, government policy interventions may be necessary for
commercial reprocessing to be economically viable.
In 2003, a Harvard University study concluded that reprocessing “will be more expensive than
direct disposal of spent fuel until the uranium price reaches over $360 per kilogram of uranium
(kgU)58—a price that is not likely to be seen for many decades, if then.”59 Furthermore, that study
argued that its findings may be conservative, as the study did not include other potential costs
associated with reprocessing, such as costs for storage of separated plutonium or removal of
americium, additional security, licensing and shutdown costs, and geologic disposal of spent
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel.60 The principal author of the study reiterated those findings in a 2021
presentation to the NASEM Committee on Advanced Reactors and Fuel Cycles, contending that a
kilogram of plutonium fuel would cost six times as much as a kilogram of conventional uranium
fuel.61

56 See NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects

of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 158.
57 Steve Clemmer et al., The Nuclear Power Dilemma, Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018, https://www.ucsusa.org/
sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-Power-Dilemma-full-report.pdf.
58 This amount would be approximately $164 per pound. In comparison, the average uranium spot price for October
2024 was $80.50 per pound. Cameco, Uranium Price, https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price.
59 Matthew Bunn et al., The Economics of Reprocessing vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Harvard University,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Final Report, 2003.
60 For more information about MOX fuel use in the United States, see Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The Use of
MOX Fuel in the United States: Bibliography of Important Documents and Discussion of Key Issues, ORNL/LTR 2012/315, https://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub38036.pdf.
61 Matthew Bunn, “The Economics of Reprocessing and Recycling vs. Direct Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel,”
presentation to the Committee on Advanced Reactors and Fuel Cycles of the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine, 2021.

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Other researchers have reported costs of “closed cycles” are on average higher than “open cycles”
by between less than 5% to 20%; however, they report there may be overlap in costs depending
upon the various operation factors, assumptions, and uncertainties.62
When Congress deliberated about funding GNEP in 2008, the House Appropriations Committee
expressed concern regarding the life cycle costs of the program:
Embarking on a costly process leading to major new construction projects is unwise,
particularly where there is no urgency, and the Department has failed to persuade the
Committee of the critical need to proceed with GNEP now. In addition, before the
Department can expect the Committee to support funding for a major new initiative, the
Department must provide a complete and credible estimate of the life-cycle costs of the
program [and] demonstrate that it can manage and control the costs of its ongoing
projects.63

The 2023 NASEM study reviewed previous studies of reprocessing economics and made the
following observation:
Like all such studies, the specific methodologies vary, and there are many important
assumptions made regarding the input data used to calculate costs, making cost
comparisons challenging. A common conclusion reached across many cost and modeling
studies is that, while spent fuel management represents a relatively small fraction of the
total LCOE [levelized cost of electricity], differences in that area could result in large
absolute costs depending on the size of the nuclear program and the duration of electricity
generation.64

A more positive assessment of reprocessing economics is provided by the French nuclear fuel
services company Orano, which has operated a commercial reprocessing plant at La Hague,
France, since 1966. According to Orano, its costs for SNF reprocessing per mewagatt-hour of
electricity generated have dropped 40% during the past 10 years. “The cost of used fuel recycling
for French society represents less than 2% of the national electricity bill, or around €10 per year
per household,” according to the company. “This amount is going down each year thanks to
increased competitiveness made possible by efficient management of industrial facilities, use of
innovative processes and technologies, and optimized use of fuel in reactors.” Orano further
contends that the cost of reprocessing/recycling is “roughly equivalent” to that of the oncethrough fuel cycle.65 The experiences of Orano may not represent those of potential reprocessing
plants in the United States, due to differences in regulatory requirements among countries.
As this discussion indicates, the extent to which any reprocessing technology could be a viable,
cost-effective alternative to current plans for storage and disposal of SNF would depend on a host
of factors.

62 Robin Tayler et al., “A Review of Environmental and Economic Implications of Closing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle—

Part Two: Economic Impacts,” Energies, vol. 15, no. 2472 (2022).
63 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill, 2008,
committee print, 110th Cong., H.Rept. 110-185 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 68.
64 See NASEM, Merits and Viability of Different Nuclear Fuel Cycles and Technology Options and the Waste Aspects
of Advanced Nuclear Reactors, 2023, https://doi.org/10.17226/26500, p. 130.
65 Orano, “All About Used Fuel Processing and Recycling,” accessed January 7, 2025, https://www.orano.group/en/
unpacking-nuclear/all-about-used-fuel-processing-and-recycling.

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Congressional Action
Congress has enacted a variety of measures in recent years to develop advanced nuclear reactor
technologies, including SNF reprocessing and recycling.66 In the most recent example, President
Biden signed the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy
(ADVANCE) Act on July 9, 2024 (Division B of P.L. 118-870), which includes a provision to
reimburse NRC licensing fees paid by the first U.S. advanced reactor that uses recycled nuclear
fuel. The Energy Act of 2020 (Division Z of P.L. 116-260) authorized $60 million per year
through FY2025 for DOE advanced fuel cycle research, development, demonstration, and
commercial application activities, including “fuel recycling and transmutation technologies,
including advanced reprocessing technologies.”
Congress appropriated $322 million for all DOE fuel cycle research and development programs
in FY2024, including about $45 million for Material Recovery and Waste Form Development
(MRWFD), which includes reprocessing technologies.67 For FY2025, the House Appropriations
Committee recommended in report language that DOE use at least $10 million in the MRWFD
program “to continue the Department’s competitive, cost-shared program for reprocessing spent
nuclear fuel” with the goal of commercial application by 2033.68
The Energy Act of 2020 also authorized $2.14 billion through FY2025 for DOE’s Advanced
Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP), which includes fast neutron reactors that would be
necessary for indefinite recycling of plutonium fuel. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(IIJA) authorized and appropriated $2.477 billion for ARDP through FY2025, in addition to
regular annual appropriations for the program. ARDP is currently funding up to 50% of the cost
of two advanced reactor demonstrations in Wyoming and Texas.69
Reprocessing is not currently being proposed in conjunction with the ARDP demonstration
projects. If reprocessing were used to supply fuel for any of these or other commercial advanced
reactor designs, the extent to which it would resolve issues discussed previously in this report
would depend on a host of factors. As discussed above, these technologies would not eliminate
the need to manage nuclear waste resulting from such operations.
Members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy, Climate,
and Grid Security expressed interest in SNF recycling as a potential element of U.S. nuclear
waste management policy during an April 10, 2024, hearing on “American Nuclear Energy
Expansion: Spent Fuel Policy and Innovation.”70 The Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee held a hearing on the nuclear fuel cycle on March 9, 2023, that included discussions
of reprocessing and recycling of advanced reactor fuels.71

66 For example, see the Joint Explanatory Statement (Division C for H.R. 1865) accompanying the Further

Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), and §40321 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L.
117-58), and §13105 of the Inflation Reduction Act (P.L. 117-169).
67 Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Act, 2024, P.L. 118-42, Division D. The exact amount for
Material Recovery and Waste Form Development is not specified.
68 House Committee on Appropriations, Report to Accompany Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, H.Rept. 118-580, 2025, p. 112.
69 DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “Advanced Reactor Demonstration Projects,” accessed July 11, 2024.
70 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy, Climate, and Grid Security,
American Nuclear Energy Expansion: Spent Fuel Policy and Innovation, hearing, 118th Cong., April 10, 2024.
71 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Full Committee Hearing to Examine the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, hearing, 118th Cong., March 9, 2023.

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Author Information
Lance N. Larson
Analyst in Environmental Policy

Mark Holt
Specialist in Energy Policy

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR48364. Public record. Not legal advice.