# Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR47754 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** Reports - **Published:** October 20, 2023 - **Citation:** R47754 ## Text Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Updated October 20, 2023 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R47754 SUMMARY Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) led surprise attacks against Israel from the Gaza Strip by land, sea, and air. The assault came on a Jewish holiday, 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The attacks’ scope and lethality against Israel have no precedent in the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza, and the nature of the violence stunned Israelis. The apparent intelligence and operational failures in preventing the assault will be a subject of analysis for Israeli and U.S. officials. Iran reportedly provides material support to Hamas, and according to U.S. officials may be complicit in a broad sense, but President Biden has said “there is no evidence” that Iran helped plan the attack. R47754 October 20, 2023 Jim Zanotti, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Jeremy M. Sharp, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Christopher M. Blanchard, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas. Israel has initiated efforts to recover hostages, begun an aerial bombardment campaign against militants in Gaza, mobilized hundreds of thousands of reserve troops, and repositioned ground forces close to Gaza. Israel’s government almost completely halted the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza, which before the conflict had already faced crisis-level economic and humanitarian conditions. Israeli officials have said that they aim to change the status quo in Gaza, and are contemplating a major ground invasion that may seek to end Hamas’s rule there. The Israel Defense Forces has said it “calls for” all civilians residing in northern Gaza to evacuate southward. Hamas called on people to remain in place. United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has expressed concern for the effects Israeli actions regarding Gaza may have on civilian well-being. An estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) have been displaced from their homes. On October 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable international humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza. On October 18 during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Reportedly, more than 1,400 Israelis (and at least 32 American civilians) and about 3,785 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed as of October 19. Additionally, Israel has reported that the bodies of around 1,500 dead attackers have been found in southern Israeli areas recaptured by its military. Militants are also reportedly holding some 200-250 persons hostage in Gaza (including some Americans). Hundreds of American citizens are estimated to be in Gaza, and the U.S. government is discussing safe passage for them with Egypt and Israel. Hamas’s attack preparations may have extended over several years. Possible motivating factors for the attacks’ timing include the potential to disrupt Arab-Israeli normalization efforts, bolster Hamas’s domestic and regional position, capitalize on Israeli political turmoil, and use hostages as leverage for prisoner releases or other concessions from Israel. The West Bank-based Palestinian Authority appears to be in a difficult position: unwilling to embrace Hamas and its attack on Israel, but unable to denounce them for fear of alienating West Bank Palestinians. Exchanges of fire after October 7 between Israel and the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (another FTO) have fueled speculation that Hezbollah could create a second front at the Israel-Lebanon border. U.S. statements and actions, including expedited arms deliveries to Israel and the reported movement of major U.S. military assets, have conveyed warnings to Hezbollah not to get involved. President Biden is reportedly Congressional Research Service Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) requesting that Congress appropriate up to an additional $14 billion in U.S. security assistance for Israel. U.S. officials have stated that they do not intend the use of U.S. ground forces, but are reportedly deliberating about what might or might not “trigger U.S. military involvement.” Congress may consider whether or not to provide additional military assistance to Israel. Congress also may weigh whether or not to increase scrutiny of the use of U.S. defense articles, provide humanitarian assistance for Palestinians, enact sanctions on Hamas or other parties, or otherwise legislate or conduct oversight. Congressional Research Service Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Contents Conflict overview ............................................................................................................................ 1 State of play............................................................................................................................... 5 Main parties and other key actors ....................................................................................... 5 Major U.S. policy statements and actions ........................................................................... 5 What are some important questions that remain unanswered? ................................................. 7 Report methodology ........................................................................................................................ 8 What is Hamas and who supports it? .............................................................................................. 8 Overview ................................................................................................................................... 8 Foreign terrorist organization designation and consequences .................................................. 11 Hamas’s relationship with Iran................................................................................................ 12 Hamas attacks: Why and why now? .............................................................................................. 14 What is Palestine Islamic Jihad and who supports it? ................................................................... 15 Is there evidence that Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad are using cryptocurrency to finance their activities?............................................................................................................... 15 How did Hamas achieve the element of surprise? ......................................................................... 16 Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks? ................ 18 What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this crisis?........................................................... 20 How has Israel’s military responded to the attacks?...................................................................... 24 Counterattacks in Gaza via air and artillery strikes ................................................................. 24 Iron Dome ............................................................................................................................... 25 Siege of Gaza .......................................................................................................................... 25 “IDF’s call” for evacuation from northern Gaza ..................................................................... 26 What role do humanitarian considerations have in the conflict? ................................................... 28 What international humanitarian law responsibilities do the conflict parties have? ............... 28 What is the status of hostages taken from Israel? ................................................................... 29 What is the humanitarian situation in Gaza? ........................................................................... 30 What is Egypt’s role regarding humanitarian developments in Gaza?.................................... 31 What are other relevant humanitarian considerations? ........................................................... 32 U.S. policy ........................................................................................................................ 32 In Israel ............................................................................................................................. 33 Is an Israeli ground invasion likely, and what are the probable implications? .............................. 33 Objectives and operational considerations .............................................................................. 33 Hamas tunnel system............................................................................................................... 34 Who or what could replace Hamas control in Gaza? .............................................................. 36 Could the conflict widen to include other actors against Israel? ................................................... 37 Lebanese Hezbollah ................................................................................................................ 37 West Bank militants ................................................................................................................ 39 Groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen ........................................................................................... 39 Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 40 How have international actors responded? .................................................................................... 40 Arab states ............................................................................................................................... 40 Iran .......................................................................................................................................... 43 China and Russia ..................................................................................................................... 43 United Nations ........................................................................................................................ 44 Congressional Research Service Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) What are the considerations for Congress and U.S. policy? ......................................................... 46 What are some consular, diplomatic, and security issues involving U.S. citizens in Israel and Gaza? ................................................................................................................... 46 What roles might (or might not) the U.S. military play? ........................................................ 48 How has the Biden Administration acted to support Israel? ................................................... 50 Expedited arms deliveries ................................................................................................. 50 What support does the United States provide to the Palestinians?.......................................... 51 What are some possible options for Congress? ....................................................................... 52 Presidential Drawdown Authority..................................................................................... 53 Additional foreign military financing for Israel ................................................................ 53 Use of U.S. stockpile in Israel .......................................................................................... 53 Emergency arms sales ....................................................................................................... 54 Monitoring conditions on the use of U.S. defense articles ............................................... 54 Humanitarian assistance.................................................................................................... 55 Calls for a cease-fire and respect for international law ..................................................... 55 Iran: Transfer of $6 billion ................................................................................................ 56 Sanctions or aid restrictions related to Hamas and PIJ ..................................................... 57 Efforts to prevent Hamas and PIJ from accessing cryptocurrency resources ................... 58 Additional oversight.......................................................................................................... 59 How might the conflict affect Israel’s government and domestic politics? ............................ 59 What are key long-term considerations for U.S. regional priorities? ...................................... 60 Figures Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map ......................................................................................... 4 Figure 2. Hamas Organization and Personnel ............................................................................... 10 Figure 3. Map of West Bank .......................................................................................................... 21 Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2014-FY2024 Request.................................. 22 Figure 5. Tunnels in Gaza.............................................................................................................. 35 Figure 6. View Inside a Gaza Tunnel ............................................................................................ 36 Figure 7. Regional Map of Selected Iran-Allied Groups............................................................... 38 Figure A-1. Old City of Jerusalem ................................................................................................ 65 Appendixes Appendix A. What were prevailing conditions (with Gaza, Jerusalem, West Bank, Israel, and regional diplomacy) before the attacks? .............................................................................. 62 Appendix B. Previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts .................................................................... 70 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 71 Congressional Research Service Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Congressional Research Service Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Conflict overview On October 7, 2023, Gaza Strip-based militants led by the Palestinian Sunni Islamist group Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or FTO) engaged in a series of surprise attacks by land, sea, and air against Israel (see Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map). Palestine Islamic Jihad (or PIJ, another FTO) claimed that its forces also participated in the attacks, and others outside of Hamas and PIJ may also have joined. The assault targeted Israeli military bases and civilian areas during the final Jewish high holiday, just over 50 years after the Egypt-Syria surprise attack that sparked the 1973 Yom Kippur War, known in the Arab world as the October War. The attacks’ scope and lethality against Israel have no precedent in Possible Iranian role in Hamas attacks the 16 years Hamas has controlled Gaza. The The possible role of Iran in the planning, support, or nature of the violence stunned Israelis and execution of the Hamas attacks is a question of keen many others.3 The apparent intelligence and interest to many Members of Congress. National operational failures in preventing the assault Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has described Iran as “complicit in this attack in a broad sense,” given the or limiting its impact have become a subject of level of support it has provided Hamas for years.1 analysis for Israeli and U.S. officials.4 President Joe Biden said on October 15, “did they [Iran] have foreknowledge; did they help plan the attack …there’s no evidence of that at this point.”2 For more detail, see “Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks?” below. In response to the attacks, Israel’s cabinet formally declared war on Hamas, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserting that Israel will win a long and difficult campaign. On October 7, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations, Gilad Erdan, sent a letter to the Security Council that stated, “this is an initiated attack by terrorist organizations led by Hamas.”5 That same day, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield reaffirmed to Israeli officials “our ironclad support for Israel’s security and right to self-defense.”6 During the following week, Israel took steps to halt the supply of electricity, food, water, and fuel to Gaza, mobilized troops, and initiated an aerial bombardment campaign targeting Gaza-based militants. In a letter to the Security Council, Ambassador of the Permanent Observer Mission of the “State of Palestine” to the United Nations Riyad Mansour alleged that Israel’s actions through October 10 “constitute war crimes.”7 1 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” October 10, 2023. 2 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript,” CBS News, October 15, 2023. 3 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “President Herzog reveals Hamas ‘Captive Taking Handbook’ in CNN interview,” October 15, 2023. 4 For information on prevailing conditions in the region before the outbreak of conflict, see What were prevailing conditions (with Gaza, Jerusalem, West Bank, Israel, and regional diplomacy) before the attacks?. For information on the four previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts since Hamas seized Gaza in 2007, see Previous major Israel-Hamas conflicts. 5 X, Pamela Falk CBS News Correspondent United Nations, October 7, 2023, https://twitter.com/PamelaFalk/status/ 1710717063939936336. 6 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on Attacks on Israel,” October 7, 2023. 7 Michelle Nichols, “Palestinian UN envoy accuses Israel of ‘genocidal’ campaign against Gaza,” Reuters, October 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 1 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Observers debate how to apportion blame between the militants and Israel for the worsening of humanitarian conditions that were already dire. While Israeli actions mentioned above have inflicted casualties and limited life-sustaining supplies, Hamas personnel in Gaza and other militants reportedly contribute to making civilian areas and facilities targets by operating in or near them. The situation faced by civilians in Gaza, including some American citizens, appears to be growing increasingly desperate. There are reportedly hundreds of U.S. citizens in Gaza, many of whom are seeking to leave; the White House has stated that it has sought to work with Israel and Egypt to arrange safe passage for them. The State Department has advised Americans who can safely do so to transit toward the Egyptian border near Gaza, though conditions may not permit that move for some.8 As of October 16, Egypt has stated its readiness to use its Rafah crossing with Gaza to open a humanitarian corridor for aid into the territory, and to allow U.S. citizens and other foreigners safe passage out. However, Egyptian officials claim that Israeli air strikes have made the crossing inoperable to date, with details difficult to verify.9 On October 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it “calls for” the evacuation of all civilians in Gaza City “from their homes southwards for their own safety and protection.”10 Hamas reportedly called on people in these areas to remain in place.11 U.N. officials have expressed concern about potentially grave humanitarian consequences,12 with an estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) currently displaced from their homes. Reportedly, some of those who have evacuated or have been evacuating may have been killed by Israeli airstrikes.13 U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres has called for a ceasefire, the immediate release of hostages, and unimpeded humanitarian aid.14 Under reported U.S. pressure, Israel announced the resumption of water supply to southern Gaza on October 15.15 On October 16, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable international humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza. On October 18, during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan to facilitate international aid to Gaza through Egypt, and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.16 8 U.S. Department of State, “Information for U.S. Citizens in Gaza,” October 18, 2023. 9 “Gaza aid stuck as Egypt says Israel not cooperating,” Reuters, October 16, 2023. 10 Israel Defense Forces, “IDF Announcement Sent to the Civilians of Gaza City,” October 13, 2023. Passages from the announcement include, “The IDF calls for the evacuation of all civilians of Gaza City from their homes southwards for their own safety and protection and move to the area south of the Wadi Gaza,” and “Civilians of Gaza City, evacuate south for your own safety and the safety of your families and distance yourself from Hamas terrorists who are using you as human shields.” 11 “Hamas tells Gaza residents to stay home as Israel ground offensive looms,” Reuters, October 13, 2023. 12 “UN says Israel wants 1.1 million Gazans moved south,” Reuters, October 12, 2023. 13 Yahya Abou-Ghazala, “They followed evacuation orders. An Israeli airstrike killed them the next day,” CNN, October 17, 2023; “70 killed after convoys of evacuees in Gaza hit by Israeli airstrikes,” NBC News, October 14, 2023. 14 “Middle East on ‘verge of the abyss’ UN warns, as Israel-Hamas conflict deepens Gaza crisis,” UN News, October 15, 2023. 15 Barak Ravid, “Israel resumes water supply to southern Gaza after U.S. pressure,” Axios, October 15, 2023. 16 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023; Brett Samuels, “Biden announces humanitarian aid deal for Gaza,” The Hill, October 18, 2023. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Reportedly, more than 1,400 Israelis (and at least 32 American citizens) and about 3,785 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed as of October 19,17 with a single explosion at a Gaza City hospital on October 17 apparently killing many civilians. Hamas-run authorities in Gaza claimed that Israel carried out a strike on the location, but Israel attributed the explosion to a misfired rocket launched by PIJ.18 President Biden has expressed outrage and sadness at the explosion and loss of life. While in Israel on October 18, he said that “based on what I’ve seen it appears it was done by the other team, not – not you [Israel]. But there’s a lot of people out there who are not sure.”19 He said later that day that his public statement to Netanyahu was based on data shown to him by the Defense Department.20 As a result of their attacks, Hamas and other militants aligned with them could be holding some 200 to 250 persons hostage in Gaza.21 A Hamas spokesperson threatened on October 9 to kill hostages in the event of unannounced Israeli strikes on civilian homes in Gaza;22 a Hamas spokesman later said that the group “is prepared to release non-Israeli hostages once conditions allow movement in Gaza.”23 Rescuing the hostages would be highly challenging, and the goal of doing so may affect Israeli military planning.24 17 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel | Flash Update #13,” October 19, 2023; White House “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” released October 20, 2023. Additionally, Israel reported that the bodies of around 1,500 dead militants had been found as of October 10 in southern Israeli areas recaptured by its military. 18 “Israel denies involvement in Gaza hospital blast, says explosion caused by Palestinian rocket,” Associated Press, October 17, 2023; Neri Zilber, “Gaza hospital explosion caused by misfired Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket, says IDF,” Financial Times, October 18, 2023. 19 White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel Before Bilateral Meeting,” October 18, 2023. 20 Kathryn Watson, “Biden tells Israel, ‘You’re not alone’; says military data show Gaza militants to blame for hospital explosion,” CBS News, October 18, 2023. 21 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF says hostages in Gaza include around 30 children, 10-20 elderly people,” Times of Israel, October 19, 2023; Hamas spokesman Abu Ubaida quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas says 250 people held hostage in Gaza,” The Guardian, October 16, 2023. 22 An individual identified as Abu Ubaydah of the Al Qassam Brigades said, “Going forward, we announce that each time our peaceful people are targeted in their houses without a prior notice, we will respond by executing one of the civilian hostages. We will video the execution and broadcast it. We hold the enemy accountable for this decision before the world. The ball is in its court.” Al Jazeera Satellite Television, October 9, 2023, 1700 GMT. 23 “Hamas says it is preparing to release non-Israeli hostages,” NBC News, October 16, 2023. 24 Danielle Gilbert, “Why the Gaza Hostage Crisis Is Different,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map Congressional Research Service 4 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) State of play Main parties and other key actors Israel has formed an emergency unity government and “war management cabinet” with key opposition figures (see “How might the conflict affect Israel’s government and domestic politics?”), and Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that Israel’s military intends to “demolish Hamas” as it prepares for a likely ground assault of Gaza.25 In an invasion, Hamas and other Palestinian militants may rely on their knowledge of Gaza’s terrain, a vast network of tunnels, and urban warfare tactics to counter Israel’s conventional military superiority. Since the October 7 attacks, Israel also has exchanged some fire with the Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (an FTO) and Palestinian militants across Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Israel has ordered the evacuation of 28 communities in northern Israel. If these clashes escalate, Hezbollah’s arsenal of more than 100,000 missiles and rockets could pose a grave threat to Israeli strategic sites and population centers.26 Officials from the Palestinian Authority/Palestine Liberation Organization (PA/PLO), based in the West Bank, appear to be in a difficult position, unwilling to embrace their Hamas rivals but also unable to denounce them for fear of alienating the sizable population of Palestinians who support confronting Israel.27 Amid rising tensions and violence between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank. PA President and PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has criticized Israel’s actions, but also has said that no organization other than the PLO represents the Palestinian people.28 The United States; the European Union; Arab governments including Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar; and various international organizations, among other parties, may seek to play roles in efforts at mediation or humanitarian assistance. Some have started making such overtures. After Qatari mediation, Hamas released two American hostages on October 20. As U.S. officials travelled to Israel and around the region, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian made a regional tour of his own, meeting with Iran-allied or -friendly actors in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar, including top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders.29 Major U.S. policy statements and actions President Biden and senior members of his Administration have condemned the attacks on Israel. They have pledged unwavering U.S. support for Israel, directed the provision of U.S. military and security assistance to Israel, engaged diplomatically with Middle East and global interlocutors, encouraged Israeli decision makers to implement Israel’s response in accordance with international humanitarian law, underscored the importance of civilian protection for all 25 “Israel vows to demolish Hamas as troops prepare to move on shattered Gaza,” Reuters, October 15, 2023. 26 Adi Hashmonai, “Israel Plans to Evacuate Communities Close to Border with Lebanon, Many Refuse to Leave,” Haaretz, October 17, 2023. 27 Mohammad al-Kassim, “PA President Mahmoud Abbas MIA as Hamas wages war against Israel,” Ynetnews, September 10, 2023. 28 “President Abbas discusses difficult developments in Palestine with Venezuelan counterpart,” WAFA News Agency, October 16, 2023. 29 Peter Baker and Farnaz Fassihi, “Fearing Escalation, Biden Seeks to Deter Iran and Hezbollah,” New York Times, October 15, 2023. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) conflict actors, sought to assist American citizens in Israel and Gaza, and negotiated with Israel to enable humanitarian aid to reach civilians in Gaza. In an interview aired on the program 60 Minutes on October 15, President Biden expressed support for Israeli efforts to eliminate Hamas—calling it a “group of people who have engaged in barbarism that is as consequential as the Holocaust”—while also appealing for the protection of civilians and a pathway to a Palestinian state, and responded to a question about whether he would “support Israeli occupation of Gaza” with a warning that it would be “a big mistake.”30 On October 18, President Biden traveled to Israel and voiced additional support for its efforts against Hamas and its allies. Also on October 18, the United States vetoed a draft United Nations Security Council resolution on the conflict (see “United Nations”). In an October 19 Oval Office speech, President Biden announced that he is sending Congress an urgent budget request to support critical partners, including Israel and Ukraine, and address other domestic and global issues. The Administration is reportedly requesting that Congress provide $14 billion for security assistance to Israel and $10 billion in general humanitarian assistance (some of which could potentially fund humanitarian needs in Gaza).31 Biden also referred to the protection of civilians and U.S. efforts to work with Israel and Egypt to provide humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in Gaza. In the speech, he said: In Israel, we must make sure that they have what they need to protect their people today and always. The security package I’m sending to Congress and asking Congress to do is an unprecedented commitment to Israel’s security that will sharpen Israel’s qualitative military edge, which we’ve committed to – the qualitative military edge. We’re going make sure Iron Dome continues to guard the skies over Israel. We’re going to make sure other hostile actors in the region know that Israel’s stronger than ever and prevent this conflict from spreading. Look, at the same time, [Prime Minister] Netanyahu and I discussed again yesterday the critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting civilians in combat as best as they can. The people of Gaza urgently need food, water and medicine. Yesterday, in discussions with the leaders of Israel and Egypt, I secured an agreement for the first shipment of humanitarian assistance from the United Nations to Palestinian civilians in Gaza. If Hamas does not divert or steal this shipment—these shipments, we’re going to provide an opening for sustained delivery of lifesaving humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians.32 From October 11 to 16, Secretary of State Blinken conducted a circuit of high-level diplomacy and consulted leaders and officials in Israel, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt before returning to Israel to consult with Israel’s emergency war cabinet. The Administration said the visits had “four key objectives: to make clear that the United States stands with Israel; to prevent the conflict from spreading to other places; to work on securing the release of hostages, including American citizens; and to address the humanitarian crisis that exists in Gaza.”33 In media remarks, Secretary Blinken expressed U.S. opposition to the relocation of civilians from Gaza to the Sinai Peninsula. He also criticized Hamas for its operational practices, describing the group as using the civilian population of Gaza as human shields.34 U.S. diplomats 30 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript.” 31 “Biden declares Israel and Ukraine support is vital for US security, will ask Congress for billions,” Associated Press, October 19, 2023. 32 White House “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” released October 20, 2023. 33 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press,” Cairo, Egypt, October 15, 2023. 34 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Randa Abul Azm of Al-Arabiya,” October 15, 2023. Congressional Research Service 6 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) are facilitating the evacuation of U.S. citizens in Israel to Cyprus via ship, and remain engaged with authorities in Israel and Egypt regarding U.S. nationals in Gaza. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin travelled to Israel on October 13 and met with Israeli leaders to discuss “expediting security assistance to Israel, including precision guided munitions and air defense ammunition.”35 The President has directed the Department of Defense to position two U.S. carrier strike groups in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and has bolstered U.S. air assets in the region in an apparent bid to reassure Israel and other U.S. partners, and to warn Iran and Hezbollah not to widen the conflict. U.S. 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit forces reportedly were in transit to the eastern Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf as of October 17. U.S. officials have stated that they do not plan to involve U.S. troops in armed action, and National Security Council spokesman John Kirby has stated that “the Israelis have made it very clear that they don’t want foreign troops on their soil—that they want to prosecute these operations on their own.”36 President Biden and other U.S. officials have implied U.S. willingness to use force, without specifying potential triggers or red lines.37 President Biden has appointed former Ambassador David Satterfield as the Special Envoy for Middle East Humanitarian Issues. What are some important questions that remain unanswered? As the Israel-Hamas conflict approaches its two-week mark, how the following issues unfold may be particularly important for the parties and U.S. interests. • • • Recovering the hostages. Can Israel do it? How? With the help of the United States? Will Hamas follow through on threats to kill some hostages in response to Israeli strikes affecting civilians in Gaza? Will Hamas release non-Israeli hostages when movement and access conditions in Gaza permit? Would Israel or the United States exchange prisoners for hostages? An Israeli ground assault on Gaza. If it happens, as statements from Israeli officials suggest, how long and extensive will it be, and with what results and human costs? What would an invasion mean for Hamas’s rule over Gaza, and if Hamas were to be defeated, who would assume responsibility for the territory and its over two million people? Would such a defeat effectively remove threats that Israelis have historically faced from people in Gaza with whom Israel has a long, complicated history of violence and uneasy coexistence? What might reconstruction costs be, and who would pay them? Potential escalation between Israel and Hezbollah or other Iran-backed actors. Could a major second front materialize? What might trigger escalation? 35 U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III’s Visit to Israel,” October 13, 2023. 36 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” October 12, 2023. 37 On October 17, John Kirby, National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications said, “There are no plans or intentions to put U.S. boots on the group in combat in Israel. But as we’ve also said, we have significant national security interests in the region. Those national security interests have not changed. As a matter of fact, they are more important perhaps now than they have been in the recent past. And those forces will be there to demonstrate a sincere capability of protecting and defending those national interests if need be…. We never talk about future military operations, and I simply wouldn’t do that. They are there to send a deterrence signal. There is more than enough capability to de-—protect and defend our national security interests if it comes to that.” White House, “Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby En Route Tel Aviv, Israel,” October 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 7 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) • • An Israeli operation that endangers Hamas’s position in Gaza? Miscalculations at the Lebanese border? Strikes involving groups in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or attacks elsewhere? Could the situation escalate into more direct conflict between Israel and Iran? Impact of major civilian casualties. How might incidents causing major civilian casualties, such as the October 17 explosion (whose cause is disputed) that reportedly killed many Palestinians at and around a Gaza City hospital, or the cumulative effect of casualties over time, affect global public sentiment and various actors’ stances on the conflict? Longer-term outcomes. What might be the longer-term ramifications for U.S. priorities such as regional stability, security for Israel, countering the reach of Iran and its allies, and quality of life for all affected people? How will U.S. support for Israel in the current conflict affect its standing in the region? Can U.S.-Israel-Saudi diplomacy resume, and will efforts toward an IsraeliPalestinian two-state solution be viable? Does this conflict have implications for U.S. efforts to influence outcomes in places of significant global contention such as Ukraine and Taiwan, or for the U.S. role in influencing the overall world geopolitical order? Report methodology This report provides information and analysis on complex and fluid developments in an ongoing conflict. Information in this report is drawn from official statements, media reporting, and other publicly available information as of October 19, 2023. CRS cannot independently verify the details of reported conflict and diplomatic developments, and information presented herein is subject to revision as additional information becomes available. Levels of documentation and the specificity of publicly available information may vary, and the facts of individual incidents or developments may remain subject to dispute. CRS is unable to investigate, confirm, or refute allegations of war or atrocity crimes and violations of international humanitarian law. CRS cannot make definitive assessments of whether reported incidents might arguably constitute war or atrocity crimes pursuant to international law, or whether evidence collected would necessarily lead to prosecutions for such crimes. Statements of attribution by U.S. or other international officials are not determinative for the purposes of legal accountability. What is Hamas and who supports it? Overview Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928 that has branches throughout the world.38 Hamas emerged in Gaza in the late 1980s, and established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah movement in the 1990s by violently attacking Israeli targets after Fatah had entered into a peace process with Israel. Over time, Hamas has attacked or repressed Palestinian political and factional opponents. 38 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2021, released February 2023. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) After Israel withdrew military forces from Gaza in 2005, Hamas forcibly seized the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2007.39 Hamas has both political and military components, and exercises de facto government authority and manages service provision in Gaza. Hamas controls Gaza through its security forces and obtains resources from smuggling, informal “taxes,” and reported external assistance. According to the U.S. State Department, “Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.”40 Media reports have suggested that during this decade, Hamas has received some of its funding in cryptocurrency.41 Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader for Gaza, came from Hamas’s military wing (see Figure 2). Aside from those living in Gaza and the West Bank, some Hamas leaders and personnel reportedly live in Arab countries and Turkey. Qatar allows Hamas’s political bureau leader, Ismail Haniyeh, to operate an office in Doha. Hamas and other Gaza-based militants have engaged in occasional conflict with Israel since Hamas seized Gaza by force in 2007. During major conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, Hamas and other militants launched rockets toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes decimated much of Gaza’s infrastructure. Since 2007, Gaza has faced crisis-level economic and humanitarian conditions, partly owing to broad restrictions that Israel and Egypt—citing security concerns—have imposed on the transit of people and goods. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe drinking water.42 Because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy, external assistance largely sustains humanitarian welfare. Egypt and Qatar helped mediate conflict and provided basic resources in the wake of four past major Israel-Hamas clashes, but Gaza has not experienced broader economic recovery or reconstruction (see “Hamas-controlled Gaza” below). 39 CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti, updated October 27, 2022. 40 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2021, released February 2023. 41 E.g., Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2023. 42 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-criticalhumanitarian-indicators. Congressional Research Service 9 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Figure 2. Hamas Organization and Personnel Source: Council on Foreign Relations using noted sources, October 2023. Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,43 has killed hundreds of Israelis44 and more than two dozen U.S. citizens (including some dual U.S.-Israeli citizens)45 in attacks since 1993. As the Qassam Brigades developed from a small band of guerrillas into a more sophisticated organization with access to greater resources and territorial control, its methods of 43 Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anti-colonialist resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces in 1935. 44 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ TerrorAttacks.html and https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/comprehensive-listing-of-terrorism-victims-in-israel. In the aggregate, other Palestinian militant groups (such as Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) also have killed scores, if not hundreds, of Israelis since 1993. 45 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/ usvictims.html. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) attack evolved from small-scale kidnappings and killings of Israeli military personnel to suicide bombings and rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. The planning, preparation, and implementation of the October 7, 2023, attacks in Israel apparently demonstrate a further evolution in the Qassam Brigades’ capabilities, including the use of drone munitions, personnelcapable gliders, and complex infantry operations featuring thousands of personnel attacking across Israeli-controlled lines along multiple axes. Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine.46 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding principles. It stated that Hamas sees its conflict as being with the “Zionist project,” rather than Jews in general, and expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines (the provisional borders of the West Bank and Gaza) if it results from “national consensus,” while rejecting Zionism completely and stating Hamas’s preference for the establishment of an Islamist Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and from the southern Israeli city of Eilat to the Lebanese border.47 (For background on the history of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Appendix B and CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.) Having consolidated control over Gaza, and pursuing popular support through armed attacks on Israel, Hamas has appeared to seek to compete politically with other Palestinian movements and establish its indispensability to a future negotiated Israeli-Palestinian political arrangement. Hamas’s 2017 document states that the group remains open to democratic political competition with Palestinian rivals, but underscores goals incompatible with recent Arab-Israeli normalization diplomacy. Elections have not occurred in Gaza since 2007, and Hamas appears to maintain strict control over political activity in areas under its control. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented Hamas human rights violations against Palestinian civilians and violence against Israelis. Foreign terrorist organization designation and consequences48 The U.S. government designated Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on October 8, 1997. (PIJ and Lebanese Hezbollah (or Hizballah) were designated as FTOs on the same date.) The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) is responsible for identifying entities for designation as an FTO. Prior to doing so, the Department is obligated to demonstrate that the entity in question engages in “terrorist activity” or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.49 When assessing entities for possible designation, the CT Bureau looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts. Entities placed on the FTO list are suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. By designating an entity as an FTO, the United States seeks to limit the group’s financial, property, 46 For an English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp. 47 “Hamas in 2017: The document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. This document, unlike the 1988 charter, does not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood. 48 Prepared by John W. Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10613, Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), by John W. Rollins. 49 As defined in Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)), or “terrorism,” as defined in Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (FRAA) (22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2)). Congressional Research Service 11 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and travel interests. Per Section 219 of the INA, as amended by Section 302 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), the Secretary of State must demonstrate that the entity of concern has met the three criteria to allow the Department to designate it as an FTO. The suspected terrorist group must: • • • be a foreign organization, engage in or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorism, and threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests of the United States. In general, the designation of an entity, such as Hamas, as an FTO leads or may lead to the following consequences: • • • • • • • • It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to, and in certain circumstances removable from, the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of a designated FTO to block all transactions involving those assets. May motivate efforts by the U.S. government and other nations to curb terrorism financing. May stigmatize and isolate the FTO outside of its established support base. May deter donations or contributions to and economic transactions with the FTO. May heighten public awareness and knowledge of the FTO and terrorist organizations more generally. May signal to other governments U.S. concern about designated organizations. Hamas’s relationship with Iran The Iranian government has supported Hamas for decades, going back nearly to the group’s inception.50 Iranian officials met with Hamas leaders and expressed public backing for the group and its goals beginning in the early 1990s, as Hamas sought to take up the mantle of Palestinian resistance to Israel against the backdrop of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israel negotiations that culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accord.51 Hamas opened an external office in Iran in 1992. 50 The Iranian government has backed terrorist groups since the early 1980s, focused initially on supporting the Shia Islamist group Hezbollah in Lebanon and pressuring Persian Gulf monarchies to cease their support for Iraq in its war against Iran. After the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising) broke out in 1987 (the same year Hamas was founded), Iran began to focus more on supporting Palestinian groups. See U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, January 1988 and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, April 1990. 51 “Iran pledges to aid Hamas in fight for ‘free Palestine,’” Independent (London), November 17, 1992; Christopher Walker, “PLO fears rise of fundamentalists,” Times (London), December 18, 1992; “Iran tells Hamas it is firmly against PLO peace deal,” Reuters, November 30, 1993. For background on the Oslo Accord, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congressional Research Service 12 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) It is less clear how much material support the Iranian government provided to Hamas in the first years of the relationship. In 1998, Hamas’s spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin (later killed in a 2004 Israeli strike) reportedly obtained from Iran a pledge of $15 million a month.52 During the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) of 2000-2005, Iran reportedly continued to provide support to Hamas, including via the Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (also an FTO).53 Some experts have contrasted Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah (a “full Iranian proxy,” in the words of one observer) with its relationship with Hamas (“a pragmatic partner to Iran’s anti-Israel axis”).54 Since Hamas took over de facto control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has engaged in several rounds of conflict with Israel, with continued reported material and financial support from Iran. Iranian aid has been especially important to Hamas in light of Israeli-Egyptian restrictions in place for Gaza since 2007 on the transit of people and goods, and with regard to Hamas’s arsenal of rockets, which have featured prominently in Hamas attacks against Israel for years. Iran reportedly initially smuggled rockets into Gaza by sea and via illicit tunnels under the Egyptian border. After Egypt began cracking down on those tunnels in 2013, and as ties between Iran and Sudan (a key arms transit point) began to deteriorate in 2014, Iran apparently focused more on teaching Palestinian militants how to use Iranian systems and locally manufacture their own variants.55 Iran-Hamas relations deteriorated after the outbreak of violence in Syria in 2011, with Iran and Hezbollah backing the government of Bashar al Asad, and Hamas siding with the mostly Sunni opposition. In 2012, Hamas’s political leadership left Damascus; Qatar has since then allowed it to operate an office in Doha. In 2017, with Hamas more isolated regionally and with the Iranbacked Asad government ascendant, the two sides began to repair ties and have since appeared closely aligned. Hamas’s top political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly visited Tehran at least three times between 2019 and the October 7 attacks.56 The level of Iranian material support for Hamas has reportedly remained high in recent years. In a September 2020 publication, the State Department reported that “Iran historically provided up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.”57 Haniyeh reportedly said in a January 2022 interview that Iran was the “main funder” of a $70 million “plan of defense for Gaza” after 2009.58 According to an October 2023 media report, “An Israeli security source said that Iran had significantly increased funding for Hamas’ military wing in the past year from $100 million to about $350 million a year.”59 Some analysts have asserted that certain weapons—particularly rocket-propelled grenades—that Gazan militants are observably using (based on open source images) are likely of North Korean 52 Laura King, “Hamas leader gaining Arab support,” Associated Press, May 27, 1998. 53 Aaron Mannes, “Iran binds Hizballah to Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2004. 54 Ido Levy, “How Iran fuels Hamas terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1, 2021. 55 Fabian Hinz, “Iran transfers rockets to Palestinian groups,” Wilson Center, May 19, 2021; Adnan Abu Amer, “Report outlines how Iran smuggles arms to Hamas,” Al-Monitor, April 9, 2021. 56 Maren Koss, “Flexible resistance: How Hezbollah and Hamas are mending ties,” Carnegie Middle East Center, July 11, 2018. Haniyeh reportedly visited Tehran in June 2019, January 2020 (for the funeral of assassinated Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani), and August 2021 (for Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s inauguration). Iran and Sudan announced the resumption of diplomatic relations on October 9, 2023. 57 U.S. State Department, Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, September 2020. 58 Mai Abu Hasaneen, “Hamas holds memorial tribute for Soleimani in Gaza,” Al-Monitor, January 7, 2022. 59 Samia Nakhoul, “How Hamas secretly built a ‘mini-army’ to fight Israel,” Reuters, October 16, 2023. Congressional Research Service 13 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) origin. One U.S.-based scholar said, “This could be new supplies or from previous shipments going back as far as 2009,” and that any North Korean weapons likely took an indirect route via Iran or Syria to Hamas. North Korea’s official news agency denied that any of its weapons were being used in the ongoing conflict.60 Hamas attacks: Why and why now? Hamas leaders have said that their planning and preparation for the October 2023 attacks took place over several years, suggesting that the group made a strategic decision to prepare itself to be able to carry out attacks and operations that might change the status quo and prevailing assumptions in the group’s long confrontation with Israel.61 The decision to launch the attacks in October 2023 may reflect various Hamas motivating factors, including the following: • • • • Disrupting Arab-Israeli normalization efforts – The October 7 attacks may have been intended to disrupt existing and potential future normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states, including U.S.-backed efforts to promote Saudi-Israeli normalization. Hamas may have assessed that Arab governments’ increased willingness to normalize relations with Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state—and potential PA acquiescence to this trend—provided an opening for Hamas to portray itself as uniquely committed to the Palestinian national cause. Seeking to strengthen its domestic and regional position – Hamas may have launched the attacks in a bid to bolster its domestic political position vis-à-vis the struggling PA and its president Mahmoud Abbas. Difficult and deteriorating living conditions in Gaza may have increased local political pressure on Hamas, and Hamas leaders may have perceived political opportunity arising from alleged Israeli encroachments on Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem and a pattern of confrontations in 2022 and 2023 between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. A former senior U.S. official has speculated, “Hamas’s intention is to get Israel to retaliate massively and have the conflict escalate: a West Bank uprising, Hezbollah attacks, a revolt in Jerusalem.”62 Capitalizing on Israeli domestic turmoil – Political tensions have risen in 2023 among Israelis, stemming from disputes over proposed judicial reform and other issues. Hamas and its allies may have perceived an opportunity to strike at a time of internal division and distraction within Israel, and perhaps amplify discord among Israelis, by launching the attacks and successfully targeting Israeli military and civilian targets. Using hostages for prisoner releases or other concessions – Hamas leaders have long highlighted the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel as a priority for the group, and may have launched the attacks to use hostages to obtain prisoner releases or other Israeli concessions. 60 “North Korea denies its weapons used by Hamas against Israel,” Reuters, October 12, 2023. 61 Hamas official Ali Baraka quoted in Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam, “Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas commander behind the attack on Israel?” Reuters, October 11, 2023. 62 Martin Indyk, “Why Hamas Attacked—and Why Israel Was Taken by Surprise,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) What is Palestine Islamic Jihad and who supports it? Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is another FTO that, like Hamas, is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and receives support from Iran, including possibly cryptocurrency.63 PIJ emerged in the 1980s in the Gaza Strip as a rival to Hamas. Since 2000, PIJ has conducted several attacks against Israeli targets (including suicide bombings), killing scores of Israelis. PIJ militants in Gaza sometimes take the lead in firing rockets into Israel—perhaps to pressure Hamas into matching its hardline tactics or to demonstrate its credentials as a resistance movement to domestic audiences and external supporters. PIJ’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism, Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, and Shiite revolutionary thought (inspired by the Iranian Revolution). PIJ seeks liberation of all of historic Palestine through armed revolt and the establishment of an Islamic state, but unlike Hamas has not established a social services network, formed a political movement, or participated in elections. PIJ has not received as much support from Palestinians as Hamas has. Some PIJ leaders reside in Syria, Lebanon, or other Arab states. For three days in August 2022, Israel and PIJ militants in Gaza exchanged fire. Hamas stayed out of the violence. A similar round of violence between Israel and PIJ (with Hamas abstaining) took place in November 2019. PIJ personnel reportedly hold some of the hostages from the October 7 attacks and claimed operations at Israel’s northern border with Lebanon in the days following the attacks.64 According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2021 (most recent), “estimates of PIJ’s membership range from about 1,000 to several thousand.” Is there evidence that Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad are using cryptocurrency to finance their activities?65 According to reporting by the Wall Street Journal and CNN, citing a cryptocurrency analytics firm, digital currency wallets linked to Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) received as much as $93 million in cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June 2023. Digital currency wallets linked to Hamas allegedly received about $41 million over a similar time frame (a figure attributed to a different analytics firm), but Israeli authorities may have been able to interdict some or all of that amount.66 On October 10, the Israel government issued a press release stating that, in collaboration with Binance (the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange), it had frozen cryptocurrency accounts 63 Berwick and Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto.” 64 “Islamic jihad faction holding over 30 Israelis captive, its chief says,” Reuters, October 8, 2023; “Palestinian Al Quds Brigades claim responsibility for attack at Lebanon-Israel border,” Reuters, October 9, 2023. 65 Prepared by Rebecca M. Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance; and Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics. 66 Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2023; Scott Glover et al., “‘They’re opportunistic and adaptive’: How Hamas is using cryptocurrency to raise funds,” CNN, October 12, 2023. Congressional Research Service 15 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) linked to Hamas.67 On October 18, the United States applied sanctions to a Gaza-based cryptocurrency exchange with links to Hamas.68 U.S. financial regulators have previously raised concerns about Hamas-linked activity in cryptocurrencies. For example, In March 2023, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trade Commission filed a civil enforcement action against Binance.69 Among other items, the CFTC alleges that Binance received and dismissed information regarding Hamas transactions in February 2019.70 Additionally, in August 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a series of terrorismrelated cryptocurrency actions. One of them involved the Qassam Brigades, described as Hamas’s military wing.71 According to an industry report from early 2020, Qassam Brigades cryptocurrency fundraising efforts had generated “tens of thousands of dollars of Bitcoin” and was among “the largest and most sophisticated cryptocurrency-based terrorism financing campaigns ever seen.”72 As part of the actions reported in August 2020, U.S. law enforcement seized the infrastructure of the Qassam Brigades websites and subsequently covertly operated alqassam.net. U.S. law enforcement also reportedly tracked and seized 150 cryptocurrency accounts through which funds were laundered to and from Qassam Brigades accounts. The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia also unsealed criminal charges against individuals who allegedly acted as related money launderers while operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Cryptocurrency donations reportedly continued to flow to the Qassam Brigades following the August 2020 actions; the campaign for such donations appears to have ended in April 2023.73 How did Hamas achieve the element of surprise? The nature and timing of the attacks from Gaza have prompted questions about whether or not the Israeli or U.S. governments had prior information to suggest such attacks were possible or imminent or, if not, why they might have missed signs or misinterpreted indications. IDF Major General Aharon Haliva, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, has stated that his command failed to warn of the attack and that he bears “full responsibility for the failure.”74 Ronen Bar, head of the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet or Shabak), also has taken personal responsibility for the intelligence failure. An unnamed U.S. official in a White House-organized press briefing declined to address the question of U.S. intelligence prior to the 67 Camomile Shumba and Sandali Handagama, “Hamas-Linked Crypto Accounts Frozen by Israeli Police, with Binance’s Help: Report,” Coin Desk, October 10, 2023. 68 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Following Terrorist Attack on Israel, Treasury Sanctions Hamas Operatives and Financial Facilitators,” October 18, 2023. 69 Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “CFTC Charges Binance and Its Founder, Changpeng Zhao, with Willful Evasion of Federal Law and Operating an Illegal Digital Asset Derivatives Exchange,” press release, March 27, 2023. 70 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Changpeng Zhao, Binance Holdings Limited, Binance Holdings (IE) Limited, Binance (Services) Holdings Limited, and Samuel Lim, 33 (United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 2023). 71 U.S. Department of Justice, “Global Disruption of Three Terror Finance Cyber-Enabled Campaigns,” August 13, 2020. 72 Chainalysis, “Terrorism Financing in Early Stages with Cryptocurrency but Advancing Quickly,” January 17, 2020, https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/terrorism-financing-cryptocurrency-2019/. See also Elliptic, “Cracking the Code: Tracing the Bitcoins from a Hamas Terrorist Fundraising Campaign,” April 26, 2019. 73 David Carlisle, “How Hamas Has Utilized Crypto, and What May be Coming,” Elliptic, October 11, 2023; Nidal AlMughrabi, “Hamas Armed Wing Announces Suspension of Bitcoin Fundraising,” Reuters, April 28, 2023. 74 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF intel chief says he ‘bears full responsibility’ for not warning of Hamas attack,” Times of Israel, October 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 16 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) attack, and said that the United States “will continue to provide Israel with support during this critical time, including close—close, deep intelligence sharing.”75 Israel’s reportedly advanced intelligence capabilities appear to have failed to detect planning and preparation for the October 7 attacks, including Palestinian groups’ acquisition or development of munition-carrying drones, personnel-carrying gliders, and thousands of missiles and rockets. Some former Israeli security officials have speculated that Palestinian armed groups have adapted their operations and methods following repeated rounds of conflict with Israel.76 Periodic attacks in Syria—attributed to Israel—against reported shipments of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah and other armed groups on Israel’s northern borders suggest that Israel’s intelligence and defense establishment remain actively focused on transregional and cross-border security threats. Domestic political tensions and confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and in and around Jerusalem also may consume Israeli intelligence and domestic security resources. There is insufficient publicly available information at this time to determine whether or how these factors may have affected Israel’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to the October 7 attacks. Some Members of Congress or others may raise questions about U.S. intelligence detection or interpretation of data prior to the attacks. U.S. intelligence officials have not indicated that the United States had specific information to suggest the October 7 attacks were imminent. In April 2023, U.S. Director for Central Intelligence William Burns said, “Despite the promise of the Abraham Accords and progress to a normalization between Israel and more Arab states, tensions in the region, including between Palestinians and Israelis, threaten to bubble over again.”77 The U.S. military and its naval partners periodically intercept weapons shipments in the Arabian SeaRed Sea corridor that have been presumed to be destined for the Iran-backed Houthi movement in Yemen. It is possible that Hamas and other Gaza-based armed groups use similar sources, methods, and routes to acquire and smuggle weaponry. Hamas figures have suggested that their planning and preparations for the attacks spanned several years, and included a “subterfuge campaign” in which it sought to convey the impression that it was unprepared for or unwilling to engage in a new round of conflict.78 As one apparent element of this effort, Hamas encouraged Israel to believe that economic incentives it was providing to Gazans were decreasing Hamas’s motivation to engage in conflict.79 Hamas figures also have told the media that they compartmentalized information about their plans and limited dissemination to exclude even senior political leaders.80 The groups responsible also may have taken other operational security measures to conceal their activities and preparations. Footage released by the attackers indicates that initial attacks were made against Israeli technical observation infrastructure along the Gaza-Israel line of control; the disabling of these sites may have contributed to the attackers’ apparent achievement of operational surprise. 75 White House, “Background Press Call by a Senior Administration Official Regarding Hamas Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” October 7, 2023. 76 Tia Goldenberg, “What went wrong? Questions emerge over Israel’s intelligence prowess after Hamas attack,” Associated Press, October 9, 2023. 77 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “DCIA @ Rice University,” April 11, 2023. 78 Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam, “Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas commander behind the attack on Israel?” Reuters, October 11, 2023; Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack,” Reuters, October 10, 2023. 79 Nakhoul and Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack.” 80 Hamza Hendawi, “Hamas political leaders were unaware of Israel incursion plan, Egypt officials say,” The National, October 9, 2023. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) There is insufficient public information available at this time to determine whether or how the deployment locations of IDF personnel in Israel and the West Bank at the time of the attacks may have shaped events or the initial Israeli response. The attacks’ occurrence during Jewish Israelis’ observation of the Sabbath and the holiday of Simchat Torah also may have benefitted the attackers and increased the likelihood that the public spread of information and mobilization of a response would be slower. Did Iran play a role in planning, directing, or otherwise enabling the Hamas attacks? It remains unclear to what extent, if at all, the government of Iran was directly involved in the October 2023 Hamas assault. U.S. and Israeli officials have stated publicly that despite the Iranian government’s longstanding support for Hamas and its enthusiastic praise for the October 2023 assault, they do not have evidence at this time that the government of Iran played a direct role in planning it or carrying it out. Media accounts, citing a variety of unnamed U.S. and foreign officials, have varied in their assessments of Iranian involvement. As of October 17, 2023, one early media account has indicated that Iran had a direct role in the October 7 attacks. On October 8, 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unnamed Hamas and Hezbollah sources, that senior Iranian officials from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) met with Hamas counterparts (along with Hezbollah and PIJ leaders) in Beirut regularly since August to plan the attacks and, on October 2, 2023, “gave the green light for the assault.”81 The publishing of that account reportedly caused some controversy among Wall Street Journal reporters.82 A subsequent October 11 report in the Wall Street Journal indicated that U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Iran “likely knew Hamas was planning operations against Israel but didn’t know the precise timing or scope.”83 Most other media reports align with that latter account from October 11. On October 9, 2023, the Washington Post reported that planning for the assault began “as early as mid-2022” with “key support” from Iran (including training for Hamas militants in camps in Lebanon), but that “U.S. and Israeli officials said they have no firm evidence so far that Iran authorized or directly coordinated the attack.” That article said further that the “rockets and missiles launched by Hamas may have been locally produced, but they possess a clear Iranian pedigree.”84 Multiple outside experts have expressed skepticism that Hamas could plan such a complex and resource-intensive assault without the awareness, if not active support, of Iran.85 However, CNN reported on October 11 that the United States had collected intelligence indicating senior Iranian officials were “caught by surprise” by the assault, perhaps as a result of Hamas’s “operational independence from Iran.”86 The New York Times similarly reported the U.S. collection of intelligence showing 81 Summer Said et al., “Iran helped plot attack on Israel over several weeks,” Wall Street Journal, October 8, 2023. 82 Max Tani, “Wall Street Journal reporters split over Iran story,” Semafor, October 16, 2023. 83 Warren Strobel, “Iran knew Hamas was planning attacks, but not timing of scale, U.S. says,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2023. 84 Joby Warrick et al., “Hamas received weapons and training from Iran, officials say,” Washington Post, October 9, 2023. 85 Said et al., op. cit.; Dan De Luce et al., “Hamas attack bears hallmarks of Iranian involvement, former U.S. officials say,” NBC News, October 8, 2023. 86 Zachary Cohen et al., “Initial US intelligence suggests Iran was surprised by the Hamas attack on Israel,” CNN, October 11, 2023. Congressional Research Service 18 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) that unnamed Iranian officials “who typically would be aware of operations involving the Quds Force” were surprised by the assault.87 As of October 17, U.S. officials in public statements maintained that firm evidence tying Iran directly to the assault did not exist, though they also asserted that “Hamas wouldn’t be around in the way that it is without the support that it’s received from Iran over the years,” as Secretary of State Blinken said on October 8.88 Blinken stated the same day, “In this moment, we don’t have anything that shows us that Iran was directly involved in this attack, in planning it or carrying it out, but that’s something we’re looking at very carefully, and we’ve got to see where the facts lead.”89 On October 9, Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer said that “Iran is broadly complicit in these attacks,” given that Iran has been Hamas’s “primary backer for decades,” but that there were no signs of “direct involvement” by Iran as of yet.90 Finer also said “we do not have the ability to corroborate [the Wall Street Journal report] at this time.”91 A State Department spokesperson said on October 10, “we do not have information to suggest that Iran either directed or orchestrated these attacks by Hamas. Iran likely knew Hamas was planning operations against Israel, but without the precise timing or scope of what occurred.”92 An IDF spokesperson reportedly said something similar, saying, “Iran is a major player but we can’t yet say if it was involved in the planning or training.”93 Another IDF spokesperson said, “We have no evidence or proof” of Iranian involvement but, “We are 100 percent sure that the Iranians were not surprised.”94 For their part, Iranian officials, as noted above, have denied direct involvement; one Hamas official said on October 9, 2023, that Iran was unaware of the operation in advance.95 Some observers (including some Members of Congress) have tied the October 2023 Hamas assault to funds from the September 2023 U.S.-Iran agreement that involved the freeing of several U.S. hostages in exchange for the transfer of $6 billion in Iranian funds from South Korea to Qatar.96 For more on these topics and congressional action, see “Iran: Transfer of $6 billion.” 87 Adam Entous et al., “Early intelligence shows Hamas attack surprised Iranian leaders, U.S. says,” New York Times, October 11, 2023. 88 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Dana Bash of CNN’s State of the Union,” October 8, 2023. 89 U.S. State Department, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken with Kristen Welker of NBC’s Meet the Press,” October 8, 2023. 90 “U.S. to offer ‘every kind of support’ to Israel on hostages, White House advisor says,” CBS News, October 9, 2023. 91 Andrew Zhang et al., “‘No evidence or proof’: Israel and U.S. uncertain of Iran link to Hamas attack,” Politico, October 9, 2023. 92 U.S. State Department, Press Briefing, October 10, 2023. 93 “No evidence yet of Iran link to Hamas attack, says Israeli military,” Guardian, October 9, 2023. 94 Andrew Zhang et al., op. cit. 95 Bassem Mroue and Sarah el Deeb, “Hamas official says Iran and Hezbollah had no role in Israeli incursion but they’ll help if needed,” Associated Press, October 9, 2023. 96 See, for example, Representative French Hill, “Release: Rep. Hill condemns Hamas attack on Israel,” October 7, 2023; Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ranking Member’s Press, “Risch statement on terrorist attacks against Israel,” October 7, 2023. For background on the prisoner exchange/fund transfer agreement, see CRS Report R47321, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clayton Thomas. Congressional Research Service 19 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) What is the role of the Palestinian Authority in this crisis? After Hamas’s attacks on October 7, despite the considerable animus between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, PA President Mahmoud Abbas said that Palestinians have the right “to defend themselves against the terrorism of settlers and the occupation forces.”97 In a statement released the same day, the PA Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed Israel for “the destruction of the peace process” and said that “the continuation of the injustice and oppression to which the Palestinian people are exposed is the reason behind this explosive situation.”98 Per some analysts, the Hamas attack has put Abbas in a difficult position, unwilling to embrace his Hamas rivals and their attack on Israel, but also unable to denounce them for fear of alienating West Bank Palestinians.99 Abbas has continued to engage with other world leaders (including an October 9 call with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, in which Abbas asked the United Nations to “immediately intervene to stop the ongoing Israeli aggression”), but has not made any public appearances.100 The PA was created in the 1990s to provide Palestinians with temporary, limited self-rule in Gaza and specific urban areas of the West Bank (see Figure 3)—under overarching Israeli control— pending a final Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. It is dominated by Fatah, a secular Palestinian political party whose chairman Mahmoud Abbas has served as PA president since his election by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in 2005 after the death of Yasser Arafat. When his four-year term expired in 2009, the PA extended his term indefinitely until new elections could take place; no elections have occurred to date. The PA has exercised little or no effective control in Gaza since Hamas forcibly seized control there in 2007. Having different Palestinian leaders in the two territories has complicated the question of who speaks for the Palestinians at home and abroad. 97 Gianluca Pacchiani, “Abbas stressed Palestinian right to self defense, as int’l community condemns Hamas,” Times of Israel, October 7, 2023. 98 X post, State of Palestine - MFA (@pmofa), October 7, 2023, https://twitter.com/pmofa/status/ 1710630801379922370. 99 Mohammad al-Kassim, “PA President Mahmoud Abbas MIA as Hamas wages war against Israel,” Ynetnews, September 10, 2023. 100 “President Abbas calls on UN to promptly intervene to stop Israeli aggression against Palestinians,” WAFA News Agency, October 9, 2023. Congressional Research Service 20 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Figure 3. Map of West Bank Source: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory, 2018, adapted by CRS. Note: All boundaries and depictions are approximate. Successive U.S. presidential Administrations and Israeli governments appear to have viewed the Abbas-led PA as a traditional counterweight to Hamas. Under Abbas, the PA does not appear to have actively organized or directed violent campaigns targeting Israel or Israelis. The PA and its security forces generally engage in some discreet coordination efforts with Israel to counter shared threats from Hamas and other militants. This coordination has reportedly waned at least to some extent in connection with increased West Bank violence in 2023. The United States has invested in boosting PA governance and security capacities. The U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority (USSC), established in 2005, is a U.S.-led multilateral mission of more than 75 security specialists from nine NATO countries based in Jerusalem, with a forward post in the West Bank city of Ramallah, where the PA is headquartered.101 The USSC is headed by a three-star U.S. flag officer who leads U.S. efforts to 101 Information provided by the USSC to CRS, October 20, 2022. The core of the USSC is made up of U.S. military officers hosted by the Department of State. Supporting contingents of security specialists from the United Kingdom and (continued...) Congressional Research Service 21 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) help develop and reform the PA security sector, and facilitate coordination and communication between Israeli and PA security units. For more information about the USSC and U.S. non-lethal security assistance to PA security forces, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. See Figure 4 for information on overall bilateral U.S. aid to the Palestinians. Figure 4. U.S. Bilateral Aid to the Palestinians, FY2014-FY2024 Request appropriations Sources: U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), adapted by CRS. Notes: All amounts are approximate and reflect appropriations for each fiscal year. Some amounts have been appropriated but not obligated. Amounts for FY2024 have been requested but not appropriated. NADR = Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, ESF = Economic Support Fund, OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations. Despite the potential for the PA to act as a counterweight to Hamas, some factors now constrain the United States from supporting the PA as it had in Abbas’s early years of rule. The PA is facing a major ongoing financial crisis that could lead to bankruptcy, amid Palestinian domestic turmoil, internal corruption allegations, and grievances the PA has with current Israeli government policies in the West Bank—including on settlements and security.102 In a July 2023 CNN interview, President Biden said that the PA has “lost its credibility” and created a “vacuum for extremism among the Palestinians.” He also said at the time that some Israeli cabinet members are “part of the problem,”103 referring to Israeli-Palestinian tensions stemming from Israeli actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Speculation surrounds who might lead the PA once President Abbas (born in 1935) leaves office—whether via elections or otherwise104—perhaps further contributing to West Bank instability as various actors anticipate a contest for succession. The Taylor Force Act (TFA, enacted in March 2018 as Div. S, Title X of P.L. 115-141), prohibits most U.S. economic aid that “directly benefits” the PA, because of certain PA payments “for acts Canada work with the U.S. core team, as do smaller contingents from the Netherlands, Turkey, Italy, Poland, Greece, and Bulgaria. 102 Alex Lederman, “The Palestinian Authority Is in Danger, and So Is Israel,” Israel Policy Forum, June 29, 2023. 103 Transcript: “Interview with U.S. President Joe Biden,” CNN, July 9, 2023. 104 Udi Dekel and Noa Shusterman, “The Day after Abbas”: Strategic Implications for Israel, Institute for National Security Studies, December 2022; International Crisis Group, Managing Palestine’s Looming Leadership Transition, February 1, 2023. Congressional Research Service 22 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) of terrorism.”105 U.S. officials have encouraged other parties in the region to support the PA,106 encountering some public criticism because language in the TFA calls on all countries to cease budgetary support to the PA until it “stops all payments incentivizing terror.”107 Palestinian Payments for “Martyrs” and Prisoners The Palestinian practice of compensating families who lost a member (militant or civilian) in connection with Israeli-Palestinian violence reportedly dates back to the 1960s.108 Palestinian payments on behalf of prisoners or decedents in their current form apparently “became standardized during the second intifada [uprising] of 2000 to 2005.”109 Various PA laws and decrees since 2004 have established parameters for payments.110 U.S. lawmakers and executive branch officials have condemned the practice, arguing that it may incentivize violence, and focusing particular criticism on an apparent tiered structure that provides higher levels of compensation for prisoners who receive longer sentences.111 Beyond these issues, PA security forces have faced a number of challenges in seeking to counter Hamas and other militants. When the forces have cautiously avoided confrontation, they have been vulnerable to criticism from Israeli and U.S. officials that they are weak or incapable of maintaining order, or even sympathetic to the militants’ causes. When they have undertaken operations to arrest militants—which in some cases may have been for the purpose of minimizing Israeli incursions—some domestic critics have labeled them as collaborators with Israel, especially when such operations and the resulting prosecution and imprisonment of suspects appeared to be related to Israeli raids, information sharing, or objectives.112 105 During the legislative process for the TFA, some Members of Congress argued that these PLO/PA payments—made to Palestinians (and/or their families) who are imprisoned for or accused of terrorism by Israel—provide incentives for Palestinians to commit terrorist acts. For more information see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 106 U.S. Mission to the United Nations, “Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in the Middle East,” May 24, 2023. 107 Sander Gerber, “Opinion: Biden & Co. Keep Funding Palestinian Terror—in Defiance of Congress,” New York Post, June 20, 2023. 108 Neri Zilber, “An Israel ‘Conspiracy Theory’ That Proved True—but Also More Complicated,” The Atlantic, April 27, 2018. 109 Eli Lake, “The Palestinian incentive program for killing Jews,” Bloomberg, July 11, 2016. 110 Yossi Kuperwasser, “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, http://jcpa.org/paying-salaries-terrorists-contradicts-palestinian-vows-peacefulintentions/. 111 See, for example, Opening Statement of Senator Bob Corker, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Consideration of the Taylor Force Act, hearings, 115th Cong., 1st sess., July 12, 2017, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/corker-opening-statement-at-hearing-on-taylor-force-act; Joel Gehrke, “House passes bill that could cut off Palestinian Authority funding due to aid of terrorists’ families,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2017. For an analysis arguing that these PLO/PA payments are not the primary drivers of violence against Israel, see Shibley Telhami, “Why the discourse about Palestinian payments to prisoners’ families is distorted and misleading,” Brookings Institution, December 7, 2020. 112 Jack Mukand, “A year on, Nizar Banat’s killing sheds light on PA corruption, but justice is on hold,” Times of Israel, October 3, 2022; Ahmad Melhem, “Palestinian Authority steps up arrests in Nablus,” Al-Monitor, September 28, 2022. Congressional Research Service 23 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) How has Israel’s military responded to the attacks? Counterattacks in Gaza via air and artillery strikes Having formally declared war on Hamas, the Israeli government has mobilized around 360,000 reservists, or between 3% and 4% of Israel’s total population. Netanyahu has stated that Israelis should expect prolonged conflict. With operations against attackers inside Israel reportedly concluded as of October 11, thousands of Israeli air and artillery strikes have occurred in the Gaza Strip, and Israeli ground forces are reported to be building a base and massing in adjacent areas. Israeli strikes in Gaza present a dilemma because several military targets are located in close proximity to civilian residential areas and other facilities like schools and hospitals. President Biden said in a 60 Minutes interview that Hamas hides “behind the civilians” and puts “their headquarters where civilians are.”113 Israeli officials have stated that the IDF tries to avoid civilian casualties and provides warnings to civilians before some strikes.114 In such efforts, the IDF may be limited by incomplete or imperfect information, Israeli perceptions regarding operational urgency, and constraints on how precisely the IDF can deliver warnings. An unnamed senior Israeli government source has said: the “roof knocking” policy, whereby the IDF has previously used text messages, phone calls, or an initial strike on the roof to warn residents of a building that it is about to be struck, is not the system currently applying. In certain circumstances, it will be used, the source says, but today Israel is already evacuating masses of the [Gaza] populace from central terrorist areas and attacking there.115 The effectiveness of Israel’s strikes in Gaza in destroying or damaging military positions, personnel, and infrastructure is unclear. Israel claims to have killed a number of militant leaders, including some from Hamas’s elite Nukhba forces who reportedly helped spearhead the October 7 attacks.116 Despite Israeli efforts to target rocket launching infrastructure, Hamas and other militants continue to fire rockets into Israel, though these salvos reportedly have not matched the volume and intensity of the initial barrage on October 7.117 It is unclear to what extent this may be due to damage from Israeli strikes, Hamas operational decisions, or other factors. 113 Scott Pelley, “President Joe Biden: The 2023 60 Minutes interview transcript.” 114 Jack Detsch and Anusha Rathi, “Israel Prepares for Block-by-Block Warfare in Gaza,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2023. 115 “Senior Israeli source: Gaza will not be Hamastan; ‘roof knocking’ policy no longer norm,” Times of Israel, October 9, 2023. 116 According to the IDF, the IDF and Israel Security Agency (ISA, Shin Bet, or Shabak) have killed Ali Qadi, Commander of Hamas’s Nukhba Jabalya Assault Company; Muetaz Eid, Commander of the Hamas Southern District of National Security; Zachariah Abu Ma’amar, Head of the International Relations office in Hamas’s Politburo; Joad Abu Shmalah, Hamas Minister of Economy in Gaza; Belal Alqadra (or Bilal al Kedra), Commander of the Nukhba Southern Khan Yunis Assault Company; Merad abu Merad, Head of the Hamas Aerial Array in Gaza City; and Osama Mazini, the head of the Shura Council of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Information retrieved from https://idfanc.activetrail.biz/anc16102023.12345 and https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/updates-articles-videos-and-more/ real-time-updates/, October 17, 2023. See also “Nukhba Force: All you need to know about Hamas’ lethal military unit in target of Israel Army,” CNBC, October 13, 2023. 117 The initial barrage apparently included some 2,500-3,000 rockets. Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack,” Reuters, October 10, 2023. Congressional Research Service 24 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Iron Dome According to figures from the IDF, from October 7 through October 16, Hamas, other Gaza-based Palestinian militants, and Hezbollah fired an estimated 6,000 rockets at Israel.118 Of that amount, roughly 2,000-3,000 were fired within the initial hours of Hamas’s surprise attack against Israel in the early morning of October 7.119 Iron Dome’s targeting system and radar are designed to fire its Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles that pose threats to the area being protected, and, in previous rounds of Israel-Hamas confrontations, Iron Dome’s interception rate has exceeded 90%.120 Nevertheless, when facing a rocket barrage, even with success rates exceeding 90%, some rockets reach populated areas. There is insufficient public information available at this time to authoritatively assess Iron Dome’s interception rate in the current conflict.121 According to one analysis by the Modern War Institute at West Point, “If Hamas fires ten rockets and misses with nine, Iron Dome can most likely intercept the one threatening round…. But extrapolate this dynamic—by firing a thousand, two thousand, or even more rockets—and, eventually, the advantage shifts in favor of the attacker.”122 In the ongoing war, Israel has deployed Iron Dome batteries nationwide to defend both against rocket attacks emanating from Gaza and mortar and rocket attacks emanating from Syria and Lebanon. Though Iron Dome apparently continues to successfully intercept incoming rockets at a high rate, some Israelis and some others have questioned whether Israel has become over-reliant on technological solutions both to deter their adversaries and prolong difficult policy dilemmas visà-vis the Palestinians.123 According to one Israeli critic, though Iron Dome undoubtedly has provided Israelis a certain sense of security, it also has led many Israelis to “not feel the urgency, or sufficient enough optimism, to press their leaders to solve the underlying problems causing the long-term crisis facing Gaza.”124 Siege of Gaza Since Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, Israel has maintained air, land, and sea restrictions on access to and from Gaza for people and goods, in concert with similarly tight parameters that Egypt enforces at its land border with Gaza. A security fence separates Gaza from Israel, though militants reportedly penetrated it in at least 28 areas during the October 7 attacks. A maritime exclusion zone remains in place off the Gaza coast. The Erez crossing between Gaza and Israel was damaged in the attacks and is closed. Israel has declared a military exclusion zone 118 Government of Israel, Israel Defense Forces, https://www.idf.il/en/. 119 Samia Nakhoul and Jonathan Saul, “How Hamas duped Israel as it planned devastating attack,” Reuters, October 10, 2023. 120 “Israel says Iron Dome shoots down 97% of Gaza rockets,” Reuters, August 7, 2022. 121 One analyst has said, “Iron Dome’s interception rate may have remained constant compared to previous conflicts, with the successful strikes due to the high number of rockets fired. It also seems possible, however, that the high number of rockets fired and their launch frequency overwhelmed the system and degraded its interception rate.” Fabian Hinz, “The Hamas attack and Israeli military options: Rocket use by Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 10, 2023. 122 Patrick Sullivan and John Amble, “What Happened to Iron Dome? A Lesson on the Limits of Technology at War,” Modern War Institute at West Point, October 10, 2023. 123 Seth J. Frantzman and Aaron Mehta, “In wake of Hamas attack, Israel may have to change intel, tech strategy,” Breaking Defense, October 9, 2023. See also Michael Koplow, “The Great Shattering,” Israel Policy Forum, October 9, 2023. 124 Anshel Pfeffer, “The Costly Success of Israel’s Iron Dome,” The Atlantic, May 24, 2021. Congressional Research Service 25 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) surrounding Gaza in areas of southern Israel, having evacuated Israeli residents of the region to areas farther north in Israel. On October 9, Israel announced a “complete siege” in Gaza that would apparently cut Gaza’s residents off from the flow of food, water, fuel, and electricity.125 On October 12, Israel’s energy minister said that Israel-imposed restrictions on the flow of goods, including fuel, and the cessation of the provision of water and electricity services from Israel to Gaza would remain in place until the release of Israeli hostages from Gaza.126 The siege has generated fierce debate between • those who argue the siege is a necessary element of Israel’s efforts to deprive its adversaries of important supplies and sustenance, and demoralize and confuse them in connection with a likely Israeli ground invasion; and • those who criticize Israeli measures as potentially severely harmful to civilians— including vulnerable populations in hospitals, the elderly, and young children—and assert that the measures breach international law. “IDF’s call” for evacuation from northern Gaza On October 13, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it “calls for” for the evacuation of all civilians in Gaza City in northern Gaza “from their homes southwards for their own safety and protection”127 (see Figure 1. Israel and Gaza: Conflict Map). Hamas called on people in these areas to remain in place.128 U.N. officials expressed concern about potentially grave humanitarian consequences,129 with an estimated 1 million Gazans (nearly half the territory’s population) displaced from their homes. Reportedly, some of those who have evacuated or have been evacuating may have been killed by Israeli airstrikes.130 There are reportedly hundreds of American citizens in Gaza, many of whom are seeking to leave. The White House has stated that it has sought to work with Israel and Egypt to arrange safe passage for them, but—according to one media report as of October 17—“diplomatic efforts to ensure this have continued to stall.”131 The possibility of large numbers of refugees raises complex issues for neighboring Egypt (see “What is Egypt’s role regarding humanitarian developments in Gaza?”). On October 13, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi said that Gazans must “stay steadfast and remain on their land.” He committed to ensuring the delivery into Gaza of international humanitarian assistance arriving in Egypt,132 but Egyptian officials have claimed that Israeli strikes in Gaza at or near the Rafah crossing at the Egypt-Gaza border have prevented efforts to reopen the crossing (discussed further below). Ruby Mellen et al., “Israel ordered a ‘complete siege’ of Gaza. Here’s what that looks like,” Washington Post, October 11, 2023. 126 Israel Katz (@Israel_katz), post on X, 2:34 AM EST, October 12, 2023. 127 Israel Defense Forces (@IDF), post on X (formerly Twitter), 1:50 AM EST, October 13, 2023. 128 “Hamas tells Gaza residents to stay home as Israel ground offensive looms,” Reuters, October 13, 2023. 129 “UN says Israel wants 1.1 million Gazans moved south,” Reuters, October 12, 2023. 130 Yahya Abou-Ghazala, “They followed evacuation orders. An Israeli airstrike killed them the next day,” CNN, October 17, 2023; “70 killed after convoys of evacuees in Gaza hit by Israeli airstrikes,” NBC News, October 14, 2023. 131 Astha Rajvanshi, “Why Egypt’s Border with Gaza Is Sealed,” Time, October 17, 2023 132 “Gazans must ‘remain on their land’: Egypt’s al-Sisi,” Agence France Presse, October 13, 2023. 125 Congressional Research Service 26 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) For residents in the northern Gaza region who faced endemically poor living and working conditions at the outset of conflict, followed by days of active bombardment, the “IDF’s call” for them to abruptly leave their homes and most of their possessions may present enormous stresses. Many humanitarian experts argue that implementing an evacuation may not be feasible, especially under present conditions. Medically compromised, elderly, and disabled individuals, their families, or families with young children may face particular challenges finding safety. Individuals and families confront the question of whether to remain in a zone that may likely experience more intense conflict in the coming days and weeks, or to migrate to southern Gaza areas where residential and health care infrastructure is reportedly inferior in capacity to that in the north, while risking potential hazards during the journey and upon arrival. For example, Hamas may discourage or block movement. Some Gazans’ reaction to the “IDF’s call” to evacuate could be affected by personal and collective memories of the mass expulsion or displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians during the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars.133 Thus, some Gazans might interpret the “IDF’s call” as part of a larger pattern of Israeli efforts to weaken or destroy the Palestinian national cause. Under pressure reportedly exerted by the United States, among other governments and organizations, to ensure that those who live in or evacuate to southern Gaza do not face lifethreatening privation, Israel announced the resumption of water supply there (but apparently not other items) on October 15.134 Then, on October 16, Secretary of State Blinken announced: the United States and Israel have agreed to develop a plan that will enable humanitarian aid from donor nations and multilateral organizations to reach civilians in Gaza – and them alone – including the possibility of creating areas to help keep civilians out of harm’s way. It is critical that aid begin flowing into Gaza as soon as possible. We share Israel’s concern that Hamas may seize or destroy aid entering Gaza or otherwise preventing it from reaching the people who need it. If Hamas in any way blocks humanitarian assistance from reaching civilians, including by seizing the aid itself, we’ll be the first to condemn it and we will work to prevent it from happening again. 135 On October 18 during a visit to Israel, President Biden confirmed this plan to facilitate international aid to Gaza through Egypt, and announced $100 million in U.S. humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.136 It is unclear whether or how the movement of a large portion of northern Gaza’s population to southern Gaza might affect Israeli future military operations or improve humanitarian outcomes. If large numbers of civilians leave the areas of Gaza City and its vicinity, where Israel claims that most Hamas and other militant infrastructure is located, Israel might be able to more precisely target adversaries with less collateral damage. However, it is possible that militants could seek to embed themselves with evacuating civilians, while also using Hamas’s vast internal network of tunnels to impede Israeli military efforts (see “Hamas tunnel system”). Israel has reportedly conducted several air strikes in southern Gaza since October 7, particularly in Khan Yunis, where Hamas reportedly maintains operational infrastructure. 133 See, for example, “Israeli evacuation call in Gaza hikes Egypt’s fears of a mass exodus of refugees into its territory,” Associated Press, October 13, 2023. 134 Barak Ravid, “Israel resumes water supply to southern Gaza after U.S. pressure,” Axios, October 15, 2023. 135 Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Press on President Biden’s Upcoming Trip to Israel and Agreement with Israel to Develop a Humanitarian Aid Plan for Gaza,” October 16, 2023. 136 White House, “U.S. Announcement of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People,” October 18, 2023; Brett Samuels, “Biden announces humanitarian aid deal for Gaza,” The Hill, October 18, 2023. Congressional Research Service 27 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) What role do humanitarian considerations have in the conflict? What international humanitarian law responsibilities do the conflict parties have?137 All parties to the current conflict, including Hamas and Israeli forces, as well as any other state militaries or non-state armed groups who join the fighting, are prohibited by international humanitarian law (IHL) from causing undue suffering amongst civilians and combatants during the conflict. IHL, also known as jus in bello, is intended to limit harm and suffering caused by parties to an armed conflict. These prohibitions adhere in all instances of the use of military force or other military operations in armed conflict, including actions taken in self-defense against armed attack. The basic principles of IHL include (1) the distinction between civilians and combatants; (2) the prohibition of attack on those not participating in armed conflict (hors de combat), including combatants who have surrendered or been wounded; (3) the prohibition against infliction of unnecessary suffering; (4) the principle of necessity, which permits military action only when necessary to weaken the military capacity of an enemy; and (5) the principle of proportionality, which prohibits military action that will cause injury or death to civilians or damage to civilian objects that is excessive in relation to the military advantage gained.138 IHL violations might have already occurred, be ongoing, or continue to take place as this conflict unfolds, as indicated by • • • the attacks of October 7 on civilians and the taking of civilian hostages; reports of intentional or indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian areas and destruction of civilian and cultural buildings—including places of worship, hospitals, and schools; and statements by officials on both sides of the conflict explaining plans to attack, starve, or deny humanitarian assistance to a civilian population, or destroy objects indispensable to a civilian population’s survival, and reports of such plans and actions being carried out. Both Israel and the “State of Palestine” are required to prevent and punish criminal violations of IHL (“war crimes”), systematic widespread attacks on civilian populations (“crimes against humanity”), and the intentional destruction of any group in whole or in part (“genocide”).139 In addition, the International Criminal Court (ICC) possesses the authority to investigate and prosecute alleged instances of these crimes during the current conflict. In December 2014, Palestinian leaders accepted ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed by Palestinian nationals or “in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014,” and in January 2015 the “State of Palestine” became party to the Rome Statute, the treaty that 137 Prepared by Matthew C. Weed, Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation. 138 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Fundamentals of IHL, https://casebook.icrc.org/law/fundamentals- ihl#d_iii. 139 To the extent that Hamas is considered the governing authority for Gaza, which for purposes of the Geneva Conventions appears to be considered part of the “State of Palestine,” Hamas holds responsibility for adherence to the Geneva Conventions in Gaza. As a party to armed conflict, Hamas, whether considered as a state or non-state actor, is bound by the obligations of IHL and its officials and personnel are subject to criminal prosecution for atrocity crimes. See generally Jelena Pejic, “The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye,” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 93, no. 881 (March 2011). Congressional Research Service 28 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) established the ICC.140 After a preliminary examination, the ICC Prosecutor announced in March 2021 that the Prosecutor had opened a formal investigation into the “situation in Palestine.”141 On October 10, 2023, the Office of the ICC Prosecutor stated that the Prosecutor’s investigation extends to the current conflict, and that the Office is continuously gathering information and evidence related to all alleged atrocity crimes.142 Israel rejects the ICC’s jurisdiction over its nationals.143 What is the status of hostages taken from Israel? On October 16, a spokesman for Hamas said the group was holding 200 hostages, said 50 others were being held by other “resistance factions and in other places,” and claimed that Israeli strikes since October 7 had killed 22 hostages.144 A Hamas spokesman also said that the group “is prepared to release non-Israeli hostages once conditions allow movement in Gaza.”145 An earlier Hamas statement claimed to have dispersed hostages, including in tunnels reported to span areas of the Gaza Strip.146 On October 19, an Israeli media account cited IDF data stating that “among the 203 hostages that the military believes with high confidence are being held by terrorists in the Gaza Strip, some 30 are children and youths, and another 10-20 are elderly.”147 On October 9, President Biden said, “We believe it is likely that American citizens may be among those being held by Hamas,” and he said “I have directed my team to work with their Israeli counterparts on every aspect of the hostage crisis, including sharing intelligence and deploying experts from across the United States government to consult with and advise Israeli counterparts on hostage recovery efforts.”148 On October 11, John Kirby, National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications, said, “We know that a—a number of those Americans are being held hostage right now by Hamas.”149 The presence of hostages complicates Israeli military considerations and planning, along with U.S. diplomatic, military, and intelligence considerations. Past cases of Hamas hostage taking suggest that related concerns could persist for years. In prior conflicts with Israel, Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, have taken hostages and used them to extract concessions from Israel, including the release of prisoners. In 2011, Hamas secured the release of more than a thousand prisoners in exchange for a single Israeli soldier held hostage. On October 9, Al Jazeera aired a statement attributed to Hamas’s Qassam Brigades threatening that Hamas would broadcast the execution of civilian hostages in response 140 International Criminal Court, Situation in the State of Palestine, ICC-01/18, https://www.icc-cpi.int/palestine. 141 International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, Respecting an Investigation of the Situation in Palestine, March 3, 2021, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-fatou-bensoudarespecting-investigation-situation-palestine. 142 “ICC Prosecutor Says Mandate Applies to Current Israel-Palestinian Conflict,” Reuters, October 10, 2023. 143 “Israel Rejects ICC Probe, Saying It Lacks Jurisdiction,” Associated Press, April 8, 2021. 144 Hamas spokesman Abu Ubaida quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas says 250 people held hostage in Gaza,” The Guardian, October 16, 2023. 145 “Hamas says it is preparing to release non-Israeli hostages,” NBC News, October 16, 2023. 146 Hamas statement on Telegram social media, as reported in Cassandra Vinograd and Isabel Kershner, “Hamas Took Scores of Hostages from Israel. Here’s What We Know About Them.” New York Times, October 10, 2023. 147 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF says hostages in Gaza include around 30 children, 10-20 elderly people,” Times of Israel, October 19, 2023. 148 White House, “Statement from President Joe Biden on American Citizens Impacted in Israel,” October 9, 2023. 149 White House, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre and NSC Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby,” October 11, 2023. Congressional Research Service 29 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to any subsequent Israeli strikes on civilian homes that occur without prior warning.150 Qatar, which allows Hamas to operate an office in Doha, reportedly has engaged Hamas figures in discussions on a potential swap of female Hamas-held hostages for female Palestinian prisoners held by Israel.151 In an October 10 interview, one prominent Palestinian politician from the West Bank rejected Hamas’s kidnapping of children, and said that messages had been delivered to Hamas to dissuade it from executing any hostages.152 He indicated that Hamas was considering possible prisoner exchange proposals. On October 10, top Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh said that Hamas will not engage in negotiations on the status of hostages until the conflict concludes and that the group would only release hostages for agreeable concessions.153 Hamas released a video showing an Israeli hostage on October 17.154 What is the humanitarian situation in Gaza?155 The Gaza Strip is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. More than two million people, the majority of whom are registered Palestinian refugees, live in the territory and most rely on humanitarian assistance. In Gaza, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provides humanitarian services to 1.4 million Palestinian refugees;156 the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) coordinates humanitarian assistance for other vulnerable populations. UNRWA has 13,000 national and international staff in Gaza, most of them refugees themselves.157 Before the Hamas attack on Israel, the humanitarian situation in Gaza was already protracted and living conditions were dire.158 UNRWA’s persistent funding shortfalls limited its capacity to respond.159 The World Food Program (WFP) cut assistance for 60 percent of its food aid recipients in Gaza in June 2023, despite deepening food insecurity, also due to underfunding.160 Hostilities and airstrikes in Gaza continue to destroy infrastructure and humanitarian facilities and, as of October 19, 2023, had reportedly displaced more than about 1 million people, including about 527,500 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) taking spontaneous shelter in UNRWA’s schools, which are temporarily closed.161 The sharp increase in displacement was partly due to 150 An individual identified as Abu Ubaydah of the Al Qassam Brigades said, “Going forward, we announce that each time our peaceful people are targeted in their houses without a prior notice, we will respond by executing one of the civilian hostages. We will video the execution and broadcast it. We hold the enemy accountable for this decision before the world. The ball is in its court.” Al Jazeera Satellite Television, October 9, 2023, 1700 GMT. 151 Reuters, “Qatar leading talks to swap Hamas-held hostages for Palestinians in Israeli jails,” October 9, 2023. 152 Sarah Ferguson and Marina Freri, “Palestinian politician claims Hamas ready to swap hostages,” ABC News Australia, October 10, 2023. 153 Regional media reports on Hamas statement, October 10, 2023. 154 Ivana Kottasová, “Hamas releases first video of a hostage taken to Gaza,” CNN, October 17, 2023. 155 Prepared by Rhoda Margesson, Specialist in International Humanitarian Policy. 156 For information on UNRWA, U.S. contributions to it, and congressional oversight, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. 157 U.N. News, “Explainer: UN on the ground amid Israel-Palestine crisis,” October 10, 2023. 158 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan: Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), January 2023; U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Annual Operational Report 2022, July 27, 2023. 159 International Crisis Group, “UNRWA’s Reckoning: Preserving the UN Agency Serving Palestinian Refugees.” Report 242, September 15, 2023. 160 WFP, “WFP sounds alarm on food security amid conflict in Israel and Palestine, urges immediate humanitarian access,” October 8, 2023. 161 UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, Flash Update #13, October 19, 2023; UNRWA, “Situation Report #7 on the situation in the Gaza Strip,” October 17, 2023. Congressional Research Service 30 Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Question [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR47754. Public record. Not legal advice.