# FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR47048 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** February 10, 2022 - **Citation:** R47048 ## Text FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response February 10, 2022 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R47048 SUMMARY FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a nationwide emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 as amended), authorizing assistance administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Five days later, the President notified then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor that the agency would assume leadership of the federal pandemic response effort—the first known instance of FEMA serving in such a role for a public health incident. The Stafford Act declarations and FEMA’s role in the pandemic response changed the scope of the statute and the agency. Both President Donald J. Trump and President Joseph R. Biden Jr. activated the Stafford Act and FEMA resources in unprecedented ways to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Former President Trump issued the first unilateral, nationwide Stafford Act emergency declaration. Soon after, President Trump issued the first Stafford Act major disaster declaration for an infectious disease incident, and directed FEMA to lead the federal response. Within weeks, President Trump declared concurrent major disasters in every state and territory, marking the first time in history that the Stafford Act was activated to simultaneously deliver assistance for major disasters across the entire country. After assuming office in January of 2021, President Biden expanded the scope of assistance FEMA could provide for the pandemic, including full federal reimbursement for a wide range of ongoing emergency response measures undertaken by state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and healthcare providers. FEMA, in turn, undertook unprecedented agency-level measures to respond. FEMA activated the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) from which it coordinates federal response efforts, for the longest duration in its history (ongoing as of the date of publication). FEMA also established an interagency Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to lead the response—the first time the agency reported using such a team to manage nationwide federal response planning, logistics, and operations. To meet the extraordinary demands of a nationwide disaster, FEMA adapted foundational elements of its regionalized response framework, including changes to the deployment of federal assets, the prioritization and fulfillment of requests for emergency supplies, and communication with SLTTs. FEMA additionally coordinated novel applications of the Defense Production Act (DPA) for pandemic response, including contracting for and allocating scarce medical supplies, identifying anti-price-gouging and hoarding actions, and entering agreements to coordinate information-sharing with medical supply manufacturers and distributors. These extraordinary strains and innovations have prompted FEMA to rethink how the agency currently responds to disasters. R47048 February 10, 2022 Erica A. Lee, Coordinator Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery Diane P. Horn Analyst in Flood Insurance and Emergency Management Bruce R. Lindsay Specialist in American National Government William L. Painter Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations Lauren R. Stienstra Section Research Manager Shawn Reese Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy Elizabeth M. Webster Analyst in Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery President Trump, President Biden, and FEMA also made significant pandemic-specific changes to its flagship response and recovery grant programs, Public Assistance and Individual Assistance. These programs are generally activated in response to sudden-onset hazards that strike a defined geographic area, such as hurricanes or fires. Their pandemic adaptations enabled the programs to finance assistance across the country over an extended period of time for pandemic-related lost wages, new sheltering options, emergency food distribution, COVID-19 diagnostic testing, vaccination programs, and facility reopening costs. The expansions of these grant programs well exceeded previous demands on the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that funds Stafford Act assistance. As of the end of the first quarter of FY2022, FEMA reports spending approximately $90 billion from the DRF on the pandemic response. FEMA’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic has raised basic questions about the purpose and capacity of the agency and the Stafford Act. Policy issues facing Congress in the wake of these events include whether, and how, FEMA and the Stafford Act should be activated for long-term public health incidents, the consequences of pandemic-specific activations of Stafford Act authorities for the Disaster Relief Fund, and to what extent FEMA operational innovations should revert or continue. Congress additionally faces questions about the nature of FEMA’s role in coordinating and implementing DPA activities for ongoing supply-chain issues and future public health incidents. Congressional Research Service FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents ..................... 3 FEMA’s Role in COVID-19 Pandemic Response .......................................................................... 6 FEMA’s Role Prior to March 13, 2020 ..................................................................................... 6 FEMA’s Role Following Stafford Act Declarations for the Pandemic ..................................... 9 Response Organizational Structure after FEMA’s Assumption of Leadership................. 12 Stakeholder Commentary on Leadership Transition ......................................................... 13 FEMA’s Pandemic Response: Key Lines of Effort ................................................................ 16 Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the Federal Pandemic Response ..................................... 16 SLTT Emergency Management Operational Support ....................................................... 16 Public Assistance (PA) for SLTT and Nonprofit Response Efforts................................... 16 Individual Assistance (IA) for Funeral Costs, Lost Wages, and Crisis Counseling .......... 17 Supply Chain Stabilization ............................................................................................... 19 Critical Medical Supply Distribution ................................................................................ 20 National Guard Mobilization ............................................................................................ 20 Vaccination Assistance ...................................................................................................... 21 Considerations for Congress.......................................................................................................... 23 Stafford Act Legislative Considerations.................................................................................. 23 Applicability of Stafford Act to Public Health Incidents .................................................. 23 Clarification of Roles and Leadership for Public Health Incidents .................................. 24 Adaptation of Stafford Act Public Assistance for the Pandemic ....................................... 27 Adaptation of Stafford Act Individual Assistance for the Pandemic ................................ 29 Hazard Mitigation Funding for Pandemic Stafford Act Declarations ............................... 31 FEMA Preparedness and Response Operations ...................................................................... 33 FEMA’s Public Health Preparedness Coordination.......................................................... 33 FEMA’s Preparedness Grants for Public Health Incidents ............................................... 35 Validating National Readiness: Exercises ......................................................................... 36 Pandemic Response and the Limits of FEMA’s Capacity and Expertise ......................... 37 Adapting FEMA’s Regionalized Response Structure to a Nationwide Disaster .............. 41 FEMA-Led Critical Supply Distribution .......................................................................... 42 Equity and FEMA’s Pandemic Response ......................................................................... 44 FEMA and the Defense Production Act .................................................................................. 46 Defense Production Act Coordination Issues.................................................................... 47 FEMA, the Defense Production Act, and Supply Distribution ......................................... 49 COVID-19 Spending Patterns from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) ..................................... 51 The COVID-19 Pandemic Disaster Declarations and Tapping into the DRF ................... 51 Lost Wages Assistance and Boosting FEMA’s Pandemic Involvement ........................... 54 A Catastrophic Disaster Like No Other ............................................................................ 56 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 61 Figures Figure 1. Agency Leadership Designations in Domestic Incident Response .................................. 5 Figure 2. Authorization of Stafford Act Assistance for Pandemic-Related Costs .......................... 11 Figure 3. Organization of the Federal Coordinated Pandemic Response ...................................... 15 Congressional Research Service FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Figure 4. Duration of Select FEMA Lines of Effort in Federal Pandemic Response .................... 22 Figure 5. HMGP Funding for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations .................................................. 33 Figure 6. DRF Unobligated Balances and Projections, December 2019-June 2021 ..................... 52 Figure 7. Monthly Obligations for COVID-19 Disaster Declarations .......................................... 54 Figure 8. Cumulative Allocations, Obligations, and Expenditures from the DRF for COVID-19 .................................................................................................................................. 57 Figure 9. COVID-19 DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter.................................................. 57 Figure 10. Hurricane Sandy DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ....................................... 59 Figure 11. Hurricane Harvey DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ..................................... 59 Figure 12. Hurricane Irma DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ......................................... 60 Figure 13. Hurricane Maria DRF Obligations by Program and Quarter ....................................... 60 Tables Table 1. Key Leadership Designations for Federal COVID-19 Pandemic Response ..................... 7 Table 2. Major Disaster Program Obligation Ratios ..................................................................... 55 Table A-1. Select FEMA Authorities Relevant to Federal Pandemic Response ............................ 62 Appendixes Appendix A. Key FEMA Authorities for Pandemic Response ...................................................... 62 Appendix B. Bibliography—Selected Resources.......................................................................... 65 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 67 Congressional Research Service FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Introduction On January 20, 2020, the United States documented its first known case of the disease caused by the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2.1 In the weeks and months following, federal officials activated multiple emergency powers, established interrelated response task forces and decisionmaking bodies, and enacted a series of relief bills that together constituted what is referred to as the coordinated federal response, or whole-of-government response, to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak and eventual pandemic.2 These actions included historic declarations of emergency and major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended).3 The pandemic marked the first instance in the history of the United States in which the President activated the Stafford Act to provide nationwide assistance for the same incident; it also generated the first major disaster declarations for a public health incident. Contrary to historical precedent, existing federal incident response doctrine, and the primary scenarios outlined in federal pandemic response plans, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assumed leadership of this coordinated response at the direction of President Donald J. Trump on March 19, 2020.4 President Trump, and later President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., deployed FEMA and the Stafford Act in unprecedented ways to provide nationwide assistance during the pandemic, ranging from the distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), to the development of a new unemployment assistance program, to the establishment of federal vaccination sites. As lead agency for government-wide DPA planning and coordination, FEMA Administrators also helped to implement selected presidential invocations of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, P.L. 81-774, as amended)5 to respond to pandemic-related supply constraints. The use of DPA during the pandemic—including by FEMA—at times underwhelmed expectations and raised concerns among policy experts, Members of Congress, and governors.6 1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), PanCAP Adapted: U.S. Government COVID-19 Response Plan, Mar. 13, 2020, p. 1, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6819-covid-19-response-plan/ d367f758bec47cad361f/optimized/full.pdf (hereinafter HHS, PanCap-Adapted). 2 For an explanation of the sequence of federal emergency declarations, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. A compilation of hundreds of CRS products on various federal relief measures is available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/resources/covid19/; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) references are available at https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus. For an agency description of the initial federal response, see Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Pandemic Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Initial Assessment Report, Jan. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_covid-19-initial-assessmentreport_2021.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, Initial Assessment Report); for a perspective from nonfederal stakeholders, see National Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), COVID-19 Pandemic: After-Action Report, June 2021, https://www.astho.org/COVID-19/NHSC-COVID-19-Pandemic-After-Action-Report/ (hereinafter NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report). 3 The Stafford Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq. 4 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4, 7, 24. 5 The Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.) confers on the President authorities to mobilize domestic industry in service of national defense, broadly defined, including emergency preparedness and response to natural hazards like the pandemic. For recent information on the use of the DPA for the pandemic, see FEMA, The Defense Production Act Committee Report to Congress, Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/ documents/fema_DPAC-report-Defense-production-act-committee_2020.pdf. See also CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire. 6 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 4 and 7. See also testimony by then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor in U.S. Congress, Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Evaluating the Federal Government’s Procurement and Distribution Strategies in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, hearings, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., June Congressional Research Service 1 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response As noted in the following report, the pandemic compelled FEMA to rapidly adapt longstanding components of its response operations, flagship response and recovery programs, and coordination with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. In the words of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor, who led FEMA in its first year of pandemic response, these innovations reflected “tremendous creativity, ... [and] also laid bare gaps and shortcomings in [the agency’s] plans, procedures, and policies.”7 To identify areas to improve, FEMA assessed its initial response to the pandemic in a January 2021 report.8 Additionally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General have published multiple reports examining aspects of FEMA’s pandemic response (a list of resources may be found in Appendix B). The 117th Congress faces questions regarding the scope and purpose of the Stafford Act, FEMA, and the agency’s use of the DPA as all three continue to shape the coordinated federal pandemic response. Should the Stafford Act and FEMA play central roles in future U.S. responses to infectious disease events? How should the Stafford Act and FEMA operate in conjunction with other emergency authorities and public health agencies in the future? How should FEMA deploy or coordinate the DPA to manage future supply chain constraints posed by biological incidents? Where should Congress locate responsibility for the challenges faced in the federal COVID-19 pandemic response, and how should those challenges be redressed? What, if any, authorities should Congress provide or revise given the course of the federal response? This report first examines FEMA’s planned and actual role in the federal COVID-19 pandemic response. It then presents considerations for Congress focused on the Stafford Act and its public health adaptations, FEMA’s public health preparedness and response operations, the Disaster Relief Fund that finances Stafford Act assistance, and FEMA’s use of the DPA during the pandemic. A comprehensive account of FEMA’s many individual lines of effort and challenges faced during the COVID-19 pandemic exceeds the scope of this report; however, Appendix B includes relevant resources. Terms Within this report, the term “state” refers to states and territories. For purposes of the Stafford Act, “‘State’ means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands” (42 U.S.C. §5122(4)). The term “tribe” refers to Indian tribal governments. Per the Stafford Act, “[t]he term ‘Indian tribal government’ means the governing body of any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994” (42 U.S.C. §5122(6)). 6, 2020, p. 3, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Gaynor%20&%20Polowczyk-2020-06-09.pdf (hereinafter, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution). See Shayan Karbassi, “Understanding Biden’s Invocation of the Defense Production Act,” Mar. 4, 2021, Law Fare Blog, https://www.lawfareblog.com/ understanding-bidens-invocation-defense-production-act; H.Res. 906, Calling on the President to invoke the Defense Production Act to respond to COVID-19, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.; and Ariel Cohen, “Pharmacies, Governors Say Biden Test Program Is Depleting Supply,” CQ News, Jan. 27, 2022, https://plus.cq.com/doc/news-6440599?0. For background, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-108, Nov. 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21108.pdf, and CRS Report R43767, The Defense Production Act of 1950: History, Authorities, and Considerations for Congress, by Heidi M. Peters. 7 Then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor, Introductory Letter, Initial Assessment Report, p. i. 8 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report. Congressional Research Service 2 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Generally, Stafford Act assistance is requested by the “governor” (i.e., “the chief executive of any State” (42 U.S.C. §5122(5)), or the “chief executive” (i.e., “the person who is the Chief, Chairman, Governor, President, or similar executive official of an Indian tribal government” (42 U.S.C. §5122(12)). The term “Recipient” in this report refers to “[a] non-Federal entity that receives a Federal award directly from a Federal awarding agency to carry out an activity under a Federal program”; and the term “Applicant” or “PA Applicant” refers to “the responsible entity for a [Public Assistance] project,” per FEMA, Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG), FP 104-009-2, June 1, 2020, pp. 21-22, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ fema_pappg-v4-updated-links_policy_6-1-2020.pdf (hereinafter FEMA, PAPPG 2020). The term “COVID-19 pandemic” refers to the public health disaster caused by the COVID-19 virus in the U.S., including the domestic outbreak that predated the World Health Organization’s designation of pandemic on March 11, 2020. World Health Organization, “WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19,” March 11, 2020, https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-sopening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020. Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents This section summarizes federal plans for FEMA’s involvement in infectious disease incidents prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus in the United States to contextualize the actual role of the agency in the COVID-19 pandemic response. Multiple overlapping and interrelated authorities govern U.S. federal responses to domestic hazards, including public health incidents. This report focuses on those that activate or involve FEMA, including those tailored to biological incidents and specifically infectious disease incidents (see Appendix A for a select list of relevant authorities). Under these authorities, U.S. domestic incident response is organized according to a federalist “bottom-up” framework. Federal policy envisions a “whole-of-community” approach to domestic incident response, involving the authorities of individuals, SLTTs, private partners, and, when warranted, federal agencies. Federal authorities provide for federal involvement only if an incident exceeds state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) response capacity,9 and generally only after one or more state, tribal, or territorial authorities request such involvement or assistance.10 FEMA articulates these principals in its assertion that incident preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery are ideally “locally executed, state, tribe, and territory-managed, and federally supported.”11 The Department of Homeland Security identifies relevant roles and responsibilities of SLTTs, federal agencies, and private sector partners in the National Response Framework (NRF), a strategic guide to intergovernmental incident response.12 The NRF recognizes that incidents— 9 See, for example, the President’s authority to authorize major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act following a request from a governor or tribal chief executive “based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary” (the Stafford Act, Section 401(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170(a)). 10 One exception, invoked for COVID-19, is the power of the President to declare an emergency under the Stafford Act Section 501(b) absent a request for assistance. Previously, this authority had been invoked for incidents involving federal property. See CRS Insight IN11251, The Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19, by Erica A. Lee, Bruce R. Lindsay, and Elizabeth M. Webster. 11 See, for example, FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 9. 12 The NRF was developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2005 (PKEMRA, as amended, P.L. 109-295); PKEMRA amended the Homeland Security Congressional Research Service 3 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response particularly nationally significant, severe incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic—transcend the authorities of a single federal statute, response framework, or agency.13 Under the NRF and related domestic response plans, federal disaster response activities generally fall under the leadership of one agency—what is referred to as the lead federal agency.14 According to the Public Health Service Act15 and federal response operations plans,16 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is to lead federal public health response efforts for public health incidents. Meanwhile, the Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act identify leadership and coordination roles for FEMA in domestic incidents that warrant federal assistance, particularly those with Stafford Act declarations.17 FEMA interpretations of these authorities and related presidential policy appear in Figure 1.18 Federal guidance detailing pandemic response activities, including the Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP; updated by FEMA in 2018) and its adaptation for the COVID-19 pandemic, PanCAP-Adapted (released by HHS on March 13, 2020), envisioned HHS leading the federal response.19 In its initial self-assessment, FEMA underscored Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) in order to enhance domestic incident response. Section 509 of Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, P.L. 109-295 (6 U.S.C. §319); U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Response Framework, Fourth Edition, Oct. 28, 2019, pp. 22, 45, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/ NRF_FINALApproved_2011028.pdf, (hereinafter DHS, NRF 2019); FEMA, “National Response Framework,” https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/frameworks/response. For more information, see CRS Report R46696, National Preparedness: A Summary and Select Issues, by Shawn Reese and Lauren R. Stienstra. 13 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness, GAO-21-513, Aug. 2021, p. 9, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-513, (hereinafter GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings). 14 DHS, NRF 2019, p. 22. 15 The Public Health Service Act (PHSA, P.L. 78-409) provides emergency authorities the HHS Secretary may activate in response to threat of disease or disorder. Under the PHSA, the HHS Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan” [succeeded by the NRF]. Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh. For more information, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. 16 DHS defines a biological incident as one which has “the potential to overwhelm state and local resources and for which the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to lead all federal public health and medical efforts, deems that, in consultation with other relevant agencies, interagency support is or will be required” in interagency guidance detailing a federal response plan for biological incidents. DHS, Biological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operations Plans, Final—January 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/ 2020-07/fema_incident-annex_biological.pdf, p. vii. Additionally, according to FEMA, Presidential Policy Directive 44 (PPD-44) outlines agency leadership of domestic incidents in the absence of Stafford Act declarations; under this directive, HHS served as lead federal agency and FEMA lent support through late March, 2020. FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23. CRS has not reviewed PPD-44, as it is not publicly available. 17 Notably, FEMA has not served as the lead federal agency in incidents with Stafford Act declarations, particularly those relevant to the expertise of other federal agencies. For example, the President declared emergencies in New York and New Jersey under the Stafford Act for the West Nile Virus, but the CDC served as the lead federal agency. U.S. Congress, Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, “Responding to the West Nile Virus: Public Health Implications and Federal Response,” hearing, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., Oct. 3, 2002, no. 107-233. 18 See, for example, Sections 402 and 502 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§5170a and 5192), which authorize the President to “direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to utilize its authorities and the resources granted to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services)” to support state and local response and recovery efforts following a Stafford Act major disaster or an emergency, respectively. These authorities were delegated to FEMA in Executive Order 12148 and subsequent amendments. Executive Order 12148, “Federal Emergency Management,” 44 Federal Register 43239, July 24, 1979. 19 The PanCAP and PanCAP-Adapted are not publicly available. CRS may share the documents with Members of Congressional Research Service 4 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response [t]he 2018 Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP) did not envision FEMA as the agency leading federal response for a whole-of-government response under the Stafford Act, or its role in managing health and medical supplies and equipment for SLTT partners nationally. FEMA regional pandemic plans either did not exist or did not account for jurisdictionspecific capabilities or deficiencies.20 However, federal pandemic plans did allow for the possibility that a situation could evolve to warrant a different leadership structure, including one co-led by HHS and FEMA. In particular, the PanCAP-Adapted stipulated that HHS may “request FEMA coordination support to the overall federal response while HHS continues to lead the public health and medical response.”21 Further, the PanCAP-Adapted noted that widespread domestic transmission of the COVID-19 virus or a Stafford Act declaration might require the activation of an interagency Unified Coordination Group (UCG) at FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).22 FEMA and HHS implemented variations of these proposed leadership structures in March 2020. Figure 1. Agency Leadership Designations in Domestic Incident Response According to FEMA’s Interpretation of Presidential Policy Source: FEMA’s interpretation of Presidential Policy Directive 44 (PPD-44), FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 32. See also DHS, National Response Framework, Fourth Edition, October 28, 2019, p. 43. Congress and congressional staff upon request. 20 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 11. 21 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted, p. 7. 22 Ibid., p. 10. Congressional Research Service 5 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response NRF and Supporting Interagency Operations Plans The NRF organizes federal response capabilities responsibilities under “Emergency Support Functions” (ESFs), each of which pertains to a particular response function and designates a lead agency and supporting agencies. 23 For example, ESF-8—Public Health and Medical Services “[c]oordinates the mechanisms for assistance in response to an actual or potential public health and medical disaster or incident.”24 The agency designated as ESF-8 Coordinator is HHS. Additional federal interagency plans and systems translate the doctrine of the NRF into operational structures and procedures. These include:  the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which outlines a flexible response management structure and vocabulary that may be used at local, state, regional, or national levels.25 NIMS reflects the Incident Command System (ICS), which standardizes chains of command, organizational hierarchies, resource management and communication processes, and functional areas for field-level incident management operations;26  the Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) align federal response tasks to specific agency roles and responsibilities;27 FIOP “annexes,” like the Biological Incident Annex, tailor FIOPs to outline federal responses to specific types of hazards; and  the Pandemic Crisis Action Plan (PanCAP), authored by FEMA in 2018, which adapts existing authorities and interagency response plans to specifically address a pandemic, including the PanCAP-Adapted, which HHS adapted specifically to guide response to the COVID-19 pandemic. FEMA’s Role in COVID-19 Pandemic Response FEMA’s Role Prior to March 13, 2020 To coordinate the response, President Trump first established the White House Coronavirus Task Force, led by then-HHS Secretary Alex Azar.28 Two days later, on January 31, 2020, then-HHS Secretary Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), under which the Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies.”29 Thereafter, leadership of the expanding federal response evolved,30 as summarized in Table 1. During this time, FEMA reported that it was lending support to HHS in its role as lead federal agency for public health response.31 According to FEMA, this support 23 DHS, NRF 2019, pp. 21-22. 24 Ibid., p. 40. 25 FEMA, National Incident Management System, Third Edition, Oct. 2017, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/ 2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf. 26 Emergency Management Institute, ICS Review Document, Mar. 2018, https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/ icsresource/assets/ics%20review%20document.pdf. 27 See, for example, DHS, Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_response-fiop.pdf; and DHS, Recovery Federal Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan, Second Edition, Aug. 2016, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/ Recovery_FIOP_2nd_aug2016.pdf. 28 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidentscoronavirus-task-force/. 29 PHSA, P.L. 78-410, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§201-300mm–61; HHS, “Public Health Emergency Declarations,” 2020: Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists Nationwide as the Result of the 2019 Novel Coronavirus, January 31, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/default.aspx. The declaration was made retroactive to January 27, 2020, and has been renewed several times. 30 For more information, see FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 23-25. 31 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020. Provided to CRS from FEMA Office of Congressional Research Service 6 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response included “crisis action planning, situational awareness reporting, interagency coordination, course of action development and logistics supply chain analysis.”32 Additionally, FEMA and HHS collaborated to “quickly adapt” the federal government’s general pandemic response plan to COVID-19.33 However, FEMA’s overall role appeared relatively narrow. When invited to testify at a hearing on the federal response efforts before the Subcommittee on National Security of the U.S. House Oversight and Reform Committee FEMA declined, responding “the Agency does not feel as if there is much that we would be able to testify to.”34 In February, FEMA began to identify personnel to deploy for pandemic incident management, and on March 4, 2020, FEMA reported that it was readying more than 50 teams to support SLTTs.35 However, the agency reported that it was not preparing for a Stafford Act declaration and reasserted that HHS was the lead federal agency for the federal government’s public health response to the pandemic.36 Additionally, FEMA indicated to Congress that it was not a part of the White House Coronavirus Task Force at this time.37 Table 1. Key Leadership Designations for Federal COVID-19 Pandemic Response Relevant to FEMA’s Role Date Authority Jan. 29, 2020 Various, including explicitly the National Biodefense Strategy, National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) 14.38 Leadership Designation Secretary of HHS to lead federal response as chair of White House Coronavirus Task Force. Summary President Trump announced the formation of the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which was “charged ... with leading the United States Government response,” and was to be “led by Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, and ... coordinated through the National Security Council.”39 The announcement referenced the National Biodefense Strategy, which along with NSPM14 established a leadership structure chaired by the HHS Secretary for implementing the Strategy.40 Congressional and Legislative Affairs. 32 Ibid. 33 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23. 34 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefsoversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response. 35 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 83; FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020. 36 FEMA, “FEMA Support to Coronavirus Response,” fact sheet, Mar. 4, 2020. 37 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Reform, “FEMA Briefs Oversight Committee on Administration’s Coronavirus Response,” Mar. 20, 2020, https://oversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/fema-briefsoversight-committee-on-administration-s-coronavirus-response. 38 HHS, “Posting of the National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83 Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018. 39 Stefanie Grisham, “Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding the President’s Coronavirus Task Force,” Jan. 29, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-presidentscoronavirus-task-force/. 40 HHS, National Biodefense Strategy, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/biodefense-strategy/Pages/goals-andobjectives.aspx; Multiple Agencies, National Biodefense Strategy, Sept. 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Biodefense-Strategy.pdf; HHS, “National Security Presidential Memorandum 14, ‘Support for National Biodefense,’” notice, 83 Federal Register 52841-52843, Oct. 18, 2018. Congressional Research Service 7 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Date Authority Leadership Designation Summary The establishment of the White House Coronavirus Task Force modified the incident response structures established in federal pandemic response plans.41 Jan. 31, 2020 The Public Health Service Act.42 Secretary of HHS to lead federal public health and medical response to COVID-19 public health emergency. Then-Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Alex Azar declared a Public Health Emergency under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) for the COVID-19 pandemic, which provides that the HHS Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the National Response Plan” [succeeded by the NRF].43 Feb. 26, 2020 Various, including NRF.44 Vice President to lead whole-of-government response. President Trump announced that Vice President Michael Pence would lead the coordinated federal response and ESF-8.45 Secretary Azar confirmed in the same remarks that he would continue to serve as Chairman of the White House Coronavirus Task Force.46 March 13, 2020 The Stafford Act; Public Health Service Act, PanCap-Adapted: Biological Incident Annex to NRF. FEMA to lead provision of Stafford Act assistance; HHS to lead overall federal pandemic response. President Trump declared a Stafford Act emergency nationwide, specifying that “Administrator Gaynor shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act, subject to the Department of Health and Human Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Government’s response to COVID-19.”47 March 18-20, 2020 The Stafford Act. FEMA to serve as lead federal agency of the whole-of-government pandemic response. President Trump and Vice President Pence notified then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor that the agency would assume the role of LFA of the coordinated federal response. HHS would continue to lead the public health response.48 41 GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34. 42 PPD-44 is not a public document and was not available for CRS review for the writing of this report. However, FEMA reported that “PPD-44 enhances the ability of the federal government to respond to domestic incidents by providing for the timely identification of a lead federal agency (LFA) to oversee the federal response prior to a national disaster declaration and by ensuring that an appropriate incident management capability is available. Under this authority, FEMA supported HHS with incident management capability for the COVID-19 response,” prior to the Stafford Act declarations. FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 23. 43 Public Health Service Act §2801; 42. U.S.C. §300hh. 44 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34). 45 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus Task Force in Press Conference,” Feb. 27, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarkspresident-trump-vice-president-pence-members-coronavirus-task-force-press-conference/. 46 Ibid. 47 Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, to then-Acting Secretary Chad Wolf, then-Secretary Steven Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and then-Administrator Peter Gaynor, Mar. 13, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determinationstafford-act/ (hereinafter President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19”). 48 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7. Congressional Research Service 8 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Date Authority Leadership Designation March 20, 2020 National Response Framework; PanCap-Adapted; Biological Incident Annex to NRF. Unified Coordination Group (UCG) to serve as interagency decisionmaking body for federal pandemic response. Following FEMA’s assumption of the role of LFA, FEMA and HHS established the UCG “for decisionmaking.” Principals included the FEMA Administrator, the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the HHS Assistant Secretary for Health, and Director of the Influenza Division in the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).49 January 20, 2021 Various, including NRF.50 President Joseph R. Biden establishes the White House COVID19 Response Team. President Biden established the White House COVID-19 Response Team, coordinated by appointee Jeffrey Zients.51 Summary Source: CRS Analysis of Federal Pandemic Response structure leadership designations, and relevant authorities identified in Table A-1. FEMA’s Role Following Stafford Act Declarations for the Pandemic On March 13, 2020, President Trump unilaterally declared an emergency pursuant to Stafford Act Section 501(b), authorizing assistance for COVID-19 response efforts for all U.S. states, territories, and the District of Columbia.52 This emergency declaration for the pandemic authorized a single form of FEMA assistance: Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective measures.53 Subsequently, governors and tribal chief executives submitted requests for major disaster declarations pursuant to Stafford Act Section 401 for the COVID-19 pandemic, and President Trump declared major disasters for all 50 states, five territories, the District of Columbia, and the Seminole Tribe of Florida. President Biden later approved the major disaster declaration requests of the Navajo Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians for the COVID19 pandemic.54 49 Ibid., pp. 24-25, 32. 50 The National Response Framework specifies that “[r]egardless of the type of incident, the President leads the Federal Government response effort to ensure that the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently to large-scale and catastrophic incidents.” (DHS, NRF 2019, p. 34). 51 President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Executive Order on Organizing and Mobilizing the United States Government to Provide a Unified and Effective Response to Combat COVID-⁠19 and to Provide United States Leadership on Global Health and Security,” Executive Order 13987, Jan. 20, 2021, 86 Federal Register 7019-7021. 52 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.” 53 PA provides supplemental grants or direct assistance (e.g., personnel, materials, operations) on a cost-share basis to subfederal governments and eligible nonprofits for costs incurred for specific activities, in this case, eligible emergency response measures. FEMA developed multiple iterations of guidance outlining eligible costs and measures. Current guidance is available at FEMA. Eligible measures are available in pandemic-specific guidance at FEMA, “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance,” https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specificguidance-covid-19-declarations. PA for emergency assistance is authorized pursuant to Section 502 of the Stafford Act (P.L. 93-288); 42 U.S.C. §5192. President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.” 54 Specific presidential declarations of major disaster for COVID-19 are listed at FEMA, “COVID-19 Disaster Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/coronavirus/disaster-declarations, and the FEMA “Disasters” webpage, available at https://www.fema.gov/disasters. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. Congressional Research Service 9 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response All major disaster declarations reauthorized PA for emergency protective measures, and most major disaster declarations authorized Individual Assistance (IA)—Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) in the President’s initial declaration.55 Subsequently, President Trump authorized the FEMA Administrator to approve CCP requests, and through the program, 46 states, Washington, DC, and four territories applied for and received CCP awards.56 Later, on August 8, 2020, President Trump invoked IA statutory authorities to authorize FEMA to expend up to $44 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program to provide supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving unemployment insurance.57 Congress also later authorized Funeral Assistance for the pandemic under the Stafford Act declarations.58 Upon assumption of office in January 2021, President Biden increased the federal cost share for PA-eligible activities from 75% to 100% and expanded the range of work eligible for reimbursement. Figure 2 provides a chronology of the activation of Stafford Act authorities for the pandemic. 55 The Crisis Counseling Program (CCP) provides community-based outreach and psycho-educational services to support individuals and communities recovering from disasters. FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” press release, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/femaadministrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30 States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/femaadministrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling. 56 According to the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories [Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not apply for CCP assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo Nation’s CCP Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band Creek Indians did not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations and Related Federal Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-22-104437.pdf). 57 The Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program includes a 25% nonfederal cost sharing requirement funded by states and territories. It was authorized as a form of Other Needs Assistance under Stafford Act Section 408(e)(2) (42 U.S.C. §5174(e)(2)). President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-majordisaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease-2019/. For additional information on LWA, see CRS Insight IN11492, COVID-19: Supplementing Unemployment Insurance Benefits (Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation vs. Lost Wages Assistance), by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker. 58 Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia. For additional information on COVID-19 Funeral Assistance, see CRS Insight IN11582, FEMA Funeral Assistance for COVID-19, by Elizabeth M. Webster. Congressional Research Service 10 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Figure 2. Authorization of Stafford Act Assistance for Pandemic-Related Costs Sources: CRS interpretation of pandemic-specific PA and IA guidance, Stafford Act declarations, and relevant presidential memoranda. Notes: a. The President granted multiple extensions of the 100% federal cost share for PA and may issue additional extensions. FEMA announced that PA will be available for eligible pandemic-related measures indefinitely; the agency will provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to the program’s conclusion. According to current policy, FEMA will cover 100% of eligible costs through July 1, 2022, after which it will cover 90% of eligible costs. b. Congress authorized Funeral Assistance first through the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 and then in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA); on the date of ARPA’s enactment, the President amended the declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic to add Funeral Assistance for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia. The emergency and major disaster declarations for the pandemic were unprecedented in several respects. The emergency declaration marked the first time that a President had declared a Stafford Act emergency for all jurisdictions nationwide. Additionally, the COVID-19 nationwide emergency declaration marked the first time the president issued such an expansive declaration absent a governor or tribal chief executive’s request, as is generally required for Stafford Act declarations except for very rare incidents determined to be of “primary Federal responsibility.”59 Additionally, while Presidents have occasionally declared emergencies under Stafford Act for public health incidents, the major disaster declarations for the pandemic were the first to be issued for any public health incident under current law.60 Initially, in the March 13, 2020 Stafford Act declaration of emergency, President Trump explained that: [FEMA] Administrator Gaynor shall coordinate and direct other Federal agencies in providing needed assistance under the Stafford Act, subject to the Department of Health 59 Stafford Act Section 501(b); 42 U.S.C. §5170. For discussion, see Elizabeth Goiteen, “Emergency Powers, Real and Imagined: How President Trump Used and Failed to Use Presidential Authority in the COVID-19 Crisis,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy, vol. 11, no. 27 (2020), pp. 51-53; for background, see CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay; and CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. 60 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 11 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response and Human Services’ role as the lead Federal agency for the Federal Government’s response to COVID-19.61 However, on March 18, 2020, President Trump and Vice President Pence then directed FEMA to assume leadership of the coordinated federal response. FEMA assumed this role on March 19, 2020.62 The following description of FEMA’s planned and observed role in the federal pandemic response draws upon a number of interrelated authorities in statute, regulations, and interagency guidance, as summarized in Appendix A. Response Organizational Structure after FEMA’s Assumption of Leadership On March 20, 2020, FEMA and HHS established the Unified Coordination Group, consisting of four principals (representing FEMA and HHS) whose responsibility included “operational command, leadership, and decision making for the coordinated federal response,” according to the GAO.63 FEMA reported that, as lead federal agency for the coordinated federal response, the agency also led the UCG.64 The FEMA Administrator and HHS Secretary additionally served on the White House Coronavirus Task Force, which oversaw the coordinated federal response. Following FEMA’s assumption of leadership, HHS transferred eight operational task forces it had established to support the federal response from the HHS Secretary’s Operations Center to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) at FEMA headquarters.65 The task forces represented interagency efforts dedicated to:         Community Based Testing; Data Management; Laboratory Diagnostics; Healthcare System Resilience; Medical Countermeasures; Supply Chain Stabilization; Community Mitigation Measures; and Continuity of Operations.66 Each task force was responsible for securing resources to support the federal pandemic response and to coordinate specific lines of effort. For example, the Community Based Testing Task Force, led by HHS with support from FEMA, was responsible for the creation of federally-supported community-based testing sites to increase COVID-19 testing nationwide.67 According to FEMA, these task forces were initially led by HHS and Department of Defense (DOD) subject matter experts. The task forces did not correspond to the existing structure and functions of the NRCC, 61 President Trump, “Letter on Stafford Act Emergency Declaration for COVID-19.” 62 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 7. 63 Note that the GAO identified three principals in its June 2020 report on the federal pandemic response; FEMA later identified four principals in its Initial Assessment Report. GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts, pp. 12-13 (hereinafter GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities); FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 25. 64 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 35. 65 Ibid., p. 37. 66 For a thorough description of the responsibilities and key tasks of each task force, see GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, pp. 91-92. 67 GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, p. 91; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 38-39. Congressional Research Service 12 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response which is modeled off of the NRF and NIMS (National Incident Management System) guidance (see textbox on p. 6 for more information). As a result, existing NRCC response functions and the pandemic-specific task forces operated in parallel.68 See Figure 3 for a visualization of the federal pandemic response organization according to FEMA.69 As FEMA describes, “[f]or any given incident, FEMA disaster response begins and ends with the affected [FEMA] Region in the lead.”70 In line with this posture, FEMA’s ten Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) all activated to support the federal pandemic response, led by FEMA Regional Administrators. FEMA regional staff coordinated with SLTT representatives, relayed information from the NRCC to SLTT partners, and deployed regional FEMA personnel to directly assist SLTT emergency management and public health offices.71 However, FEMA found that certain functions typically coordinated out of regional offices required adaptation. For example, FEMA designed national Mission Assignments (or “work orders” for federal personnel) to reduce the burdens on FEMA regions and provide the NRCC better situational awareness nationwide.72 In May and June, 2020, FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response changed to enable FEMA to “prepare and support the upcoming hurricane season and other potential disasters Americans may face.”73 The remaining response task forces were converted into working groups, over which HHS reassumed oversight.74 HHS and the Defense Logistics Agency assumed responsibility for certain FEMA lines of effort related to medical supply chain management and procurement, respectively.75 However, FEMA retains an active and leading role in the federal pandemic response as of the date of publication of this report. Stakeholder Commentary on Leadership Transition Perceived delays in FEMA’s assumption of a leadership role in the federal response prompted concern among some Members of Congress, news media, and academic sources.76 For example, Representative Xochitl Torres Small noted in a July 2020 hearing that a congressional evaluation of lessons learned should 68 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 32-40. 69 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 70 FEMA, Incident Management and Support Keystone, Jan. 2011, p. 47, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/ 2020-07/fema_incident_management_and_support_keystone-Jan2011.pdf. 71 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 33-34, 80-85. 72 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 57-59. 73 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, p. 7. 74 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5. 75 GAO has noted that the scope and nature of the transition of FEMA supply chain management responsibilities to HHS lacked clarity. See GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts, pp. 19-20; See also submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Gaynor and Real Admiral Polowcyzk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, p. 7. 76 See, for example, Daniel Kaniewski, “Coronavirus Is a Disaster. Why Hasn’t FEMA Been Brought In?” Politico, Mar. 10, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/03/10/coronavirus-crisis-fema-125076; Eric Lipton, Zolan Kanno-Youngs, and Helene Cooper, “Trump Slowly Enlisting More Agencies in ‘Whole of Government’ Response to Virus,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/us/politics/coronavirus-governmentarmy-corps.html; and William Shields, “The COVID-19 Pandemic: Early Lessons for Public Governance: The United States Experience,” in Good Public Governance in a Global Pandemic, Paul Joyce, Fabienne Maron and Purshottama Sivanarain Reddy, eds., IIAS public Governance Series, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 429-442. Congressional Research Service 13 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response includ[e] revisiting the appointment of FEMA as the lead of the federal response effort in mid-March, more than six weeks after the White House Coronavirus Task Force was formed; a delay that unquestionably put the agency at a disadvantage of executing such a formidable task.77 Despite these concerns, FEMA’s response also garnered praise from some subfederal stakeholders. In July 2020, the Director of California’s Office of Emergency Services testified that [g]iven the complexity of the situation and how late into the response they took over federal responsibility, FEMA was both challenged and worked to be incredibly responsive. FEMA did the best they could to organize information and operations to assist our state. FEMA Region IX is still embedded in the SOC and has played a critical role in the state’s Logistics and Commodity Movement Task Force and in communicating across the entire federal family. Particularly, the FEMA Region IX Administrator and liaison officers have been highly communicative and supportive.”78 77 Testimony of Rep. Xochitl Torres Small, Chairman of House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Management and Accountability, in U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Subcommittees on Oversight, Management and Accountability and Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery, House Committee on Homeland Security, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, hearing, 116th Cong., 2nd sess., July 14, 2020 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response). 78 Submitted testimony of Director, California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor Mark Ghilarducci, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal and State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response, p. 4. Congressional Research Service 14 Figure 3. Organization of the Federal Coordinated Pandemic Response According to FEMA Source: CRS adaptation of FEMA, “Revised UCG Structure in COVID-19 Response,” Initial Assessment Report, p. 36. Notes: Not all task forces are pictured. Color codes indicate agency leadership of different functions. ASPR = Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response; OASH = Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health and Response; CDC = U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; SOC = HHS Secretary’s Operations Center, the primary emergency operations center for HHS; ESF = Emergency Support Functions as described in the National Response Framework; JIC = Joint Information Center. CRS-15 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response FEMA’s Pandemic Response: Key Lines of Effort This section identifies FEMA’s key lines of effort during its expanded role in the pandemic response following the Stafford Act declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic (see Figure 4). This overview is not intended to offer an exhaustive catalogue of FEMA’s actions during the pandemic (see Appendix B for resources that comprehensively detail FEMA’s pandemic response efforts). Lead Federal Agency (LFA) of the Federal Pandemic Response In this role, FEMA coordinated resources across the federal government and helped to establish and served on the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), an interagency decision-making body. On March 19, 2020, as FEMA assumed leadership of the coordinated response, federal pandemic response operations moved to the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), an interagency response operations room inside FEMA headquarters.79 The NRCC activated to Level 1, its highest activation level, for 426 days—an activation of unprecedented duration.80 FEMA’s 10 Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) also all activated and coordinated SLTT support and communications.81 SLTT Emergency Management Operational Support FEMA’s national and regional offices provided technical assistance and communications support and deployed federal personnel to SLTT emergency management offices. For example, according to FEMA, over 100 FEMA Integration Team (FIT) members—already embedded in state emergency management offices prior to the pandemic—supported pandemic response communication and planning across all levels of government. FEMA regional offices also deployed Incident Management Assessment Teams-Advance (IMAT-As) and liaison officers to support state, territorial, and tribal requests for direct and financial assistance.82 Public Assistance (PA) for SLTT and Nonprofit Response Efforts Since March 13, 2020, FEMA has provided reimbursement through the PA program for the eligible costs of specific emergency protective measures incurred by eligible PA Applicants (e.g., SLTTs and eligible nonprofits) responding to the pandemic. The wide range of costs eligible for reimbursement includes pandemic-related purchase and distribution of food; the provision of emergency medical care and diagnostic and screening testing; non-congregate sheltering for eligible individuals; the purchase of medical supplies; the construction and operation of alternative care facilities; the reopening of eligible public and nonprofit facilities; and compensation of overtime and surge staff needed to execute the above measures.83 79 Ibid., pp. 25, 32. 80 Initial activation to Level 1 reported in FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 32. FEMA reported that the NRCC reduced activation to Level III on May 19, 2021. FEMA, “FEMA Daily Ops Briefing,” May 19, 2021. 81 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 158-159. 82 Ibid., pp. 10, 25-26, 77, 81-85. 83 See FEMA, “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/ media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations, for a collection of guidance delineating eligible work, particularly FEMA, “Eligible Emergency Protective Measures,” August 27, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/eligible-emergency-protective-measures. Congressional Research Service 16 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Additionally, FEMA provided direct federal assistance (e.g., federal personnel, materials, space, operations) when PA Applicants were found unable to execute eligible response activities. FEMA mission assignments—or “work orders”—for FEMA and other agencies reflect provision of direct assistance ranging from the provision of temporary medical facilities to the deployment of federal personnel to perform vaccination to the establishment of quarantine housing. 84 Most recently, in January 2022, FEMA released guidance stipulating how the agency would support the expansion of healthcare facilities, including with direct federal assistance.85 Under the emergency and major disaster declarations issued by President Trump, Applicants could receive reimbursement for 75% of the eligible costs of specific response measures. Subsequently, President Biden increased the federal cost share to 100%.86 Under current presidential directive, FEMA shall reimburse 100% of costs incurred from January 20, 2020, through July 1, 2021.87 Thereafter, FEMA has announced that PA may be available to cover at least 90% of eligible costs incurred.88 The agency will provide at least thirty days’ notice prior to the conclusion of the program for the pandemic.89 As of December 2021, FEMA has obligated more than $34 billion through the PA program for pandemic-related expenses, an unprecedented sum for a single incident.90 Individual Assistance (IA) for Funeral Costs, Lost Wages, and Crisis Counseling The President and Congress authorized FEMA to provide select forms of IA to support recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, President Trump authorized FEMA to provide assistance through the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) and the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program. Subsequently, Congress authorized FEMA to provide COVID-19 Funeral Assistance. CCP is a type of IA that can be authorized pursuant to a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act.91 It provides grants to state, local, territorial, or tribal government agencies that allow them to deliver—or contract with local mental health services to deliver—communitybased outreach and psycho-educational services to support individuals and communities 84 OpenEFMA, “OpenFEMA Dataset: Mission Assignments,” reflecting obligations made through January 7, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/openfema-data-page/mission-assignments. 85 FEMA and Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), Healthcare Facility Expansion Assistance Playbook, Dec. 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_healthcare-facility-expansionassistance-playbook.pdf. 86 President Joseph R. Biden, “Memorandum to Extend Federal Support to Governors’ Use of the National Guard to Respond to COVID-⁠19 and to Increase Reimbursement and Other Assistance Provided to States,” Jan. 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/21/extend-federal-support-to-governors-useof-national-guard-to-respond-to-covid-19-and-to-increase-reimbursement-and-other-assistance-provided-to-states/. 87 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022. 88 FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022. 89 See, “Time Limitations for the Completion of Work,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2021, p. 6, https://www.fema.gov/ sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_public-assistance-eligibility-for-covid_policy_9-1-2020.pdf. 90 CRS Analysis of FEMA, “Public Assistance Funded Projects—Details,” as of Dec. 5, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/ openfema-data-page/public-assistance-funded-projects-details-v1. 91 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171. Congressional Research Service 17 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response recovering from disasters.92 The majority of the jurisdictions that received major disaster declarations for the COVID-19 pandemic were authorized to receive assistance through the CCP.93 President Trump authorized some CCP requests, and on April 28, 2020, the FEMA Administrator was authorized to approve COVID-19-related requests for CCP to expedite assistance.94 Invoking ONA’s general statutory authority, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum that authorized the LWA program and allowed FEMA to provide grants to states, territories, and the District of Columbia for supplemental lost wages payments to individuals receiving unemployment insurance.95 ONA typically provides financial assistance for uninsured disasterrelated necessary expenses and serious needs (e.g., assistance to replace disaster-damaged personal property and vehicles, and funeral assistance); LWA was a novel use of ONA.96 Funeral Assistance is another form of ONA that helps with eligible funeral expenses and is typically available when the President authorizes the Individuals and Households Program (IHP)—a type of Individual Assistance—pursuant to a declaration of emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act.97 In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Congress authorized FEMA to provide COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.98 Specifically, Section 201 of the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2021 (Division M of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260), and Section 4006 of the American Rescue Plan Act of 92 42 U.S.C. §5183; 44 C.F.R. §206.171. 93 The Crisis Counseling Program requests submitted by American Samoa and the Seminole Tribe of Florida had not been approved as of Aug. 24, 2021 (email to CRS from FEMA Office of External Affairs, Aug. 24, 2021, noting “American Samoa and Seminole Tribe of Florida have not been declared for IA with CCP”). 94 FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Authority to Approve Crisis Counseling During Coronavirus,” release, Apr. 28, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-administrator-authority-approve-crisis-counseling-during-coronavirus; and FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Approves 30 States for Crisis Counseling,” Release HQ-20-129, May 2, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/news-release/20200726/fema-administrator-approves-30-states-crisis-counseling. According to the GAO, FEMA awarded “about $467 million to 46 states, Washington, DC, and four U.S. territories [Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands] via the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program.” The states of Alaska, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Wyoming did not apply for CCP assistance (Alaska also withdrew its application for the CCP Regular Service Program). The Navajo Nation’s CCP Regular Services Program application is under review (as of December 2021), and the Poarch Band Creek Indians did not apply for CCP assistance (GAO, Behavioral Health and COVID-19: Higher-Risk Populations and Related Federal Relief Funding, GAO-22-104437, December 2021, pp. 74-76 (Appendix V), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22104437.pdf). 95 President Donald J. Trump, “Memorandum on Authorizing the Other Needs Assistance Program for Major Disaster Declarations Related to Coronavirus Disease 2019,” Aug. 8, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidentialactions/memorandum-authorizing-needs-assistance-program-major-disaster-declarations-related-coronavirus-disease2019/. See also, FEMA, “Lost Wages Supplemental Payment Assistance Guidelines,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/ coronavirus/governments/supplemental-payments-lost-wages-guidelines. LWA was subject to a 25% nonfederal cost sharing requirement. 96 Section 262(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) authorized states to waive the requirement that individuals repay Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) that they were not entitled to receive if the state determines: “(1) the payment of such covered assistance [LWA] was without fault on the part of the individual; and (2) such repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” Additionally, pursuant to Section 262(c), a state’s debt waiver issued under Section 262(b) also waives a debt owed to the United States. 97 42 U.S.C. §5174(e)(1); 44 C.F.R. §206.119(b)(1). 98 Only Funeral Assistance, and not all forms of Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance, has been authorized for the COVID-19 pandemic Stafford Act declarations. Congressional Research Service 18 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response 2021 (P.L. 117-2) authorized FEMA to provide financial assistance for COVID-19-related funeral expenses at 100% federal cost share.99 Supply Chain Stabilization In coordination with DOD and HHS, FEMA led efforts to stabilize critical domestic supply chains, particularly medical supply chains, upon assuming the role of LFA in March 2020.100 FEMA initiated several efforts in this capacity. First, FEMA began working with HHS and DOD to assess and stabilize the PPE supply chain after forming the Supply Chain Task Force.101 The Supply Chain Task Force supported PPE distribution efforts, analyzed supply chain vulnerabilities, and transported privately purchased PPE from manufacturers abroad to domestic airports through Project Air Bridge.102 Second, as designated lead of the federal government’s Joint DPA Office, FEMA coordinated and vetted invocations of the statute in support of the federal pandemic response.103 In this role, FEMA released guidance in coordination with Customs and Border Protection on the use of DPA to allocate and federal prioritize orders for scarce medical supplies.104 FEMA’s DPA actions included procuring critical medical supplies through priority-rated contracts, seizing and distributing PPE under anti-hoarding and price-gouging authorities, restricting exports of certain critical medical supplies, and establishing a voluntary agreement with private medical distributors to share price, cost, supply, distribution, and capacity utilization information, among other data, on certain critical health supplies.105 99 On the date of the enactment of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), the declarations for the COVID- 19 pandemic for the declared states, territories, and District of Columbia (but not the three tribes) were amended to authorize Funeral Assistance under Other Needs Assistance (ONA) (the amendments limit IHP-ONA to Funeral Assistance). 100 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 12-17; GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted Actions, Sept. 2020, pp. 10-24, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-701.pdf (hereinafter GAO, Federal Efforts); FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 24-25. 101 Submitted testimony of then-FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, pp. 4-5. 102 Ibid.; GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-12; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 45-76; CRS Report R46628, COVID19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire, pp. 7-16. 103 FEMA, “Defense Production Act Authority and Functions of the FEMA Administrator,” https://www.fema.gov/ disaster/defense-production-act/dpa-authority-and-functions. For detailed discussion of pandemic-specific organization of DPA authorities across the government, see GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-2018, November 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; for a brief overview of DPA leadership and FEMA’s role see CRS In Focus IF11767, The Defense Production Act Committee (DPAC): A Primer, by Michael H. Cecire. 104 Executive Office of the President, Executive Order 13911, “Delegating Additional Authority Under the Defense Production Act With Respect to Health and Medical Resources to Respond to the Spread of COVID-19,” Mar. 27, 2020, 85 Federal Register 18403. Subsequent notices report that authorities delegated to the DHS Secretary have “in turn been delegated to the FEMA Administrator in DHS Delegation 09052, Rev. 00.1 (Apr. 1, 2020).” See, for example, FEMA, “Prioritization and Allocation of Certain Scarce or Threatened Health and Medical Resources for Domestic Use,” temporary final rule, Apr. 10, 2020, 85 Federal Register 20195. 105 See CRS Report R46628, COVID-19 and Domestic PPE Production and Distribution: Issues and Policy Options, coordinated by Michael H. Cecire; FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 69-73; GAO, Defense Production Act: Opportunities Exist to Increase Transparency and Identify Future Actions to Mitigate Medical Supply Chain Issues, GAO-21-108, November 2020, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-108.pdf; CRS Insight IN11470, Defense Production Act (DPA): Recent Developments in Response to COVID-19, by Heidi M. Peters and Erica A. Lee; FEMA, “Pandemic Congressional Research Service 19 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response FEMA transferred certain medical supply chain responsibilities back to HHS and ASPR beginning in June 2020, including management of the Supply Chain Task Force, which became the Supply Chain Advisory Group under HHS’s management on June 15, 2020.106 Critical Medical Supply Distribution Following its assumption of the role of lead federal agency, FEMA coordinated and often executed federal efforts to distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, testing supplies, ventilators, and oxygen. As part of this effort, FEMA collaborated with ASPR and DOD to provide and receive contracting support, including entering into an agreement with ASPR that enabled FEMA to acquire and distribute critical medical supplies, including PPE, from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).107 At the time of publication, FEMA continues to distribute scarce medical supplies to states, tribes, and territories through its authorities to provide direct assistance under the PA program. States, tribes, and territories may then distribute these resources to localities and eligible nonprofits within their jurisdictions, including healthcare facilities. National Guard Mobilization The President has authorized FEMA to fund 100% of eligible costs of mobilizing the National Guard under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to execute certain pandemic response measures, including work related to vaccination, hospital and medical staffing (including “wraparound” hospital support services like cleaning, security, and food preparation), testing, and food distribution, among others.108 Under Title 32, FEMA issues fully-funded mission assignments to DOD for National Guard mobilization; troops operate at the direction of governors. Funding covers troops’ salaries, allowances, travel expenses, and per diem.109 Barring any changes, FEMA’s 100% Response Voluntary Agreement Under Section 708 of the Defense Production Act; Plans of Action To Respond to COVID-19,” 86 Federal Register 28851-28884, May 28, 2021. 106 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 10-11. 107 Submitted testimony of Administrator Peter Gaynor and Rear Admiral John Polowczyk, HSGAC, Federal Procurement and Distribution, p. 7; FEMA and HHS, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Assistant Secretary for Preparedness Response,” executed Apr. 5, 2020, provided to CRS by FEMA Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs. Available to congressional members and staff upon request. 108 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; White House, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Nov. 9, 2021 (hereinafter White House, “Maximizing Assistance,” Nov. 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandumfor-the-secretary-of-homeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-onmaximizing-assistance-to-respond-to-covid-19/; FEMA, “FEMA Administrator Gives Remarks to Ongoing COVID-19 Response,” Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20220114/icymi-fema-administrator-gives-remarksongoing-covid-19-response; FEMA, “Federal Support for Wraparound Medical Care and Services During COVID-19 Response,” Jan. 14, 2022. 109 FEMA will also reimburse states and territories for the costs of mobilizing the National Guard for eligible work under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (State Active Duty), but mission assignments may help relieve economic and administrative burdens associated with Title 10 mobilizations. FEMA, “National Guard Deployment Extended to Support COVID-19 Response,” updated Jan. 14, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/national-guard-deploymentextended-support-covid-19-response. Congressional Research Service 20 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response funding for the eligible costs of National Guard mobilization is scheduled to expire on July 1, 2022, after which FEMA will cover 90% of eligible costs.110 Vaccination Assistance FEMA provides 100% reimbursement and direct assistance through the PA program for Applicants’ eligible vaccination work, currently available through July 1, 2022.111 Since January 2021, FEMA has provided enhanced vaccination assistance, including extensive direct assistance (e.g., federal personnel, supplies, contract assistance, facilities) and the establishment of several dozen federally-run mass vaccination sites that provided vaccine allocations in excess of those distributed to individual states and territories.112 FEMA PA is available for a range of costs related to vaccine administration and distribution, including operations and surge personnel costs, PPE, facility support costs, vaccine storage and transportation, equipment, security, and transport for individuals under certain circumstances.113 Applicants may also receive reimbursement and direct assistance for vaccination community outreach (e.g., communications, personnel), booster vaccination campaigns, and vaccination of children ages 5 through 11 years.114 110 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022. 111 President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/01/memorandum-on-maximizing-assistanceto-respond-to-covid-19-2/; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022; FEMA, “Vaccine Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; and CRS Report R46715, FEMA Assistance for Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar. 112 FEMA, “Vaccine Support,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support; CRS Report R46715, FEMA Assistance for Vaccine Administration and Distribution: In Brief, by Erica A. Lee and Kavya Sekar; FEMA, “Federally Supported Community Vaccination Centers,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/vaccine-support/ vaccine-center; and FEMA, “Community Vaccination Centers Playbook,” Final version, https://www.fema.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/fema_community-vaccination-centers_playbook_04-23-2021.pdf. 113 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Medical Care Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim) (Version 2),” FEMA Policy #104-21-0004, pp. 6-9, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_public-assistancecovid-19-medical-care-v2-with-equity-job-aid_policy_3-15-2021.pdf. 114 FEMA, “FEMA Funds Community Engagement for COVID-19 Vaccinations,” May 12, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fema-funds-community-engagement-covid-19-vaccinations; FEMA, “FEMA Public Assistance Supports COVID-19 Vaccine Administration to Children,” provided by FEMA Congressional and Legislative Affairs, Nov. 3, 2021; and FEMA, “FEMA Support for COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts Continues,” Sept. 20, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/FEMA_Advisory_FEMA_Support_for_COVID19_Vaccination_Efforts_Continues_09202021.pdf. Congressional Research Service 21 Figure 4. Duration of Select FEMA Lines of Effort in Federal Pandemic Response Source: CRS Analysis of FEMA Pandemic-Specific Guidance and Documentation of Response Efforts. Notes: a. At any time, FEMA may announce an end to the “incident period” that marks the period during which the pandemic occurred. Separately, FEMA policy notes that Public Assistance for pandemic-related costs will be available on an ongoing basis; FEMA will provide at least 30 days’ notice prior to its conclusion. For further discussion on the duration of Stafford Act declarations and Public Assistance, see CRS Report R46809, Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarations for the COVID-19 Pandemic, coordinated by Erica A. Lee and Sarah A. Lister. b. The Community Based Testing Sites initiative involved multiple phases; this graph reflects phases in which FEMA was directly involved. The White House announced the establishment of new federal surge testing sites in December 2021, supported in part by FEMA. The White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to Protect Americans and Help Communities and Hospitals Battle Omicron,” Dec. 21, 2021; FEMA, “FEMA Funding for the Safe Opening and Operating of Schools, Including Testing,” Jan. 18, 2022. c. FEMA began accepting applications for Funeral Assistance on Apr.12, 2021 for deaths attributed to COVID-19 since Jan. 20, 2020. CRS-22 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Considerations for Congress The following section identifies considerations and policy options for Congress in four areas critical to FEMA’s role in the federal pandemic response: the Stafford Act, FEMA’s operations and organization, the Defense Production Act (DPA), and the Disaster Relief Fund. Stafford Act Legislative Considerations The following section identifies policy considerations specific to FEMA’s authorities under the Stafford Act and their relevance to the federal COVID-19 pandemic response. Applicability of Stafford Act to Public Health Incidents The design of the Stafford Act might complicate activations for public health incidents. Presidents generally activate the Stafford Act to respond to rapid-onset events that cause measurable losses in a specific geographic area (e.g., tornadoes), in contrast to ongoing infectious disease incidents that spread across whole regions.115 As noted above, the federal government mobilized and adapted the Stafford Act in unprecedented ways to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the Stafford Act, governors or tribal chief executives may request an emergency or major disaster declaration only when an incident is “of such severity and magnitude” that state, local, tribal, or territorial governments are unable to effectively respond without supplemental federal assistance.116 FEMA defines the time interval during which the disaster-causing incident occurs as the “incident period.”117 Per FEMA regulations, Stafford Act assistance shall only alleviate “the damage or hardship ... which took place during the incident period or was in anticipation of that incident.”118 FEMA weighs the monetary value of structural damages incurred during the incident period when evaluating a state’s capacity to respond to an incident, and then makes a recommendation to the President regarding the state’s request for a declaration.119 Infectious disease incidents are diffuse and develop over a significant period of time without damaging infrastructure; they do not conform to the temporal and geographic limits built into FEMA’s declaration process. The lack of measurable physical damage might make it difficult to determine whether the infectious disease outbreak is beyond the state’s response capacity under the current assessment framework. Similarly, it may be difficult for FEMA to determine the geographic areas eligible for federal assistance and establish incident periods for pandemics. Additionally, policymakers may be concerned that definitions within the Stafford Act limit declarations for future infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. Under the Stafford Act, emergencies are defined broadly as follows: any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect 115 For more information, see CRS Report R42702, Stafford Act Declarations 1953-2016: Trends, Analyses, and Implications for Congress, by Bruce R. Lindsay. 116 Stafford Act Sections 401 and 501; 42 U.S.C. §§5170, 5191. 117 44 C.F.R. §206.32(f). 118 Ibid. 119 For information on the damage assessment process, see CRS Report R44977, Preliminary Damage Assessments for Major Disasters: Overview, Analysis, and Policy Observations, by Bruce R. Lindsay. Congressional Research Service 23 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.120 The broad definition of an emergency arguably provides the President with the discretion to declare emergencies for a range of incidents, including infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. However, the scope of emergency assistance is fairly limited. By contrast, the Stafford Act authorizes a wider range of federal assistance for major disasters, defined as: any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.121 While President Trump and President Biden determined that pandemics could be included within the definition of major disaster (which does not explicitly list infectious disease outbreaks or pandemics), future administrations could view the list to more narrowly constrain the meaning of “any natural catastrophe.” If so, requests for disease outbreaks and pandemics could be denied in the future on the basis that they do not meet the legal definition of a major disaster.122 If Congress wants to broaden the applicability of the Stafford Act to include future infectious disease incidents, it could require FEMA to update its regulations accordingly. The effort may require identification of metrics that may accurately measure a state’s response capacity with respect to infectious disease outbreaks. Towards this end, Congress might consider directing FEMA to clearly measure hazard losses beyond structural damages. Congress could alternatively consider amending the Stafford Act to include infectious disease outbreaks and pandemics. Others may disagree and argue that such incidents should not be eligible for major disaster assistance, and propose to amend the definition of major disasters to specifically exclude them. Clarification of Roles and Leadership for Public Health Incidents Federal planning, including a pandemic response plan adapted for COVID-19, envisioned HHS— not FEMA—as the lead federal agency for pandemic response (for more detail, see “Federal Response Doctrine: FEMA’s Planned Role in Infectious Disease Incidents”).123 When warranted, these plans also allowed for parallel leadership, whereby HHS would lead federal public health and medical response, and FEMA would coordinate intergovernmental consequence management. The Public Health Service Act specifies that the HHS Secretary shall lead federal public health response efforts for declared Public Health Emergencies.124 Separately, the Homeland Security Act and the Stafford Act (by delegated authority) direct the FEMA 120 Stafford Act Section 102(1); 42 U.S.C. §5122(1). 121 Stafford Act Section 102(2); 42 U.S.C. §5122(2). 122 For example, FEMA explained that Governor Rick Snyder’s (Michigan) request for a major disaster declaration for the Flint water contamination incident was denied based on the grounds that it did not meet the definition of a major disaster. Letter from W. Craig Fugate, FEMA Administrator, to Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, Jan. 16, 2016; reprinted in CRS Report R46665, Stafford Act and Selected Federal Recovery Programs for Civil Unrest: Historical Perspectives and Policy Observations, coordinated by Bruce R. Lindsay. 123 HHS, PanCAP-Adapted. 124 Public Health Service Act Section 2801; 42 U.S.C. §300hh. Congressional Research Service 24 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response Administrator to coordinate federal disaster response efforts.125 Officials issued declarations for the pandemic under both statutes, introducing multiple leadership roles.126 In practice, the presence of multiple leadership roles generated confusion. GAO reported confusion among nonfederal governments and healthcare providers; one local public health official called the early federal response “incoherent, confusing, and uncoordinated.”127 Subsequently, FEMA reported that headquarters staff did not clearly understand the responsibilities of the Unified Coordination Group directing the whole-of-government response or interagency operational working groups that transitioned from HHS to FEMA.128 The National Homeland Security Consortium (NHSC), a body comprising SLTT associations, emergency management associations, and private-sector stakeholders, among others, identified an initial problem of the federal response as follows: The federal government’s messaging was neither unified nor consistent. The failure to implement a national strategy or plan led to states, localities, tribes, and territories (SLTTs) issuing guidance that was inconsistent with federal guidance. The guidance changed constantly, which further confused the public and led to lost credibility.... This event tested the limits of the national response doctrine—in particular NIMS/ICS—and agencies’ understanding of how to implement it, for prolonged, nontraditional, complex incidents. 129 These findings echoed those of pre-pandemic GAO and HHS assessments that unclear, conflicting authorities persist in federal public health response plans, presidential directives, and statutes.130 FEMA has acknowledged that HHS’s and FEMA’s “parallel and overlapping authorities” in federal response doctrine challenged pandemic response planning and operations.131 Additional challenges emerged following the establishment of the White House Coronavirus Task Force led by the Vice President, which was not envisioned by pre-pandemic plans and authorities.132 FEMA reported that the Task Force, which included the FEMA Administrator and the HHS Secretary, effectively worked with FEMA senior officials.133 However, FEMA also 125 The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act amended the Homeland Security Act to specify that the FEMA Administrator “shall ... lead the Nation’s efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters, including catastrophic incidents.” (Section 503(2)(A) of the Homeland Security Act, as amended); 6 U.S.C. §313(2)(A). Stafford Act Sections 402(1)-(2), 403(a), and 502(a)(1)-(2); 42 U.S.C. §§5170a(a)-(2), 5170b(a), and 5192(a)(1)-(2), provide the President authority to direct and coordinate federal disaster and emergency response authorities. These authorities have been delegated to FEMA as well as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, who has then delegated them to the FEMA Administrator. FEMA, Disaster Operations Legal Reference, V 4.0, Sept. 25, 2020, pp. xxv-xxxii, available at https://oregondisasterlegalservices.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/DOLR_4_09252020.pdf. 126 While previous incidents received declarations under both statutes, the scale of the pandemic and involvement of every federal agency exacerbated confusion regarding agency roles and hierarchies. 127 See, for example, GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 93-94. 128 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 8; 25, 32-33; 36-37; 39; 80. 129 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8. 130 GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Gaps in Pandemic Planning and Preparedness Need to Be Addressed, GAO-09-909T, July 29, 2009, p. 8; GAO, Defense Civil Support: DOD, HHS, and DHS Should Use Existing Coordination Mechanisms to Improve Their Pandemic Preparedness, GAO-17-150, Feb. 10, 2017, pp. 18-22; https://www.gao.gov/ products/gao-17-150; HHS, Crimson Contagion 2019 Functional Exercise After-Action Report 2020, Jan. 2020, pp. 17, 19, 24-25, 29-31, 34-35. 131 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 31. 132 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 34; GAO, Biodefense: After-Action Findings, p. 26. 133 Ibid. Congressional Research Service 25 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response reported that daily engagement with the White House caused the agency to undertake additional efforts to ensure communication was consistent across the agency and subfederal partners. The GAO found that conflicting messaging from the White House Coronavirus Task Force and federal agencies may have contributed to confusion among subfederal stakeholders.134 Members of Congress, oversight bodies, the news media, stakeholders from the healthcare industry and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments have repeatedly called upon the government to clarify agency roles and clearly identify responsibility and decision-making authority for specific lines of effort and the federal response on the whole.135 In its initial selfassessment on the agency’s COVID-19 response efforts, FEMA also recommended that the federal government clarify agency authorities, roles, and financial responsibilities for public health incidents.136 The NHSC recommended that the federal government update and promulgate a national strategy, framework, and plan for pandemics.137 Congress may consider clarifying statutory authorities and roles in large-scale public health incidents declared under both the Public Health Service Act and the Stafford Act. Neither the Stafford Act nor FEMA regulations currently specify how FEMA shall coordinate with HHS in public health incidents declared under the Stafford Act; Congress could amend the statute or direct the agencies to issue relevant rulemaking following analysis of agency after-action reports. Notably, in September 2020, GAO recommended that HHS, in consultation with FEMA, clarify roles and responsibilities with respect to pandemic supply chain management and supply gaps— recommendations that remained open as of September 2021.138 Emergency managers, experts, and SLTT stakeholders have proposed possible leadership structures.139 The International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) recommended that President Biden, upon assuming office “formally designate FEMA as THE lead agency for all hazards Incident Coordination across the federal government enterprise to include Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act events” and reinstate the FEMA Administrator’s membership in the 134 GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 76, 94. 135 See, for example, GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities, pp. 65-66; GAO, Federal Efforts, p. 94; GAO, “Priority Open Recommendations: Department of Homeland Security,” Aug. 13, 2021, p. 4, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21377pr.pdf; NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, pp. ii, 6; Testimonies of Rep. Payne and Rep. Thompson, in House Homeland Security Committee, Federal And State Pandemic Supply Preparedness and Response; Priscilla Alvarez et al., “Confusion and Frustration Still Reign a Week After FEMA Takes over Coronavirus Response,” CNN, Mar. 27, 2020; Testimony of Heather Krause, U.S. Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Assessing the Federal Government’s COVID-19 Relief and Response Efforts and Its Impact,” hearing, 117th Cong., 1st sess., July 29, 2021 (hereinafter House T&I, Federal Response Efforts); IAEM, “IAEM Recommendations for Action During the First 100 Days of the Administration of PresidentElect Biden,” Dec. 2020, https://www.iaem.org/Portals/25/documents/IAEM-Recommendations-to-the-BidenTransition-Team.pdf (hereinafter IAEM, “Recommendations for Action”). 136 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, pp. 22-23, 31-33. 137 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 8. 138 These GAO recommendations were most recently reviewed in September 2021. GAO, Federal Efforts, pp. 1-2. These recommendations build on pre-pandemic GAO recommendations to clarify roles and responsibilities in national biodefense strategy. See GAO, National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of Effective Implementation, GAO-20-273, Feb. 2020. 139 For scholarly analysis of these and other alternatives, see, for example, Daniel Gerstein, “Assessing the US Government Response to the Coronavirus,” July 20, 2020, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, pp. 166-174; David Carter and Peter May, “Making Sense of the U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Response: A Policy Regime Perspective,” Administrative Theory and Praxis, May 5, 2020, pp. 265-277; Roy Guharoy and Edward Krenzelok, “Lessons from the Mismanagement of the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Blueprint to Reform CDC,” American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, vol. 78, iss. 18, Sept. 15, 2021, pp. 1739-1741. Congressional Research Service 26 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response President’s cabinet.140 The National Homeland Security Consortium issued a similar recommendation while noting that “[c]onsensus was not achieved ... on this recommendation. At least one association maintained that as a public health disaster, public health at the state and national level should be the lead coordinating agency.”141 Alternatively, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense (a private organization assessing U.S. biodefense efforts) identified deficiencies in historical iterations of agency leadership and recommended that the Vice President lead federal biodefense efforts under the auspices of a White House Biodefense Coordination Council.142 Adaptation of Stafford Act Public Assistance for the Pandemic The President’s Stafford declarations for the pandemic authorized FEMA Public Assistance (PA) for emergency protective measures for jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to the pandemic, no President had ever mobilized the PA program, FEMA’s largest federal grant program, as a primary instrument to respond to an infectious disease event.143 The PA program generally operates following incidents clearly delimited in time and space (e.g., hurricanes); the pandemic compelled FEMA to make rapid pandemic-specific adaptations for long-term response efforts across the country.144 For example, federal regulations provide that emergency response activities funded through PA be completed within six months of a declaration, though extensions may be granted.145 For the pandemic, the President directed that the PA program provide reimbursement and direct assistance for eligible measures from January 20, 2020 to beyond July 2022—more than two and a half years.146 The PA program may additionally provide assistance beyond that time frame, subject to presidential and agency discretion.147 The President and FEMA have also deployed PA to provide financial reimbursement and direct assistance for novel uses. For the pandemic, FEMA will reimburse Applicants for eligible costs incurred for work required to safely reopen and operate designated facilities (e.g., the purchase of 140 IAEM, “Recommendations for Action.” The FEMA Administrator was a member of the President’s Cabinet from 1996-2001. For more information, see DHS Office of Inspector General, FEMA: In or Out? OIG-09-25, Feb. 2009, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_09-25_Feb09.pdf. 141 NHSC, Pandemic After-Action Report, p. 19. 142 Bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (now Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense), A National Blueprint for Biodefense, Oct. 2015, pp. 6-7, 9, 15, https://biodefensecommission.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/10/NationalBluePrintNov2018-03.pdf. 143 See CRS Insight IN11229, Stafford Act Assistance for Public Health Incidents, by Erica A. Lee and Bruce R. Lindsay. 144 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance—COVID-19 Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations. 145 44 C.F.R. §206.205(c). 146 President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “Memorandum for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Nov. 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/11/09/memorandum-for-the-secretary-ofhomeland-security-and-the-administrator-of-the-federal-emergency-management-agency-on-maximizing-assistance-torespond-to-covid-19/; President Joseph R. Biden., Jr. “Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-⁠19,” Mar. 1, 2022, Memorandum on Maximizing Assistance to Respond to COVID-19 | The White House; FEMA Advisory: “COVID-19 Cost Share Extension,” Mar. 1, 2022. 147 See, for example, “Time Limitations,” in FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Work Eligible for Public Assistance (Interim),” FEMA Policy FP 104-009-19, Sept. 1, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/ fema_policy_104-009-19_PA-eligibility-policy-covid.pdf. Congressional Research Service 27 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response PPE for schools, disinfection, surveillance testing), provide ongoing non-congregate sheltering for at-risk and exposed individuals, and execute a wide range of work related to vaccination assistance.148 These novel applications may modify interpretations of what assistance FEMA may provide under the Stafford Act’s nonexclusive list of emergency response measures.149 Further, President Biden increased the federal cost share that FEMA will reimburse for PAeligible costs from the statutory floor of 75% to 100% for all jurisdictions nationwide. Prior to that, SLTT governments and eligible healthcare organizations, including nonprofits, noted the challenge of meeting the fiscal burdens of the 25% cost share, as well as providing the up-front costs of eligible work before requesting reimbursement.150 FEMA has observed that the increased federal cost share for pandemic response and the expansion of PA-eligible work (to include reopening costs and enhanced vaccination assistance) significantly increased projected obligations in FY2021.151 These pandemic-era changes to PA raise questions about future uses of, and expectations for, the PA program.152 Congress might consider challenges related to the program’s adaptation when considering how, if at all, PA should be mobilized for hazards with nationwide impacts, like infectious disease events and climate change. Should Congress affirm the program’s relevance for future public health incidents, Congress may consider whether existing PA authorities for response are sufficient or should be expanded,153 and whether to clarify the eligibility of certain activities, including vaccination-related assistance, the costs of reopening and operating facilities during infectious disease incidents, and the ongoing costs of non-congregate sheltering for eligible populations. Alternatively, Congress might prefer narrower interpretations of the Stafford Act’s list of eligible expenses and further limit the statute’s authorities. Novel projects funded by PA during the pandemic may be relevant to these discussions. The state of California used the PA program to create Project Roomkey, which provided hotel and motel rooms to individuals experiencing homelessness in an effort to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 transmission associated with congregate shelters, and thereby reducing the strain on the health care system.154 Similarly, FEMA and the President made PA available to reimburse food banks and restaurants for 100% of the costs of purchasing and distributing meals to eligible individuals.155 Evaluating such innovative uses of PA might help agency heads and Congress as 148 See FEMA’s website “Public Assistance Disaster-Specific Guidance - COVID-19 Declarations,” https://www.fema.gov/media-collection/public-assistance-disaster-specific-guidance-covid-19-declarations. 149 Stafford Act Section 403(a); 42 U.S.C. §5170b(a). 150 See Testimony of J. Ryan McMahon II, County Executive, Onondaga County, New York, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Confronting the Coronavirus: Perspectives on the COVID-19 Pandemic One Year Later, 117th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 24, 2021 (hereinafter House Homeland Security Committee, Confronting the Pandemic). 151 FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of April 30, 2021, May 11, 2021, Fiscal Year 2021 Report to Congress, p. 24; Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of July 31, 2021, Aug. 10, 2021, p. 26; FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of September 30, 2021, Oct. 7, 2021, p. 27. Reports available at https://www.fema.gov/ about/reports-and-data/disaster-relief-fund-monthly-reports. 152 For background about the PA program, its scope, and expense, see CRS Report R46749, FEMA’s Public Assistance Program: A Primer and Considerations for Congress, by Erica A. Lee. 153 See, for example, an expanded list of eligible measures in S. 4627/H.R. 8266, “FEMA Assistance Relief Act of 2020,” 116th Cong., 2nd sess. 154 California Department of Social Services, “Project Roomkey/Housing and Homelessness COVID Response,” https://www.cdss.ca.gov/inforesources/cdss-programs/housing-programs/project-roomkey. 155 FEMA, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic: Purchase and Distribution of Food Eligible for Public Assistance,” FEMA Policy FP 104-010-03, Apr. 11, 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_purchase- Congressional Research Service 28 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response they determine whether and how the program may be deployed for future unconventional or longduration incidents.156 Congress may also note the logistical challenges posed by the program’s nationwide use during the pandemic that may have delayed assistance and hampered SLTT response efforts. For instance, many stakeholders expressed confusion and frustration attributed to regional inconsistencies in program delivery and eligibility determinations.157 In response, GAO recommended in October 2021 that FEMA clarify PA eligibility requirements nationwide and require additional training for the agency’s PA employees to promote consistent policy interpretations within and across FEMA regions.158 How, if at all, the regionally-administered PA program should change in the wake of these challenges remains an open question. Adaptation of Stafford Act Individual Assistance for the Pandemic FEMA’s IA program was adapted to support the pandemic response, providing an unprecedented amount of assistance through Other Needs Assistance (ONA) for COVID-19 Funeral Assistance and the Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program.159 In a July 19, 2021 press release, FEMA stated that it “has provided over $710 million to more than 107,000 people to assist with COVID-19related funeral costs.”160 and, as of the publication of this report, there is no deadline to apply for COVID-19 Funeral Assistance.161 Moreover, FEMA provided approximately $40 billion through the LWA program to participating states, territories, and the District of Columbia.162 The agency’s initial self-assessment lauded the speed with which it awarded LWA grants and the amount of funding obligated through the program.163 FEMA also acknowledged that the CCP was authorized and-distributions-of-food_policy.pdf; CRS Report R46432, Food Banks and Other Emergency Feeding Organizations: Federal Aid and the Response to COVID-19, coordinated by Kara Clifford Billings. 156 See Karen Stabiner, “What If We Turned Restaurants into Government Contractors,” The Counter, Feb. 11, 2021, https://thecounter.org/biden-fema-reimbursement-restaurants-food-aid/; FEMA, “COVID-19 Community Food Distribution Community Innovations,” July 2020, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_covid_fooddistribution_ci-story_june1.pdf; “New FEED Act to Address Food Insecurity with Help from Restaurants,” July 2020, FoodTank, https://foodtank.com/news/2020/07/new-feed-act-to-address-food-insecurity-with-help-from-restaurants/. 157 GAO, COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response, GAO-22-105051, October 2021, pp. 23-24, 353-366, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105051.pdf. 158 Ibid. 159 FEMA’s “Disaster Relief Fund Monthly Report” includes Individual Assistance program obligations for catastrophic disasters. For the COVID-19 declarations, the estimated Individual Assistance total through FY2021 is $41.8 billion (and financial assistance to individuals and households was only provided for ONA). By contrast, the estimated total through FY2021 for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria combined is $6.0 billion (and, for these disasters, financial assistance was provided for both housing assistance and ONA) (FEMA, Disaster Relief Fund: Monthly Report as of June 30, 2021, July 12, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/documents/fema_july2021-disaster-relief-fund-report.pdf). See also Statement of Heather Krause, Director, Physical Infrastructure, and Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, Testimony Before Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, COVID-19 Pandemic: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of Assistance to Individuals, Communities, and the Transportation Industry, GAO-21-105202, July 29, 2021, p. 3, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-105202.pdf. 160 FEMA, “FEMA COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Tops $700 Million,” press release HQ-21-138, July 19, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/press-release/20210719/fema-covid-19-funeral-assistance-tops-700-million. 161 FEMA, “Funeral Assistance FAQ,” https://www.fema.gov/disaster/coronavirus/economic/funeral-assistance/faq. 162 FEMA, “By the Numbers: Coronavirus Pandemic Whole-of-America Response,” press release, Mar. 8, 2021. The Lost Wages Assistance total of “[a]lmost $40 billion for those who were unemployed due to COVID-19 through Dec. 27, 2020” was provided as of the COVID-19 obligations as of Mar. 4, 2021. FEMA’s “By the Numbers: Lost Wages Assistance Totals,” Feb. 9, 2021, lists the LWA total as $42.6 billion. 163 FEMA, Initial Assessment Report, p. 5. Congressional Research Service 29 FEMA’s Role in the COVID-19 Federal Pandemic Response for all of the states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and that all tribal nation members were eligible for CCP services.164 Additional consideration of the pandemic-caused needs of individuals and households is not addressed in FEMA’s selfassessment. Congress could consider requiring FEMA to evaluate whether the IA provided to support COVID-19 pandemic recovery—which has been limited to ONA and CCP—has been sufficient to meet the needs of affected individuals and households. Congress could also consider whether FEMA may require additional authorities to meet the needs of disaster-affected individuals and households following a future [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR47048. Public record. Not legal advice.