# Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46924 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** September 24, 2021 - **Citation:** R46924 ## Text Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations September 24, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46924 SUMMARY Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Central Asia is a landlocked region that borders the Caspian Sea to the West, Russia to the north, China to the east, and Afghanistan and Iran to the south. The five Central Asian countries— Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—collectively cover an area approximately 40% that of the United States. The region’s overall population of about 73 million is ethnically diverse and predominantly under 30; the majority religion in Central Asia is Sunni Islam, and the region is also home to religious minority groups including Shia Muslims and various Christian denominations, primarily Russian Orthodox. In addition to the local Turkic and Persian languages, Russian remains spoken throughout the region to varying degrees. R46924 September 24, 2021 Maria A. Blackwood Analyst in Asian Policy Outside observers classify the governments of Central Asia as authoritarian to varying degrees; all five countries rank low on international democracy and human rights indexes. Central Asia has been described as a challenging environment for efforts to promote democracy, and observers have expressed concerns that democratic progress in the region has been uneven or lacking. Members of Congress have drawn attention to human rights issues in Central Asia, including the lack of press freedom and the detention of political prisoners. Although Central Asian governments have implemented varying degrees of market reforms, political elites maintain significant control over the region’s economies, and corruption remains prevalent. Central Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions in the world. Fostering regional connectivity has long been a major U.S. priority in Central Asia. Intra-regional relations have improved markedly since 2016, when Uzbekistan, the region’s most populous country, embarked on a policy of reengaging with its neighbors. This has led to progress on issues such as border demarcation and water disputes. Periodic border clashes have continued between some countries, and analysts assess that water resources remain a potential source of conflict in the region. Much of Central Asia’s hydropower potential remains unrealized. Some Central Asian governments are pursuing, with uneven progress, projects to develop solar and wind power in their countries. Despite these and other efforts toward diversification, economies such as Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports. The United States was among the first countries to recognize the five Central Asian countries when they became independent amid the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. Since that time, the United States has emphasized support for the five countries’ independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The U.S. Strategy for Central Asia defines the primary U.S. strategic interest in the region as building a “more stable and prosperous Central Asia that is free to pursue political, economic, and security interests with a variety of partners on its own terms; is connected to global markets and open to international investment; and has strong, democratic institutions, rule of law, and respect for human rights.” The United States has provided over $9 billion in direct assistance to the countries of Central Asia in the past three decades to s upport security, democratic reform, and economic growth, and to meet humanitarian needs. Russia maintains strong political, economic, and military ties with the region, and is the primary destination for labor migrants from Central Asia. China’s economic presence in Central Asia has grown significantly in recent years and is accompanied by an expanding security footprint. Many in Central Asia remain wary of China, however, due in part to fears of potential Chinese territorial encroachment and anger at China’s repression of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, many analysts assess that the primary concerns of Central Asian governments are maintaining stability and ensuring their own countries’ security. The governments of Central Asia have generally adopted a pragmatic approach toward the Taliban, particularly Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The government of Tajikistan, which also shares a border with Afghanistan, has by contrast expressed strong opposition to a Taliban-led government in Afghanistan. All five countries previously provided logistical assistance at various times to U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, ranging from overflight rights to hosting U.S. forces. The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan leased bases to the United States from 2001 to 2014 and from 2001 to 2005, respectively. Given Central Asian countries’ proximity to Afghanistan and interest in contributing to regional stability, security cooperation between the United States and Central Asian countries may evolve in light of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Congressional Research Service Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Contents Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1 History..................................................................................................................... 2 Country Backgrounds ...................................................................................................... 4 Kazakhstan ............................................................................................................... 4 Political Background............................................................................................. 5 Human Rights...................................................................................................... 6 Economy ............................................................................................................ 8 U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations ........................................................................ 9 The Kyrgyz Republic ............................................................................................... 10 Political Background........................................................................................... 12 Human Rights.................................................................................................... 15 Economy .......................................................................................................... 16 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations ...................................................................... 17 Tajikistan ............................................................................................................... 19 Political Background........................................................................................... 20 Human Rights.................................................................................................... 22 Economy .......................................................................................................... 23 U.S.-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations ........................................................................ 24 Turkmenistan.......................................................................................................... 24 Political Background........................................................................................... 25 Human Rights.................................................................................................... 26 Economy .......................................................................................................... 28 U.S.-Turkmenistan Bilateral Relations ................................................................... 29 Uzbekistan ............................................................................................................. 29 Political Background........................................................................................... 31 Human Rights.................................................................................................... 33 Economy .......................................................................................................... 34 U.S.-Uzbekistan Bilateral Relations ...................................................................... 35 Regional Issues............................................................................................................. 36 U.S. Regional Relations and Interests ......................................................................... 36 U.S. Strategy for Central Asia .............................................................................. 37 C5+1 ................................................................................................................ 37 Intra-Regional Issues................................................................................................ 38 Border Disputes ................................................................................................. 39 Energy ................................................................................................................... 41 Oil and Gas ....................................................................................................... 41 Renewables ....................................................................................................... 43 Security ................................................................................................................. 45 Afghanistan ....................................................................................................... 45 Terrorism and Violent Extremism ......................................................................... 50 Foreign Terrorist Fighters .................................................................................... 50 Counternarcotics ................................................................................................ 52 Nonproliferation................................................................................................. 52 Foreign Relations .................................................................................................... 52 Russia .............................................................................................................. 52 China ............................................................................................................... 55 Congressional Research Service Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Outlook and Issues for Congress...................................................................................... 57 Corruption and Human Rights ................................................................................... 58 Trade ..................................................................................................................... 58 Figures Figure 1. Map of Central Asia ........................................................................................... 1 Figure 2. Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia, 1992 ............................................................ 3 Figure 3. Map of Kazakhstan ............................................................................................ 4 Figure 4. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic.............................................................................. 12 Figure 5. Map of Tajikistan ............................................................................................. 20 Figure 6. Map of Turkmenistan ....................................................................................... 25 Figure 7. Map of Uzbekistan........................................................................................... 30 Figure 8. Exclaves in the Fergana Valley........................................................................... 40 Figure 9. Oil and Gas in Central Asia ............................................................................... 43 Figure 10. Aral Sea Watershed ........................................................................................ 44 Figure 11. The Eurasian Economic Union ......................................................................... 54 Figure 12. Russian Military Installations in Central Asia ..................................................... 55 Tables Table 1. Kazakhstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes .................................... 6 Table 2. Kyrgyzstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes .................................. 15 Table 3. Tajikistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes..................................... 21 Table 4. Turkmenistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes ............................... 26 Table 5. Uzbekistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes................................... 32 Table 6. Oil and Natural Gas in Central Asia ..................................................................... 42 Table 7. Central Asia on Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes.............................. 60 Appendixes Appendix. Central Asian Countries’ Performance on Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes ........................................................................................................... 60 Contacts Author Information ....................................................................................................... 61 Congressional Research Service Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Overview Central Asia is a region rich in mineral resources that borders Russia, China, Afghanistan, and Iran (see Figure 1). The United States was among the first countries to recognize the newly independent Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since that time, the United States has repeatedly expressed support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the five Central Asian countries, and has implemented programs to support democracy, good governance, and economic reforms in the region. Some observers contend that Central Asia’s importance to the United States has historically been “derivative of interests that were not indigenous to Central Asia itself, but rather were functions of U.S. policies, priorities, and relationships with countries around the region. ”1 Since 2001, U.S. engagement with Central Asia has largely focused on security cooperation, particularly in relation to the conflict in Afghanistan. Russia maintains strong political and military ties with the region, and China’s significant economic presence is accompanied by an expanding security footprint. Central Asia’s combined population of approximately 73 million is ethnically diverse, and the median age across all five countries is about 28. In addition to Turkic (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek, among others) and Persian (Tajik) languages, Russian remains spoken throughout the region. Outside nongovernmental observers characterize Central Asian governments as authoritarian and repressive to varying degrees (see Appendix). The five countries’ heads of state did not change between 1992 and 2005, and political elites maintain significant influence over Central Asia’s economies. Figure 1. Map of Central Asia Source: Graphic created by CRS. 1 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Paul Stronski, U.S. Policy Toward Central Asia 3.0, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2016, pp. 3-4. Congressional Research Service 1 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; ARM—Armenia; AZE—Azerbaijan; IND—India. History Historically inhabited by a combination of nomadic pastoralist and settled agrarian societies, the territories that now make up the five Central Asian states were incorporated into the Russian empire over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries through a combination of military conquests and political settlements. They became part of the Soviet Union after a period of armed struggle following the 1917 Russian Revolution. In 1924, Soviet authorities established the boundaries that served as the basis for Central Asia’s modern borders. Soviet settlement policies and Stalinera internal deportations of certain ethnic groups brought new populations to the region. While the name of each Central Asian republic derives from the locally predominant group, the region has historically been ethnically diverse (see Figure 2). Soviet policies granted local languages certain protections, but Russian functioned as a lingua franca and was privileged and promoted for most of the 20th century. The Soviet legacy in Central Asia is complex, encompassing universal literacy and economic development on the one hand, and brutal repression and environmental degradation on the other. Central Asians’ contributions to the Soviet war effort against Nazi Germany continue to find broad resonance and are officially commemorated in all five countries. The states of Central Asia became independent with the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the assessment of one scholar, independence brought “massive transformations [that] coexist with significant continuities with the Soviet past.”2 Following independence, many of the region’s ethnic Russians moved to Russia, the ethnic German minority mostly left for Germany, and almost all of Central Asia’s Jewish population emigrated. Nevertheless, the Central Asian countries maintain varying levels of ethnic diversity, even as they have embarked on the process of forging new identities as independent nation-states. The Islamic religious heritage of the region’s traditionally Sunni Muslim majority is one factor that informs contemporary national identities in Central Asia. 3 Soviet ideology was hostile to religion, and Soviet anti-religion policies in Central Asia led to the elimination of Islam from public life. 4 Experts and stakeholders assert that Islamic civil society is now growing in importance in the region. 5 At the same time, Central Asian governments generally exert strict control over religious activity. 6 2 Adeeb Khalid, Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), p. 442. 3 Adeeb Khalid, Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Centra l Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 117-119, 125-126, 132-133. 4 Khalid, Central Asia, pp. 218-220, 351-352; Khalid, Islam After Communism , pp. 82-83. 5 Edward Lemon, Samuel Doveri Vesterbye, and Bradley Jardine, Emerging Forms of Islamic Civil Society in Central Asia, T he Hollings Center for International Dialogue, May 2021. 6 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom , May 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 2 Figure 2. Major Ethnic Groups in Central Asia, 1992 Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, available at https://www.loc.gov/item/92685272. CRS-3 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Country Backgrounds Kazakhstan Endowed with significant hydrocarbon and mineral resources, Kazakhstan is the most developed country in Central Asia. 7 Kazakhstan shares lengthy borders with Russia to the north and China to the east, and also borders Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (see Figure 3); it is the world’s ninth largest country by land area (about four times the size of Texas). The ethnically diverse population of approximately 19 million is predominantly Kazakh (69%), with minority groups including Russians (18.4%), Uzbeks (3.2%), Ukrainians (1.4%), Uyghurs (1.4%), and Tatars (1%), among others.8 About 70% of the population is Muslim, mostly Sunni, and approximately a quarter is Christian, primarily Russian Orthodox. Since independence, Kazakhstan’s authoritarian government has introduced market reforms, developed the energy sector, and moved to diversify its economy. Kazakhstan pursues a “multi-vector” foreign policy, seeking to balance its relations with major powers while actively participating in international organizations. 9 Figure 3. Map of Kazakhstan Source: Graphic created by CRS. Notes: Abbreviations: GEO—Georgia; AZE—Azerbaijan; MNG—Mongolia. 7 Kazakhstan ranks 51 st in the U.N.’s 2020 Human Development Index, ahead of Kyrgyzstan (120 th), T ajikistan (125th), T urkmenistan (111 th), and Uzbekistan (106 th). Rankings available at https://hdr.undp.org/. 8 Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2021 zhyl basyna Qazaqstan Respublikasy khalqynyng zhekelgen etnostary boiynsha sany [Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by individual ethnic groups at the beginning of 2021], available at https://stat.gov.kz/api/getFile/?docId=EST AT 414397. 9 “ Mukhtar T ileuberdi: ‘Despite the Pandemic, the Foundations of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Remain Unchanged,’” The Astana Times, January 7, 2021. Congressional Research Service 4 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Political Background Since independence, Kazakhstan’s political system has been dominated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, a former high-level Soviet official who became the country’s first president in 1991 and remained in that office until 2019. He won reelection four times, most recently in 2015, although observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report that elections in Kazakhstan consistently do not meet international standards of impartiality, integrity, and transparency. 10 While Nazarbayev’s authoritarian government faced international criticism for human rights violations and suppression of political dissent, he enjoyed strong domestic popularity for much of his presidency due to his largely successful efforts to promote stability and economic development. 11 Nazarbayev resigned from the presidency in March 2019, but he maintains his position as Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Security Council, an influential post to which he is legally entitled for life, and as leader of the ruling Nur Otan (Radiant Fatherland) party. The day after Nazarbayev’s resignation, Kazakhstan’s capital, formerly Astana, was renamed NurSultan in his honor. As First President and Elbasy (Leader of the Nation), Nazarbayev enjoys constitutionally protected status, including lifelong immunity from prosecution as well as special protections for property belonging to him and certain family members. 12 Nazarbayev was succeeded by Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, an experienced politician and diplomat who previously served as Kazakhstan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva. Tokayev became acting president upon Nazarbayev’s resignation and subsequently won a snap presidential election in June 2019 with 71% of the vote, although independent observers questioned the integrity of this result. 13 Tokayev is widely seen as a Nazarbayev loyalist, and his stated motivation for running was to maintain Nazarbayev’s “strategic course” and “ensur[e] the continuity of our Leader’s policies.”14 Tokayev has coupled his emphasis on continuity with promises of systemic reforms aimed at modernizing Kazakhstan’s political system and improving government openness and accountability. 15 Some analysts contend that major changes are unlikely as long as Nazarbayev remains entrenched in the political system, questioning the extent to which President Tokayev can act independently of his predecessor. 16 In October 2019, Tokayev signed a decree further enhancing Nazarbayev’s 10 See OSCE Office for Democracy and Human Rights (ODIHR) reports on elections in Kazakhstan, available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kazakhstan. 11 Annette Bohr et al., Kazakhstan: Tested By Transition, Chatham House, November 2019, p. 16. 12 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 5, 2018 , No. 178-VI, “On the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” available at https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=38039248#pos=4;-104; Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 20, 2000, No. 83 -II, “On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan —T he Leader of the Nation,” available at http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/constitutional_laws/o-pervomprezidente-respubliki-kazahstan-lidere-nacii. 13 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Kazakhstan Early Presidential Election, 9 June 2019: ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, October 4, 2019; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, p. 40; Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020: Kazakhstan. 14 “Nazarbaev reshil vydvinut’ T okaeva v prezidenty Kazakhstana” [Nazarbayev has decided to nominate T okayev for the presidency of Kazakhstan], BBC News Russian, April 23, 2019. 15 President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart T okayev’s State of the Nation Address, September 2, 2019 , available at https://www.akorda.kz/en/addresses/addresses_of_president/president-of-kazakhstan-kassym-jomart-tokayevs-state-ofthe-nation-address-september-2-2019; Ann M. Simmons, “Kazakhstan’s Newly Elected Leader Calls Himself a ‘Reformer,’” Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2019; S. Frederick Starr, “First Glimpses of T okayev’s Kazakhstan: T he Listening State?” Atlantic Council, September 17, 2019. 16 See, for example, Paolo Sorbello, “ T he Illusions of Post -Nazarbayev Kazakhstan,” The Diplomat, February 1, 2021; Nurseit Niyazbekov, “Democracy, the T okayev Way,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2020; Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. v, Congressional Research Service 5 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations powers as Chairman of the National Security Council, requiring that most senior government appointments be approved by Nazarbayev. 17 Moreover, Kazakhstan’s parliament is dominated by Nazarbayev’s Nur Otan party. Legislation passed in 2020 formalized the concept of a parliamentary opposition, but critics contend that real opposition groups have no chance of entering parliament. 18 The most recent parliamentary elections, held in January 2021, reaffirmed Nur Otan’s commanding majority (the party currently holds 76 of 98 elected seats).19 Table 1. Kazakhstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes Issue Index 2016 Status/Rank 2020/2021 Status/Rank Democracy Freedom House, Freedom in the World Not Free (Score: 24/100) Not Free (Score: 23/100) Press Freedom Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 160 th of 180 Countries 155 th of 180 Countries Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom Moderately Free (68 th of 178 Countries) Mostly Free (34 th of 178 Countries) Perceptions of Corruption Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 131 st of 168 Countries 94 th of 179 Countries Rule of Law World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 73 rd of 128 Countries and Jurisdictions 62 nd of 128 Countries and Jurisdictions Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law Index 2020. Human Rights According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kazakhstan include restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association; restrictions on political participation; the absence of an independent judiciary and due process; corruption; unlawful or arbitrary killing by or on behalf of the government; and torture by police and prison officials. 20 The State Department notes severe limitations on media independence in Kazakhstan as well as widespread government surveillance of the internet. 21 Reporters Without Borders ranks Kazakhstan 155th out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 1). Human Rights Watch assesses that Kazakhstan’s government actively persecutes real or perceived political opponents, especially those associated with Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, an opposition movement banned as “extremist” since 2018. 22 10-15, 19-22. 17 Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev T akes Back Control,” Eurasianet, October 21, 2019. 18 Zulfiya Raissova, “Why Does Kazakhstan Have Parliamentary Opposition?” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, July 2, 2020; Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: Would-Be Opposition Political Parties to Get Leg Up,” Eurasianet, May 7, 2020. 19 Another nine deputies are appointed by the Assembly of t he People of Kazakhstan, a constitutional body chaired by the president. 20 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan , March 30, 2021. 21 Ibid. 22 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020, pp. 323-325; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, p. 385. Congressional Research Service 6 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Although Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, restrictive legislation on public demonstrations makes it difficult to exercise in practice. President Tokayev signed a new law on the organization and conduct of demonstrations in May 2020, and the government of Kazakhstan touts the legislation as a positive reform. 23 Domestic and international human rights organizations have criticized the law for failing to meet international human rights standards , however. According to Human Rights Watch, onerous restrictions and bureaucratic requirements mean that the ability to protest remains “more a privilege than a right.”24 Local activists and international human rights experts also expressed concerns that parliament considered the law while the country was under lockdown due to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, impeding public debate and blocking potential protests of the bill. 25 In the past decade, economic inequality and a perceived lack of government accountability have fueled discontent that has sometimes manifested in demonstrations despite Kazakhstan’s restrictive protest rules. For example, in 2011, protests by oil workers in the western town of Zhanaozen turned violent, leaving at least 15 demonstrators dead and dozens injured after police opened fire. 26 In 2016, large-scale protests took place against proposed changes to the country’s land code, which critics feared would lead to a Chinese takeover of Kazakhstan’s agricultural land. 27 Since 2018, women have protested a perceived lack of support from the state for single mothers and families with many children. 28 Nazarbayev’s resignation and the June 2019 presidential election catalyzed further protests and calls for broader political change, including transition to a parliamentary system. 29 Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan is led by Mukhtar Ablyazov, a fugitive businessman and former government official accused of embezzling some $6 billion while serving as chairman of BT A Bank, a m ajor Kazakhstani financial institution. A vocal Nazarbayev critic, Ablyazov maintains that the charges against him are politically motivated. He received political asylum in France but lost court cases brought against him in the United States, the United K ingdom, and other jurisdictions. He was sentenced in absentia on criminal charges in both Kazakhstan and Russia. Kazakhstan’s government has been accused of abusing the INT ERPOL Red Notice system and other international law enforcement mechanisms in its efforts to go after Ablyazov and his associates. See U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kazakhstan, March 30, 2021; Alexander Cooley and John Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), pp. 71-73; Serge Enderlin, “La France accorde l’asile politique au principal opposant kazakh” [France grants political asylum to primary Kazakh opposition figure], Le Monde, October 5, 2020; “ Russia Sentences Fugitive Kazakh Banker Ablyazov in Absentia to 15 Years,” RFE/RL, December 29, 2020. 23 Assel Satubaldina, “Freedom of Expression Is the Constitutional Right of Every Citizen, Says T okayev,” Astana Times, February 17, 2021; Almaz Kumenov, “Kazakhstan: President Signs off on Contentious Rally Law,” Eurasianet, May 26, 2020. 24 Mihra Rittman, “Kazakhstan’s ‘Reformed’ Protest Law Hardly an Improvement: Serious Restrictions on Right to Free Assembly Remain,” Human Rights Watch, May 28, 2020. 25 Sarah H. Cleveland, “Joint Opinion on Compliance of the Draft Law on the Procedure for Organising and Holding Peaceful Assemblies with the Republic of Kazakhstan’s Human Rights Obligations,” International Bar Associatio n’s Human Rights Institute, T he International Commission of Jurists, and the Centre for Civil and Political Rights, May 1, 2020; Laura Mills, “ Kazakhstan Draft Law Would Undermine Freedom of Assembly ,” Human Rights Watch, March 31, 2020. 26 Bohr et al., Kazakhstan, pp. 48-49. 27 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained,” BBC, April 28, 2016. Catherine Putz, “ Social Benefits Remain at the Heart of Ongoing Kazakh Frustration ,” The Diplomat, January 13, 2020. 28 29 See CRS Insight IN11113, Kazakhstan’s Snap Presidential Election Met with Protests, by Maria A. Blackwood. Congressional Research Service 7 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Economy Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s most economically developed country, with an export-oriented economy highly dependent on hydrocarbons. 30 Major exports by value include oil, copper, ferroalloys, uranium, and wheat. Dependence on oil exports renders Kazakhstan vulnerable to external shocks. During a period of falling oil prices and currency devaluation tied to international sanctions on Russia (Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner), Kazakhstan’s real gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to an annual average of slightly above 1% percent in 2015-2016, later accelerating to over 4% in 2017-2019. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the related fall in oil prices have caused significant economic pressure.31 The World Bank estimates that Kazakhstan’s economy contracted by 2.5% in 2020 as a result of the pandemic; the country last experienced negative economic growth in the late 1990s. Projections indicate a recovery of 2.5% GDP growth in 2021. 32 Energy Kazakhstan is a major energy exporter, producing significant volumes of crude oil, natural gas, and coal. The country is estimated to have the 12th -largest reserves of oil and 16th -largest reserves of natural gas in the world. 33 Kazakhstan’s oil and gas resources attract significant investment from U.S., European, Russian, and Chinese firms (see also “Oil and Gas,” below). According to the U.N. Trade Statistics Database, crude oil accounted for about 58% of Kazakhstan’s exports by value in 2019. Kazakhstan holds 12% of the world’s uranium resources and has led world uranium production since 2009. According to the World Nuclear Association, the country accounted for 43% of world uranium production in 2019. 34 In 2015, Kazakhstan’s state-owned nuclear energy company Kazatomprom and China General Nuclear Power Corporation agreed to a joint venture to build a fuel fabrication plant, with production slated to begin in 2021. 35 Kazakhstan also hosts a lowenriched uranium (LEU) bank owned and operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The LEU bank is intended to decrease the global risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by guaranteeing countries that lack enrichment capabilities access to fuel for peaceful purposes in the event of supply disruptions on the commercial market. It is the only facility of its kind that is not controlled by any individual country. 36 30 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19, 2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview. 31 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, November 16, 2020, p. 18. 32 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79. 33 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, pp. 16, 34. 34 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan,” September 2020. 35 Kazatomprom National Atomic Company, “Kazatomprom and Chinese Companies Sign an Agreement on Nuclear Cooperation,” December 15, 2015; Mattia Baldoni and Kamen Kraev, “ Kazatomprom-CGN Joint Venture to Supply Framatome Assemblies t o China,” NucNet, March 5, 2020. 36 IAEA, “IAEA Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Bank,” at https://www.iaea.org/topics/iaea-low-enriched-uranium- bank; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “ IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank Launches in Kazakhstan, Significant Milestone for NT I-Backed Nuclear Security Initiative,” August 28, 2017. Congressional Research Service 8 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Diversification Kazakhstan’s government seeks to promote non-oil exports through ongoing structural and institutional reforms. The Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, promulgated by Nazarbayev in 2012, aims to position Kazakhstan as one of the world’s top 30 most-developed economies by 2050. 37 As part of this framework, officials are prioritizing transport and logistics development and modernization projects, largely aligned with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Kazakhstan’s government also seeks to turn the country into a regional financial hub, in part through the Astana International Financial Centre. This special economic zone, opened in 2018, is backed by Chinese investment and is modeled on the Dubai International Financial Centre. 38 As part of its economic diversification efforts, Kazakhstan’s government has announced that the country aims to produce 50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. The U.S. Department of Commerce has identified the agricultural sector as an area of opportunity for U.S. firms as Kazakhstan seeks to reduce its dependence on extractive industries. 39 U.S.-Kazakhstan Bilateral Relations The United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan’s independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The two countries have developed a strong and wideranging bilateral relationship, even as Kazakhstan has sought to avoid alignment with any one power. In February 2019 Senate testimony, General Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, described U.S. relations with Kazakhstan as “the most mature and forwardthinking in Central Asia.”40 Nuclear threat reduction has been an area of close cooperation between the United States and Kazakhstan from the inception of the bilateral relationship. Kazakhstan was home to the Soviet Union’s primary nuclear test site, a 6,950-square-mile zone situated near the city of Semipalatinsk (renamed Semey in 2007) in Kazakhstan’s northeast. Over 450 nuclear tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk Test Site between 1949 and 1989. 41 The dissolution of the Soviet Union left Kazakhstan with one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals, including some 1,400 nuclear warheads and more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kazakhstan denuclearized and relinquished the Soviet warheads that remained on its territory, the last of which were transferred to Russia in 1995. 42 Kazakhstan cooperated closely with the United States to secure nuclear materials and dismantle associated infrastructure as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, through which the United States has provided over $275 million in assistance to Kazakhstan’s efforts to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and related 37 “Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of the Nation, N.A. Nazarbayev, Strategy Kazakhstan 2050: New Political Course of the Established State,” December 14, 2012, available at https://strategy2050.kz/en/page/multilanguage/. 38 “Seeking Belt Buckle Role, Kazakhstan Launches China-Backed Financial Hub,” Reuters, July 5, 2018. 39 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, “Kazakhstan—Market Overview,” January 19, 2021, at https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/kazakhstan-market-overview. 40 Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command , February 5, 2019. 41 Radiological Conditions at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan: Preliminary Assessment and Recommendations for Further Study (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1998), pp. 3-7; Joanna Lillis, Dark Shadows: Inside the Secret World of Kazakhstan (New York: I.B. T auris, 2019), pp. 234-243. 42 Federation of American Scientists, “Kazakhstan Special Weapons,” at https://fas.org/nuke/guide/kazakhstan/ index.html; Nuclear T hreat Initiative, “Nuclear Disarmament Kazakhstan,” January 2, 2019, at https://www.nti.org/ analysis/articles/kazakhstan-nuclear-disarmament. Congressional Research Service 9 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations infrastructure since 1991.43 Kazakhstan also cooperates with the U.S. Department of Energy on nuclear security and nuclear energy through the U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership, formalized in 2001. 44 Military-to-military contacts constitute a significant aspect of the U.S.-Kazakhstan bilateral relationship. Since 2003, Kazakhstan has hosted Exercise Steppe Eagle, a multilateral military exercise that focuses on peacekeeping capabilities. In its most recent iteration, conducted in southeastern Kazakhstan in June 2019, Exercise Steppe Eagle included participants from the U.S. Army and the Arizona Army National Guard, as well as forces from the United Kingdom, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with observers from India, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Counternarcotics is an active area of cooperation between the two countries. Kazakhstan is a transit country for heroin and other opiates from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe, and the United States seeks to improve Kazakhstan’s capacity to combat drug trafficking and related criminal activity. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration maintains a regional office in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The State Department has characterized U.S.-Kazakhstan law enforcement and military ties as “strong and growing.”45 U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan aims to advance human rights and democratic values by supporting the rule of law, fostering local media development, and building the capacity of civil society organizations. Additionally, U.S. programs seek to support economic reform and promote renewable energy and improved energy efficiency. 46 Another focus of U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan is security cooperation, particularly strengthening military partnerships, fighting transnational crime, and combatting weapons of mass destruction. 47 The State Department requests $10.7 million in appropriations for aid to Kazakhstan for FY2022, as compared to $12.1 million allocated for FY2020. 48 The Kyrgyz Republic The Kyrgyz Republic (commonly known as Kyrgyzstan) is a mountainous country slightly smaller than South Dakota. Kyrgyzstan borders China in addition to three other Central Asian states (see Figure 4) and maintains close ties with Russia. The population of approximately 6.6 million is predominantly Kyrgyz (73.8%) with minority groups including Uzbeks (14.8%), Russians (5.1%), Dungans (1.1%), and Uyghurs (0.9%), among others. 49 Approximately 90% of the population is Muslim, primarily Sunni; a plurality of the Christian minority, which accounts for about 7% of the population, is Russian Orthodox. 50 For most of the 30 years since independence, Kyrgyzstan has been considered by scholars and nongovernmental organizations 43 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Kazakhstan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021. 44 Kazakhstan is seeking to produce 50% of its power from alternative energy sources by 2050. As such, the Partnership has most recently focused on clean energy deployment and improving the efficiency of Ka zakhstan’s electricity markets. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of International Affairs, “ U.S.-Kazakhstan Energy Partnership,” at https://www.energy.gov/ia/international-affairs-initiatives/us-kazakhstan-energy-partnership. 45 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kazakhstan, August 3, 2018, p. 2. 46 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2, p. 287. 47 Ibid., pp. 309, 380-381. 48 Ibid., p. 576. National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia” [Ethnic composition of the population], available at http://www.stat.kg/ru/opendata/category/312/. 49 50 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Kyrgyz Republic, May 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 10 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations (NGOs) as the most democratic country in Central Asia, with a vibrant civil society and a higher degree of press freedom than is found elsewhere in the region (see Table 2). 51 Supporting a more inclusive and accountable democracy is a stated U.S. goal in Kyrgyzstan. 52 The country is one of 21 states worldwide that participate in the House Democracy Partnership. 53 In light of recent political developments (see “Political Background,” below), in 2021 the NGO Freedom House classified Kyrgyzstan as “not free” for the first time in 11 years. U.S. officials and others have voiced concern about the influence of organized crime in Kyrgyz politics. 54 Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about government pressure on independent media outlets, including the congressionally funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 55 The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant economic strain in Kyrgyzstan, which is an impoverished country that relies heavily on foreign remittances. 51 On Kyrgyztan’s “exceptionalism,” see, for example, Eugene Huskey, Encounters at the Edge of the Muslim World: A Political Memoir of Kyrgyzstan (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), pp. 213 -215. See also Johan Engvall, “Kyrgyzstan and the T rials of Independence,” in Marlene Laruelle and Johan Engvall, eds., Kyrgyzstan Beyond “Democracy Island” and “Failing State” (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 1-19. Kyrgyzstan is the only Central Asian country to be characterized as “Partly Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report after 1993, although it did not consistently maintain that rating (Kyrgyzstan was rated “Partly Free” in 23 o f the 30 years since the country became independent). In most years since 1991, Freedom House assessed that Kyrgyzstan exhibited a higher degree of political rights and civil liberties than any other Central Asian country. See Freedom House, “Country and T erritory Rankings and Statuses, 1973-2021,” available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/ Country_and_T erritory_Ratings_and_Statuses_FIW1973-2021.xlsx. 52 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018, pp. 5, 10. House Democracy Partnership, “Kyrgyzstan,” available at https://hdp.house.gov/sites/ housedemocracypartnership.house.gov/files/Kyrgyzstan%20One-Pager.pdf/. 54 See, for example, House Foreign Affairs Committee (@HouseForeign), T witter, October 16, 2020, 12:17PM, available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/1317137561018601475; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “Statement on T hreats to the Kyrgyz Constitutional Order,” October 13, 2020. 53 55 See, for example, Senator Bob Menendez (@SenatorMenendez), T witter, December 13, 2019, 12:54PM, available at https://twitter.com/SenatorMenendez/status/1205546563285798913, and House Foreign Affairs Committee (@HouseForeign), T witter, December 14, 2019, 12:03AM, available at https://twitter.com/HouseForeign/status/ 1205714827706015744. Congressional Research Service 11 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 4. Map of the Kyrgyz Republic Source: Graphic created by CRS. Political Background Kyrgyzstan experienced political upheavals that ousted authoritarian-leaning presidents in 2005 and 2010. 56 A new constitution adopted in 2010 limited the presidency to one six-year term and converted the country to a semi-parliamentary system in which the president shared executive power with the prime minister. Several Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers voiced support for Kyrgyzstan’s parliamentary democracy, the only such political system in Central Asia. 57 In light of subsequent political developments, analysts raised concerns about democratic backsliding in the country. 58 According to Freedom House, by 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s legislature had “de facto surrendered its constitutionally granted power to form and control the executive branch,” and become a rubber-stamp body “merely paying lip service to the declared goal of building a parliamentary democracy.”59 Such concerns were heightened following an April 2021 referendum in which voters approved a new constitution. In addition to significantly increasing presidential power and weakening the legislature, the new constitution also allows a president to 56 Bruce Pannier, “Rethinking Kyrgyzstan’s T ulip Revolution,” RFE/RL, August 25, 2009; Catherine Putz, “Remembering Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutions,” The Diplomat, April 9, 2015. 57 See, for example, Sen. T ed Kaufman, “Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 156 (July 15, 2010), p. S5954; Sen. John Kerry, “Kyrgyzstan’s Democratic T ransition,” remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 157 (June 28, 2011), p. S4149; Rep. Joe Wilso n, “New Partnership with Kyrgyzstan,” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 158 (February 27, 2012), p. H951. See, for example, Paul Stronski and Katherine Quinn -Judge, “Kyrgyzstan at 25: T reading Water,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016. 58 59 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan. Congressional Research Service 12 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations serve two five-year terms. The document has drawn criticism as “undermin[ing] human rights norms and weaken[ing] checks and balances necessary to prevent abuses of power.”60 The new constitution came after political upheaval in the wake of disputed October 2020 parliamentary elections whose results heavily favored pro-establishment parties. Opposition parties alleged widespread irregularities, including vote-buying and voter intimidation; these assertions were deemed credible by international election observers. 61 After mass protests broke out in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s capital, the Central Election Commission annulled the election results. 62 Amid the resulting power vacuum, Sadyr Japarov, a former member of parliament who had been serving a lengthy prison sentence on charges he maintains were politically motivated, emerged as the leading contender to assume power.63 Within 11 days of the elections, Japarov had become both prime minister and acting president. 64 Upon taking power, Japarov and his allies began to push for a constitutional referendum to return Kyrgyzstan to a presidential form of government, arguing that the country is not ready for parliamentarism. New parliamentary elections were initially scheduled for December 2020; they were postponed after the sitting parliament voted to extend its mandate through June 2021. 65 The elections are currently scheduled to take place on November 28, 2021. A snap presidential election and a referendum on whether or not Kyrgyzstan should adopt a presidential system took place in January 2021, raising concerns about the state of democracy and rule of law in the country. 66 Japarov was elected president with 79% of the vote amid relatively low turnout. In the concurrent constitutional referendum, 84% of voters supported reverting to a presidential system. 67 60 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Withdraw Problematic Draft Constitution,” March 5, 2021. “Kyrgyz Opposition Decries Mass Irregularities in Parliamentary Elections,” RFE/RL, October 4, 2020; OSCE ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission, Kyrgyz Republic—Parliamentary Elections, October 4, 2020, “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” pp. 1-2, 9. 61 62 Central Commission on Elections and the Conduction of Referendums of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, “T sIK priznala nedeistvitel’nymi itogi golosovaniia na vyborakh” [CEC has declared election results in valid], October 6, 2020; Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kyrgyzstan Election: Euphoria T urns to Insecurity as Mob Rule Spreads,” BBC News, October 8, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Does Kyrgyzstan’s Post -Election Chaos Put It on the Road to Revolution?” The Diplomat, October 6, 2020. 63T emur Umarov, “ Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 26, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ A Hidden Force In Kyrgyzstan Hijacks T he Opposition ’s Push for Big Changes,” RFE/RL, October 13, 2020; “ Sadyr Japarov: Kyrgyzstan Needs to Change ‘Political Culture,’” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2020. 64 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov’s Nomination as PM Pauses Crisis,” Eurasianet, October 14, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyz President Jeenbekov Offers Resignation,” The Diplomat, October 15, 2020; Peter Leonard, “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov Seizes All Levers of P ower,” Eurasianet, October 16, 2020; “ Kyrgyz Parliament Gives Newly Elected PM Japarov Presidential Powers,” RFE/RL, October 16, 2020. 65 Catherine Putz, “ Kyrgyzstan Punts on Elections to Pursue Constitutional Reforms,” The Diplomat, October 22, 2020; Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Upcoming Parliament Elections Present New Opportunities and Challenges for Kyrgyzstan ,” The Diplomat, August 4, 2021. 66 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Urgent Amicus Curiae Brief Relating to the Postponement of Elections Motivated by Constitutional Reform Issued Pursuant to Article 14a of the Venice Commission’s Rules of Procedure on the Basis of Comments by Mr. Richard Barrett (Member, Ireland), Ms. Marta Cartabia (Substitute Member, Italy), Ms. Hanna Suchocka (Honorary President, Former Member, Poland) , Opinion No. 1007/2020, November 17, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bad Faith Efforts to Overhaul Constitution ,” November 21, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Statement on Constitutional Referendum in the Kyrgyz Republic,” November 27, 2020; Ayzyiek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional Chamber Nixes Attempt to Halt Power Grab,” Eurasianet, December 2, 2020. 67 “Kyrgyzstan: Japarov Secures Commanding Election Victory,” Eurasianet, January 10, 2021; Mariya Omelicheva, “ Why Did Kyrgyz Voters Give Up Parliamentarism?” The Diplomat, January 12, 2021; Ana-Maria Anghelescu, Congressional Research Service 13 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Some analysts posit that Kyrgyz voters may be drawn to a strong presidential system due to longstanding frustrations with corruption and the ineffectiveness of parliament. 68 Japarov enjoys widespread popularity, and many in Kyrgyzstan support his populist platform. 69 In a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in February and March 2021, 70% of respondents said the country is heading in the right direction, up from 41% in August 2020. 70 Nevertheless, some argue that the new constitution and the process by which it was adopted set the stage for future political instability. 71 As he moved to consolidate power, Japarov announced his intention to combat crime and corruption. In October 2020, Kyrgyz authorities arrested Raimbek Matraimov, a former highlevel customs official implicated in a large-scale corruption and money-laundering scheme, and Kamchybek Kolbayev, who is designated by the U.S. Treasury Department as a key member of a transnational criminal organization. 72 In December 2020, Treasury added Matraimov to the Specially Designated Nationals List under Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328), due to his involvement in corruption. The State Department additionally announced visa sanctions against Matraimov and his spouse a day later. 73 While Kyrgyz authorities have expressed willingness to cooperate with the United States on combatting corruption, some analysts question the sincerity of Japarov’s anti-corruption efforts and speculate that he has backing from organized crime leaders. 74 The handling of court cases against Matraimov and Kolbayev has raised concerns among U.S. officials and others in light of their lenient treatment; both men have been released from custody.75 “ Should Europe Worry About Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat, January 16, 2021. 68 See, for example, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Referendum: Another Step Backward?,” event held on April 9, 2021, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tw5jjrXiFH8; Georgy Mamedov, “‘Japarov Is Our T rump’: Why Kyrgyzstan Is the Future of Global Politics,” Open Democracy, January 6, 2021. Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “ Kyrgyzstan: Japarov, Last Hope or Populist Menace?,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmalaiev, “ How Kyrgyz Social Media Backed an Imprisoned Politician’s Meteoric Rise to Power,” Open Democracy, October 15, 2020. 69 70 “ Ahead of Elections, IRI Poll Reveals Kyrgyz Public Expectations,” International Republican Institute, April 2, 2021. 71 Bruce Pannier, “ Does the New Kyrgyz Constitution Set the Country Up for Future Unrest?” RFE/RL, April 13, 2021. 72 Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, “Plunder and Patronage in the Heart of Central Asia,” available at https://www.occrp.org/en/plunder-and-patronage/; U.S. Department of State, T ransnational Organized Crime Rewards Program, “ Kamchybek Asanbekovich Kolbayev Criminal Network ,” April 9, 2017; U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ T reasury Designates Key Members of the Brothers’ Circle Criminal Organization,” December 20, 2012; “Kyrgyzstan: Kolbayev Arrested in Dramatic Fashion, but Is It T heater?” Eurasianet, October 22, 2020. 73 U.S. Department of the T reasury, “ Treasury Sanctions Corrupt Actors in Africa and Asia,” December 9, 2020; U.S. Department of State, “ On the Occasion of International Anticorruption Day and International Human Rights Day ,” December 10, 2020. 74 Ilgiz Kambarov, “ Japarov’s Many Promises: Can Stability Emerge From Chaos in Kyrgyzstan?” The Diplomat, October 22, 2020; Chris Rickleton, “ Kyrgyzstan’s Japarov: Revolutionary Crime-Fighting Anti-Corruption Crusader?” Eurasianet, October 23, 2020; Bruce Pannier, “ Kyrgyz Judiciary Seemingly Moving in Step with New Leader Japarov,” RFE/RL, October 26, 2020; Umarov, “Who’s in Charge Following Revolution in Kyrgyzstan?”; “ Former Kyrgyz Security Council Chief Dismisses New Government ’s Anti-Corruption Efforts as a ‘T heatrical Show,’” RFE/RL, October 27, 2020. 75 “Kyrgyzstan ‘Ready to Closely Work’ with U.S. After ‘Meddling’ Accusation,” RFE/RL, December 11, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “U.S. Embassy Statement on Release of Kamchybek Kolbayev,” March 3, 2021; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ U.S. Embassy Statement on the Release of Criminal Boss Raimbek Matraimov,” April 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Table 2. Kyrgyzstan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes Issue Index 2016 Status/Rank 2020/2021 Status/Rank Democracy Freedom House, Freedom in the World Partly Free (Score: 38/100) Not Free (Score: 28/100) Press Freedom Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 85 th of 180 Countries 79 th of 180 Countries Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom Mostly Unfree (96 th of 178 Countries) Moderately Free (78 th of 178 Countries) Perceptions of Corruption Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 136 th of 168 Countries 124 th of 179 Countries Rule of Law World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 83 rd of 128 Countries and Jurisdictions 87 th of 128 Countries and Jurisdictions Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law Index 2020. Human Rights According to the U.S. State Department, significant human rights issues in Kyrgyzstan include serious restrictions on freedom of expression and the press, corruption, torture and arbitrary detention, and inadequate judicial independence. 76 In 2015, the State Department recognized imprisoned activist Azimjon Askarov, an ethnic Uzbek from southern Kyrgyzstan, with its Human Rights Defender Award. This led to significant friction in the U.S.-Kyrgyzstan bilateral relationship (see “U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations,” below). Multiple Members of Congress called upon the Kyrgyz government to release Askarov, but he died in prison in July 2020. 77 Kyrgyzstan has a vibrant civil society relative to its neighbors, and its media pluralism has been described as “exceptional” in the region. 78 NGOs assert that politicians and other powerful individuals have used the justice system to pressure independent media outlets, particularly those involved in reporting on corruption. 79 Recent legislative initiatives have also raised concerns regarding freedom of expression. In June 2020, Kyrgyzstan’s parliament passed a law that would enable authorities to censor websites containing information they determined to be untruthful and require internet service providers to turn user data over to government agencies on request. After the bill sparked protests and drew criticism from international observers, then-President 76 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kyrgyz Republic, March 30, 2021. U.S. Department of State, “Winners of the 2014 Human Rights Award,” July 17, 2015; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Menendez, Six Senate Colleagues Call on Kyrgyzstan Pr esident to Release Prisoners,” May 8, 2020; U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Call on Central Asian Leaders to Release Unjustly Detained Prisoners at High Risk of COVID-19,” June 30, 2020; Committee to Protect Journalists, “ Journalist Azimjon Askarov Dies in Pprison in Kyrgyzstan,” July 25, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ T he T ragedy of Azimjon Askarov,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2020; Mihra Rittman, “ Kyrgyzstan Must Answer for the Death of Activist Azimjon Askarov,” The Washington Post, July 29, 2020. 77 78 Reporters Without Borders, 2020 World Press Freedom Index: Kyrgyzstan. 79 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kyrgyzstan. Congressional Research Service 15 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Sooronbay Jeenbekov returned it to the legislature for revision. A new version of the bill passed in July 2021 and was signed into law by President Japarov in August. 80 Nongovernmental organizations operating in Kyrgyzstan also face challenges. In July 2021, President Japarov signed into law new financial and programmatic reporting requirements on NGOs. The bill drew international criticism and inspired protests when it was initially introduced in 2020. 81 Its passage prompted the State Department to express “deep concern” and urge Kyrgyzstan’s leadership to reconsider the legislation. 82 Economy Kyrgyzstan is a lower middle income country whose economy is heavily dependent on remittances and mining. Gold, Kyrgyzstan’s main export commodity, is primarily produced by the Kumtor mine, which accounted for 12.5% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP in 2020. 83 Kyrgyzstan is one of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world, with remittances, predominantly from Russia, equaling roughly 30% of GDP in 2019. 84 Kyrgyzstan’s large informal economy is estimated at about 24% of GDP; some analysts argue it may be even larger. 85 China is Kyrgyzstan’s largest trading partner, followed by Russia. Kyrgyzstan’s 1998 accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) helped establish the country as a hub for the re-export of Chinese goods. 86 Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU, also abbreviated EAEU) since 2015. Accession has proven somewhat controversial domestically because EEU membership introduced new regulatory hurdles while failing to confer some of the expected benefits. 87 80 Mariya Zozulya, “ Internet Censorship Looms in Kyrgyzstan,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, August 12, 2020; “Zhogorku Kenesh otklonil zakonproekt o zashchite ot lozhnoi informatsii” [Jogorku Kenesh rejects bill on protection from false information], Radio Azattyk, June 30, 2021; Bermet T alant, “Kyrgyz Parliament Sneaks T hrough ‘Fake News’ Law With President’s Blessing,” Eurasianet, July 29, 2021; “ Kyrgyz President Signs Controversial ‘False Information’ Bill Into Law,” RFE/RL, August 24, 2021. 81 Human Rights Watch, “ Kyrgyzstan: Bills Curbing Basic Freedoms Advance,” June 20, 2020; Ayzirek Imanaliyeva, “Kyrgyzstan: Draft Bill T hreatens to Drive NGOs Against the W all,” Eurasianet, May 22, 2020; Bakyt T oregel’din ulu, “Usileniiu kontrolia nad NKO byt’? Spornyi zakon odobren parlamentom vo vtorom chtenii [Strengthening control over NGOs? Controversial law approved by parliament in second reading],” Radio Azattyk, June 19, 2020. 82 U.S. Department of State, “Kyrgyz Republic’s New Law Directed at NGOs,” Press Statement, July 8, 2021. 83 Kumtor Gold Company, “Contribution to the Economy,” at https://www.kumtor.kg/en/contribution-to-the-kyrgyz- economy/. Following Japarov’s rise to power, the government of Kyrgyzstan moved to nationalize the mine, which had been owned by a Canadian company. See Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “ Kyrgyzstan Moves to Nationalise Gold Mine Run by Canadian Company,” Al Jazeera, July 9, 2021; “ US Court Rules Kyrgyzstan in Contempt for Pushing Ahead with Local Legal Action Against Kumtor Gold,” bne IntelliNews, July 23. 2021. “COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April, 2020, pp. 18-20. 84 85 Hans Holzhacker and Dana Skakova, Kyrgyz Republic Diagnostic, EBRD, May 2019, p. 7. 86 Philipp Schroeder and Elina Schroeder, Entrepreneurship in Kyrgyzstan: Adjustments to a Changing Economic Environment (Bishkek: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2017); Roman Mogilevskii, “Re-export Activities in Kyrgyzstan: Issues and Prospects,” University of Central Asia, Inst itute of Public Policy and Administration, Working Paper no. 9 (2012); Bartlomej Kaminski and Gael Raballand, “Entrepot for Chinese Consumer Goods in Central Asia: T he Puzzle of Re-exports T hrough Kyrgyz Bazaars,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no. 5 (2009): pp. 581-590. Nurjamal Djanibekova, “Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan Border Crises Complicated by Mutual Distrust,” Eurasianet, February 6, 2020; “Here’s Looking at EAEU #1: Blowing Hot and Cold,” Eurasianet, June 4, 2020; Roman Mogilevskii, James T hurlow, and Adeline Yeh, “Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the Eurasian Economic Union: Measuring Economy-Wide Impacts and Uncertainties,” University of Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy and Administration, Working Paper no. 44 (2018). 87 Congressional Research Service 16 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations The expanding Chinese economic presence in Kyrgyzstan has sparked controversy and protests. China’s Export-Import Bank owns almost 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s roughly $4.8 billion of foreign debt. 88 As part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has supported several large-scale infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan, financed primarily through concessional loans. In February 2020, a joint Chinese-Kyrgyz project to build a $280 million logistics center in Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn province was cancelled after protests by local residents, who criticized the investment as a Chinese land-grab. 89 The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant negative impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy and the country’s under-resourced healthcare system. The World Bank estimates an 8.6% decline in GDP in 2020 and projects a rebound to 3.8% growth in 2021. Previous forecasts had predicted 3.4% growth in 2020, and GDP growth had averaged 4% since 2014. 90 Remittances to Kyrgyzstan fell sharply in 2020 as a consequence of the pandemic and the related economic downturn in Russia. 91 Additionally, a large number of people either returned from abroad or were unable to migrate for work, a circumstance analysts deemed likely to aggravate unemployment and place additional stress on the country’s social services. 92 Kyrgyzstan has received emergency financial assistance from international financial institutions, and the Kyrgyz government has requested debt relief from China. 93 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan Bilateral Relations The United States was among the first countries to recognize Kyrgyzstan’s independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. From 2001 to 2014, the United States operated a Transit Center at Manas, near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, in support of both Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. U.S. relations with Kyrgyzstan deteriorated under President Almazbek Atambayev (in office 20112017), reportedly in part due to Russian pressure. 94 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations improved somewhat under his successor, President Jeenbekov (in office 2017-2020). Bilateral security cooperation has waned since 2014; the State Department is seeking to develop cooperation in combatting terrorism and extremism, and promoting regional stability. Other U.S. priorities in 88 Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan’s China Debt: Between Crowdfunding and Austerity,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2020. 89 “ China-Led $280 Million Kyrgyzstan Project Abandoned After Protests,” Reuters, February 18, 2020. 90 World Bank, Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, Spring 2021: Data, Digitalization, and Governance , March 30, 2021, pp. 31, 131-132; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, June 4, 2020, pp. 5, 37; World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, January 2021, p. 79. 91 “COVID-19 Crisis T hrough a Migration Lens: Migration and Development Brief 32,” World Bank Group, April, 2020, pp. 18-20; Konstantin Larionov, “The Impact of Global Economic Recession on Kyrgyz Labor Migrants in Russia,” Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, April 14, 2020; OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16, 18. 92 OECD, COVID-19 Crisis Response in Central Asia, November 16, 2020, pp. 15-16; Asian Development Bank and U.N. Development Programme, COVID-19 in the Kyrgyz Republic: Socioeconomic and Vulnerability Impact Assessment and Policy Response, August 2020, pp. 21-26. Reid Standish, “ How Will Kyrgyzstan Repay Its Huge Debts to China?” RFE/RL, February 27, 2021; Paul Bartlett, “China Offers Cash-Strapped Kyrgyzstan a Glimmer of Hope on Debt,” Nikkei Asia, December 3, 2020. 93 94 Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “T he United States Just Closed Its Last Base in Central Asia,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2014; Olga Dzyubenko, “U.S. Vacates Base in Central Asia as Russia’s Clout Rises,” Reuters, June 3, 2014. Congressional Research Service 17 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Kyrgyzstan include supporting a more inclusive and accountable democracy and improving the country’s business environment.95 In 2015, after the U.S. State Department presented Azimjon Askarov with its 2014 Human Rights Defender Award, the Kyrgyz government terminated the bilateral cooperation agreement (BCA) that had been in place between the United States and Kyrgyzstan since 1993. 96 The BCA had facilitated the provision of U.S. humanitarian and technical economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan by providing tax exemptions and guaranteeing certain protections for U.S. civilian and military personnel present in Kyrgyzstan in connection with U.S. assistance programs.97 In 2015, the State Department warned that the lack of a BCA could put U.S. assistance programs to Kyrgyzstan in jeopardy. 98 Aid programs have continued, however, and U.S. officials have been involved in efforts to conclude a new BCA. 99 The State Department requests $31.4 million in assistance to Kyrgyzstan for FY2022, compared to $34.4 million allocated in FY2020, in order to pursue goals that include supporting democracy in the country, strengthening civil society and independent media, improving rule of law and promoting good governance, combatting corruption, protecting human rights, promoting business competitiveness, and combatting tuberculosis. The United States also seeks to promote law enforcement reform, counter violent extremism, and assist Kyrgyzstan in professionalizing its military and safely managing its conventional munitions stockpiles. 100 In January 2020, the Trump Administration suspended the issuance of most immigrant visas to Kyrgyz citizens as part of its expansion of the travel restrictions introduced by Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017. The Administration cited Kyrgyzstan’s failure to comply with information-sharing criteria, deficiencies in the security of Kyrgyz passports, and deficiencies in the integrity of the country’s passport issuance process. 101 Kyrgyzstan’s introduction of biometric passports was delayed in 2019, reportedly as the result of a corruption investigation involving the tender for passport booklets. 102 Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the U.S. travel restrictions, stating that they caused “significant damage” to U.S.-Kyrgyzstan relations and noting that more than 80 countries had yet to introduce biometric passports. 103 President Biden revoked 95 U.S. Department of State, Integrated Country Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, November 16, 2018. 96 “ Kyrgyzstan Ends U.S. Cooperation Agreement Amid Human Rights Dispute,” RFE/RL, July 21, 2015. 97 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Regarding Cooperation to Facilitate the Provision of Assistance, May 19, 1993. 98 U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyzstan: T angible Benefit s of U.S. Assistance in Response to T ermination of the 1993 Bilateral Agreement ,” July 23, 2015. 99 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Readout of U.S. Ambassador Donald Lu’s Meeting with Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Ruslan Kazakbaev,” December 3, 2020; Ibid., “ Successful U.S.-Kyrgyz Annual Bilateral Consultations: Building Our Partnership,” July 31, 2019; Ibid., “ USAID Representative Visits the Kyrgyz Republic to Advance Bilateral Cooperation Agreement ,” April 22, 2019. 100 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022 , Appendix 2, pp. 160, 288, 309, 340, 380-381, 577-578. T he White House, “ Proclamation on Improving Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry,” January 31, 2020; U.S. Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic, “ Kyrgyz Republic Designated for U.S. Immigrant and Diversity Visa Restrictions,” February 1, 2020. 101 102 Alexandra Li, “ Multimillion Passport Deal Under Investigation in Kyrgyzstan ,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, April 19, 2019. 103 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Zaiavlenie Ministerstva innostrannykh del Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki ot 1go fevralia 2020 goda [Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic dated February 1, 2020],” February 1, 2020. Congressional Research Service 18 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Executive Order 13780 and related proclamations on January 20, 2021, ordering the resumption of visa processing. 104 Kyrgyzstan began issuing biometric passports in May 2021. Tajikistan Tajikistan borders four other states, including China and Afghanistan (see Figure 5), and maintains close ties with Russia. Tajikistan’s population of approximately 9.5 million is predominantly Tajik (about 84% as of 2014), with a sizeable Uzbek minority (about 14% as of 2014). 105 The country’s territory is slightly smaller than Wisconsin. According to local estimates, more than 90% of Tajikistan’s inhabitants are Muslim, primarily Sunni; Ismaili Shias account for about 4% of the Muslim population. 106 Tajikistan’s long border with Afghanistan and the potential for instability in that country to spill over into Central Asia draw interest in Tajikistan from China, Russia, and the United States. Following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the government of Tajikistan has stood out from its neighbors in its strong opposition to a Taliban-led government, signaling that it would not recognize a government in Afghanistan that it does not see as inclusive. 107 In Afghanistan, opposition to the Taliban is concentrated in the country’s ethnic Tajik community; Tajiks are estimated to be the second-largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, accounting for about a quarter of the population. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is causing significant strain on foreign remittances, which come primarily from Russia and equaled roughly a third of GDP in 2019. Tajikistan is increasingly dependent on China, which is Tajikistan’s largest foreign creditor and is building a security presence in the country. Tajikistan has faced incidents of violence attributed to the Islamic State (IS), but it has been asserted by some observers that the government also uses the prospect of insurgent activity as a pretext for stifling opposition. President Emomali Rahmon and his family control the government and significant sectors of the economy. The U.S. Department of State describes corruption in Tajikistan as widespread. 108 104 T he White House, “ Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States,” January 20, 2021. 105 T he CIA World Factbook. 106 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021. 107 Umida Hashimova, “ T ajikistan and Uzbekistan T ake Different Approaches to Afghanistan ,” The Diplomat, September 13, 2021; Bruce Pannier, “T ajikistan: T he T aliban’s T oughest Critic,” RFE/RL, September 13, 2021; Ivan Klyszcz, “ Don’t Underestimate Tajikistan in the Afghanistan Crisis,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2021. 108 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements: Tajikistan, July 21, 2021. Congressional Research Service 19 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Figure 5. Map of Tajikistan Source: Graphic created by CRS. Notes: Abbreviations: TKM—Turkmenistan; KAZ—Kazakhstan. Political Background Tajikistan is a presidential republic with power heavily concentrated in the executive. The president serves as both head of state and head of the government; the role and influence of the legislature is limited. President Rahmon, 68, has been in power since 1992 and is now the oldest and longest-serving head of state in the post-Soviet states. He was exempted from term limits in a 2016 constitutional referendum that also granted him and his family immunity from prosecution. 109 Freedom House describes Tajikistan under Rahmon as a “nepotistic kleptocracy,” as a small group of families close to the president dominate the political and economic spheres. 110 Although six parties have seats in parliament, all support Rahmon, and observers have described Tajikistan as a de facto one-party state. 111 As speaker of the parliament’s upper chamber, the president’s son, Rustam Emomali, 33, is first in the line of presidential succession. OSCE observers describe the electoral process in Tajikistan as lacking credibility and transparency. 112 Shortly after Tajikistan became independent in 1991, the country entered into a five-year civil war (1992-1997) during which as many as 300,000 people died and more than a million were displaced. 113 The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), which fought as part of a 109 Catherine Putz, “Meet Central Asia’s Newest President-for-Life,” The Diplomat, May 23, 2016. 110 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2018: Tajikistan. 111 Edward Lemon, “T he Fall of T ajikistan’s Opposition,” The Diplomat, March 2020. 112 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1. 113 Estimated fatalities vary widely, from 50,000 to 300,000. See Anna Matveeva, “The Perils of Emerging Statehood: Civil War and State Reconstruction in T ajikistan,” Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, March 2009; and Bruce Congressional Research Service 20 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations coalition of anti-government forces, was legalized following the 1997 peace deal and adopted an agenda of democratization. It became Tajikistan’s second-largest political party and held seats in parliament from 2000 to 2015. 114 In 2015, the Tajik government outlawed the IRPT and labelled it a terrorist organization in what the U.S. State Department characterized as “steps to eliminate political opposition.”115 Some of the party’s leaders have been sentenced to lengthy prison terms, while others have fled the country. Tajikistan’s March 2020 parliamentary elections were the first to be held since the IRPT was outlawed. One opposition party fielded candidates, but failed to secure any seats. The president’s People’s Democratic Party won a decisive majority of 47 out of 63 seats in the lower chamber, among reports of widespread electoral fraud. International observers questioned the integrity of the electoral results. 116 In October 2020, President Rahmon was reelected for a fifth term with 90.9% of the vote, in an election that “lacked credibility and transparency” in the assessment of the OSCE. 117 Some analysts had previously speculated that he might be replaced on the ballot by his son, who was eligible to run in 2020 following constitutional changes that lowered the age requirement for candidates. Some argue that it is likely Rahmon will not serve out his full seven-year term, and will resign in favor of his son at some point before the next presidential election, which is set to take place in 2027. 118 Table 3. Tajikistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes Issue Index 2016 Status/Rank 2020/2021 Status/Rank Democracy Freedom House, Freedom in the World Not Free (Score: 16/100) Not Free (Score: 8/100) Press Freedom Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 150 th of 180 Countries 162 nd of 180 Countries Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom Mostly Unfree (149 th of 178 Countries) Mostly Unfree (134 th of 178 Countries) Perceptions of Corruption Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 151 st of 168 Countries 149 th of 179 Countries Rule of Law World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index Not Ranked Not Ranked Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency I nternational, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law Index 2020. Pannier, “ T ajikistan’s Civil War: A Nightmare the Government Won’t Let Its People Forget ,” RFE/RL, June 23, 2017. 114 Ilya Lozovsky, “T he Death of T ajikistan’s Islamic Renaissance,” Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, June 5, 2018; Human Rights Watch, “T ajikistan: Reverse Political Party Closure,” September 14, 2015. 115 U.S Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Introduction , April 13, 2016. 116 “T ajikistan: Fraud-Ridden Election Hands Crushing Win to Ruling Party,” Eurasianet, March 2, 2020; OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections, 1 March 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, May 27, 2020, p. 3. 117 OSCE ODIHR, Republic of Tajikistan Presidential Election, 11 October 2020: ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report, 29 January, 2021, p. 1. 118 T emur Umarov, “T he Secret of the T ajik President’s Staying Power,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October 10, 2020. Congressional Research Service 21 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Human Rights According to the State Department, significant human rights issues in Tajikistan include kidnapping and forced repatriation of citizens from foreign countries, forced disappearances, torture, arbitrary detention, and a non-independent judiciary, as well as significant restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, religious freedom, and political participation. 119 Tajikistan has faced criticism, including from some Members of Congress, for engaging in transnational repression of government critics.120 This includes targeting IRPT members and other dissidents through law enforcement mechanisms such as International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) wanted persons notices and pressuring family members who remain in Tajikistan (see also “Outlook and Issues for Congress,” below). 121 Media freedom in Tajikistan reportedly is curtailed severely. 122 Reporters Without Borders ranked Tajikistan 162nd out of 180 countries in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index (see Table 3), down from 149th in 2018. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about government pressure on independent media outlets in Tajikistan, particularly the U.S.-funded RFE/RL. 123 Tajikistan’s government sometimes curtails internet access throughout the country, purportedly in order to block citizens’ access to critical voices, including those of IRPT leaders. 124 The Tajik government restricts and strictly regulates religious practices. 125 Authorities target outward signs of religiosity, such as hijabs and beards. Minors are prohibited from participating in public religious activities. The government also places restrictions on minority religious groups, including Christian denominations. 126 Tajikistan is designated a “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (IRFA, P.L. 105-292), but the State Department has consistently waived related sanctions in consideration of U.S. national interests . In its 2021 Annual Report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommends that the State Department redesignate Tajikistan as a CPC and condition U.S. assistance to Tajikistan, other than aid to improve humanitarian conditions or advance human rights, on improvement of religious freedom conditions in the country and mandated religious freedom training for Tajik officials. Additionally, USCIRF recommends targeted sanctions on 119 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Tajikistan, March 30, 2021. 120 See, for example, Rep. Alcee Hastings, “Introduction of the T ransnational Repression Accountability and Prevention Act of 2019 (T RAP Act),” remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 165 (September 16, 2019), p. E1153; Rep. Steve Cohen, “ Congressman Cohen Introduces the T ransnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act ,” press release, July 29, 2021. 121 Nate Schenkkan and Isabel Linzer, Out of Sight, Not Out of Reach: The Global Scale and Scope of Transnational Repression, Freedom House, February 2021, pp. 48-49; Edward Lemon, “Weaponizing Interpol,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 2 (2019): pp. 15-29. 122 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020: Tajikistan. 123 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Bipartisan Group of Senators Sends Letter to President of T ajikistan Regarding Harassment of T ajik Journalists,” October 25, 2019. 124 “ T ajikistan’s Internet Goes Down Just as Speech by Exiled Opposition Leader Delivered Online,” RFE/RL, September 17, 2020; Catherine Putz, “ Muhiddin Kabiri Speaks Online, T ajikistan’s Internet Shuts Down ,” The Diplomat, September 18, 2020. See also “T ajikistan: Opposition Comes On, Internet Goes Off,” Eurasianet, February 23, 2019. 125 See Jason Morton, Promoting Religious Freedom and Countering Violent Extremism in Tajikistan , U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, November 2020. 126 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan, May 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 22 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious freedom in Tajikistan. 127 Economy Tajikistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, with an economy dependent on metal and mineral exports and remittances from migrant workers. Although Tajikistan has no known deposits of bauxite, the country’s primary industrial asset is the state-owned Tajikistan Aluminum Company (Talco), the world’s fourth-largest aluminum smelter. The factory accounts for a significant fraction of Tajikistan’s GDP. It also consumes about a third of the country’s electricity supply at a steeply discounted rate and has been implicated in large-scale corruption involving members of the president’s family. 128 Tajikistan has significant hydropower potential. The partially U.S.-funded Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000) aims to develop hydropower infrastructure and export electricity to South Asia. 129 If completed, the Rogun Dam could alleviate domestic electricity shortages and make the country a net energy exporter. Two of the planned six turbines are currently operational, and construction is slated for completion in 2028. 130 Although Tajikistan has increased electricity exports, the country continues to face rolling blackouts domestically. 131 Tajikistan depends heavily on remittances from labor migrants in Russia, which equaled almost a third of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2019 (down from almost half in 2013). 132 This renders Tajikistan highly vulnerable to external shocks. Remittances fell significantly in 2020 due to travel restrictions and economic disruption in Russia caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 133 The pandemic response has increased unemployment and exacerbated Tajikistan’s chronic food insecurity. According to the World Bank’s Listening to Tajikistan survey, in May 2020 more than 41% of respondents reported that their households had reduced their food consumption. The World Bank estimates that Tajikistan’s GDP growth fell to 2.2% in 2020 (down from 7.5% in 2019), projecting a gradual acceleration in GDP growth in 2021 and 2022. 134 Although Russia remains Tajikistan’s primary economic partner, China has increased its presence in the country in recent years. China has made a range of investments in Tajikistan as part of the Belt and Road Initiative and now holds the majority of Tajikistan’s foreign debt. In April 2019, a Chinese state-owned company entered into an agreement to receive a stake in Talco in exchange 127 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 48. 128 Cooley and Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders, pp. 80-111; “ Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; David T rilling, “ Russian Aluminum Giant Pries Open Books at T ajikistan’s Largest Factory,” Eurasianet, June 9, 2014. 129 USAID, Secretariat for CASA-1000 Power Transmission Project Fact Sheet, September 14, 2020. 130 Catherine Putz, “T ajikistan’s Rogun Dam Begins Operations,” The Diplomat, November 20, 2018; Catherine Putz, “ Winter Energy Woes Bedevil Central Asia,” The Diplomat, January 13, 2021. 131 “T ajikistan Returning to Electricity Rationing Regime,” Eurasianet, January 6, 2021; “T ajikistan: Lights Out as Dams Falter,” Eurasianet, November 17, 2020. 132 World Bank, “ Personal Remittances, Received (% of GDP)—T ajikistan,” available at https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/BX.T RF.PWKR.DT .GD.ZS?locations=T J. Khiradmand Sheraliev, “ A Critical Lesson for T ajikistan: T he State of Migrant Workers in 2020 ,” The Diplomat, January 6, 2021; “ T ajikistan: Coronavirus T aking Heavy T oll on Remittances,” Eurasianet, July 22, 2020. 133 134 World Bank, Tajikistan Country Economic Update Fall 2020: Economic Slowdown Amid the Pandemic , December 23, 2020. Congressional Research Service 23 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations for investing $545 million in modernizing the facility. 135 As much as 90% of Tajikistan’s telecommunications infrastructure is from China, manufactured by Huawei. 136 U.S.-Tajikistan Bilateral Relations Tajikistan works with the United States to promote greater regional connectivity in Central Asia, and U.S. officials have viewed it as an important partner for promoting stability in Afghanistan. 137 The State Department requests $48.4 million for assistance to Tajikistan in FY2022, compared to $50.9 million allocated in FY2020. U.S. aid to Tajikistan includes public health programs targeting nutrition, tuberculosis, and maternal and child health, as well as programs intended to build democratic institutions, political pluralism and civil society; support the modernization of the country’s education system; address climate change; support agricultural development; and improve private sector competitiveness.138 U.S. engagement with Tajikistan also includes security cooperation, particularly in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and countering violent extremism. Tajikistan lies along a major drug trafficking route for opiates from Afghanistan, and the United States provides equipment and training to relevant Tajik agencies. 139 Turkmenistan Turkmenistan borders the Caspian Sea and four other countries, including Afghanistan and Iran (see Figure 6). The country is slightly larger than California and is more than 80% desert. The size of Turkmenistan’s population is disputed; the figure asserted by the government is 6.2 million, but some argue that it may be less than half of that. 140 According to the U.S. State Department, Turkmenistan is approximately 89% Muslim (predominantly Sunni), and about 9% Eastern Orthodox. 141 A large majority of the country’s population is Turkmen (approximately 85% according to U.S. government estimates), with minority groups including Uzbeks and Russians. Since independence, Turkmenistan’s authoritarian government has kept the country largely isolated from the outside world and maintained tight control over the economy, although Turkmenistan’s natural gas resources have attracted foreign investment. Turkmenistan’s constitution establishes “permanent neutrality” as the core principle of the country’s foreign policy. History and geography underpin a complicated but important relationship with Russia, and increasing economic dependence is driving closer ties with China. In recent years, U.S. engagement with Turkmenistan has focused primarily on border security issues, particularly with neighboring Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s government has not acknowledged any cases of COVID-19 within its borders. Independent media operating outside the country have compiled evidence of COVID-19 infections and deaths, and report that authorities have imposed pandemicrelated restrictions domestically. 142 The pandemic has exacerbated Turkmenistan’s economic 135 “ Report: T ajikistan to Yield Share in Aluminum Plant to China,” Eurasianet, December 5, 2019; “Chast’ imushchestva aliuminievogo giganta T adzhikistana peredadut novoi kompanii [Part of the assets of T ajikistan’s aluminum giant will be transferred to a new company],” Fergana News, May 22, 2020. 136 Bradley Jardine, “ China’s Surveillance State Has Eyes on Central Asia,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2019. 137 See, for example, U.S. Department of State, “ U.S. Relations With T ajikistan: Bilateral Relations Factsheet,” January 20, 2021. 138 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2, pp. 162, 288, 310, 340, 380-381. 139 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “T ajikistan Summary.” 140 “ T urkmenistan Faces ‘Shocking Population Decline’ As Exodus Continues,” RFE/RL, July 12, 2021. 141 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Turkmenistan , May 12, 2021. 142 T urkmen.news, Survival of the Fittest: All About Coronavirus in Turkmenistan, Though Officially the Country Has No COVID-19 Infections, May 2021. Congressional Research Service 24 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations situation. Residents face chronic food shortages as well as difficulties withdrawing cash, which is used for most transactions. Figure 6. Map of Turkmenistan Source: Graphic created by CRS. Political Background Executive power in Turkmenistan is largely unchecked, and President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov dominates the country’s political structures. The president has extensive powers that include presiding over the Cabinet of Ministers, as well as appointing and dismissing regional governors and mayors. Although the constitution stipulates the independence of the judiciary, the president also appoints and dismisses judges. The legislature, termed a “rubberstamp body” by observers, became bicameral following constitutional changes introduced in September 2020. 143 Following 2012 legislation allowing for a multi-party system, Turkmenistan has three officially recognized political parties: the Democratic Party (established in 1991 as the successor to the Soviet-era Communist Party), the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and the Agrarian Party. The OSCE describes Turkmenistan’s political environment as “only nominally pluralist,” as all three parties are aligned with the president and electoral procedures fail to meet international standards. 144 Saparmurad Niyazov, former first secretary of Turkmenistan’s Communist Party, became the country’s first elected president after an uncontested 1992 race. A 1994 referendum extended his term to 2002, and in 1999, amendments to the constitution proclaimed him president for life. Niyazov, known as Turkmenbashi, or Leader of the Turkmen, was an autocratic ruler who created a cult of personality around himself and his family, isolated the country, and suppressed dissent. 143 Bruce Pannier, “T urkmen Elections Look Like Next Step T oward Dynasty,” RFE/RL, March 22, 2018. 144 OSCE ODIHR, Turkmenistan Parliamentary Elections, 25 March 2018, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission: Final Report, May 30, 2018. Congressional Research Service 25 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Following Niyazov’s death in December 2006, former Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Berdimuhamedov was elected in a 2007 election widely seen as fraudulent. He was reelected in 2012 and again in 2017 (in 2016, the presidential term was extended from five to seven years). No constitutional limit exists on the number of terms a president can hold office. With the passage of constitutional amendments in 2016, presidential candidates no longer have an upper age limit. Berdimuhamedov has largely followed in his predecessor’s authoritarian footsteps. 145 He has replaced Niyazov’s cult of personality with veneration of himself and uses the title Arkadag (the Protector).146 Many analysts assess that Berdimuhamedov is positioning his son Serdar, 39, as his successor.147 Table 4. Turkmenistan: Selected Democracy and Human Rights Indexes Issue Index 2016 Status/Rank 2020/2021 Status/Rank Democracy Freedom House, Freedom in the World Not Free (Score: 4/100) Not Free (Score: 2/100) Press Freedom Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 178 th of 180 Countries 178 th of 180 Countries Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom Repressed (174 th of 178 Countries) Repressed (167 th of 178 Countries) Perceptions of Corruption Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 154 th of 168 Countries 165 th of 179 Countries Rule of Law World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index Not Ranked Not Ranked Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 and Freedom in the World 2021; Reporters Without Borders, 2016 World Press Freedom Index and 2021 World Press Freedom Index; The Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of Economic Freedom and 2021Index of Economic Freedom; Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2016 and Corruption Perceptions Index 2021; World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2016 and Rule of Law Index 2020. Human Rights The State Department identifies human rights issues in Turkmenistan, and Turkmenistan faces human rights criticism from international nongovernmental organizations. The NGO Freedom House describes the country as “a repressive authoritarian state where political rights and civil liberties are almost completely denied in practice.”148 Citizens are reportedly subject to widespread surveillance, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture. The government also imposes severe restrictions on freedom of movement. 149 The State Department describes corruption in 145 Aisha Berdyeva, “T urkmenistan: Berdymukhamedov Marks First Year as President,” Eurasianet, February 11, 2008. 146 Farangis Najibullah, “ T urkmenistan: My Personality Cult Is Better T han Yours,” RFE/RL, February 13, 2012. 147 “ T urkmen Leader’s Son T akes On New Roles; Rapid Rise Renews T alk of Succession,” RFE/RL, February 12, 2021; Victoria Clement, “Passing the Baton in T urkmenistan,” Atlantic Council, October 21, 2019. 148 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Turkmenistan. 149 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Turkmenistan , March 30, 2021. Congressional Research Service 26 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Turkmenistan as rampant. 150 With billions of dollars in state revenues allegedly embezzled on behalf of the president, one NGO has termed Turkmenistan a “model kleptocracy.”151 Because of its violations of religious freedom, Turkmenistan has been designated as a CPC under the IRFA since 2014. The State Department regularly waives the related sanctions, citing U.S. national interests. The Secretary of State redesignated Turkmenistan as a CPC in December 2020. USCIRF describes religious freedom conditions in Turkmenistan as “among the worst in the world.”152 In its 2021 Annual Report, USCIRF recommends that the State Department continue to designate Turkmenistan as a CPC and lift the sanctions waiver, given the country’s record of severe and wide-ranging violations of religious freedom. Additionally, USCIRF recommends that the U.S. government limit security assistance to Turkmenistan under IRFA Section 405(a)(22) and impose targeted sanctions on government agencies and officials responsible for severe violations of religious freedom in Turkmenistan. 153 Turkmenistan has long faced international criticism for engaging in widespread use of stateorchestrated forced labor, particularly in the harvesting of cotton. Public sector employees are reportedly forced to pick cotton, and private businesses are allegedly also forced to contribute labor. In 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection responded to concerns about forced labor by issuing a Withhold Release Order banning the importation of all cotton from Turkmenistan, as well as all products produced using cotton from Turkmenistan. 154 In its 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, the State Department assessed that the government of Turkmenistan had a documented “policy or pattern of forced labor,” and ranked Turkmenistan as a Tier 3 country for human trafficking. 155 Although Turkmenistan has taken steps to mechanize the cotton harvest, local officials continue to coerce soldiers, public sector workers, and private-sector employees to pick cotton without pay in order to meet government production quotas. Additionally, students and public sector workers, including teachers and doctors, continue to face compulsory mobilization for public works projects such as preparing public spaces for presidential visits and supporting government-sponsored events.156 Media outlets in Turkmenistan are predominantly state-controlled, and NGOs identify significant abuses. The Committee to Protect Journalists has condemned the “systematic harassment” of the few independent journalists active in the country, and, in its 2021 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked Turkmenistan 178th out 180 countries in levels of freedom available to journalists (see Table 4), terming Turkmenistan “an ever-expanding news ‘black hole.’”157 The U.S.-funded RFE/RL is one of a small number of independent news outlets that reports from within Turkmenistan. Internet censorship is prevalent, and the government blocks access to many websites. 150 U.S. Department of State, 2021 Investment Climate Statements, July 21, 2021. 151 Crude Accountability, Turkmenistan: A Model Kleptocracy, June 2021. 152 U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom , April 2021, p. 50. 153 Ibid. 154 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “Withhold Release Orders and Findings,” May 18, 2018, at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/trade-community/programs-outreach/convict-importations/detention-orders. 155 U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2021, p. 565. 156 Ibid., pp. 565-567. 157 Reporters Without Borders, “T urkmenistan,” at https://rsf.org/en/turkmenistan; Committee to Protect Journalists, “T urkmenistan Journalist Soltan Achilova Barred from T raveling Abroad,” March 25, 2019. Congressional Research Service 27 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Economy The opaque nature of Turkmenistan’s government presents difficulties for accessing reliable data on the country’s centrally-managed economy.158 Turkmenistan is largely dependent on the export of hydrocarbons, especially natural gas, which was estimated to have accounted for 83.4% of the country’s exports by value in 2019, with oil comprising another 9.5%. 159 Soviet industrialization policies established a cotton monoculture in the country, and cotton is Turkmenistan’s largest export after hydrocarbons. The country’s other major crop, wheat, is cultivated for the domestic market. Foreign direct investment remains limited beyond the hydrocarbons sector. The government of Turkmenistan maintains that the country has had no cases of COVID-19. The country has experienced the economic effects of the global pandemic, with GDP growth slowing to 0.8% in 2020 according to IMF data. 160 Turkmenistan is estimated to have the fourth-largest natural gas reserves in the world, accounting for about 7% of the global total. 161 The country’s export capacity is limited by its infrastructure. Payment disputes with Russia and Iran halted gas flows from Turkmenistan in 2016 and 2017, respectively, leaving China as Turkmenistan’s major export market. Roughly half of Turkmenistan’s gas production is consumed domestically, while the majority of the rest is exported to China. Turkmenistan is China’s largest natural gas supplier by pipeline, accounting for over 60% of pipeline imports in 2019 (see “Oil and Gas,” below). China is also Turkmenistan’s primary international lender, having provided over $8 billion in loans to develop Turkmenistan’s gas infrastructure. Analysts speculate that Turkmenistan services its Chinese loans through discounted gas sales. 162 Although Russia resumed gas imports from Turkmenistan in 2019, the volume is relatively minor compared to Turkmenistan’s exports to China. 163 The drop in natural gas prices and lower demand resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant negative impact on Turkmenistan’s economy. The value of China’s imports from Turkmenistan, which consist almost exclusively of natural gas, fell by 30% in 2020. 164 Even before the pandemic, declining revenue from gas exports put pressure on Turkmenistan’s economy, reducing living standards in recent years. High inflation, currency devaluation, tight foreign exchange controls, and import restrictions mean that the country faces chronic shortages of food and constraints on the ability to withdraw paper currency at local banks. The U.S. 158 Economic indicators provided by the government of T urkmenistan are generally seen as unreliable. T he U.S. Department of Commerce terms GDP and growth rate figures put forward by the government of T urkmenistan “implausible” and “not credible” (see U.S. Department of Commerce, Turkmenistan Country Commercial Guide, July 21, 2019, available at https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=T urkmenistan-Market-Overview). Citing a lack of reliable data, the World Bank does not publish economic output, income, or growth data for T urkmenistan. See also Peter Leonard, “ T urkmenistan: End of the Road for the Roaring Growth Myth?” Eurasianet, April 7, 2021. 159 Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit. 160 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: Managing Divergent Recoveries, April 2021, p. 38. T his contrasts with the 5.8% growth claimed by the government of T urkmenistan. T he Economist Intelligence Unit estimates a 0.8% contraction in T urkmenistan’s GDP in 2020. 161 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2021, July 2021, p. 34. Luca Anceschi, “A T ale of Four Pipelines: T he International Politics of T urkmen Natural Gas,” in Adam Hug, ed., Spotlight on Turkmenistan, T he Foreign Policy Centre, July 2019, pp. 36-37; Jakub Jakobowski and Mariusz Marszewski, “Crisis in T urkmenistan: A T est for China’s Policy in the Region,” Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), August 31, 2018. 162 163 Catherine Putz, “Russia Is Buying T urkmen Gas Again. Why?” The Diplomat, April 25, 2019. 164 People’s Republic of China General Administration of Customs, “Imports and Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/Destination, 12.2020,” January 18, 2021, available at http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/81bd4a20-01a845be-bcbc-f0627fd206da.html. Congressional Research Service 28 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Department of Commerce describes corruption in Turkmenistan as “pervasive and endemic,” and notes that foreign companies have reported problems collecting payments for government contracts.165 The Heritage Foundation’s 2021 Index of Economic Freedom classifies Turkmenistan as “repressed,” ranking it 167th out of 180 countries. The country’s dire economic situation has prompted many citizens to emigrate to countries such as Turkey and Russia. 166 U.S.-Turkmenistan Bilateral Relations Turkmenistan’s constitution outlines the principle of “permanent neutrality” as the basis for the country’s foreign policy. The United Nations officially recognized Turkmenistan’s neutral status in 1995. 167 In practice, Turkmenistan’s neutrality translates to foreign policy isolationism, and the country is largely closed off from the outside world. While Turkmenistan’s geography and energy resources make it a potential strategic partner for the United States, the development of U.S. Turkmenistan ties is hampered by the country’s uninviting investment climate, repressive government, and generally closed nature. Bilateral engagement to date has focused largely on regional security issues. In 2019 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Joseph L. Votel, then-Commander of U.S. Central Command, noted that while international cooperation is limited by Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy, U.S. efforts have focused on English language training, medical engagements, and the development of Turkmenistan’s Special Forces. He identified Turkmenistan’s interest in enhancing its disaster response capability and border security as avenues of opportunity for U.S. Central Command. “Maintaining a small, consistent security cooperation portfolio in Turkmenistan has outsized impact and will help counter Russian and Chinese influence,” he concluded. 168 The State Department requests $4.1 million in assistance to Turkmenistan in FY2022, compared to $4 million allocated in FY2020. 169 In order to “help [Turkmenistan] become a partner whose contributions can help stabilize Afghanistan,” U.S. programs include efforts to improve the country’s business climate and foster a more diversified economy; combat trafficking in persons; and advance good governance. 170 Uzbekistan Many analysts see Uzbekistan a potential regional leader. 171 Uzbekistan has the largest population in the region and is the only country that borders all four other Central Asian states (see Figure 165 U.S. Department of Commerce, International T rade Administration, Turkmenistan—Country Commercial Guide, October 15, 2020. 166 “Istochniki: T urkmenistan v sostoianii depopulatsii. V strane ostalos’ 2,7 milliona naseleniia” [Sources: T urkmenistan is in a state of depopulation. T here are 2.7 million inhabitants left in the country], Radio Azatlyk, July 2, 2021; Bruce Pannier, “How Many People Live in T urkmenistan? T he Official Figure Is Hard to Believe,” RFE/RL, January 23, 2020. 167 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 50/80, Maintenance of International Security, December 12, 1995. 168 U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command , February 5, 2019. 169 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2022, Appendix 2, pp. 583-584. 170 Ibid., p. 289. 171 See, for example, Nathan Hutson and Marsha McGraw Olive, “Uzbekistan Rising as Central Asian Integration Catalyst,” Eurasianet, February 8, 2021; Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, “ Will an Ascendant Uzbekistan Challenge Kazakhstan’s Leadership in Central Asia?” Geopolitical Monitor, June 4, 2018; T imur T oktonaliev, “Could Uzbekistan Lead Central Asia?” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 22, 2017. Congressional Research Service 29 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations 7). The country also shares a border with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is slightly larger than California, and the majority of the country’s population of approximately 34.9 million is Uzbek (83.8%), with Tajik (4.8%), Kazakh (2.5%), Russian (2.3%), Karakalpak (2.2%), and Tatar (1.5%) minorities, among others. 172 Most of Uzbekistan’s inhabitants are Muslim (88% according to U.S. government estimates, and 96% according to the government of Uzbekistan), almost exclusively Sunni, and about 2.2% of the population is Russian Orthodox. 173 The United States and Uzbekistan cooperate in addressing regional threats such as illegal narcotics, trafficking in persons, terrorism, and violent extremism. 174 Additionally, the wide-ranging reform effort currently underway in Uzbekistan potentially creates new opportunities for U.S. engagement with the country across a range of sectors. Uzbekistan previously had sought to position itself as an intermediary between the Taliban and the Afghan government, in line with Uzbekistan’s stated aim of facilitating intra-Afghan peace talks. 175 Uzbekistan’s stance toward the Taliban is generally seen as pragmatic, with the priority of ensuring Uzbekistan’s security (see “Afghanistan,” below). 176 Figure 7. Map of Uzbekistan Source: Graphic created by CRS. 172 Population estimate as of July 1, 2021, from the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, available at https://stat.uz/en/. Ethnic breakdown estimated as of 2017, from the CIA World Fact book. 173 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Uzbekistan , May 12, 2021. 174 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Uzbekistan: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2021. 175 James Durso, “ Uzbekistan’s Role in Afghan Reconciliation,” The Diplomat, August 18, 2020; Umida Hashimova, “What Is Uzbekistan’s Role in the Afghan Peace Process?” The Diplomat, March 11, 2019. 176 See, for example, Henry Foy, “T aliban T akeover T urns Uzbekistan into P owerbroker,” Financial Times, September 9, 2021; Muhammad T ahir, “ Majlis Podcast: Uzbekistan Walks the T ightrope in Its Policies T oward Afghanistan,” RFE/RL, September 5, 2021; Gavin Helf and Barmak Pazhwak, “ Central Asia Prepares for T aliban T akeover,” United States Institute of Peace, July 20, 2021. Congressional Research Service 30 Central Asia: Background and U.S. Relations Political Background From 1991 to 2016, Uzbekistan was led by President Islam Karimov, a former high-level Soviet official. International observers considered his rule authoritarian and highly repressive. 177 Karimov’s economic policies emphasized self-sufficiency, and his government pursued a largely isolationist foreign policy. After his death, Karimov was succeeded by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who was prime minister under Karimov for 13 years. After serving as acting president, Mirziyoyev won a December 2016 presidential election that was criticized by international observers as “devoid of genuine competition.”178 Although Mirziyoyev was widely expected to continue his predecessor’s policies, he embarked on an ambitious reform program, aiming to transform Uzbekistan by modernizing and liberalizing the economy, streamlining the bureaucracy, easing political repression, addressing human rights concerns, reengaging with the international community, and attracting increased foreign investment. U.S. officials and other international observers have noted continuing reforms in Uzbekistan since the country began that process in 2016. 179 Uzbek government officials consistently describe the country’s reform process as “irreversible.”180 Longtime observers describe the overall changes taking place in Uzbekistan as “remarkable,” particularly with regard to increased openness, improved governance, and decreased repression, and U.S. officials have voiced strong support for the country’s ongoing reforms.181 Reform remains a top-down, centralized process, leading to skepticism among some analysts as to whether the government will implement true democratization. 182 Analysts note a slower pace in areas such as the privatization of state assets, decentralization of political power, and combatting corruption. 183 Some observers, including the U.S. government, continue to express concerns about human rights and political freedoms. 184 177 See, for example, “Uzbekistan: Authoritarian President Karimov Reported Dead: Legacy Is Quarter Century of Ruthless Repression,” Human Rights Watch, September 2, 2016; Casey Michel, “ Uzbekistan’s Karimov Leaves Behind a Legacy of Repression, Slavery, and Kleptocracy,” The Diplomat, September 2, 2016. 178 OSCE ODIHR, Uzbekistan, Early Presidential Election, 4 December 2016: Final Report, March 22, 2017, p. 1. 179 See, for example, U.S. Embassy in Uzbekistan, “ Secretary Michael R. Pompeo and Uzbekistan Foreign Minister Abdulaziz K [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46924. Public record. Not legal advice.