# India-U.S. Relations

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46845

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** July 19, 2021
- **Citation:** R46845

## Text

India-U.S. Relations
July 19, 2021

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46845

SUMMARY

India-U.S. Relations
India is expected to become the world’s most populous country, home to about one of every six
people. Many factors combine to infuse India’s government and people with “great power”
aspirations: its rich civilization and history; expanding strategic horizons; energetic global and
international engagement; critical geography (with more than 9,000 miles of land borders, many
of them disputed) astride vital sea and energy lanes; major economy (at times the world’s fastest
growing) with a rising middle class and an attendant boost in defense and power projection
capabilities (replete with a nuclear weapons arsenal and triad of delivery systems); and vigorous
science and technology sectors, among others.
In recognition of India’s increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs—and with
a widely held assumption that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the
United States—the U.S. Congress and three successive U.S. Administrations have acted both to
broaden and deepen America’s engagement with New Delhi. Such engagement follows decades
of Cold War-era estrangement. Washington and New Delhi launched a “strategic partnership” in
2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale
joint military exercises and significant defense trade. In concert with Japan and Australia, the
United States and India in 2020 reinvigorated a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as a
flagship initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Biden Administration has strongly
embraced the Quad mechanism. In 2021, mutual efforts to address the coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic have been at the forefront of bilateral engagement. Bilateral trade and
investment have increased, while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising
newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals account for a large proportion of
foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information
technology sector.

R46845
July 19, 2021
K. Alan Kronstadt,
Coordinator
Specialist in South Asian
Affairs
Shayerah I. Akhtar
Specialist in International
Trade and Finance
William A. Kandel
Analyst in Immigration
Policy
Liana W. Rosen
Specialist in International
Crime and Narcotics
Sara M. Tharakan
Analyst in Global Health
and International
Development

Jill H. Wilson
Yet more engagement has meant more areas of friction in the partnership, many of which attract
Analyst in Immigration
congressional attention. India’s economy, while slowly reforming, continues to be a relatively
Policy
closed one, with barriers to trade and investment deterring foreign business interests. The recent
global health pandemic was damaging to India’s economic progress. Washington also has issues
with New Delhi’s cooperative engagements with Russia and Iran, countries where India has
longstanding equities. Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of
nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved; New Delhi views these as trade disputes. India’s
intellectual property protection regime comes under regular criticism from U.S. officials and firms. Other stumbling blocks—
on localization barriers and civil nuclear commerce, among others—sometimes cause tensions. Meanwhile, cooperation in
the fields of defense trade, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although progressing rapidly and improved relative to that of
only a decade ago, runs up against institutional and political obstacles. Moreover, the U.S. Administration and some
Members of Congress take notice of human rights issues in India, perhaps especially those related to religious freedom, and
most recently regarding changes in the status of India’s Jammu and Kashmir region and to India’s citizenship laws.

Despite these many areas of sometimes serious discord, the U.S. Congress has remained broadly positive in its posture
toward the U.S.-India strategic and commercial partnership. The Biden Administration has indicated that it intends to
maintain the expansion and deepening of U.S.-India ties. Congressional legislation and oversight has and can continue to
affect the course of U.S.-India relations, including in areas such as resourcing for a U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, trade and
investment (including bilateral defense trade) relations, immigration policy, nuclear proliferation, human rights, and
cooperative efforts to address COVID-19 and climate change, among many others.

Congressional Research Service

India-U.S. Relations

Contents
Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Selected Current Developments ...................................................................................................... 1
The Biden Administration and India ......................................................................................... 1
The COVID-19 Pandemic ......................................................................................................... 4
Farmer Protests.......................................................................................................................... 4
U.S.-India Strategic and Security Relations .................................................................................... 6
Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ................................................ 6
Bilateral Security Relations....................................................................................................... 9
Selected Security Topics ......................................................................................................... 10
India and Fentanyl ................................................................................................................... 14
U.S.-India Trade and Investment Relations ................................................................................... 15
Selected Trade Issues .............................................................................................................. 16
U.S.-India Engagement on Trade Issues ................................................................................. 18
India’s Foreign Relations and U.S. Interests ................................................................................. 19
India-China Relations.............................................................................................................. 19
India-Pakistan Relations.......................................................................................................... 22
India-Russia Relations and CAATSA Legislation .................................................................. 25
Other Selected Indian Foreign Relations ................................................................................ 27
U.S.-India Health Cooperation and COVID-19 ............................................................................ 30
Health Programs ...................................................................................................................... 30
COVID-19 ............................................................................................................................... 31
U.S. Immigration Policy ................................................................................................................ 33
Energy and Climate Issues ............................................................................................................ 35
Space Issues and Cooperation ....................................................................................................... 38
Human Rights Concerns in India .................................................................................................. 38
U.S. Foreign Assistance to India ................................................................................................... 42
Outlook and Issues for Congress ................................................................................................... 42

Figures
Figure 1. Key Indo-Pacific Energy and Trade Routes ..................................................................... 7
Figure 2. U.S.-India Trade and Investment ................................................................................... 16
Figure 3. Western Sector of the India-China Frontier ................................................................... 21
Figure 4. Conflict Map of Pre-August 2019 Jammu and Kashmir ................................................ 23
Figure 5. Map of Indian States ...................................................................................................... 44

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 44

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Overview
India—South Asia’s dominant actor with more than 1.3 billion citizens and the world’s thirdlargest economy by purchasing power parity1—is characterized by U.S. officials as an emerging
great power and strategic partner of the United States and a key potential counterweight to
China’s growing international clout.2 Since 2005, Washington and New Delhi have pursued a
“strategic partnership,” and bilateral security cooperation has expanded, including through
defense trade and combined military exercises. Bilateral trade and investment have grown. The
Administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump sought to strengthen the
U.S.-India partnership, and the Trump Administration notably identified India as a key player in
the U.S. efforts to secure the vision of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”3 In 2021, mutual efforts to
address the coronavirus 2019 disease (COVID-19) pandemic have been at the forefront of
bilateral engagement. Leaders in both capitals have issued strongly positive remarks on the state
of the partnership, as most recently demonstrated following the March 2021 summit-level
meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad.”4 Nevertheless, lingering bilateral
frictions in the areas of trade and immigration, and growing concerns about human rights in India,
may hinder progress in the broader partnership. U.S. policies toward countries such as Russia and
Iran—with which India has longstanding cooperative ties—may also present obstacles.
This report reviews the major facets of current U.S.-India relations, particularly in the context of
congressional interest. It discusses areas in which perceived U.S. and Indian national interests
converge and areas in which they diverge; other leading Indian foreign relations that impact U.S.
interests; the outlines of bilateral engagement in defense, trade, and investment relations, as well
as important issues involving health, immigration, energy, climate change; and human rights
concerns.

Selected Current Developments
The Biden Administration and India
President Joseph Biden was a strong and consistent advocate of positive U.S.-India relations and
U.S. support for India during his 36-year Senate career. As a presidential candidate, he remarked,
“I’ll continue to believe and continue what I’ve long called for including—standing with India
and confronting the threats it faces in its own region along its borders.”5 Under the Trump
Administration, U.S.-India relations were marked primarily by deepening security cooperation,
sharpened trade disputes, and a personal connection between President Trump and Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi.6
1 Purchasing power parities (PPP) measure the amount of goods and services that a country’s currency can buy in

another country; GDP in PPP terms allows for comparison of the economic output across countries, controlling for
differences in price levels.
2 For example, just before leaving office, the Trump Administration declassified its “Strategic Framework for the IndoPacific,” and the document gives a prominent role to India therein, stating that, “A strong India, in cooperation with
like-minded countries, would act as a counterbalance to China” (see the January 15, 2021, document at
https://news.usni.org/2021/01/15/u-s-strategic-framework-for-the-indo-pacific).
3 See the Pentagon’s June 1, 2019, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report at https://go.usa.gov/xyAWJ.
4 See the March 12, 2021, Quad Joint Statement at https://go.usa.gov/xH6Rb.
5 Quoted in “Will Back India Against Threats on Border, Says Biden,” Indian Express (Delhi), August 17, 2020.
6 “President Trump Lauds Prime Minister Modi as ‘Great Leader, Loyal Friend’ on His 70 th Birthday,” Press Trust

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Prime Minister Modi tweeted a November 7, 2020, message of congratulations to Biden on a
“spectacular victory.” Days later, the two leaders spoke by phone and “agreed to work closely to
further advance the India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, built on shared
values and common interests.”7 Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in late January spoke by
phone with his Indian counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and the two officials
signaled substantive continuity by reaffirming the bilateral partnership.8 President Biden’s
inaugural communication with Prime Minister Modi came in early February, with the leaders
committing that the United States and India will work closely together to win the fight
against the COVID-19 pandemic, renew their partnership on climate change, rebuild the
global economy in a way that benefits the people of both countries, and stand together
against the scourge of global terrorism. The leaders agreed to continuing close cooperation
to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, including support for freedom of navigation,
territorial integrity, and a stronger regional architecture through the Quad. The President
underscored his desire to defend democratic institutions and norms around the world and
noted that a shared commitment to democratic values is the bedrock for the U.S.-India
relationship.… The leaders agreed to stay in close touch on a range of global challenges
and look forward to what the United States and India will achieve together for their people
and for their nations.9

Independent observers widely expected the Biden Administration to continue expansion of the
bilateral partnership, and most saw concern about China’s growing economic and military power
as the driving force of the relationship. Many speculate that the Administration would pay more
attention to India’s domestic developments, including on human rights, but considered broad
policies unlikely to change due to the perceived overarching need to counterbalance China.10
Many analysts laud an expected U.S. return to multilateralism—especially given India’s recently
warmer sentiments toward the Quad initiative (see below)—and were eager to see the extent to
which the Administration would commit resources prioritizing the Indo-Pacific region in its
foreign policy.11
New Delhi’s policy community appeared mostly welcoming of the Biden victory, even with
uncertainties about how his Administration would address relations with China and Pakistan,
ongoing U.S.-India trade disputes, and policies on immigration and climate change, among
others.12 The 2017 U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change dismayed many
in India, and New Delhi has welcomed the United States rejoining that effort in 2021.13 While the
Indian government has in recent years moved away from a Cold War-era legacy of antiIndia, September 18, 2020.
7 See Modi’s November 7, 2020, tweet at https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1325145433828593664, and the
Indian External Affairs Ministry’s November 17, 2020, readout at https://tinyurl.com/yscp9a7h.
8
See the State Department’s January 29, 2021, readout at https://go.usa.gov/x6y5b.
9 See the White House’s February 8, 2021, readout at https://go.usa.gov/x6yNr.
10 “Biden Expected to Expand U.S.-India Relations While Stressing Human Rights,” New York Times, December 24,
2020. See also Aparna Pande, “India Should Be Relieved Biden Won,” The Print (Delhi), November 10, 2020; Michael
Kugelman, “What a President Biden Will Mean for India and World,” India Today (Delhi), November 7, 2020.
11 Ashley Tellis, “Pivoting to Biden: The Future of U.S.-India Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
November 9, 2020; Walter Ladwig, “What Does Biden’s Victory Mean for the Indo-Pacific?,” Royal United Services
Institute (London), November 30, 2020.
12 See, for example, “Biden, Modi, and Comfort in the Old Normal” (op-ed), Hindu (Chennai), November 7, 2020; C.
Raja Mohan, “Biden Moment Offers Delhi an Opportunity to Elevate Defense Cooperation to a Higher Level” Op-ed),
Indian Express (Delhi), January 19, 2021.
13 See the Indian External Affairs Ministry’s February 8, 2021, readout at https://tinyurl.com/nnd7xkhk.

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Americanism that persisted into the 21st century, India tends to be, in the words of one analyst,
“Politically fractious and preternaturally suspicious of self-interested foreigners; India does not
want to be part of anyone’s strategic calculations.”14 In this sense, there may yet exist an
“ingrained ideological bias in [New Delhi’s] dominant foreign policy elite” that fuels ongoing
doubts about American intentions and reliability on the world stage.15
With the Biden Administration’s early focus on the centrality of democratic processes (notably
via the Quad initiative—at times referred to as a “diamond of democracies”16), analysts are
closely watching how it will address signs of democratic backsliding or authoritarianism in India
(see the “Human Rights Concerns in India” section below). Early speculation foresaw U.S.
partners being unlikely to “get a pass” on this issue in the same way they did over the previous
four years; one commentator has argued that, “Indians would be foolish to expect the free pass on
human rights and democracy issued by the Trump administration to remain valid.”17 Several
months into the new Administration, there are few indications that it has confronted Indian
leaders on the topic, disappointing some observers.18 Some analysts expect pressure to come
through private rather than public channels, with at least one contending that such messaging will
be “predictable, but inconsequential.”19
The Biden Administration has made limited statements regarding U.S.-India relations, but the
current Secretary of State previously indicated certain views. Secretary Tony Blinken, in the year
before joining the Biden Administration, publicly stated “real concerns” about India’s human
rights record.20 As part of his Senate confirmation process in January 2021, Blinken was asked in
writing how he would address “the current prevalent violence towards minority communities in
India and the growing intolerance of dissenting voices by the Indian government and its
supporters.” His reply: “The U.S.-India relationship is based on shared values. The Biden-Harris
administration’s intention is to again make human rights and religious freedom core pillars of
U.S. foreign policy and we will work with other democracies, such as India, to strengthen these
values.”21

14 “Joe Biden’s Passage to India,” Economist (London), March 20, 2021.
15 C. Raja Mohan, “Why Does the Deepening Indo-US Friendship Puzzle So Many?” (op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi),

March 9, 2021.
16 See, for example, “China Building Offensive, Aggressive Military, Top US Pacific Commander Says,” CNN.com,
March 21, 2021.
17 Quotes from Walter Ladwig, “What Does Biden’s Victory Mean for the Indo-Pacific?,” Royal United Services
Institute (London), November 30, 2020, and Sadanand Dhume, “Will Biden Say Howdy Modi?” (op-ed), Wall Street
Journal, November 12, 2020. See also S. Raghotham, “If Modi Changes Course, Biden May Be India’s Best Chance”
(op-ed), Deccan Herald (Bengaluru), January 16, 2021.
18 See, for example, Nitish Pahwa, “Biden Is Already Embracing an Authoritarian Regime,” Slate, March 29, 2021.
19 “Will a Biden-Harris Administration Confront Modi on Human Rights?” Al Jazeera (Doha), November 12, 2020;
K.P. Nayar, “India Low on Biden Watch List” (op-ed), Tribune (Chandigarh), December 7, 2020.
20 In mid-2020, Blinken stated that, for a prospective Biden presidency, “strengthening and deepening the relationship
with India is going to be a very high priority.” He went on to mention “challenges” and “real concerns” related to New
Delhi’s human rights record, “particularly in cracking down on freedom of movement and freedom of speech in
Kashmir, [and] some of the laws on citizenship,” while opining that, with partners like India, “you can speak frankly
and directly about areas where you have differences even as you’re working to build greater cooperation and strengthen
the relationship going forward” (“Dialogues on American Foreign Policy and World Affairs: A Conversation with
Former Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken” (transcript), Hudson Institute, July 9, 2020).
21 “Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted to Honorable Anthony J Blinken,” Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, January 21, 2021.

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U.S. officials and independent observers have been particularly concerned about freedom of
religion in India, especially as regards the country’s large Muslim minority.22 Many analysts have
urged the Biden Administration to prioritize the issue in foreign policy.23 In 2020, a campaign
website entitled “Joe Biden’s Agenda for Muslim-American Communities” included discussion
of India, which read in part, “[T]he Indian government should take all necessary steps to restore
rights for all the people of Kashmir.” It argued that “restrictions on dissent, such as preventing
peaceful protests or shutting or slowing down the Internet, weaken democracy,” and expressed
Biden’s “disappointment” with “the measures that the government of India has taken” to change
certain citizenship laws, calling them “inconsistent with the country’s long tradition of secularism
and with sustaining a multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy.”24 As a U.S. Senator, Vice
President Kamala Harris, herself of Indian ancestry, was in 2019 openly critical of India’s foreign
minister for refusing to meet with a Muslim-American House Member, and some commentary
foresees her public engagement with issues of interest to India over the course of her career,
including on H1-B visas, as having the potential to impact U.S.-India relations.25

The COVID-19 Pandemic
The United States has long supported India’s health sector with assistance and cooperation on
infectious diseases, maternal and child health care, and HIV/AIDS, among others areas. In 2020,
cooperation was expanded to address the COVID-19 pandemic in India, where infection rates in
April-May 2021 increased. The March 2021 Quad summit highlighted a new multilateral
initiative to accelerate the manufacture and distribution of vaccines, with the United States
committing at least $100 million to the effort. In April, with India’s health crisis worsening,
President Biden committed to further provide India with a range of emergency assistance.26 In
May, the Administration announced its support for a waiver of intellectual property rights (IPR)
obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) for COVID-19 vaccines, a move that
could benefit India, among other countries (see “Health Cooperation and COVID-19” section
below). Many analysts contend that the scope and effectiveness of U.S. COVID-19-related
assistance to India could significantly affect the course of the broader strategic partnership going
forward.27

Farmer Protests
In September 2020, India’s Parliament passed three pieces of legislation intended to make major
changes to the workings of the country’s agricultural markets, specifically by removing existing
22 “US Has Privately Raised Issues with India, Says Ambassador for Religious Freedom Sam Brownback,” Hindustan

Times (Delhi), December 9, 2020; “India: Government Policies, Actions Target Minorities,” Human Rights Watch,
February 19, 2021.
23 See, for example, Farahnaz Ispahani, “President Biden Must Prioritize International Relations Freedom” (op-ed), The
Hill, January 26, 2021.
24 See the undated website at https://joebiden.com/muslimamerica.
25 “Kamala Harris Decries Jaishankar’s Decision of Not Meeting Jayapal,” News Nation (Noida), December 21, 2019;
Salvatore Babones, “Biden and Harris Could Be Bad News for India’s Modi,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2020;
“Kamala Harris Promises to Lift Existing Per Country Caps for Employment-Based Green Cards,” Business Line
(Chennai), November 13, 2019.
26 See the White House’s March 12, 2021, fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xH6Re; its April 26, 2021, readout at
https://go.usa.gov/xHzxE; and its April 28, 2021, fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHzxV.
27 See, for example, Daniel Markey, “The Strategic Consequences of India’s COVID-19 Crisis,” Council on Foreign
Relations, April 28, 2021.

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restrictions on the marketing of farm products so as to allow farmers to negotiate directly with
private buyers. Government officials and pro-reform analysts in India and elsewhere contend that
the changes are long overdue and would serve to increase both national agricultural production
and farmer incomes while benefitting consumers.28 Within months, however, mass opposition to
the new laws arose, with farmer groups in the fertile, Sikh-majority state of Punjab, the
neighboring Haryana state, and elsewhere in the country arguing that any rapid withdrawal of the
government’s role in the country’s agricultural markets would lead to exploitation of farmers by
private firms. Opponents also criticized the new laws as having come without sufficient
consultation and consensus-building.29
India’s Domestic Political Setting
India, the world’s most populous democracy, is, according to its Constitution, a “sovereign, socialist, secular,
democratic republic” where the bulk of executive power rests with the prime minister and his/her Council of
Ministers. Since its 1947 independence, most of India’s 14 prime ministers have come from the country’s Hindispeaking northern regions, and all but 3 have been upper-caste Hindus. The 543-seat Lok Sabha (House of the
People) is the locus of national power, with directly elected representatives from each of the country’s 28 states
and 8 union territories (see Figure 5). The most recent national elections were held in spring 2019, when the
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was reelected with an outright majority of Lok Sabha seats (303).
After decades of coalition governments, the BJP had in 2014 won the first parliamentary majority in India since
1984. The Indian National Congress Party, which dominated national politics from 1947 to 1977, saw its status
further decline in the 2019 elections, winning 52 seats.
The BJP and Congress are, in practice, India’s only national parties. In previous recent national elections they
together won roughly half of all votes cast, but in 2019 the BJP boosted its share to nearly 38% of the estimated
600 million votes cast (to Congress’s 20%; turnout was a record 67%). The influence of regional and caste-based
(and often “family-run”) parties—although blunted by two consecutive BJP majority victories—remains a crucial
variable in Indian politics. Such parties now hold nearly one-third of Lok Sabha seats. Almost half of Indians live in
five states—Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh. At present, four of these have
BJP or BJP-allied chief ministers, including Uttar Pradesh, with nearly 200 million citizens. In April 2021, the BJP’s
regional rival Trinamool Congress Party narrowly defeated an historic BJP surge in West Bengal elections.
The Indian Constitution divides legislative powers into a Union List, a State List, and a Concurrent List. Although
India’s union government is granted more powers than in most other federal systems (including that of the United
States), the State List provides state assemblies and their chief ministers with exclusive powers over 66 “items,”
including public order, law enforcement, health care, and power, communication, and transportation networks.30

Mass, generally peaceful, farmer-led protests began in late November 2020 and have continued to
date (albeit on a smaller scale in 2021), mainly in and near the Indian capital of New Delhi.31 In
January, the Indian Supreme Court issued a hold on the new laws, and soon after the Indian
government announced a suspension of the laws’ implementation pending ongoing negotiations
with farmer groups. The protests became violent on January 26, a national holiday in India,
attracting global attention. Indian authorities’ responses to these and previous major protests elicit
criticism on human rights grounds. Indian officials have arrested numerous journalists and
activists, requested broad internet shutdowns, and brought pressure on social media companies,
including threats to arrest their employees in India. By some accounts, the crackdown on dissent
28 See, for example, the Indian Agriculture Ministry’s September 17, 2020, release at https://tinyurl.com/3nbyt8r4;

Amy Kazim, “India’s Farm Reforms Fail to Tackle Growers’ Sluggish Incomes” (op-ed), Financial Times (London),
February 17, 2021.
29 “Why Indian Farmers Are Protesting Against New Farm Bills,” Al Jazeera (Doha, online), September 25, 2020;
Shekhar Gupta, “Modi Govt Has Lost Farms Laws Battle” (op-ed), The Print (Delhi, online), February 6, 2021.
30 See also CRS In Focus IF10298, India’s Domestic Political Setting, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
31 “Indian Farmers Vow to Carry on Months-Long Protest Despite Concerns Over Coronavirus, Reuters, April 15,
2021.

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has been excessive and reflective of a broader trend toward authoritarianism in India.32 The Biden
Administration and some Members of Congress have taken note of the developments, with some
among the latter group expressing support for the protesters’ cause. Perceived backsliding in
India’s democracy and human rights record may present a challenge for the Biden Administration
in formulating its policies toward India and the Indo-Pacific.33

U.S.-India Strategic and Security Relations
Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue34
After decades of foreign policy discussions about the “Asia-Pacific,” the U.S. government has in
recent years fully incorporated the Indian Ocean into its strategic outlook and now employs
terminology about the “Indo-Pacific” region, providing India with higher visibility in America’s
strategic calculations.35 The region is replete with key energy and trade routes (see Figure 1) and
includes several of the world’s largest democracies. While the Biden Administration has not
issued a formal Indo-Pacific strategy, it moved quickly to engage with the reinvigorated
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad,” a mechanism first conceived in 2007 and revived as
“Quad 2.0” in 2017. In 2019 and 2020, the four member countries—the United States, India,
Japan, and Australia—held ministerial-level sessions.36 The 2020 iteration came in the wake of
India-China border conflict and Delhi’s decision to allow Australia to rejoin the major annual
Malabar joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which in November 2020
brought all four Quad navies together for the first time since 2007. At the 2020 Ministerial
meeting, the four countries “reviewed recent strategic developments across the Indo-Pacific and
discussed ways to enhance Quad cooperation on maritime security, cybersecurity and data flows,
quality infrastructure, counterterrorism and other areas.” They further “pledged to continue
regular consultations to advance the vision of a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.”37

32 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “The Real Darkness on Horizon Is the Turn Indian Democracy Is Taking” (op-ed), Indian

Express (Delhi), January 30, 2021; Ashutosh Varshney, “India’s Democratic Exceptionalism in Now Withering Away”
(op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi), February 23, 2021.
33 See CRS Report R46713, Farmer Protests in India, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
34 See also CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and
Australia, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery.
35 In 2018, the U.S. Department of Defense formalized the new conception by redubbing its Pacific Command
(PACOM) as the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Its area of responsibility, accounting for about half of the
Earth’s surface, stretches as far west as the Indian Ocean south of India’s westernmost Arabian Sea coast (see
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility).
36 The “Quad 2.0” revival came in late 2017 with a working-level meeting in Manila. This was followed by four similar
sessions, leading to ministerials in September 2019 and October 2020, both of which resulted in separate readouts.
These statements showed significant areas of overlap, while also illuminating differences in emphases among the
countries (see Tanvi Madan, “What You Need to Know About the ‘Quad,’ in Charts,” Brookings Institution, October 5,
2020).
37 See the State Department’s October 6, 2020, release at https://go.usa.gov/xHFZq.https://go.usa.gov/xHFZq.

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Figure 1. Key Indo-Pacific Energy and Trade Routes

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map and information generated by Hannah Fischer using data from the South
China Morning Post (2017); the Department of State (2015); Esri (2016); and DeLorme (2016).

President Biden embraced the Quad initiative by joining its first-ever summit-level meeting in
March 2021, a session also notable for producing the Quad’s first-ever Joint Statement, which
read in part,
We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by
democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion. … Together, we commit to
promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security
and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We support the
rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes,
democratic values, and territorial integrity.38

An accompanying fact sheet outlined three new Quad initiatives: (1) the Quad Vaccine
Partnership (to expand “manufacturing of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines”); (2) the Quad
Climate Working Group; and (3) the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group.
The four national leaders also co-wrote an opinion article declaring, “We are striving to ensure
that the Indo-Pacific is accessible and dynamic, governed by international law and bedrock
principles such as freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of disputes, and that all
countries are able to make their own political choices, free from coercion.” The piece placed
special emphasis on climate change and the Paris Accord, and health issues, particularly COVID19.39
Delhi’s traditional pursuit of “nonalignment” in foreign affairs—more recently articulated as an
approach that seeks “strategic autonomy”—has led to a deep aversion to international alliances
and a wariness toward formalized multilateral engagements beyond the purview of the United
38 See the March 12, 2021, Joint Statement at https://go.usa.gov/xH6Rb.
39 See the March 12, 2021, fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xH6Re; Joe Biden, Narendra Modi, Scott Morrison, and

Yoshihide Suga, “Our Four Nations Are Committed to a Free, Open, Secure and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region” (oped), Washington Post, March 13, 2021.

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Nations (U.N.).40 The only Quad member to share a land border with China and the only to
operate outside of the U.S.-led security alliance system, India’s views on the Indo-Pacific region
typically emphasize “inclusiveness” and have not targeted China. Until 2020, India had taken a
cautious approach to Quad engagement, wary of aggravating China and uncertain about U.S.
strategic intent in the region.41 Prime Minister Modi’s 2018 efforts to “reset” relations with China
after a militarized mid-2017 territorial dispute and his rejection of Australian participation in the
2018 Malabar exercises, suggested that the Quad’s prospects had dimmed. Subsequent
developments in India-China relations appear to have driven India to strengthen ties with external
forces to balance against Chinese assertiveness. While India’s government takes steps toward
more engagement with the Quad, there remains confusion among many in New Delhi about what
the Quad is and how it will fit into India’s regional strategy.42
There appear to be limits to the extent to which Indian leaders will concretize bilateral security
relations with the United States. Despite Delhi’s engagement with the Quad, in July 2020, India’s
external affairs minister insisted that India will “never” be part of an alliance system.43 A summer
2020 survey of figures from New Delhi’s policy community found them predicting that India will
move closer to the United States, but that a security alliance is unlikely and India should not
expect the United States to get involved in a ground war in the Himalayas.44
India is expanding its defense relations with other Indo-Pacific states. In late 2019, India inked a
defense cooperation agreement with the Indian Ocean island nation of Comoros and, along with
France, has vowed to help with economic development there, as well as in three other Vanilla
Island states (Madagascar, Seychelles, and Mauritius).45 New Delhi is moving to expand defense
relations with Indonesia—including with “coordinated patrols” by naval forces—as well as
undertaking new outreach to the IOR island nations of Maldives and Mauritius. In March 2021,
India notably signed a deal to sell its Brahmos cruise missiles to the Philippines.46
European Union nations, along with other Indo-Pacific states, increasingly are cooperating with
and supporting the Quad, leading some analysts to encourage development of a “Quad Plus”: A
“minilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific that expands the core Quad 2.0 to include other
crucial emerging economies.” South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand are listed among the
prime candidates for such an effort. India already has developed defense relations with many. 47 In
early 2021, the French, British, and German navies have increased their presence in the IOR amid
mounting suspicions of China. In April, French naval forces joined with those of the Quad for
drills in the Bay of Bengal. This “Le Perouse” exercise was the first to include the Indian navy,
40 See Jeff Smith, “Strategic Autonomy and U.S.-India Relations,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 2020.
41 Caitlin Byrne, “Can the Quad Navigate the Complexities of a Dynamic Indo-Pacific?,” Observer Research

Foundation (New Delhi), November 1, 2019.
42
C. Raja Mohan, “Confusion Reigns on What the Quad Is and Its Future in India’s International Relations” (op-ed),
Indian Express (Delhi), October 6, 2020.
43 “India Will Never Be Part of an Alliance System, Says External Affairs Minister Jaishankar,” Hindu (Chennai), July
20, 2020.
44 “China’s Aggression Pushing India Closer to the U.S. But Alliance Unlikely at Present,” Hindu (Chennai), August 9,
2020.
45 Indrani Bagchi, “India Boosts Its Profile in West Indian Ocean,” Times of India (Delhi), October 26, 2019.
46 Abhijnan Rej, “India and Indonesia Push Ahead with Defense Relationship,” Diplomat (Tokyo), January 13, 2021;
see the MOD’s December 17, 2020, release at https://tinyurl.com/8vjkfz2w; Rajeswari Rajagopalan, “Jaishankar
Reaches Out to Delhi’s Indian Ocean Partners,” Diplomat (Tokyo), February 25, 2021; “Philippines Signs Agreement
with India for World’s Fastest Supersonic Missiles,” Straits Times (Singapore), March 3, 2021.
47 Jagannath Panda, ed., “Quad Plus: Form Versus Substance,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, 5 (2020).

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which said the event would “showcase high levels of synergy, coordination and inter-operability
between the friendly navies.”48

Bilateral Security Relations
U.S. and Indian officials have for more than a decade rated security and military cooperation
among the most important aspects of transformed bilateral relations, viewing the bilateral defense
partnership as “an anchor of global security,” and extolling India’s growing role as a net provider
of security in the Indian Ocean region.49 Combined military exercises among all services have
become routine. In addition, defense trade has emerged as a leading facet of the bilateral
partnership: India is now a major purchaser in the global arms market and a lucrative potential
customer for U.S. companies. The two nations have signed defense contracts cumulatively worth
at least $20 billion (in current dollars) since 2008, up from $500 million prior to that year.50 As
discussed above, the “Quad” consultation mechanism has since 2020 emerged as a leading facet
of India’s regional strategy. U.S. legislation enacted in 2017 (known by the acronym “CAATSA,”
see below), however, seeks to counter U.S. adversaries, including Russia, and may trigger
sanctions on India related to its purchases of Russian defense equipment. Other potential areas of
friction include differences over Afghanistan policy and U.S. concerns about democratic decline
in India.51
In 2005, the United States and India signed a 10-year defense framework agreement outlining
planned collaboration in several areas including multilateral operations, expanded two-way
defense trade, and increasing opportunities for technology transfers and co-production. In 2015,
the pact was enhanced and renewed for another decade, and called for an existing bilateral
Defense Policy Group (DPG, established in 1995) to serve as the “primary mechanism to guide
the U.S.-India strategic defense partnership” through four subgroups. The Trump Administration
did not employ the DPG mechanism.
President Obama recognized India as a “Major Defense Partner” (MDP) of the United States
during Prime Minister Modi’s 2016 visit to Washington, DC.52 MDP is a unique designation
created for India by the U.S. Congress and is intended “to elevate defense trade and technology
sharing with India to a level commensurate with that of our closest allies and partners,” as well as
“institutionalize changes the United States has made to ensure strong defense trade and
technology cooperation.”53 The designation was created in large part to carry over a presumption
of approval for export licenses to India from the previous administration.54 In 2021, Secretary of
Defense Austin stated an intention to “further operationalize” India’s MDP status.55 In 2018, India
48 “European Navies Build Indo-Pacific Presence as China Concerns Mount,” Nikkei Asia (Tokyo), March 4, 2021;

“France to Lead Quad Naval Drill in Indo-Pacific Challenge to China,” Nikkei Asia (Tokyo), April 2, 2021; see the
MOD’s April 5, 2021, release at https://tinyurl.com/4j9shwjj.
49 See, for example, the December 10, 2015, comments of then-Defense Secretary Ashton Carter at https://go.usa.gov/
xyAWW.
50 The first-ever major U.S. arms sale to India came in 2002 with the delivery of 12 counter-battery (or “Firefinder”)
radar sets worth $190 million (see the January 21, 2021, State Department fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHkuU).
51 See Joshua White, “After the Foundational Agreements: An Agenda for US-India Defense and Security
Cooperation,” Brookings Institution, January 2021.
52 See the June 7, 2016, Joint Statement at http://go.usa.gov/x8EFV.
53 U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, “Enhancing Defense and Security Cooperation with
India, Fiscal Year 2017,” Joint Report to Congress, July 2017, at https://go.usa.gov/x6HfD.
54 CRS interviews with Defense Department officials, April 2018.
55 See the Senate Armed Services Committee’s January 2021 transcript at https://go.usa.gov/xHKGX.

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was elevated to Strategic Trade Authorization Tier-1 status, which allows India to receive licensefree access to a wide range of military and dual-use technologies regulated by the Department of
Commerce.56
Congress has both formally endorsed and sought to guide the scope and direction of U.S.-India
defense cooperation. In Section 1292 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for
FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), the 114th Congress called upon the Secretary of State and Secretary of
Defense to jointly take actions on enhancing defense and security relations with India. In the
NDAA for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232), the 115th Congress modified requirements for the annual
report on U.S.-India defense cooperation so as to better identify and address obstacles to more
rapid progress.57
India’s Military
India’s armed forces are oriented primarily against Pakistan and China. India possesses the world’s second-largest
military by active personnel (about 1.5 million, after China) and third-largest by defense budget ($64 billion in
2020, after the United States and China). India’s defense spending is more than six times as great as Pakistan’s, but
only one-third that of China. The number of active personnel is more than double Pakistan’s and three-fourths of
China’s. India enjoys a roughly 2:1 advantage or better over Pakistan in stocks of major naval and air force
platforms, while facing a roughly 1:3 disadvantage against China in the same categories. India’s military services
remain heavily reliant on defense imports, with Russia accounting for about half of such supplies by dollar value
from 2016-2020, followed by France and Israel. With a ‘Make in India’ initiative, Prime Minister Modi has strongly
advocated policies to boost India’s indigenous defense industries despite budgetary constraints and procurement
obstacles. In 2020, the first-ever Chief of Defense Staff was appointed, which may improve high-level coordination
of military planning.58
The Lowy Institute's broader Asia Power Index for 2020 ranks India fourth among Indo-Pacific countries (behind the
United States, China, and Japan, but ahead of Russia), with a score reduced from the previous year, mainly in the
areas of “cultural influence” and “future resources.” According to The Military Balance 2021, “India continues to
modernize its armed forces, though progress in some areas remains slow.” It asserts that, “[T]he overall capability
of India’s large conventional forces is limited by inadequate logistics, maintenance and shortages of ammunition,
spare parts and maintenance personnel. Though modernization continues, many equipment projects have seen
delays and cost overruns, particularly indigenous systems.” In the assessment of one former U.S. government
official and longtime observer, India’s “underperforming economy has constrained military budgets and largely
confined the Indian military to ensuring internal security and protecting the country’s frontiers.” He concludes
that, until Indian policy makers become willing to contemplate joint military operations with others, India’s military
will remain “unable to partner with other nations flexibly in major combat contingencies further afield.” 59

Selected Security Topics
Defense Trade and the DTTI. Defense trade has emerged as a key aspect of the bilateral
partnership. New Delhi seeks to transform its military into one with advanced technology and
global reach, reportedly planning up to $100 billion on new procurements over the next decade to
56 See the January 21, 2021, State Department fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHkuU.
57 According to H.Rept. 115-676, the new reporting requirements include a description of the progress on enabling

agreements between the United States and India, any limitations that hinder or slow progress, measures to improve
interoperability, and actions India is taking, or the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State believe India should
take, to advance the relationship with the United States.
58 The Military Balance 2021 (Routledge), 2021; “Trends in International Arms Transfers 2021,” SIPRI Fact Sheet,
March 2021.
59 “Asia Power Index 2020,” Lowy Institute (Sydney, online at https://power.lowyinstitute.org); The Military Balance
2021 (Routledge), 2021; Ashley Tellis, “India: Capable, but Constrained,” in Gary Schmitt, ed., A Hard Look at Hard
Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key US Allies and Security Partners, 2nd ed. (US Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute), October 2020.

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update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. Prior to 2008, U.S.-India defense trade was negligible, but
has since seen transfers of major platforms, primarily transport and patrol aircraft, attack
helicopters, and advanced missiles valued in the billions of dollars.60 Washington has in recent
years sought to identify sales that can proceed under the technology-sharing and co-production
model sought by New Delhi while also urging reform in India’s defense offsets policy.61 The U.S.
government has advocated for India’s purchase of Lockheed Martin F-21, and Boeing’s F/A-18
Super Hornet and F-15EX Eagle, although New Delhi has demurred from pursuing such deals to
date. More recently, reports suggest that, after leasing two unarmed MQ-9B SkyGuardian
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in late 2020, India may purchase as many as 30 armed
SkyGuardian or Predator-B UAVs at a cost of up to $3 billion.62
In 2012, the Pentagon launched an initiative to overcome the “unique national bureaucratic
structures, acquisition models, and budget processes” that were seen to impede deeper defense
cooperation with India. This Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) was described in a
2017 White House fact sheet as “the premier forum for deepening collaboration on defense codevelopment and co-production.” The DTTI includes eight Joint Working Groups on a range of
mutual interests; the most recent session was held virtually in September 2020. To date, the
initiative has produced no major initiatives or breakthroughs.63
“Enabling” Bilateral Defense Agreements. The post-2001 growth of U.S.-India cooperation led
U.S. administrations to seek conclusion of four “foundational” defense cooperation accords with
India that would facilitate and, in many cases, provide the legal framework for an intensified
bilateral defense partnership. These are (1) the General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA); (2) the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMoA,
formerly the Logistic Support Agreement or LSA); (3) the Communications Compatibility and
Security Agreement (COMCASA, an India-specific designation, formerly the Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement or CISMoA); and (4) the Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA). In addition,
negotiations on a bilateral Industrial Security Annex (ISA) began in 2018.64 U.S. law requires that
60 Major U.S. defense and weapons sales to India since 2008 include transport and maritime aircraft (C-130J Super

Hercules, C-17 Globemaster-IIIs, and P-8I Poseidons), transport, maritime, and attack helicopters (CH-47F Chinooks,
MH-60 Romeo Seahawks, and AH-64E Apaches), Harpoon missiles, and M777 howitzers, among others. India is now
the largest operator of the C-17 and the P-8I outside of the United States. India also in 2007 received an amphibious
transport dock ship as an excess U.S. defense article, the former USS Trenton, now commissioned as the INS Jalashwa
(see https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales).
61 Since 2005, India has required that 30% of any defense deal valued at more than Rs3 billion (about $50 million) must
be reinvested in the Indian economy, a requirement that many firms find difficult to meet. In 2016, New Delhi
announced a new policy—“Defense Procurement Procedure 2016”—that is geared toward creating new partnerships
for indigenous defense firms, rather than mere weapons purchase agreements. Under the rubric of “Make in India,”
priority will be given to indigenously designed, developed, and manufactured hardware (see https://www.mod.gov.in/
dod/defence-procurement-procedure).
62 “India to Buy US Armed Drones to Counter China, Pakistan,” Economic Times (Delhi), March 10, 2021.
63 Topics include aircraft carriers; jet engines; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); chemical-biological
protection; and land, naval, air, and other systems. See the undated Pentagon fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xH8Zp; the
June 26, 2017, White House fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHkFn; and the Pentagon’s September 15, 2020, release at
https://go.usa.gov/xHkFW. See also Javin Aryan, “The Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI): Lost in the
Acronym Bowl,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), December 10, 2020.
64 GSOMIA enables the sharing of military intelligence between two countries and requires each country to protect the
other’s classified information. The LEMoA—a modified version of a Logistics Support Agreement or LSA—is a
facilitating agreement that establishes basic terms, conditions, and procedures for reciprocal provision of logistic
support, supplies, and services between the armed forces of the United States and India. The COMCASA (CISMoA)
requires purchasers of U.S. defense equipment to ensure that equipment supplied to a foreign buyer is compatible with

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certain sensitive defense technologies can only be transferred to recipient countries that have
signed a CISMoA and/or BECA. New Delhi signed a GSOMIA in 2002 after 15 years of
negotiations. American officials tried unsuccessfully for many years afterward to persuade India
to sign on to the three other foundational defense pacts, more recently called “facilitating” or
“enabling” agreements by U.S. officials. More than a decade passed before India signed a
LEMoA in 2016, and the accord became operationalized during the 2017 “Malabar” joint naval
exercises. COMCASA was signed during the September 2018 “2+2” summit, an ISA was inked
in late 2019, and the BECA was finalized in October 2020.
Combined Military Exercises. Since 2002, the United States and India have been increasing the
scope, complexity, and frequency of combined military exercises, with an emphasis on maritime
security and interoperability.65 India now conducts more exercises and personnel exchanges with
the United States than with any other country.66 These include major annual “Malabar” joint naval
exercises that typically are held in the Indian Ocean, bilateral and multilateral air exercises, and
joint special forces training and other ground force exercises.67 The Malabar naval exercise was
inaugurated in 1992. Japan joined in 2014 and became a permanent participant the next year. In
addition to Malabar, India has deepened its involvement in the biennial Rim-of-the-Pacific
(RIMPAC) exercise and, in 2019, an Indian Navy frigate participated in U.S.-sponsored “Cutlass
Express” exercises held near Djibouti. In 2020, U.S. and Indian forces conducted their first-ever
tri-service exercise dubbed “Tiger Triumph.” In early 2021, naval forces from the Quad plus
Canada held “Sea Dragon” anti-submarine drills near Guam, and, more recently, a U.S. carrier
strike group was joined by Indian naval and air forces for complex operations exercises in the
Indian Ocean.68 In 2018, the two countries’ air forces relaunched their “Cope India” exercises
after a nine-year hiatus.69 The forces had last flown together in the 2016 “Red Flag-Alaska”
exercises. Meanwhile, “Tarkash” joint ground force counterterrorism exercises occurred with
India’s elite National Security Guard troops in 2015 and 2017, and regular “Vajra Prahar” joint
special forces exercises were held most recently in early 2021.70
In April 2021, the Indian government protested after a U.S. Navy vessel conducted a “freedom of
navigation” operation by sailing through India’s exclusive economic zone west of India’s
Lakshadweep islands. New Delhi claimed that international law did not permit such transit
without consent, but a Pentagon spokesman called the passage “innocent” and “in accordance
with international law.” Some Indian analysts opined that the episode risked alienating India.71
other American systems. A BECA allows India to access a range of topographical, nautical, and aeronautical data,
engage in subject matter expert exchanges, and receive training at the U.S. National Geospatial Intelligence College.
An ISA would protect classified U.S. information and technology used in the defense transfers of co-production
initiatives involving private companies.
65 According to the State Department, joint exercises “enhance U.S.-India relations and help create a more stable and
secure Indo-Pacific region” (see the January 21, 2021, fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHkuU).
66 Nevertheless, the U.S. military has far greater engagement with other Asian militaries. For example, in 2017, the
U.S. Navy conducted 28 major exercises with Japan’s maritime defense forces, and one with India’s. U.S. forces
typically conduct more bilateral exercises with Singapore than they do with India (Cara Abercrombie, “Realizing the
Potential: Mature Defense Cooperation and the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership,” Asia Policy 14,1, January 2019).
67 U.S. and Indian special forces soldiers have held at least eight “Vajra Prahar” joint exercises, and hundreds of U.S.
Special Forces soldiers have attended India’s Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School.
68 See the January 11, 2021, U.S. Navy article at https://go.usa.gov/xHZAv, and the March 29, 2021, U.S. Navy article
at https://go.usa.gov/xHZsx.
69 See the December 17, 2018, U.S. Air Force article at https://go.usa.gov/xHZ7d.
70 See https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-and-indian-armies-participate-in-exercise-yudh-abhyas.
71 “India Protests U.S. Navy’s Transit Through Its Exclusive Economic Zone,” Reuters, April 10, 2021; see the

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Intelligence and Counterterrorism Cooperation. The U.S.-India Counterterrorism (CT) Joint
Working Group, established in 2000, is one of the oldest dialogues between the two governments.
Its 17th session, held virtually in September 2020, came simultaneously with the third U.S.-India
Designations Dialogue, where the State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism and his
counterpart from India’s External Affairs Ministry led their respective inter-agency/interdepartmental delegations to discuss counterterrorism cooperation—including through intelligence
sharing—between the two countries. Both sides “denounced use of terrorist proxies and strongly
condemned cross-border terrorism in all its forms,” and gave special attention to several Pakistanbased terrorist groups, underlining “the urgent need for Pakistan to take immediate, sustained, and
irreversible action” against those.72 The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2018
noted, “Continued weaknesses in intelligence and information sharing negatively impacted state
and central law enforcement agencies” in India. The 2019 version found that, “Indian security
agencies are effective in disrupting terror threats despite some gaps in intelligence and
information sharing.”73 For more than a decade the United States has been providing antiterrorism training for Indian security personnel.74
A U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue was established in 2011, with the U.S. Homeland
Security Secretary and Indian Home Minister as co-chairs. The initiative has sought to foster
agency-to-agency engagements on a wide array of law enforcement issues, including
counternarcotics, counterfeit currency, illicit financing and transnational crime, infrastructure
security, transportation and trade, coastal security, and large-city policing.75 A mid-2018 session
reportedly finalized a draft plan to establish six new working subgroups in the areas of illicit
finance, illegal smuggling of cash, financial fraud and counterfeiting; cyber information;
megacity policing and sharing of information among federal state and local partners; global
supply chain, transportation, port, border and maritime security; capacity building; and
technology enhancement.76 Progress apparently was hampered by differences over data
localization.77 In March 2021, officials from the two countries agreed to reestablish the Dialogue
and “to discuss important issues such as cybersecurity, emerging technology and addressing
violent extremism.”78
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Multilateral Export Controls. According to public
sources, India is modernizing and growing its nuclear weapons arsenal, which currently consists
of approximately 150 warheads and an operational triad of delivery systems. India also possesses
a stockpile of highly enriched uranium and continues to produce weapons-grade plutonium.
Indian ballistic missiles can deliver warheads on targets more than 5,000-km away—a range that
encompasses China’s eastern population centers. Some analysts saw India’s longstanding noMinistry of External Affairs’ April 9, 2021, release at https://tinyurl.com/69hkappp, and the Pentagon’s April 9, 2021,
transcript at https://go.usa.gov/x6vq9; Arun Prakash, “US 7th Fleet’s Patrol in India’s EEZ Was an Act of Impropriety”
(op-ed), Indian Express (Delhi), April 12, 2021.
72 See the September 11, 2020, Joint Statement at https://go.usa.gov/xHZm2.
73 See the reports at https://go.usa.gov/xHZdY and https://go.usa.gov/xHZdT.
74 See the June 26, 2017, White House fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xyF7v.
75 U.S. Embassy press release, May 24, 2011; Indian External Affairs Ministry release, May 27, 2011.
76 “India-US Homeland Security Plan Drafted,” Press Trust India, September 3, 2018.
77 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-6) of 2003 calls for exchanges of terrorist screening information
with foreign intelligence agencies, but has yet to be fully implemented with India (Douglas Smith and Kashish
Parpiani, “Actualizing US-India Cooperation on Homeland Security,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi),
November 27, 2019).
78 See the March 23, 2021, Department of Homeland Security readout at https://go.usa.gov/xHZvC.

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first-use policy to have been weakened by New Delhi’s 2003 declaration that it could potentially
use nuclear weapons in response to chemical or biological attacks.79 India has neither acceded to
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nor accepted International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
on all of the country’s nuclear material and facilities. Following Washington’s urging, the
multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) decided in 2008 to exempt India from the portions of
its export guidelines that required India to have such safeguards. During the 19-month period
ending in January 2018, India joined three major multilateral export control regimes: the Missile
Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. The NSG has
been considering India’s membership, with U.S. support, since 2011, but China is among the
members blocking this.80

India and Fentanyl81
India’s role in the production of illicit drugs, particularly synthetic opioids, has grown in recent
years. The country’s vast pharmaceutical and chemical industries are prone to exploitation by
criminal networks engaged in the trafficking of synthetic opioids, such as tramadol, as well as
precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit drugs, including illicit fentanyl precursors.
According to the State Department, there is an expectation that “as global demand for synthetic
drugs continues to grow, illicit manufacturing and trafficking networks in India will also
increase.”82 India is also one of the few countries in the world where licit opium poppy is
cultivated for pharmaceutical purposes; some additional opium poppy is also illicitly cultivated
for domestic demand and the government of India reportedly eradicated several thousand opium
poppy hectares each year in recent years.83
Amid an increasingly complex and global synthetic drug problem, India has emerged, alongside
China and Mexico, as a primary source for fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances destined
ultimately for the United States.84 India’s role has grown since China’s 2018 decision to control
two fentanyl precursors, known as NPP and 4-ANPP, and China’s 2019 decision to impose strict
domestic controls on the production and sale of all fentanyl-class opioids, including all known
and all potential future variations of fentanyl. Traffickers have reportedly shifted from China to
India as a new source for precursor chemicals in order to circumvent Chinese controls.85 The U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) further reports that Mexico-based transnational
criminal organizations are “diversifying their sources of supply” to include fentanyl shipments

79 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76 (July 20, 2020);

Arms Control Association, “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” August 2020.
80 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Nuclear Suppliers Group,” updated July 14, 2020. See also CRS Report RL33016, U.S.
Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr.
81 This section written by Liana W. Rosen, Specialist in International Crime and Narcotics.
82 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol. 1, March 2021, p. 155.
83 United Nations, World Drug Report, Statistical Annex, Table 6.2.3. Eradication of Opium Poppy, and Cultivation of
Opium Poppy and Production of Opium in Small Countries (online only), June 2020, https://wdr.unodc.org/wdr2020/
field/Annex/6.2.3_Eradication_of_opium_poppy_and_cultivation_of_opium_poppy_and_production_of_opium_in_
small_countries.xlsx.
84 CRS In Focus IF10890, China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role, by Liana W. Rosen and Susan V.
Lawrence; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Global SMART Update, The Growing Complexity of
the Opioid Crisis, vol. 24, October 2020, p. 4.
85 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol. 1, March 2021, p. 58; C4ADS,
Lethal Exchange: Synthetic Drug Networks in the Digital Era, November 2020.

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from India.86 Traffickers in India also produce large volumes of ephedrine, methamphetamine,
and other illicit drugs.
For more than three decades, successive U.S. Presidents have identified India as among the
world’s most significant illicit drug-producing and drug-transit countries.87 India is party to the
three U.N. drug-control conventions.88 The United States and India also maintain bilateral treaties
on mutual legal assistance and extradition. The two countries convened virtually for an inaugural
Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) meeting in November 2020, and followed up with a
second meeting in June 2021.89 The U.S.-India CNWG intends to increase collaboration on
combating the production and trafficking of synthetic opioids, including fentanyl and tramadol,
and precursor chemicals used to manufacture them. Despite ongoing efforts to improve domestic
controls on the production and export of controlled substances (including the domestic regulation
in 2018 of tramadol, a synthetic opioid that is not under international drug control), the State
Department’s 2021 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) describes an underresourced and uncoordinated counternarcotics effort in India that limits Indian authorities’ ability
to enforce their drug laws and conduct complex investigations of criminal drug manufacturing.90
The 2021 INCSR further reports that India regulates 18 of the 29 precursor chemicals scheduled
for international control, pursuant to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.91 There are also no domestic controls in place (e.g.,
registration requirements) on specialized equipment (e.g., tableting and encapsulating machines)
commonly used in the manufacturing of synthetic drugs.92 The most recent CNWG convened in
June 2021.93

U.S.-India Trade and Investment Relations94
U.S.-India trade ties are a key part of bilateral relations, but have faced heightened challenges in
recent years. U.S. goods and services trade with India accounts for 2.5% of total U.S. world
trade.95 Bilateral trade is more consequential for India, for whom the United States is a top trading
partner, representing about 17% of India’s exports and 7% of its imports.96 Bilateral foreign direct
investment (FDI) is limited, but growing. Market access and other barriers to U.S. trade with
India have been long-standing concerns among some Members of Congress and U.S. businesses,
and successive Administrations. The Biden Administration’s inaugural trade policy report states,
86 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Fentanyl Flow to the United States, DEA-DCT-DIR-008-20, January 2020,

p. 3.
87 CRS Report R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries, by Liana W.
Rosen.
88 These are the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and the Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances of 1988.
89 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-India Counternarcotics Working Group,” press release,
December 1, 2020; “Joint Statement of U.S.-India Counternarcotics Working Group,” press release, June 3, 2021.
90 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol. 1, March 2021, pp. 163-166.
91 Ibid, p. 63.
92 Ibid, p. 58.
93 See the resulting June 3, 2021, Joint Statement at https://go.usa.gov/xFrnF.
94 This section written by Shayerah I. Akhtar, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. See also CRS In Focus
IF10384, U.S.-India Trade Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar and K. Alan Kronstadt.
95 CRS analysis of data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for 2020.
96 World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Profile for India, 2019 data.

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“While India’s large market, economic growth, and progress towards development make it an
essential market for many U.S. exporters, a general and consistent trend of trade-restrictive
policies have inhibited the potential of the bilateral trade relationship.”97
The Trump Administration—which took issue
with India’s “unfair” trade practices—sought
to address certain frictions in a limited
bilateral trade deal, which was not achieved.
Some analysts expect that, under the Biden
Administration, bilateral trade relations may
be less strained and resolving frictions will
remain a priority.98 In March 2021, U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai and
Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry
Piyush Goyal discussed the importance of the
bilateral trade and investment relationship,
and committed to strengthening cooperation
on shared objectives.99 Members of Congress
may monitor and weigh in on a range of
bilateral trade issues and engagement on these
issues.

Figure 2. U.S.-India Trade and Investment

Source: CRS, with U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
data.

U.S.-Indian engagement on trade issues takes
place amid an uncertain growth outlook for
India’s economy. After several years in which it attained the world’s fastest growth rate (above
7%), India’s economy grew more slowly in 2019, and was hit hard by the pandemic. The World
Bank estimates that the Indian economy contracted by 7.3% in 2020, and that it will expand by
8.3% in 2021, flanked by policy support from the Indian government.100 India’s COVID-19
outbreak appears to be constraining a previously expected stronger economic recovery in 2021.

Selected Trade Issues
Tariffs and Trade Preferences. Bilateral tensions have grown over both countries’ tariff policies.
India’s average most-favored-nation (MFN) applied tariff rate (17.6%) is the highest of any major
world economy. India’s bound tariff rates under its World Trade Organization (WTO)
commitments are even higher. This allows India to increase its applied rates further without
violating its WTO commitments and has created a longstanding source of uncertainty for U.S.
exporters. India’s tariff hikes on a range of labor-intensive products and on mobile phones,
televisions, and other electronics and communication devices under its “Make in India” campaign
remain a particular U.S. concern.101 The United States and other countries have requested to join
various WTO challenges on India’s technology tariffs.
97 USTR, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, March 2021, p. 35.
98 See, for example, Prabha Raghavan, “India US ties: Under Biden, less acrimonious trade ties likely; sticking points

may remain,” The Indian Express, November 18, 2020.
99 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Virtual Meeting with Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry
Piyush Goyal,” press release, March 25, 2021.
100 World Bank Group, Global Economic Prospects, June 2021, pp. 3-4.
101 The Modi government launched the Make in India campaign in 2014 to boost India’s manufacturing to support
domestic jobs.

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India opposes the 25% steel and 10% aluminum national-security-based “Section 232” tariffs
imposed by the Trump Administration in 2018, which remain in place.102 India repeatedly delayed
retaliating against the United States, in hopes of resolving the issues bilaterally, but it ultimately
imposed higher retaliatory tariffs of 10% to 25%, affecting U.S. exports such as nuts, apples,
chemicals, and steel. The two sides are challenging each other’s tariffs in the WTO. India applied
the retaliatory tariffs soon after President Trump in June 2019 terminated India’s eligibility for the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a U.S. trade and development program, based on
India’s failure to provide “equitable and reasonable” access to its markets. The termination
followed an U.S. investigation into India’s market access practices and petitions by U.S. dairy
and medical technology industries.103 India had been the largest beneficiary of GSP, under which
around 10% of U.S. imports from India previously entered duty-free.
Digital Trade. In March 2020, India adopted a 2% digital services tax (DST) that applies only to
non-resident companies. In a Section 301 investigation, the Trump Administration concluded that
India’s DST is discriminatory, inconsistent with international taxation principles, and a burden to
U.S. commerce, but it deferred taking specific action. 104 In early 2021, the Biden Administration
announced its determination to apply additional tariffs of 25% on certain products from India, as
well as to immediately suspend the additional tariffs for up to 180 days to provide additional time
to complete the ongoing multilateral negotiations on international taxation at the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in the G20 process.105 India has defended
its DST as a way to level the playing field between domestic and foreign companies. Other
bilateral issues for U.S. businesses include India’s restrictions on the business activities of ecommerce platforms and requirements for data localization of certain financial flows.106 New
guidelines for social media, including requirements to remove content deemed by the government
a threat to national security, public order and “decency or morality,” with imprisonment for noncompliance, have also raised concerns.107
Supply Chains. Pandemic-related disruptions have highlighted U.S. and other foreign
companies’ reliance on Chinese origin goods in their supply chains. These disruptions, along with
increasing U.S.-China strategic competition, have spurred some companies to consider
restructuring their supply chains. India, with previous encouragement from the Trump
Administration, has increased efforts to attract firms relocating production from China, including
for medical devices and telecommunications products. President Biden’s focus on diversifying
U.S. supply chains could make India’s potential role more prominent, but certain barriers to
investment and other obstacles to doing business in India could present challenges.108
102 CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Rachel F.

Fefer.
103 CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian C.
Jones and Liana Wong. The GSP program expired on December 31, 2020.
104 CRS In Focus IF11564, Section 301 Investigations: Foreign Digital Services Taxes (DSTs), by Andres B.
Schwarzenberg.
105 USTR, “Proposed Action in Section 301 Investigation of India’s Digital Services Tax,” USTR-2021-0003, March
26, 2021. This could cover approximately $55 million of U.S. imports from India (or 0.2% of total U.S. goods imports
from India); USTR, “USTR Announces, and Immediately Suspends, Tariffs in Section 301 Digital Services Taxes
Investigations,” press release, June 2, 2021.
106 CRS In Focus IF10770, Digital Trade, by Rachel F. Fefer. See, for example, letter from Rep. Susan DelBene and
Rep. Ray LaHood (representing the Digital Trade Caucus) to Amb. Katherine Tai, U.S. Trade Representative, March
29, 2021.
107 Jeff Horwitz and Newley Purnell, “India Threatens Jail for Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter Employees,” Wall
Street Journal, March 5, 2021.
108 Executive Order 14017, “America’s Supply Chains,” 86 Federal Register 11849, March 1, 2021.

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Other Issues. A range of other bilateral trade issues persist. A key issue for India is U.S.
temporary visa policies (see Immigration discussion), which affect Indian nationals working in
the United States. For the United States, India’s treatment of intellectual property (IP) is a critical
issue. USTR continued to identify India on the U.S. 2021 Special 301 Priority Watch List,
identifying as of concern India’s treatment of patents, high IP theft rates, and lax trade secret
protection, for instance. The two countries historically have differed on how to balance IP
protection to incentivize innovation and support other policy goals, such as access to medicines,
including for COVID-19 (see below). Other U.S. concerns include India’s FDI rules and
regulatory transparency.

U.S.-India Engagement on Trade Issues
Bilateral Talks. The United States and India do not have a bilateral free trade agreement, but
previously engaged in now-stalled negotiations on a potential bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
Under the Trump Administration, the two sides sought to negotiate a limited trade deal, in part to
address heightened trade frictions over tariffs and other trade restrictions. U.S. aims included
“resolution of various non-tariff barriers, targeted reduction of certain Indian tariffs, and other
market access improvements.”109 Restoration of GSP benefits reportedly has been a top priority
for India. Despite concerted efforts in 2019 and 2020, a trade deal did not materialize. Under the
Biden Administration, the two sides have agreed “to work constructively to resolve key
outstanding bilateral trade issues and to take a comprehensive look at ways to expand the trade
relationship.”110 They also committed to revitalizing their engagement through the Trade Policy
Forum, for which they agreed to hold the next Ministerial-level meeting in 2021.
Regional Integration. India and the United States are absent from the Indo-Pacific region’s two
major trade pacts. India negotiated, but did not join the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), signed by China and 14 other countries in November 2020.111 India cited
concerns about RCEP’s fairness and balance, and reportedly also was wary of Chinese import
competition. The United States withdrew from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in
2017. The 11 remaining TPP parties (including 7 RCEP members, but not India or China) signed
the new Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP (CPTPP or TPP-11), which entered
into force in December 2018. An open question is whether India and the United States may revisit
these pacts, or pursue other forms of regional integration.
Multilateral Engagement. The United States and India often have opposing stances on trade
issues in the WTO.112 With India’s growing integration in the global economy, some
policymakers have called on India, like China, to be a more responsible stakeholder in the rulesbased global trading system. They blame India for impeding WTO progress on issues such as the
moratorium on e-commerce customs duties, disciplines on fisheries subsidies, and previously on
the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). The United States and some developed countries also are
critical of India, China, and others for self-designating as developing countries to claim special

109 USTR, 2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report, March 2021, p. 35.
110 USTR, “Readout of Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Virtual Meeting with Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry

Piyush Goyal,” press release, March 25, 2021.
111 CRS Insight IN11200, The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Status and Recent Developments, by
Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs and Michael D. Sutherland.
112 CRS In Focus IF10002, The World Trade Organization, by Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Rachel F. Fefer, and Ian F.
Fergusson.

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and differential treatment under WTO rules—criticisms that these countries refute.113 Presently,
active debate is underway in the WTO on whether to waive WTO IP rules in relation to the
prevention, containment, or treatment of COVID-19, a concept initially proposed by India and
South Africa in October 2020. The United States previously was opposed to the general concept
of a waiver, but in May 2021, the Biden Administration announced U.S. support for waiving IP
protections for COVID-19 vaccines.114 Members of Congress have mixed views on the issue.115

India’s Foreign Relations and U.S. Interests
India-China Relations
India’s relations with China have been fraught for decades, with signs of increasing enmity in
recent years. The year 2020 included the worst open conflict between India and China in nearly
five decades. Serious impasses persist over border demarcation, as well as over Chinese support
for Pakistan and China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean region, among other issues.
Despite multiple sources of serious bilateral friction, India and China also share important
perceived interests, including large-scale bilateral trade and investment (albeit most flowing from
China to India), and on global issues such as climate change and health.
The brief but bloody 1962 India-China war left in place one of the world’s longest disputed
international borders. Beijing formally claims the entirety of India’s Arunachal Pradesh state as
its territory, calling it “South Tibet,” and it also occupies Aksai Chin, claimed by India as part of
its Ladakh Union Territory (see Figure 3). Lethal fighting broke out in the Western Sector near
the 2,100-mile-long “Line of Actual Control” (LAC) in 2020 and, although a limited
disengagement agreement was reached in February 2021, border tensions remain significant.116
Such conflict elicits fears of the potential for full-scale war between two contiguous, nucleararmed powers, as well as the potential for Chinese collusion with Pakistan and a two-front war
for India.117 The Chinese government also takes issue with the presence of the Dalai Lama and a
self-described “Central Tibetan Administration” and “Tibetan Parliament in Exile” on Indian soil.
Moreover, India faces longstanding water disputes with China; some analysts argue that Beijing is
seeking “hydro-hegemony” over its numerous downstream neighbors on the Brahmaputra and
other rivers.118
China has long been a major benefactor of Pakistan, providing advanced weapons, nuclear
technology, and fulsome foreign investment. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a
Chinese initiative to develop energy, commercial, and infrastructure links between its western
Xinxiang province and Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast, and is a major facet of China’s broader Belt

113 CRS Report R45417, World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction, coordinated by Cathleen D.

Cimino-Isaacs.
114 USTR, “Statement from Ambassador Katherine Tai on Covid-19 Trips Waiver,” press release, May 5, 2021.
115 Inside U.S. Trade, “Lawmakers Keep Up Pressure on Biden to Support TRIPS Waiver,” March 17, 2021; Doug
Palmer, “Poor Countries Are Fighting with Drug Companies over Vaccines. Now Biden Must Pick a Side,”
POLITICO, March 22, 2021.
116 “India-China Border Standoff Shows No Signs of Easing 1 Year On,” Nikkei Asia (Tokyo), May 5, 2021.
117 Aparna Pande, “The US Hasn’t Woken Up to India’s Nightmare of a Two-Front War with China and Pakistan” (oped), Print (Delhi, online), July 20, 2020.
118 Brahma Chellaney, “Will China Turn Off Asia’s Tap?,” Project Syndicate, December 22, 2020; “India Plans Dam
on Brahmaputra to Offset Chinese Construction Upstream,” Reuters, December 1, 2020.

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and Road Initiative (BRI).119 Formally launched in 2014, the CPEC effort has seen Beijing invest
more than $30 billion in Pakistan’s energy and transport infrastructures. India explicitly objects to
the BRI and refrains from any participation due to complaints that the transit lines run across
territory claimed by India.120 Many Indians are quick to label the BRI as a wholly unilateral
initiative that may provide cover for Beijing’s territorial ambitions in South Asia. Media reports
suggest that China may intend to build a naval base on the Arabian Sea near Gwadar, Pakistan,
and is reaching out to other South Asian littoral states, notably including port and other
infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.121 Some Indian observers argue China has
shifted from establishing a presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region to seeking
preeminence there, as manifested by the BRI, thus sharpening India-China competition, and
raising concerns in New Delhi that Beijing seeks to “contain” Indian regional influence.122
Following the 2020 border clashes, India-China relations “entered a new, more precarious, and
unpredictable era.”123 Many in the Indian strategic community appear to have concluded that
China has exposed an expansionist intent.124 Conversely, many analysts contend that growing
U.S.-India cooperation has deepened Beijing’s distrust of New Delhi. This leads to a dynamic in
which “pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away and leading it to deepen
its security partnerships,” and has created a cycle of escalating distrust on both sides.125 It also
leads some commentators to urge that India open new diplomatic fronts in its geopolitical
struggle with China, perhaps especially with Taiwan.126
Conflict at the Disputed Frontier. In 2017, India and China were able to de-escalate a tense
military standoff over the Doklam region, a 34-square-mile piece of Himalayan territory disputed
by China and Bhutan with vital strategic significance for India.127 Media reports in April 2020
that Chinese military forces near the “Western Sector” of the LAC in Ladakh were being
119 See http://cpec.gov.pk. Formally launched in 2014, the effort may see Beijing invest up to $62 billion in Pakistan.
120 “India Refuses to Endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Hindu (Chennai), June 10, 2018.
121 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Pakistan’s Gwadar Port: A New Naval Base in China’s String of Pearls in the Indo-Pacific,”

Center for strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2018; H.I. Sutton, “China’s New High-Security Compound in
Pakistan May Indicate Naval Plans,” Forbes, June 2, 2020; Smurti Pattanaik, “The Geopolitics of Power Configuration
in South Asia: Understanding Chinese Defense Minister’s Visit to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka,” Institute for Defense
Studies and Analyses (New Delhi), June 3, 2021.
122 “India Takes Its Tussle with China to the High Seas,” Financial Times (London), October 20, 2020; Abhijit Singh,
“India Has a Bigger Worry than the LAC” (op-ed), Wire (Delhi, online), June 12, 2020.
123 Daniel Markey, “Preparing for Heightened Tensions Between China and India,” Council on Foreign Relations, April
19, 2021.
124 Vijay Oberoi, “All Is Not Quiet on the Eastern Front” (op-ed), Citizen (Delhi, online), October 12, 2020; Vijay
Gokhale, “The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations,” Carnegie India (New Delhi), March 10,
2021; Chietigj Bajpaee,” New Normal in Sino-Indian Ties,” War on the Rocks (online), April 21, 2021.
125 Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Assessment of India,” War on the Rocks (online), March 25, 2020; quote from
Rajeswari Rajagopalan, “India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff with China,” Diplomat (Tokyo,
online), June 5, 2020.
126 See, for example, Mohamed Zeeshan, “Can India Pursue the ‘Strategic Encirclement’ of China?” Diplomat (Tokyo,
online), October 6, 2020; Bharat Bhushan, “What Are India’s Options Beyond Aligning with US?” (op-ed), Quint
(Delhi, online), June 26, 2020; “New Delhi-Taipei Cooperation is Both Mutually Beneficial and a Pointed Signal to
China” (editorial), Times of India (Delhi), April 4, 2021.
127 Control of the plateau could facilitate a military seizure of the 20-mile-wide Siliguri Corridor, or “Chicken’s Neck,”
that connects core India with its seven smaller northeastern states. India responded to new Chinese road-building
efforts in the region with army troops, and the two countries agreed to a mutual withdrawal of forces in what was
widely viewed as a victory for Indian resolve. Still, the de-escalation did not resolve underlying causes (Manoj Joshi,
“Doklam ‘Dis-Engagement’ May Have Been Mutual, but It Is India That Has Come Out on Top,” Observer Research
Foundation (New Delhi), August 31, 2017).

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supplemented in large numbers and with heavy equipment raised tensions with India. Chinese
reinforcements may have been a response to Indian infrastructure projects in the area. The
stresses erupted into violence (but no serious casualties) in May, when Indian and Chinese patrols
clashed on the northern shores of Pangong Lake, as well as at Naku La, at the northern reaches of
India’s Sikkim state between Nepal and Bhutan, hundreds of miles east of Ladakh (see Figure 3).
By May’s end, some 10,000 Chinese troops apparently had encroached as much as two miles into
both the disputed areas around Pangong, and into Ladakh’s Galwan River Valley, about 60 miles
north.128 Although formal military-to-military talks were launched, on June 15, a skirmish
involving hundreds of soldiers broke out in the Galwan Valley, leaving 20 Indian soldiers dead,
the first such casualties at the LAC since 1975 (Indian officials claimed 16 Chinese soldiers were
killed at the time).129
Figure 3. Western Sector of the India-China Frontier

Source: Adapted by CRS.

Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations. In early 2021, after two years of running second to
the United States, China reemerged as India’s largest trading partner.130 Until the 2020 border
conflict erupted, Chinese investment capital, technology, and management skills were welcomed
by many in India; China had pledged to invest hundreds of billions of yuan in India in coming
years. (India is not among China’s top trade partners.) Shortly after the lethal June 2020 battle at
the LAC, India’s government moved to attenuate trade and commercial ties to China. New Delhi
announced a ban on 59 Chinese mobile apps, including the popular TikTok and WeChat, that
were “engaged in activities which [are] prejudicial to sovereignty and integrity of India, defense
of India, security of state and public order.” By November, it had banned a total of more than 200
128 “The Chinese and Indian Armies Settle a Clash by Fisticuffs,” Economist (London), May 16, 2020; “Indian and

Chinese Soldiers Injured in Cross-Border Fistfight, Says Delhi,” Guardian (London), May 20, 2020; “A Border
Dispute Between India and China Is Getting More Serious,” Economist (London), May 30, 2020; “India, China Bring
in Heavy Equipment and Weaponry to Their Rear Bases in Ladakh,” Press Trust India, May 31, 2020.
129 “3 Separate Brawls, ‘Outsider’ Chinese Troops & More,” India Today (Delhi), June 21, 2020.
130 “China Becomes India’s Biggest Trading Partner in First 9 Months of FY21,” Business Standard (Delhi), February
24, 2021.

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such apps, a development that Beijing called “discriminatory” and part of a collusive effort with
the United States.131
India’s efforts to further economically disentangle itself from China would likely face difficulties,
given the myriad consumer goods purchased and the number of Chinese components that are
crucial to Indian supply chains.132 Chinese imports are crucial to India’s ability to scale up its
renewables sector and combat climate change; about 80% of India’s solar panels come from
China.133 Chinese investments into India have grown significantly over the last decade, with
Chinese firms emerging as prominent players seeking long-term presence in numerous key
sectors. More than half of Indian start-ups valued at $1 billion or more reportedly have Chinese
investment.134 Although a trade war would be harmful to the economies of both countries, India is
viewed as likely suffering greater harm. This may partially explain why, following a February
2021 agreement to disengage in Ladakh, India, reportedly moved to clear 45 pending investment
proposals from China that had been put on hold since early 2020 (about 150 such proposals from
China worth more than $2 billion reportedly were on hold).135

India-Pakistan Relations
India’s conflict and rivalry with neighboring Pakistan—essentially continuous over the more than
seven decades since the 1947 Partition of British India—is unabated. The countries have fought
four wars, most recently a 14-week-long clash in 1999, the first-ever between two nuclear-armed
powers. Pakistan’s apparent tolerance of several anti-India terrorist groups in its territory, and the
two nations’ competing claims to the disputed territory of the former princely state of Jammu and
Kashmir, are at the core of the bilateral discord. Since taking office in 2014, Prime Minster
Modi’s government has tread cautiously with Pakistan even as some of his Hindu nationalist
ministers issue belligerent rhetoric about Pakistan’s assumed status as a hotbed of anti-India
terrorists. Sporadic high-level engagement was cut off in mid-2015, but efforts to rebuild ties
culminated with Modi’s surprise Christmas Day 2015 visit to Pakistan. The fragile process
quickly disintegrated, however, following bloody January and September 2016 attacks on Indian
military bases in Kashmir (at Pathankot and Uri, respectively), allegedly by Pakistan-based Jaishe-Mohammed (JeM) militants. Following the latter attack, New Delhi claimed to have launched a
first-ever “surgical strike” against militant targets in Pakistan-held Kashmir.136

131 See the Electronics and IT Ministry’s June 29, 2020, release at https://tinyurl.com/k42vfb9w; “India Bans 43 More

Mobile Apps as It Takes on China,” Reuters, November 25, 2020; “China Says India ‘Abusing National Security,’
Colluding With US,” Hindu (Chennai), September 3, 2020; “Chinese Tech Companies Bet Big on India, Now They’re
Being Shut Out,” CNN.com, December 10, 2020.
132 This is especially true in the electronics and pharmaceutical sectors. As of mid-2020, Chinese brands accounted for
almost three-quarters of India’s smartphone sales, and nearly 40% of India’s electronics-equipment imports. About
70% of active ingredients used by drug-makers came from China (“After Deadly Border Clash, India Faces
Uncomfortable Truths About Its Reliance on China,” Washington Post, June 26, 2020).
133 “India-China Conflict Is Bad for the Planet,” Slate, September 28, 2020.
134 Ananth Krishnan, “Following the Money: China Inc.’s Growing Stake in India-China Relations,” Brookings
Institution, March 2020; “‘TikTok Changed My Life’: India’s Ban on Chinese Apps Leaves Video Makers Stunned,”
NRR.com, July 16, 2020.
135 “China and India Are Sparring but Neither Can Afford a Full-On Trade War,” CNN.com, July 5, 2020; “India to
Clear 45 Investments From China,” Reuters, February 22, 2021.
136 “India Blames Pakistan as Kashmir Attack Kills 17 Soldiers,” Reuters, September 18, 2016; “India’s ‘Surgical
Strikes’ in Kashmir: Truth or Illusion?,” BBC News, October 23, 2016.

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In early 2019, an alleged JeM militant conducted a suicide bombing in Pulwama that killed 40
Indian paramilitary troops. A subsequent military clash, retaliatory Indian airstrike on Pakistani
territory at Balakot, and a brief air battle elicited new concerns about escalation, but the crisis
ended without further major conflict (see Figure 4). India subsequently rejected any high-level
bilateral peace negotiations pending decisive Pakistani action against anti-India militants inside
Pakistan. However, terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, responsible for the days-long
2008 terrorist assault on Mumbai) and JeM continue to operate, by some accounts with the
support of Pakistani state elements.137 Pakistani officials have taken limited efforts to curb the
further activities of such groups.138
Figure 4. Conflict Map of Pre-August 2019 Jammu and Kashmir

Source: Adapted by CRS.
Notes: Limits shown do not reflect U.S. government policy on boundary representation or sovereignty.

For many Indian analysts, the Pulwama episode marked a watershed moment, as New Delhi
broke from decades of militarily restrained posture with an airstrike on Pakistan proper.
According to some, that retaliation successfully deterred Pakistan from supporting further
terrorist attacks in Indian Kashmir. Yet Pakistani observers frame a different narrative, calling the
“failed” airstrike and subsequent aerial combat a demonstration of India’s conventional military
weakness and ineptitude.139 The April 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
137 The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 (released in June 2020) says, “Pakistan continued to

serve as a safe haven for certain regionally focused terrorist groups” and “allowed groups targeting India, including
LeT and its affiliated front organizations, and JeM, to operate from its territory” (see https://go.usa.gov/xHwcf).
138 In February 2020, LeT founder Hafiz Saeed was sentenced to 11 years in prison on charges of terrorism financing,
Pakistan’s first-ever high-profile conviction on such charges. Skeptical observers, especially those in India, saw in the
news a continuation of Pakistan’s policy of making tactical concessions to forward a larger strategic goal. Other leading
Pakistan-based terrorist leaders, including JeM founder Masood Azhar, have evaded prosecution (Sushant Sareen,
“Hafiz Saeed Conviction: Deception or Disavowal?,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), February 14, 2020;
Ajai Sahni, “Transparent Deception” India Today (New Delhi), February 21, 2020).
139 See, for example, Sushant Sareen, “Pulwama Propelled India’s Pugnacious Policy,” Observer Research Foundation
(New Delhi), February 17, 2020; Adil Sultan, “India’s ‘Surgical Strike’ Doctrine: Implications for South Asian

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Community states, “Although a general war between India and Pakistan is unlikely, crises
between the two are likely to become more intense, risking an escalatory cycle.”140
Kashmir.141 The disputed territory of Kashmir has been the site of multiple wars and is identified
as a potential nuclear “flashpoint.”142 Both India and Pakistan formally claim sovereignty over the
former princely state, with India controlling roughly two-thirds, including the Muslim-majority
Valley region. In August 2019, the Indian government took a series of controversial actions that
eroded the (largely nominal) constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir, which until then
had been the country’s only Muslim-majority state. It repealed Article 370 of the Indian
Constitution and Section 35A of its Annex, and the state was bifurcated into two “Union
Territories,” each with reduced administrative powers. The moves were accompanied by a major
security lockdown, including the long-term detention of leading local political figures. Seven
months later, Kashmir experienced a “double lockdown” with the imposition of COVID-19related restrictions.
In early 2021, 4G internet service was restored in the Valley after 18 months (2G service had been
restored in March 2020 after more than six months of full internet shutdown). Reports indicate
that the internet shutdowns cost the Kashmiri economy $4.2 billion.143 Numerous Members of
Congress have issued criticisms of India’s actions.144 The UN Human Rights Commission is
among those bodies continuing to criticize Delhi’s moves in Kashmir as discriminatory and
repressive. Analysts note a general reduction in militancy in the Valley since mid-2019 while
continuing to characterize the “new normal” there as a depressed economy and an increased sense
of alienation among the populace.145 In June 2021, Prime Minister Modi met with 14 mainstream
Kashmiri political leaders from 8 regional parties who sought discussions on future elections and
restoration of statehood. It was the Indian leader’s first formal meeting with local Kashmiri
political figures in more than two years.146
A New India-Pakistan Détente in 2021? On February 25, 2021, two years after the Pulwama
crisis, the Indian and Pakistani militaries issued a surprise Joint Statement reaffirming their
mutual commitment to a cease-fire agreement for the LOC originally made in 2003, and agreeing
“to address each other’s core issues and concerns which have propensity to disturb peace and lead
to violence.” A rare conciliatory note came from Pakistan’s powerful army chief later in February,
when he called on the two countries to “bury the past” and initiate cooperative engagement. Yet
he also placed an onus on New Delhi to “create a conducive environment,” especially with regard

Strategic Stability,” Strafasia (London, online), February 26, 2020.
140 The assessment continues, “Under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, India is more likely than in the past to
respond with military force to perceived or real Pakistani provocations, and heightened tensions raise the cost of
conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, with violent unrest in Kashmir or a militant attack in India being
potential flashpoints” (see the ODNI’s April 9, 2021, report at https://go.usa.gov/xHpQn).
141 See also CRS Report R45877, Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
142 “U.S. and India, Trying to Reconcile, Hit Bump,” New York Times, March 22, 2000; “Kashmir Emerges as
Flashpoint Among 3 Nuclear Powers,” Nikkei Asia (Tokyo), December 21, 2020.
143 “India Restoring Fast Mobile Internet in Kashmir After 18 Months,” Reuters, February 5, 2021; “The 550-Day 4G
Blackout Cost Kashmir’s Economy $4.2 Billion,” Quartz India (online), February 8, 2021.
144 See CRS Report R45877, Kashmir: Background, Recent Developments, and U.S. Policy, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
145 “UN Experts Say Jammu and Kashmir Changes Risk Undermining Minorities’ Rights, United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, February 18, 2021 at https://tinyurl.com/4yjzvpz8; Ayjaz Wani, “Perspectives
on the ‘New Normal’ in Kashmir, Observer Research Foundation (Delhi), March 21, 2021.
146 “India’s Modi Discusses Kashmir Elections in First Talks Since Autonomy Revoked,” Reuters, June 24, 2021.

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to Indian-held Kashmir.147 Subsequent reporting revealed that the United Arab Emirates had been
brokering months of “secret talks” since late 2020, with the cease-fire reportedly being the first of
several planned steps toward a reinvigorated India-Pakistan peace process. Next steps would
include reinstatement of ambassadors in respective capitals then, crucially, resumption of trade
relations and negotiations toward a resolution on Kashmir.148
U.S. Approach to India-Pakistan Tensions. U.S. policy seeks to prevent conflict between India
and Pakistan from escalating while supporting the U.S.-India strategic partnership that has been
underway since 2005. During the final years of the Obama Administration, U.S. relations with
South Asia’s two nuclear-armed powers were on fairly clear, and starkly contrasting, trajectories.
Extensive and positive engagement with India continued the bilateral “strategic partnership”
launched in 2005, while U.S. relations with Pakistan were increasingly clouded by mutual
frustration and distrust, along with a dramatic decrease in previously fulsome levels of U.S.
foreign assistance. The Trump Administration broadly adopted its predecessor’s approach to
India, making New Delhi an anchor of its Indo-Pacific strategy. The Trump Administration
simultaneously took a harder line toward Pakistan (nominally still a “Major Non-NATO Ally” of
the United States) that included a blanket “suspension” of security aid to that country, a punitive
step linked to perceptions that Pakistan had failed to effectively combat anti-Afghan and antiIndia militants based on its soil. Many analysts saw the Trump Administration acting mostly as a
bystander to the Pulwama aftermath, arguably the worst South Asia crisis in decades, although
some considered the relatively subdued U.S. posture to be reflective of Washington’s ongoing
strategic shift toward India.149 The United States expresses solidarity with India in its fight against
terrorism, and Washington continues to pressure the Islamabad government to decisively end the
use of Pakistani territory by terrorist groups.150 The long-standing U.S. position on Kashmir is
that the issue should be resolved between India and Pakistan while taking into account the wishes
of the Kashmiri people.151

India-Russia Relations and CAATSA Legislation
Despite its long-held non-alignment policy, India maintained close and friendly relations with the
Soviet Union, which was a key benefactor of India until the Soviet Union’s 1990 dissolution.
Since that time, Russia has remained a crucial source of India’s defense hardware, although
India’s purchases from Russia as a proportion of all arms imports have declined in recent years.152
147 See the February 25, 2021, Joint Statement at https://tinyurl.com/nk97f5w; Gen. Bajwa quoted in “Pakistan Army

Chief Says ‘It Is Time to Bury the Past’ with India,” Al Jazeera (Doha), March 19, 2021.
148 “UAE Brokering Secret India-Pakistan Peace Roadmap: Officials,” Al Jazeera (Doha), March 22, 2021; “Through a
Backchannel, Steps Forward,” Hindu (Chennai), April 12, 2021; “India, Pakistan Held Secret Talks to Try to Break
Kashmir Impasse,” Reuters, April 14, 2021.
149 “With Trump Silent, No ‘Sheriff’ in Town on Pakistan-India Crisis, Diplomats Say,” NBC News (online), March 6,
2019; “The Trump Administration and the Indo-Pakistan Crisis,” Economist (London), March 7, 2019.
150 The most recent session of the U.S.-India Counter Terrorism Joint Working Group produced a Joint Statement
reading, “The two sides underlined the urgent need for Pakistan to take immediate, sustained, and irreversible action to
ensure that no territory under its control is used for terrorist attacks.… The U.S. reiterated its support for the people and
government of India in the fight against terrorism” (see the September 11, 2020, statement at https://go.usa.gov/
xHAnv).
151 See, for example, a July 22, 2019, State Department tweet at https://twitter.com/state_sca/status/
1153444051368239104?lang=en.
152 Over the past 20 years (2001-2020), about 67% of India’s defense imports came from Russia (in dollar value).
However, from 2016 to 2020, Russia accounted for 49% of Indian defense imports (see the SIPRI database at
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php; see also Sieman Wezeman, et al., “Developments Among the

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In April 2021, India’s external affairs minister lauded India’s “Special and Privileged Strategic
Partnership with Russia” as “uniquely strong and steady.”153 Many in New Delhi view Russia as a
reliable ally that provides India with military equipment and technologies denied to it by Western
suppliers, and that has broadly aligned itself with India’s regional policies.154 Yet Russia’s recent
diplomatic outreach to key Indian rivals China and Pakistan has led to some disquiet in India.
Increased Sino-Russian coordination has the potential to complicate India’s foreign policy,
especially when it is framed as a counter to U.S. influence in the region. Russia is in this sense a
key factor in India’s China policy: from New Delhi’s perspective, Moscow-Beijing rivalry can
help to preclude potential Chinese hegemony in Asia.155 Meanwhile, recent Russian outreach to
Pakistan—including high-level visits and unprecedented arms sales—may cause alarm for Indian
leaders.156
India’s plan to purchase Russian-made S-400 air defense systems, in progress since 2016, has the
potential to trigger U.S. sanctions on India under Section 231 of the Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which targets “significant
transactions” with Russia’s defense or intelligence sectors. In 2018, Congress passed legislation
permitting the President to waive CAATSA sanctions, but the conditions are fairly stringent.157
Indian planners appear to have concluded that alternatives to the S-400 offered by Washington—
the Patriot and THAAD systems—lack the purported range and versatility of the Russian
equipment.158 Despite a trend away from Russian arms imports, India in late 2019 submitted $800
million toward the full $5.4 billion contract for S-400 systems.159 It also entered a new $3.1
billion contract for indigenous production of 464 Russian-designed T-90S tanks that are likely to
rely on Russian-built engines.160 Recent press reports indicate that New Delhi is going “full steam
ahead” with S-400 purchases—the first deliveries are set for autumn 2021, to be completed by
early 2023—and that U.S. officials privately tell their Indian interlocutors that a Section 231
waiver may not be forthcoming.161

Recipients of Major Arms, 2015-19,” SIPRI Yearbook 2020).
153 See the External Affairs Ministry’s April 7, 2021, transcript at https://tinyurl.com/3ufp4rre.
154 Sushant Singh, “The New Non-Alignment” (op-ed), Indian Express (Mumbai), October 12, 2018; Manoj Joshi,
“Still Best Friends: India Cannot Simply Abandon Russia” (op-ed), Times of India (Delhi), October 13, 2018; Nandan
Unnikrishnan, “Bridge the Geopolitical Distance With Russia,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), February
16, 2021.
155 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Sino-Russian Alliance” (op-ed), Indian Express (Mumbai), June 11, 2019; Sadanand
Dhume, “Moscow Isn’t New Delhi’s Pal” (op-ed), Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2020. By one account, the Trump
Administration’s “chaotically aggressive” China policy and “incoherent” Russia policy compelled Beijing and Moscow
to grow closer, and New Delhi “cannot be locked completely out of a China-Russia embrace” (Robert Kaplan, “Here’s
the Real Foreign Policy Disaster That Trump Has Created for the U.S.” (op-ed), Washington Post, October 14, 2019).
156
Feroz Hassan Khan, “Russia-Pakistan Strategic Relations,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, January 2021.
157 Section 1294 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232) provides
waiver authority if the President certifies that a waiver is in the U.S. national security interest and that a government
offered a waiver is significantly reducing the proportion of its total defense equipment produced by Russia, among
other provisions. See the State Department’s undated fact sheet at https://go.usa.gov/xHXmH.
158 See Sameer Ali Khan, “The United States Has Few Good Options When It Comes to India’s Plans to Purchase
Russian-Made Missile Defense System,” Atlantic Council, June 27, 2019.
159 “India Watching US for Sanctions on Turkey,” Defense News, December 2, 2019.
160 “Russia Says in Talks to Make More Military Equipment in India,” Reuters, April 6, 2021.
161 “US Curbs Looms, But India Looks to Induct Russia S-400 Systems,” Times of India (Delhi), January 11, 2021;
“India’s Friction With U.S. Rises Over Planned Purchase of Russia S-400 Defense Systems,” Reuters, January 15,
2021.

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During March 2021 travel to India, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin urged all American
“allies and partners to move away from Russian equipment … and really avoid any kind of
acquisitions that would trigger sanctions on our behalf.” Just prior to the visit, the Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Bob Menendez, sent a letter to Secretary Austin
asking that he “reaffirm the Biden administration’s opposition to India’s planned purchase,”
saying that such a purchase, “will clearly constitute a significant, and therefore sanctionable,
transaction with the Russian defense sector under Section 231 of CAATSA.” The Senator also
warned that a purchase would “limit India’s ability to work with the U.S. on development and
procurement of sensitive military technology.”162 U.S. officials have expressed concerns that
India’s defense trade with Russia could hinder future U.S.-India defense cooperation and lead to
“technology leakage,” and that the S-400 system could compromise the operations of advanced
U.S. platforms such as F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft.163
Since CAATSA’s 2017 enactment, analysts have warned that not providing a waiver for India
would likely exacerbate lingering doubts in New Delhi about cooperation with the U.S. regional
strategy, arguing that a “collision between the United States and India [will be] inevitable—and it
is likely to be deeply disruptive to the strategic cooperation that is slowly emerging when the
Indo-Pacific region itself is in unsettling flux.”164 India’s 2020 border conflict with China and its
stronger embrace of the Quad mechanism may have eased these fears, but numerous observers
continue to argue that India meets the congressional criteria for a waiver and, further, that
President Biden should, if the time comes, issue such a waiver in the service of broader U.S.
interests.165 Some even contend that cordial India-Russia ties serve U.S. interests as a hedge
against a potential Sino-Russian alliance, given the recent spike in New Delhi’s animosity toward
Beijing.166

Other Selected Indian Foreign Relations
Afghanistan. India designates Afghanistan as a “neighbor” based on New Delhi’s territorial
claims to Pakistan-held Kashmir abutting northeastern Afghanistan, and India takes a keen
interest in maintaining its “strategic partnership” with the Kabul government. India has been the
largest regional contributor to Afghan reconstruction, devoting at least $3 billion toward that
162 “Austin Hints India’s Purchase of Russian Missile System Could Trigger Sanctions,” Politico, March 20, 2021; see

the March 17, 2021, letter at https://go.usa.gov/xH9j9.
163 In late 2019, an unnamed senior State Department official articulated some of the concerns the U.S. government and
defense industry have about the potential for defense co-research, co-development, and co-production with India to
result in technology leakage, specifically citing Russia as a potential benefactor, calling on Indian officials to “tighten
up your procurement processes, tighten up your defense technology security processes and protocols” to be better
positioned as a “closer partner” of the United States (see the November 21, 2019, State Department transcript at
https://go.usa.gov/xH98h; “Why the S-400 and the F-35 Can’t Get Along,” Defense One (online), July 17, 2019.).
164 Ashley Tellis, “How Can U.S.-India Relations Survive the S-400 Deal?,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, August 29, 2018. See also Tanvi Madan, “Between a Cold War Ally and an Indo-Pacific Partner: India’s U.S.Russia Balancing Act,” War on the Rocks (online), October 16, 2018.
165 Todd Young, “Sanctioning India Would Spoil the Quad,” Foreign Policy (online), April 11, 2021; Jeff Smith, “U.S.
CAATSA Sanctions and India: Waivers and Geopolitical Considerations,” Heritage Foundation, April 7, 2021; Richard
Rossow and Kriti Udaphyaya, “Assessing India’s CAATSA Sanctions Waiver Eligibility,” Diplomat (online), February
11, 2021; Kashish Parpiani, Nivedita Kapoor, and Angad Singh, “India’s Purchase of the S-400: Understanding the
CAATSA Conundrum,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), February 25, 2021.
166 Salvatore Babones, “America’s India Problem Is All About Russia,” Foreign Policy (online), February 16, 2021.
Russian officials have been critical of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, leading some in New Delhi to worry that Moscow
may “tag along” with Chinese interests in the region (Aleksei Zakharov, “While Criticizing the Indo-Pacific, Russia
Steps Up Its Presence,” Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi), February 6, 2020).

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effort since 2001, and it reports successful efforts in all 34 Afghan provinces with more than 400
projects completed. Indian leaders envisage a peaceful Afghanistan that can serve as a hub for
regional trade and energy flows, and New Delhi has provided “Political support for an Afghanled, Afghan-owned, Afghan-controlled and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation.”167
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “India’s paramount concern is for a stable Afghan
security environment,” and “The deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan … may
adversely affect the ability of India to provide aid.”168
Indian officials welcomed their government’s inclusion in the Biden Administration’s strategy for
regional talks, especially after New Delhi found itself excluded from past regional formulations,
including the U.N.’s early 2020 “6+2+1” that included Afghanistan’s “immediate neighbors”
only. Yet any political settlement in Afghanistan that includes power-sharing with the Taliban is
very likely to rile India, and New Delhi is wary of signs that Washington is assuming a place for
the Taliban in future Afghan governance.169 For skeptical Indian analysts, such an outcome would
leave Pakistan as the “real winner” in any deal that “threatens to turn Afghanistan into a weak,
pliable neighbor that Pakistan can influence at will.”170
India and Pakistan have vigorously jockeyed for influence in Afghanistan, and high-visibility
Indian targets have come under attack there, allegedly from Pakistan-based and
possibly -supported militants.171 Indian leaders have remained deeply skeptical of an apparent
U.S. reliance on Pakistani i

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46845. Public record. Not legal advice.