# Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46781 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** December 28, 2022 - **Citation:** R46781 ## Text Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Updated December 28, 2022 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R46781 SUMMARY Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment for many of the 33 countries in LAC, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and irregular; major factors driving migration include proximity, economic and security conditions, and familial ties. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a long-standing component of relations with the region, involving close cooperation with Mexico, Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean. U.S. Administrations have long supported democracy and human rights in the region, with a current focus on authoritarian governments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as democratic backsliding and corruption in other countries. Since 2020, support to help the region respond to the health and economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has been a major component of U.S. policy. In its approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean, the Biden Administration espouses three broad priorities—expanding economic opportunities, strengthening democracy, and building security. The COVID-19 pandemic and related recession exacerbated long-standing structural challenges in the region, fueled political social unrest, and prompted unprecedented levels of irregular immigration. The Administration is attempting to confront these challenges and advance its policy priorities through a strategy of intensified engagement comprising increased foreign assistance and enhanced bilateral, multilateral, and institutional collaboration, including through various commitments made at the June 2022 Summit of the Americas hosted by the United States. Among its key efforts, the Administration is aiming to improve health security in the region; collaborate on effective migration management; deepen engagement on climate change and energy security; promote inclusive democracy and combat corruption; and press for democracy and respect for human rights in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. R46781 December 28, 2022 Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator Specialist in Latin American Affairs June S. Beittel Analyst in Latin American Affairs Carla Y. Davis-Castro Research Librarian Peter J. Meyer Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs Karla I. Rios Analyst in Latin American Affairs Clare Ribando Seelke Specialist in Latin American Affairs M. Angeles Villarreal Specialist in International 117th Congress Action. Congress traditionally has played an active role in U.S. policy toward Trade and Finance LAC through legislation and oversight. In March 2021, Congress appropriated $10.8 billion (P.L. 117-2; American Rescue Plan Act of 2021) to respond to COVID-19 worldwide, including in LAC. In November 2021, Congress approved the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54), which directs the use of diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions against antidemocratic actions and corruption in Nicaragua. In December 2021, Congress approved the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), or FY2022 NDAA, which included provisions on Colombia, Central America, and China’s presence and influence in the region, among other LAC provisions. In 2022, Congress completed action in March on FY2022 foreign aid appropriations as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K), which included funding directives for several key countries and regional programs; the State Department estimates an FY2022 allocation of just over $2 billion in assistance for LAC, a 13% increase from FY2021. P.L. 117-103 also included, as Division V, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, intended to promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of Haiti and support for anticorruption efforts and human rights. In December 2022, Congress enacted the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263), with several LAC provisions, including reporting requirements on Mexico, the Caribbean Basin, and the activities of China and Russia in LAC; the measure also incorporated the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022. Congress also completed action in December 2022 on FY2023 foreign aid appropriations in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K). Although the law did not include a total amount for assistance to the region, it included numerous funding directives for countries, regional programs, and initiatives and continued to condition assistance to several countries. Both houses approved several resolutions on the region, including H.Res. 760, S.Res. 37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res. 489 on the human rights situation in Cuba; S.Res. 22 on relations with Ecuador; S.Res. 120 on the Summit of the Americas; H.Res. 1168 on trade with Caribbean ; S.Res. 753 on Brazil’s presidential election; and S.Res. 472 on relations with the Dominican Republic. More than 40 congressional hearings focused on U.S. policy challenges in LAC (see Appendix). Congressional Research Service Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Contents Regional Political and Economic Environment............................................................................... 1 COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean ....................................................................... 2 Political Situation ...................................................................................................................... 4 Electoral Practices............................................................................................................... 4 Decline in Democratic Practices ......................................................................................... 6 Economic Situation ................................................................................................................... 7 U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean .................................................................... 9 Trump Administration Policy .................................................................................................. 10 Biden Administration Policy .................................................................................................... 11 Legislative Action in the 117th Congress ................................................................................. 16 Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions .................................................................. 16 Additional Congressional Action ...................................................................................... 19 Regional U.S. Policy Issues........................................................................................................... 19 U.S. Foreign Aid ..................................................................................................................... 19 Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 22 Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs..................................................................................... 25 Trade Policy ............................................................................................................................ 28 Selected Country and Subregional Issues...................................................................................... 31 The Caribbean ......................................................................................................................... 31 Caribbean Regional Issues ................................................................................................ 31 Cuba .................................................................................................................................. 35 Haiti .................................................................................................................................. 36 Mexico and Central America .................................................................................................. 39 Mexico .............................................................................................................................. 39 Central America’s Northern Triangle................................................................................ 41 Nicaragua .......................................................................................................................... 44 South America ......................................................................................................................... 46 Brazil................................................................................................................................. 46 Colombia ........................................................................................................................... 49 Venezuela .......................................................................................................................... 52 Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 53 Figures Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean ........................................................................ 1 Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries .................................................. 32 Figure 3. Map of Central America ................................................................................................. 41 Tables Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in Latin America and the Caribbean ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023 Projection ........................ 8 Congressional Research Service Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2023 Request .......... 20 Table 4. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20142021 ............................................................................................................................................ 28 Table A-1. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts ............................................... 55 Table A-2. Congressional Hearings in the 117th Congress on Latin America and the Caribbean ....................................................................................................................... 57 Appendixes Appendix. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Data and Hearings .......................... 55 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 60 Congressional Research Service Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Regional Political and Economic Environment The Latin American and Caribbean region consists of 33 countries, ranging from the Caribbean nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s smallest states, to the South American nation of Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country. (See Figure 1 and Table A-1 for a map and basic facts on the region’s independent countries.) Over the past four decades, the region has made significant advances in political and economic development. Notable political and economic challenges remain, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks. Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics. Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American countries are in green. Geographically, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern coast of South America, but all three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Congressional Research Service 1 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress COVID-19 in Latin America and the Caribbean1 Beginning in 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had widespread public health, economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Countries throughout the region suffered sharp recessions in 2020 and increases in poverty. Most Latin American and Caribbean countries began to recover economically in 2021 and 2022 but are still contending with the lingering effects of the pandemic, China’s economic slowdown, and increases in global fuel and food prices due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (see “Economic Situation,” below). Difficult economic times also have contributed to increased social protests in some countries and have fueled an anti-incumbent electoral trend in the region (see “Political Situation,” below). In terms of public health, from the start of the pandemic through late December 2022, Latin American and Caribbean countries reported almost 1.75 million COVID-19 deaths, according to data from Johns Hopkins University. The region reported over 26% of deaths worldwide despite the region accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s population. Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Argentina had the highest numbers of COVID-19 deaths in the region; Brazil had the secondhighest COVID-19 death toll globally, after the United States. The regional rankings change when examining mortality (death) rates per 100,000 population; using this metric, Peru had the highest recorded COVID-19 mortality rate in the region (and globally), followed by Chile, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Colombia, and Paraguay. Some Caribbean countries that have had fewer deaths compared with other countries in the region have had high mortality rates (see Table 1).2 Experts have expressed concerns that countries worldwide, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, have significantly undercounted deaths for various reasons, suggesting that COVID-19 deaths in the region could be significantly higher.3 When the pandemic first surged in the region in 2020, Pan American Health Organization Director (PAHO) Director Dr. Carissa Etienne expressed concern about the poor and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk.4 In 2021, the PAHO director stated that the virus had deepened inequities that had long divided the region and exposed vulnerabilities in the region’s health, economic, and social sectors.5 In October 2022, PAHO’s director maintained that trends show “we may be transitioning from the acute phase of the pandemic into a phase of sustained control” but also noted the need to “rely on testing and increase vaccination rates in every country in the region.”6 She noted that although over 70% of people in Latin America and the Caribbean had 1 For further background, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer. 2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (hereinafter, Johns Hopkins, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26, 2022). Data presented by Johns Hopkins reflect COVID-19 deaths as reported by countries worldwide. 3 See, for example, The Economist, “The Pandemic’s True Death Toll,” updated December 26, 2022, at https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excess-deaths-estimates, which estimates that COVID-19 deaths in the Latin America and Caribbean region could be 50% higher than reported. Also see David Adam, “COVID’s True Death Toll: Much Higher Than Official Records,” Nature, March 10, 2022. 4 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020; PAHO, “PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Spread of COVID-19 Among Indigenous Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020; and PAHO, “Countries Urged to Face Challenge of Better Access to Health for Populations of African Descent in COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, December 2, 2020. 5 PAHO, “Weekly Press Briefing on COVID-19, Director’s Remarks,” April 7, 2021; and PAHO, “Annual Report of the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, 2020, Director’s Remarks,” July 21, 2021. 6 PAHO, “Press Briefing on COVID-19: Director’s Opening Remarks,” October 12, 2022. Congressional Research Service 2 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress been fully vaccinated, several countries and territories had yet to reach the 40% mark. As noted in Table 1, as of late December 2022, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines had fully vaccinated less than 40% of their populations, with Haiti having fully vaccinated only 2% of its population. PAHO has helped countries with their vaccination campaigns and has facilitated access to vaccines through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines; 22 countries in the region signed agreements to access vaccines through the facility. In addition, 10 countries in the region—Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—benefit from the COVID19 Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) launched by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, to provide donor-funded vaccines for low- and middle-income economies.7 As of late December 2022, PAHO reported that over 151 million doses had been delivered through COVAX.8 Latin American and Caribbean countries also acquired COVID-19 vaccines from other sources, including China, Russia, and India. The United States significantly ramped up its donation of vaccines to the region beginning in June 2021 and had provided over 70 million doses to 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries by early December 2022, both bilaterally and through COVAX (see “Biden Administration Policy,” below).9 Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths, Mortality Rates, and Vaccinations in Latin America and the Caribbean Deaths (12/26/22) Deaths per 100,000 (12/26/22) Population Fully Vaccinated (%) (12/25/22) Brazil 692,652 325.86 83 Mexico 331,013 259.02 65 Peru 218,008 661.19 87 Colombia 141,881 278.84 73 Argentina 130,080 287.81 84 Chile 63,039 329.77 93 Ecuador 35,940 203.71 82 Bolivia 22,282 190.88 54 Guatemala 19,993 111.60 42 Paraguay 19,666 275.72 50 Honduras 11,063 111.70 59 Costa Rica 9,072 178.09 85 Panama 8,554 198.25 74 Country 7 The COVAX Facility, “Committee Agreements; Confirmations of Intent to Participate, and AMC-Eligible Countries,” December 15, 2020. 8 PAHO, “Tracker COVAX Initiative—COVID-19 Deliveries in the Region,” updated December 21, 2022. 9 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated December 6, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha. Congressional Research Service 3 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Deaths (12/26/22) Deaths per 100,000 (12/26/22) Population Fully Vaccinated (%) (12/25/22) Cuba 8,530 75.31 88 Uruguay 7,552 217.4 84 Venezuela 5,830 20.50 52 Dominican Republic 4,384 40.41 57 Trinidad and Tobago 4,277 305.61 51 El Salvador 4,230 65.22 67 Jamaica 3,461 116.88 25 Suriname 1,393 237.46 41 Guyana 1,286 163.50 49 Haiti 860 7.54 2 Bahamas 833 211.83 43 Belize 688 173.03 57 Barbados 568 197.65 54 St. Lucia 409 222.73 30 Nicaragua 245 3.70 90 Grenada 238 211.52 35 Antigua and Barbuda 146 149.09 *63 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 118 106.36 28 Dominica 74 102.79 *41 Saint Kitts and Nevis 46 86.48 *50 1,748,411 — — Country Total LAC* Sources: Statistics for COVID-19 deaths and deaths per 100,000 are from Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” December 26, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. Vaccination statistics are from Josh Holder, “Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World,” New York Times, updated December 25, 2022, at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html, which draws vaccinations data from local governments via Our World in Data. Vaccination numbers marked with an asterisk are from Pan American Health Organization, COVID-19 Vaccinations in the Americas, updated December 22, 2022, at https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp. Notes: *Total LAC includes all independent countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) but not overseas territories. Peru revised its official COVID-19 death toll in May 2021 to account for excess deaths attributed to COVID-19 not previously counted. Political Situation Electoral Practices In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes (ideologically on both the left and the right) governed 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries. Today, observers consider four countries in the region— Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and most recently Haiti—to be ruled by authoritarian governments Congressional Research Service 4 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress or to be not free because of their poor records on political rights and civil liberties.10 Most governments in the region are elected democracies. Nevertheless, although free and fair elections have become the norm in Latin America and the Caribbean, elections for head of government at times have been controversial and contested. In 2021, six Latin American and Caribbean countries held successful free and fair elections for head of government. Ecuador held two presidential rounds in February and April, electing center-right candidate Guillermo Lasso, inaugurated in May.11 Peru held two president rounds in April and June; in a close election, Peru’s national electoral court ultimately declared far-left candidate Pedro Castillo the winner in July. St. Lucia held parliamentary elections in July in which Philip Pierre of the opposition center-left St. Lucia Labour Party became prime minister in a landslide election, ousting the conservative United Workers Party of Allen Chastanet from power after one term. The Bahamas held parliamentary elections in September in which the opposition center-left Progressive Liberal Party, led by Philip Davis, ousted the ruling center-right Free National Movement of the outgoing prime minister in a landslide. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro of the leftist Liberty and Re-foundation Party won a decisive victory in presidential elections in November, alleviating concerns expressed prior to the election that a close race could be marred by a lack of transparency or fraud allegations, as occurred in 2017. In Chile, leftist and former student leader Gabriel Boric won a decisive victory in a second presidential round held in December. The November 2021 presidential race in Nicaragua was the regional exception to free and fair elections for head of state in 2021. Ahead of the election, the government of President Daniel Ortega escalated repression by arresting opposition figures and banning major opposition parties from participating in the race, in which Ortega claimed victory for a fifth (and fourth consecutive) term. Latin America and the Caribbean: In 2022, seven Latin American and Caribbean 2022 Elections countries held free and fair elections. Barbados held successful elections for head of Barbados January 19 government in January, in which Prime Minister Costa Rica February 6 / April 3 Mia Mottley won a second term, with her Colombia May 29 / June 19 center-left Barbados Labour Party winning all Grenada June 23 30 seats in the House of Assembly. Costa Rica St. Kitts and Nevis August 5 had completed two presidential rounds by April, Brazil Oct. 2 / Oct. 30 electing Rodrigo Chaves of the center-right 12 Dominica December 6 Social Democratic Progress Party. Colombia elected leftist candidate Gustavo Petro, who led Notes: Elections for head of government. Includes a coalition of leftist parties and became first and potential second rounds for presidential Colombia’s first leftist president.13 In summer elections. 2022, two Caribbean countries held elections in which incumbent parties were ousted; Grenada elected Dickon Mitchell of the center-left National Democratic Congress in June, and St. Kitts 10 See Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2021, February 2022 (hereinafter, EIU, Democracy Index 2021), which classifies all four governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022, February 2022, which classifies Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free based on their poor records on political rights and civil liberties. 11 See CRS In Focus IF11218, Ecuador: An Overview, by June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin. 12 See CRS In Focus IF10908, Costa Rica: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer. 13 See CRS Insight IN11955, Colombia: Presidential Elections in 2022, by June S. Beittel. Congressional Research Service 5 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress and Nevis elected Terrance Drew of the center-left St. Kitts and Nevis Labour Party in August. In late October 2022, Brazil conducted a second presidential round in which former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the center-left Workers’ Party defeated rightist populist President Jair Bolsonaro. In early December 2022, Dominica held a snap election in which the center-left Dominica Labour Party won its sixth consecutive race, with Roosevelt Skerrit continuing as prime minister, a position he has held since 2004. Candidates and parties from the political left and center-left won all but two elections for head of government in the region in 2021 and 2022. This leftward political shift largely appears to be less about ideology than about the unpopularity of incumbent leaders and parties seeking reelection amid tough economic conditions as countries struggle to recover from the pandemic and contend with increased food and fuel prices and other global economic challenges. In early December 2022, Peru’s Congress impeached President Pedro Castillo and removed him from office after Castillo announced the dissolution of Congress and the instillation of an emergency government to rule by decree. Peru’s Congress swore in Vice President Dina Boluarte as president and subsequently voted to move Peru’s presidential and legislative elections forward two years to April 2024. Decline in Democratic Practices Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean still face considerable challenges. In a number of countries, weaknesses remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency, advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. Numerous elected presidents in the region have left office early amid severe social turmoil, economic crises, or high-profile corruption; in several cases, the presidents’ own autocratic actions contributed to their ousters, as illustrated by the impeachment of Peru’s President Castillo in December 2022. Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises. EIU Democracy Index. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2021 democracy index, issued in February 2022, showed a continuous decline in democratic practices in Latin America since 2017.14 Prior to 2017, the EIU viewed Cuba as the only authoritarian regime in the region. Venezuela joined Cuba’s authoritarian ranks in 2017, as President Nicolás Maduro’s government violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian practices in 2018 under longtime President Ortega, as the government violently repressed protests. The EIU added Haiti to the list of authoritarian governments in the aftermath of the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, which left the country virtually bereft of elected officials functioning at any level. The downward trend in democratic practices accelerated in 2021, according to the EIU, with a particularly sharp decline in the region’s commitment to democratic political culture. This reflects widespread dissatisfaction with governments’ handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, growing skepticism about democratic governments’ ability to address the region’s challenges, and increasing tolerance of authoritarian practices. According to the EIU, the region’s weak commitment to democratic political culture has enabled illiberal populists to thrive, including Presidents Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Despite these and other notable challenges, the EIU noted that 80% of the region’s 14 EIU, Democracy Index 2021. Congressional Research Service 6 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress population lived under democratic regimes, scoring below only Western Europe and North America.15 Freedom House. Freedom House cited Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as not free in its annual report assessing political rights and civil liberties worldwide in 2021. The report highlighted concerns about Cuba’s repression against peaceful protestors in July 2021, Nicaragua’s jailing of major opposition candidates to ensure the noncompetitive reelection of President Ortega, and the Venezuelan government’s prioritization of political power over the population’s well-being. Freedom House also raised concerns about El Salvador’s decline under President Bukele and the normalization of claims of fraud by President Bolsonaro in Brazil. According to Freedom House, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti were among the countries worldwide with the most significant deteriorations in political rights and civil liberties.16 Decline in the Quality of and Satisfaction with Democracy. Public satisfaction with how democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, the percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries averaged 39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level since the poll began in 2004.17 In the 2021 AmericasBarometer Survey, satisfaction with democracy increased marginally to 43% among 20 countries in the region, still far lower than in 2012, when 57% of the region expressed satisfaction with democracy.18 Several broad political and economic factors appear to be driving the decline in satisfaction with democracy in the region. Political factors include an increase in authoritarian practices, weak democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, corruption, high levels of crime and violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence state institutions. Economic factors include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates; high levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries; increased poverty; and the inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and advancement opportunities, along with the increased precarity of the region’s previously expanding middle class. Given these trends, the eruption of social protests in many countries throughout the region in 2019 was unsurprising to many observers, though unique circumstances sparked unrest in each country. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated many of these challenges, contributing to increased protests in the region since late 2020. Regional economic decline, along with difficult security and political conditions, also has helped fuel increased migration, especially from Central America, but also from other countries, including Haitians who had migrated to South America in the aftermath of the country’s 2010 earthquake and Venezuelans who had settled in countries throughout the region since 2015. Economic Situation The COVID-19 pandemic took a significant toll on Latin American and Caribbean economies. Even before the onset of the pandemic and its economic effects, the region had experienced 15 Ibid. 16 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2021, March 2021. 17 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019. 18 Noam Lupu, Mariana Rodríguez, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds., LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt University, LAPOP, 2021. Congressional Research Service 7 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress several years of slow economic growth. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported a 7.0% economic contraction for the region in 2020. Caribbean nations that depend on tourism had deep economic recessions, many with gross domestic product declines of 10% of more in 2020.19 Most of the region’s countries began some economic recovery in 2021, with the IMF estimating a regional growth rate of 6.9% for the year, ahead of world economic output. The IMF projects 3.5% growth for 2022, still ahead of projected world output. For 2023, the IMF projects that regional growth in Latin America and the Caribbean will slow to 1.7%, about one percentage point behind projected world growth (see Table 2). Major economic challenges to the regional and world economies include the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has led to increased energy and food prices; persistent and broadening inflation pressures; and China’s economic slowdown.20 A number of Latin American and Caribbean countries implemented stimulus programs to help protect their economies and vulnerable populations during the pandemic. Recognizing that many countries required external financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic downturn, international financial institutions increased lending to countries throughout the region. An important factor in the region’s economic recovery in 2021 was the availability and distribution of vaccines. Table 2. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2019-2023 Projection (annual percentage change, constant prices) Regional Average, Six Largest Economies, and World Output 2019 2020 2021 2022 Projection 2023 Projection 0.2 -7.0 6.9 3.5 1.7 Brazil 1.2 -3.9 4.6 2.8 1.0 Mexico -0.2 -8.1 4.8 2.1 1.2 Argentina -2.0 -9.9 10.4 4.0 2.0 Chile 0.9 -6.1 11.7 2.0 1.0 Colombia 3.2 -7.0 10.7 7.6 2.2 Peru 2.2 -11.0 13.6 2.7 2.6 World Output 2.8 -3.0 6.0 3.2 2.7 Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022. The decline in economic growth in 2020 exacerbated poverty and income inequality throughout Latin America, with concerns that the region’s past development gains could be set back more than a decade.21 According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), even before the pandemic, the reductions in poverty that the region made from 2002 through 2014 had begun to erode. Overall poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% of the region’s population in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014 but crept up slowly to 30.4% in 2019, influenced by several years of slow growth. With the pandemic-related economic recession 19 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October 2022. 20 Ibid. 21 Michael Stott, “Poverty Surge Set Latin America Back over a Decade, Says UN,” Financial Times, March 4, 2021. Congressional Research Service 8 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress experienced by most countries in the region in 2020, poverty increased to 32.8%. This accounted for an estimated 203 million people—an increase of 17 million people in poverty from 2019 to 2020. With economic growth rates increasing in 2021 and 2022, poverty declined slightly to 32.3% in 2021 and 32.1% in 2022 and the estimated number of people living in poverty declined to 201 million.22 According to ECLAC, however, extreme poverty in Latin America increased from 11.4% of the population in 2019 to 13.1% in 2020, dipped to 12.9% in 2021, and increased again to 13.1% in 2022, with an estimated 82 million in extreme poverty in 2022 (up from 70 million in 2019).23 Poverty and extreme poverty, according to ECLAC, were estimated to be highest in rural areas as well as among working-age women, Indigenous people, Afro-descendant populations, children and adolescents, people with less education, and single-parent and extended households. The sharp fall in labor income was the main factor in increasing poverty and extreme poverty in Latin America during the pandemic. ECLAC notes, however, that government transfers to vulnerable populations helped partially offset the fall in income in the region and that poverty figures would have reached higher levels without such transfers.24 U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political, security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages between the United States and the region, and the United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. In addition, the Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both authorized and irregular; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration trends. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for over 50 years. The flow of illicit drugs—including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine from Colombia—poses risks to U.S. public health and safety, and the trafficking of such drugs has contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States as well in Latin America and the Caribbean. Since 2000, Colombia has received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other countries in the region to combat drug trafficking and related violence and to advance citizen security. These efforts include the Mérida Initiative, begun in 2007 to support Mexico; the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), begun in 2008; and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), begun in 2009. Another long-standing component of U.S. policy, particularly since the end of the Cold War, has been support for strengthened democratic governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in the region have made enormous strides in terms of 22 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2022, November 2022. The study examines poverty and extreme poverty in 18 Latin American countries. 23 Ibid. ECLAC estimates extreme poverty rates based on the cost of the basic food basket in each country, with the monthly costs of the basic food basket known as the “extreme poverty line.” See ECLAC, “ECLAC Statistical Briefings, No. 4, Subnational Poverty Estimates for Latin America,” December 2021. 24 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022. Congressional Research Service 9 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress democratic political development, several face considerable challenges. Current U.S.-democracy promotion efforts include initiatives aimed at strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights. Trump Administration Policy Under the Trump Administration, the United States took a more confrontational approach to relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, especially regarding efforts to curb irregular immigration from the region, compared to previous U.S. Administrations’ emphasis on partnership. In 2018, the State Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on three pillars for engagement—economic growth and prosperity, security, and democratic governance. The framework reflected continuity with long-standing regional U.S. policy priorities but at times appeared to be at odds with the Administration’s occasionally antagonistic actions and statements on immigration, trade, and foreign aid. In 2020, the White House also set forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere that included the prevention of illegal and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and trafficking as its first line of effort in the region.25 According to Gallup and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. leadership in the region increased markedly during the Trump Administration.26 On trade issues, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA in 2017. As negotiated in 2015 by 12 Asia-Pacific countries, the TPP would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Chile, Mexico, and Peru, which were parties to the agreement. The President also strongly criticized the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, threatened U.S. withdrawal, and initiated renegotiations. The three countries agreed in 2018 to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many of NAFTA’s provisions but included modernizing updates and changes. Before approval, the agreement was amended to address congressional concerns regarding labor, the environment, dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights. From FY2018 to FY2021, the Trump Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the region would have cut assistance considerably, but Congress rejected those proposals by providing significantly more assistance than requested. In 2019, the Trump Administration withheld some assistance to the “Northern Triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—in an attempt to compel their governments to curb the flow of migrants to the United States. Perhaps no issue dominated Trump Administration policy toward the region as much as migration, which tested U.S. relations with Mexico and Central America. In 2017, the Administration announced it would end Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a program begun in 2012 that provides relief from deportation for certain immigrants who arrived as children; federal court challenges led to a June 2020 Supreme Court decision vacating the Administration’s recession of DACA. The Administration also announced in 2017 that it would terminate temporary protected status (TPS) designations for Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court challenges put the terminations on hold. In 2018, Mexico’s president 25 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020; and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miami Herald, August 16, 2020. 26 Gallup, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; and Pew Research Center, “Trump Ratings Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay Mostly Favorable,” January 8, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress agreed to allow the United States to return certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions. The Trump Administration used various policy tools intended to deter increased unauthorized migration from Central America. In addition to aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on remittances, these tools included asylum cooperative agreements with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third countries to the Northern Triangle countries. At the end of 2020, Congress enacted the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (P.L. 116-260; Division FF, Title III, Subtitle F), requiring the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. As democratic conditions in Venezuela deteriorated under President Maduro, the Trump Administration imposed numerous broad financial sanctions, including sanctions against the state oil company, the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. The Administration also provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who fled to other countries, especially Colombia, and for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. Congress largely supported the Administration’s policy approach toward Venezuela; in December 2019, it enacted the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-94, Division J), which, among its provisions, codified several sanctions and authorized humanitarian assistance. On Cuba, the Trump Administration reversed the engagement policy advanced during the Obama Administration and imposed numerous economic sanctions on Cuba for its poor human rights record and its support for the Maduro government in Venezuela. In January 2021, the Secretary of State designated the Cuban government as a state sponsor of international terrorism. On climate change issues, in June 2017, President Trump announced his intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, an international accord to address climate change. Withdrawal took effect in November 2020.27 Securing a clean energy future had been a key priority in U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean under the Obama Administration.28 Biden Administration Policy During the 2020 election campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that his policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean would be very different from the Trump Administration’s approach. The Biden Administration’s early broad foreign policy objectives and outlook for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean appeared in its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, issued by the White House in March 2021. The interim guidance, which provided broad foreign policy direction to U.S. agencies and departments, maintained that the Biden Administration would expand engagement throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with Canada and Mexico, “based on principles of mutual respect and equality and a commitment to economic prosperity, security, human rights, and dignity.” This effort, according to the interim 27 See CRS In Focus IF10668, Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, by Jane A. Leggett. 28 For background on climate change issues in U.S. policy toward Latin America under the Obama Administration, see the section on “Climate Change and Clean Energy“ in CRS Report R43882, Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan. Congressional Research Service 11 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress guidance, included working with Congress to provide Central America with foreign assistance and taking other steps “to address the root causes of human insecurity and irregular migration, including poverty, criminal violence, and corruption.” The guidance also maintained that the Administration would cooperate to confront the regional effects of climate change, and help support good governance and democratic institutions in the region.29 The tone of the Administration’s policy toward the region, which emphasized partnership and engagement, contributed to a surge in positive views of U.S. leadership in the Americas in 2021.30 In October 2022, the Biden Administration issued its National Security Strategy and laid out three broad U.S. priorities for the Western Hemisphere—expanding economic opportunities, strengthening democracy, and building security—priorities that reflected long-standing continuity with U.S. policy for the region. The Administration asserted that no region impacts the United States more than the Western Hemisphere because of strong trade ties, shared democratic traditions, and familial bonds; it maintained that “the security and prosperity of the United States hinges on that of our neighbors.” According to the strategy, the United States has an overriding strategic interest in strengthening collaboration Latin America and the Caribbean through intensified diplomatic engagement with hemispheric partners to preserve economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security.31 In its National Security Strategy, the Biden Administration acknowledged the considerable challenges confronting the Western Hemisphere, remarking that the COVID-19 pandemic and resultant recession exacerbated long-standing structural challenges, fueled political and social unrest, undermined faith in democracy’s ability to deliver, and spurred unprecedented levels of irregular migration. It also noted challenges posed by increased geopolitical and economic volatility and climate change. The Administration vowed to confront these challenges and advance its policy priorities in the region through regular interaction and engagement, multilateral and institutional collaboration, and regional initiatives. In June 2022, the Biden Administration hosted the Ninth Summit of the Americas in Los Angeles, CA. The summit’s official theme was “Building a Sustainable, Resilient, and Equitable Future.”32 President Biden met with heads of government or representatives from 30 countries (excluding Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as the Administration did not invite representatives from these countries). The hemispheric leaders approved political commitments related to health, climate change, clean energy, digital transformation, and democratic governance.33 The Biden Administration also announced several new regional policy initiatives at the summit, including new aid commitments to advance food security in the hemisphere as well as a new framework, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, aimed at mobilizing increased investment, making supply chains more resilient, creating clean energy jobs and energy, and ensuring sustainable and inclusive trade.34 29 White House, President Joseph R. Biden Jr, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf. 30 Gallup, Rating World Leaders: The U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia, 2022. According to the Gallup study, across 19 countries in the region, 52% approved of U.S. leadership and 32% disapproved. This was a reverse image of 2020, when Gallup polling showed 52% disapproved of U.S. leadership and 34% approved. 31 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf. 32 Ibid. 33 For background, see CRS Insight IN11934, 2022 Summit of the Americas, by Peter J. Meyer. 34 White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Commitments to Advance Food Security in the Western Hemisphere,” and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces the Americas Partnership for Economic Congressional Research Service 12 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Policy analysts offered mixed assessments of the summit. Some asserted that U.S. initiatives were modest and not fully developed, whereas others emphasized that the summit prompted pragmatic steps on shared challenges that could portend stronger regional partnerships on such key issues as health, migration, climate change, and economic recovery.35 The following areas discussed below—COVID-19 and health security, migration, climate change, and democracy—highlight some of the Biden Administration’s key policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. COVID-19 and Health Security. At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the Administration launched a partnership with PAHO to establish an Americas Health Corps that would provide training to 500,000 public health, health science, and medical professionals throughout the region.36 The initiative is aimed at supporting implementation of an Action Plan on Health and Resilience in the Americas, agreed to at the summit. The action plan focuses on addressing the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic in the region and strengthening the capacity and resilience of the region’s health systems to address future infectious disease outbreaks. Through mid-2022, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had provided more than $539 million for the COVID-19 response in the region. As noted, as of early December 2022, the United States had donated over 70 million COVID-19 vaccine doses to 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries, both bilaterally and through the COVAX Facility.37 Migration. Also at the June 2022 summit, the Biden Administration joined with 20 other hemispheric countries to endorse the Los Angeles Declaration for Migration and Protection. The agreement seeks to mobilize the region around actions to create conditions for safe, orderly, humane, and regular migration, and to strengthen frameworks for international protection and cooperation.38 Much of the Administration’s attention to the region in early 2021 focused on immigration from Central America. By July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and to collaboratively manage migration in the region. The Administration subsequently broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven economic downturn contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere. In October 2021, the United States participated in a migration ministerial in Colombia to address regional cooperation regarding irregular migration, which essentially was a precursor to the Los Angeles Declaration. In October 2022, the United States participated in a ministerial in Peru on the Los Angeles Declaration and announced new U.S. commitments in humanitarian and security assistance to address the immediate drivers and root Prosperity,” June 8, 2022. 35 See, for example, Oliver Stuenkel, Shannon K. O’Neil, Andrés Rozental, and Juan Battaleme, “A Region Divided: What Did the Summit of the Americas Accomplish? Global Memo by FGV, CFR, COMEXI, and CARI,” Council of Councils, June 10, 2022, at https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global-memos/region-divided-what-did-summitamericas-accomplish; and Ralph Espach, “What Did the Summit of the Americas Accomplish?,” Center for Naval Analyses, June 27, 2022, at https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2022/06/summit-of-the-americas-in-review. 36 White House, “Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Announces Action on COVID-19 Pandemic Response and Improving Health Systems and Health Security in the Americas,” June 8, 2022. 37 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “COVID-19-Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #5, FY2022, June 30, 2022; and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated December 6, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/. 38 White House, “Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” June 10, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-declaration-on-migration-andprotection/. Congressional Research Service 13 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress causes of irregular migration. Also in October 2022, the Administration announced new policies, coordinated with Mexico, to address the large number of Venezuelans arriving without visas at the U.S. Southwest border.39 (Also see “Migration Issues,” below.) Climate Change. The Biden Administration reincorporated climate change concerns into the U.S. policy approach toward Latin America and the Caribbean.40 The Administration invited seven Latin American and Caribbean heads of government to attend the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit on Climate.41 The summit sought to build support among the world’s leading economies to adopt more ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in advance of the 2021 U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26). In September 2021, Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry participated in a virtual High-Level Dialogue on Climate Action in the Americas hosted by Argentina designed to build momentum for climate action in the region ahead of COP26. Among the climate change actions taken at the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the Administration announced a new U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030) aimed at supporting climate adaptation, strengthening energy security, and building resilience for critical infrastructure and local economies.42 The National Security Strategy issued in October 2022 maintains the Administration will use mitigation and adaptation efforts to fuel a sustainable economic recovery and protect forest ecosystems, including by promoting trade and investment in clean energy and mobilizing financing and other support for conservation of the Amazon.43 At the November 2022 27th Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States announced several new initiatives on climate change; these initiatives included engagement and technical support for climate resilience and sustainable development in small island developing states in the Caribbean (and Pacific) and expanded access to risk-based insurance to protect vulnerable people in the Caribbean and Central America (as well as Africa and the Pacific).44 Democracy. In its first year, the Biden Administration set forth its broad foreign policy priority of renewing democracy to counter rising authoritarianism and nationalism around the world. In Latin America and the Caribbean, this priority has included working with partners to promote democracy in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, as well as broader efforts in other countries to reinforce democracy and combat corruption, which undermines citizens’ trust in government.45 39 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces New Migration Enforcement Process for Venezuelans,” October 12, 2022. 40 Under the Biden Administration, the United States also rejoined the Paris Agreement in February 2021, reversing the Trump Administration’s withdrawal of the United States from the agreement. See CRS In Focus IF11746, United States Rejoins the Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Options for Congress, by Jane A. Leggett. 41 The seven leaders were from Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico. 42 White House, “Fact Sheet: Vice President Harris Launches the U.S.-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 (PACC 2030),” June 9, 2022. 43 White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022. 44 White House, “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces New Initiatives at COP27 to Strengthen U.S. Leadership in Tackling Climate Change,” November 11, 2022. 45 See U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” speech, March 3, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/; and U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities For Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 16, 2021, Serial No. 117-90 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2022). Congressional Research Service 14 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Secretary of State Blinken addressed concerns about the state of democracy in the Americas during an October 2021 visit to Ecuador. He noted how the pandemic had exacerbated economic inequities in the region and contributed to an increase in dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. Blinken focused his remarks on three major challenges and approaches to help make democracy work: (1) more effectively fight corruption by strengthening existing, and developing new, anti-corruption tools; (2) improve civilian security by taking a more holistic approach that deals with the root causes of crime and violence; and (3) tackle economic and social challenges such as by bolstering labor standards, expanding access to adequate education and health, and providing more inclusive opportunities.46 President Biden highlighted many of those same themes, as well as the need to defend against authoritarianism and respect human rights, during the December 2021 global Summit for Democracy, in which 25 governments from Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as various civil society activists, were invited to participate virtually. 47 At the June 2022 Summit of the Americas, the hemisphere’s leaders adopted a range of commitments to promote democracy, good governance, and human rights. The Biden Administration announced an initiative to protect, defend, and promote civic space in Central America and new commitments to support civil society and promote independent media and information integrity.48 On the Venezuela policy challenge, the Biden Administration is continuing to pressure the Maduro government through economic sanctions and providing humanitarian support to Venezuelans both inside and outside the country. The Administration supported negotiations between the Venezuelan opposition and the Maduro government; after such negotiations resumed in November 2022, the Administration issued a license for a U.S. oil company to resume some operations in Venezuela, although further sanctions relief may depend upon the results of such negotiations. (See “Venezuela,” below.) On Nicaragua, the Administration has used targeted sanctions and broad sanctions against the gold sector in response to the antidemocratic actions of the Ortega government. The Administration has also worked multilaterally to increase international pressure against the Nicaraguan government, including at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations. (See “Nicaragua,” below.) On Cuba, the Biden Administration in its initial months announced it would review policy decisions made in the prior Administration, including the decision to designate Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.49 Since Cuba’s harsh response to street protests in 2021, the Administration has imposed several rounds of targeted sanctions against Cubans officials involved in the government’s repression. In May 2022, the Administration announced several policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban people, which included facilitating family reunification and easing some U.S. restrictions on travel and remittances. (See “Cuba,” below.) 46 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, “Making Democracy Deliver for the Americas,” speech, October 20, 2021. 47 White House, “Summit for Democracy Summary of Proceedings,” December 23, 2021. The eight Latin American and Caribbean countries not invited to the summit were Bolivia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 48 White House, “Fact Sheet: Bien Harris Administration Advances Democratic Renewal Agenda at the Ninth Summit of the Americas,” June 7, 2022. 49 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council Bharat Ramamurti,” March 9, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Since mid-2021, the situation in Haiti—with a presidential assassination, a surge in gang violence, and an earthquake—has provided considerable challenges for the Biden Administration. In October 2022, in light of increased violence by criminal gangs and deteriorating health conditions that have included a cholera outbreak, the United States worked with Canada to coordinate the delivery of equipment to the Haitian National Police with the goal of strengthening the force’s ability to stem gang violence and permit the flow of humanitarian assistance. The Administration has supported efforts to secure a U.N. Security Council resolution to create a multinational force to address Haiti’s security situation, cholera outbreak, and food insecurity.50 (See “Haiti,” below.) Legislative Action in the 117th Congress Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap, particularly in the areas of immigration and trade. Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions Since 2020, Congress has appropriated some $17 billion in international affairs funding to respond to COVID-19 globally. In the 117th Congress, this funding included $10.8 billion appropriated in the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), enacted in March 2021. The funding has supported contributions to multilateral efforts and health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and donation of COVID-19 vaccine doses worldwide, including to Latin America and the Caribbean. In November 2021, Congress completed action on the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform Act of 2021, or the RENACER Act (P.L. 117-54). Among its provisions, the measure directed the U.S. government to use its diplomatic tools and targeted sanctions to advance democratic elections and combat corruption. Prior to the bill’s passage, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs had ordered reported a similar, although not identical, measure (H.R. 2946) in July 2021, and the Senate had approved S. 1041, amended, in August 2021. In December 2021, Congress completed action on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), which contained several provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean, including    Section 1007 extended authority to support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia. Section 1035 extended a prohibition on the use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Section 1205 provided temporary authority to obligate or expend not more than $2 million in FY2022 to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security forces participating in the training program of the United SatesColombia Action Plan for Regional Security. 50 U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, “The Secretary’s Upcoming Travel to Canada,” October 26, 2022. Congressional Research Service 16 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress  Section 1206 required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a security cooperation strategy for certain combatant commands, including the U.S. Southern Command.  Section 1336 extended a certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles by the Department of Defense (DOD) to Guatemala during FY2022 and required a series of reports (by the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller General, and a federally funded research and development center) on U.S. security cooperation with the Northern Triangle countries. Section 1337 required a report, within 180 days, from the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State on the security cooperation relationship between the United States and Colombia and activities focused on human rights and the rule of law.   Section 1338 required a report by June 30, 2022, from the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and in consultation with the heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies, on efforts by China to expand its presence and influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. In March 2022, Congress completed action on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (or FY2022 SFOPS legislation), included as Division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103). Although the law and its explanatory statement did not specify total funding for Latin America and the Caribbean, they included funding directives for several key countries (Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Venezuela) and regional programs for the Caribbean and Central America and included numerous reporting requirements; ultimately the State Department allocated over $2 billion in assistance for the region (see “U.S. Foreign Aid”). P.L. 117-103 also included, as Division V, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, to promote the sustainable rebuilding and development of Haiti and the prioritization of U.S. support for anti-corruption efforts and human rights. In December 2022, Congress approved the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (P.L. 117-263, H.R. 7776; hereinafter referred to as the FY2023 NDAA). The FY2023 NDAA, which was signed into law on December 23, 2022, included with several provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean:      Section 1011 extended through 2025 authority to support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign in Colombia. The provision also required an annual report assessing the threat to Colombia from narcotics trafficking and designated foreign terrorist organizations. Section 1034 extended a prohibition through FY2023 on the use of funds to close or relinquish control of the U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Section 1069 required a DOD report within one year on the U.S. military posture and capabilities in the Caribbean Basin, particularly in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Section 1070 required DOD quarterly briefings for the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services on Department of Defense support for civil authorities to address immigration at the Southwest border. Section 1201 codifies the temporary authority in the FY2022 NDAA (Section 1205) to pay for travel and subsistence expenses of foreign national security Congressional Research Service 17 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress      forces participating in the training program of the United Sates-Colombia Action Plan for Regional Security. Section 5598 required the President to submit a report within 180 days on bilateral security and law enforcement cooperation with Mexico. Sections 5541-5550, the United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 expressed the sense of Congress that the United States should take steps to strengthen bilateral relations. Among its provisions, the act required the development and implementation of strategies and other measures to facilitate commercial and economic ties, foster inclusive economic development across Ecuador, combat illicit economies, corruption, and negative foreign influence, strengthen democratic governance, and foster conservation and stewardship. Similar bills had been reported in the Senate (S. 3591) and introduced in the House (H.R. 8711.) Section 6805 required, within 90 days, a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) assessment and report on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere regarding (1) threats to U.S. interests and (2) the use, or threat of using, mass migration by Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela to diminish domestic dissent and increase remittances from migrants in the United States. Section 11203 required the Commandant of the Coast Guard to conduct a study and issue a report within two years on threats to national security, drug trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean region, including Cuba. Several provisions relate to the influence of China and Russia in Latin America and the Caribbean. Section 1259 required the Secretary of State to conduct a review and issue a report, within one year, on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) port and port-related infrastructure purchases and investments globally that are critical to U.S. interests and national security. Section 6524 required a DNI report, within 180 days, on the activities undertaken by China and Russia to increase their influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Section 6526 required a DNI report, within 180 days, on Chinese financing of port infrastructure globally. In December 2022, Congress completed action on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act 2023 (FY2023 SFOPS legislation), included as Division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617). The legislation and its explanatory statement designated more funding than requested for Colombia, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, and the Inter-American Foundation; directed funding to various initiatives and objectives throughout the region; placed conditions on some assistance to Central America, Colombia, and Haiti; and included numerous reporting requirements. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid” as well as country and subregional sections below.) In the 117th Congress, the House and Senate approved several resolutions on U.S. relations with the region. On the human rights situation in Cuba, the House approved H.Res. 760 in November 2021 and the Senate approved four resolutions (S.Res. 37, S.Res. 81, S.Res. 310, and S.Res. 489) from April 2021 to January 2022. Among other resolutions, the Senate passed S.Res. 22 in April 2021, reaffirming the U.S. partnership with Ecuador; S.Res. 120 in May 2021, recognizing the Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to a more prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere; S.Res. 753 in September 2022, expressing support for “free, fair, credible, transparent, and peaceful” elections in Brazil; and S.Res. 472 in December 2022, reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the Dominican Republic. In July Congressional Research Service 18 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress 2022, the House approved H.Res. 1168, urging the President to prioritize and implement trade programs with the Caribbean region that promote sustainable and resilient economic development. Additional Congressional Action In other unfinished congressional action in the 117th Congress, the House approved H.R. 6 in March 2021, which would have provided a pathway to citizenship for those brought to the United States as children and those from countries with TPS designations. In July 2021, the Senate approved S. 2045, which would have renamed the street in front of the Cuban Embassy after a Cuban democracy activist. In April 2022, the House passed H.R. 4133, which would have authorized Caribbean Basin Security Initiative assistance from FY2022 through FY2026 and established monitoring and reporting requirements for the program. The Senate and House separately approved broad bills aimed at positioning the United States to better compete with China, both of which included numerous provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean.51 The Senate approved S. 1260, the United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021, in June 2021, and the House approved H.R. 4521, the America COMPETES Act of 2022, in February 2022. In March 2022, the Senate approved H.R. 4521, substituting the language of S. 1260, and the measure went to conference in April 2022. Ultimately, many provisions, including those on Latin America and the Caribbean, were not included in a narrower legislative vehicle signed into law in August 2022 (P.L. 117-167) aimed at supporting the semiconductor industry, boosting renewable energy industries, and addressing climate change. Both House and Senate versions of H.R. 4521 would have required a strategy to strengthen U.S. economic competitiveness and promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean; required a report assessing China’s engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in Latin America and the Caribbean; support U.S. defense cooperation in the region; and increased U.S. engagement with civil society in the region regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. The Senate version also would have required a strategy to increase exports of U.S. goods and services to Latin America and the Caribbean and would have authorized a capital increase for the InterAmerican Development Bank. The House version also would have increased U.S. engagement with the Caribbean on energy issues and disaster resilience; required a strategy to expand U.S. educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America and the Caribbean region (and a report on China’s related activity in the region); and required reports on major Chinese infrastructure investments in Latin America and the Caribbean and on multilateral efforts to address Latin American fentanyl trafficking, including efforts between China and Latin America to combat such trafficking. Regional U.S. Policy Issues U.S. Foreign Aid The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to support development and other U.S. objectives. The COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased economic and development challenges in the region. As noted, the Latin American and Caribbean 51 For background, see CRS In Focus IF10982, China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, by Mark P. Sullivan and Thomas Lum. Congressional Research Service 19 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress economy as a whole contracted by 7.0% in 2020.52 Although the region began to recover in 2021, with 6.9% GDP growth, Latin America’s extreme poverty rate nevertheless was 12.9%, with an estimated 81 million people unable to satisfy basic nutritional requirements.53 Moreover, nearly 61% of individuals surveyed in the region in 2021 asserted that their personal economic situations were worse than they had been a year earlier.54 This deterioration in living conditions has contributed to political unrest and large-scale migration flows throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.55 The Biden Administration requested more than $2.4 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2023, which (in current dollars) is more funding than the region has received in any single year in more than a decade. This total included a proposed $369.9 million (18.2%) increase in State Department- and USAID-managed funding for the region, compared with the FY2022 estimated level (see Table 3). The Administration’s FY2023 budget request also included $38.0 million for the Inter-American Foundation (IAF)—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that supports community-led development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2023 Request (billions of U.S. dollars) 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 (est.) 2023 (req.) 1.69 1.67 1.67a 1.69 1.72b 1.79b 2.04 2.41 Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2023; and U.S. Department of State, “FY2022 Estimate Data,” August 16, 2022. Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary contributions to the Organization of American States. a. Final FY2018 allocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 million of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating some of those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region. b. The FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include supplemental COVID-19 assistance. Much of the increased funding for the region was requested to support continued implementation of the Administration’s four-year, $4 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of irregular migration from Central America. The FY2023 request included $986.8 million for bilateral and regional programs in the seven countries of Central America, which is $282.8 million (41.8%) more than the estimated amount allocated to the subregion in FY2022.56 The Administration also sought increased funding for Haiti to help the country restore democratic institutions, address the deteriorating security situation, and foster stability in the aftermath of the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and recurrent natural disasters. The FY2023 52 IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 2022. 53 Ibid; and ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2022, November 2022, pp. 56-57. 54 Vanderbilt University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), “LAPOP Data Playground,” accessed September 22, 2022. 55 Moisés Naím, “Why Hard-Liners Are Gaining Steam in Latin America,” Politico Magazine, July 12, 2022; and Michael Stott, “Repression and Poverty Trigger Record Migration in the Americas,” Financial Times, September 11, 2022. 56 $27.8 million of the $986.8 million requested for Central America would be provided through global accounts that are not included in the regional total for the Western Hemisphere. This comparison between the FY2022 estimate and FY2023 request excludes assistance requested for Central America through global accounts, since FY2022 estimate data for such assistance is not available. Congressional Research Service 20 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress request included $274.8 million for Haiti, which is $55.6 million (25.4%) above the FY2022 estimate. With regard to other regional priorities in FY2023, the Administration requested $462.9 million to support counternarcotic efforts, peace accord implementation, and rural security and development in Colombia; $141.6 million to strengthen the rule of law in Mexico; $63.5 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative; and $55.0 million for democracy, human rights, and health activities in Venezuela. Congressional Action. In March 2021, Congress enacted the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), which provided $10.8 billion to respond to COVID-19 globally, including through health interventions, humanitarian assistance, and contributions to multilateral response efforts. That funding built on nearly $6.3 billion appropriated during the 116th Congress to support global vaccine procurement and delivery and other pandemic-related foreign assistance programs. As of June 2022, USAID had provided the region with at least $539.0 million of supplemental pandemic response aid. As of late December 2022, the United States had provided Latin American and Caribbean countries with more than 70 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines.57 Congress concluded action on FY2022 appropriations approximately halfway through the fiscal year. The House passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84; also known as the SFOPS bill), in July 2021, and an SFOPS bill (S. 3075) was introduced in the Senate in October 2021, but neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-95) that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when President Biden signed into law the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K). The act and accompanying explanatory statement did not specify a total foreign assistance amount for Latin America and Caribbean; however, the State Department has allocated more than $2.0 billion to the region.58 Congress concluded action on FY2023 appropriations on December 23, 2022, when it approved the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617), with FY2023 SFOPS appropriations legislation included as Division K. Although the House Appropriations Committee reported its SFOPS bill (H.R. 8282/H.Rept. 117-401) and Senator Coons introduced a separate SFOPS bill in the Senate (S. 4662) in July 2022, Congress did not take further action on either bill. Instead, before approving the FY2023 omnibus appropriations measure, Congress approved three continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-180, P.L. 117-229, and P.L. 117-264), which funded most foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2022 level from October 1, 2022, to December 30, 2022. The FY2023 SFOPS appropriations legislation and its accompanying explanatory statement do not specify a comprehensive appropriations total for Latin America and the Caribbean. They do not specify comprehensive appropriations levels for top Administration funding priorities, including Central America, Haiti, and Mexico. Nevertheless, the act and the explanatory statement designate more funding than the Administration requested for Colombia ($487.4 million), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative ($82.5 million), and the IAF ($47 million). They also place conditions on some aid to Central America, Colombia, and Haiti, and direct funding to various initiatives and objectives throughout the region. For additional information, see CRS Report R47331, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2023 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R47070, Department 57 USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean,” Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year 2022, June 30, 2022, and U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations, Western Hemisphere,” updated November 8, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-deliveries/#wha. 58 U.S. Department of State, FY2022 estimate data, August 16, 2022. Congressional Research Service 21 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2023 Budget and Appropriations, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Cory R. Gill; and CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer. Migration Issues Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and relations between the governments of those countries and the United States. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of individuals who have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the DACA initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum-seekers.59 The Trump Administration implemented many executive changes to immigration policy; the Biden Administration revised some, but not all, of these policies. The Trump Administration’s rhetoric, tariff threats, foreign aid cuts, and restrictive immigration policies tested relations with many countries in the region, and particularly with Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries. The Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras (those terminations are facing legal challenges),60 rescinded DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be vacated,61 and restricted access to asylum.62 In January 2019, the Trump Administration launched the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that required many migrants and asylum-seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. The Administration also signed what it termed asylum cooperative agreements (ACAs) with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras; these agreements would allow the United States to transfer certain asylum-seekers who arrive at a U.S. border to Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras to apply for asylum in one of those countries. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began to implement the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019 but suspended implementation in March 2020. DHS finalized ACAs with El Salvador and Honduras in late 2020, but never implemented them. The factors that drive U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and some have changed over time. These factors include poverty and unemployment; political and economic instability; crime and violence; natural disasters, climate change, and food insecurity; relatively close proximity to the United States; familial ties in the United States; and relatively attractive U.S. economic conditions. The economic and social effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with ongoing turmoil in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba and Haiti, have prompted increased migration from those and other countries in the region. Migrant apprehensions at the Southwest border reached a 45-year low in 2017 but began to rise in FY2019, with increasing numbers of unaccompanied children and families from the Northern 59 Temporary protected status (TPS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the United States. TPS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in 2010. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative the Obama Administration implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present individuals who arrived in the United States as children. 60 As legal challenges to the termination of TPS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of TPS documents for current beneficiaries through December 31, 2022. 61 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020). 62 CRS Report R46755, The Law of Asylum Procedure at the Border: Statutes and Agency Implementation. Congressional Research Service 22 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, comprising a majority of apprehensions. In FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.63 In response to the pandemic, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention issued an order to restrict travel across land ports of entry, known as Title 42, for the part of the U.S. Code it falls under. DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented the policy, which initially suspended asylum processing for those subject to Title 42. As a result, most migrants without valid travel documents were expelled into Mexico or returned to their home countries as quickly as possible. In FY2021, border enforcement encounters (apprehensions and expulsions) reached a record 1.7 million at the Southwest border, although that total included individuals expelled into Mexico more than once. Migrant origins also expanded beyond Mexico and Central America to include South American countries and the Caribbean.64 In FY2022, border encounters at the Southwest border reached nearly 2.4 million for the first time, with large increases in migration from Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.65 The Biden Administration initially introduced a comprehensive immigration agenda that included a focus on addressing unauthorized immigration from Central America. President Biden took executive actions revising some of the Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies but maintained certain COVID-19-related immigration restrictions while contending with a large increase in the number of Central American and Mexican migrants seeking to enter the United States at the Southwest border. In March 2021, the Administration designated Venezuela for TPS (and in September 2022 extended that designation until March 2024). In July 2021, the Administration released two new strategies to address the underlying causes that push Central Americans to migrate and collaboratively manage migration in the region. Bilateral and regional foreign assistance has sought to address the root causes of migration and to support migration management efforts. After several legal challenges, the Supreme Court ruled in June 2022 that the Biden Administration could terminate the MPP program.66 While the MPP is being phased out, the Administration has continued to use Title 42 authority to expel migrants. On November 15, 2022, a federal court blocked the use of Title 42. The Department of Justice filed an unopposed stay motion to keep Title 42 in place for some period to prepare for an orderly transition to new policies at the border, and a federal judge issued a stay until December 21 2022. On December 19, 2022, however, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts issued an administrative stay order permitting Title 42 to remain in effect and, on December 27, the court voted to keep Title 42 in effect pending a ruling in an ongoing court case.67 63 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.” See explanation of the difference between a Title 8 apprehension under DHS authority and a Title 42 expulsion under Centers for Disease Control and Prevention authority in the notes. 64 CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and William A. Kandel. 65 U.S. CBP, “Nationwide Encounters,” accessed November 2, 20222, at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters. 66 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10420, Supreme Court Grants Stay in MPP Case, by Ben Harrington and Hillel R. Smith. 67 Caroline Downey, “Federal Judge Blocks Use of Title 42 to Expel Migrants on Public-Health Grounds,” National Review, November 16, 2022; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Statement from DHS on Decision Regarding Title 42,” November 15, 2022; Nancy Gimena Huisha-Huisha et al. v. Alejandro Mayorkas, in his official capacity, Secretary of Homeland Security et. al., Civil Action No. 21-100 (United States District Court for the District of Columbia 2022); Joel Rose, “U.S. Supreme Court Extends Border Restrictions Just Before They Were Set to End,” NPR, Morning Edition, December 19, 2022; Rebecca Santana and Elliot Spagat, “Supreme Court Keeps Immigration Limits in Place Indefinitely,” AP, December 27, 2022, and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related Congressional Research Service 23 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress The Administration has broadened its engagement on migration issues as the pandemic-driven economic downturn has contributed to large-scale migrant flows throughout the hemisphere. In June 2022, the Administration announced the Los Angeles Declaration for Migration and Protection at the Summit of the Americas with 20 other Western Hemisphere countries.68 The declaration recognized irregular migration management as a shared responsibility and sought to bolster regional efforts to improve border controls, create legal migration and protection pathways, support migrants and host communities, and coordinate responses to mass migration movements. Several of the signatory countries announced commitments to regularize certain unauthorized populations and to implement or expand temporary worker programs. The Administration announced humanitarian aid to support vulnerable migrants, a commitment to resettle 20,000 refugees from the region in FY2023-FY2024, and the resumption of family reunification parole programs for Haitians and Cubans, among other measures.69 Implementation of the Los Angeles Declaration officially began in September 2022.70 In October 2022, the Administration launched new border enforcement policies aimed to reduce the number of Venezuelans encountered by CBP at the Southwest border. Venezuelans apprehended between ports of entry are subject to the public health-related Title 42 policy, which allows CBP to expel migrants back to Mexico (in coordination with the government of Mexico). At the same time, up to 24,000 Venezuelans who are outside the United States, meet program requirements, and have a financial sponsor in the United States can apply to travel by air to the U.S. interior and be paroled into the country.71 Congressional Action. The 117th Congress did not consider comprehensive immigration measures (S. 348/H.R. 1177), but immigration-related bills saw floor or committee action in one chamber, mainly in the House. These bills would have addressed temporary and permanent immigration, humanitarian admissions, and legalization of unauthorized immigrants, among other issues.72 Congress continued funding and overseeing U.S. assistance to respond to the Venezuela regional migration crisis, address the root causes of migration from Central America, and bolster Mexico’s interdiction and humanitarian protection systems. The FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) requires a DNI assessment and report on mass migration in the Western Hemisphere regarding threats to U.S. interests and the use, or the threat of using, mass migration by Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela to diminish dissent and increase remittances from migrants in the United States. The measure also requires DOD quarterly briefings for the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services on DOD support for civil authorities to address immigration at the Southwest border. For additional information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10874, COVID-Related Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y. Santamaria; CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R47182, International Migration Trends in the Western Hemisphere; CRS Report R47061, Immigration Legislation and Restrictions on Entry into the United States Under Title 42: Litigation and Legal Considerations, by Kelsey Y. Santamaria. 68 The White House, “Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection,” June 10, 2022. 69 The White House, “Fact Sheet: The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection U.S. Government and Foreign Partner Deliverables,” June 10, 2022. 70 The White House, “Readout of Los Angeles Declaration Implementation Launch,” September 27, 2022. 71 See CRS Insight IN12040, New Immigration Policies Related to Venezuelan Migrants, by Audrey Singer, Jill H. Wilson, and Clare Ribando Seelke. 72 See CRS Report R47061, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno. Congressional Research Service 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report R46999, Immigration: Apprehensions and Expulsions at the Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and William A. Kandel; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10798, Supreme Court Rules That Migrant Protection Protocols Rescission Was Not Unlawful, by Hillel R. Smith; CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure, by Jill H. Wilson; and CRS Report R46764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): By the Numbers, by Andorra Bruno. Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the region’s role as a source and/or transit zone for several illicit drugs destined for U.S. markets— cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opioids, including heroin and fentanyl. Traffickers in the region also divert and traffic in precursor chemicals used in illicit drug production. Heroin abuse and synthetic opioid-related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising questions about how to address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that methamphetamine and cocaine overdoses in the United States are rising, with some cocaine overdoses linked to the presence of synthetic opioids. Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market continue to drive drug production in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Over 90% of heroin seized and sampled in the United States comes from Mexico. Opium poppy cultivation and heroin production rose in Mexico from 2012 through 2017 but have since declined, possibly replaced in part by the expansion of illicit fentanyl production of fentanyl. After the Chinese government implemented strict controls on all forms of fentanyl, including fentanyl analogues in mid-2019, Mexico became “the only significant source of illicit fentanyl or fentanyl analogues trafficked to the United States” by 2021.”73 Mexico is also the primary foreign source of methamphetamine encountered in the United States. Estimated coca cultivation and potential cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly 89% of cocaine in the United States, decreased but remained near record levels in 2021.74 Although estimated coca cultivation and production in Peru also fell, estimated coca cultivation and production increased slightly in Bolivia. Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region have worked closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict illicit flows. However, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has scaled back some cooperation and Colombian President Gustavo Petro has criticized past supply-side efforts and urged a new approach to drug policy. In March 2020, the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as Venezuela’s legitimate president), and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. As charged, Maduro allegedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that conspired with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic illicit drugs to the United States. Over the past several years, Maduro government officials have been identified as conspiring with FARC dissidents and National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas operating in Venezuela to smuggle 73 U.S. Department of State, Supplement to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, report to Congress pursuant to Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)), as amended by Section 6610 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81), June 17, 2022. 74 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in the Andean Region,” July 14, 2022. Congressional Research Service 25 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress cocaine and illicit gold.75 President Petro’s restoration of ties with the Maduro government and decriminalization of marijuana and potentially cocaine could strain U.S.-Colombia antidrug efforts, although Secretary Blinken said the countries’ approaches are “largely in sync” during a recent visit to Colombia.76 U.S. antidrug cooperation with Bolivia decreased under former President Evo Morales (2006-2019) and remains limited under his successor, President Luis Arce. The lack of a constitutional government in Haiti and the ongoing political crisis in Nicaragua have hindered antidrug efforts and cooperation with those countries as well. Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American governments, particularly in Mexico, Central America, and Haiti continue to suffer from weak criminal justice systems and law enforcement agencies. Public corruption, including high-level cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs, investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover illicit proceeds. The COVID-19 pandemic lowered violence in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remained elevated in Mexico. Criminal gangs with origins in Southern California, principally the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, urban areas in Guatemala. Gangs have been involved in a range of criminal activities, including local drug distribution, extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and they have used violence to enforce COVID-19-related quarantines. Violent gangs, some tied to politicians and linked to drug traffickers, threaten to overwhelm the de facto government in Haiti, exerting power and control over territory, access to fuel, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. U.S. Policy. For more than 50 years, U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean has focused on countering drug trafficking and reducing drug production in the region. The largest antidrug support program, Plan Colombia, helped the country combat both drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade. U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative with Mexico, CARSI, and the CBSI. Through visa denials and revocations, targeted economic sanctions, and federal criminal investigations and prosecutions, U.S. Administrations also have sought to punish foreign officials and entities complicit with drugs traffickers, gangs, and other criminal groups. The State Department manages several deterrence tools, including multiple visa denial programs targeting foreign drug traffickers, as well programs to offer rewards for information related to significant foreign narcotics traffickers and transnational organized crime. The Biden Administration’s National Drug Control Strategy, released in April 2022, focuses on using data to improve domestic treatment and harm-reduction efforts and disrupting the domestic and international financial activities of transnational criminal organizations, as well as strengthening foreign antidrug partnerships.77 Drug policy efforts complement broader efforts to combat corruption, a core component of the Administration’s national security policy.78 To 75 Douglas Farah, The Maduro Regime’s Illicit Activities: A Threat to Democracy in Venezuela and Security in Latin America, Atlantic Council, August 12, 2020. 76 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Colombian President Gustavo Petro At a Joint Press Availability,” October 3, 2022. 77 The White House, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, April 21, 2022, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/National-Drug-Control-2022Strategy.pdf. 78 The White House, “Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest,” June 3, 2021. Congressional Research Service 26 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress complement those strategies, the Biden Administration is implementing a new Bicentennial Framework for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation that focuses on addressing drugs and violence from a public health perspective, combating transborder crime, and dismantling illicit financial networks. The Administration also announced new “holistic U.S.-Colombia counternarcotics metrics” in May 2022; these metrics could further evolve with new bilateral approaches adopted with the Petro government.79 Future regional drug policy may be further informed by the findings of the congressionally mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, which recommended the State Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual drug certification process with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral priorities.80 Congressional Action. The 117th Congress continued to address drug policy and other crimerelated issues through legislation, foreign assistance, conditions on foreign assistance, and reporting requirements in legislation. Both the FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) and the FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) had several provisions on Colombia, including an extension of authority to support a unified counterdrug and counterterrorism campaign. The FY2023 NDAA added an annual reporting requirement assessing the threat to Colombia from narcotics trafficking and designated foreign terrorist organizations. The FY2023 NDAA also required the President to submit a report on bilateral security and law enforcement cooperation with Mexico and required the Coast Guard to submit a report on threats to national security, drug trafficking, and other relevant threats in the Florida Straits and Caribbean region, including Cuba. With regard to foreign assistance, the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division K) contained counternarcotics conditions on assistance to Colombia for FY2022. The explanatory statement to the measure included several reporting requirements from H.Rept. 11784, such as a review of funds provided through the Mérida Initiative, plans to improve data collection on synthetic drug trafficking, efforts to combat fentanyl flows, and the efficacy of U.S. past drug policy efforts. For FY2023, the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2023 (H.R. 2617, Division K), continued counternarcotics and human rights conditions on assistance to Colombia. Concurrent with the submission of a spend plan for assistance plan for assistance to Colombia, the law required a report detailing Colombia’s counternarcotics strategy and the planned U.S. assistance in support of such strategy. For assistance to Mexico, the law included as priorities security and justice sector capacity building to combat and prosecute transnational criminal organizations and activities to address the flow of illegal opioids into the United States. The explanatory statement also endorsed language in H.Rept. 117-401 supporting State Department efforts to address the flow of illegal opioids into the United States. In addition, the statement required the Secretary of State to submit a report on U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Central and South America, including a review of prior counternarcotics initiatives in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico. For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10578, U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10371, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF12182, Haiti: Political Conflict and U.S. Policy Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke and 79 The White House, “ONDCP Welcomes New Holistic U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Metrics,” May 4, 2022. 80 Report of the Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission, Charting a New Path Forward, December 2020. Congressional Research Service 27 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS Report R46695, The U.S. “Majors List” of Illicit Drug-Producing and Drug-Transit Countries, by Liana W. Rosen. Trade Policy The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the United States’ most important regional trading partners. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading partners in the region remained strong, despite challenges, such as the downturn in economic growth and trade due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the high levels of violence in some countries. The United States accounted for roughly 31% of the region’s merchandise imports and 45% of its merchandise exports in 2021. Most of this trade was with Mexico, which accounted for 76% of U.S. imports from the region and 61% of U.S. exports to the region in 2021. After a 15% decline in total U.S. trade with the region caused by the 2020 global economic downturn, total trade rebounded to 27% growth in 2021. U.S. exports to the region increased 33% in 2021, and imports increased by 22% (see Table 4). The United States has strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the past 28 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994, which was replaced by the USMCA on July 1, 2020, the United States currently has six FTAs in force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru. NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, establishing new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues important to the United States, such as intellectual property rights protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute settlement, investment, labor, and the environment. The United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into NAFTA renegotiations in 2017 and concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30, 2018. The agreement, which entered into force on July 1, 2020, continues most of NAFTA’s market opening provisions but modernizes and revises NAFTA with new provisions on digital trade, state-owned enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, enforcement of workers’ rights, and the environment. Certain revisions to USMCA, including tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle industry, removal of government-procurement provisions for Canada, and changes to investorstate dispute settlement provisions, are significant because they scale back previous Administrations’ U.S. trade policy goals. Table 4. U.S.Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014-2021 (in billions of current U.S. dollars) Partner Country 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Mexico 241.0 236.5 230.2 243.6 266.0 256.7 211.4 276.5 Brazil 42.4 31.6 30.2 37.3 39.4 42.9 34.6 46.9 Chile 16.5 15.4 12.9 13.6 15.3 15.7 12.5 17.3 Colombia 20.1 16.3 13.0 13.4 15.1 14.8 11.9 16.7 Total LAC 418.9 383.4 360.7 388.8 424.0 418.4 340.2 451.3 1,621.9 1,503.3 1,451.5 1,547.2 1,665.8 1,645.9 1,428.5 1,754.3 U.S. Exports World Congressional Research Service 28 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress Partner Country 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Mexico 295.7 296.4 293.5 312.7 343.7 356.1 323.5 384.7 Brazil 30.0 27.5 26.0 29.5 31.2 30.9 23.4 31.3 Chile 9.5 8.8 8.8 10.6 11.4 10.4 10.1 15.1 Colombia 18.3 14.1 13.8 13.6 13.8 14.2 10.8 13.2 Total LAC 445.3 411.6 400.6 428.2 465.5 464.9 414.3 505.7 2,356.4 2,248.8 2,186.8 2,339.6 2,536.2 2,491.7 2,330.8 2,831.1 U.S. Imports World Source: CRS with data from the U.S. Department of Commerce provided by Trade Data Monitor. Note: This table provides statistics on the top four countries followed by the total of U.S. trade with 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries in the region through several trade-preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (P.L. 98-67, subsequently amended, with no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of selected Caribbean products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to uncertain economic and political conditions in the region. Several preference programs for Haiti, which expire in 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two other preference programs include the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA, P.L. 106-200, Title II), which has been extended through September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which expired on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends to eligible Caribbean countries preferences on apparel products, similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA and USMCA. The GSP program, first authorized in the 1970s, provides duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the world, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries. Numerous other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere do not include the United States. For example, the Pacific Alliance, a trade arrangement composed of Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, has made efforts to negotiate a possible trade arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In June 2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political agreement in principle for a potential comprehensive trade agreement. Talks, however, appear to have stagnated, and it is unclear if or when an agreement will move forward. In April 2020, Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA from 2000 and remove most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. This agreement appears to have stagnated, as well. Numerous observers have proposed that the United States strengthen trade relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through regional trade agreements or other efforts.81 Some policymakers also have expressed an interest in enhancing trade ties in the Western Hemisphere to enhance economic competitiveness. Although the United States re [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR46781. Public record. Not legal advice.