# The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR45732 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** April 17, 2023 - **Citation:** R45732 ## Text The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview Updated April 17, 2023 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R45732 SUMMARY The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview A plaintiff injured by a defendant’s wrongful act may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name a particularly familiar example of a tort, a person who negligently causes a vehicular collision may be liable to the victim of that crash. By compelling people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring people from harming others and (2) compensating those who are injured. R45732 April 17, 2023 Michael D. Contino Legislative Attorney Andreas Kuersten Legislative Attorney For a substantial portion of this nation’s history, however, the doctrine of “sovereign immunity” barred people injured by the tortious acts of a federal officer or employee from filing lawsuits against the United States. Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that ordinarily prohibits private citizens from suing a sovereign state without its consent. Until the mid-20th century, a tort victim could obtain compensation from the United States only by persuading Congress to pass a private bill compensating him for his loss. Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the United States for the torts of its employees. Subjecting the federal government to tort liability creates a financial cost to the United States, and it also may incentivize government officials to base their decisions on the desire to reduce the government’s exposure to monetary damages, regardless of the perceived social benefit of an alternative. In an attempt to mitigate these potential negative effects of abrogating the government’s immunity from liability and litigation, the FTCA limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States. For example, the FTCA contains several exceptions that categorically bar plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in certain kinds of cases. Federal law also restricts the types and amount of damages a victorious plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit. Additionally, a plaintiff may not initiate an FTCA lawsuit unless he has timely complied with a series of procedural requirements, such as providing the government an initial opportunity to evaluate the plaintiff’s claim and decide whether to settle it before the case proceeds to federal court. Since Congress first enacted the FTCA, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute’s contours. The Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to reconsider its long-standing FTCA precedents, thereby leaving it to Congress to amend the FTCA if it disagrees with judicial interpretation of its application. Some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to modify the FTCA in various respects, such as by broadening the circumstances in which a plaintiff may hold the United States liable for torts committed by government employees. Congressional Research Service The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview Contents Background ..................................................................................................................................... 3 The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA ........................................ 7 Employees and Independent Contractors .................................................................................. 8 The Boyle Rule.................................................................................................................. 10 Scope of Employment .............................................................................................................. 11 Attorney General Certification ................................................................................................ 14 Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity........................................................... 16 The Discretionary Function Exception ................................................................................... 18 Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary........................................................... 19 Whether Policy Considerations Influence the Exercise of the Employee’s Discretion....................................................................................................................... 22 The Intentional Tort Exception................................................................................................ 25 The Exception to the Intentional Tort Exception: The Law Enforcement Proviso ........... 26 The Foreign Country Exception .............................................................................................. 28 The Military Exceptions .......................................................................................................... 28 The Combatant Activities Exception ................................................................................ 28 The Feres Doctrine ........................................................................................................... 30 Other Limitations on Damages Under the FTCA.......................................................................... 32 Procedural Requirements............................................................................................................... 34 Legislative Proposals to Amend the FTCA ................................................................................... 37 Proposals to Abrogate or Modify Feres .................................................................................. 39 Private Bills ............................................................................................................................. 41 Contacts Author Information........................................................................................................................ 42 Congressional Research Service The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview plaintiff injured by a defendant’s wrongful conduct may file a “tort” lawsuit to recover money from that defendant.1 To name a familiar example of a tort, “a person who causes a crash by negligently driving a vehicle is generally liable to the victim of that crash.”2 By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) “deter[ring] people from injuring others” and (2) “compensat[ing] those who are injured.”3 A In ordinary circumstances, a tort victim may sue the employer of a tortfeasor under the theory of respondeat superior, where an employer bears responsibility for an employee’s actions.4 Until the mid-20th century, however, the principle of sovereign immunity—a legal doctrine that bars private citizens from suing a sovereign government without its consent—prohibited plaintiffs from suing the United States for the tortious actions of federal officers and employees.5 Thus, for a substantial portion of this nation’s history, persons injured by torts committed by the federal government’s agents were generally unable to obtain financial compensation through the judicial system.6 Congress ultimately deemed this state of affairs unacceptable and enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946.7 The FTCA allows plaintiffs to file and prosecute certain types of tort lawsuits against the United States in federal court, with the potential of recovering financial compensation from the federal government.8 Some FTCA lawsuits are relatively mundane; for instance, a civilian may sue the United States to obtain compensation for injuries sustained as a result of minor accidents on federal property.9 Other FTCA cases, however, involve grave allegations of government misfeasance. For example, after naval officers allegedly sexually 1 See, e.g., Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “tort” as “a civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu[ally] in the form of [monetary] damages”). See generally CRS In Focus IF11291, Introduction to Tort Law, by Kevin M. Lewis (describing tort law, its purposes, and its relevance to Congress). The author of this product is no longer at CRS. Any questions from congressional clients about this product should be directed to Michael Contino. 2 Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 66. See also Jeffrey Axelrad, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claims: Better Than Third-Party ADR For Resolving Federal Tort Claims, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2000) (describing “an automobile accident” as a “paradigm” example of a tort). 3 E.g., Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, Tort Reform and Innovation, 60 J.L. & ECON. 385, 386 (2017). See also Nancy S. Kim, Adhesive Terms and Reasonable Notice, 53 SETON HALL L. REV. 85, 126 (2022) (“It is universally accepted, however, that tort law should compensate victims and deter harmful behavior.”); John C. P. Goldberg, TwentiethCentury Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 514–83 (2003) (discussing various scholarly accounts of the purposes of tort law). 4 See, e.g., Thiele v. Bd. of Trs. of Ill. State Univ., 35 F.4th 1064, 1067 (7th Cir. 2022). 5 E.g., Paul Figley, Ethical Intersections & The Federal Tort Claims Act: An Approach for Government Attorneys, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 347, 348–49 (2011) [hereinafter Figley, Ethical Intersections] (explaining that “[f]or a century and a half, . . . the United States’ sovereign immunity . . . protected it from suit[s]” filed by “citizens injured by the torts of federal employees”). 6 Axelrad, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1332 (“Until the Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1946, no general remedy existed for torts committed by federal agency employees.”). See also Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 348 (explaining that, until 1946, “the only practical recourse for citizens injured by the torts of federal employees was to ask Congress to enact private legislation affording them relief”). 7 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80. See, e.g., id. §§ 2401(b), 2402 (additional provisions of the U.S. Code that apply in FTCA cases). See also infra “Background” (describing the circumstances leading to the FTCA’s enactment in 1946). 8 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”). 9 See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 809 F.3d 807, 809–10 (5th Cir. 2016) (lawsuit seeking compensation for injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained as a result of falling off a stepladder while exiting a trailer owned by the Federal Emergency Management Agency). Congressional Research Service 1 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview assaulted several women at the Tailhook Convention in 1991, those women invoked the FTCA in an attempt to hold the United States liable for those officers’ conduct.10 Family members of persons killed in the 1993 fire at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco likewise sued the United States under the FTCA, asserting that federal law enforcement agents committed negligent acts that resulted in the deaths of their relatives.11 Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit12 affirmed an award of more than $100 million against the United States in an FTCA case alleging that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) committed “egregious government misconduct” resulting in the wrongful incarceration of several men who were falsely accused of participating in a grisly gangland slaying.13 Empowering plaintiffs to sue the United States can ensure that persons injured by federal employees receive compensation and justice. At the same time, waiving the government’s immunity from tort litigation comes at a significant cost. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service (Bureau) reports that the United States spends hundreds of millions of dollars annually to pay tort claims under the FTCA,14 and the Department of Justice reports that it handles thousands of tort claims filed against the United States each year.15 Moreover, exposing the United States to tort liability arguably creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions “not on the relevant and applicable policy objectives that should be governing the execution of their authority,” but rather on a desire to reduce the government’s “possible exposure to substantial civil liability.”16 As explained in greater detail below, the FTCA attempts to balance these competing considerations by limiting the circumstances in which a plaintiff may successfully obtain a damages award against the United States.17 For example, the FTCA categorically bars plaintiffs 10 Hallett v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 1423, 1425 (D. Nev. 1995). The court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the United States on a variety of grounds. See id. at 1427–32; Hallett v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 874, 877–83 (D. Nev. 1994). 11 See Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441, 446 (W.D. Tex. 1999). The United States ultimately prevailed at trial and on appeal. See Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448, 453 (5th Cir. 2003). 12 This report periodically references decisions by federal appellate courts of various regional circuits. For purposes of brevity, references to a particular circuit in the body of this report (e.g., the First Circuit) refer to the U.S. Court of Appeals for that particular circuit. 13 See Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 83–84, 102, 108 (1st Cir. 2009). See also Bravo v. United States, 583 F.3d 1297, 1299 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (opining that “[t]he facts in the Limone case grew out of one of the darkest chapters in the history of the FBI, which involved rampant misconduct and corruption in the Boston office spanning a period of at least two decades”). 14 The Bureau’s Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2022, https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/datasets/judgmentfund-report-to-congress/judgment-fund-annual-report-to-congress, lists all payments that the United States made to individual claimants under the FTCA and other compensatory statutes between October 1, 2021, and September 30, 2022. The sum of the “Confirmed Payment Amounts” for all reported “Litigative Payments” and “Administrative Payments” pursuant to the FTCA equaled a total of $525,353,470.44. This value includes only those payments that the Bureau explicitly coded as “Federal Tort Claims Act” payments. 15 Table 5 of the United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report, https://www.justice.gov/media/1279221/dl?inline, reports that plaintiffs filed 3,030 tort cases against the United States during FY2022, and that an additional 5,016 tort cases against the federal government remained pending from the previous year. In addition, the report states that the Department of Justice received 3,056 new tort-related civil matters during FY2022. 16 Mark C. Niles, “Nothing But Mischief”: The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1309 (2002). 17 See Gregory C. Sisk, Official Wrongdoing and the Civil Liability of the Federal Government and Officers, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 295, 322 (2011) (“The claim for individual justice in court to an aggrieved person or entity must be balanced against the common good advanced by effective collective measures of government and the preservation of democratic rule.”); David W. Fuller, Intentional Torts and Other Exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 375, 377 (2011) (“While a concern for fairness and equity in favor of aggrieved plaintiffs certainly Congressional Research Service 2 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview from pursuing certain types of tort lawsuits against the United States.18 The FTCA also restricts the types and amount of monetary damages that a plaintiff may recover against the United States.19 Additionally, the FTCA requires plaintiffs to comply with an array of procedural requirements before filing suit.20 This report provides an overview of the FTCA.21 It first discusses the events and policy concerns that led Congress to enact the FTCA, including the background principle of sovereign immunity.22 The report then explains the effect, scope, and operation of the FTCA’s waiver of the United States’ immunity from certain types of tort claims.23 In doing so, the report describes categorical exceptions to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity,24 statutory limitations on a plaintiff’s ability to recover monetary damages under the FTCA,25 and the procedures that govern tort claims against the United States.26 The report concludes by discussing various legislative proposals to amend the FTCA.27 Background A person injured by the tortious activity of a federal employee generally has two potential targets that may be named as a defendant in a tort lawsuit: (1) the federal employee who committed the tort and (2) the federal government itself.28 In many cases, however, suing the employee is not a viable option.29 For one, as explained in greater detail below, Congress has opted to shield federal officers and employees from personal liability for torts committed within the scope of their employment.30 Even if Congress had not decided to insulate federal employees from tort liability, suing an individual is often an unattractive option for litigants, as individual defendants may lack the financial resources to satisfy an award of monetary damages. 31 motivated legislators, that concern had to be balanced against others and was not the only impetus behind the FTCA.”); Niles, supra note 16, at 1296 (“The critical objective in providing for governmental exposure to tort liability is arriving at the proper balance between positive disincentives for negligent and unreasonable activity on the one hand and negative liability threats which distort the proper decision making process on the other.”). 18 See infra “Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.” 19 See infra “Other Limitations on Damages.” 20 See infra “Procedural Requirements.” 21 This report is not intended to provide an exhaustive treatment of all topics related to the FTCA. Treatises that analyze the FTCA in greater depth include LESTER S. JAYSON & HON. ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES (2005) and GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2008). 22 See infra “Background.” 23 See infra id.; “The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA.” 24 See infra “Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.” 25 See infra “Other Limitations on Damages.” 26 See infra “Procedural Requirements.” 27 See infra “Legislative Proposals to Amend the FTCA.” 28 See Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 29 See id. 30 See infra “The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA.” 31 See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (2014) (summarizing the FTCA as “allowing suits directly against the federal government instead of officers (who might be judgment proof), and making the United States liable . . . .”); Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 606 (2006) (“[W]hen it comes to larger, litigable [tort] claims, many Americans are ‘judgment-proof’: They lack sufficient assets (or sufficient collectible assets) to pay the judgment in full (or even in Congressional Research Service 3 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview For many litigants, the legal and practical unavailability of tort claims against federal employees makes suing the United States a more attractive option.32 Whereas private defendants sometimes lack the financial resources to satisfy judgments rendered against them, the United States possesses sufficient financial resources to pay virtually any judgment that a court might enter against it.33 A plaintiff suing the United States, however, may nonetheless encounter significant obstacles.34 In accordance with the legal doctrine of sovereign immunity, a private plaintiff ordinarily may not file a lawsuit against a sovereign entity—including the federal government—unless that sovereign consents.35 For a substantial portion of this nation’s history, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred citizens injured by the torts of a federal officer or employee from pursuing a lawsuit against the United States.36 Until 1946, “the only practical recourse for citizens injured by the torts of federal employees was to ask Congress to enact private legislation affording them relief”37 through “private bills.”38 Some, however, criticized the private bill system.39 Not only did private bills impose “a substantial burden on the time and attention of Congress,”40 but some members of the public also became increasingly concerned “that the private bill system was unjust and wrought with political substantial part).”); Harbury, 522 F.3d at 417 (describing “federal employee[s]” as “potentially judgment-proof”). 32 See Harbury, 522 F.3d at 417. 33 See Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 361 (“From the perspective of a plaintiff . . . for whom the FTCA provides a remedy, the government is the very best sort of deep pocket defendant.”); Axelrad, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1333 (describing the United States as “the ultimate ‘deep pocket’”); Richard H. Seamon, Causation and the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 691, 739 (1997) (“There is no defendant with a deeper pocket than the United States.”). To that end, Congress has created a standing appropriation from which successful claimants may collect FTCA judgments and settlements known as the Judgment Fund. 31 U.S.C. § 1304. See also James E. Pfander & Neil Aggarwal, Bivens, the Judgment Bar, and the Perils of Dynamic Textualism, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 417, 426–27 & nn.51–52 (describing the Judgment Fund and its history); Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 352–54 (same). 34 See Harbury, 522 F.3d at 417. 35 E.g., Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The default position is that the federal government is immune to suit.”); Lipsey v. United States, 879 F.3d 249, 253 (7th Cir. 2018) (“The United States as sovereign is immune from suit unless it has consented to be sued.”); Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018) (“The United States is immune from suit without its consent.”); Veronica J. Finkelstein, A Distinction With a Difference: Understanding How the Federal Tort Claims Act Can Impact a Medical Malpractice Case, 93 P.A. B. ASS’N Q. 21, 25 (2022) (“As the sovereign is infallible, it can only be sued by consent.”). 36 Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 348–49 (explaining that, “for a century and a half, . . . the United States’ sovereign immunity . . . protected it from suit” by “citizens injured by the torts of federal employees”). 37 Id. at 348. See also Axelrad, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1332 (“Until the [FTCA] was enacted in 1946, no general remedy existed for torts committed by federal agency employees.”). 38 See, e.g., Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 746 (2021). For more information about private bills, see CRS Report R45287, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, by Christopher M. Davis. 39 Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 350 (claiming that “Members of Congress had long recognized that” private bills were “a poor way to resolve private claims against the government”). 40 Id. See also Helen Hershkoff, Early Warnings, Thirteenth Chimes: Dismissed Federal-Tort Suits, Public Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 183, 187 (describing the significant burdens of “investigating the thousands of tort claims submitted to [Congress] each year for payment and enacting legislation for any claimant Congress chose to compensate”); Pfander & Aggarwal, supra note 33, at 424 n.39 (commenting that the 76th Congress (in 1939 and 1940) considered more than 1,700 private bills, more than 300 of which became law). Congressional Research Service 4 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview favoritism.”41 In 1946, Congress enacted the FTCA,42 which effectuated “a limited waiver of [the federal government’s] sovereign immunity”43 from certain common law44 tort claims.45 With certain exceptions and caveats discussed throughout this report, the FTCA authorizes plaintiffs to bring the following civil lawsuits exclusively in federal court if their claims are 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. against the United States; for money damages; for injury to or loss of property, or personal injury or death; caused by a federal employee’s46 negligent or wrongful act or omission; while acting within the scope of his or her office or employment; under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the plaintiff in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.47 Thus, not only does the FTCA “free Congress from the burden of passing on petitions for private relief”48 by “transfer[ring] responsibility for deciding disputed tort claims from Congress to the 41 Stephen L. Nelson, The King’s Wrongs and the Federal District Courts: Understanding the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 259, 267 (2009). See also Axelrad, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1332 (“Favoritism in Congress . . . could make or break the claimant’s ability to be made whole.”). 42 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 41, at 268–71 (discussing the FTCA’s legislative history). 43 E.g., Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018). 44 Notably, however, “the United States . . . has not rendered itself liable under [the FTCA] for constitutional tort claims.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (emphasis added). See also Dianne Rosky, Respondeat Inferior: Determining the United States’ Liability for the Intentional Torts of Federal Law Enforcement Officials, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 895, 942 n.166 (2003) (“Repeated subsequent attempts to pass legislation creating federal liability for constitutional torts have failed.”). As a general matter, “federal constitutional claims for damages are cognizable only under” the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), “which runs against individual governmental officers personally,” Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 945 (D.C. Cir. 2016), or under the Tucker Act, which waives the government’s immunity against certain types of constitutional claims under specified conditions. See, e.g., Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 827 F.3d 167, 176 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)). Nevertheless—and as explained below—even though constitutional tort claims are not themselves actionable under the FTCA, whether a government employee transgressed constitutional bounds while performing his duties may nonetheless inform whether an exception to the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff’s nonconstitutional tort claim. See infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text. 45 In addition to the FTCA, other federal statutes may also allow persons to obtain compensation from the United States for injuries or property damage caused by an individual acting on the United States’ behalf. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) (allowing the armed forces to “settle[] and pay” certain “claim[s] against the United States for” property loss, personal injury, or death caused by an officer or employee of the armed forces); id. § 2734(a) (allowing the armed forces to “settle and pay” certain “claim[s] against the United States” brought by an “inhabitant of a foreign country” for property loss, personal injury, or death). See generally Lt. Cmdr. Clyde A. Haig, Discretionary Activities of Federal Agents Vis-A-Vis the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Military Claims Act: Are Discretionary Activities Protected at the Administrative Adjudication Level, and to What Extent Should They Be Protected?, 183 MIL. L. REV. 110, 110–50 (2005) (comparing 10 U.S.C. § 2733(a) to the FTCA). 46 See infra “Employees and Independent Contractors.” 47 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). 48 Pfander & Aggarwal, supra note 33, at 424. See, e.g., Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that Congress enacted the FTCA “in the interest of providing a more efficient means of compensation” than “securing recompense by private bill”). Congressional Research Service 5 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview courts,”49 it also creates a mechanism to compensate victims of governmental wrongdoing.50 In addition to this compensatory purpose, the FTCA also aims to deter tortious conduct by federal personnel by rendering the United States liable for the torts of its agents, thereby incentivizing the government to carefully supervise its employees.51 The FTCA does not itself create a new federal cause of action against the United States; rather, the FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from certain types of claims that exist under state tort law.52 Thus, in most respects, “the substantive law of the state where the tort occurred determines the liability of the United States” in an FTCA case.53 In this way, the FTCA largely “renders the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances.”54 Critically, however, the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is not complete.55 To address “concerns . . . about the integrity and solvency of the public fisc and the impact that extensive litigation might have on the ability of government officials to focus on and perform their other duties,” the FTCA affords the United States “important protections and benefits . . . not enjoyed by other tort defendants”56 that are explained below.57 Moreover, to limit the forums in which a plaintiff may permissibly litigate a tort suit against the United States, Congress vested the federal district courts (as well as a small number of territorial courts) with exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA cases.58 Furthermore, because Congress believed “that juries would have difficulty viewing 49 Figley, Ethical Intersections, supra note 5, at 347. See also Hershkoff, supra note 40, at 196 (explaining that the FTCA “by design shifted responsibility for disputes about government negligence from Congress to the Article III courts”). 50 Pfander & Aggarwal, supra note 33, at 424. See, e.g., Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that Congress enacted the FTCA “to afford easy and simple access to the federal courts for persons injured by the activities of government” (quoting Collins v. United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986) (Brown, J., concurring))). 51 Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 52 E.g., Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The FTCA does not create a new cause of action; rather, it permits the United States to be held liable in tort by providing a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Raplee v. United States, 842 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that “the FTCA merely waives sovereign immunity to make the United States amenable to a state tort suit”); Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC v. United States, 569 F.3d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“This statutory text does not create a cause of action against the United States; it allows the United States to be liable if a private party would be liable under similar circumstances in the relevant jurisdiction.”). 53 Raplee, 842 F.3d at 331. See also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (providing that the United States may be liable to the plaintiff in tort under the FTCA “if a private person[] would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred”); Garling v. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2017) (“State substantive law applies to suits brought against the United States under the FTCA.” (quoting Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004))). Because “state law operates in the FTCA not of its own force, but by congressional incorporation[,] [s]everal commentators have cited the FTCA as a relatively unusual example of state law that operates in the federal system by congressional choice.” Rosky, supra note 44, at 957. 54 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962). See also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (“The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”). 55 Niles, supra note 16, at 1300. See also Fuller, supra note 17, at 377 (“Congress never intended the FTCA as a comprehensive waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability.”). 56 Niles, supra note 16, at 1300. 57 See infra “Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity”; “Other Limitations on Damages”; “Procedural Requirements.” 58 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (“Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with . . . the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions against the United States . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any Congressional Research Service 6 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview the United States as a defendant without being influenced by the fact that it has a deeper pocket than any other defendant,”59 FTCA cases that proceed to trial are generally tried by the court without a jury.60 The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA The FTCA only authorizes tort lawsuits against the United States itself;61 it expressly shields individual federal employees from personal liability for torts that they commit within the scope of their employment.62 Thus, under the FTCA the remedy against the United States “is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages” that might otherwise be available “against the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”63 Starting in the late 1980s, Congress has prohibited courts from holding federal employees personally liable for torts committed within the scope of their employment in order to avert what Congress perceived as “an immediate crisis involving the prospect of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the entire Federal workforce.”64 The individual employee generally remains immune from tort liability for torts committed within the scope of employment, even if a provision of the FTCA forecloses the plaintiff from recovering monetary damages from the United States itself.65 employee of the Government . . . .”). A litigant aggrieved by a district or territorial court’s judgment in an FTCA case generally has the right to appeal to a regional U.S. Court of Appeals. See id. § 1291 (providing that, with limited exceptions, “the courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . and the District Court of the Virgin Islands”). A litigant aggrieved by the U.S. Court of Appeals’ ruling in an FTCA case may then request that the U.S. Supreme Court exercise its discretionary authority to review the case. See id. § 1254 (“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . [b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil . . . case . . . after rendition of judgment.”). 59 Matthew L. Zabel, Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in Federal Tort Claims Act Cases, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 185, 205 (citing 92 CONG. REC. 10,092 (1946) (statement of Rep. Scrivner)). 60 28 U.S.C. § 2402; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (“A plaintiff cannot opt for a jury in an FTCA action.”). See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 252 (2007) (explaining that the U.S. Constitution does not require a jury trial in FTCA cases because “the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the right to a jury trial . . . does not apply to proceedings against the sovereign”); Chestnut v. United States, 15 F.4th 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Since a plaintiff does not have a jury right in an FTCA action . . . .”). But see Zabel, supra note 59, at 194 (noting that federal courts sometimes empanel “advisory juries” in FTCA cases to render nonbinding verdicts); Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 875 (6th Cir. 1990) (FTCA case in which a “trial before an advisory jury took place”). 61 See, e.g., Jude v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 908 F.3d 152, 157 n.4 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he only proper defendant in an FTCA claim is the United States.”). 62 Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 509 (2013). That said, the FTCA shields federal employees from liability only for tort claims; it does not shield federal employees from personal liability for constitutional or statutory violations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2) (“Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States, or . . . a violation of a statute of the United States . . .”). See also Sisk, supra note 17, at 307 (“[F]ederal employees remain potentially liable for constitutional torts.” (quoting KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.3, at 227 (3d ed. 1994))). 63 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). See also Levin, 568 U.S. at 509. This provision of the FTCA is “often called the Westfall Act.” Id. 64 Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591, 597 (6th Cir. 2020) (“In 1988, Congress abandoned this piecemeal approach and passed broad legislation to expand the benefit of sovereign immunity to all federal employees.”); Adams v. United States, 420 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). 65 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (concluding that federal law “immunizes Government Congressional Research Service 7 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview As the following subsections of this report explain, determining whether the FTCA governs a particular tort case—and, thus, whether the FTCA shields the individual who committed the alleged tort from personal liability—requires the court to ask two threshold questions: (1) whether the individual who committed the tort was in fact a federal employee,66 and, if so, (2) whether that individual committed the tort within the scope of their office or employment.67 Employees and Independent Contractors The FTCA only waives the United States’ sovereign immunity as to torts committed by an “employee of the Government.”68 Thus, if a plaintiff attempts to sue the United States for a tort committed by someone who is not a federal employee, the plaintiff’s claim against the government will necessarily fail.69 For the purposes of the FTCA, the term “employee of the government” includes      officers or employees of any federal agency; members of the military or naval forces of the United States; members of the National Guard while engaged in training or duty under certain provisions of federal law; persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity; and officers and employees of a federal public defender organization (except when such employees are performing professional services in the course of providing representation to clients).70 As a result of this relatively broad definition of “employee,” the FTCA effectively waives the government’s immunity from torts committed by certain categories of persons who might not ordinarily be considered “employees” as a matter of common parlance.71 Because the FTCA applies only to torts committed by federal “employees,” the FTCA provision shielding federal employees from personal tort liability does not protect nonemployees, or individuals who fall outside the statutory definition of employee.72 With certain caveats discussed below,73 a plaintiff injured by the tortious action of a nonemployee may potentially be able to sue employees from suit even when an FTCA exception precludes recovery against the Government”). 66 See infra “Employees and Independent Contractors.” 67 See infra “Scope of Employment.” 68 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). 69 See, e.g., Kinebrew v. United States, No. 15-6855, 2016 WL 3014887, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2016) (“The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity under the FTCA for claims based on the alleged negligence of nonemployees . . . .”); Gonzalez v. United States, C.A. No. C-06-352, 2007 WL 2008675, at *3 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2007) (“The FTCA does not impose liability on the government for the acts of non-employees . . . .”). 70 28 U.S.C. § 2671. 71 See, e.g., U.S. Tobacco Coop. Inc. v. Big S. Wholesale of Va., LLC, 899 F.3d 236, 248 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n ‘employee’ for purposes of the [FTCA] need not have formal employee status.”). 72 See, e.g., Creel v. United States, 598 F.3d 210, 211–15 (5th Cir. 2010) (concluding that, because individual physician at Veterans Affairs Medical Center was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the federal government, plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against that surgeon could proceed); Woodruff v. Covington, 389 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort claims against them and to substitute the United States as the defendant on the ground that the individual defendants were “not ‘federal employees’”). 73 See infra “The Boyle Rule.” Congressional Research Service 8 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview that nonemployee individually under ordinary principles of state tort law, even though he could not sue either federal employees or the United States under the FTCA.74 Whether an individual doing work on behalf of the federal government meets the statutory definition of employee is not always immediately clear. For instance, the United States commonly hires independent contractors to carry out its governmental objectives.75 The FTCA, however, explicitly excludes independent contractors from the statutory definition of “employee.”76 As a result, “the government cannot be held liable” under the FTCA “for torts committed by its independent contractors”;77 the plaintiff must instead attempt to seek compensation from the contractor itself.78 Whether an alleged tortfeasor is an independent contractor as opposed to a government employee is often a question for courts to resolve. While different courts consider different sets of factors,79 most courts hold that “the critical factor” when assessing whether a defendant is an employee or 74 See, e.g., Creel, 598 F.3d at 211–15 (remanding with instructions to deny nonemployee’s motion to dismiss and to grant United States’ motion to dismiss); Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 903–04 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that if individual defendant was “an independent contractor rather than a federal employee,” the plaintiff’s case against that defendant could proceed). 75 See, e.g., In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Since the United States began its military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, its use of private contractors to support its mission has risen to ‘unprecedented levels.’ At times, the number of contract employees has exceeded the number of military personnel alongside whom they work in these warzones.” (quoting Comm’n on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations 1 (Feb. 24, 2011))). 76 See 28 U.S.C. § 2671; U.S. Tobacco, 899 F.3d at 248 (“An ‘employee’ does not include an ‘independent contractor’ working for the government.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671; United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976)). 77 Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2016). Accord, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 661 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The FTCA expressly does not waive the government’s immunity for claims arising from the acts or omissions of independent contractors.”); Tsosie v. United States, 452 F.3d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Although ‘employees’ of the government include officers and employees of federal agencies, ‘independent contractors’ are not ‘employees.’ As such, ‘the FTCA does not authorize suits based on the acts of independent contractors or their employees.’” (quoting Curry v. United States, 97 F.3d 412, 414 (10th Cir. 1996))). 78 See, e.g., Creel, 598 F.3d at 211–15 (concluding that, because individual physician at Veterans Affairs Medical Center was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the federal government, plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim against that surgeon could proceed); Woodruff v. Covington, 389 F.3d 1117, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort claims and to substitute the United States as the defendant on the ground that the defendants were “not ‘federal employees’”); Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 903–04 (concluding that if individual defendant was “an independent contractor rather than a federal employee,” the plaintiff’s case against the defendant could proceed). But see infra “The Boyle Rule.” 79 Compare, e.g., U.S. Tobacco, 899 F.3d at 248 n.4 (“Although none are dispositive of the question, factors that courts may consider in making the determination [of whether the tortfeasor is an independent contractor] include: ‘(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.’” (quoting Robb v. United States, 80 F.3d 884, 889 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996))), and Creel, 598 F.3d at 213–14 (listing similar factors), with, e.g., Woodruff, 389 F.3d at 1126 (“We have devised seven factors to guide this determination: (1) the intent of the parties; (2) whether the United States controls only the end result or may also control the manner and method of reaching the result; (3) whether the person uses his own equipment or that of the United States; (4) who provides liability insurance; (5) who pays social security tax; (6) whether federal regulations prohibit federal employees from performing such contracts; and (7) whether the individual has authority to subcontract to others.” (quoting Lilly v. Fieldstone, 876 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1989))). Congressional Research Service 9 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview an independent contractor for the purposes of the FTCA is whether the federal government possesses the authority “to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.”80 “[A] contractor can be said to be an employee or agent of the United States within the intendment of the [FTCA] only where the Government has the power under the contract to supervise a contractor’s day-to-day operations and to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.”81For example, courts have typically determined that certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNAs) working for federal hospitals qualify as employees under the FTCA.82 These courts have justified that conclusion on the ground that CRNAs do not ordinarily enjoy broad discretion to exercise their independent judgment when administering anesthesia, but instead operate pursuant to the direct supervision and control of an operating surgeon or anesthesiologist working for the federal government.83 That same analysis produces a different result when considering physicians. Courts have generally held that because physicians who provide medical services at facilities operated by the United States often operate relatively independently of the federal government’s control, such physicians ordinarily qualify as “independent contractors, and not employees of the government for FTCA purposes.”84 The Boyle Rule Because the FTCA’s prohibition on tort suits against individual federal employees does not insulate independent contractors from liability, a plaintiff injured by the tortious action of an independent contractor working for the federal government may potentially be able to recover compensation directly from that contractor.85 Nevertheless, a plaintiff asserting a tort claim 80 Ohlsen v. United States, 998 F.3d 1143, 1157 (10th Cir. 2021); U.S. Tobacco, 899 F.3d at 248. See also, e.g., Creel, 598 F.3d at 213 (same). 81 U.S. Tobacco, 899 F.3d at 248 (quoting Wood v. Standard Prods. Co., 671 F.2d 825, 829 (4th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 82 See, e.g., Bird v. United States, 949 F.2d 1079, 1080 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[A]t the time in question the [certified registered nurse anesthetist] was not an independent contractor but was an employee of the government[.]”); Bryant, 2000 WL 33201357, at *11 (concluding that nurse anesthetist “was acting as an employee of the federal government within the meaning of the FTCA”). 83 See Bryant, 2000 WL 33201357, at *9 (“[T]he written policy and procedure of the Medical Center required either the chief anesthesiologist or the operating surgeon to exercise immediate clinical supervision of CRNAs . . . .”); id. at *9– 10 (“[A] CRNA’s ability to exercise his or her professional judgment is limited . . . [S]o long as the directions of the surgeon comply with standards of safe anesthesia practice, a CRNA is obligated to follow those directions even if he or she disagrees.”); id. at *10 (“[T]he undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that CRNA Franc was subject to the supervision and control of operating surgeons when engaging in her activities as a nurse anesthetist. Unlike a physician, her actions in administering anesthesia were subject to the control of federal employees.”). 84 Robb, 80 F.3d at 890 (citing numerous cases). See also Creel, 598 F.3d at 212 (concluding that orthopedic surgeon who performed surgical procedure at Veterans Affairs Medical Center “was an independent contractor”). Cf. Woodruff, 389 F.3d at 1128 (holding that defendant physicians failed to prove they were federal employees for FTCA purposes). That said, there is no per se rule “that a physician must always be deemed an independent contractor;” whether any particular physician hired by the government qualifies as an independent contractor depends on the facts of each case. Robb, 80 F.3d at 889. See also Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 903–04 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that “resident physician in training” was “an ‘employee of the Government’ for purposes of the FTCA”). Moreover, Congress has provided that, under specified circumstances, certain types of medical contractors qualify as employees of the federal government for purposes of the FTCA. See Glenn v. Performance Anesthesia, P.A., No. 5:09CV-00309-BR, 2010 WL 3420538, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 27, 2010), aff’d, Hancox v. Performance Anesthesia, P.A., 455 F. App’x 369 (4th Cir. 2011) (summary order) (“[P]ursuant to the Gonzalez Act, health care providers who serve under a personal services contract authorized by the U.S. Secretary of Defense are deemed to be employees of the government for the purpose of disposing of personal injury claims.”); 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (the Gonzalez Act). 85 See, e.g., Creel, 598 F.3d at 211–15 (concluding that, because individual physician at Veterans Affairs Medical Center was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the federal government, plaintiff’s medical Congressional Research Service 10 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview directly against a federal contractor may still encounter other obstacles to recovery. As the Supreme Court ruled in its 1988 decision, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., a plaintiff may not pursue state law tort claims against a government contractor if imposing such liability would either create “a ‘significant conflict’” with “an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest’” or “‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”86 Several courts have therefore rejected tort claims against defense contractors on the ground that allowing such suits to proceed could undesirably interfere with military objectives.87 Courts have been less willing to extend Boyle immunity to nonmilitary contractors.88 Even in the military contractor context, government officials “must remain the agents of decision.”89 Accordingly, for Boyle to apply, the government must have mandated the contractor’s action that allegedly violated state law.90 Scope of Employment As noted above,91 the FTCA applies only to torts that a federal employee commits “while acting within the scope of his office or employment.”92 This operates as a “threshold requirement” under the FTCA.93 Thus, “[i]f a government employee acts outside the scope of his employment when malpractice claim against that surgeon could proceed); Woodruff, 389 F.3d at 1125 (affirming denial of individual defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s tort claims and to substitute the United States as the defendant on the ground that the defendants were “not ‘federal employees’”); Ezekiel, 66 F.3d at 903–04 (concluding that if individual defendant was “an independent contractor rather than a federal employee,” the plaintiff’s case against the defendant could proceed). 86 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 87 See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512 (“[S]tate law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced.”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[W]hether the defendant is the military itself or its contractor, the prospect of military personnel being haled into lengthy and distracting court or deposition proceedings is the same where, as here, contract employees are so inextricably embedded in the military structure. Such proceedings, no doubt, will as often as not devolve into an exercise in finger-pointing between the defendant contractor and the military, requiring extensive judicial probing of the government’s wartime policies. Allowance of such suits will surely hamper military flexibility and cost-effectiveness, as contractors may prove reluctant to expose their employees to litigation-prone combat situations.”); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1336–37 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that federal law preempted claims against private companies involved in construction of air defense system). But see Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458, 481 (3d Cir. 2013) (allowing claim against defense contractor to proceed where “[t]he military did not retain command authority over” the contractor); In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995–96, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that federal statute governing liability for nuclear accidents precluded government contractor from asserting Boyle defense against claims arising out of nuclear incident). 88 See, e.g., Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Assocs., Inc., 797 F.3d 720, 731 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In the Ninth Circuit, however, the government contractor defense is only available to contractors who design and manufacture military equipment. This precedent renders the government contractor defense unavailable to VSE, a non-military contractor.”) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). But cf. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 459 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to decide whether “Boyle is applicable only to military contractors”). 89 Badilla v. Midwest Air Traffic Control Serv., Inc., 8 F.4th 105, 122 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig., 897 F.2d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1999). 90 Id.; see Helfrich v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n, 804 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2015) (“In other words, in that circumstance—when state law was contrary to a contract term actually selected by an agency (a ‘discretionary’ decision)—there would be a ‘significant conflict between government policy and state tort liability of the contractor.”). 91 See supra “Background”; “The Preclusion of Individual Employee Tort Liability Under the FTCA.” 92 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 93 Magee v. United States, 9 F.4th 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2022). Congressional Research Service 11 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview engaging in tortious conduct, an action against the United States under the FTCA will not lie.”94 Instead, the plaintiff may potentially file a state-law tort action against the employee who committed the tort.95 Courts usually determine whether a federal employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he committed an alleged tort by applying the law of the state in which the tort occurred.96 Although the legal principles that govern the scope of a tortfeasor’s employment vary from state to state,97 many states consider whether the employer hired the employee to perform the act in question and whether the employee undertook the allegedly tortious activity to promote the employer’s interests.98 The mere fact that the employee committed an illegal or wrongful act does not necessarily entail that the employee acted outside the scope of his employment.99 94 Folley v. Henderson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Zeranti v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 3d 465, 468–69 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[I]f the federal employee was acting outside the scope of his or her employment, then the FTCA does not apply and the Court does not have jurisdiction over a vicarious liability claim asserted against the United States for its employee’s negligence.”). 95 Folley, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1016. See, e.g., Dowdy v. Hercules, No. 07-CIV-2488(EVEN) (LB), 2010 WL 169624, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (“As implied by the text of the FTCA, lawsuits against federal employees arising out of actions taken outside of the scope of their federal employment would face no sovereign immunity obstacles, because such claims are against those individuals, not the United States.”); Moreland v. Barrette, No. CR 05-480 TUC DCB, 2007 WL 2480235, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 28, 2007) (concluding that because doctor employed by army hospital “did not act within the scope of his employment” at the time he allegedly committed a tort, “the Government [wa]s not liable under the FTCA for his alleged negligent acts,” and the doctor himself was “not immune from suit under the FTCA”). 96 See, e.g., M.D.C.G. v. United States, 956 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2020) (“‘The issue of whether an employee is acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of the FTCA is governed by the law of the state in which the wrongful act occurred.”); Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2016) (“We interpret the FTCA’s ‘scope of employment’ requirement in accordance with the . . . law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred.”); Johnson v. United States, 534 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Scope of employment questions are governed by the law of the state where the alleged tortious acts took place.”). But see Doe v. Meron, 929 F.3d 153, 164 (4th Cir. 2019) (“When the allegedly tortious conduct occurs in a foreign country, rather than apply the law of the foreign country, courts have frequently applied District of Columbia law.”). 97 Compare, e.g., Johnson, 534 F.3d at 963 (“In determining whether an employee’s act is within the scope of employment [under South Dakota law,] a court considers a number of factors, including: (1) whether the act is commonly done in the course of business; (2) the time, place, and purpose of the act; (3) whether the act is within the enterprise of the master; the similarity of the act done to the act authorized; (4) whether the means of doing harm has been furnished by the master; and (5) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result.”), with, e.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Texas’s general rule . . . is that an employee acts within his scope of employment if the act is done (1) within the employee’s general authority, (2) in furtherance of the employer’s business, and (3) for the accomplishment of the objective for which the employee was employed.”). See also Paula Dalley, Destroying the Scope of Employment, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 637, 641 (2016) (“[T]he definition of ‘scope of employment’ varies from state to state.”). 98 See, e.g., Merlonghi v. United States, 620 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2010) (“Massachusetts courts . . . determine whether an employee’s conduct is within the scope of his employment based on (1) ‘whether the conduct in question is of the kind the employee is hired to perform,’ (2) ‘whether it occurs within authorized time and space limits,’ and (3) ‘whether it is motivated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.’” (quoting Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852, 855 (Mass. 1996))); Rodriguez, 129 F.3d at 766; Callaham ex rel. Foster v. United States, C/A No. 3:12-cv-579-JFA, 2012 WL 1835366, at *2 (D.S.C. May 21, 2012) (“In South Carolina, an act done for the purpose of benefitting the employer is considered within the scope of employment.”); Birke v. United States, No. 4:08CV1608MLM, 2009 WL 1605771, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 8, 2009) (“Florida law provides [that] to establish employer liability based on its employee’s acting within the scope of his employment, a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) the conduct is of the kind the employee is hired to perform, (2) the conduct occurs substantially within the time and space limits authorized or required by the work to be performed, and (3) the conduct is activated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.’” (quoting Fernandez v. Fla. Nat’l Coll., Inc., 925 So.2d 1096, 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006))). 99 See, e.g., Doe, 929 F.3d at 166 (“[E]ven intentional torts and illegal conduct may fall within employees’ scope of Congressional Research Service 12 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview Two cases involving vehicular mishaps illustrate how courts perform the scope of employment inquiry in practice. In Barry v. Stevenson, for instance, two soldiers—one driver and one passenger—were returning to their headquarters in a government-owned Humvee military truck after completing a work assignment on a military base.100 The truck hit a dip in the trail, injuring the passenger.101 Because the driver “was engaged in annual Army National Guard training” and “driving a government vehicle . . . on government property” at the time of the accident, the court concluded that the driver “was acting within the course of his employment” as a federal officer “when the injury occurred.”102 In Merlonghi v. United States, by contrast, a special agent employed by the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) collided with a motorcyclist while driving home from work in a government vehicle.103 The agent and the motorcyclist had engaged in a verbal altercation and “swerved their vehicles back and forth towards each other” immediately prior to the collision.104 After brandishing a firearm at the motorcyclist,105 the agent sharply careened his vehicle into the motorcycle, throwing the motorcyclist to the ground and severely injuring him.106 The court determined that the agent “was not acting within the scope of his employment” at the time of the collision even though “he was driving a government vehicle and was on call.”107 The court first observed that “engaging in a car chase while driving home from work [wa]s not the type of conduct that OEE hired [the agent] to perform.”108 The court also emphasized that the agent “was not at work, responding to an emergency, or driving to a work assignment” at the time of the collision.109 The court further noted that the agent’s actions were not “motivated . . . by a purpose to serve the employer,” as the agent’s “argument with [the motorcyclist] and the back-and-forth swerving leading to the altercation had nothing to do with an OEE assignment. His conduct related to personal travel and a personal confrontation.”110 Because the agent “was not acting within the scope of his employment when he crashed into” the motorcyclist, the court ruled that the district court had correctly dismissed the motorcyclist’s claims seeking compensation from the United States.111 employment. In considering whether an intentional tort or an illegal act falls within the scope of employment, the inquiry is whether the tort or crime was a foreseeable aspect of the employee’s employment.”) (internal citations omitted). 100 965 F. Supp. 1220, 1222–23 (E.D. Wis. 1997). 101 Id. at 1223. 102 Id. 103 620 F.3d at 52. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Id. at 53. 107 Id. at 56. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. at 57. 111 Id. at 58. Congressional Research Service 13 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview Attorney General Certification Occasionally a plaintiff will file a tort suit against an individual112 without realizing that the defendant is a federal employee.113 In such cases, the FTCA allows the Attorney General to certify “that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.”114 If the Attorney General files such a certification, then   the lawsuit is “deemed an action against the United States” under the FTCA;115 the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United States is substituted as defendant in the employee’s place;116 and  the case proceeds against the government in federal court.117 In such instances, the United States “remain[s] the federal defendant in the action unless and until the [d]istrict [c]ourt determines that the employee . . . engaged in conduct beyond the scope of his employment.”118 If a district court determines that an employee was acting beyond the scope of their duties, however, the court must deny the substitution motion and the action will continue against that employee in their personal capacity.119 By creating a mechanism by which the United States may substitute itself as the defendant in the individual employee’s place, the FTCA effectively “immunize[s] covered federal employees not simply from liability, but from suit.”120 In this way, the FTCA “relieve[s] covered employees from the cost and effort of defending the lawsuit” and instead places “those burdens on the Government’s shoulders.”121 In some cases, the Attorney General’s decision to substitute the United States in the officer’s place may adversely affect the plaintiff’s chances of prevailing on his claims. Generally speaking, once the Attorney General certifies that the federal employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the allegedly tortious act, “the FTCA’s requirements, exceptions, 112 Courts have disagreed regarding whether the Attorney General may certify a corporation, rather than a natural person, as a federal “employee” that is immune from liability under the FTCA. Compare Adams v. United States, 420 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Corporate entities . . . are not eligible for immunity certification as government employees under the FTCA.”), with B & A Marine Co. v. Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 715–16 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming district court’s ruling that corporate entity was an “employee[] of the Government acting within the scope of [its] employment” for FTCA certification purposes). 113 See Hershkoff, supra note 40, at 200 (noting that injured persons will sometimes “file[] a garden-variety personalinjury suit” against an individual “in state court, not knowing that the tortfeasor is an agent or employee of the United States”). 114 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)–(2). 115 Id. 116 Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 230 (2007). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)–(2). 117 Osborn, 549 U.S. at 230 (“Upon the Attorney General’s certification” in a case “commenced in state court, the case is to be removed to a federal district court, and the certification remains ‘conclusive . . . for purposes of removal.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2))); id. at 231 (“Once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to adjudicate the case resides in the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the state court.”); Hockenberry v. United States, 42 F.4th 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2022) 118 Osborn, 549 U.S. at 231. 119 Id.; Carroll v. Trump, 49 F.4th 759, 755-66 (2d Cir. 2022). 120 Osborn, 549 U.S. at 238. 121 Id. at 252. Congressional Research Service 14 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview and defenses apply to the suit.”122 Depending on the circumstances, those requirements, exceptions, and defenses can “absolutely bar [the] plaintiff’s case” against the United States,123 as explained below.124 Moreover, the individual federal employee remains immune from liability even when the FTCA “precludes recovery against the Government” itself.125 Thus, under certain circumstances, the FTCA will shield both the United States and its employees from liability for its tortious actions, thereby effectively “leav[ing] certain tort victims without any remedy.”126 A plaintiff may sometimes prefer to litigate against the United States rather than against an individual government employee, especially if the employee does not have enough money to satisfy a judgment that the court might ultimately render in the plaintiff’s favor.127 Because government employees may be “under-insured or judgment proof,” they may lack sufficient assets to “satisfy judgments rendered against them” in tort cases.128 Thus, a plaintiff often does not object when the Attorney General certifies named defendants as acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the alleged tort.129 If a plaintiff does not challenge the Attorney General’s certification, the certification has conclusive effect.130 If a plaintiff successfully obtains a judgment against the United States based on the tortious conduct of a federal employee, the government may not subsequently sue the culpable employee to recover the amount of money the government paid to the plaintiff.131 Consequently, if the government successfully substitutes itself for an individual defendant in an FTCA case, that substitution may effectively relieve the individual employee from all civil liability for any allegedly tortious action.132 Because this aspect of the FTCA is particularly favorable for government employees, if the Attorney General refuses to certify that an employee was acting within the scope of employment, that employee may at any time before trial petition the district court for such a certification.133 If the court agrees that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, then the case proceeds “against the Government, just as if the Attorney General 122 Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)). 123 Id. at 417. 124 See infra “Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity.” See Hockenberry, 42 F.4th at 1170 (reflecting that where a claim fails within an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, substitution bars an action, and sovereign immunity does not allow a plaintiff to bring the original federal employee defendant back into the action). 125 United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). See Hershkoff, supra note 40, at 201 (explaining that the FTCA “bars relief against individual employees for torts committed in the course of employment even if the FTCA precludes relief against the government”). 126 B & A Marine Co. v. Am. Foreign Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 127 See id. (“From the plaintiff’s perspective, [the federal government substituting itself as the sole defendant] can produce a net positive: Although the plaintiff must now litigate against the Federal Government, the original defendant—a potentially judgment-proof federal employee—has been replaced by the seemingly bottomless U.S. Treasury.”). 128 Pfander & Aggarwal, supra note 33, at 443 n.133. 129 Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 422 (1995) (“Ordinarily, scope-of-employment certifications occasion no contest.”). 130 E.g., Doe, 929 F.3d at 160. 131 See Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he government, when it is held liable under the [FTCA], has no right of indemnity from its negligent employee.”). 132 See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 229 (2007) (explaining that the FTCA “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out of acts they undertake in the course of their official duties”). 133 Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 133 n.3 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3)). Congressional Research Service 15 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview had filed a certification.”134 If the court instead finds that the government employee was not acting within the scope of employment, then the lawsuit may proceed against the government employee in their personal capacity.135 Exceptions to the FTCA’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity As mentioned above,136 the FTCA imposes significant substantive limitations on the types of tort lawsuits a plaintiff may permissibly pursue against the United States.137 In enacting the FTCA, Congress was concerned about “unwarranted judicial intrusion[s] into areas of governmental operations and policymaking.”138 Congress therefore opted to explicitly preserve the United States’ sovereign immunity from more than a dozen categories of claims,139 which are set out in Section 2680 of the FTCA:    “Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation . . . or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty”;140 “Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter”;141 certain claims arising from the actions of law enforcement officers administering customs and excise laws;142 134 Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3)–(4)). 135 Id. 136 See supra “Background.” 137 See, e.g., Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the FTCA’s “waiver of immunity is far from absolute,” as “many important classes of tort claims are excepted from the Act’s coverage”). 138 Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 139 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)–(f), (h)–(n). In addition to Section 2680, other provisions of the U.S. Code—as well as certain judicially created doctrines—also preserve the United States’ immunity from various types of tort suits. See, e.g., id. § 1346(b)(2) (providing that, notwithstanding the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity, “no person convicted of a felony who is incarcerated while awaiting sentencing or while serving a sentence may bring a civil action against the United States . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act”); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802–03 (1972) (holding that the FTCA does “not authorize suit against the Government on claims based on strict liability for ultrahazardous activity”); United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 149–54 (1966) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 4126, which entitles injured inmates to compensation under specified circumstances, barred injured prisoner from recovering additional damages under the FTCA); Williamson v. United States, 862 F.3d 577, 578–79 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that Federal Employees’ Compensation Act precluded plaintiff from obtaining damages under the FTCA). See generally Fuller, supra note 17, at 381–82 (“Numerous other federal statutes either prohibit or provide their own single mechanism for potential recovery against the government and thus indirectly prevent claims that would otherwise be cognizable under the FTCA.”). 140 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). See also infra “The Discretionary Function Exception.” 141 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b). See, e.g., Dolan v. USPS, 546 U.S. 481, 483–92 (2006) (analyzing the scope of Section 2680(b)). 142 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (providing that, with four specified exceptions, the FTCA does not authorize claims “arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer”). See also, e.g., Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 215–28 (2008) (interpreting Section 2680(c)); DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. Congressional Research Service 16 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview           certain admiralty143 claims against the United States for which federal law provides an alternative remedy;144 claims “arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in administering” certain provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917;145 “Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United States”;146 certain claims predicated upon intentional torts committed by federal employees;147 “Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system”;148 “Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war”;149 “Any claim arising in a foreign country”;150 “Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority”;151 “Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company”;152 or “Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.”153 If a tort claim against the United States falls within any of these exceptions, the district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it.154 Some of the exceptions listed above are more doctrinally significant than others.155 The following sections discuss the most frequently litigated exceptions to the United States’ waiver of immunity from tort claims. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1123–26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 2019 WL 5301048 (Oct. 21, 2019) (applying Section 2680(c)’s “detention of goods exception”). 143 “Admiralty” is defined as “the rules governing contract, tort, and workers’-compensation claims arising out of commerce on or over navigable water.” Admiralty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 144 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (providing that the FTCA does not apply to “[a]ny claim for which a remedy is provided by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States”). 145 28 U.S.C. § 2680(e). Among other things, the Trading with the Enemy Act “affords the President broad powers to regulate, license, and prohibit trade with foreign nations.” Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301–41. 146 28 U.S.C. § 2680(f). 147 See id. § 2680(h). See also infra “The Intentional Tort Exception.” 148 28 U.S.C. § 2680(i). 149 Id. § 2680(j). See infra “The Combatant Activities Exception.” 150 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k). See infra “The Foreign Country Exception.” 151 28 U.S.C. § 2680(l). See Thacker v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 139 S. Ct. 1435, 1441 (2019) (“Congress made a considered decision not to apply the FTCA to the [Tennessee Valley Authority].”) (emphasis omitted). 152 28 U.S.C. § 2680(m). The Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 replaced the Panama Canal Company with the Panama Canal Commission. E.g., Black v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 641 F. App’x 1007, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (summary order). 153 28 U.S.C. § 2680(n). 154 See, e.g., DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 2019 WL 5301048 (Oct. 21, 2019). 155 See, e.g., Matthews v. United States, Civil No. 07-00030, 2011 WL 3471140, at *2 (D. Guam Aug. 5, 2011), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 366 (9th Cir. 2014) (describing “the discretionary function exception” as “the most frequently litigated” Congressional Research Service 17 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview The Discretionary Function Exception Section 2680(a)156—also known as the discretionary function exception157—“preserves the federal government’s immunity . . . when an employee’s acts involve the exercise of judgment or choice.”158 Along with being one of the most frequently litigated exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity,159 the discretionary function exception is, according to at least one commentator, “the broadest and most consequential.”160 For example, the United States has successfully invoked the discretionary function exception to avoid tort liability in cases involving exposures to radiation, asbestos, Agent Orange, and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).161 The discretionary function exception serves at least two purposes.162 First, the exception “prevent[s] judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.”163 According to one commentator, the Congress that enacted the FTCA viewed such second guessing to be “inappropriate” because (1) “such judgments are more appropriately left to the political branches of our governmental system”; and (2) “courts, which specialize in the resolution of discrete factual and legal disputes,” may not be “equipped to make broad policy judgments.”164 Second, the discretionary function exception is intended to “protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations.”165 By insulating the government from statutory exception to the FTCA); James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposal for Institutional Reform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1541 (2000) (similar). 156 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (stating that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity “shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused”). 157 E.g., Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018). 158 E.g., Tsolmon v. United States, 841 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 2016). For another CRS product analyzing the discretionary function exception, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10355, Can Mass Shooting Victims Sue the United States?, by Kevin M. Lewis. 159 See, e.g., Hon. Robert C. Longstreth, Does the Two-Prong Test for Determining Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial Partisanship?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 398, 403 (2011) (describing the discretionary function exception as “heavily litigated”); Nelson, supra note 41, at 262 (“The [discretionary function exception] is the most criticized and litigated exception to the FTCA.”). 160 Niles, supra note 16, at 1300. See Sisk, supra note 17, at 301 (“The most important [exception] (in terms of frequency of assertion by the government, successfully more often than not) is the discretionary function exception.”); Seamon, supra note 33, at 700–01 (describing the discretionary function exception as “broad,” and as “the most important exception” to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity). 161 Seamon, supra note 33, at 694–95. See Clendening v. United States, 19 F.4th 421, 435 (4th Cir. 2021) (“Courts have frequently found that ‘the [G]overnment’s decision whether to warn about the presence of toxins, carcinogens, or poisons falls under the discretionary function exception.’”) (quoting Sánchez ex rel. D.R.-S. v. United States, 671 F.3d 86, 101-02 (1st Cir. 2012)). 162 See Niles, supra note 16, at 1307 (“Two basic reasons have been offered to justify the different judicial treatment of claims challenging discretionary acts, and claims focused on merely ministerial functions.”). 163 Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988) (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 164 Niles, supra note 16, at 1308. See Seamon, supra note 33, at 703 (explaining that the discretionary function exception reflects “(1) separation-of-powers concerns and, relatedly, (2) the incompetence of courts, compared to executive-branch officials, to decide matters of public policy”). See Nieves Martinez v. United States, 997 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Thus, the exception ‘protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.’”) 165 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)). Congressional Research Service 18 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview liability for the discretionary actions of its employees, the discretionary function exception arguably decreases the likelihood that federal employees will shy away from making sound policy decisions based on a fear of increasing the government’s exposure to tort liability.166 Relatedly, exposing the United States to liability for discretionary acts could cause government officials to “spend an inordinate amount of their tax-payer compensated time responding to lawsuits” rather than serving the “greater good of the community.”167 The discretionary function exception thus “marks the boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.”168 As explained in greater detail below,169 to determine whether the discretionary function exception bars a particular plaintiff’s suit under the FTCA, courts examine whether the federal employee was engaged in conduct that was (1) discretionary and (2) policy-driven.170 “If the challenged conduct is both discretionary and policy-driven,” then the FTCA does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity with respect to that conduct, and the plaintiff’s FTCA claim must therefore fail.171 If, by contrast, an official’s action either (1) “does not involve any discretion” or (2) “involves discretion,” but “does not involve the kind of discretion—consideration of public policy—that the exception was designed to protect,” then the discretionary function exception does not bar the plaintiff’s claim.172 Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary When first evaluating whether “the conduct that is alleged to have caused the harm” to the plaintiff “can fairly be described as discretionary,”173 a court must assess “whether the conduct at issue involves ‘an element of judgment or choice’ by the employee.”174 “The conduct of federal employees is generally held to be discretionary unless ‘a federal175 statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.’”176 If “the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive” established by a federal statute, regulation, or 166 See Niles, supra note 16, at 1309 (noting the possibility “that the threat of liability will induce government officials to make decisions based not on the relevant and applicable policy objectives that should be governing the execution of their authority, but based rather on” avoiding “possible exposure to substantial civil liability”). 167 Id. at 1310. 168 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808. 169 See infra “Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary”; “Whether Policy Considerations Influence the Exercise of the Employee’s Discretion.” 170 E.g., Gordo-Gonzalez v. United States, 873 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2017). 171 Id. See, e.g., Garling v. EPA, 849 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2017) (“If both elements are met, the governmental conduct is protected . . . and sovereign immunity bars a claim that involves such conduct.”). 172 Seamon, supra note 33, at 706–07; Foster Logging, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2020). 173 E.g., Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018) (quoting Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 252 (1st Cir. 2009)). 174 E.g., Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). 175 “State law will not suffice” to render the discretionary function exception inapplicable; “only federal statutes, regulations, or policies will suffice to . . . divest the federal government of its sovereign immunity.” Evans, 876 F.3d at 381 (emphasis added). 176 Id. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). See, e.g., Compart’s Boar Store, Inc. v. United States, 829 F.3d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Government employees act with discretion unless they are following a regulation or policy that is ‘mandatory and . . . clearly and specifically define[s] what the employees are supposed to do.’” (quoting C.R.S. ex rel. D.B.S. v. United States, 11 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 1993))). Congressional Research Service 19 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview policy, “then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect.”177 Put another way, the discretionary function exception does not insulate the United States from liability when its employees “act in violation of a statute or policy that specifically directs them to act otherwise.”178 Even where a federal statute, regulation, or policy pertaining to the challenged action exists, the action may nonetheless qualify as discretionary if the law in question “predominately uses permissive rather than mandatory language.”179 In other words, where “a government agent’s performance of an obligation requires that agent to make judgment calls, the discretionary function exception” may bar the plaintiff’s claim under the FTCA.180 Notably, “[t]he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language” in a federal statute, regulation, or policy “does not transform an otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding” law that will defeat the discretionary function exception.181 “Even when some provisions of a policy are mandatory, governmental action remains discretionary if all of the challenged decisions involved ‘an element of judgment or choice.’”182 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rich v. United States183 exemplifies how courts evaluate whether a federal employee has engaged in discretionary conduct. The plaintiff in Rich—a federal inmate stabbed by members of a prison gang—attempted to file an FTCA suit alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) should have housed him separately from the gang members.184 Federal law permitted—but did not affirmatively require—BOP “to separate certain inmates from others based on their past behavior.”185 Because federal law empowered prison officials to “consider several factors and exercise independent judgment in determining whether inmates may require separation,” the Rich court held that BOP’s decision whether or not to separate an inmate from others was discretionary in nature and therefore outside the scope of the FTCA.186 177 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 178 Tsolmon v. United States, 841 F.3d 378, 384 (5th Cir. 2016). See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 937 F.3d 316, 330 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that discretionary function exception did not apply where agency employee allegedly “failed to comply with the mandatory directives in” the agency’s standard operating procedures); Collins v. United States, 564 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir. 2009) (“If a statute or regulation or other directive intended to be binding forbids the specific act contended to have been negligent, the employee who committed the act was not exercising authorized discretion.”). 179 Compart’s Boar Store, 829 F.3d at 605 (quoting Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042, 1047 (8th Cir. 2013)). 180 Gonzalez v. United States, 814 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 765– 66 (9th Cir. 2006); Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500-01 (11th Cir. 1997); and Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358, 360–61 (1st Cir. 1991)). 181 Gonzalez, 814 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996)). See Lam v. United States, 979 F.3d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 2020) (“This decision teaches the importance of analyzing policies that contain mandatory words in their overall context.”). 182 Compart’s Boar Store, 829 F.3d at 605 (quoting Hart v. United States, 630 F.3d 1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 2011)). 183 811 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2015). 184 See id. at 141–42. 185 See id. at 145 (analyzing 28 C.F.R. § 524.72). 186 Id. See also Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[H]ousing and cellmate assignments unquestionably involve an ‘element of judgment or choice.’” (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991))); Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Congress intended to give the BOP discretion in making its classification decisions and determinations about placement of prisoners.”); Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that BOP’s “decision not to separate” two inmates “is properly classified as a discretionary act”). But see Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 638 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that once “a valid separation order” separating two inmates “is in effect, there is no discretion left” for the discretionary function exception to protect). Congressional Research Service 20 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview By contrast, in the Supreme Court case of Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, the discretionary function exception did not shield the United States from liability.187 The plaintiff in Berkovitz alleged that the federal government issued a license to a vaccine manufacturer “without first receiving data that the manufacturer must submit showing how the product . . . matched up against regulatory safety standards,” as required by federal law.188 After the plaintiff allegedly contracted polio from a vaccine produced by that manufacturer, the plaintiff sued the United States under the FTCA.189 Because “a specific statutory and regulatory directive” divested the United States of any “discretion to issue a license without first receiving the required test data,” the Court held that “the discretionary function exception impose[d] no bar” to the plaintiff’s claim.190 Courts have disagreed on whether the discretionary function exception shields tortious conduct that allegedly violates the U.S. Constitution, as contrasted with a federal statute, regulation, or policy. Most courts191 have held that “the discretionary-function exception . . . does not shield decisions that exceed constitutional bounds, even if such decisions are imbued with policy considerations.”192 These courts reason that “[t]he government has no discretion to violate the Federal Constitution; its dictates are absolute and imperative.”193 By contrast, a minority of courts 187 See 486 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1988). 188 Id. at 542. 189 Id. at 533. 190 Id. at 532, 542–43. 191 See, e.g., Loumiet v. United States, 828 F.3d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“We conclude, in line with the majority of our sister circuits to have considered the question, that the discretionary-function exception does not categorically bar FTCA tort claims where the challenged exercise of discretion allegedly exceeded the government’s constitutional authority to act.”) (emphasis added). 192 Id. at 944. See, e.g., Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79, 101 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he discretionary function exception does not . . . shield conduct that transgresses the Constitution.”); Raz v. United States, 343 F.3d 945, 948 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that government’s actions “f[e]ll outside the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception because [the plaintiff] alleged they were conducted in violation of [the Constitution]”); Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[F]ederal officials do not possess discretion to violate constitutional rights . . . .” (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. United States, 837 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1988))); Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1002 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The Constitution can limit the discretion of federal officials such that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception will not apply.”). That is not to say that these courts permit FTCA claims against the United States predicated solely on violations of federal constitutional law. The Supreme Court has squarely held that “the United States . . . has not rendered itself liable under [the FTCA] for constitutional tort claims.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994). Rather, the abovecited cases hold that the discretionary function exception will not bar a state law tort claim against the United States when a government employee also violates the U.S. Constitution in the course of committing that tort. See Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 945–46 (“A plaintiff who identifies constitutional defects in the conduct underlying her FTCA tort claim . . . may affect the availability of the discretionary-function defense, but she does not thereby convert an FTCA claim into a constitutional damages claim against the government; state law is necessarily still the source of the substantive standard of FTCA liability.”); Limone, 579 F.3d at 102 n.13 (“[W]e do not view the FBI’s constitutional transgressions as corresponding to the plaintiffs’ causes of action—after all, the plaintiffs’ claims are not Bivens claims [against individual federal officers alleging violations of the Constitution]—but rather, as negating the discretionary function defense.”). That said, some judges have doubted whether there is a coherent distinction between (1) a federal constitutional tort claim and (2) a claim that a federal employee violated the U.S. Constitution in the course of committing a state law tort. See Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 394 (5th Cir.) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It is difficult to conceive of a violation of a constitutional right that does not also give rise to a state [law] cause of action . . . . Under the majority’s framework, by a plaintiff’s artful pleading, the United States can be liable whenever the Constitution is violated even though, under Meyer, the sovereign is not subject to liability for constitutional torts.”), rev’d en banc, 608 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2010). 193 Loumiet, 828 F.3d at 944 (internal quotations omitted); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 837 F.2d at 120 (“[C]onduct cannot be discretionary if it violates the Constitution.”). Congressional Research Service 21 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview have instead concluded that the discretionary function exception shields actions “based upon [the] exercise of discretion” even if they are “constitutionally repugnant.”194 These courts base that conclusion on the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), which purports to shield discretionary judgments even when a government employee abuses his discretion.195 Still other courts have declined to take a side on this issue.196 Whether Policy Considerations Influence the Exercise of the Employee’s Discretion If the allegedly tortious conduct that injured the plaintiff was discretionary, the court must then proceed to the second prong of its analysis, evaluating “whether the exercise or non-exercise of the granted discretion is actually or potentially influenced by policy considerations”197—that is, whether the challenged action “implicate[s] social, economic, [or] policy judgments.”198 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the discretionary function exception “protects . . . only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.”199 For instance, if a given decision requires a federal employee to “balance competing interests”200—such as weighing the benefits of a particular public safety measure against that measure’s financial costs201—then that decision is likely susceptible to policy analysis within the meaning of the discretionary function exception.202 When applying the second prong of the discretionary function exception, courts employ an objective rather than a subjective standard.203 Courts therefore “do not examine . . . ‘whether 194 See Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924, 930 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Congress could have adopted language that carved out certain behavior from this exception—for example, grossly negligent behavior, intentional behavior, or behavior that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. But Congress did not do so.”); Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626, 627–28 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Linder v. United States, 937 F.3d 1087, 1090 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he theme that ‘no one has discretion to violate the Constitution’ has nothing to do with the [FTCA], which does not apply to constitutional violations.”). 195 See Kiiskila, 466 F.2d at 628 (“28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) precludes action for abuse of discretionary authority whether through negligence or wrongfulness.”). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (stating that the discretionary function exception applies “whether or not the discretion involved be abused”). 196 See Doe v. United States, 831 F.3d 309, 319–20 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Whether a properly pled constitutional violation allows a plaintiff to circumvent the discretionary function exception is an open question in this circuit. Because we conclude the plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead [a constitutional violation], we need not settle the issue of whether a constitutional violation removes the applicability of the discretionary function exception.”); Doe KS v. United States, Case No. 17-2306, 2017 WL 6039536, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2017) (“Assuming—without holding—that the majority of appellate courts are correct about FTCA liability for exceeding constitutional authority . . . .”) (emphasis added). 197 E.g., Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 380 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018) (quoting Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 252 (1st Cir. 2009)). 198 E.g., Gonzalez v. United States, 814 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 2016). 199 Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988). 200 E.g., Compart’s Boar Store, Inc. v. United States, 829 F.3d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Herden v. United States, 726 F.3d 1042, 1050 (8th Cir. 2013)). 201 See Morales v. United States, 895 F.3d 708, 716 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We reject the suggestion that the government cannot invoke the discretionary function exception whenever a decision involves considerations of public safety . . . . In case after case, we have considered the government’s balancing of public safety with a multitude of other factors.”). 202 See, e.g., Croyle ex rel. Croyle v. United States, 908 F.3d 377, 382 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Balancing safety, reputational interests, and confidentiality is the kind of determination ‘the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.’”) (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536). 203 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 814 F.3d at 1032 (“In determining if the conduct involves policy judgment, we do not look to an agent’s subjective weighing of policy considerations.”); Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not focus on the subjective intent of the government employee or inquire whether the employee actually Congressional Research Service 22 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview policy considerations were actually contemplated in making the decision’”204—that is, “[t]he decision need not actually be grounded in policy considerations so long as it is, by its nature, susceptible to a policy analysis.”205 The discretionary function exception “applies ‘even if the discretion has been exercised erroneously’ and is deemed to have frustrated the relevant policy purpose.”206 Whether the employee committed negligence in exercising his discretion “is irrelevant to the applicability of the discretionary function exception.”207 Nor does it matter whether the allegedly tortious action was undertaken “by low-level government officials [or] by high-level policymakers.”208 The critical question is whether a decision at issue is “‘susceptible to policy analysis.”209 The nature of the conduct challenged by the plaintiff—as opposed to the status of the actor—governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.210 As long as the challenged conduct involves the exercise of discretion in furtherance of some policy goal, the discretionary function exception forecloses claims under the FTCA.211 Conversely, where a subjectively discretionary act does not flow from plausible policy objectives, that act does not fall within the discretionary function exception.212 If the first element of the discretionary function exception is satisfied, then courts will generally presume that the second element is satisfied as well.213 The Supreme Court has held that when an “established governmental policy, as expressed or implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising that discretion.”214 Nevertheless, a plaintiff may weighed social, economic, and political policy considerations before acting.” (quoting Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 500 (11th Cir. 1997))). 204 Seaside Farm, Inc. v. United States, 842 F.3d 853, 858 (4th Cir. 2016). See also, e.g., Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1045 (8th Cir. 2019) (“[A]s long as a discretionary decision is susceptible to policy analysis, the [discretionary function] exception applies whether or not [the] defendant in fact engaged in conscious policybalancing.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Jude v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 908 F.3d 152, 159 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Such ‘social, economic, or political’ policy analysis need not have actually occurred in the disputed instance, but rather the decision need only have been theoretically susceptible to policy analysis.”). 205 Gonzalez, 814 F.3d at 1028 (quoting GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States, 286 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002)). See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 809 F.3d 807, 813 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Our inquiry is ‘not whether the decision maker in fact engaged in a policy analysis when reaching his decision but instead whether his decision was susceptible to policy analysis.’” (quoting In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 713 F.3d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 2013))). 206 Pornomo v. United States, 814 F.3d 681, 687–88 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Holbrook v. United States, 673 F.3d 341, 350 (4th Cir. 2012)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (providing that the applicability of the discretionary function exception does not hinge on “whether or not the discretion involved be abused”). 207 Evans v. United States, 876 F.3d 375, 381 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 81 (2018). See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 845 F.3d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the discretionary function exception “shield[s] decisions of a government entity made within the scope of any regulatory policy expressed in statute, regulation, or policy guidance, even when made negligently”) (emphasis added). 208 Chadd v. United States, 794 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015). See also, e.g., Wood, 845 F.3d at 128 (“The analysis also does not depend on whether the conduct was that of a high-level agency official making policy or a low-level employee implementing policy.”). 209 Cangemi v. United States, 13 F.4th 115, 133 (2d Cir. 2021). 210 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984). 211 Evans, 876 F.3d at 380 (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 334 (1991)). 212 See Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 1058, 1083 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The narrow decision to copy [an employer] on a letter acknowledging the withdrawal of Armstrong’s complaint, by contrast, was made after her first complaint was closed and before her last complaint was filed or any investigation was conducted, and did not involve such [policy] considerations.”). 213 Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324. 214 Id. Congressional Research Service 23 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview rebut that presumption if “the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime” at issue in the case.215 Courts assessing the applicability of the discretionary function exception utilize a case-by-case approach.216 Given the fact-intensive nature of the discretionary function inquiry, “deciding whether a government agent’s action is susceptible to policy analysis is often challenging.”217 Nevertheless, examples from the caselaw help illustrate which sorts of governmental actions are susceptible to policy analysis.218 For instance, in the Rich case discussed above,219 the court held that “prisoner placement and the handling of threats posed by inmates against one another are ‘part and parcel of the inherently policy-laden endeavor of maintaining order and preserving security within our nation’s prisons.’”220 The court explained that “factors such as available resources, proper classification of inmates, and appropriate security levels are ‘inherently grounded in social, political, and economic policy.’”221 Accordingly, the court held that BOP’s decision to house the plaintiff with inmates who ultimately attacked him was susceptible to policy analysis, such that the discretionary function exception shielded the United States from liability.222 By contrast, courts have held that decisions motivated solely by laziness or careless inattention “do not reflect the kind of considered judgment ‘grounded in social, economic, and political policy’” that the discretionary function exception is intended to shield from judicial secondguessing.223 For example, the discretionary function exception does not shield “[a]n inspector’s decision (motivated simply by laziness) to take a smoke break rather than inspect” a machine that malfunctions and injures the plaintiff.224 Courts have similarly held that allowing toxic mold to grow on food served at the commissary on a naval base is not a decision influenced by social, economic, or political policy, and that, as a result, the discretionary function exception does not bar a plaintiff sickened by that mold from suing the United States.225 215 Id. at 324–25. 216 E.g., Hajdusek v. United States, 895 F.3d 146, 150 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Shansky v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 693 (1st Cir. 1999)). 217 Id. at 151. 218 See, e.g., Croyle ex rel. Croyle v. United States, 908 F.3d 377, 381-82 (8th Cir. 2018) (“‘[T]he decision to warn is, at its core, a policy decision.’ Likewise, supervising employees typically involves policy considerations.”) (internal citations omitted). 219 See supra “Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary.” 220 Rich v. United States, 811 F.3d 140, 145 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998)). 221 Id. at 146 (quoting Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 1998)). 222 Id. See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he District Court correctly concluded that housing and cellmate assignments are ‘of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.’” (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 2000))); Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1345 (concluding that federal law “does not render the discretionary function exception inapplicable to cases . . . in which a prisoner attacks another prisoner”); Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[B]alancing the need to provide inmate security with the rights of the inmates to circulate and socialize within the prison involves considerations based upon public policy.”). 223 Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984)). 224 Id. at 110–11 (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991)). See also Palay v. United States, 349 F.3d 418, 432 (7th Cir. 2003). 225 See Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177, 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005). Congressional Research Service 24 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview The Intentional Tort Exception Another exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity is known as the “intentional tort exception.”226 An intentional tort occurs “when the defendant acted with the intent to injure the plaintiff or with substantial certainty that his action would injure the plaintiff.”227 A familiar example of an intentional tort is battery—that is, purposeful harmful or offensive physical contact with another person.228 Subject to a significant proviso discussed below,229 the intentional tort exception generally230 preserves the United States’ immunity against claims arising out of            assault; battery; false imprisonment; false arrest; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; libel; slander; misrepresentation; deceit; or interference with contract rights.231 The Supreme Court has observed that this list “does not remove from the FTCA’s waiver all intentional torts” and that the list includes “certain torts . . . that may arise out of negligent”—and therefore unintentional—“conduct.”232 Thus, while the phrase “intentional tort exception” provides a suitable “shorthand description” of the exception’s scope, that moniker is, according to the Supreme Court, “not entirely accurate.”233 226 See, e.g., Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 (2013) (“We have referred to [28 U.S.C.] § 2680(h) as the ‘intentional tort exception.’” (quoting United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 54 (1985))); see also Dickson v. United States, 11 F.4th 308, 313-14 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). 227 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A History of Prima Facie Tort: The Origins of a General Theory of Intentional Tort, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 447, 447 (1990). See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (2012) (noting the “distinction between the intentional torts, such as battery, assault, and false imprisonment, and the non-intentional torts, such as the negligent infliction of physical or emotional harm and strict liability for defective products and abnormally dangerous activities”). 228 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13. 229 See infra “The Exception to the Intentional Tort Exception: The Law Enforcement Proviso.” 230 But see Levin, 568 U.S. at 518 (holding that another federal statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1089(e), “abrogates the FTCA’s intentional tort exception” with respect to torts committed by specified classes of government employees). 231 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 232 Levin, 568 U.S. at 507 n.1. See also Fuller, supra note 17, at 379–80 (observing “that the label ‘intentional tort exception’ is something of a misnomer” because § 2680(h) not only (1) “excludes some torts that courts have held need not always be intentional;” but also (2) “fails to include all intentional torts in the list of excluded causes of action”); Sisk, supra note 17, at 304 (“This exception . . . includes most intentional torts (but perhaps not all, as trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not listed).”). 233 Levin, 568 U.S. at 507 n.1. Congressional Research Service 25 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview The FTCA’s “legislative history contains scant commentary” discussing Congress’s rationale for exempting these categories of torts from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity.234 At least some Members of the Congress that first enacted the FTCA appeared to believe that (1) “it would be ‘unjust’ to make the government liable” for the intentional torts of its employees,235 and (2) “exposing the public fisc to potential liability for assault, battery, and other listed torts would be ‘dangerous,’ based on the notion that these torts are both easy for plaintiffs to exaggerate and difficult to defend against.”236 The intentional tort exception has shielded the United States from liability for serious acts of misconduct allegedly committed by federal officers. In a particularly high-profile example,237 a group of women who were allegedly sexually assaulted by naval officers at the 1991 Tailhook Convention sued the United States under the FTCA “for the sexual assaults and batteries allegedly perpetrated by Naval officers at the Convention social events.”238 The court ultimately ruled that the intentional tort exception defeated the plaintiffs’ claims against the United States, as the alleged sexual assaults constituted intentionally tortious acts.239 The Exception to the Intentional Tort Exception:240 The Law Enforcement Proviso The intentional tort exception contains a carveout known as the “law enforcement proviso”241 that renders the United States potentially liable for certain intentional torts committed by federal investigative or law enforcement officers.242 Congress added this proviso in 1974 “in response to widespread publicity over abuse of powers by federal law enforcement officers.”243 Only the following torts fall within the law enforcement proviso’s ambit:       assault; battery; false imprisonment; false arrest; abuse of process; and malicious prosecution.244 234 Fuller, supra note 17, at 383–84. 235 Id. at 384. 236 Id. 237 See supra “.” 238 Hallett v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 850 F. Supp. 874, 878 (D. Nev. 1994). 239 Id. at 877–78. 240 See Fuller, supra note 17, at 385. 241 See, e.g., Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 52 (2013) (using the phrase). 242 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 243 Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR45732. Public record. Not legal advice.