# Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44984

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** November 23, 2020
- **Citation:** R44984

## Text

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and
Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy
Updated November 23, 2020

Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R44984

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Summary
This report analyzes state-to-state arms sales in the Middle East with a particular focus on U.S.
transfers, as authorized and reviewed by Congress. Arms sales historically have been one
important means for Congress to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. The
information in this report, including sales data, is drawn from a number of official and unofficial
open sources.
Arms sales are an important tool that states can use to exercise their influence. The Middle East
has long been a key driver of the global trade in weapons, to a disproportionate degree relative to
its population. Some states in this heavily militarized and contested region are major arms
purchasers, empowered by partnerships with outside supporters and wealth derived from vast
energy reserves. Others have relied on grants and loans from the United States and other partners
to supplement their more modest resources to meet defense goals. In part due to external
relationships but in some cases increasingly independently, some Middle Eastern countries have
developed military industrial bases that supply some of their own defense needs and/or generate
profits through arms exports.
The United States is the single greatest arms supplier to the Middle East by volume and value,
and has been for decades. However, other major producers like Russia, France, and China are also
key players in the region, and their transfers of some sophisticated but smaller volume and value
items, such as armed unmanned aerial vehicles and air defense systems, may have outsized
effects on regional security. These countries’ respective strategies and goals for arms sales appear
to differ in some ways.
This report considers a number of fundamental questions related to U.S. arms sales to the region,
namely whether such sales have contributed to or achieved stated U.S. policy aims, including
fostering greater intra-regional security and cooperation. The report then explores in greater depth
arms sales, primarily from the United States, to six Middle Eastern states: Egypt, Iraq, Israel,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These states, some of the region’s
largest arms purchasers, have taken a range of approaches to pursuing influence and security in an
unstable region. Some appear to be increasing their commitment to the United States as their
primary security guarantor even as they may be interested both in building up their own domestic
arms production capabilities and in seeking out alternative suppliers. When considering domestic
or non-U.S. procurement, these states may focus on indications of U.S. military or political
commitment to the region and/or U.S. willingness to share technology relative to other potential
suppliers.
This report concludes by considering a number of arms sales-related issues of congressional
interest. Both the executive and legislative branches have constitutional prerogatives regarding
U.S. arms sales, and congressional action related to arms sales has influenced U.S. policy in the
Middle East. Congress requires the executive branch to ensure that sales to regional states not
adversely affect Israel’s military advantage over its neighbors (or qualitative military edge,
QME), and arms transfer policy has figured prominently in debates over several countries and
crises, such as the Saudi-led coalition’s military efforts in Yemen since 2015. Congress also
continues to consider arms sales in the context of broader policy issues, such as human rights.
The report discusses a number of options available to Members of Congress to influence arms
sales to the region, including those related to oversight, reporting requirements, checks on
executive action, and conditions on transfers or funding.

Congressional Research Service

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The Demand for Arms in the Middle East ................................................................................ 1
Overview of Major Outside Suppliers ...................................................................................... 2
Debates over Arms Sales and U.S. Policy in the Middle East .................................................. 3
Have Arms Sales to the Middle East Achieved Their Intended Objectives? ...................... 4
What are Potential Negative Consequences of Arms Sales? .............................................. 9
Impact on U.S. Domestic Industry .................................................................................... 10
History of Congress and Arms Sales in the Middle East ........................................................ 12
Select Country Profiles .................................................................................................................. 14
Egypt ................................................................................................................................. 14
Iraq .................................................................................................................................... 16
Israel.................................................................................................................................. 19
Qatar.................................................................................................................................. 20
Saudi Arabia ...................................................................................................................... 22
UAE .................................................................................................................................. 24
U.S. Policy and Potential Issues for Congress............................................................................... 26
Congressional Oversight: May 2019 Emergency Arms Sales ................................................. 26
Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME) .............................................................................. 30
Saudi-led Coalition Operations in Yemen and Civilian Casualties ......................................... 32
Questions Regarding Use of U.S. Arms ............................................................................ 33
End-Use Monitoring (EUM) ................................................................................................... 34
Possible Illegal Transfer of U.S. Weaponry in Yemen ...................................................... 35
Providing Weaponry to Governments Suspected of Human Rights Violations ...................... 37
CAATSA: Possible Sanctions on Purchasers of Russian Weapons......................................... 39
Outlook.................................................................................................................................... 41

Figures
Figure 1. Arms Deliveries to the Middle East: Value, by Selected Supplier, 1950-2019 ................ 3
Figure 2. Arms Suppliers to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) ....................................... 7
Figure 3. Arms Suppliers to Egypt ................................................................................................ 15
Figure 4. Arms Suppliers to Iraq ................................................................................................... 17
Figure 5. Arms Suppliers to Israel ................................................................................................. 19
Figure 6. Arms Suppliers to Qatar ................................................................................................. 21
Figure 7. Arms Suppliers to Saudi Arabia ..................................................................................... 23
Figure 8. Arms Suppliers to UAE.................................................................................................. 25
Figure A-1. U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East ........................................................................... 43
Figure D-1. Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Select Countries .......................................................... 50
Figure E-1. Total Foreign Military Financing to MENA vs. Global, 1950-2017 .......................... 51

Congressional Research Service

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Tables
Table A-1. U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East ............................................................................. 43

Appendixes
Appendix A. Historical U.S. Arms Sales to the Middle East ........................................................ 43
Appendix B. Selected Resolutions Disapproving of Arms Sales to the Middle East .................... 45
Appendix C. Selected DSCA Major Arms Sales Notifications to Middle East, 2010Present ........................................................................................................................................ 47
Appendix D. Total Proposed U.S. Arms Sales to Selected Countries by Year .............................. 50
Appendix E. Historical Foreign Military Financing (FMF) .......................................................... 51
Appendix F. Past Presidential Usage of Emergency Authorities: Five Case Studies .................... 52

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 60

Congressional Research Service

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Introduction
This report provides an overview of U.S. arms sales to the Middle East.1 The report includes




brief information on U.S. arms sales to the region since the end of the Cold War;
data on current arms sales by country, with in-depth material on several specific
countries, as they relate to regional and global geopolitical developments; and
analysis of how arms sales shape and reflect U.S. policy in the region in light of
actions by Congress and the executive branch.

The data in this report is based on a combination of official and unofficial open-source data
sources, including from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).2

The Demand for Arms in the Middle East
The Middle East is one of the most heavily armed regions in the world, featuring numerous
conflicts or standoffs that involve many states in the region. Israeli leaders, pointing to a series of
perceived threats, assert a continued need to maintain a large and technologically advanced
military. Iran is seen as a threat not just by the United States and Israel, but by nearly every one of
its neighbors in the Persian Gulf (the Gulf); Iran in turn views the United States, Israel, and others
as foes. Ongoing conflicts and instability in places like Yemen, Syria, and Libya demonstrate the
extent to which outside states seek to influence outcomes using their own military forces and
arms transfers to local partners.
Several additional factors have created an enormous demand for arms in the region. Several
countries face transnational terrorist threats and, in some cases, domestic insurgencies. In
addition, some states have large, well-equipped militaries that can influence national arms sales
decisions by virtue of the prominent role they often play in domestic and foreign policy.
Advances in military technology and capabilities have made some legacy systems obsolete,
creating a need for new acquisitions. Some have argued that the importance Middle Eastern
governments evidently ascribe to large weapons purchases stems from the role arms may play in
building international credibility, as well as national pride and identity. These are strong
incentives in a region where political legitimacy is widely contested and where some states
became independent in the early 1970s.3 An increasingly competitive and unstable global
environment also may be a factor, as regional states seek to diversify their arms providers.
By almost every measure, the Middle East is a–if not the–major participating region in the global
arms trade. Sales data show that the Middle East accounted for an estimated 35% of global arms
1 This report uses the terms arms trade, arms sales, and arms transfers interchangeably to refer to the buying and

selling of conventional weapons between states; this report does not consider the black market in arms. In this report,
the Middle East refers to all countries for which the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs has
responsibility in the U.S. government.
2 For more on the long-standing debate over the use of these various sources, and their respective strengths and
weaknesses, see Sen. John McCain, “The Need for Improved Analysis of Conventional Arms Transfers,”
Congressional Record, vol. 139 (April 28, 1993), pp. S8484-S8488.
3 See, for example, Emma Soubrier, “Mirages of Power? From Sparkly Appearance to Empowered Apparatus,
Evolving Trends and Implications of Arms Trade in Qatar and UAE,” in The Arms Trade, Military Services and the
Security Market in the Gulf States: Trends and Implications, David Des Roches and Dania Thafer, eds., Gerlach Press,
2016.

Congressional Research Service

1

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

imports from 2015 to 2019.4 According to these data, between 2000 and 2019, the U.S. has
supplied nearly 45% of the arms imported by Middle Eastern states, far outpacing those from the
next largest suppliers (Russia and France supplied 19.3% and 11.4% of the Middle East’s arms
imports, respectively).5 Recent sales follow established patterns: the Middle East has historically
been of particular importance for the United States as an arms market. U.S. arms sales data shows
that between 1950 and 2017, the Middle East accounted for over $379 billion in U.S. Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) agreements (in current, non-inflation adjusted dollars), representing 51.5%
of FMS agreements worldwide, and over $234 billion in FMS deliveries, representing 45.8% of
FMS deliveries worldwide.6

Overview of Major Outside Suppliers
A small number of actors provide most of the external supply of weapons to the Middle East. By
every measure, the United States has been the single largest seller of arms to the region for over
two decades (before which it contended with the Soviet Union for supremacy in this regard; see
Figure 1). This reflects both the technological superiority of U.S. arms as well as the active U.S.
role in the region. At present, the United States appears to be trying to maintain regional influence
amid conflicting domestic and foreign policy imperatives, namely some public desire for an end
to U.S. military engagements in the region and demands for U.S. attention and military
engagement elsewhere. Many Middle Eastern states appear to view Russia either as a genuine
alternative supplier or as a second option whose presence might increase regional buyers’
leverage with U.S. officials and exporters, even though purchases from Russia could invite
possible U.S. sanctions (see “CAATSA: Possible Sanctions on Purchasers of Russian Weapons”).
Both geopolitical considerations and Russia’s relative comparative advantages appear to motivate
its interest in the region.7 These comparative advantages include weaponry and systems that are
often cheaper than U.S. alternatives, as well as the fact that Moscow does not impose
preconditions on arms sales as the U.S. does, including those related to human rights or secondary
use.8 European suppliers, while less centrally involved with regional arms sales than they were in
past decades, remain players—despite signs that at least some of them appear increasingly
conflicted about profit imperatives versus human rights.9 Export-oriented production helps
maintain the defense industrial base in Europe as in the United States.

4 Pieter Wezeman, et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute, March 2020.
5 CRS analysis of arms transfers data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI’s arms
transfers data are derived from a variety of publicly available sources, some of which are unofficial, and attempts to
capture DCS data in addition to official FMS data. For this reason, there are slight differences in SIPRI’s figures and
those from official U.S. documents. For more on SIPRI’s sources and methods see,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods.
6 CRS analysis of FMS data from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Fiscal Year Series (updated
September 30, 2017). It should be noted that these dollar values for U.S. arms agreements and deliveries to the Middle
East states is significantly undercounted because it excludes U.S. arms delivered under Direct Commercial Sales
(DCS). For more details see, CRS In Focus IF11441, Transfer of Defense Articles: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), by
Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti.
7 See, for example, Richard Connolly and Cecilie Sendstad, “Russia’s Role as an Arms Exporter: The Strategic and
Economic Importance of Arms Exports for Russia,” Chatham House, March 20, 2017.
8 Anna Borschchevskaya, “The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales to the Middle East,” Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, December 2017.
9 See, for example, Beth Oppenheim, “Europe Is at War over Arms Exports,” Foreign Policy, September 18, 2019.

Congressional Research Service

2

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Relative newcomer China may be testing waters in the region and making observations to inform
its own industrial and strategic goals, particularly with regard to the sale of advanced
technologies (such as drones) that many other suppliers to date have been reluctant to sell. While
the volume, value, and sophistication of Chinese sales lag behind even most individual Western
European suppliers, China may be looking to increase its share of the regional arms trade in
coming years. If it does so, some question whether it will be able to continue to remain neutral in
regional rivalries and conflicts.10
Figure 1. Arms Deliveries to the Middle East:
Value, by Selected Supplier, 1950-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.
Note: Total exports by supplier to all Middle Eastern states.11

Looking ahead, experts expect the regional arms market to be increasingly dynamic, with the U.S.
facing increasing competition from other major powers and mid-sized states vying for advantages
in terms of scale, technological innovation, and supplier relationships.12

Debates over Arms Sales and U.S. Policy in the Middle East
Scholars broadly recognize arms sales as an important instrument of state power, even as they
debate the particular effects of arms transfers between nations and the relationship between arms
transfers and interstate behavior.13 States have many incentives to export arms, including
10 See, for example, Daniel Samet, “Missiles, tanks, and fighter jets: China is eyeing more Middle East arms sales,”

National Interest, December 13, 2019.
11 See footnote 7 for methodology details.
12 “From muskets to missiles: The battle for the Middle Eastern arms market is heating up,” Economist, February 13,
2020; “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2019,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 2020.
13 See, for example, David Kinsella, “Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold
War,” American Journal of Political Science 38, No. 3, August 1994; Gregory S. Sanjian, “Promoting Stability or
Instability? Arms Transfers and Regional Rivalries, 1950-1991,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 1999; Cassady

Congressional Research Service

3

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

enhancing the security of allies or partners, constraining the behavior of adversaries, using the
prospect of arms transfers as leverage on governments’ internal or external behavior, and creating
the economies of scale necessary to support a domestic arms industry.14 Congress, by authorizing
and providing oversight of U.S. arms sales, has the potential to shape U.S. policy in the Middle
East. Congressional actions and opinions in specific arms sales cases arguably had a significant
effect on overall policy trajectories.15
In recent years, conflict in the Middle East has highlighted both the important role Congress may
play in shaping U.S. policy in the region (see Yemen, below), and the limits of Congress’s ability
to restrain executive action. Greater congressional scrutiny has delayed deliveries of precision
guided munitions and led to investigations into the possible misuse of U.S. equipment. On the
other hand, to date, no congressionally passed resolution disapproving of an arms sale has been
able to overcome a presidential veto.
Congress may seek to examine: the extent to which U.S. arms sales to the Middle East and related
advisory support have improved U.S. partners’ military capabilities, the benefits and drawbacks
of empowering partner militaries, and the extent to which the United States can achieve its
broader policy objectives given divides on select issues among some of its regional partners and
between the U.S. and some states. Beyond these general policy questions, some in Congress
continue to question whether specific U.S. arms sales to Gulf partners have been consistent with
U.S. statutes and international law.

Have Arms Sales to the Middle East Achieved Their Intended Objectives?
U.S. officials justify arms sales to Middle Eastern states chiefly as a way of building those states’
capacities to contribute to regional U.S. objectives, such as countering terrorism and deterring
Iran. This capacity building is often framed in the context of reducing financial and logistical
demands on the United States. For decades, some executive branch officials and Members of
Congress also have identified some arms sales relationships as supportive of more targeted U.S.
priorities, such as fostering intra-regional cooperation to counter Iran, preventing U.S.
competitors like Russia and China from making inroads in the region, and reinforcing Egypt and
Jordan’s peace treaties with Israel. The record of arms sales in supporting these general and
specific goals has been mixed, and the relative importance of arms sales as a contributing factor is
difficult to quantify.

Have Arms Sales Made U.S. Partners More Capable?
In the Middle East, the United States has sought to use arms sales to bolster partners’ capabilities
to advance major U.S. regional security policy priorities, including countering terrorism, ensuring
free access of the region’s energy resources to global markets, safeguarding U.S. regional
partners’ internal stability, and countering Iran. U.S. arms sales to partners in the Middle East
have demonstrably improved their military capabilities, in some cases dramatically so, as in the
Craft, Weapons for Peace, Weapons for War: The Effect of Arms Transfers on War Outbreak, Involvement, and
Outcomes,” Routledge, 1999.
14 Richard Johnson, “United States Arms Transfer Decision-Making: Determinants of Sales versus Aid,” Peace
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 21, No. 4, 2015.
15 See, for example, Richard Grimmett, “Congress and Foreign Policy Series: Executive-Legislative Consultations on
Arms Sales,” Congressional Research Service, House Foreign Affairs Committee Print, December 1982; and, James M.
Lindsay, “Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 2,
June 1994, pp. 281-304.

Congressional Research Service

4

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

case of Israel. Still, many experts express skepticism about the relative effectiveness of some
national forces as a complement or replacement for U.S. or European military forces, particularly
in the Gulf.16
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have demonstrated an ability to project power beyond
their borders with U.S. and other foreign support, but decades of U.S. arms sales and training
have not created fully independent, logistically self-sufficient, integrated forces in any single Gulf
country or across the Gulf as a whole—a long-standing U.S. goal. One former DOD advisor has
criticized what he views as a U.S. policy approach that is overly focused on arms transfers and
ignores building institutions to use those arms effectively. As he has written:
Most of the United States’ partners in the region lack the defense-institutional capacities
that would enable them to become net security providers and better warriors. Giving them
more tools, when what they really need is to strengthen, and sometimes even build from
scratch, their entire defense and security sectors, is not going to do them much good.17

U.S. officials often frame arms sales to the Middle East, particularly the Gulf, as helping to
reduce the United States’ direct military burden in the region, where the U.S. has a large physical
presence in the form of tens of thousands of troops hosted across several major partners’ bases.
While arms sales and other attempts to develop Gulf militaries might reduce or obviate the need
for the U.S. to maintain such a presence in the future, the increased scale and sophistication of
U.S. arms sales has not, to date, seen an accompanying decrease in the U.S. regional military
footprint.
The geostrategic importance of the resources and waterways of the Gulf region has evolved since
the United States first prioritized expanded partnerships and power projection to the region in the
1970s, including as U.S. domestic energy production has significantly increased. Nevertheless,
forecasts of global energy and security trends—particularly East Asian energy dependence on the
region—could create incentives for the United States to maintain a military footprint in the
Middle East, regardless of U.S. and European energy consumption and Gulf partner capabilities.
Joint U.S.-Middle Eastern military partnerships have yielded mixed results in recent years. U.S.
equipment and training of partner counter-terrorism forces have at times led to successful
operations in places such as Yemen, Iraq, and Tunisia.18 With regard to the United States’ most
significant recent counterterrorism effort, the years-long campaign against the Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL), the participation of Middle Eastern states has varied. While
Iraqi forces, aided by billions of dollars in U.S. training and assistance, were the driving force
behind the Islamic State’s territorial defeat in Iraq, other U.S. regional partners were not major
military participants despite the large amount of U.S. arms and platforms they possess.
Various Gulf countries conducted airstrikes in Syria in 2014 and 2015 as part of the U.S.-led
Counter-IS Coalition, but apparently have not done so in recent years; U.S. partners outside the
region and the United States itself have far outpaced their efforts. Logistical, C4ISR (Command,
Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), and
readiness constraints, along with potential domestic political risks, may have shaped Gulf
countries’ decisions. Similarly, while three Gulf navies participate in the eight-member
International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), inaugurated in November 2019 to provide

16 See, for example, Andrew Exum, “U.S. arms sales to the Gulf have failed,” Atlantic, June 21, 2019.
17 Bilal Saab, “Arms sales can’t replace U.S. engagement in the Gulf,” Foreign Policy, September 20, 2019.
18 William Maclean, Noah Browning, and Yara Bayoumy, “Yemen counter-terrorism missions shows UAE ambition,”

Reuters, June 28, 2016; Lilia Blaise, Eric Schmitt, and Carlotta Gall, “Why the U.S. and Tunisia Keep Their
Cooperation Secret,” New York Times, March 2, 2019.

Congressional Research Service

5

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

maritime security in the Gulf, the United States founded the effort and as of September 2020 a
British naval commander leads it.

Have Arms Sales Supported Cooperation between and among U.S. Partners?
There are deep divisions within the Middle East that potentially complicate U.S. efforts to create
a united front among its regional partners; arms sales do not appear to have ameliorated these
rifts, though they potentially could be used for that purpose. Moreover, the partners to whom the
United States sells arms have policy approaches that differ from some U.S. policies, particularly
regarding Iran, raising questions about the utility of arms sales in furthering U.S. interests. These
dynamics are particularly visible in the Gulf, where fostering unity has been a long-sought, and
long-frustrated, U.S. policy goal.
The most prominent example of these divisions is the ongoing rift in the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) between Qatar and some of its former partners, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain (along with some other Arab states) cut ties
with and began a trade boycott of fellow GCC member Qatar, whose relatively independent
foreign policy and support for Muslim Brotherhood-aligned regional movements had caused
friction with its neighbors before 2017, notably in 2013-2014. U.S., Kuwaiti, and other efforts to
mediate a resolution of the dispute have not succeeded, and speculation about an imminent
resolution of the dispute have not come to fruition.19 In June 2017, then-Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Bob Corker announced that he would withhold preliminary (i.e., prenotification) approval of all future arms sales to GCC states until Congress could obtain “a better
understanding of the path to resolve the current dispute.”20 While acknowledging that the dispute
remained unresolved, Corker lifted his hold in February 2018. There do not appear to have been
any comparable Administration attempts to leverage arms sales to resolve the rift.
Middle Eastern states also have widely divergent views of Iran, with relations ranging from
confrontational to amicable. Saudi Arabia, whose energy infrastructure Iran targeted in September
2019, is engaged in a regional competition with Iran; each side has accused the other of harboring
aggressive sectarian and strategic designs on the other and throughout the region. Similarly, the
Bahraini government accuses Iran of fomenting unrest among Bahrain’s Shia majority. The UAE
generally shares the Saudi view of Iran as a threat and Iran-UAE relations are further complicated
by a territorial dispute. Yet, the two states have significant commercial ties and Emirati officials
have held talks in Iran, including in the past year. The other GCC states maintain relatively
normal ties with Iran: the governments of Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar all communicate regularly
with their Iranian counterparts. In the event of armed conflict between Iran and the United States,
it is unclear how likely these three states, with their U.S.-supplied weapons, would be to
participate militarily.
The differences of views among U.S. partners complicate U.S. efforts to encourage greater
cooperation, including the U.S. initiative to assemble a “Middle East Strategic Alliance” (MESA)
to counter Iran. Egypt withdrew from the initiative in April 2019, reportedly citing concerns about
the effort’s viability and the potential to increase tensions with Iran. The Trump Administration
took emergency action in May 2019 to sell arms to Jordan with the stated purpose of deterring
Iran. While Jordan views certain Iranian regional activities as a threat, however, U.S. arms sales

19 Nabeel Nowairah, “Rethinking U.S. policy toward the fractured GCC,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

May 12, 2020.
20 Eric Schmitt, “Senator Puts Hold on Arms Sales to Persian Gulf Nations Over Qatar Feud,” New York Times, June
26, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

6

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

do not appear to make any more likely the prospect of Jordan playing a major role in counter-Iran
military operations.

Have Arms Sales Deterred U.S. Regional Partners From Cooperating with U.S.
Competitors?
From the perspective of “strategic denial,” U.S. sales do appear to have limited the extent to
which some purchasers of U.S. equipment and training have turned to strategic competitors of the
United States, such as Russia or China, for comparable support. According to recent arms sales
data, the U.S. has supplied nearly 45% of the arms imported by Middle Eastern states between
2000 and 2019, while Russia accounted for 19% and China about 2.5% (see Figure 2).21
For decades, officials in successive Administrations have argued, as President Trump stated in
November 2018, “If we foolishly cancel these contracts [with Saudi Arabia], Russia and China
would be the enormous beneficiaries.”22 Speaking of the importance that U.S. arms sales play in
solidifying U.S. relationships with Middle East partners, CENTCOM Commander General
Kenneth McKenzie said in June 2020 that, “We don’t want [U.S. partners in the Middle East]
turning to China, we don’t want them turning to Russia to buy those systems.”23 As increasing
Chinese armed unmanned aerial vehicle and missile transfers and Russian arms sales to the region
demonstrate, these considerations appear likely to remain relevant.
Figure 2. Arms Suppliers to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

The pipeline of U.S. ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance arguably makes U.S. partner
militaries dependent on the United States for sustained military operations, but possible
21 CRS analysis of arms transfers data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). See footnote

7 for information on methodology.
22 White House, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia, November 20, 2018.
23

“CENTCOM and the Shifting Sands of the Middle East: A Conversation with CENTCOM Commander Gen.
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.”, Middle East Institute virtual panel, June 10, 2020.

Congressional Research Service

7

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

interruptions of U.S. support may carry diplomatic and strategic costs. A partner who the United
States decides to “cut off” could turn to others over time, even with significant sunk costs.
Various countries’ development of their own defense production capabilities, including through
co-production arrangements under arms sales approved by Congress, may erode any existing U.S.
leverage of this type over time.

Have U.S. Arms Sales Helped to Reinforce Regional Peace?
While the prospect of receiving U.S. armaments may not in-and-of-itself be the determining
factor in promoting peaceful relations amongst Middle Eastern nation states, over the past few
decades it has been a factor in reinforcing peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors.
Since the Israel-Egypt 1979 peace treaty, U.S. policymakers have facilitated arms sales to Egypt
to support the related goals of sustaining its close military cooperation with the United States and
peace with Israel. Indeed, successive appropriations acts have made funds available for Egypt
only if the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the treaty. While
U.S. arms represent an incentive for Egypt to uphold the 1979 treaty, Egypt’s ties with Israel are
arguably reinforced more by growing cooperation between the two in other areas of mutual
concern, such as countering terrorism in the Sinai Peninsula and natural gas development in the
eastern Mediterranean.
In the case of Jordan, while there is no comparable statutory requirement conditioning U.S.
assistance on Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel, a number of U.S. policy moves related to
arms were important in supporting the treaty. These moves include Jordan’s acquisition of a
squadron of F-16s in 1996 and its designation as a major non-NATO ally later that year. A State
Department spokesman directly linked the designation to the peace treaty, saying “this new
designation recognizes Jordan’s continued support for peace and underscores the strong
relationship that is growing between Jordan and the United States. And you can trace it back, I
think, to 1994 when President Clinton expressed his determination to support the courageous
stand that King Hussein took in advancing the peace process.”24 Israeli support reportedly helped
overcome some initial congressional hesitance.25
Potential arms sales to the UAE may also have played a role in securing its September 2020
normalization of relations with Israel (Bahrain also established ties with Israel in a series of
agreements collectively known as the Abraham Accords). After the Israeli-UAE agreement was
announced, but before it was signed, Israeli media reported that the UAE had conditioned its
agreement to full normalization with Israel on a major U.S. arms sale package that included,
among other items, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.26 Israeli officials announced in October 2020
that they would not oppose such an arrangement. In mid-November 2020, the Trump
Administration notified Congress of its intent to sell up to 50 F-35s to the UAE, a decision with
potentially dramatic implications for Israel and the region. For more, see “Israel’s Qualitative
24 U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing #184, November 14, 1996. Available at

http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1996/96-11-14.std.html.
25 See Deborah Jones, “Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Jordan: National Security or Peace Process Politics?”
National Defense University, National War College, 1998; Lori Plotkin, “Jordan-Israel Peace: Taking Stock, 19941997,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 1997.
26 Nahum Barnea, “U.S. to Sell F-35 Jets to UAE as Part of Secret Clause in Israel Ties Agreement,” YnetNews.com,
August 18, 2020. For information on the F-35, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by
Jeremiah Gertler. On August 20, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said that an F-35 sale was
not an explicit condition of the normalization deal with Israel, but that the agreement should remove “any hurdles” to
such a sale. “Gantz raps Netanyahu for sidelining him on F-35 policy as UAE deal brewed,” Times of Israel, August
20, 2020.

Congressional Research Service

8

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Military Edge (QME)”, below, as well as CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge
and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and
Jim Zanotti.

What are Potential Negative Consequences of Arms Sales?
Some observers challenge the premise that the United States should export arms to the Middle
East at all, particularly in partnership with non-democracies.
Unpredictability of Local Actors. As policymakers debate the U.S. military “footprint” in the
region, some observers have warned that as the U.S. relies more heavily on local partners to
provide regional security. In their view, this is, in effect, outsourcing the task of maintaining U.S.
deterrence to independent and potentially less capable actors and it increases the risk of instability
and perhaps unintended conflict.27
Human Rights. As some Middle Eastern countries have engaged in regional military operations
using U.S. arms and equipment, critics have argued that these operations have a moral cost–
including the use of those arms that result in the death of civilian noncombatants–and a
detrimental effect on U.S. interests.28 Debate over the war in Yemen, as well as UAE and Qatari
military support for some parties to the conflict in Libya, has attracted particular attention in this
regard during the Trump Administration. Another argument is that weapons provided by the
United States empower undemocratic regimes that repress human rights, fostering the political
instability that is characterized as a threat to U.S. interests.29 Trump Administration officials have
responded to such criticisms by arguing, perhaps more explicitly than their predecessors, that
national security concerns can and should sometimes supersede human rights concerns. In
response to a question about the advisability of the United States partnering with governments
accused of human rights violations, Secretary Pompeo said in an April 2019 hearing,
There’s no doubt that it’s a mean nasty world out there, but not every one of these leaders
is the same. Some of them are trying to wipe entire nations off the face of the Earth. And
others are actually partnering with us to help keep America safe. There’s a difference
among leaders. You might call them tyrants; you might call them authoritarians. But,
there’s a fundamental difference. And therefore, a fundamental difference in the way the
United States should respond.30

Military Balance. Congress has long debated whether and how improving the capabilities and
independent operational capacity of Middle Eastern states might shape the military balance of
power in the region. From the 1970s through the 2010s, some in Congress viewed arms sales to
some Middle Eastern states with significant skepticism and scrutiny, citing fears about potential
threats to the security of Israel.31 In more recent years, Gulf states and others have developed
more overt ties with Israel, thus arguably making Israeli security less of a concern in the debate
27 Fahad Nazer, “Main Obstacle to New US-GCC Partnership May Be GCC Itself,” Atlantic Council, June 3, 2015;

Perry Cammack and Michelle Dunne, “Fueling Middle East Conflicts – or Dousing the Flames,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, March 23, 2018.
28 See, for example, A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, “Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S.
Foreign Policy,” Cato Institute, March 13, 2018.
29 Amnesty International, Arms Transfers to the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for an Effective Arms Trade
Treaty, 2011.
30

CQ Congressional Transcripts, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations Holds
Hearing on Fiscal 2020 Budget Request for the State Department, April 9, 2019.
31 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel’s next security concern: a Middle East arms race,” Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

9

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

on arms sales to those states. The volume of U.S. sales has also contributed to what some
characterize as a regional arms race,32 an issue of longstanding congressional concern.33
Sustainability. Others challenge the long-term financial and political viability of current sales
arrangements within regional states, questioning whether U.S. partners can and should purchase
high volumes of arms or sophisticated, high-cost systems in light of fiscal strains and domestic
obligations. For some U.S. partners, maintaining high levels of arms procurements may result in
less spending on infrastructure, education, and various public services to which populations have
become accustomed in recent decades.34

Impact on U.S. Domestic Industry
The impact of U.S. arms exports on the U.S. economy and domestic job creation has been an
issue of contention. Some have argued that U.S. arms exports are critical to the U.S. economy and
have created a substantial number of American jobs. Others have argued that the economic and
strategic benefits of U.S. arms exports are marginal, especially when weighed against to their
potentially negative impacts.
Trump Administration Reinterprets Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)35
On July 24, 2020, the Trump Administration announced that the United States would reinterpret the multilateral
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to ease export guidelines for some unmanned aerial systems (UAS)
or drones, including armed MQ-9 Reaper drones and other systems. In a factsheet released the same day, the
State Department listed five policy objectives of the change, of which the first was “to increases [sic] trade
opportunities for U.S. companies.”36 Other objectives include bolstering partner capacity and strengthening
bilateral relationships. The move follows previous changes in 2018 and 2019 to facilitate UAS exports. Section
1278 of the House-passed FY2021 NDAA directs the Secretary of State to submit annual reports on the
effectiveness of U.S. efforts to export certain items covered by the MTCR.
U.S. membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) had previously constrained U.S. arms sales,
including in 2015, when it was cited in a letter that indicated the Obama Administration’s intent not to sell certain
drones to Jordan.37 Supporters of the change argued that the restriction on UAS exports allowed China to
develop its industrial base, achieve technological advancements, and establish relationships with U.S. partners.38
Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Jordan have bought Chinese UAS, and several have used them in
combat, including Saudi Arabia (in Yemen) and the UAE (in Libya). Other significant or potential UAS exporters

32 Anna Ahronheim, “Israel’s next security concern: a Middle East arms race,” Jerusalem Post, May 24, 2017.
33 22 U.S.C. §2778(a)(2) directs the President to consider, when evaluating arms transfers, whether, among other

possibilities, their export “would contribute to an arms race.” The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993 (P.L. 102-138), found that, in addition to regional instability and other factors, “the continued
proliferation of weapons and related equipment and services contribute further to a regional arms race in the Middle
East.” Section 404 of the law directed the President to negotiate and then implement a “multilateral arms transfer and
control regime” for the region and further required a number of reports, including annual reports documenting all
transfers to Middle Eastern states and their impact on regional military balance. Those reports were declared obsolete
and discontinued in the FY2017 State Department Authorities Act (P.L. 114-323), which repealed Section 404 of P.L.
102-138. Arms sale notification guidelines require the executive branch to assess the potential effects of proposed sales
on the regional security environment.
34 See, for example, Jaroslaw Jarzabek, “G.C.C Military Spending In Era of Low Oil Prices,” Middle East Institute,
August 2016.
35 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11069, U.S.-Proposed Missile Technology Control Regime Changes, by Paul K. Kerr.
36 U.S. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Policy on the Export of Unmanned Aerial
Systems,” July 24, 2020.
37 Rowan Scarborough, “Obama: No U.S. drones for ally Jordan,” Washington Times, August 19, 2015.
38 See Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Chairman Risch on Administration’s Decision to Modernize the Missile
Technology Control Regime,” July 24, 2020.

Congressional Research Service

10

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

include Israel and Turkey. Opponents condemned the shift as a “reckless” move that increases the risk of
governments using U.S. materiel to abuse human rights.39

As noted above, the U.S. plays a major role in the global arms market; according to one 2020
survey, 42 of the world’s 100 largest defense firms are based in the U.S., including seven of the
top ten.40 Successive U.S. administrations have argued that arms sales play a role in sustaining the
U.S. defense industrial base and that arms sales, in keeping that industry competitive and
innovative, have national security and economic benefits for the United States.41
While the majority of U.S. defense contractors’ business is domestic, exports to Middle Eastern
states have at times played a key role in supporting the United States’ defense industry. Kuwaiti
and Qatari purchases of Boeing’s F-18 and F-15 jets helped keep assembly lines open in St.
Louis, Missouri.42 Similar dynamics have reportedly played out in South Carolina (where
Bahrain’s purchase of 16 F-16s boosted a Lockheed-Martin plant in the state),43 Ohio (where
Saudi orders have sustained General Dynamics tank production in Lima),44 Massachusetts (home
to Raytheon, whose production of the Patriot air and missile defense system was rejuvenated by a
2008 UAE deal),45 and elsewhere. Orders for other systems that remain in use by U.S. forces may
add to orders being placed for U.S. and other partner countries’ purchases, but may not have an
easily identifiable net effect.
More so than its predecessors, the Trump Administration has emphasized the economic benefits
to the United States of selling arms abroad. In the April 2018 National Security Presidential
Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the Administration specified
that when making arms transfer decisions, it would take into account a potential arms sale’s
“financial or economic effect on United States industry and its effect on the defense industrial
base.”46 President Trump often speaks about arms sales as a boon for U.S. workers; in October
2018, he claimed that new arms sales to Saudi Arabia would be worth “over a million” jobs.47
One analyst argues that Saudi arms sales support 40,000 jobs at most, at least some of which are
located outside of the United States (mostly in Saudi Arabia, which, as noted above, is seeking to
boost its own domestic arms industry).48 Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
39 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Menendez Statement on Administration’s Loosening of Regulations to Export

Drones,” July 24, 2020.
40 “Top 100 for 2020,” DefenseNews.
41 U.S. State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade,” July
27, 2020. See also CRS In Focus IF10548, Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base, by Heidi M. Peters.
42 Chuck Raasch, “Boeing jet deal means big boost for St. Louis jobs,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, September 28, 2016;
Joe Gould, “US-Qatar fighter jet sale worth $21B in middle of diplomatic crisis,” Defense News, June 6, 2017.
43 Maayan Schechter, “Lockheed Martin facility in Greenville ‘ideal’ for F-16 shift,” The Greenville News, March 26,
2017.
44
Andrea Shalal-Esa, “Saudi, Egypt orders to keep US tank plant running,” Reuters, May 11, 2012; Rich Smith, “Can a
Massive Saudi Arms Deal Help Save General Dynamics’ Tank Biz?” Motley Fool, August 21, 2016.
45 Ivan Gale, “UAE aids upgrade of Raytheon’s Patriot missile system,” The National, June 29, 2011; Andrea ShalalEsa, “Raytheon sees “never-ending” opportunity in Patriot missile system,” Reuters, August 4, 2013.
46 The White House, National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,
April 19, 2018.
47 White House, “Remarks by President Trump at Defense Roundtable,” October 20, 2018.
48 William Hartung, “U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen,” Center for International Policy,
November 2018. This estimate appears to go back at least several decades; the same figure (“I believe it is, per billion
dollars, about 40,000 jobs”) was referenced by a witness at an October 1981 Senate hearing. Hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, “Arms Sales Package to Saudi Arabia,” October 5, 1981.

Congressional Research Service

11

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Clarke Cooper cited a figure of 5,700 jobs for every $1 billion in arms sales in July 2020. 49An
outside analyst, citing Commerce Department data, estimates that, generally, $1 billion in arms
exports supports about 4,000 jobs, fewer than are supported by other export industries.50
Beyond challenging the scale of arms sales’ economic impact, opponents of specific arms sales
sometimes characterize these potential economic benefits as incommensurate with possible risks
to U.S. national interests. In March 2016, Senator Chris Murphy said of arms sales to Saudi
Arabia,
Ultimately I’m tasked with creating jobs in Connecticut, but first and foremost I’m tasked
with keeping America safe from attack and keeping my state safe from attack. And so the
most sacred obligation you have, right now as a member of Congress, is to prevent another
9-11 attack from happening. And so, to me, the way in which we have sold arms to the
Saudis without requiring them to be a true lasting daily partner in the fight against
extremism really puts our country’s national security in jeopardy. And so, yes, sometimes
you have to make tradeoffs between, you know, economic security and physical security
for the nation. But the latter has to triumph when there’s a conflict.51

History of Congress and Arms Sales in the Middle East
Since the end of World War II, the Middle East has at times featured prominently in congressional
deliberations over U.S. arms sales. Members’ questions over specific arms sales to states in the
region have helped frame the terms of the arms sales debate, and have shaped the broader,
sometimes contentious relationship between the executive and legislative branches over U.S.
foreign policy.
In the aftermath of World War II, the provision of arms became a major area of competition in the
Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. Through arms sales, the two
superpowers sought to reinforce nations within their spheres of influence, and to entice
nonaligned states to support them. The Middle East was one of the most contested regions, with
the United States providing weapons to partners like Saudi Arabia and prerevolutionary Iran, and
Soviet weapons flowing to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.
Some policymakers, reflecting currents within public opinion, reacted to this postwar military
buildup with calls for a more measured approach, leading to the passage of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act in 1961, which began by declaring “a world ... free from the scourge of war and
the dangers and burdens of armaments” to be the fundamental goal of U.S. policy. To achieve this
goal, Congress created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), an independent
agency charged with coordinating research on international arms sales and managing U.S.
participation in international meetings and negotiations convened to discuss arms control.
After the Nixon Administration acted unilaterally with regard to specific arms transactions with
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (P.L. 93559), which laid the basis for the system that still exists in its essential form today.52 The Nelson49 U.S. Department of State, Briefing with Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper on New

Developments in the U.S. Defense Trade, July 24, 2020.
50 Jonathan Waverly, “America’s Arms Sales Policy: Security Abroad, Not Jobs at Home,” War on the Rocks, April 6,
2018.
51 Stephen Snyder, “US senator to Saudis: Stop bombing civilians in Yemen,” PRI, March 16, 2016.
52 Peter Tompa, “The Arms Export Control Act and Congressional Codetermination over Arms Sales,” American
University International Law Review Vol. 1 (1986), p. 294. Legislation with the same name was also passed in 1948
and 1961, among other years.

Congressional Research Service

12

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Bingham Amendment to the act required the President to notify Congress of government-togovernment arms sales above $25 million, after which Congress would have 20 calendar days to
veto the sale by concurrent resolution. Nelson-Bingham was quickly put to the test when the Ford
Administration informed Congress in July 1975 of its intent to sell a number of air defense
missile batteries to Jordan. Congressional concerns over the security of Israel (whose government
opposed the sale), and over the fact that Congress was not consulted in advance, led the Ford
Administration to withdraw the sale. The sale went through later in the year after a number of
modifications mollified those concerns.53 The episode marked an important precedent in the
establishment of congressional prerogatives over arms sales.54
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 94-329)
further refined the process by which Congress reviews arms sales proposed by the executive
branch. As amended by P.L. 99-247, the AECA requires that, for sales over a certain valuation,
the administration must provide formal notification 30 calendar days before taking steps to
conclude the sale, during which time Congress may adopt a joint resolution of disapproval,
which, if signed by the President, will prevent the sale from going forward.55 Dozens of
resolutions of disapproval have been introduced, with the majority related to proposed sales to
Middle East countries (see Appendix B). To date, no sale has been blocked as a result of a joint
resolution of disapproval.
However, in some cases, congressional scrutiny, skepticism, or adoption of such a resolution has
arguably contributed to preventing or delaying arms sales to Middle East countries, or to altering
the terms of sale. For example, after 64 Senators sent a letter to the White House indicating their
opposition to elements of a proposed arms package for Saudi Arabia in 1987, the Reagan
Administration dropped the inclusion of Maverick antitank missiles to secure approval for the
remaining items.56
The closest Congress has come to blocking a sale legislatively came in 1986, when both the
House and the Senate adopted by veto-proof majorities legislation to block a proposed sale of
several hundred Sidewinder, Harpoon, and Stinger missiles to Saudi Arabia. President Reagan
vetoed the legislation (S.J.Res. 316) but decided to drop the Stinger missiles from the sale. This
was enough to save the rest of the deal, the blocking of which failed by a single vote in the
53 Lewis Sorley, Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis (The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 109-

110.
54 Congressional authority over arms sales is constitutionally derived from the commerce clause (Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3) as well as Article 4, Section 3, Clause 1, which grants to Congress the power to “dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting ... Property belonging to the United States,” among others. Presidential power
in this area is not as clearly enumerated and rests on more general executive authorities. For more on the debate over
these concurrent powers, see Tompa, op. cit.
55 After a joint resolution is passed by both the House and the Senate, the measure would next be sent to the President.
Once this legislation reaches the President, presumably he or she would veto it in a timely manner. Congress would
then face the task of obtaining a two-thirds majority in both houses to override the veto and impose its position on the
President. For more information on this process and historical examples thereof, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms
Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr. In the 1983 Supreme Court Case INS vs. Chadha, the Court
ruled unconstitutional the legislative veto, a process by which Congress could overturn Administration decisions
without formally enacting a law, such as concurrent resolutions under the AECA. In 1986, Congress passed P.L. 99247, revising the AECA to replace concurrent resolutions with joint resolutions (which can be vetoed by the President).
Larry Mortsolf, “Revisiting the Legislative Veto Issue: A Recent Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act,”
DISAM Journal (volume 8, issue 4), Summer 1986.
56 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Withdraws Antitank Arms From Saudi Sale,” New York Times, October 9, 1987. For more
examples, see CRS Report R46580, Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge and Possible U.S. Arms Sales to the United
Arab Emirates, coordinated by Jeremy M. Sharp and Jim Zanotti.

Congressional Research Service

13

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Senate, 66-34. More recently, proposed Senate legislation to block specific sales of weapon
systems to Saudi Arabia did not garner sufficient votes to pass in September 2016 (27-71) and
June 2017 (47-53), nor did a similar measure to block a proposed sale to Bahrain in November
2018 (21-77).
The congressional response to the Trump Administration’s May 2019 invocation of AECA
emergency authorities to immediately sell billions of dollars in U.S. weapons to Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Jordan marks a significant moment in the history of U.S. arms sales to the Middle East
(for more see “Congressional Oversight: May 2019 Emergency Arms Sales”, below). On June 5,
2019, a bipartisan group of seven senators introduced Joint Resolutions of Disapproval against
the sales. About two weeks later, the Senate passed those resolutions, followed by the House in
July. President Trump vetoed those measures on July 24, 2020, and the Senate voted not to
override his vetoes. Since the emergency sales, some Members of Congress have proposed
amending that emergency authority to restrict the conditions under which the president may
exercise it.
In June 2020, it was reported that the Trump Administration, frustrated with informal
congressional holds placed on sales to Saudi Arabia and Turkey, may forgo the notice and right of
approval traditionally given to relevant congressional committees before formal arms sales
notifications.57 This informal approval process dates back to February 1976 correspondence
between then-Senate Foreign Relations Committee member Senator Hubert Humphrey and the
Ford Administration. In the midst of congressional proceedings that would lead to the passage of
the AECA later that year, the Administration wrote that, “We will provide advance notification to
the Committees’ staff in writing of all FMS cases under consideration” which “will provide at
least twenty (20) additional days for committee review…before the formal statement required by
Section 36b.” One observer has argued that eliminating the informal committee notification
process “could circumvent congressional oversight,” while also damaging the Administration’s
stated policy objective by “[depriving] the administration of an early opportunity to adjust sales to
reflect congressional concerns, which could actually lead to delays.”58 The Trump Administration
informally notified Congress of its intent to sell F-35s to the UAE on October 29, and submitted
formal notification for that and other UAE sales packages on November 10, 2020, short of the
traditional 30-day period between informal and formal notification.59

Select Country Profiles
Egypt
By one metric, Egypt is the world’s third-largest importer of arms, a product of its status as the
biggest Arab state, its large and politically powerful military, and its strategically important
geographic position (including administration of the Suez Canal).60 First a Soviet client during the
Cold War, Egypt became a major market for U.S. arms in the late 1970s and 1980s, as the United
States sought to entice and then reward and reinforce Egypt’s pivot away from Soviet influence
and its 1979 peace treaty with Israel.
57 Michael LaForgia, et al., “Trump Administration May End Congressional Review of Foreign Arms Sales,” New York

Times, June 25, 2020.
58 LaForgia, et al., op. cit.
59 Engel Statement on Proposed Sale of F-35 Aircraft to UAE, October 29, 2020.
60 “USA and France dramatically increase major arms exports; Saudi Arabia is largest importer,” Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, March 9, 2020.

Congressional Research Service

14

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

As part of this support, Egypt has consistently been one of the world’s highest recipients of
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which it uses exclusively to purchase U.S. weapons. But
political turmoil in Egypt since 2011 and repressive measures that the government of President
Abdel Fattah al Sisi has taken against domestic opponents after Sisi overthrew the elected
government in 2013 have contributed to tension between the United States and Egypt,
complicating bilateral relations. Within this context, Egypt’s government has sought sources of
major defense systems beyond the United States, though sales have risen and some previously
withheld aid has been restored under the Trump Administration (see “Providing Weaponry to
Governments Suspected of Human Rights Violations,” below).61 In 2020, the Administration
notified Congress of a potential sale of $2.3 billion in equipment to refurbish 42 of Egypt’s U.S.origin AH-64E Apache attack helicopters.
From 2010 to 2014, 47% of Egyptian arms acquisitions came from the United States; that figure
dropped to 15% from 2015 to 2019, as France (35%) and Russia (34%) stepped in to fill the gap
(see Figure 3). Most of Egypt’s military assets (including its air fleet) are divided between
higher-end American equipment, Western European imports, and older Eastern European
systems. Although diversification may lessen Egypt’s dependence on any one supplier to some
extent, it also raises the level of complexity Egypt faces in maintaining diverse weapons systems
and juggling multiple supplier relationships. For example, Egypt’s pursuit of some Russian
systems could trigger U.S. sanctions (see CAATSA, below).
Figure 3. Arms Suppliers to Egypt
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

61 Some specific recent transactions illustrate apparent Egyptian attempts to diversify in the aftermath of the Obama

Administration’s reaction to the 2013 military intervention. In February 2014, Egypt signed a $3 billion weapons deal
with Russia. Two months later, the United States went through with a sale of Apache helicopters that had been frozen
because of the 2013 military intervention and its aftermath, although the Obama Administration continued to withhold
delivery of more than a dozen F-16s until March 2015.

Congressional Research Service

15

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Meanwhile, Egypt has strengthened its relationship with European suppliers, especially France,
despite European uneasiness regarding Sisi’s post-2013 crackdown against dissent. Egypt and
France concluded a $5.2 billion deal for 24 Rafale fighter jets in February 2015, and seven
months later, Egypt agreed to buy two Mistral helicopter carriers for more than $1 billion.62 The
two countries signed another agreement, worth more than $1 billion, in April 2016 for additional
ships, fighter jets, and a military satellite communication system.63 It remains to be seen whether
Egypt’s recent purchases from non-U.S. sources will affect its relationship with the United States.
According to one Egyptian officer, “The idea is to diversify armaments either from Russia, the
US, China, or France, and not to rely on one armament source.”64
Egypt’s military record in light
of recent arms purchases is
unclear: in its conflict against
an Islamic State-aligned
insurgency in the Sinai
Peninsula, one account
describes the “intensified
counterterrorism campaign” as
an indicator of Egypt’s military
revival, while another says the
“campaign has been ineffective
at best and counterproductive at
worst.”65

Iraq

Egyptian Arms at a Glance:
Select Platforms and Procurements
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 36 F-4s (US), 240 F-16s (US), 24 Rafales
(France), 91 Mirages (France), 36 MiG-21MFs (USSR), 18 MiG-29s
(Russia), 80 CAC F-7s (China)
Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 22 C-130Hs (US), 3 An-74s (Ukraine),
8 DHC-5Ds (Canada), 24 C295Ms (international)
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 45 AH-64 Apaches (US), 55 SA 342
Gazelles (US), 12 Ka-52S (Russia)
Air defense: 4 Patriot batteries (US); S-300VM (Russia)
Navy: 4-8 submarines (China/Germany), 41 fast-attack craft (35 missile,
6 gun; USSR, Israel, US), 11 frigates (US, China, Spain, France), 2 Mistrals
(France), 4 corvettes (France), 1 missile corvette (Russia)
Artillery: 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (US)
Armored vehicles: 1,130 battle tanks (mostly M1A1s, US), hundreds
of APCs (USSR, US, Egypt)
Total value of all DSCA FMS notifications since 2010: $2.1 billion
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States (41.6%), Russia
(24.7%), France (17.3%), Germany (5.5%), and China (2.7%)
Note: The information in this and the following national
platforms/procurements textboxes is drawn almost entirely from Jane’s.

Iraq has purchased major U.S.
weapons systems and materiel
(with some U.S. FMF and other
assistance), but has also sought
to diversify the sources from
which it obtains arms. As Iraq
struggles to manage U.S.-Iran tensions (and periodic direct conflict within Iraq itself), Russia has
emerged as an alternative supplier for some systems.
From 2011 until 2016, the United States proposed more than $28 billion in foreign military sales
to Iraq, including a $2.3 billion sale of 18 F-16s in 2011; a proposed $4.8 billion sale of 24
Apache helicopters in 2014 has not been implemented.66 U.S. arms sales to Iraq took on greater
urgency after the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL, ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da’esh)
swept into northern Iraq in July 2014, resulting in proposals for $2.4 billion for 175 Abrams tanks
in December 2014 and nearly $2 billion for F-16 munitions in January 2016. During the Trump
62 France originally built the Mistrals for a 2011 deal with Russia, but their delivery to Russia was cancelled after the

imposition of EU sanctions on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine and unilateral annexation of Crimea.
63 Oscar Nkala, “Egypt, France To Sign Arms Deal Mid-April,” Defense News, April 6, 2016.
64 “Egypt Defence Expo highlights Cairo's diversified military strategy,” The National (UAE), December 8, 2018.
65 Robert Springborg and F.C. Williams, “The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes,”Carnegie Middle East
Center, February 28, 2019; William Hartung and Seth Binder, “U.S. Security Assistance to Egypt: Examining the
Return on Investment,” Project on Middle East Democracy and Center for International Policy, May 2020.
66 Figure calculated from DSCA Major Arms Sales Archives.

Congressional Research Service

16

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Administration the United States has proposed one foreign military sale to Iraq, and deliveries
from other countries, notably Russia, have increased significantly. In 2020, reports have
suggested that Iraq’s F-16 program is facing considerable challenges after U.S. contractors
withdrew from the country amid security concerns.67
Figure 4. Arms Suppliers to Iraq
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

According to SIPRI, Russian arms deliveries to Iraq tripled from 2010-2014 to 2015-2019; for the
last period, Russia was the second largest supplier of arms to Iraq (34% of deliveries), behind
only the United States (45%); see Figure 4.68 Iraq has a considerable amount of Russian-origin
equipment, a legacy of its past supply relationship with the Soviet Union. A $4.2 billion arms deal
between Iraq and Russia was announced in October 2012 and was reportedly put on hold a few
weeks later.69One component of the deal, however, an order of Mi-28 Havoc “Night Hunter”
attack helicopters, was delivered and used against the Islamic State.70 In 2020, amid calls from
some Iraqis that U.S. forces leave the country, several Iraqi officials have expressed interest in
additional major arms purchases from Russia, including the S-400 air defense system, with some
indicating that at least preliminary talks have been held.71 Iraq has purchased military unmanned
aerial vehicles from China, but U.S. officials reported in June 2019 that most of these systems
were not operational. Iraq has also finalized major arms purchases from smaller suppliers, such as

67 Ellen Ioanes and Lara Seligman, “Iraqi F-16s Could Be in Jeopardy Amid Iran Tensions,” Foreign Policy, January

30, 2020; Hollie McKay, “Billions wasted? Iraqi pilots claim pricey F-16 program is falling apart,” Fox News, August
26, 2020.
68 “USA and France dramatically increase major arms exports; Saudi Arabia is largest importer,” op. cit.
69 Suadad al-Salhy, “Iraq scraps $4.2 billion Russian arms deal, cites graft,” Reuters, November 10, 2012.
70 “Iraq Receives Final Mi-28 NE Military Helicopters From Russia,” The Moscow Times, June 29, 2016.
71 Ben Kesling and Brett Forrest, “Iraq Considers Purchase of Russian Air-Defense Missile System,” Wall Street
Journal, January 10, 2020.

Congressional Research Service

17

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

South Korea and the Czech Republic; Iraq represents a top-three client for each country’s defense
industry.
Iraqi officials have acknowledged and welcomed Iranian military assistance and advice to their
national security forces since 2014, likening Iranian support to support received from other
foreign parties, including the United States. Iran also supplied some Shia militias that fought the
Islamic State alongside Iraqi forces, and
reportedly arms some forces that operate
Iraqi Arms at a Glance:
outside the official Iraqi command structure.
Select Platforms and Procurements
However, Iraq does not appear to have
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 34 F-16s (US), 18 Supurchased major weapons systems from Iran.
25s (Russia), 10 L-159As (Czech Republic), 4 AC-208Bs
Annex B of UNSCR 2231, which endorsed
(US)
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 3 C-130Es, 6 An-32s
(JCPOA, or Iran nuclear deal), banned Iran
(Ukraine), 6 C-130J-30s
from selling arms.72 The U.N. Security
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 30 Bell 407s
(Canada/US), 24 Mi-24s (Russia), 15 Mi-28s (Russia)
Council considers that ban to have expired as
scheduled on October 18, 2020, although the
Air defense: 24 Pantsyr systems (Russia)
Trump Administration asserts that it has
Navy: patrol craft (Italy, U.S., China)
invoked a provision of Resolution 2231 that
Artillery: 24 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (US)
reimposes all U.N. sanctions on Iran,
Armored vehicles: 255 battle tanks (Czech Republic,
including the ban. For more, see CRS In
US, USSR, France, Italy), 1000+ APCs (US, Ukraine,
USSR, UK, Pakistan)
Focus IF11429, U.N. Ban on Iran Arms
Total value of all DSCA FMS notifications since
Transfers and Sanctions Snapback, by
2010: $33.7 billion
Kenneth Katzman.
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States
(51.7%), Russia (26.3%), South Korea (4.7%), Ukraine
(3.4%), and Italy (2.6%).

As the U.S. role and presence in Iraq shifts,
with the possibility of further military
reductions, the structure and terms of U.S.
security assistance may become an issue of greater prominence in the bilateral relationship.
Reflecting Iraq’s needs, current fiscal difficulties, and status as a major oil exporter, the United
States blends U.S.-funded programming with lending and credit guarantees. Recent FMF
assistance to Iraq has supported the cost of U.S. FMF loans and supports ongoing security
cooperation. In addition, the sale of U.S. arms to the forces of the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) has been approved by Iraqi national government authorities, but sales to both
entities could fuel tensions if KRG-Baghdad relations sour. U.S. officials assess that Iraq is
increasingly capable of operating independently against internal threats posed by the Islamic
State, but Iraq continues to have military capability deficits relative to some of its neighbors and
extra-regional powers.
As with a number of other Middle East partners, Iraq’s human rights record has been a subject of
concern for some Members of Congress. The competence of the Iraqi military in the face of the
Islamic State’s 2014 offensive, when thousands of U.S.-supplied items were captured by IS

72 In February 2014, it was reported that Iraq had agreed, in November 2013, to purchase approximately $200 million

worth of weapons (including mortars, ammunition, and light and medium arms) from Iran, allegedly spurred by
frustration on the part of then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki about the slow pace of deliveries from the United States.
Some observers viewed the deal, which appeared to violate a then-operative U.N. ban on the sale of Iranian weapons to
any other state (UNSCR 1747), as both a message to the United States and a bid for greater support from Iran. Ahmed
Rasheed, “Exclusive: Iraq signs deal to buy arms, ammunition from Iran – documents,” Reuters, February 24, 2014.

Congressional Research Service

18

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

fighters to be turned on Iraqi forces, other anti-IS fighters, and civilians, also has attracted
additional scrutiny (see “End-Use Monitoring (EUM)”).

Israel
Citing concerns about alienating other Middle Eastern states and spurring a regional arms race,
the United States was a limited arms supplier to Israel during its first two decades of existence.73
Israel relied mostly on France for its heavy weaponry, but it also employed some U.S. weapons,
including tanks.
It was not until Israel’s victory against multiple Soviet-backed Arab states in the 1967 Six Day
War that the United States began to reconsider the nature of its support. President Lyndon B.
Johnson secured the sale of F-4 Phantom fighters to Israel in 1968, and the U.S. quadrupled its
aid after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, during which the U.S. airlifted thousands of tons of defense
equipment (including M60 tanks) to Israel. Some have traced U.S. support in part to the growing
organization and effectiveness of U.S. domestic Israel advocacy groups starting in the 1970s.74
Figure 5. Arms Suppliers to Israel
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

Israeli military imports—particularly in the realm of fighter aircraft and missile/missile defense
technology—remain almost exclusively American (see Figure 5). U.S. arms exports, funded at
least in part by large amounts of U.S. aid, help maintain Israel’s military advantage over its
neighbors (see “Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge” below), a reflection of the depth and breadth
of U.S.-Israel ties. Moreover, Israel in 2017 became the first country outside the United States to
receive F-35s, which Israel has since reportedly used in airstrikes in Syria.75 The probability of

73 See Dennis Ross, Doomed to Succeed: The U.S.-Israel Relationship from Truman to Obama (Farrar, Straus and

Giroux, 2015), pp. 43-50.
74 See, for example, Michael Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present
(Norton, 2007), p. 536.
75 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli F-35s to be declared operational in December,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 22, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

19

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

continued Israeli reliance on U.S. weapons and defense technology was demonstrated in the
memorandum of understanding (MOU) the two countries concluded in September 2016. Under
the terms of that MOU, which is the third between the two countries, the executive branch
committed to request that Congress provide $38 billion in military aid over 10 years, from
FY2019 to FY2028. (For more information on the MOU and its terms, see CRS Report RL33222,
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.) The U.S. was responsible for 78% of Israel’s
arms imports from 2015 through 2019, with Germany and Italy following behind.
Israel has an active and growing indigenous arms industry, the development of which has been
subsidized in part by U.S. support. Since FY1984, Israel has been allowed to spend a portion of
its U.S. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assistance on arms produced by Israeli manufacturers
(known as Off-Shore Procurement, or OSP).76 Israel is unique in this regard—no other FMF
recipient can use any of the FMF for domestic procurement.
Although breaking out the exact role of U.S.
OSP funding in the development of the Israeli
arms industry is difficult, Israel’s defense
contractors have become competitive with
other global leaders: from 2015 to 2019, Israel
was the world’s 8th highest arms exporter, not
far behind such traditional suppliers as the
United Kingdom, supplying nations such as
India, Azerbaijan, and Vietnam. Some
observers have raised concerns, going back to
the late 1970s, about possible Israeli violations
of the conditions under which U.S. assistance
is provided, including the potentially
unauthorized retransfer of U.S.-provided
weapons to third-party states.77

Qatar

Israeli Arms at a Glance:
Select Platforms and Procurements
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 59 F-15s (US), 219 F16s (US), 20 F-35s (US)
Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 7 C-130J-30s, 14 C130s, 8 Boeing 707s (US)
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 45 AH-64 Apaches
(US)
Air defense: 4 Patriot batteries (US); 10 Iron Dome
batteries (US/Israel), David’s Sling (US/Israel, unknown
number) Arrow I and Arrow II (US/Israel)
Navy: 5 submarines (Germany), 38 fast-attack craft (10
missile, 28 gun; Israel), 3 missile corvettes (US/Israel)
Artillery: 350 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (US)
Armored vehicles: 1,030 battle tanks (Israel/US), 385
Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs, US/Israel)
Total value of all Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
notifications since 2010: $9.6 billion
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States
(81.8%), Germany (15.3%), Italy (2.6%), Canada (0.2%),
and France (0.1%).

Located between its larger and more powerful
neighbors Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of
which have sought to exert significant
influence over Qatar’s regional relationships,
Qatar has sought to solidify its relationship with the United States. According to one source,
Qatar views U.S. support as “adequate compensation for appearing too close an ally to

76 See, for example, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Report No. 97-028, “Israeli Use of

Offshore Procurement Funds,” November 22, 1996, at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/fy97/97-028.pdf. Under the
terms of the MOU for U.S. military aid to Israel for FY2009-FY2018, that level was set at 26.3%, which is around
$815 million of its FMF allocation of $3.1 billion. However, OSP will be phased out by FY2028 (with the phase-out
beginning in FY2024) under the terms of the new MOU signed in September 2016. The September 2016 MOU reduces
funding for OSP from $815 million in FY2019 to $450 million in FY2025 to $0 in FY2028. For more information, see
CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
77 Duncan Clarke, “Israel’s Unauthorized Arms Transfers,” Foreign Policy 99, Summer 1995; Ila L. Hahn, “Managing
U.S. Military Technology and Arms Release Policy to Israel,” Air Command and Staff College Air University Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2009. For more, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M.
Sharp.

Congressional Research Service

20

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Washington.”78 Qatar has had a formal defense cooperation agreement with the United States
since 1992; the agreement was renewed for 10 years in December 2013.79 Qatar hosts the United
States’ 379th air expeditionary wing and a number of other U.S. and coalition assets at Al Udeid
Air Base, including U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Combined Air Operations Center.
Figure 6. Arms Suppliers to Qatar
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

Despite its small size and population, Qatar is increasingly recognized as an influential regional
player, due in no small part to the growing array of military assets its considerable resource
wealth allows it to obtain. France was traditionally Qatar’s main arms provider, with hundreds of
millions of dollars in weapons provided throughout the 1980s and 1990s. However, prior FranceQatar deals were surpassed and possibly superseded by a 2015 announcement that Qatar and the
Qatari Arms at a Glance:
Select Platforms and Procurements
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 9 Mirage 2000s (France), 23 Rafales
(France)
Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 8 C-17As (US), 4 C-130J-30s (US)

78 “Qatar- External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – The Gulf States, August 7, 2017.
79 Before the close U.S.-Qatar relationship developed, the two countries contended with one another in the late 1980s

when Qatar rejected U.S. demands that it return Stinger missiles that it had obtained on the black market from Iran,
which had in turn captured the missiles from anti-Soviet Afghan fighters transiting Iran. Qatar’s desire for Stinger
missiles reportedly stemmed from U.S. plans to sell the missiles to Bahrain, with which Qatar had a border dispute until
2001. Michael Wines and Doyle McManus, “Gulf State of Qatar Gets Missiles,” Los Angeles Times, March 31, 1988;
Elaine Sciolino, “Qatar Rejects U.S. Demand for Return of Illicit Stingers,” New York Times, June 28, 1988. In
response, Congress included in the FY1989 Foreign Operations appropriations bill (P.L. 100-461) a provision
(§566(d)) banning any U.S. arms agreements with Qatar until the president notified relevant congressional committees
that the missiles had been returned. That provision was repealed in the FY1991 measure (P.L. 101-513, § 568(b)),
passed in late 1990 in the run up to the Gulf War.

Congressional Research Service

21

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

United States were proposing to
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 11 SA 342 Gazelles (international),
enter into a transaction for up to 72
7 AH-64s (US)
F-15QA aircraft worth over $21
Air defense: 10 Patriot PAC-3 batteries (US)
billion; a letter of offer and
Navy: 7 fast-attack craft – missile (France, UK)
acceptance for 36 jets, worth $12
Artillery: 22 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (France)
billion, was signed in June 2017.
Armored vehicles: 70 battle tanks (Germany, France), 188 APCs
The F-15QAs, in addition to 24
(US, France)
Eurofighter Typhoons (announced
Total value of all DSCA FMS notifications since 2010: $47.9
in December 2017, with deliveries
billion
expected in 2022) and 36 French
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States (52.9%), France
Rafales (deliveries ongoing through
(30.7%), Germany (7.7%), Italy (2.3%), and China (2%).
2022), are likely to dramatically
boost Qatari air capabilities (see
Figure 6). One analysis describes
the boost as “overdue and overambitious,” given Qatar’s evident intent to strike a course
independent from its neighbors and the challenge that training and sustaining such a large force
may present.80
Recent deals with Qatar are emblematic of another factor important to U.S. military operations:
interoperability. Reportedly, one of the reasons Qatar wanted to buy U.S. fighters to partially
replace its French-made Mirages, “was because they discovered how difficult it was for their
existing fighter aircraft to fly with the U.S. air force as part of coalitions over Libya and Syria.”81

Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia has been one of the largest purchasers of U.S. arms by value and volume, though
decades of U.S.-Saudi weapons transactions have at times been accompanied by public
controversy and vigorous congressional debate.
The Obama and Trump Administrations have notified Congress of proposed arms sales with a
potential aggregate value of more than $120 billion from 2009 to the present, reflecting the
putative importance of Saudi Arabia to U.S. strategy in the Middle East. The technologically
advanced and often historic amounts of arms transfers both reflect and reinforce U.S.-Saudi ties.
The relationship has been challenged by historic differences such as official Saudi animosity to
Israel (which has declined somewhat); more recent tensions include U.S. concerns regarding
Saudi domestic governance, actions with regard to international terrorism, and the kingdom’s
regional power projection (such as the war in Yemen).

80 Qatar – Air Force, Jane’s, last updated April 16, 2020.
81 Andrew Exum, “What Progressives Miss About Arms Sales,” Atlantic, May 23, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

22

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Figure 7. Arms Suppliers to Saudi Arabia
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

Though the United States remains Saudi Arabia’s largest arms provider (see Figure 7), the
kingdom has tried to diversify its arms sources, including through a concerted effort in recent
years to expand its own defense industrial base. In May 2017, shortly before President Trump’s
visit, then-Deputy Crown Prince (and now
Crown Prince) Mohammed bin Salman
Saudi Arms at a Glance:
announced the creation of a governmentSelect Platforms and Procurements
owned company called Saudi Arabian
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 150 F-15s (US), 67
Military Industries (SAMI) to manage
Tornados (Europe), 71 Typhoons (Europe)
production of air and land systems, weapons Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 47 C-130s (US), 4
and missiles, and defense electronics
CN235s (Spain)
(perhaps in imitation of the UAE’s much
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 47 AH-64 Apaches (US)
more established state arms conglomerate,
Air defense: Patriot PAC-2 (US)
the Emirates Defense Industries Company
Navy: 9 fast-attack craft (US), 7 frigates (France), 4
or EDIC; more below). The establishment of missile corvettes (US)
SAMI represents a step toward the
Artillery: 161 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (US)
government’s goal that 50% of Saudi
Armored vehicles: 833 battle tanks (US), 1850 APCs
military procurement spending be domestic
(UK, France)
by 2030.82 Several parts of a potentially
Total value of all DSCA FMS notifications since
high-value package of arms sales announced 2010: $133.9 billion
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States (60.6%),
during the President’s May 2017 visit
U.K. (18.2%), France (8.4%), Spain (2.3%), and Germany
include arrangements for the actual
(2%).
production of certain items to be carried out
in Saudi Arabia. For example, a $6 billion
agreement between Lockheed Martin and the Saudi Technology Development and Investment

82 Shuja al-Baqmi, “Saudi Arabia Launches ‘SAMI’ for Military Industries,” Asharq Al-Aqsat, May 18, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

23

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Company (known by its Arabic acronym, TAQNIA) includes plans for the assembly of 150
Blackhawk helicopters in Saudi Arabia.83
U.S. reluctance or inability to share sensitive military technology has periodically opened
opportunities for other suppliers like Russia, with which Saudi Arabia reportedly has engaged in
talks regarding a potential purchase of the S-400 air defense system (see “CAATSA: Possible
Sanctions on Purchasers of Russian Weapons,” below). China has also contemplated greater arms
sales to Saudi Arabia, partly a legacy of its reported covert ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia
in the 1980s.84 On a state visit to Beijing in March 2017, King Salman and President Xi Jinping
signed a series of agreements worth $60 billion, including a deal to construct a Chinese factory in
the kingdom that will manufacture military UAS for Saudi Arabia’s expanding drone fleet.85
Saudi Arabia has deployed armed Chinese-made drones in Yemen.

UAE
U.S. arms are central to the UAE’s growing military capabilities (see Figure 8); major sales from
the United States include the purchase of 80 F-16s in 2000 and an additional 30 in 2014.86
Moreover, the UAE’s purchase of the THAAD missile defense system, initially proposed in 2008
and approved in late 2011, represented the first sale of the system abroad. However, like its close
ally Saudi Arabia, the UAE appears to be attempting both to diversify its sources of arms imports
and build up domestic production capacity, partly in response to concerns about U.S. policy.

83 “Saudi-US arms deal includes plans for 150 Lockheed Martin Black Hawk helicopters,” Arab News, May 20, 2017.
84 Reportedly, China covertly sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s. Richard Strauss, “Saudi Arabia’s

Chinese Missiles: Another Log on the Middle East Fire,” Los Angeles Times, April 10, 1988.
85 “China’s Saudi drone factory compensates for US ban,” Middle East Eye, March 29, 2017; Ian Armstrong, “What’s
Behind China’s Big New Drone Deal?” The Diplomat, April 20, 2017.
86 Wade Boese, “U.A.E. to Receive 80 F-16s With Features More Advanced Than Similar U.S. Jets,” Arms Control
Today, April 1, 2000; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed ‘Little
Sparta,” Washington Post, November 9, 2014.

Congressional Research Service

24

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Figure 8. Arms Suppliers to UAE
Value and Rank, by Supplier, 2000-2019

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), importer/exporter total trend-indicator value
(TIV) tables. Figure created by CRS.

In response to previous U.S. reluctance to sell the UAE long-sought F-35s due to concerns about
Israeli security,87 the Emiratis evidently had started looking elsewhere, specifically Russia, for
advanced combat aircraft. Media reporting indicates that the two nations signed an agreement in
the spring of 2017 to develop a fifth-generation fighter jet, along with a separate purchase by the
UAE of Russian Sukhoi Su-35 fighters.88 Some speculated that the UAE’s engagement with
Russia was intended to gain U.S. concessions on F-35s or other possible transactions due to U.S.
concerns regarding Russia-UAE arms dealings.89 In November 2020, several months after Israel
and the UAE announced an agreement to normalize their relations, the Trump Administration
notified Congress of its intent to sell the UAE up to 50 F-35s, along with $10 billion in munitions
(see “Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME),” below).

87 Andrea Shalal-Esa and William Maclean, “Gulf buyers eye future purchases of Lockheed’s F-35 jet,” Reuters,

November 21, 2013.
88 Andrew O’Reilly, “Russian sale of fighter jets to UAE highlights shift toward Kremlin amid U.S. hesitancy,” Fox
News, March 2, 2017.
89 Tony Osborne, “UAE Leaning to Russia Could Be Price of U.S. Arms Sale Inaction,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 27, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

25

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

UAE Arms at a Glance:
Select Platforms and Procurements
Fixed-wing combat aircraft: 79 F-16s (US), 59
Mirage 2000s (France)
Fixed-wing transport aircraft: 8 C-130s (US), 7
CN235s (Spain), 8 C-17As (US)
Rotary-wing combat aircraft: 18 AS 550 Fennecs
(Europe), 30 407 MRHs (U.S./Canada), 19 AH-64
Apaches (US), 12 AS 350s (France)
Air defense: 2 THAAD batteries (US)
Navy: 9 corvettes (Germany, UAE, Italy), 26 fastattack craft (Germany, UAE)
Artillery: 165 155 mm self-propelled howitzers (US)
Armored vehicles: 502 battle tanks (France, Italy),
682 APCs (Turkey, France, Spain, Finland/Poland)
Total value of all DSCA FMS notifications since
2010: $23.7 billion
Top Five Suppliers, 2000-2019: United States
(52.7%), France (25.8%), Russia (5%), Italy (2.5%), and
Spain (1.8%).

In addition, after having been rebuffed in its
attempts to purchase armed drones from the
United States, the UAE reportedly purchased
Chinese surveillance drones which it has
outfitted with targeting systems and operated
in Libya and Yemen.90 In November 2020,
alongside the F-35 notification, the Trump
Administration formally proposed selling up
to 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones to the UAE.

In terms of its indigenous arms industry, the
UAE has been described as “the most
promising of the Arab candidates seeking to
gain emerging arms producer status.”91
Established in 2014 from the consolidation of
a number of state-owned firms, the Emirates
Defense Industries Company (EDIC)
represents an attempt not just to become less
reliant on foreign suppliers, but also to
diversify the Emirates’ still largely
hydrocarbon-based economy. Some observers
point out that “domestic demand and consumption will dominate the formative years of
indigenous industrial development,”92 but already EDIC has signed contracts with foreign
customers from Algeria to Russia to Kuwait.93 The use of UAE equipment, including locally
made armored vehicles, assault rifles, and personnel carriers, has figured prominently in the
Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen. The UAE is also active in Libya, where it has reportedly
operated drones and attack helicopters, perhaps in violation of a U.N. arms embargo.94

U.S. Policy and Potential Issues for Congress
The countries above and their respective approaches to arms acquisitions affect U.S. foreign
policy objectives and congressional interests in multiple ways. This section outlines related issues
that Congress may consider via the legislative process (including authorization and
appropriations) and/or oversight.

Congressional Oversight: May 2019 Emergency Arms Sales
On May 24, 2019, the Trump Administration formally notified Congress of immediate foreign
military sales and proposed export licenses for direct commercial sales of training, equipment,
and weapons with a possible value of more than $8 billion, including sales of precision guided
90 Jeremy Page and Paul Sonne, “Unable to Buy U.S. Military Drones, Allies Place Orders With China,” Wall Street

Journal, July 17, 2017; “How the UAE’s Chinese-made drone is changing the war in Yemen,” Foreign Policy, April
27, 2018.
91 Florence Gaub and Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “Defence industries in Arab states: players and strategies,” European
Union Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 141, March 2017.
92 Theodore Karasik and Adam Dempsey, “UAE Struggling to Build World Class Defense Industry?” Lexington
Institute, April 26, 2017.
93 Zoe Stanley-Lockman, “The UAE’s Defense Horizons,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2, 2017.
94 Aidan Lewis, “Covert Emirati support gave East Libyan air power key boost: U.N. report,” Reuters, June 9, 2017.

Congressional Research Service

26

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

munitions (PGMs) to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the transfer of PGMs by the UAE to Jordan.
Other notified sales include F-15 Engines and Support for Saudi Arabia and Javelin Anti-Tank
Missiles and Patriot Guidance Enhanced Missiles for the UAE.
In making the notifications, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo invoked emergency authority
codified in sections 36(b)(l), 36(c)(2), 36(d)(2), and 3(d)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA), as amended (22 U.S.C. 2776). The AECA provides for 15- and 30-day congressional
review periods for arms sales, leases, and transfers meeting specific value and recipient criteria.95
However, if the President states in a formal notification to Congress that “an emergency exists”
requiring the sale, export license, or technical assistance and manufacturing license of arms and
related materiel, “in the national security interests of the United States,” that notification waives
the requirements for congressional review. The President is then free to proceed with the sale,
export, or licensing. The President must provide Congress at the time of this notification a
“detailed justification” for his/her determination. In at least five other cases, past Administrations
have used AECA emergency authorities to immediately sell arms to foreign partners, at times
generating debate in Congress over the cases in question and the broader availability and use of
the authorities by the executive branch.96
The arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan came amid heightened U.S.-Iranian tensions
and renewed attacks by the Yemen-based Houthis against Saudi infrastructure.97 In the
justification for the use of emergency authority under the AECA, Secretary of State Pompeo
wrote to Congress that:
Iranian malign activity poses a fundamental threat to the stability of the Middle East and
to American security at home and abroad…. The rapidly evolving security situation in the
region requires an accelerated delivery of certain capabilities to U.S. partners in the
region…. Such transfers, whether provided via the Foreign Military Sales system, or
through the licensing of Direct Commercial Sales, must occur as quickly as possible in
order to deter further Iranian adventurism in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East.

Some Members expressed support for the proposed sales, while others reacted with statements of
concern.98
On June 12, 2019, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing to examine the sales. In
his opening statement, Chairman Eliot Engel described the invocation as “an abuse of authority”
and an attempt by the Administration to “cut Congress out of the picture.” He argued that the
emergency described by the Administration was “phony,” saying that
...a real emergency would require weapons that can be delivered immediately. If you need
them right now you want weapons that can be delivered immediately, not months or even
years from now as these do. A real emergency would require weapons that have already
95 For more background on congressional review procedures, see CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional

Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr and CRS In Focus IF11197, U.S. Arms Sales and Human Rights: Legislative Basis
and Frequently Asked Questions, by Paul K. Kerr and Liana W. Rosen.
96

The AECA emergency authority was invoked once by the Carter Administration, to sell arms to Saudi-backed North
Yemen in 1979; once by the Reagan Administration, to sell missile systems to Saudi Arabia in 1984; twice by the
George H. W. Bush Administration, first to sell tanks and aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1990, then to sell a Patriot fire unit
to Israel and repair parts and logistical support services to Saudi Arabia in 1991; and once by the George W. Bush
Administration, to export Sentinel radar assemblies and related equipment to the U.S. Armed Forces in Kuwait in 2003.
97 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11212, U.S.-Iran Tensions Escalate, by Kenneth Katzman.
98 See, for example, Senator Tom Cotton, Senate debate, Congressional Record, vol. 165, No. 99 (June 13, 2019), pp.

S3454-S3457.

Congressional Research Service

27

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

been built and are relevant to whatever the immediate threat is. A real emergency would
not justify building new factories in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to
manufacture weapons that have been built in the United States for years and years. A real
emergency would not be followed by our Defense secretary telling us the threat has now
diminished.99

The sole witness, Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper,
defended the emergency invocation in a number of ways. First, he pointed to various acts of
aggression attributed, either directly or via its proxies, to Iran by the Administration, as well as an
uptick in classified “threat streams” tracked by U.S. intelligence. Cooper also described as
“equally important” the need to “[reassure] our partners that we have not abandoned them or that
we have left them to carry the full load of responsibility in the region,” citing various
coproduction arrangements included in some of the emergency sales. Finally, Cooper implied that
an informal hold placed in 2018 by Senator Robert Menendez on the notification of planned
direct commercial sales to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was partially responsible
for the Administration choosing to invoke the emergency authority.100 Under established interbranch arrangements, the Trump Administration had respected Senator Menendez’s objection and
abstained from proceeding with the formal notification of the sales, which would have triggered a
formal thirty day review period. Assistant Secretary Cooper argued that the Administration was
no longer willing or able to do so, in part because, in its view: “the protracted process did
contribute to the conditions that necessitated the emergency.”
Some Members expressed skepticism of the Administration’s explanation of the emergency
invocation, and several Members asked the witness questions about the fact that some systems
notified for sale in May 2019 might not be delivered for months if not years. According to a State
Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) report obtained and made public by Politico in
August 2020, the value of the $8.1 billion package is about evenly divided between direct
commercial sales and foreign military sales (14 cases worth $4.2 billion and 8 cases worth $3.9
billion, respectively).101 The OIG report states that, as of the time of its review, foreign partners
had taken delivery of 4 of 22 cases (including precision-guided munitions), including $20 million
of the $3.9 billion in potential foreign military sales. Furthermore, the OIG report relays an
estimate from the State Department that delivery on 5 of 22 cases would not begin until 2020.
The OIG also reports that Department staff first proposed invoking the emergency authority on
April 3, 2020, in response to a directive from Secretary Pompeo to expedite arms transfers on
which Members of Congress had placed informal holds (15 of 22 cases were under such holds).102
99 CQ Congressional Transcripts, “House Foreign Affairs Committee Holds Hearing on Emergency Arms Sales,” June

12, 2019.
100 See Senator Menendez Letter to Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, June 28, 2018.
Available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/download/rm-letter-to-pompeo-mattis-uae-yemen.
101
Jacqueline Feldscher and Nahal Toosi, “State Department did not consider civilian casualties when sending arms to
Middle East, report finds,” Politico, August 11, 2020. Report is available at https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000173df44-d479-af73-ff5e7dd00000.
102 After President Trump removed State Department Inspector General Steve Linick from office on May 15, 2020,
reports emerged that Linick had been looking into issues surrounding the May 2019 emergency determination. Press
reports alleged that Linick’s investigation suggested that Secretary Pompeo had “disregarded…high-level officials” in
the Administration who advised against it. Lara Seligman, et. al., “Senior officials advised against emergency arms
sales to Saudis,” Politico, May 20, 2020. After a seven-hour interview with Linick on June 3, several House committee
heads released a statement saying that Linick had testified that Secretary Pompeo had refused an interview with Linick
about the case, and that Linick had faced inappropriate pressure to drop the investigation. U.S. House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Engel, Maloney, Menendez, Connolly & Castro Statement on IG Linick’s Interview, June 3, 2020. In
response, Secretary Pompeo called Linick a “bad actor” whose work did not improve the Department. Michelle

Congressional Research Service

28

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Legislative Responses. On June 5, 2019, a bipartisan group of seven senators introduced 22
separate Joint Resolutions of Disapproval against the sales. One cosponsor, Sen. Lindsey Graham
(R-SC), expressed in a statement his concern about “the precedent these arms sales would set by
having the Administration go around legitimate concerns of Congress.”103 On June 20, the Senate
passed three measures to disapprove of (a) the proposed coproduction and manufacture of
Paveway PGMs in Saudi Arabia (S.J.Res. 36); (b) the sale of Paveway PGMs to Saudi Arabia
(S.J.Res. 38); and (c) the other 20 sales notified on May 24 (20 resolutions en bloc) by margins of
53-45, 53-45, and 51-45, respectively. The House passed three of the resolutions on July 17; the
three resolutions were vetoed on July 24 by President Trump, who cited the threat posed by
Iranian support to Yemeni’s Houthi movement and described Saudi Arabia and the UAE each as a
“bulwark against the malign activities of Iran and its proxies in the region.” A simple majority of
Senators voted to override President Trump’s vetoes on July 29, but the required two-thirds
majority was not reached and the sales were able to proceed.
On June 18, the House voted to approve an amendment to the FY2020 Defense Appropriations
Act (H.Amdt. 371 to Division C of H.R. 2740) to prohibit the use of funds made available by the
Act for the issuance of export licenses for any defense article or service named in the 22
emergency sale notifications. The amendment was included in the House-passed version of the
bill as Section 11005. That provision, however, was not included in the FY2020 Defense
Appropriations Act signed into law in December 2019 (Division A of H.R. 1158).104
Beyond attempts to block the specific emergency sales notified in May 2019, some Members
have considered and proposed changes to the underlying authority in the AECA. In the June 12,
2019, House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Chairman Engel suggested that Members “have
to strongly consider changing the Arms Export Control Act’s emergency provision.”
In the Senate, Senator Menendez proposed an amendment to the FY2020 National Defense
Authorization Act (S.Amdt. 295 to S. 1790) that would have changed the AECA’s emergency
provisions in several ways. First, emergency sales could only be made to NATO member states
and five other close U.S. allies (including Israel), and could not be made to any countries engaged
in significant transactions with the Russian defense sector. Second, the president would have to
submit with the emergency determination a detailed explanation of how the waiver “directly
responds to or addresses the circumstances of the emergency cited in the determination.” Lastly,
emergency sales would only be permitted if they “directly respond to or counter a physical
security threat” and if 75% of the sale is delivered within two months of the determination.
Senator Menendez introduced another amendment (S.Amdt. 296) that would have immediately
terminated all emergency determination-related arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and
amended the AECA in the same way as S.Amdt. 295. Neither measure was included in the final
FY2020 NDAA, nor were similar measures included in the House- or Senate-passed version of
the FY2021 NDAA. Senator Menendez also introduced the Saudi Arabia False Emergencies Act
(or the SAFE Act, S.1945), the text of which is identical to S.Amdt. 295 (except for the Russian
defense sector-related provision) in June 2019; it was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but no floor vote has been scheduled or held. House Rules Chairman Jim McGovern
Kelemen, “Ex-State Department Inspector General Says He Was Given No Valid Reason When Fired,” NPR, June 10,
2020. Linick was succeeded by Stephen Akard, who himself resigned in August 2020, shortly before the OIG report
mentioned above was transmitted to Congress; a temporary OIG, Matthew Klimow, was announced in September
2020.
103 Joe Gould, “Graham, Menendez offer action to thwart Trump arms sales to Saudi, UAE and Jordan,” Defense News,
June 5, 2019.
104 See Kylie Atwood, “Defense spending bill stripped of proposals that would have been tough on Saudi Arabia,
sources say,” CNN, December 13, 2019.

Congressional Research Service

29

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

proposed an amendment to the FY2021 National Defense Authorization Act (House Rules
Committee Amendment 582) that would have limited the emergency authority to items delivered
within two months and to items produced in the United States, but the amendment was not made
in order for consideration on the floor.

Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME)
The term “qualitative military edge” (QME) was embraced by the Reagan Administration and its
successors to refer to the advantage in military technology that Israel, with a smaller territory and
population than some of its historical adversaries, seeks to maintain.105 The concept stems from
traditional security concerns about Israel’s Arab neighbors, with whom Israel engaged in
numerous conflicts over the course of several decades. No formal definition in law existed until
lawmakers codified U.S. support for Israel’s QME as U.S. policy in 2008 (P.L. 110-429, §201).106
That legislation requires that any proposed U.S. arms sale to “any country in the Middle East
other than Israel” must include a notification to Congress with a “determination that the sale or
export of such would not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to
Israel.” It defines QME as
the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any
individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining
minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in
sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are
superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or
non-state actors.

During its review of several planned sales over the years, Congress has considered Israeli
concerns about arms transfers to some Arab states, including a 1981 sale of Airborne Warning and
Control System (AWACS) surveillance planes (which ultimately occurred) and a 1986 effort to
sell several classes of missiles, both to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Israeli concerns over plans to
sell certain precision-guided weapons to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states delayed a
major arms sales package that the George W. Bush Administration contemplated in 2007.107
Israel views Iran as a top security challenge, a view shared by Saudi Arabia and other historic
Israeli adversaries in the region. Still, concerns about Israeli security have influenced
consideration of potential U.S. arms agreements in recent years. Some suggested that “Israel
sought to leverage” a large sale of F-15s to Qatar in 2016 to boost the amount of military
assistance it was negotiating with the United States.108 The new U.S.-Israel 10-year memorandum
of understanding (MOU) was signed in September 2016; the State Department formally notified
105 In a 1981 statement for the record in response to questions from the House Appropriations Subcommittee on

Foreign Operations Appropriations, then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig said, “A central aspect of US policy since
the October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative military edge.” Secretary of State Al Haig,
Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence Long, House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981.
106 Some have argued that the lack of a legal definition and “ambiguity on the part of multiple U.S. administrations”
may have been intentional.” William Wunderle and Andre Briere, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel’s Qualitative
Military Edge: The Need for a Common Vision,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2008.
107 David S. Cloud and Helene Cooper, “Israel’s Protests Are Said to Stall Gulf Arms Sale,” New York Times, April 5,
2007.
108 Julian Pecquet, “Will Congress pick Qatar over Israel?” Al-Monitor Congress Pulse, March 10, 2016. Then-Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Corker stated in July 2016 that “when the [long-term] MOU [for U.S. aid
to Israel] is completed, hopefully as part of that, or shortly thereafter, these sales [to Qatar] will be completed.”

Congressional Research Service

30

Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy

Congress about the Qatar sale on November 17, 2016. In addition, the large package of arms sales
to Saudi Arabia announced during President Trump’s May 2017 visit to the kingdom reportedly
raised Israeli anxieties, with advocacy groups voicing concern and several ministers suggesting
that the United States did not consult with Israel in advance.109 Still, opposition to the Saudi
proposal appeared muted in comparison to similar packages proposed in the past.110
The August 2020 announcement that Israel and the UAE have agreed to normalize relations,
followed by the September 2020 normalization of relations between Israel and Bahrain, has
implications for Israel’s QME and its impact on future U.S. arms transfers. Media reports indicate
that the United States, as part of negotiations over Israeli-UAE normalization, supported the sale
of a number of technologically advanced platforms to the UAE, most notably the F-35 but also
armed MQ-9 Reaper drones and EA-18G Growler jets.111 The UAE Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs said that the UAE’s desire for F-35s preceded the agreement with Israel by many years
and that, “We ought to get them…. And now the whole idea of, you know, a state of belligerency
or war with Israel will no longer exist. So I think it should be…easier.”112 Israeli Prime Minister
Binyamin Netanyahu denied reports that he had agreed not to oppose a U.S-UAE arms sale.
Despite continuing debate within Israel regarding such a sale in the context of the QME issue,
Netanyahu and Defense Minister Benny Gantz issued a joint statement in October 2020, stating,
“Since the U.S. is upgrading Israel’s military capability and is maintaining Israel’s qualitative
military edge, Israel will not oppose the sale of these systems [F-35 and others] to the UAE.”113
On November 10, 2020, the State Department formally notified Congress of the Administration’s
intention to sell up to 50 F-35s, along with 18 MQ-9 drones and $10 billion in munitions, to the
UAE.
Some who welcome the normalization of Israel-UAE ties have cautioned against the U.S. selling
F-35s to the UAE, warning that circumstances and regional dynamics can change, giving friendsturned-adversaries access to advanced weaponry.114 Others emphasize the risk that further
dissemination of sensitive U.S. technology increases the odds of it falling into the wrong hands.115
For its par

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44984. Public record. Not legal advice.