# Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44897 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** July 17, 2017 - **Citation:** R44897 ## Text Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Asian Affairs Updated July 17, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R44897 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Summary This report examines human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and policy options for Congress. The PRC government under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping has implemented a clampdown on political dissent, civil society, human rights activists and lawyers, and the religious, cultural, and linguistic practices of Tibetans and Uyghurs. Other major human rights violations in China include the practice of incommunicado detention, torture of persons in custody, censorship of the Internet, and restrictions on the freedoms of religion, association, and assembly. The era of Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, who was China’s leader from 2002 to 2012, was marked by serious human rights abuses, but also by an emerging civil society of nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups, a growing number of human rights activists and lawyers, and the rise of limited investigative reporting and public discourse on social media platforms. Despite moving forward with some policies aimed at reducing rights abuses and making the government more transparent and responsive, Xi has implemented new laws that appear to strengthen the role of the Communist Party and the state over a wide range of social and civil society activities in the name of national security, and instated greater government controls over the media and the Internet. Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been temporarily detained, arrested, sentenced to prison terms, or placed under heavy surveillance in what is known as the “7-09 Crackdown.” Human rights conditions in the PRC long have been a central issue in U.S.-China ties. According to some analysts, the Trump Administration has indicated a partial departure from the Obama Administration’s approach toward human rights in China, which some analysts say suggests less emphasis on human rights in U.S. dealings with Beijing. The issue of human rights is not among the “four pillars” of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during discussions between President Trump and President Xi at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. In a speech to State Department employees in May 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that “guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated.” He also said, “If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests.” Congress and successive Administrations have developed an array of means for promoting human rights and democracy in China, often deployed simultaneously. Policy tools include open censure of China; quiet diplomacy; congressional hearings and legislation; funding for rule of law and civil society programs in the PRC; support for dissidents and prodemocracy groups in China and the United States; sanctions; bilateral dialogue; Internet freedom efforts; public diplomacy; and coordinating international pressure. Another high-profile policy practice is the U.S. government issuance of congressionally mandated country reports, including reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons. Many experts and policymakers have sharply disagreed over the best policy approaches and methods to apply toward human rights issues in China. Possible approaches range from supporting incremental progress and promoting human rights through bilateral and international engagement, to conditioning the further development of bilateral ties on improvements in human rights in China. Some approaches attempt to balance U.S. values and human rights concerns with other U.S. interests in the bilateral relationship. Other approaches challenge the underlying assumption that U.S. human rights values and policies may involve trade-offs with other U.S. interests, arguing instead that human rights are fundamental to other U.S. objectives. Congressional Research Service Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress For additional information, including policy recommendations, see CRS Report R41007, Understanding China’s Political System; the Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Annual Report 2016; the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016; and other resources cited in the report. Congressional Research Service Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Assessing Human Rights and Democracy in China ........................................................................ 4 Public Opinion and Democracy ................................................................................................ 6 U.S. Policy Questions and Options ................................................................................................. 7 Crackdown on Dissent.................................................................................................................... 11 Arrests of Rights Lawyers and Activists ................................................................................. 12 Selected Prominent Cases ................................................................................................. 12 Civil Society .................................................................................................................................. 15 New PRC Laws ............................................................................................................................. 16 National Security Law............................................................................................................. 16 Cybersecurity Law .................................................................................................................. 17 Counterterrorism Law ............................................................................................................. 17 Overseas NGO Law ................................................................................................................ 18 Charity Law............................................................................................................................. 19 Family Violence Law .............................................................................................................. 19 Frequently Raised Human Rights Issues ....................................................................................... 19 Ongoing Human Rights Issues: Selected Examples ............................................................... 20 Rule of Law ............................................................................................................................. 21 Criminal Justice ................................................................................................................ 22 Forms of Detention ........................................................................................................... 23 Torture ..................................................................................................................................... 23 Prisoners of Conscience .......................................................................................................... 25 Liu Xiaobo ........................................................................................................................ 25 Gao Zhisheng .................................................................................................................... 27 Xu Zhiyong ....................................................................................................................... 27 Media Freedom ....................................................................................................................... 28 The Internet ....................................................................................................................... 28 Weibo and WeChat............................................................................................................ 30 Religious Freedom and Ethnic Minority Issues ...................................................................... 31 Christians .......................................................................................................................... 33 Tibetans ............................................................................................................................. 34 Uyghur Muslims ............................................................................................................... 39 Falun Gong .............................................................................................................................. 42 Organ Harvesting Allegations ................................................................................................. 43 China’s Family Planning Policies ........................................................................................... 45 U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China .......................................................................... 46 Legislation and Hearings......................................................................................................... 47 Global Magnitsky Act ............................................................................................................. 48 Human Rights, Rule of Law, and Civil Society Programs ...................................................... 49 National Endowment for Democracy ...................................................................................... 49 Sanctions ................................................................................................................................. 50 Human Rights Dialogue .......................................................................................................... 51 Internet Freedom ..................................................................................................................... 52 International Broadcasting ...................................................................................................... 53 United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) ................................................................. 53 Congressional Research Service Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Joint Statement on Human Rights in China ............................................................................ 55 Appendixes Appendix. Selected Legislation Related to Human Rights in China ............................................. 56 Contacts Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 58 Congressional Research Service Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Introduction Human rights conditions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) long have been a central issue in U.S.-China relations. The two governments’ different perceptions of human rights are an underlying source of mutual misunderstanding and mistrust. Frictions over human rights issues affect other issues in the bilateral relationship, including those related to economics and security. China’s weak rule of law and restrictions on the Internet affect U.S. companies doing business in the PRC. People-to-people exchanges, particularly educational and academic ones, and collaboration among U.S. and PRC nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are hampered by periodic Chinese government campaigns against “Western values” and restrictions on foreign NGOs, as well as on the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly. For some U.S. policymakers, human rights conditions in China represent a test of the success of overall U.S. policy toward the PRC. They argue that the U.S. policy of cultivating diplomatic and economic ties with China has failed to promote meaningful political reform and improvements in human rights, and that without progress in these areas, China’s foreign policy is likely to become more aggressive, and mutual trust and cooperation in other areas of the bilateral relationship will remain difficult to achieve. They contend, furthermore, that the long-standing, overarching policy of U.S. engagement with China, which they say focuses on other U.S. interests, particularly economic ones, at times acts at cross purposes with U.S. efforts to support human rights.1 Others opine that U.S. economic engagement with China has helped to strengthen the communist regime through the legitimacy and resources that economic development has provided, and thereby lessened the impetus for fundamental political reform.2 Other experts, by contrast, maintain that U.S. engagement has helped to accelerate economic and social transformations that create the necessary conditions for political reform and improvements in rights protections in China, particularly over the long term. They add that change in China’s human rights policies will come mostly from within, and that Washington has little direct leverage over such developments and Beijing’s actions.3 Since the end of the 1980s, following the 1989 military suppression of prodemocracy demonstrators in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing, successive U.S. Administrations have employed broadly similar strategies for promoting human rights in China. Some analysts have referred to the U.S. foreign policy approach of promoting human rights and democracy in China through diplomatic and economic engagement, without directly challenging Communist Party rule, as a strategy of seeking China’s “peaceful evolution.”4 PRC leaders long have been 1 Rep. Christopher H. Smith, Cochair, Opening Remarks before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; James Mann, Statement before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; Daniel Blumenthal, “Tiananmen’s Anniversary Is a Chance for Obama to Fight for Human Rights in China,” Foreign Policy, June 4, 2014; “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?” The Atlantic, June 13, 2013. 2 “Capitalism Is Making China Richer, But Not Democratic,” NPR, November 7, 2014. 3 Wilson Center, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, “The Value of Values: Reconsidering the Role of Human Rights in U.S.-China Relations,” April 20, 2016; Simon Denyer, “Will the U.S.-Cuba Opening Mirror Engagement with China?” Washington Post, December 20, 2014; Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Tiananmen at 25: Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political Development,” May 20, 2014. 4 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016; Warren Christopher, Secretary of State under the Clinton Administration (1993-1997), stated: “Our policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political liberalization in that Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 1 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress suspicious of any U.S. efforts that they perceive as part of a long-term plan to subvert their rule through “peaceful evolution.”5 President Bill Clinton favored an approach that he and members of his Administration called “constructive engagement”—furthering diplomatic and economic ties while pressing for open markets, human rights, and democracy—calling it “our best hope to secure our own interest[s] and values and to advance China’s.”6 President George W. Bush also came to view U.S. engagement as the most effective means of promoting U.S. interests as well as freedom in the PRC.7 Both Bush and President Barack Obama emphasized that China’s respect for international human rights norms would benefit China’s own success and stability.8 The Obama Administration attempted to forge bilateral cooperation on many fronts, while “managing differences” with China on issues including human rights.9 Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the Administration’s human rights policy as one of “principled pragmatism.”10 This approach was based upon the premise that tough but quiet diplomacy is both less disruptive to the overall relationship and more effective in producing change than public censure. Nonetheless, the Obama Administration publicly criticized China’s human rights policies on many occasions.11 Some human rights groups and policymakers have criticized the Trump Administration’s “transactional” focus on U.S. security and economic interests in foreign affairs, while appearing to downplay human rights issues or preferring to raise them quietly.12 They criticized Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for not appearing in person as his predecessors had done to publicly announce the release of the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in March 2017, and the Trump Administration for not signing a joint letter, signed by 11 other countries, that denounced China over its alleged torture of detained human rights lawyers and activists.13 In a speech to State Department employees on May 3, 2017, Tillerson stated that “guiding all of our foreign policy actions are our fundamental values: our values around freedom, human dignity, the way people are treated.” He also stated, “If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests.”14 Some great country.” Warren Christopher, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 13, 1993. 5 Baogang He, “Working with China to Promote Democracy,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2013. 6 “Clinton Defends ‘Constructive Engagement’ of China,” CNN.com, October 24, 1997. 7 “Transcript of Bob Costas’ Interview with President George W. Bush,” PRNewsChannel.com, August 11, 2008; “Bush Woos China on Trade,” BBC News, May 30, 2001. 8 Department of State, “Press Conference Following U.S.-China Human Rights Dialogue,” Beijing, China, August 2, 2013; Ewen MacAskill and Tania Branigan, “Obama Presses Hu Jintao on Human Rights During White House Welcome,” Guardian.co.uk, January 19, 2011; Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “Obama Pushes Hu on Rights but Stresses Ties to China,” New York Times, January 19, 2011. 9 Zachary Keck, “Kerry: US-China Ties ‘Most Consequential in the World,’” The Diplomat, November 5, 2014. 10 Charley Keyes, “U.S. Is ‘Pragmatic’ with China, Russia,” CNN, December 14, 2009; Hillary Clinton, Georgetown University, December 14, 2009, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/hillaryclintonhumanrightsagenda.htm. 11 See, for example, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China in Joint Press Conference,” Great Hall of the People, Beijing, China, November 12, 2014. 12 “A Coldly Transactional China Policy; Donald Trump’s First Meeting with Xi Jinping Was All About Business,” Economist.com, April 8, 2017; Kevin Liptak, “Trump Signals He Won’t Press Human Rights Ahead of Key Diplomatic Week,” CNN, April 2, 2017. 13 Nahal Toos, “Rubio Chides Tillerson over Absence on Human Rights Report’s Launch,” Politico.com, March 2, 2017; Simon Denyer and Emily Rauhala, “Eleven Countries Signed a Letter Slamming China for Torturing Lawyers. The U.S. Did Not,” Washington Post, March 22, 2017. 14 Rex. W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, “Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees,” Washington, DC, May 3, Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 2 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress observers criticized this approach. In an opinion piece published on May 8, 2017, for example, Senator John McCain stated: In a recent address to State Department employees, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said conditioning our foreign policy too heavily on values creates obstacles to advance our national interests.... To view foreign policy as simply transactional is more dangerous than its proponents realize. Depriving the oppressed of a beacon of hope could lose us the world we have built and thrived in. It could cost our reputation in history as the nation distinct from all others in our achievements, our identity and our enduring influence on mankind. Our values are central to all three.15 In March 2017, Tillerson, on his first official trip to China, stated in closing remarks that he was there to forge a “constructive and results-oriented relationship between the United States and China” and that he “made clear that the United States will continue to advocate for universal values such as human rights and religious freedom.”16 Senators Ben Cardin and Marco Rubio, in a letter to the Secretary of State, noted that Tillerson made “only one public mention of human rights concerns in the context of the bilateral relationship” during his visit to Beijing, and urged him to make human rights a “top priority” in discussions with PRC officials during the meeting between President Trump and President Xi in April 2017 at Mar-a-Lago.17 Secretary Tillerson, in a briefing to reporters following the Trump-Xi meeting, stated that during the talks, which some observers described as “coldly transactional,” Trump “noted the importance of protecting human rights and other values deeply held by Americans.”18 While no mention was made of specific issues, Tillerson added that human rights “occupied a core of all of our discussions.” The issue of human rights, however, was not listed among the “four pillars” of the new U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue that was established during the discussions.19 During his March 2017 visit to Beijing, Secretary Tillerson reportedly pressed Chinese officials on the case of U.S. citizen Sandy Phan-Gillis, who had been detained in China since March 2015 on espionage charges.20 A few weeks after the April 2017 meeting between Trump and Xi, PhanGillis, a business consultant and cultural ambassador from Houston who had made frequent trips to China, was sentenced by PRC authorities to three-and-a-half years in prison and then deported to the United States.21 Some observers believe that the case of Phan-Gillis may signal a shift in U.S. human rights policy that may emphasize U.S. citizens detained in China and focus less on 2017. 15 “John McCain: Why We Must Support Human Rights,” New York Times, May 8, 2017. 16 Department of State, “Remarks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at a Press Availability,” Beijing, China, March 18, 2017. 17 “Cardin, Rubio Call on Tillerson to Raise Human Rights Concerns with Chinese President Xi,” Congressional Documents and Publications, April 4, 2017. 18 “A Coldly Transactional China Policy; Donald Trump’s First Meeting with Xi Jinping Was All About Business,” op. cit. 19 “Briefing by Secretary Tillerson, Secretary Mnuchin, and Secretary Ross on President Trump’s Meetings with President Xi of China,” White House Press Releases and Documents, Palm Beach, Florida, April 7, 2017. The four pillars of the newly established U.S.-China Comprehensive Dialogue are: the diplomatic and security dialogue; the comprehensive economic dialogue; the law enforcement and cybersecurity dialogue; and the social and cultural issues dialogue. 20 Lomi Kriel, “China Sentences Houston Businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis in Spying Case,” Houston Chronicle, April 26, 2017. 21 Dui Hua Foundation, “Dui Hua Welcomes Return of Sandy Phan-Gillis to the United States,” April 28, 2017; “China Convicts American as Spy,” Dow Jones, April 26, 2017; Lomi Kriel, “China Sentences Houston Businesswoman Sandy Phan-Gillis in Spying Case,” Houston Chronicle, April 26, 2017. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 3 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Chinese dissidents and prisoners of conscience.22 In February 2017, U.S. officials reportedly assisted the family of Chinese human rights attorney Xie Yang, whose youngest daughter is a U.S. citizen by birth, as his wife and two daughters were attempting to leave Thailand for the United States. The U.S. government has employed an array of efforts and tactics aimed at promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in China. The effects of these efforts primarily have been evident along the margins of the PRC political system. Congressional policy tools include open letters to the Administration and to Chinese leaders in support of human rights or critical of PRC policies; hearings; funding for foreign assistance programs in China and U.S.-based groups that promote human rights; meetings with Chinese dissidents and human rights lawyers; raising human rights issues during official visits to China; and sanctions. Executive branch options include diplomatic negotiations and formal dialogues focused on human rights issues; public diplomacy programs; international broadcasting; and coordination of international pressure. Another high-profile practice is the issuance of congressionally mandated country reports, including reports on human rights, religious freedom, and trafficking in persons. Many analysts have observed that China’s leaders have become less responsive to international pressure on human rights in recent years.23 Other experts, however, have emphasized that the treatment of some prominent Chinese dissidents and rights activists by PRC authorities may have been less severe than it might otherwise have been in part as a result of international attention and pressure.24 Assessing Human Rights and Democracy in China The PRC government is led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), whose rule is referenced in the preamble to China’s Constitution. The PRC Constitution provides for many civil and political rights, including, in Article 35, the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and demonstration. Other provisions in China’s constitution and laws circumscribe or condition these rights and freedoms, however, and the state restricts these freedoms in practice. China’s leaders typically view these rights as subordinate to their own authority and to the policy goals of maintaining state security and social stability, promoting economic development, and providing for economic and social rights. They assert that perspectives on human rights vary according to a country’s level of economic development and social system, implying that human rights are not “universal,” in contrast to statements by some U.S. government officials that have emphasized “universal rights.” PRC leaders frequently denounce foreign criticisms of China’s human rights record and policies as interference in China’s sovereign, internal affairs.25 Nearly 30 years after the 1989 demonstrations for democracy in Beijing and elsewhere in China and the subsequent military crackdown, the Communist Party remains firmly in power, through both coercive measures and highly publicized efforts to improve governance. Many Chinese citizens have attained living standards, educational and travel opportunities, access to information, and a level of global integration that few envisioned in 1989. Little progress, however, has been made in most areas of political freedom and civil liberties. China’s leaders 22 “China Lawyer’s Family Says US Helped Them Flee,” The Telegraph, May 8, 2017. 23 John Kamm, Dui Hua Foundation, “China’s Human Rights Diplomacy: Past, Present, Future,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2014. 24 Simon Denyer, “In China, Signs that Global Pressure May (Sometimes) Get Results,” Washington Post, January 2, 2016; Sophie Richardson, “Underestimating Bad Faith,” Human Rights Watch, July 9, 2014; Sophie Richardson, “EU Brings Some Transparency to Dialogue with China,” Human Rights Watch, December 9, 2014. 25 See Wang Yi, “Work Together to Promote and Protect Human Rights, China Daily, February 27, 2017. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 4 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress have rejected institutional reforms that they perceive might undermine the CCP’s monopoly on power, and continue to respond forcefully to signs and instances of autonomous social organization, independent political activity, and social instability. They seek to prevent the development of linkages among individuals, social groups, and geographical regions that they perceive as having potential political impact. The government maintains severe restrictions on unsanctioned religious, ethnic, and labor activity and groups, political dissidents, and human rights lawyers. Government authorities have imposed harsh policies against Tibetans, Uyghurs, and practitioners of Falun Gong. As CCP General Secretary and State President Xi Jinping took over the reins of power in 2012 and early 2013, there was a period of cautious optimism and discussion in intellectual circles in China about the need for political reform and how to address these issues.26 However, Xi has carried out a crackdown on political dissent and civil society, reversing what appeared to some observers to be a trend toward increased tolerance of mild criticism of government policies, the exchange of some news and opinion on social media, some advocacy by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and legal actions against officials on behalf of some aggrieved citizens.27 Many citizens who had openly discussed political issues, engaged in political or social activism, attempted to defend dissidents or human rights activists in court, or tried to expose some China and U.N. Human Rights corrupt officials have been punished.28 Xi’s Covenants focus on national security and the perception China has signed (1997) and ratified (2001) the of civil society as a threat to Communist Party International Covenant on Economic, Social, and rule appear to be driven in part by the Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and signed (1998), but not ratified, the International Covenant on Civil and daunting political challenges that he faces, Political Rights (ICCPR). including persistent political corruption; a slowing national economy; rising popular expectations; severe environmental pollution; unrest in Tibet and violent clashes in Xinjiang; and the growing popular attraction to organized religions, which some of China’s leaders contend may undermine their authority.29 In some ways, the PRC central government has continued to demonstrate a measure of responsiveness toward popular and expert opinion, reflecting a style of rule that some experts refer to as “responsive authoritarianism” or “consultative authoritarianism,” and what PRC leaders refer to as “consultative democracy.”30 The CCP has striven to meet the demands and expectations of many Chinese citizens for competent and accountable governance and fair 26 Jamil Anderlini, “How Long Can the Communist Party Survive in China?” Financial Times, September 20, 2013. 27 James Fallows, “China’s Great Leap Backward,” The Atlantic, December 2016; Tom Mitchell, “Xi’s China: Smothering Dissent,” Financial Times, July 27, 2016. 28 Robert Daly, “China in 2014: The Three Rs,” CNN.com Blogs, December 16, 2013; Zachary Keck, “Four Things China Learned from the Arab Spring,” The Diplomat, January 4, 2014. 29 David Ignatius, “China’s Xi Jinping Consolidates Power and Brings Stability,” Washington Post, February 28, 2014; Willy Lam, “Xi Consolidates Power at Fourth Plenum, but Sees Limits,” China Brief, vol. 14, no. 22, November 20, 2014; David Shambaugh, “Obama in China: Preserving the Balance,” transcript, Brookings Institution, November 5, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20141105_obama_china_transcript.pdf. 30 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.; Jessica Teets, “Civil Society and Consultative Authoritarianism in China,” The 7th Annual Conference on U.S-China Economic Relations and China’s Economic Development, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, November 21, 2014; David M. Lampton, “How China Is Ruled: Why It’s Getting Harder for Beijing to Govern,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2014; Robert P. Weller, “Responsive Authoritarianism,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2008. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 5 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress application of the laws, while some policymaking processes have become more inclusive. In recent years, the PRC government has implemented some legal and institutional reforms aimed at preventing some rights abuses and making the government more transparent and responsive. The state has limited repressive measures largely to selected key individuals and groups, although the scope of those targeted has widened under President Xi. Many citizens continue to enjoy “everyday freedoms” and appear to remain supportive of the regime.31 Although public protests in China are common, they largely are focused upon local economic and environmental issues rather than national political ones.32 Public Opinion and Democracy Some experts believe that, over the long term, economic development will lead to democratization in China, as it already has in other East Asian societies, such as South Korea and Taiwan.33 They posit that the growing urban middle class, a manifestation of such development, will likely be a key agent of political change.34 According to other analysts, however, China’s burgeoning middle class has not yet become a catalyst for democracy, despite its members’ growing awareness of their interests and in some cases their participation in public protests.35 Third National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020)36 In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted in June 1993, the World Conference on Human Rights recommended that all countries develop national action plans identifying steps whereby they would strive to improve the promotion and protection of human rights.37 The PRC released its first human rights action plan in 2009. The third action plan was released in September 2016.38 The plan includes sections on economic, social, and cultural rights, civil and political rights, and the rights of specific groups, including ethnic minorities and women. Part II, Civil and Political Rights, addresses some of China’s most pressing human rights issues. It includes commitments toward preventing torture in police and administrative custody, abiding by the rules and regulations on places of surveillance, reducing judicial interference, and implementing the principle of presumption of innocence. Part II also includes the objectives of expanding citizens’ right to know and enlarging public involvement in legislation. 31 “The Rise of ‘Everyday Freedoms’ in China,” Al Jazeera, June 2, 2016; Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit. 32 “NYT Correspondent: Substantive Political Change Unlikely Anytime Soon,” Asia Society, March 8, 2017; “Officials Call For Calm Amid Mass Pollution Protests in China’s Hubei,” Radio Free Asia, June 27, 2016; “Chinese Blogger Who Compiled Protest Data Missing, Believed Detained,” Radio Free Asia, June 21, 2016; Brendon Hong, “China’s Hidden Protests,” The Daily Beast, January 5, 2016. 33 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit.; Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (1959). Lipset argued that socioeconomic development, including higher levels of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education, are correlated with democracy. 34 Henry S. Rowen, “When Will the Chinese People Be Free,” in Andrew J. Nathan, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds, Will China Democratize? Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013; J. Stapleton Roy, Former U.S. Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Tiananmen at 25: Enduring Influence on U.S.-China Relations and China’s Political Development,” May 20, 2014. 35 Jie Chen, A Middle Class Without Democracy, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 36 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020), September 29, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/29/c_135722183.htm. 37 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “World Conference on Human Rights,” 14-25 June 1993, Vienna, Austria, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/PlansActions/Pages/PlansofActionIndex.aspx. 38 “National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2016-2020),” Xinhua, September 29, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-09/29/c_135722183.htm Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 6 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Some public opinion polling suggests that in China, economic development has been weakly correlated with democracy, and that Chinese define democracy differently from most Americans. In a study published in 2016, one U.S. scholar found that a plurality (27%) of Chinese respondents in a survey viewed democracy as government that is “governed by and for the people,” but fewer than 40% perceived of democracy in terms of either competitive elections, rights and freedoms, or equality and justice.39 In many ways, according to some studies, members of China’s middle class are dependent upon the state for their material well-being and are not prone to agitate for democracy if they perceive that their economic needs are being met. They value social and political stability, which they believe the Communist Party can provide, and have expressed some fear of grassroots democracy.40 Many Chinese reportedly are generally satisfied with the level of democracy in their country and are optimistic that the level of democracy they enjoy will rise in the future. This sentiment causes some Chinese to resent foreign criticism of human rights conditions and to withhold sympathy for democracy activists.41 U.S. Policy Questions and Options Debates about what policies the U.S. government should pursue in order to promote human rights in China tend to revolve around the following principal sets of questions:        To what extent should the U.S. government expend time and resources promoting human rights in other countries, including China? How do such efforts relate to and advance U.S. interests and policy objectives? Which human rights issues and developments in China most warrant U.S. attention, and why? Should human rights issues be prioritized? How might improvements in some human rights lead to improvements in other human rights? Approaches to promoting human rights vary. Some are more (or less) confrontational, public, or punitive. Which approaches have been more effective in promoting human rights in China? How have U.S. approaches changed over time? What is the range of possible policy tools for promoting human rights in China? Which options are the most effective, and over what time frame are they most effective? How much importance should the United States attach to multilateral efforts to promote human rights in China? Should international approaches be focused on the United Nations, or be coordinated directly with like-minded governments? How are possible U.S. human rights policies constrained, if at all, by other U.S. policies and interests related to China? How are they constrained, if at all, by the institutions and mechanisms that form the basis of U.S.-China relations? Should the United States’ interest in human rights be the subject of negotiation, and, if so, should the United States be willing to match improvements in China’s 39 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit. 40 Andrew Nathan, National Endowment for Democracy, “12th Annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture: The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class,” October 20, 2015; Jie Chen, “Attitudes Toward Democracy and the Behavior of China’s Middle Class,” in Cheng Li, ed. China’s Emerging Middle Class, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 41 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, op. cit. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 7 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress  human rights conditions with actions valued by China? In what areas might such matching “action for action” be explored? Should the U.S. government press China to abide by international human rights standards and covenants in a separate bilateral human rights dialogue, or as part of other dialogues? Some human rights advocates argue that promoting human rights in China should be viewed as a national interest and elevated to first order importance in U.S. policy toward China. They contend that U.S. foreign policy should be more values-focused, and that other areas of the bilateral relationship, such as security and trade, would benefit from prioritizing human rights. Some experts recommend a “whole-of-government” approach, whereby human rights policy is coordinated among all agencies dealing with China, and suggest that the Administration and Congress work together to consider legislative and other measures.42 They favor placing human rights conditions upon Beijing before satisfying China’s desire for international cooperation in many areas, and imposing sanctions when necessary.43 Other specialists contend that open censure and efforts to place human rights-related conditions upon further development of the bilateral relationship have not been very effective. They suggest that it is more useful, particularly in the long run, to take a more cooperative and flexible approach toward promoting human rights in China. In this way, U.S. policies to promote human rights in the PRC are less likely to meet resistance among CCP hardliners and more likely to find agreement among Chinese governmental and nongovernmental leaders who also may be pursuing human rights and related objectives.44 A less confrontational approach, they add, is also more compatible with the myriad ongoing forms of U.S. engagement and cooperation with China. They urge U.S. policymakers to seek common ground with their Chinese counterparts and to appeal as much as possible to China’s own interests on human rights issues.45 The following are possible steps put forward by a diverse group of experts that the U.S. government and other actors could take, or that Congress could mandate or otherwise require, to promote human rights in the PRC. The U.S. government has attempted to put some of these recommended policies and efforts into practice. For a discussion of U.S. government human rights activities related to China, see “U.S. Efforts to Advance Human Rights in China,” below.   Support congressional hearings, legislation, resolutions, letters, and statements expressing concerns about human rights developments in China and individuals and groups persecuted in China for exercising internationally recognized human rights that are protected in the PRC Constitution. Increase U.S. government support for rule of law, civil society, and political participation programs in China. Provide funding to the National Endowment for 42 Yang Jianli, Remarks before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, October 6, 2016; “US: Show Breadth of Rights Commitment at China Dialogue,” Human Rights Watch, June 5, 2016; “Can the U.S. Help Advance Human Rights in China?” The Atlantic, op. cit. 43 Sophie Richardson, “How to Deal with China’s Human Rights Abuses,” ChinaFile, September 1, 2016. 44 “A Bow to Reality, Not China,” USA Today, February 27, 2009; Thomas J. Christensen, “Shaping the Choices of a Rising China: Recent Lessons for the Obama Administration,” The Washington Quarterly, July 2009; William F. Schulz, “Strategic Persistence: How the United States Can Help Improve Human Rights in China,” Center for American Progress, January 2009. 45 Wilson Center, op. cit.; Winston Lord, op. cit. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 8 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress     Democracy to support human rights and democracy groups based in the United States and Hong Kong. Support nongovernmental actors, including umbrella organizations that coordinate the efforts of disparate groups focused on human rights issues in China.46 Formulate a code of conduct for U.S. civil society organizations, including think tanks, universities, and cultural-exchange entities, for interacting with Chinese officials and policies when faced with human rights restrictions.47 Provide financial assistance to dissidents and victims of religious and ethnic persecution in China and Chinese political and religious refugees. Support research and documentation of human rights conditions and abuses in China. Link U.S. economic and human rights policies.  Impose restrictions upon Chinese trade and investment ties with the United States unless human rights conditions improve.48   Link permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status and low import tariffs with improvements in human rights conditions in China.  Challenge Chinese security regulations and restrictions on Internet use as barriers to trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Tighten U.S. export controls in response to human rights violations or reduce the export of U.S. technologies and services that can be used to violate human rights, such as Internet, surveillance, and law enforcement products and equipment.  Encourage U.S. companies in China to speak out against policies that affect both business interests and human rights.49 Impose sanctions on China and PRC officials in response to Chinese human rights abuses.  Deny U.S. visas to, or freeze the U.S. banks accounts of, Chinese officials responsible for severe human rights violations (see “Global Magnitsky Act,” below).  Apply provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act that deny U.S. visas to foreign officials responsible for particularly severe violations of religious freedom.50 46 Freedom House, The Politburo’s Predicament: Confronting the Limitations of Chinese Communist Party Repression, January 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/report/china/politburo-predicament. 47 Orville Schell and Susan L. Shirk, Chairs, Asia Society Center on US-China Relations and University of California San Diego 21st Century China Center, “Task Force Report: US Policy Toward China: Recommendations for a New Administration,” February 2017. 48 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “The Broken Promises of China’s WTO Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights,” March 1, 2017; Wei Jingsheng, Remarks before the Congressional Executive Commission on China, “Dissidents Who Have Suffered for Human Rights in China: A Look Back and a Look Forward,” December 7, 2016; Paul Carsten and Michael Martina, “US Says China’s Internet Censorship a Burden for Business: Report,” Reuters, April 8, 2016. 49 Sophie Richardson, “In China, Big Companies Are Learning the Business of Human Rights,” The Globe and Mail, September 14, 2014. 50 P.L. 105-292, §604. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 9 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress   Impose penalties on PRC officials for human rights violations, including placing holds on their foreign bank accounts.  Suspend U.S. engagement and exchanges with China’s Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Public Security until all human rights lawyers are released from detention or prison or their constitutional rights are restored.  Suspend U.S. engagement and exchanges with Chinese officials from provinces where egregious incidents of religious persecution have been reported.51  Noting the rise in detentions of some U.S. citizens and green card holders in China, some advocacy groups urge the State Department to issue a travel advisory, warning U.S. citizens and green card holders that there is a risk of arbitrary detention if they travel to China. Invoke the principle of reciprocity as a means of promoting human rights in China.    Demand that U.S. journalists, academics, and media outlets enjoy the same level of access to China that Chinese journalists, academics, and media outlets have in the United States.52  Call for mutual treatment in issuing visas for journalists and oppose the PRC government’s denial of visas to U.S. and other foreign journalists who write critically of CCP leaders or sensitive policy issues.  Grant the PRC an additional consulate in the United States if and only if the PRC government agrees to a U.S. consulate in Lhasa, Tibet.53 Raise human rights in bilateral interactions.  Raise human rights issues, not only in State Department-led dialogues and meetings with Chinese officials, but also in discussions and meetings led by other U.S. departments and agencies.  Support a separate U.S.-China human rights dialogue.  Make official human rights discussions more transparent, and open them up to include representatives from civil society, including human rights organizations.  Include civil society representatives in human rights discussions. Bolster international efforts.  Support collective statements and resolutions critical of Chinese human rights policies in the United Nations and other international fora.  Field a larger and more active U.S. delegation at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Hold China to its UNHRC Universal Periodic Review commitments. 51 For a look at religious persecution by province, see Freedom House, The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance Under Xi Jinping, February 2017. 52 For example, see H.R. 1112, Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2015 (McGovern, introduced on February 26, 2015, but did not become law) and H.R. 2899, Chinese Media Reciprocity Act of 2011 (Rohrabacher, introduced on September 12, 2011, but did not become law). 53 See Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §611). Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 10 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress    Coordinate with Asian and European democracies in engaging in diplomatic and other forms of pressure on the Chinese government to improve human rights conditions. Back internet freedom efforts.  Increase funding to the Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors for the development of software applications that enable Chinese Internet users to circumvent censorship.  Support efforts aimed at enabling Chinese audiences to circumvent Internet censorship and access Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA) online programming.  Oppose the PRC government’s efforts to promote the concept of “Internet sovereignty,” by which each country applies its own rules on issues of Internet freedom. Strengthen public diplomacy.  Provide greater funding for VOA and RFA broadcast and online programs in Mandarin, Cantonese, Tibetan, Uyghur, and English.  Strengthen the International Visitor Leadership Program, which brings established and potential leaders from China to the United States for shortterm stays that include study tours in the areas of government, media, education, economics, environment, labor, and rule of law.54 Crackdown on Dissent Less than one year into the 2012 leadership transition that brought Xi Jinping to power, PRC authorities began to carry out a clampdown on political dissent, free expression, and civil society. While the PRC government has engaged in many cycles of reform and repression in the nearly three decades since the 1989 Tiananmen military crackdown, recent security measures have been striking for their scope and severity, say observers. Xi’s policies have included detentions and arrests of hundreds of human rights attorneys, investigative journalists, prominent bloggers, members of ethnic minorities, and civil society leaders. Freedom House reported that in China, which it deems to be among the bottom 20 “unfree” countries in the world, “[a] renewed push for party supremacy and ideological conformity has undermined rule of law reforms and curtailed civil and political rights.”55 In May 2013, the CCP issued a classified directive (Document No. 9) identifying seven “false ideological trends, positions, and activities,” largely aimed at the media and liberal academics. According to the document, topics to be avoided in public discussion include universal values, constitutional democracy, freedom of the press, civil society, civil rights, an independent judiciary, and criticism of the CCP.56 In 2016, a liberal journal, Yanhuang Chunqiu, under pressure from conservatives within the Communist Party, ceased publication. For 25 years, the periodical reportedly had been a 54 United States Embassy, Beijing, China, The International Visitor Leadership Program, http://beijing.usembassy- china.org.cn/ivlp.html. 55 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf. 56 Asia Society, “Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation,” November 8, 2013, http://www.chinafile.com/document-9chinafile-translation. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 11 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress mouthpiece for political reformers and exercised relative independence, as long as it did not broach the most sensitive political topics. A former editor stated that its patrons in the Party “had grown politically weak under the current leadership.”57 In January 2017, Beijing authorities shut down two websites run by a liberal Chinese think tank, reportedly after its founder criticized the Supreme People’s Court’s top judge for publicly rejecting the ideal of judicial independence.58 Arrests of Rights Lawyers and Activists Since July 2015, over 250 human rights lawyers and activists have been detained, arrested, or placed under surveillance or house arrest in what is known as the “7-09 Crackdown.” Launched on July 9, 2015, some observers say this campaign against the growing number of human rights lawyers in China has been unprecedented in scale.59 PRC authorities have targeted, in particular, staff of the Fengrui Law Firm in Beijing, which had represented Uyghur rights advocate Ilham Tohti, dissident artist Ai Weiwei, Falun Gong practitioners, and victims of alleged government misconduct. Of the hundreds of rights lawyers and activists whom Chinese authorities have detained, most have been released, although from 15 to over 30 have been sentenced to prison terms, released on bail, or given suspended sentences usually of three years of home detention.60 At least two rights lawyers and one activist—Xia Lin, Zhou Shifeng, and Hu Shifeng—have received lengthy prison terms. Some lawyers and activists who were released on bail or suspended sentences reportedly have disappeared.61 Some rights attorneys reportedly suffered torture and psychological abuse by security personnel, were held incommunicado or at unknown locations, or were coerced into making televised confessions. Some have had their freedom of movement restricted or been prevented from travelling abroad.62 Spouses of detained lawyers have been subjected to surveillance and restrictions on movement and travel. Authorities reportedly have installed cameras or posted guards at spouses’ homes, cut off their telephone service, frozen their bank accounts, and warned them not to give interviews.63 Selected Prominent Cases  Guo Feixiong is the pen name of Yang Maodong, a legal rights advocate arrested in 2013 for demonstrating against the censorship of a progressive publication, Southern Weekend. In 2015, Guo was sentenced to six years in prison for 57 Philip Wen, “The Final Stand of Yanhuang Chunqui, Torchbearer of Chinese Liberal Thought,” Sydney Morning Herald, July 27, 2016. 58 Wendy Wu and Jane Cai, “Beijing Internet Censors Close Websites of Liberal Economic Think Tank,” South China Morning Post, January 21, 2017. 59 “Torture Accusations as EU Ambassador Raises Case of Chinese Lawyer Xie Yang,” Hong Kong Free Press, January 25, 2017; Simon Denyer, “A Broken Lawyer and a Hawkish Judge Cast Deep Pall over China’s Legal System,” Washington Post, January 22, 2017; “Mass Suppression of Lawyers Reveals True Nature of Xi’s ‘Rule by Law,’” Human Rights in China, July 14, 2015. 60 William Ide and Joyce Huang, “China Rights Lawyer Recants Torture Allegations in High Profile Case,” Voice of America, May 9, 2017. 61 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “China Must Drop All Charges Against Lawyer Xie Yang,” May 9, 2017. 62 Simon Denyer, “A Broken Lawyer and a Hawkish Judge Cast Deep Pall over China’s Legal System,” op. cit.; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Politically Charged Arrests in China Escalate Persecution of Rights Lawyers,” January 14, 2016; “China to Try Top Human Rights Lawyer, Delays Three Other Cases,” Federal Information & News Dispatch, December 7, 2016; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit. 63 “Wives of China’s Detained Lawyers Fight On,” Daily Mail, July 6, 2016. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 12 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress       “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order.” In December 2016, Chinese authorities suspended the legal license of Li Jinxing, Guo’s defense lawyer, for one year allegedly for “interfering with court proceedings.”64 Guo Hongguo, a rights activist and member of an unregistered Christian church, was convicted of subversion and given a three-year suspended sentence.65 Hu Shigen, a democracy advocate and Christian church leader with ties to the Fengrui Law Firm, was detained in July 2015 and formally arrested in January 2016 on the charge of subverting state power. He was convicted in August 2016 and sentenced to seven-and-one-half years in prison. Hu had formerly served a 16-year sentence for spreading information about the June 4, 1989, military crackdown in Beijing.66 Jiang Tianyong, a human rights lawyer who had legally defended or assisted Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and other rights lawyers and advocates, including Xie Yang, Chen Guangcheng, and Gao Zhisheng, was detained in November 2016 and held incommunicado for six months. In May 2017, Jiang was formally charged with subversion of state power.67 Li Heping, an attorney and antitorture advocate who had represented Falun Gong practitioners, members of unregistered Christian churches, and environmental activists, and had provided assistance to Chen Guangcheng and Gao Zhisheng, was held incommunicado between July 2015 and January 2016. In April 2017, a Tianjin Court, in a closed trial, sentenced Li to a three-year suspended jail term for subverting state power.68 Pu Zhiqiang, a human rights lawyer and government critic, was detained in 2014, along with other attendees of a small gathering to mark the 25th anniversary of the 1989 military crackdown. In 2015, a Beijing court handed Pu a three-year suspended sentence for the crimes of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “disturbing public order,” based in part on comments that he had made online.69 Wang Quanzhang, a member of the Fengrui Law firm, defended Falun Gong practitioners, human rights lawyers, and victims of illegal land takings. After being detained during a trial reportedly for refusing a judge’s command, Wang wrote a legal manual on judicial detention for other rights lawyers. Wang was 64 Te-Ping Chen, “Chinese Human Rights Lawyer’s Legal License Is Suspended,” Wall Street Journal, December 2, 2016. 65 “Bailed Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Have Yet to Regain Liberty,” Radio Free Asia, August 8, 2016; Human Rights in China, “Profiles: Gou Hongguo, Hu Shigen, Zhai Yanmin, and Zhou Shifeng,” August 5, 2016. 66 Javier C. Hernandez, “China Sentences Hu Shigen, Democracy Advocate, to 7 Years in Prison,” New York Times, August 3, 2016. 67 “Prominent Chinese Rights Activist Charged with Subversion after Being Held Six Months,” Reuters, June 6, 2017; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Jiang Tianyong,” https://www.nchrd.org/2017/02/jiang-tianyong/; Elizabeth M. Lynch, “Codifying Illegality? The Case of Jiang Tianyong,” China Law and Policy, January 20, 2017. 68 Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Li Heping,” https://www.nchrd.org/2015/08/prisoner-of-conscience-li-heping/; Lucy Hornby, “China Sends Warning to Lawyers with Secret Trials,” Financial Times, April 30, 2017; “The AntiTorture Work of Lawyer Li Heping That Irked the Chinese Authorities,” China Change, January 26, 2017. 69 Tom Phillips, Scuffles Outside Beijing Court as Human Rights Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang Goes on Trial,” The Guardian, December 21, 2015; Didi Tang, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Pu Denies All Police Charges,” Associated Press, December 10, 2014. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 13 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress      held incommunicado for 18 months and indicted on subversion charges in January 2017.70 Wang Yu, a rights lawyer at the Fengrui Law Firm who had defended Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti as well as Chinese feminists, was detained in July 2015 and charged with subversion in January 2016. Wang was released on bail in August 2016 after she gave a televised confession that included a denunciation of her colleagues, which observers believe was coerced.71 Wang’s husband and colleague, Bao Longjun, and their son, Bao Zhuoxuan, were detained in July 2015 as they attempted to board a flight for Australia so that Bao Zhuoxuan could attend high school there. Xia Lin, an attorney who had assisted human rights lawyers such as Pu Zhiqiang and government critics such as Ai Weiwei, was found guilty of fraud and sentenced to 12 years in jail in September 2016. At his trial, Xia’s lawyers raised numerous legal and procedural violations in his case.72 Xie Yang, an attorney who defended rights advocates, was detained in July 2015. In January 2017, Xie’s lawyers released a transcript of him describing various forms of torture that he stated he had endured during a period in which he was held incommunicado. During a court hearing on May 8, 2017, Xie, in what supporters say was a forced confession, pleaded guilty to charges of inciting subversion of state power, and denied that he had been tortured.73 Xie was released on bail on May 9, 2017, before a verdict was announced.74 Zhai Yanmin, a rights activist who worked for the Fengrui Law Firm, was convicted of subversion and handed a three-year suspended sentence in August 2016.75 Zhou Shifeng headed the Fengrui law firm, which had taken on many politically sensitive cases. In August 2016, Zhou was found guilty of subverting state power and sentenced to seven years in prison.76 70 Nectar Gan, “Human Rights Lawyer Swept Up in 709 Crackdown to Face Court in Tianjin for Subversion,” South China Morning Post, February 16,2017; Michael Caster and Peter Dahlin, “China Should Be Proud of Wang Quanzhang—Instead It Persecutes Him,” The Guardian, September 22, 2016. 71 Javier Hernandez, “China Frees Wang Yu, Human Rights Lawyer, after Videotaped Confession,” New York Times, August 1, 2016. 72 Tom Phillips, “China: Lawyer for Ai Weiwei Jailed for 12 Years in ‘Severe Retaliation,’” The Guardian, September 22, 2016; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Xia Lin,” https://www.nchrd.org/2015/02/prisoner-of-conscience-xialin/. 73 Nectar Gan, “Chinese Rights Lawyer Pleads Guilty to Subversion,” South China Morning Post, May 8, 2017; Josh Chin, “Document of Torture: One Chinese Lawyer’s Story from Jail,” Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2017. 74 “Rights Lawyers Li Heping and Xie Yang Released from Jail,” China Digital Times, May 10, 2017; Tom Phillips, “China Puts Leading Human Rights Lawyer on Trial for Subversion,” The Guardian, May 8, 2017; “UN Denounces China Crackdown on Lawyers, Seeks Release,” Reuters, May 5, 2017. 75 “Bailed Chinese Human Rights Lawyers Have Yet to Regain Liberty,” Radio Free Asia, op. cit.; Human Rights in China, “Profiles: Gou Hongguo, Hu Shigen, Zhai Yanmin, and Zhou Shifeng,” op. cit. 76 Javier C. Hernandez, “Zhou Shifeng, Chinese Lawyer, Is Sentenced to 7 Years for Subversion,” New York Times, August 4, 2016. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 14 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Civil Society In the past decade, the impact of nongovernmental organizations, also known in China as “social organizations” or “civil society organizations,” has grown.77 The PRC government increasingly has contracted the public provision of social services to NGOs, and nonstate entities have played a small but growing role in social advocacy and policy input. Environmental groups were at the forefront of civil society development, and some of them were met with resistance or repression by state authorities. Other types of social organizations have emerged in the areas of public health, education, rural development, legal aid, and policy research. China has over 650,000 registered NGOs, according to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, while the number of unregistered NGOs ranges from 1 million to 7 million.78 In addition, in 2016, several thousand foreign NGOs operated in China, of which about 1,000 had an established presence and 4,000-6,000 engaged in short-term projects, according to official and unofficial Chinese sources.79 In 2013, the PRC government announced that the process by which domestic NGOs could register to operate would be simplified, allowing them to apply directly to the Bureau of Civil Affairs to acquire legal status without also obtaining an official sponsor or supervisory unit. The government released draft legislation allowing direct registration for some types of NGOs in 2016.80 Many experts view civil society broadly—the nonstate, nonbusiness component or “third sphere” of society that includes NGOs, grass-roots groups, religious congregations, academia, trade unions, political and other organizations—as a vital agent through which human rights and democracy are defended and exercised. Under Xi Jinping, the PRC government increasingly has tried to manage civil society, which he and other leaders apparently view as a potential security threat, while attempting to harness its value. Many individuals and NGOs working in areas previously deemed acceptable or even praiseworthy by the government have faced growing restrictions. Many U.S.-based and other international NGOs in China, particularly those engaged in rule of law programs and social advocacy work, have faced increasing scrutiny, and new regulations have placed additional constraints on foreign NGOs. Although the number of civil society organizations may still be growing, according to one expert, the “space in which civil society may operate is actually shrinking.”81 In January 2016, state security officers detained and then deported Peter Dahlin, a Swedish national who had cofounded the Beijing-based Chinese Urgent Action Working Group, which provided legal aid and trained Chinese rights defenders. In a later interview, Dahlin stated, “I think the era for effecting change in China seems to be over for now for NGOs.”82 77 PRC commentators often prefer to use the term “social organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” in order to avoid suggesting an adversarial relationship between society and the state. Some Western analysts use the term “civil society organization” rather than “nongovernmental organization” to reflect Chinese NGOs’ lack of real autonomy. 78 The estimates of unregistered NGOs include organizations registered as business entities. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.; Kristie Lu Stout, “People Power in the People’s Republic of China,” CNN, June 26, 2014. 79 Edward Wong, “U.S. Denounces Chinese Law Restricting Foreign Operations,” New York Times, April 29, 2016; Nectar Gan, “China’s Controversial New Law on Foreign NGOs to Include Greater Police Oversight, Stricter Financial Scrutiny,” South China Morning Post, April 26, 2016; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Wrestles with Draft Law on Nongovernmental Organizations,” New York Times, March 11, 2016. 80 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit. 81 “Chinese Civil Society: Beneath the Glacier,” The Economist, April 12, 2014. 82 Edward Wong, “Inside China’s Secret 23-Day Detention of a Foreign Nonprofit Chief,” New York Times, July 9, 2016. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 15 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress New PRC Laws At the end of the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Party Congress, held in October 2014, the CCP Central Committee issued a communique proclaiming that it was essential to “comprehensively advance the law-based governance of the country,” including the need to “improve the system for ensuring independent and impartial exercise of judicial and procuratorial powers in accordance with the law.” The statement, however, also stressed that “[u]pholding the Party’s leadership is fundamental to socialist rule of law....”83 Although the PRC government under Xi Jinping has furthered the development of the law in some areas related to human rights and civil society, such as criminal justice, domestic violence, and philanthropy, it largely has developed the law to strengthen CCP rule. The National People’s Congress (NPC) has passed new laws that appear to strengthen the role of the state over a wide range of social activities in the name of national security, place additional restrictions on defense lawyers, and authorize greater government controls over the Internet and ethnic minority groups. According to one analyst, “Under Xi Jinping the government is creating a more coherent legal framework to enforce the preservation of the party-state.”84 In January 2016, the ambassadors of the United States, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the European Union, in a “rare joint response,” signed a letter to China expressing concerns about the new laws. The letter stated, “While we recognize the need for each country to address its security concerns, we believe the new legislative measures have the potential to impede commerce, stifle innovation, and infringe on China’s obligation to protect human rights in accordance with international law.”85 National Security Law In July 2015, China’s National People’s Congress passed a new National Security Law that provides legal grounds for greater scrutiny and state control over many social, ethnic, and cultural activities as well as speech. Some critics argue that the law’s expansiveness and vague wording may grant the government the authority to violate human rights in “almost every domain of public life” in the name of national security.86 According to the law, the state resists “negative cultural influences,” punishes “activities dividing ethnicities,” and opposes “foreign influences” that interfere with domestic religious affairs, among other mandates.87 Article 25 establishes a system for securing the Internet, including preventing illegal activity such as network attacks, cybertheft, and the dissemination of unlawful and harmful information.88 83 Shannon Tiezzi, “4 Things We Learned from China’s 4 th Plenum,” The Diplomat, October 23, 2014; Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, October 23, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/china/fourth_plenary_session/2014-12/02/content_34208801.htm. 84 Tom Mitchell, “Xi’s China: Smothering Dissent,” Financial Times, July 27, 2016. 85 Jason Subler, “Exclusive: Major Powers Team Up to Tell China of Concerns over New Laws,” Reuters, March 1, 2016. 86 Edward Wong, “Chinese Security Laws Elevate the Party and Stifle Dissent. Mao Would Approve,” New York Times, May 29, 2015; Ankit Panda, “The Truth About China’s New National Security Law,” The Diplomat, July 1, 2015; Council on Foreign Relations, “National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China,” July 1, 2015; Edward Wong, “China Approves Sweeping Security Law, Bolstering Communist Rule,” New York Times, July 1, 2015. 87 China Law Translate, “National Security Law,” July 1, 2015, http://chinalawtranslate.com/2015nsl/?lang=en. 88 Ibid. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 16 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Cybersecurity Law In November 2016, the NPC passed the Cybersecurity Law. A Chinese government official stated, “The law fits international trade protocol and its purpose is to safeguard national security.”89 Analysts say that while most policies promoted by the law are not new, the law provides a legal framework for the centralization and coordination of China’s efforts to control the Internet. The cybersecurity law gives the government broad powers to control the flow of online traffic, including blocking the dissemination of unlawful information and temporarily restricting network communications for the purposes of protecting social order or national security.90 Its detractors say that the law establishes categories of illegal Internet use that can be interpreted broadly for political purposes. While Article 12 provides that the state “protects the rights of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to use networks in accordance with law,” it outlaws activities in a number of vague areas that may result in infringements upon freedom of speech. Prohibited online activities include those that endanger “national security, national honor and interests”; incite “subversion of national sovereignty,” “the overturn of the socialist system,” “separatism,” and “ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination”; undermine “national unity”; advocate “terrorism or extremism”; and create or disseminate “false information to disrupt the economic or social order.”91 The law also places greater legal burdens upon private Internet service providers (“network operators”) to monitor content, obtain information on the real identity of their customers, participate in the state’s network security protection system, and assist public security organs. Counterterrorism Law New counterterrorism legislation, passed in December 2015, contains provisions that critics say potentially may be used to stifle free speech, particularly among Uyghur Muslims. In particular, some analysts note that the definition of terrorism contained in the law includes not only actions but also “propositions.”92 Article 19 restricts media coverage of terrorist incidents, and “where information with terrorist or extremist content is discovered, its dissemination shall immediately be halted.” Although Article 6 states that counterterrorism efforts “be conducted in accordance with law” and “respect and protect human rights,” some analysts assert that the law grants “enormous discretionary powers” to the state and that the government has not passed corresponding safeguards against potential human rights violations.93 89 “China Adopts Cybersecurity Law Despite Foreign Opposition,” Bloomberg News, November 7, 2016. 90 See Article of 58 of the Cybersecurity Law. China Law Translate, “2016 Cybersecurity Law,” November 7, 2016, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecuritylaw/?lang=en. 91 Ibid. 92 Article 3 states: “‘Terrorism’ as used in this Law refers to propositions and actions that create social panic, endanger public safety, violate person and property, or coerce national organs or international organizations, through methods such violence, destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their political, ideological, or other objectives.” China Law Translate, “Counter-Terrorism Law,” December 28, 2015, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/bilingual-counterterrorism-law/?lang=en. 93 Ibid.; Zunyou Zhou, “China’s Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Law,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2016; Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s New Anti-Terrorism Law,” The Diplomat, December 29, 2015. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 17 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Overseas NGO Law A new law regulating foreign and overseas nongovernmental organizations, which went into effect in January 2017, has raised international concern.94 Foreign observers believe that the law reflects the PRC leadership’s suspicion of foreign influences on civil society, by placing overseas NGOs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Security, and no longer the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The new law tightens registration requirements on foreign NGOs, many of which have been operating without official ties and status, by mandating that they find a government agency (“professional supervisory unit”) to sponsor them. New regulations also impose greater supervision and potentially greater controls upon their activities, funding, and staffing.95 Experts contend that PRC leaders fear the kinds of political uprisings, aided by civil society and the support of foreign NGOs and governments, that they perceive fueled popular demonstrations and toppled governments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the early 2000s and the Middle East in 2010-2011.96 Many observers say the foreign NGO law’s vague and broad provisions have created an air of uncertainty. Some experts argue that while local authorities may enforce the law with flexibility, foreign NGOs that fail to comply potentially may face civil or criminal penalties. Furthermore, foreign NGOs that work in politically sensitive areas may be especially vulnerable to arbitrary applications of the law.97 Article 47, for example, prohibits NGOs from engaging in any act that “endangers national security” or “harms national interests.” Other illegal activities under the law include engaging in or funding political or religious activities.98 Human rights groups assert that the law may deal “a very severe blow” to foreign NGOs and the domestic NGOs with which they often support, train, and partner, thus causing a “ripple effect” throughout Chinese civil society.99 Some foreign NGOs have suspended or ceased operations, while domestic social organizations have reported a drop in foreign funding.100 Some observers contend that the new law may prove too burdensome or pose too many risks for many foreign NGOs, particularly smaller ones or those involved in human rights and related activities. Others worry that the law may hamper people-to-people exchanges, including cultural, business, and professional interactions. Some fear that many foreign NGOs may have difficulties finding appropriate professional supervisory units, or that official PRC entities may decline to partner with foreign NGOs due to possible political risks.101 In response to U.S. government and other criticism of the foreign NGO law, an NPC official asserted that “We have always held a welcoming and supportive attitude toward overseas NGOs that are engaged in friendly activities 94 The law applies to NGOs from foreign countries as well as “overseas” Hong Kong and Macau. 95 China Law Translate, “2016 PRC Law on the Management of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations’ Activities Within Mainland China,” http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/2016-foreign-ngo-law/?lang=en. 96 Stanley Lubman, “China’s New Law on International NGOs—and Questions about Legal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2016; Edward Wong, “U.S. Denounces Chinese Law Restricting Foreign Operations,” op. cit. 97 Simon Denyer, “In China, Civic Groups May Face New Controls,” Washington Post, March 25, 2015; Human Rights Watch, “China: Scrap Repressive Foreign Organizations Law,” June 2, 2015. 98 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China, Adopted at the 20th Meeting of the 12th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on April 28, 2016, http://www.mps.gov.cn/n2254314/n2254409/n4904353/c5548987/content.html. 99 Julie Makinen, “China’s Move Toward Restricting Foreign NGOs Spurs Anxiety in Many Organizations,” Los Angeles Times, July 5, 2016; Simon Denyer, “In China, Civic Groups May Face New Controls,” op. cit. 100 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), March 3, 2017. 101 Zheping Huang “NGOs Are Under Threat in China’s Latest Crackdown Against ‘Foreign Forces,’” Quartz, January 4, 2017. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 18 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress in China.... But an extremely small number of NGOs attempt to, or have already engaged in, activities that endanger China’s social stability and state security. Therefore, we need to apply the rule of law to overseas NGOs’ activities in China.”102 Charity Law In 2016, the NPC passed China’s first Charity Law.103 The law eases registration requirements for charitable organizations and allows them to engage in public fundraising, but also strengthens government oversight. Backers of the legislation say that tougher reporting requirements are designed to improve transparency, protect donors, and improve public trust in charitable organizations. Some human rights groups have expressed concern that provisions of the law prohibiting the funding of activities that contravene national security may be used broadly against politically sensitive activities. Some critics contend that the law potentially restricts informal fund-raising, such as online crowdsourcing, which has become a means by which some citizens have provided financial support to Chinese dissidents and their families.104 Family Violence Law China’s first national law on domestic violence, the culmination of years of efforts by Chinese women’s rights advocates, went into effect in March 2016. The Anti-Domestic Violence Law covers physical and mental abuse between family members and cohabitating couples. It provides stronger legal mechanisms by which to protect women from domestic abuse. Although the legislation was heralded as a “significant step forward” in the area of women’s rights, the government has placed some restrictions on women’s rights advocates during the recent crackdown on civil society. In 2016, authorities ordered the closure of the Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counseling and Service Center, reportedly without providing a reason. The Center had provided services in the areas of anti-domestic violence litigation and rural women’s land rights for over two decades.105 Frequently Raised Human Rights Issues The following sections discuss prominent human rights concerns that frequently have been raised by human rights organizations and some Members of Congress. The bullet points below provide selected examples of ongoing human rights issues in China, some of which are discussed at greater length elsewhere in this report. For more detailed descriptions of human rights topics, see the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016 and the Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016.106 The PRC government has 102 Simon Denyer, “China Passes Law Tightening Regulation of Foreign NGOs,” Washington Post, April 29, 2016; Press Conference of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, April 28, 2016, translated by China Law Translate, May 4, 2016, http://www.chinalawtranslate.com/fngo-law-presser/?lang=en. 103 China Development Brief, “The Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China,” http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/ wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Charity-Law-CDB-Translation.pdf. 104 “China Approves Law on Charities, NGOs,” Voice of America, March 26, 2016; “China’s New Charity Law Makes Donating Easier, Tightens Control,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 1, 2016; Laura E. Butzel and David J. O’Connell, “China’s New Laws on Foreign and Domestic NGOs,” Exemptorgresource.com, May 19, 2016. 105 Chen Tingting, The Asia Foundation, “Battling Domestic Violence in China,” In Asia, June 29, 2016; Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “China Said to Force Closure of Women’s Legal Aid Center,” New York Times, January 29, 2016; Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. 106 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit., and Department of State, Country Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 19 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress attempted to reduce rights violations in some of these areas. However, the lack of checks on state power and the CCP’s subordination of the law to its objective of maintaining its authority and “social stability” continue to lead to human rights abuses and violations of China’s own constitution. Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese law and politics, suggests that although China has made progress in some legal areas, fundamental human rights problems endure: The lesson of the past twenty-five years seems to be that economic and social progress, enactment of better legislation, improvements in legal institutions, and reformist official policy statements do not guarantee either the enjoyment of civil and political rights or the protection of political and religious activists and their lawyers against the arbitrary exercise of state and party power.107 Ongoing Human Rights Issues: Selected Examples108           Harassment, detention, house arrest, prison terms, and residential surveillance of protest leaders, civil society activists, journalists covering stories that authorities deem to be politically sensitive, petitioners, and political dissidents and their family members. Arbitrary use of state security and “social stability” laws against political dissidents. Holding dissidents incommunicado for long periods and failing to comply with legal provisions that require authorities to notify family members of their detention. Strict controls and punishments for speech that authorities deem to be politically sensitive; heavy censorship of online communication and expression. Forced closure of law offices and suspension or revocation of attorneys’ law licenses; physical assaults, detention, house arrest, prison terms, and residential surveillance of attorneys who take on cases authorities deem to be politically sensitive. Physical and mental abuse against criminal suspects and administrative detainees, in some cases resulting in forced confessions and sometimes resulting in death. Harsh religious and ethnic policies and the arbitrary use of state security laws against Tibetans and Uyghurs. Harassment and arrests of some Christians worshipping in unregistered churches; demolition or forced alterations of church properties in some localities. Detention of Falun Gong adherents and forced renunciations of their beliefs. Repatriation of North Korean nationals residing in China, who may face severe forms of punishment after returning to North Korea, in violation of U.N. conventions. Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. 107 Jerome Cohen, “After June 4, China Is Still Fumbling Towards Respect for Rights of All,” South China Morning Post, June 2, 2014. 108 See Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit., and Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 20 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress  Government harassment, intimidation, and obstruction of independent or nonCCP candidates and their supporters in local elections; alleged manipulation of ballots and electoral procedures in order to exclude independent candidates.109  Violations of international labor rights, including the right to form independent labor unions, limitations on collective bargaining, and arrests of strike leaders and labor activists.110 Constraints on foreign journalists in China, including restrictions on movement and cases of harassment and intimidation by state security agents when journalists attempt to report on events that authorities deem to be politically sensitive or interview local citizens.111   Trafficking in persons, including reports of forced labor in Xinjiang, drug rehabilitation facilities, and administrative and extrajudicial detention centers, forced labor and sex trafficking, and the forced labor in China and forcible repatriation of North Koreans. In 2017, the Department of State downgraded China to Tier 3, for not “fully meet[ing] the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking” and “not making significant efforts to do so.”112 Rule of Law Many experts believe that strengthening the rule of law is a key means of protecting human rights and an important area of U.S. engagement in China. The lack of judicial independence, adequate legal protections, and due process guarantees for many dissidents, protest leaders, rights lawyers, activists, journalists, and ordinary aggrieved citizens, as well as the people and interests that they represent, undermines progress in human rights conditions in the PRC. Some policy experts argue that calling on PRC leaders to abide by provisions in China’s own constitution and laws is one of the most effective ways for international actors to promote human rights in the PRC. In recent years, the Chinese government has enacted some measures aimed at reducing arbitrary applications of the law and some patterns of human rights abuse as well as making the government more transparent. However, the Communist Party and its main policy objectives generally remain above the law, particularly in areas that China’s leaders deem politically sensitive. Since 2014, the PRC government has announced some policies aimed at reducing government influence over the courts, particularly at the local level. Reforms include transferring power over budgets and personnel appointments of basic level courts from local to provincial governments.113 In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued an opinion directing judges to record instances 109 PRC citizens can directly elect officials to village committees and assemblies and to the larger township, county, and municipal district People’s Congresses. Although voters generally have a choice of candidates, who are not required to be Communist Party members, CCP election committees may disqualify candidates at any level, and they may effectively control candidate lists. 110 Lucy Hornby, “Workers’ Rights Activists Sentenced in China,” Financial Times, September 26, 2016; Javier C. Hernandez, “Labor Protests Multiply in China as Economy Slows, Worrying Leaders,” New York Times, March 14, 2016. 111 Roy Greenslade, “Foreign Journalists Working in China Face Increased Harassment,” The Guardian, November 15, 2016. 112 Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2017. 113 Stanley Lubman, “Power Shift: Hopeful Signs in China’s Legal Reform,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2014; Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Moves to Enact Rule of Law, with Caveats,” New York Times (International), October 23, 2014; Ren Jin, “Judicial Reform Enforces Rule of Law,” China Daily, December 4, 2014. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 21 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress of Party and state interference. In addition, the SPC has made efforts to retry cases of wrongful conviction and reduce the rate of pretrial detention.114 Some experts contend, however, that China’s leaders may want to reduce corruption of the judicial branch at the local level, but not to subject the national government to judicial oversight.115 In January 2017, Zhou Qiang, President of China’s Supreme People’s Court, who is known as a reformer, publicly denounced the “Western” notion of judicial independence. Some experts say that Zhou’s speech reflected pressure from Xi Jinping.116 Government Transparency In 2016, the government published new guidelines promoting the “open government information” (OGI) system, which obliges government agencies to publish official materials on matters that are of public interest and allows citizens to submit requests for government information. Areas for public disclosure include major policies, assessments and audits of policies in force, government-held records, and government agencies’ administrative powers and responsibilities. The guidelines exempt some kinds of information from disclosure, including information that might “endanger state security, public security, and social stability.”117 According to some studies, many requests go unanswered, although some citizens have taken their cases to the courts, claiming that local governments are not complying with the law.118 In 2015, the Supreme People’s Court began to provide information on trials, verdicts, and the implementation of court decisions online. In 2016, China’s court system launched a website, China Open Trial Network, which airs selected criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings, as part of a move to expand people’s trust in the judicial system, according to experts.119 Criminal Justice China’s criminal justice system remains rife with abuses, especially in human rights cases. The rate of legal representation remains low, the role of lawyers is severely constrained, and there is a heavy presumption of guilt and alleged reliance upon forced confessions. In recent years, government funding for legal aid has increased, and access to legal counsel reportedly has improved. However, the rate of legal representation in criminal cases has dropped to roughly 20%, and although the acquittal rate has increased, the conviction rate remains at over 99% in criminal trials.120 Judges retain significant discretion over whether witnesses or accusers must appear in court, and only a small percentage of trials reportedly involve witnesses, thus weakening the defense in many cases.121 In 2015, the government announced new regulations to “safeguard lawyers’ rights,” including the rights for lawyers to meet with their clients and collect evidence. Legal experts say, however, that 114 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017: China – Events of 2016, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/ country-chapters/china-and-tibet. 115 “Trump Attacks and the State of China’s Legal System,’ China Digital Times, February 13, 2017. 116 Michael Forsythe, “China’s Chief Justice Rejects an Independent Judiciary, and Reformers Wince,” New York Times, January 18, 2017. 117 Jamie P. Horsley, “China Promotes Open Government as it Seeks to Reinvent Its Governance Model,” Wilson Center, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, February 23, 2016; Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Regulations on Open Government Information of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.cecc.gov/ resources/legal-provisions/regulations-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-on-open-government. 118 Bruce Dickson, The Dictator’s Dilemma, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 119 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (China), April 13, 2016; Jerome Cohen and David Wertime, “A Crack of Daylight Enters Chinese Court Proceedings,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2016. 120 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2016, op. cit.; “China Lags Behind in Rule-of-Law Ranking,” Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2016; Cao Yan, “Courts Act To Improve Protection of Rights,” China Daily, March 13, 2017. 121 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 22 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress other revisions to the law further curtail the role of defense lawyers in sensitive cases. Under new laws and regulations, lawyers may face penalties for “insulting, defaming, or threatening judicial officers,” “severely disrupting courtroom order,” disclosing client or case information to the media, or using the media and other public means to influence court decisions.122 Some Chinese lawyers openly opposed the changes.123 Forms of Detention The PRC government practices various forms Administrative Detention of detention in violation of China’s Black jails: unofficial, secretive detention centers in various unmarked places such as hotels, residences, obligations under international law and in government offices, and abandoned buildings. some cases its own laws. The Criminal Legal Education Centers: Purpose-built and ad hoc Procedure Law permits suspects of serious locations often used to “transform” Falun Gong crimes, including “endangering state security” practitioners or to persuade or coerce them to and terrorism, to be placed at a “designated renounce their beliefs. location” (residential surveillance) for up to Community Correction Centers: Under this six months, and the law does not require the system, parolees, juveniles, and other minor offenders family to be notified of the place of detention are restricted in traveling but generally live in their own residences while attending classes on “public morality,” (Article 73).125 Although the government current affairs, and the law, and taking part in social formally abolished the Re-education Through service activities.124 Labor (RETL) system in 2013, in practice public security bureaus continue to administratively detain many citizens for minor political offenses, such as “creating a disturbance and causing trouble,” without trial.126 Many people are held in quasilegal and extralegal forms of detention, such as “Legal Education Centers,” said to hold many Falun Gong members; psychiatric (ankang) facilities; and “black jails.”127 These and other forms of incarceration can be even more secretive and prone to abuses than the former RETL facilities.128 In April 2016, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention criticized Chinese authorities for their detention and treatment of U.S. citizen Sandy Phan-Gillis, stating that they had violated “international norms relating to the right to a fair trial and to liberty and security.”129 Torture China’s criminal justice system has continued to utilize torture, particularly as a means to extract confessions. Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), which went into effect in 2013, 122 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 (China), op. cit. 123 David Bandurski, “Speak Not of Lawyers Speaking Out,” China Media Project, October 12, 2016. 124 Dui Hua Foundation, “Community Correction Expands as RTL Contracts,” December 19, 2013; Dui Hua Foundation, “Criminal Detention as Punishment in Post-RTL Era,” January 22, 2014. 125 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/criminal-procedure-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china. 126 PRC citizens can be administratively detained for such activities as participating in demonstrations or petitioning the government. 127 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. 128 Margaret K. Lewis, Professor of Law, Testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “China’s Pervasive Use of Torture,” April 24, 2016; Frank Langfitt, “China Ends One Notorious Form of Detention, But Keeps Others,” NPR, February 5, 2014. 129 Human Rights Council, “Opinion No. 12/2016,” http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/Opinions/ Session75/Opinion_2016_12_China.pdf. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 23 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress prohibit the use of confessions obtained under torture as evidence and require audio or video recordings of interrogations in major criminal cases.130 The United Nations Committee against Torture concluded in late 2015, however, that despite these legal reforms, China had failed to eliminate torture and numerous other forms of ill treatment, particularly during the pretrial period and in cases of extralegal detention. The committee also expressed concern over the lack of a legal guarantee for the right of detained persons to immediately meet with a lawyer.131 Re-education Through Labor System (RETL) Established in the mid-1950s, China’s Re-education Through Labor (laojiao) penal system was long used to detain citizens who were perceived to pose a threat to “social stability” or political control, but whose offenses were not considered serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution. RETL, an administrative measure that did not involve courts or judicial processes, empowered the police to sentence persons deemed guilty of minor or noncriminal offenses to a maximum of three to four years in labor camps without trial. These offenses included petty theft, illegal drug possession, and prostitution, as well as activities that authorities deemed to be politically sensitive, such as participating in unauthorized religious groups and alleged cults such as Falun Gong, “disrupting social order,” presenting formal complaints against the government (petitioning), and rights advocacy. Estimates of the RETL population vary, from roughly 160,000 to 260,000 detainees at any time in roughly 350 centers before they were abolished.132 According to some estimates, the facilities held up to 300,000 to 400,000 prisoners at their peak, especially when they swelled with Falun Gong practitioners during the mid-2000s.133 According to some estimates, in recent years, drug offenders constituted the largest group in the RETL system, and between 2% and 10% of the RETL population were political prisoners.134 Although RETL conditions and sentences were in many cases less severe than prison terms, human rights groups reported many abuses in RETL centers, including forced labor, beatings, psychological torment, sexual assaults, lack of proper food, and inadequate access to medical care, in some cases resulting in death.135 In 2016, a joint statement issued by China’s judicial, procuratorial, and public security bodies reiterated that suspects must not be forced into confessing crimes and that any evidence collected through coercion should be excluded from their cases.136 The Ministry of Public Security issued disciplinary regulations aimed at holding police officers accountable for misconduct, including for obtaining confessions through torture, and subjecting them to criminal, administrative, and disciplinary punishments.137 However, reports of torture, including some that have caused public outrage, have continued.138 The Communist Party’s internal disciplinary system, known as 130 Dui Hua Foundation, Annual Report 2012, http://duihua.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/AR2012/ 2012AR_Eng_web.pdf; “China Bans Forced Confessions in Investigations,” Xinhua, December 26, 2012. 131 United Nations Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of China, February 3, 2016. 132 Maya Wang, “Rights Group: China May Not Be Ready for Labor Camp Reforms,” CNN, January 16, 2013; Minnie Chan, “Kinder Face for Notorious Re-education Camps,” South China Morning Post, February 21, 2007; Jim Yardley, “Issue in China: Many Jails Without Trial,” New York Times, May 9, 2005. 133 Julie Makinen, “China’s Closure of Labor Camps Gets Qualified Applause,” Los Angeles Times, January 18, 2014; Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education Through Labor in China, Amnesty International, 2013. Falun Gong adherents constituted up to one-half of all RETL detainees, according to some estimates. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 (China), March 11, 2010. 134 Dui Hua Foundation, January 2013. 135 Changing the Soup but Not the Medicine: Abolishing Re-education Through Labor in China, op. cit.; Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013 (China), February 27, 2014. 136 “China’s Government Tries Again to Stop Forced Confessions Through Torture,” Reuters, October 10, 2016. 137 Margaret K. Lewis, Professor of Law, “China’s Pervasive Use of Torture,” Testimony before the CongressionalExecutive Commission on China, April 24, 2016. 138 Amnesty International, “Urgent Action Update: Website Founder at Risk of Torture,” January 13, 2017; Chun Han Wong, “China Middle-Class Anger Reignited by Death of Researcher in Custody,” Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2016. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 24 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress shuanggui, has swelled with cases as part of Xi Jingping’s anticorruption drive. Human rights groups and relatives of CCP members subjected to the process, in which the accused do not have the right to legal counsel, have alleged widespread use of torture to extract confessions.139 Prisoners of Conscience The number of political prisoners in China is difficult to determine, although thousands of citizens are estimated to have been detained and incarcerated for exercising internationally recognized freedoms of speech and assembly, engaging in religious activities that are not officially approved, or promoting ethnic minority rights in cases involving grievances against the state. The Dui Hua Foundation, a U.S.-based human rights organization that focuses on the treatment of prisoners, criminal justice reforms, and women’s rights in China, estimated that there were 6,700 political and religious prisoners as of June 2016.140 These numbers include practitioners of Falun Gong and many Tibetans and Uyghurs. The Congressional–Executive Commission on China (CECC) maintains a Political Prisoner Database that contains information on over 1,400 cases of political and religious prisoners known or believed to be detained or imprisoned, noting that there are considerably more cases than those documented in the database.141 According to the Department of State, those held in prison or administrative detention in China for reasons related to politics and religion number in the tens of thousands.142 Some of the most prominent cases are discussed below. Liu Xiaobo On July 13, 2017, Liu Xiaobo, a political dissident, writer, activist, and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, died while serving an 11-year prison term. In December 2008, Liu helped draft “Charter 08,” commemorating the 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and inspired by “Charter 77” of the Czechoslovakian democracy movement that began in 1976. Charter 08, initially signed by over 300 PRC citizens, called for civil and political rights, legislative democracy, an independent judiciary, and a new Chinese Constitution, and urged the Chinese people to join to “work for major changes in Chinese society and for the rapid establishment of a free, democratic, and constitutional country.”143 The Charter eventually garnered roughly 10,000 additional signatures online. On December 8, 2008, a day before Charter 08 was published online, Liu was detained by the Beijing police, and on December 25, 2009, a Chinese court sentenced him to 11 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” for his writings and use of the Internet, including coauthoring, signing, and distributing the Charter. Liu’s indictment also included reference to six 139 Chris Buckley, “Confessions Made Under Duress Tarnish China’s Graft Fight,” New York Times, December 6, 2016; Nathan Vanderklippe, “China Systematically Using Torture in War on Corruption: Report,” The Globe and Mail, December 6, 2016. See also Human Rights Watch, “Special Measures: Detention and Torture in the Chinese Communist Party’s Shuanggui System,” December 6, 2016. 140 Dui Hua Foundation, Databases, Political Prisoners, http://duihua.org/wp/?page_id=195. 141 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Political Prisoner Database, October 2016, http://www.cecc.gov/ resources/political-prisoner-database. 142 Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 (China), op. cit. 143 For the full text of Charter 08, see Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Charter 08 (Chinese and English Text),” December 10, 2008, https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/charter-08-chinese-and-englishtext; Perry Link, “China’s Charter 08,” New York Review of Books, January 15, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/ articles/2009/01/15/chinas-charter-08/; Human Rights in China, “Charter 08,” December 9, 2008, http://www.hrichina.org/en/content/238. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 25 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress political essays that he wrote between 2005 and 2007.144 In October 2010, the Nobel Committee awarded Liu the Nobel Peace Prize for his “long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights.” PRC authorities barred members and representatives of Liu's family from traveling to Oslo in December 2010 to accept his Nobel award, and placed Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo’s wife, effectively under house arrest. Liu earned a reputation as an incisive critic of the Chinese Communist Party, an eloquent commentator on the harmful and “cruel” effects of many CCP policies on PRC society and citizens, and a supporter of gradual political reform driven “from below” through the raising of popular awareness about democracy.145 He had undergone other periods of incarceration and house arrest for his writings and activism, including a 20-month sentence in prison following his participation in the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations for democracy and three years in a Reeducation Through Labor camp (1996-1999). Liu advocated for the families of those killed in the Tiananmen military crackdown and for an official reassessment of the events of June 1989.146 In May 2017, Liu Xiaobo was granted medical parole, having been diagnosed with advancedstage liver cancer. Liu Xiaobo’s family asked the PRC government for permission for both Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia, who also reportedly is ill, to seek medical treatment abroad.147 Chinese authorities did not reduce Liu’s sentence nor allow him to travel abroad for treatment, although they agreed to invite foreign medical experts to join a team of Chinese doctors treating Liu. A German and an American doctor who examined Liu on July 8, 2017, stated at that time that they believed Mr. Liu could be safely transported to Germany or the United States for treatment “with appropriate medical evacuation care and support, while Chinese authorities asserted that Liu’s condition made him too ill for such a trip.148 U.S. government officials urged Beijing to allow Liu to travel abroad for medical treatment and to free Liu Xia from house arrest and to allow her to go abroad as well.149 Following Liu Xiaobo’s death, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Chinese government “to release Liu Xia from house arrest and allow her to depart China, according to her wishes.” Tillerson also stated that “I join those in China and around the world in mourning the tragic passing of 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo, who died while serving a lengthy prison 144 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “Prosecutors Indict Liu Xiaobo; Trial to Take Place December 23,” December 22, 2009, http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/prosecutors-indict-liu-xiaobo-trial-to-takeplace-december-23. 145 Emily Rauhala, “Chinese Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo Is Called “A Monument to Morality,” Washington Post, July 13, 2017; Liu Xiaobo, “Changing the Regime by Changing Society,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 2011). 146 Wu Qiang, “Liu Xiaobo: The Founder of China’s Political Opposition Movements,” China Change, June 20, 2017; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Liu Xiaobo,” https://www.nchrd.org/2011/03/prisoner-of-conscience-liu-xiaobo/; Nobel Prize.org, “Liu Xiaobo—Biographical,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/xiaobobio.html. 147 Mimi Lau, “Liu Xiaobo’s Family Want His Cancer Treated Outside China,” South China Morning Post, June 28, 2017. 148 M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, “Recommendation for the Further Treatment of Chinese Nobel Prize Laureate Liu Xiaobo: Joint Statement from Dr. Joseph M. Herman, Clinical Research Director, Department of Radiation Oncology, The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, and Dr. Markus Büchler, Chairman, Department of Surgery, University of Heidelberg,” July 8, 2017, https://www.mdanderson.org/newsroom/2017/07/recommendation-for-thefurther-treatment-of-chinese-nobel-prize-.html. 149 Chris Buckley, “In Liu Xiaobo’s Last Days, Supporters Fight China for His Legacy,” New York Times, July 11, 2017; “Liu Xiaobo to Be Seen by American and German Doctors,” Agence France-Presse, July 7, 2017; Heather Nauert, Department of State Press Briefing, June 29, 2017; “New U.S. Ambassador Risks China’s Ire with Support for Liu Xiaobo,” Bloomberg News, June 27, 2017. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 26 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress sentence in China for promoting peaceful democratic reform. Mr. Liu dedicated his life to the betterment of his country and humankind, and to the pursuit of justice and liberty.”150 Several members of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China released statements that they were “deeply saddened” by the loss of Liu Xiaobo and expressed their continued support for the promotion of human rights and peaceful democratic change in China, which Liu had advocated. They urged the PRC government to grant Liu Xia permission to leave China for a country of her choosing.151 Following and prior to Liu’s death, some Members of Congress introduced resolutions honoring Liu’s life and legacy, urging the PRC government to allow Liu Xiaobo and Liu Xia to seek medical treatment abroad, and designating the vicinity of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC, “Liu Xiaobo Plaza” (see Appendix). Gao Zhisheng Gao Zhisheng, a prominent rights lawyer, was named one of China’s top 10 lawyers by the Ministry of Justice in 2001. However, as his rights advocacy expanded to protect citizens who had run afoul of policies that authorities deemed to be sensitive, including family planning, religious practice, and Falun Gong, Gao was detained numerous times. In late 2011, he reportedly began serving a three-year prison term that had been handed down in 2006, but was suspended for five years. During his periods of detention, prison officials reportedly tortured him, denied him access to legal counsel and regular visits from his family, and withheld information about his location.152 Authorities released Gao in August 2014 but he remains under house arrest and constant surveillance by security agents.153 Xu Zhiyong In January 2014, constitutional rights advocate Xu Zhiyong was tried and convicted of “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” and sentenced to four years in prison. Xu, a lawyer, scholar, Haidian district people’s congress deputy, and rights activist, helped found the New Citizen’s Movement, a loosely organized network numbering roughly 5,000 people that promoted the rule of law, government transparency, citizens’ rights, civic engagement, and social justice. Its members, some of whom also have been arrested, reportedly met informally across the country to discuss politics and engaged in small street rallies in 2012 and 2013.154 The Open Constitution Initiative, which Xu also helped organize, was a nongovernmental legal research and aid organization that the government shut down in 2009, ostensibly for tax evasion.155 150 Department of State, “Press Statement, Rex W. Tillerson, “On the Passing of Liu Xiaobo,” July 13, 2017 151 Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “CECC Commissioners Issue Statements on the Death of Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo,” July 13, 2017, https://www.cecc.gov/media-center/press-releases/cecc-commissioners-issuestatements-on-the-death-of-nobel-laureate-liu. 152 Edward Wong, “Family’s Visit Pierces Silence on Jailed Chinese Dissident,” New York Times (International), January 24, 2013. 153 “Chinese Rights Lawyer’s Phone Calls Limited Under House Arrest,” Agence France Presse, January 8, 2015. 154 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Chinese Court Sentences 4 Activists to Jail,” New York Times Blogs, April 18, 2014. 155 Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley, “China Sentences Xu Zhiyong, Legal Activist, to 4 Years in Prison,” New York Times (International), January 26, 2014; Xu Zhiyong Tried for Advocacy of Education Equality and Official Transparency,” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, January 24, 2014. Congressional Research Service R44897 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED 27 Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 115th Congress Media Freedom Most major media outlets in China are owned or controlled by the government. Although in some ways the government exercises less direct control over news and information than it did in the early 2000s, due to the commercialization of the media, private financing of some media companies, and the rapid growth of popular use of the Internet and social media, the Chinese government continues to severely restrict the press, broadcasting, publishing, and online communication. China ranked 176th out of 180 countries on Reporters Without Borders’ 2017 World Press Freedom Index, and nearly 40 journalists and dozens of “netizens” reportedly were incarcerated in 2016.156 According to the CECC, the Chinese government has “used a variety of legal and extralegal measures to target journalists, editors, and bloggers who covered issues authorities deemed to be politically sensitive,” including cyberattacks, dismissal or disciplinary action, harassment, physical violence, detention, and prison sentences.157 Publications that broach topics related to political reform have faced growing harassment by state authorities and the independent reporting of official corruption and misconduct has been curtailed.158 Under an amendment to the PRC Criminal Law that became effective in November 2015, journalists may be held criminally liable for ‘‘fabricating false reports’’ in their coverage of ‘‘hazards, epidemics, disasters, and situations involving police.’’159 Meanwhile, the trend toward the commercialization of the press has begun to reverse, according to some analysts, while reliance upon government support, particular [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44897. Public record. Not legal advice.