# Selected Homeland Security Issues in the 115th Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44847

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** May 11, 2017
- **Citation:** R44847

## Text

Selected Homeland Security Issues in the
115th Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in Homeland Security and Appropriations
May 11, 2017

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R44847

Selected Homeland Security Issues in the 115th Congress

Summary
In 2001, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, “homeland security” went from
being a concept discussed among a relatively small cadre of policymakers and strategic thinkers
to a broadly discussed issue among policymakers, including those in Congress. Debates over how
to implement coordinated homeland security policy led to the passage of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). Evolution of America’s response to terrorist threats has continued under the leadership of
different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion.
DHS is currently the third-largest department in the federal government, although it does not
incorporate all of the homeland security functions at the federal level, even if one constrains the
definition of homeland security to the narrow field of prevention and response to domestic acts of
terrorism. In policymaking terms, homeland security is a very broad and complex network of
interrelated issues. For example, in its executive summary, the Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review issued in 2014 delineates the missions of the homeland security enterprise as follows:
prevent terrorism and enhance security; secure and manage the borders; enforce and administer
immigration laws; safeguard and secure cyberspace; and strengthen national preparedness and
resilience.
This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 115th
Congress. After a brief discussion of the definitions of homeland security, the homeland security
budget, and the role of homeland security actors in the intelligence community, the report divides
the specific issues into five broad categories:






Counterterrorism and Security Management;
Border Security and Trade;
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery;
Cybersecurity; and
DHS Management Issues.

Each of those areas contains a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research
Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface of most of these selected
issues. More detailed information on these topics and others can be obtained by consulting the
CRS reports referenced herein, or by contacting the relevant CRS expert.

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Selected Homeland Security Issues in the 115th Congress

Contents
What Is Homeland Security? ........................................................................................................... 1
The Budget and Security ........................................................................................................... 2
DHS Appropriations............................................................................................................ 2
Homeland Security and the U.S. Intelligence Community ....................................................... 3
Selected Intelligence Community (IC) Issues with Homeland Security
Implications ..................................................................................................................... 7
Homeland Security and Research and Development ................................................................ 9
Counterterrorism and Security Management ................................................................................. 10
The Transnational Trend of Terrorism..................................................................................... 10
Al Qaeda ............................................................................................................................ 11
The Islamic State................................................................................................................ 11
Considerations .................................................................................................................. 12
The Islamic State in the Homeland—the Departed, Returned, and Inspired .......................... 12
Beyond the Departed, Returned, and Inspired .................................................................. 14
Preempting and Monitoring Potential Terrorists ............................................................... 14
Medical Countermeasures to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Terrorism .............................................................................................................................. 16
Chemical Facilities Security ................................................................................................... 16
Electric Grid Physical Security ............................................................................................... 17
Continuity of Government Operations .................................................................................... 20
U.S. Secret Service.................................................................................................................. 21
Federal Facility Security ......................................................................................................... 22
DHS State and Local Preparedness Grants ............................................................................. 23
Border Security and Trade ............................................................................................................. 24
Southwest Border Issues ......................................................................................................... 24
Drug Trafficking and the Southwest Border ..................................................................... 24
Illicit Proceeds and the Southwest Border ........................................................................ 25
Cross-Border Smuggling Tunnels ..................................................................................... 26
Cargo Security ......................................................................................................................... 27
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) ................................................ 28
100% Scanning Requirement ............................................................................................ 29
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) ....................................................... 30
Immigration Inspections at Ports of Entry (POEs).................................................................. 32
Port of Entry (POE) Infrastructure and Personnel ............................................................ 33
Entry-Exit System ............................................................................................................. 34
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry (POEs) ......................................................................... 35
Aviation Security ..................................................................................................................... 36
Explosives Screening Strategy for the Aviation Domain .................................................. 37
Risk-Based Passenger Screening ...................................................................................... 39
The Use of Terrorist Watchlists in the Aviation Domain .................................................. 40
Perimeter Security, Access Controls, and Worker Vetting ................................................ 41
Security Incidents at Airports............................................................................................ 42
Foreign Last Point of Departure Airports ......................................................................... 43
Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft ............................. 43
Security Issues Regarding the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft ...................................... 44
Transit and Passenger Rail Security ........................................................................................ 46

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Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery........................................................................... 48
Disaster Assistance Funding ................................................................................................... 48
Firefighter Assistance Programs.............................................................................................. 50
Emergency Communications .................................................................................................. 50
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) ...................................................................... 52
NFIP Debt and Borrowing ................................................................................................ 53
Affordability and Solvency ............................................................................................... 53
The Role of Private Insurance in the NFIP ....................................................................... 54
FEMA Reauthorization ........................................................................................................... 55
National Preparedness System ................................................................................................ 56
National Health Security ......................................................................................................... 58
Cybersecurity................................................................................................................................. 59
Defining Cybersecurity ........................................................................................................... 60
Federal Network Security ....................................................................................................... 60
Critical Infrastructure and Cybersecurity ................................................................................ 61
Government and Private Sector Roles in Cybersecurity ......................................................... 62
Cyber Response....................................................................................................................... 63
Applied Technologies .............................................................................................................. 64
Encryption ......................................................................................................................... 64
Automation ....................................................................................................................... 65
Cloud Computing .............................................................................................................. 65
Internet of Things .............................................................................................................. 66
Cybersecurity in Selected Transportation Sectors ................................................................... 66
Aviation Cybersecurity ..................................................................................................... 66
Maritime Cybersecurity .................................................................................................... 67
DHS Management Issues .............................................................................................................. 68
Unity of Effort ......................................................................................................................... 68
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office (CBRNE) .................... 69
Common Appropriations Structure ......................................................................................... 70
DHS Headquarters Consolidation ........................................................................................... 71
Department of Homeland Security Personnel Issues .............................................................. 72
Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) Responsibilities ................................................... 73
Human Capital Strategy for Recruitment.......................................................................... 75
Millennials and Federal Government Employment .......................................................... 76
Organizational Culture at DHS ......................................................................................... 78
Interagency Collaboration through Employee Engagement Steering Committee ............ 79

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 80

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What Is Homeland Security?
There is no statutory definition of homeland security that reflects the breadth of the enterprise as
currently understood. Although there is a federal Department of Homeland Security, it is neither
solely dedicated to homeland security missions, nor is it the only part of the federal government
with significant responsibilities in this arena.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-296), which was signed into law on November 25, 2002. The new department was
assembled from components pulled from 22 different government agencies and began official
operations on March 1, 2003. Since then, DHS has undergone a series of restructurings and
reorganizations intended to improve its effectiveness and efficiency.
Although DHS does include many of the homeland security functions of the federal government,
several of these functions or parts of these functions remain at their original executive branch
agencies and departments, including the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, and
Transportation. Not all of the missions of DHS are officially “homeland security” missions. Some
components have historical missions that do not directly relate to conventional homeland security
definitions, such as the Coast Guard’s environmental and boater safety missions, and Congress
has in the past debated whether FEMA and its disaster relief and recovery missions belong in the
department.
Some criminal justice elements could arguably be included in a broad definition of homeland
security. Issues such as the role of the military in law enforcement, monitoring and policing
transfers of money, human trafficking, explosives and weapons laws, and aspects of foreign
policy, trade, and economics have implications for homeland security policy.
Rather than trying to resolve the question of what should or should not be considered a part of
homeland security, this report is a survey of issues that have come up in the context of homeland
security policy debates. After initial discussion of the definitions of homeland security, the
homeland security budget, and the role of homeland security actors in the intelligence
community, the report groups the issues into five general themes:






Counterterrorism and Security Management;
Border Security and Trade;
Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery;
Cybersecurity; and
DHS Management Issues

As each topic under these themes is introduced, the author of the section is listed, along with their
contact information. In many cases, a specific CRS report is highlighted as a source of more
detailed information.1
This report is neither exhaustive nor exclusive in its scope, but representative of the broad array
of issues likely to be taken up in one way or another by the 115th Congress in the coming months.
The report includes many issues that were touched upon in the 114th Congress through legislation
or hearings, and remain unresolved. Some specific issues or issue areas are explored from a
variety of perspectives in other CRS work (e.g., issues with law enforcement, domestic policy, or
1

In cases where an author has left CRS prior to the date of publication, only the supporting reports are mentioned in the
text, while the author is listed in a footnote.

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national security aspects), and the reader is encouraged to reach out to CRS directly or explore
the CRS website to take full advantage of the products available to them on these matters.
While this report may be updated, it should be viewed as an introduction, not a legislative tracker.
Therefore, some issues currently under debate are not included as a focal item in this report, as
the state of the debate is highly dynamic (e.g., the Administration’s proposed construction of a
wall on the U.S.-Mexico border), and other CRS analytical products provide more current
analysis than can practically be provided in a report of this breadth.

The Budget and Security
(name redacted), Specialist in Homeland Security Policy and Appropriations
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations: FY2017, coordinated by (name redacted) , and CRS Report R44052, DHS
Budget v. DHS Appropriations: Fact Sheet, by (name redacted) .
From FY2003 through FY2015, according to data from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the entire U.S. government spent almost $807 billion (in nominal dollars) on “homeland
security”—defined in law as “those activities that detect, deter, protect against, and respond to
terrorist attacks occurring within the United States and its territories.” Such spending peaked in
FY2009 at $73.8 billion. The OMB indicated that its initial estimate of the total budget for
homeland security activities for FY2016 was $71.7 billion.2
By comparison, the budget for the Department of Homeland Security has grown from $31.2
billion in FY2003, when it did not have its own appropriations bill, to $63.5 billion in FY2015,
the last year for which we have complete budget data as of the date of publication. Roughly $36.7
billion of that amount, or 57.8%, was considered “homeland security” spending by OMB’s
accounting under the above definition. Some argue that the definition in law is too focused on
explicit and directly attributable counterterrorism activities compared to broader theories that
have been part of the national discussion, which consider immigration and border control or
disaster response as a part of homeland security.

DHS Appropriations
For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested $47.3 billion in discretionary budget authority
for DHS, including over $6.7 billion to pay for the costs of major disasters under the Stafford Act.
Additional Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding was requested by the
Administration for the Coast Guard as a transfer from the U.S. Navy.
Neither the Senate bill3 nor the House bill4 that were reported out of their respective
appropriations committees in response to that request received floor consideration.
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed P.L. 114-223 into law, which contained a
continuing resolution that funded the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016,
minus 0.496% through December 9, 2016. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on
2

Finalized budget totals for FY2016, reflecting reprogrammings and transfers, are expected with the release of the
complete FY2018 budget request.
3
S. 3001, accompanied by S.Rept. 114-264.
4
H.R. 5634, accompanied by H.Rept. 114-668.

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December 10, 2016 (P.L. 114-254), funding the government at the same rate of operations as
FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. A third continuing resolution extended funding
at that rate through May 5, 2017.
On March 16, 2017, the Trump Administration submitted an amendment to the FY2017 budget
request. The amendment proposed $3 billion more in funding for DHS, including funding for
construction of a border wall and increases in staffing for U.S. Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement that had been called for by President Trump in
Executive Orders signed January 25, 2017.
On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. 115-31, Division F of which was the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017. The act included $49.3 billion in
discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2017, $1.1 billion of which was included as
supplemental appropriations in response to the March request and emerging developments.
The act included a finalized reorganization of most of the structure of DHS appropriations
intended to improve transparency. However, the appropriations for the U.S. Coast Guard continue
to be presented in their old structure due to complications with their financial management
system.
The current budget environment will likely present challenges to homeland security programs,
DHS components, and the department as a whole, going forward. The funding demands of
ongoing capital investment efforts, such as the proposed border wall and ongoing recapitalization
efforts, and staffing needs for cybersecurity, border security, and immigration enforcement, will
compete with one another for limited funding across the government and within DHS. The
potential impact of the changing budget environment is discussed at various points throughout
this report.

Homeland Security and the U.S. Intelligence Community
(name redacted), Research Fellow,
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)

Intelligence and National Security Policy

Heidi Peters, Research Librarian ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
While many think of homeland security only in terms of DHS, it is a primary mission of the
entire Intelligence Community (IC). In the years since 9/11, the “wall” between foreign and
domestic intelligence has fallen and many efforts have been initiated to better integrate the
capabilities residing in intelligence and law enforcement organizations.5 “National intelligence”
has come to mean “all intelligence,” not just foreign intelligence.6
The many barriers between foreign and domestic intelligence that existed prior to 9/11 were
intended to prevent government spying on U.S. persons and focused the IC on foreign
intelligence. The tragedy of the 9/11 attacks overcame earlier concerns and led Congress and the
5

See, for example, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), pp. 78-80, under “Legal Constraints on the FBI and ‘the Wall.’” See also Jerry Berman
and Lara Flint, “Commentary: Guiding lights: Intelligence Oversight and Control for the Challenge of
Terrorism.” Criminal Justice Ethics 22, no. 1 (2003): 2-58, at https://www.cdt.org/files/030300guidinglights_3.pdf.
They suggest that there were numerous barriers: “There was never just one wall … there were really many walls, built
between and within agencies…. Some walls were meant to protect individual rights. Others were meant to protect
national security interests.”
6
P.L. 108-458, §1012. For more on “national intelligence,” see CRS In Focus IF10525, Defense Primer: National and
Defense Intelligence, by (name redacted)
.

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executive branch to enact legislation, policies, and regulations designed to enhance information
sharing across the U.S. government.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) gave the DHS responsibility for fusing law
enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. Provisions
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as the coordinator at the federal level
for terrorism information and assessment and created the position of Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to provide strategic management across the IC.7 New legal authorities
accompanied these organizational changes.8 At the state and local level, initiatives to improve
collaboration across the federal system, such as the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs),
have expanded—the number of JTTFs across the country grew from 34 to over 100 between 2001
and 2017—and new ones, such as DHS’s National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC), have
been put in place.9
The “community” of U.S. government entities that perform some kind of intelligence-related
activity has gradually evolved into 17 organizations/agencies that span six separate government
departments and two independent agencies.10 Two intelligence elements of DHS and one element
of the FBI are most closely associated with homeland security.11
DHS’s missions include “preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing
our borders; enforcing and administering our immigration laws; strengthening cyberspace and
critical infrastructure; and strengthening national preparedness and resilience to disasters.”12


DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) provides intelligence support
across the full range of DHS missions. OIA combines the unique information
collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities (e.g., at
airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign intelligence from the IC; law
enforcement information from federal, state, local, and tribal sources; private
sector data about critical infrastructure and key resources; and information from
domestic open sources to develop homeland security intelligence.13 OIA
analytical products focus on a wide range of homeland security threats to include

7

For more on the DNI position, see CRS In Focus IF10470, The Director of National Intelligence (DNI), by (name
redacted)
.
8
For example, post 9/11 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 broadened the ability of
federal government organizations to collect and share intelligence information domestically.
9
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Protecting America From Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fusion
Centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, at http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces; and
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet, at https://www.dhs.gov/
national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet.
10
For a brief overview of the 17 components of the IC, see CRS In Focus IF10469, The U.S. Intelligence Community
(IC), by (name redacted)
.
11
For details on all 17 components of the IC see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. National
Intelligence: An Overview 2013, at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf. See
also CRS Report R44681, Intelligence Community Programs, Management, and Enduring Issues, by (name redacted)
.
12
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Roles and Responsibilities,” Appendix A in 2014
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, June 18, 2014, p. 83, at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf.
13
For more on domestic intelligence see Greg Treverton, “Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the
Options,” Monograph, RAND Corporation, 2008, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG767.html.

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

foreign and domestic terrorism, border security, human trafficking, and public
health.14 OIA’s customers range from the U.S. President to border patrol agents,
Coast Guard personnel, airport screeners, and local first responders. Much of the
information sharing is done through the NNFC—with OIA providing personnel,
systems and training.15
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), made part of DHS in 2002, has intelligence
elements that deal with information relating to maritime security and homeland
defense. The USCG’s responsibilities include protecting citizens from the sea
(maritime safety), protecting America from threats delivered by the sea (maritime
security), and protecting the sea itself (maritime stewardship). Its diverse mission
sets and broad legal authorities allow it to fill a unique niche within the IC.16

The FBI functions as both an intelligence and law enforcement agency.17 Immediately after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, investigators highlighted a number of obstacles to information
sharing among the nation’s intelligence and law enforcement communities, and called for related
reforms. In the decade following 9/11, a number of laws and executive orders included provisions
designed to improve the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts.18 For example, the IRTPA of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) directed the FBI Director “to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who
are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the FBI of an
institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of
the Bureau.”19
The FBI Intelligence Branch “oversees intelligence policy and guidance.” It includes the
Directorate of Intelligence, “the FBI’s dedicated national intelligence workforce.”20 The
directorate has “clear authority and responsibility for all Bureau intelligence functions” and
includes intelligence elements and personnel that reside at FBI Headquarters and in each FBI
field division.21 Such elements play a role in much of the investigative work that the FBI pursues.
For example, intelligence is central to FBI efforts to thwart national security threats. Such activity
is broadly managed by the FBI National Security Branch which includes:

14

DHS, “Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” at https://www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis.
Ibid. See also Office of the Director of National Intelligence, U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013, pp. 1920, at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/USNI%202013%20Overview_web.pdf.
16
U.S. Coast Guard, Intelligence, Coast Guard Publication 2-0, May 2010, at https://www.uscg.mil/doctrine/CGPub/
CG_Pub_2_0.pdf.
17
For more on the FBI’s role in the IC, see Joint Publication 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations, January 5, 2012, p. A-9.
18
See for example USA PATRIOT Act (2001) (P.L. 107-56); USA PATRIOT Reauthorization and Improvement Act
of 2005 (P.L. 109-177), and E.O. 12333, as amended by E.O.s 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008).
19
P.L. 108-458 §2001(c).
20
See https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/intelligence-branch.
21
Ibid. Unlike other IC entities, the FBI is authorized to conduct HUMINT operations within the United States as part
of its law enforcement duties. FBI/DI uses this authority to conduct source operations and interrogations of known or
suspected terrorists, criminals, or facilitators on U.S. soil. See testimony of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III, U.S.
Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, The State of Intelligence Reform 10 Years after 9/11,
hearings, 112th Cong., 1st sess., October 6, 2011, at https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-state-of-intelligencereform-10-years-after-911.
15

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







The Counterintelligence Division. It focuses on preventing theft of sensitive
information and advanced technologies.22
The Counterterrorism Division. It oversees counterterrorism investigations and
the JTTFs located in FBI field divisions.23
The High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group. It is a multiagency body
administered by the FBI and “brings together intelligence professionals from the
U.S. Intelligence Community to conduct interrogations that strengthen national
security and that are consistent with the rule of law.”24
The Weapons of Mass Destruction Division. It helps coordinate intelligencerelated efforts designed to prevent the use of chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons.25
The Terrorist Screening Center. It maintains the U.S. government’s consolidated
watch list of known or suspected terrorists.26

Law enforcement information is expected to be shared with other intelligence agencies for use in
all-source products.27 In 2016 testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, then-FBI Director James Comey commented on the importance of sharing
intelligence within the broader context of the FBI’s “intelligence transformation:”
Integrating intelligence and operations is part of the broader intelligence transformation
the FBI has undertaken in the last decade. We are making progress, but have more work
to do. We have taken two steps to improve this integration. First, we have established an
Intelligence Branch within the FBI headed by an executive assistant director (EAD). The
EAD looks across the entire enterprise and drives integration. Second, we now have
special agents and new intelligence analysts at the FBI Academy engaged in practical
training exercises and taking core courses together. As a result, they are better prepared to
work well together in the field. Our goal every day is to get better at using, collecting and
sharing intelligence to better understand and defeat our adversaries. 28

22

See https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch; FBI, Intelligence National
Strategy, November 4, 2011, at https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/november/counterintelligence_110411. See also
E.O. 12333 §1.3 (b) (20) (A) which directs the intelligence elements of the FBI to: (1) Collect (including through
clandestine means), analyze, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to support national
and departmental missions; (2) Conduct counterintelligence activities; and (3) Conduct foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence liaison relationships with intelligence, security, and law enforcement services of foreign
governments or international organizations.
23
See https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism. For more information on FBI counterterrorism investigations, see
CRS Report R44521, The Islamic State’s Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement, by (name r
edacted)
; and CRS Report R41780, The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations, by (name r
edacted)
.
24
See https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/high-value-detainee-interrogationgroup.
25
See https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/wmd.
26
See https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/tsc. For more information see CRS
Report R44678, The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel, by (name redacted), (name redacted),
and (name redacted)
.
27
“All-source” products include analysis based on information from all available sources, including those from inside
and outside the intelligence community.
28
James Comey, FBI Director, Fifteen Years After 9/11: Threats to the Homeland, Statement Before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC, September 27, 2016, at
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fifteen-years-after-911-threats-to-the-homeland.

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Selected Intelligence Community (IC) Issues with Homeland Security
Implications
Domestic Surveillance
Domestic surveillance issues will likely be a concern for the 115th Congress principally because
certain provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (P.L. 95-511),29
primarily those associated with Title VII, will sunset on December 31, 2017.
FISA provides a statutory framework regulating when government agencies may gather foreign
intelligence through electronic surveillance or physical searches, capture the numbers dialed on a
telephone line (pen registers) and identify the originating number of a call on a particular phone
line (with trap and trace devices), or access specified business records and other tangible things.
Authorization for such activities is typically obtained via a court order from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), a specialized court created to act as a neutral judicial
decision maker in the context of FISA. The 9/11 attacks prompted a new look at FISA’s
surveillance and search provisions. Major revisions are associated with several pieces of
legislation: Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 (P.L. 105-272); USA
PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56),30 IRTPA of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), Protect America Act of
2007 (P.L. 110-55), and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-261).31
The USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-23), enacted during the 114th Congress, reauthorized
three amendments to FISA known as the “roving” wiretap provision, the “Section 215” provision,
and the “lone wolf” provisions.32 Distinctions between the three amendments include




Multipoint, or “roving” wiretaps allow wiretaps to follow an individual even
when he or she changes the means of communication (i.e., wiretaps which may
follow a target even when he or she changes phones). If it had been allowed to
expire, FISA provisions would require a separate FISA Court authorization to tap
each device a target uses.33
“Section 215” broadened the types of records and “other tangible things” that can
be made accessible to the government under FISA. If it had been allowed to
expire, FISA provisions would have read as they did prior to passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act, and accessible business records would have been limited to
“common carrier, public accommodation facility, physical storage facility, or
vehicle rental facility.”34

29

The original FISA legislation, P.L. 95-511 is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/
STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf. As originally passed, FISA contained three sections and was 16 pages long.
30
The full title of the USA PATRIOT ACT is the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.
31
Most of the major revisions were written in response to recommendations in the 9/11 Commission Report and in
response to the perception that the government needed to improve its collection, production and dissemination of
counterterrorism-related intelligence to prevent more terrorist attacks. As a result of the amendments, FISA has grown
to eight sections and is now 81 pages long. P.L. 95-511, as amended, is available at http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/
Foreign%20Intelligence%20Surveillance%20Act%20Of%201978.pdf.
32
The first two of these provisions were part of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56) and the third was passed
as part of the IRTPA of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
33
CRS Report R40138, Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Expiring on December 15,
2019, by (name redacted)
.
34
Ibid.

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

The “lone wolf” provision allows the government to monitor individuals acting
alone and potentially engaged in international terrorism, providing that they are
not citizens or permanent residents of the United States. If it had been allowed to
expire, there would have been no provision for individuals acting alone.35

Title VII was added to the original FISA legislation pursuant to the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 (P.L. 110-261) with a sunset clause that repealed Title VII on December 31, 2012. The FISA
Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-238) authorized a five-year extension—such
that Title VII will be automatically repealed on December 31, 2017, unless the 115th Congress
passes legislation to extend it.


Section 702 permits the Attorney General and the DNI to jointly authorize
targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States
in order to acquire foreign intelligence information. However, it is limited in
scope. For example, it is limited to targeting non-U.S. persons, the targeting
procedures must be reasonably designed to prevent the intentional acquisition of
any communication where the sender and all intended recipients are known at the
time of the acquisition to be located in the United States, and procedures must be
consistent with Constitutional protections afforded by the 4th Amendment. Once
authorized, such acquisitions may last for periods of up to one year.36 If it is
allowed to expire, orders in effect on December 31, 2017, would be allowed to
continue through their expiration date.37 However, no new orders under Section
702 could be issued after the sunset date.

Information Sharing and Collaboration
The “wall” between domestic and foreign intelligence has come down metaphorically, but
barriers to information sharing and collaboration remain between the IC and law enforcement
entities, between IC entities in the various levels of government—federal, state, local, tribal,
territorial—and between the public and private sector.38
There are a number of efforts underway to overcome those barriers. For example, the White
House-led Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA IPC) focuses on
government-wide standards and architecture, security and access, associated privacy protections,
and best practices.39 DHS has developed a Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing and
35

Ibid.
For more on Section 702, see CRS Report R44457, Surveillance of Foreigners Outside the United States Under
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), by (name redacted)
.
37
P.L. 110-261, §404(b)(1), as amended by P.L. 112-238, §2(b).
38
Barriers to information sharing and collaboration include different uses of information collected by various
organizations (e.g., data gathered for intelligence purposes vs. evidence gathered to prosecute a criminal), access to
classified materials, complications associated with information technology, differing organizational cultures, and
concerns over the damage caused by leaked information. Various types of DHS, IC, and law enforcement centers exist
to “fuse” or bridge the gaps between organizations at all levels of government but the system for integrating
intelligence-related information is far from perfect. While the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act removed much of the
statutory basis for the “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence information, making it possible to share law
enforcement information with analysts in intelligence agencies, experts have observed that many obstacles remain.
39
P.L. 108-458 established the position of Program Manager (PM) to manage the information sharing environment
(ISE) and to be “responsible for information sharing across the Federal Government.” Consistent with the direction and
policies issued by the President, the DNI, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the PMISE issues government-wide procedures, guidelines, instructions, and functional standards, as appropriate, for the
management, development, and proper operation of the ISE. For more on this topic, see “ISE governance,” at
(continued...)
36

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Collaboration Program (CISCP) that shares threat, incident and vulnerability information between
government and industry across critical infrastructure sectors such as the chemical, energy, dams,
and financial services sectors in order to meet its public-private cybersecurity data sharing and
analytical collaboration mission.40 The FBI partners with businesses, academic institutions, state
and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants through a program called InfraGard.41
The Department of State promotes security cooperation through its Overseas Security Advisory
Council partnering with business and private sector interests worldwide.42
Congress may choose to explore how these information-sharing organizations, and others, are
measuring progress in efforts such as CISCP. Based on those metrics, it may attempt to assess the
United States’ current situation in terms of information sharing and collaboration on homeland
security-related issues such as cybersecurity, border security, transportation security, disaster
response, drug interdiction, critical infrastructure protection, and homegrown violent extremism.
As Congress reviews cases of collaboration between multiple agencies, it may examine if it is
clear which agency has the lead, and whether any single organization is accountable if a
collaborative arrangement fails.

Homeland Security and Research and Development
(name redacted), Specialist in Science and Technology Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov,
7-....)
The Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) has primary responsibility for establishing,
administering, and coordinating DHS R&D activities. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) is responsible for research and development (R&D) relating to nuclear and radiological
threats. Several other DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, also fund R&D and R&Drelated activities related to their missions. The Common Appropriations Structure that DHS
introduced in its FY2017 budget includes an account titled Research and Development in seven
different DHS components.
The Under Secretary for S&T has statutory responsibility for coordination of homeland security
R&D both within DHS and across the federal government.43 The Director of DNDO also has an

(...continued)
https://www.ise.gov/ise-governance. For more on IPCs, see Alan G. Whittaker, et al., The National Security Policy
Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National
Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, August 15, 2011, pp. 17-18.
40
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, CIKR Cyber Information and Collaboration Program, at http://csrc.nist.gov/
groups/SMA/ispab/documents/minutes/2013-06/ispab_june2013_menna_ciscp_one_pager.pdf. See also DHS, “Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program,” at https://www.us-cert.gov/
sites/default/files/c3vp/CISCP_20140523.pdf; and DHS, “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” at http://www.dhs.gov/
critical-infrastructure-sectors.
41
The InfraGard National Members Alliance (INMA) is comprised of 84 separate InfraGard Member Alliances (IMAs)
that represent over 37,000 technical experts nationwide. Each of the 84 IMAs is geographically linked with an FBI
Field Office. See “Infra Gard: Partnership for Protection,” at https://www.infragard.org/Application/General/
MoreInfo.
42
The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) was created in 1985 under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to
promote security cooperation between American private sector interests worldwide and the U.S. Department of State. It
currently encompasses a 34-member core Council, an Executive Office, over 140 Country Councils, and more than
3,500 constituent member organizations. For more, see “About OSAC,” at https://www.osac.gov/Pages/AboutUs.aspx.
43
6 U.S.C. 182.

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interagency coordination role with respect to nuclear detection R&D.44 Both internal and external
coordination have been long-standing congressional concerns.
Regarding internal coordination, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in
2012 that because so many components of the department are involved, it is difficult for DHS to
oversee R&D department-wide.45 In January 2014, the joint explanatory statement for the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) directed DHS to implement and report on
new policies for R&D prioritization. It also directed DHS to review and implement policies and
guidance for defining and overseeing R&D department-wide.46 In July 2014, GAO reported that
DHS had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D and was conducting R&D portfolio
reviews across the department, but that it had not yet developed policy guidance for DHS-wide
R&D oversight, coordination, and tracking.47
A challenge for external coordination is that the majority of homeland security related R&D is
conducted by other agencies, most notably the Department of Defense and the Department of
Health and Human Services. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Under Secretary for
S&T, “in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies,” to develop a government-wide
national policy and strategic plan for homeland security R&D,48 but no such plan has ever been
issued. Instead, in certain areas, the National Science and Technology Council (a White House
coordinating entity) has issued R&D strategies in certain topical areas, such as biosurveillance,49
and the S&T Directorate has developed R&D plans with individual agencies in response to
certain specific threats.
Provisions regarding R&D coordination have often appeared in congressional report language
accompanying homeland security appropriations bills. In the 115th Congress, they may also be
included in DHS reauthorization legislation.

Counterterrorism and Security Management
The Transnational Trend of Terrorism
John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R41004, Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign
Policy Issues for Congress.

44

6 U.S.C. 592.
See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: Oversight and Coordination of
Research and Development Should Be Strengthened, GAO-12-837, September 12, 2012, http://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-12-837.
46
“Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mr. Rogers of Kentucky, Chairman of the House Committee on
Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment on H.R. 3547, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2014,” Congressional Record, vol. 160, part 9 (January 15, 2014), p. H927.
47
See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: Continued Actions Needed to
Strengthen Oversight and Coordination of Research and Development, GAO-14-813T, July 31, 2014,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-813T.
48
P.L. 107-296, Sec. 302(2); 6 U.S.C. 182(2).
49
National Science and Technology Council, National Biosurveillance Science and Technology Roadmap,
Washington, DC, June 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
biosurveillance_roadmap_2013.pdf.
45

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Terrorism remains a transnational threat that entails risks to U.S. global interests emanating from
and manifesting in both the international and domestic environment. Central to U.S. efforts to
address transnational terrorism are actions taken to detect, deter, and defeat Al Qaeda and the
Islamic State. While recognizing that numerous other terrorist groups may wish to harm U.S.
global security interests, the current Administration appears to be primarily focused on addressing
threats from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, their affiliated organizations, and adherents to their
violence-based philosophy. Understanding how Al Qaeda and the Islamic State continue to evolve
into global entities with a diverse set of actors and capabilities is central to formulating sound
strategic policy and overseeing its effective implementation.

Al Qaeda
The past few years have witnessed a continuation in terrorist actions by entities claiming some
affiliation with or philosophical connection to Al Qaeda. Many of the past year’s global terrorist
attacks were conducted by individuals or small terrorist cells that received support ranging from
resources and training to having minimal connections, if any, with the terrorist groups to which
they claim allegiance. Some argue that recent U.S. counterterrorism successes may be reducing
the level of terrorist threats to the nation emanating from core Al Qaeda. U.S. officials suggested
that the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 coupled with continuous post-9/11 global
military and intelligence counterterrorism actions have significantly degraded Al Qaeda’s ability
to successfully launch a catastrophic terrorist attack against U.S. global interests.50 Others suggest
that Al Qaeda has changed from an organization to a philosophical movement, making it more
difficult to detect and defeat.51 Still, Al Qaeda, the organization and its affiliates, persist and have
drawn the attention of the Trump Administration.

The Islamic State52
The Islamic State (IS, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, or ISIS) is a
transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that has expanded its control over parts
of Iraq and Syria since 2013. There is debate over the degree to which the overseas members of
the Islamic State organization might represent a direct terrorist threat to U.S. facilities and
personnel in the region or to the U.S. homeland or whether the more significant concern relates to
how unaffiliated individuals not under the control of IS leadership might become inspired to
undertake attacks.53 The forerunners of the Islamic State were part of the insurgency against
coalition forces in Iraq. In the years since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the organization
has expanded and contracted its presence in Iraq and broadened its reach and activities in Syria.
The Islamic State has thrived in the disaffected Sunni tribal areas of eastern provinces of Syria
affected by the civil war. Since 2014, IS forces have killed Syrian and Iraqi adversaries, including
some civilians, often from ethnic or religious minorities, and killed hostages, including U.S.
citizens. Islamic State attempts to make further gains in Iraq and Syria continue. The group’s

50

For additional information, see CRS Report R41809, Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations,
coordinated by (name redacted).
51
Haridimos Tsoukas and Robert C. H. Chia, Philosophy and Organizational Theory, Research in the Sociology of
Organizations, Volume 32, London, U.K., 2011, pp. 287-290.
52
For additional information, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted)
and (name redacted)
.
53
CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)

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tactics have drawn international ire, and raised U.S. attention to Iraq’s political problems and to
the war in Syria.54

Considerations
The terrorist threat to U.S. global interests will likely remain an important issue for the
Administration and the 115th Congress. Over the past few years numerous individuals were
arrested in the homeland and abroad for conducting attacks and planning terrorism-related
activities directed at U.S. national security interests. Many of the attacks—successful and
unsuccessful—were of a transnational dimension and included a lone attacker who appears to
have become radicalized over the Internet, terrorist organizations wishing to use airliners as
platforms for destruction, and individuals attempting to detonate large quantities of explosives or
undertaking mass shootings in symbolic areas frequented by large groups of people.
The 114th Congress undertook efforts, largely through hearings, to better understand the nature of
terrorism in various geographic regions and assess the effectiveness of U.S. and partnering
nations’ counterterrorism efforts. Programs and policies that Congress has reviewed include
public diplomacy efforts; imposition of sanctions; terrorism financing rules; the nexus between
international crime, narcotics, and terrorism; and the relationship between domestic and
international terrorism activities. The 115th Congress may assess the Trump Administration’s
counterterrorism-related strategies, policies, and programs to ascertain if additional guidance or
legislation is required. Any such assessments will likely include considerations of how best to
balance perceived risks to U.S. global security interests with other non-security related policy
priorities.

The Islamic State in the Homeland—the Departed, Returned,
and Inspired
(name redacted)
7-.... )

, Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov,

For more information, see CRS Report R44521, The Islamic State’s Acolytes and the
Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement, by (name redacted)
Congress continues to focus attention on the threat posed by people who have pursued terrorist
activity in the homeland. It may be of value for Congress to undertake its policy discussions with
a broad understanding of the contours of such terrorist plotting, as well as the general types of
actions the government takes to mitigate this threat.
Since 2014, the Islamic State (IS)55 has become the focal point for the bulk of homegrown violent
jihadist terrorist plots.56 According to CRS analysis of publicly available information, IS
54

For additional information, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted)
and (name redacted)
.
55
The group is also referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da’esh),
among other names. For more information see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by (name redact
ed) and (name redacted)
, and CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response,
coordinated by (name redacted).
56
For this report, the term “homegrown” includes American citizens, lawful permanent residents, or visitors radicalized
largely within the United States. “Homegrown violent jihadist” describes homegrown individuals using Islam as an
ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by
a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. Such violence can be perpetrated within the
(continued...)

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supporters have accounted for 80 of the approximately 91 homegrown violent jihadist plots
between 2014 and February 2017. This includes instances in which people in the United States
wanted to travel to Syria to fight with extremist groups in the nation’s civil war as well as plots to
strike domestic targets. These plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the
courses of action that plotters57 pursued as they attempted to support the terrorist group. The first
two categories focus on foreign fighters,58 the last on people who will not or have not traveled to
train or fight overseas, but are willing to do harm in the United States:






The Departed—American foreign fighters who plan to leave or have left the
United States to fight for the Islamic State. This group includes suspects
scheming to travel but who are caught before they arrive in IS territory.
The Returned—American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the
ranks of the Islamic State and return to the United States, where they can
potentially plan and execute attacks at home.59
The Inspired—Americans lured—in part—by IS propaganda to participate in
terrorist plots within the United States.

The desire to become a foreign fighter (captured in either the departed or the returned category)
played a role in 47 of the 80 IS-related plots. Almost all of the 47 had people either departing the
United States for Syria or considering such a trip. Three of the 47 cases involved investigations of
people who had returned from the conflict zone.60 In 37 cases since the start of 2014, people
inspired by the terrorist group’s propaganda considered striking targets in the United States.61 IS
has tried to inspire attacks via its propaganda. For example, in May 2016, the group issued an
audio recording, particularly encouraging American and European sympathizers to commit
attacks in their home countries during the holy month of Ramadan (early June to early July).62
(...continued)
United States or abroad. The term homegrown violent jihadist includes


People described by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies as homegrown violent extremists—
individuals operating in the United States who are inspired by foreign terrorist organizations but do not
receive direction or assistance from such groups.


Homegrown individuals who receive direction or assistance from foreign terrorist organizations.
The 80 plots have involved more than 130 individuals in total, and this estimate includes indicted co-conspirators in
criminal cases; people who died either in attacks or as foreign fighters; and instances in which some biographical
identifiers exist for the individuals centrally involved in plotting. Unindicted co-conspirators, cooperating informants,
and undercover law enforcement personnel are not counted.
58
For the purposes of this report, foreign fighters are U.S. citizens and noncitizens who radicalized in the United States
and plotted to or traveled abroad to join a foreign terrorist group. “Plots” include schemes by homegrown individuals or
groups to either join terrorist organizations abroad (become foreign fighters) or to commit violent attacks at home or
abroad. “Attacks” involve ideologically driven physical violence committed by terrorists. To qualify as an attack, the
violence has to harm a person or people in the United States or those targeted as Americans abroad. Plots and attacks
were dated according to when they became publicly known generally via government press releases, publicly released
court documents, or news reporting.
59
This group does not include people who left the United States but failed to join up with a terrorist group. Such
individuals are among “the departed.”
60
These three plots apparently did not include viable schemes to strike domestic targets after the plotters returned to the
United States.
61
Four plots exhibited both departed and inspired qualities.
62
Paul Cruickshank, “Orlando Shooting Follows ISIS Call for U.S. Ramadan Attacks,” CNN, June 13, 2016; Maher
Chmaytelli, Stephen Kalin, and Ali Abdelaty, “Islamic State Calls for Attacks on the West During Ramadan in Audio
Message,” Reuters, May 22, 2016; U.S. Government Open Source Enterprise (OSE) Report TRO2016052227212358,
“ISIL Spokesman Urges ‘Soldiers’, ISIL ‘Supporters’ to Target ‘Civilians’ During Ramadan,” Twitter in English,
(continued...)
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The January 2016 issue of Dābiq, the Islamic State’s English language magazine, praised the
married couple reportedly involved in the San Bernardino shooting in December 2015.63

Beyond the Departed, Returned, and Inspired
Aside from the three categories based on the courses of action that IS supporters follow, at least
two other sorts of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests.




The Lost—unidentified Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State.
Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to
U.S. law enforcement. Some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to
the United States. (The post 9/11 record of U.S. counterterrorism investigations
suggests this prospect. None of the Americans who have fought for al-Shabaab, a
terrorist group based in Somalia, are known to have come home to plot attacks.)
Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad.
The Others—foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places
outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks
of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States from
abroad.

Preempting and Monitoring Potential Terrorists
Preemption and monitoring of possible IS terrorist activity by U.S. law enforcement can be
broadly described in terms of interdiction, investigation, and countering violent extremism in the
United States.

Interdiction
In this sphere, interdiction activities involve—among other things—stopping a suspected terrorist
from entering the United States. For example, within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) draw on information from the
federal government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist as they engage in intelligence-driven
screening to mitigate the risk posed by travelers destined for the United States.64 The federal
government has also coordinated with other nations regarding identifying and interdicting foreign
fighters.65 One of the known efforts targeting foreign fighters pursued by DHS involves
enhancements to the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) used by CBP to vet

(...continued)
Arabic, May 21, 2016.
63
Tom Winter and Robert Windrem, “New Issue of ISIS Magazine Dabiq Applauds San Bernardino Carnage,” NBC
News, January 19, 2016.
64
In 2012, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) described commercial air travel as “the primary target of terrorist
organizations seeking to attack the homeland or move operatives into the United States.... ” See Kevin McAleenan,
then Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations, written statement for a
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security hearing, “Eleven Years
Later: Preventing Terrorists from Coming to America,” September 11, 2012. For more on the U.S. watchlisting
regimen, see CRS Report R44678, The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel, by (name reda
cted), (name redacted), and (name redacted)
.
65
For example see Department of Homeland Security, press release, “Statement by Secretary Johnson on the United
Kingdom’s Decision to Raise Their Threat Level,” August 29, 2014.

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prospective travelers from visa waiver countries “to determine if they pose a law enforcement or
security risk before they board aircraft destined for the United States.”66
In early 2017, the Trump Administration pursued additional broader measures it believed would
thwart terrorist travel. In March 2017, the administration revised its January 27, 2017, Executive
Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.”
Effective on March 16, 2017, the revision imposed a 90-day ban on the entry into the United
States of certain aliens from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.67 The executive
order also suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days and lowered
the number of refugees accepted annually from 110,000 to 50,000.68

Investigation
Discussion of counterterrorism investigation activities largely focuses on Joint Terrorism Task
Forces (JTTFs) led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and supported by local, state,
and federal agencies—including DHS.69 The task forces fill the chief role in coordinating federal
counterterrorism cases across the United States, bringing together federal, state, and local
participants in the process. JTTFs have been involved in stopping individuals trying to leave the
United States to fight with the Islamic State as well as investigating people who have returned
from the conflict zone. Beyond U.S. borders, the FBI has legal attachés around the world that
coordinate with foreign law enforcement partners to fight terrorist activity. Additionally, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) has worked to expand its presence in countries that serve as transit
points for foreign fighters.70

Interceding With People on the Cusp of Violent Radicalization
The Obama Administration created a program focused on “proactive actions to counter efforts by
extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.”71 The program—dubbed
countering violent extremism (CVE)—reputedly covered potentially violent extremists acting
from a variety of ideological perspectives (such as homegrown jihadists and white supremacists).
It did not involve intelligence gathering or investigative work tied to criminal prosecutions. CVE
66

For details see CBP Press Release, “Strengthening Security of the VWP through Enhancements to ESTA.” For
background see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by (name redacted)
. See also Tom Warrick, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy, Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a House
Committee on Foreign Affairs joint subcommittee hearing, “ISIS and the Threat from Foreign Fighters,” December 2,
2014; Jeh C. Johnson, (then) Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, written statement for a House Homeland
Security Committee hearing, “Worldwide Threats to the Homeland,” September 17, 2014.
67
This includes most aliens from the six countries who either lacked a valid visa as of January 27, 2017, or whose visas
expired after January 27, 2017.
68
White House, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” March 6, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entryunited-states. See also the original order White House, Executive Order 13769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States,” January 27, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/
executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states.
69
See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs.
70
Tal Kopan, “Holder: DOJ Expanding International Capacity to Stem Foreign Fighters,” Politico, November 13,
2014. In September 2014, DOJ noted that one of its components, Interpol Washington, developed a program dedicated
to thwarting foreign fighters. DOJ Press Release, “Interpol Washington Spearheads Foreign Terrorist Fighter Program,
Serves as Catalyst for Global Information Sharing Network,” September 24, 2014.
71
White House, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States,” October 2016, p. 2.

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emphasized tackling the conditions and factors driving recruitment and radicalization by violent
extremists—people who promoted political goals by supporting or committing ideologically
motivated violence.72 At DHS, the program largely involved community engagement and
partnership efforts.73 It appears that much of CVE addressed people who were not breaking the
law but may have been on the path toward breaking the law by becoming violent extremists (e.g.,
terrorists).74 It is unclear what the Trump Administration plans to do with this program, but media
outlets have reported the Administration is interested in focusing it exclusively on homegrown
violent jihadists.75

Medical Countermeasures to Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Terrorism
(name redacted), Specialist in Science and Technology Policy[redacted]@crs.loc.gov
(
, 7-....)
Following the 2001 anthrax attacks, the federal government created several programs to support
the research, development, and procurement of new medical countermeasures against chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. Despite these efforts, many of the CBRN
threats that the government deems likely to pose the highest risk lack available countermeasures.
The 115th Congress may consider the effectiveness of the federal efforts and whether current
programs should be continued, modified, or ended, and whether new programs should be
established.
The research, development, and procurement of new CBRN medical countermeasures for civilian
use involves a complex multi-agency process, largely within the Department of Health and
Human Services. The Department of Homeland Security provides risk analysis to inform
countermeasure prioritization. Recent Congresses have provided HHS new authorities and
modified existing authorities to improve the performance, efficiency, and transparency of the
multiagency process. However, some key issues remain unresolved, including those related to
appropriations, interagency coordination, and countermeasure prioritization. In addition to
determining the appropriate amount of funding, Congress may decide whether to return to
funding a key procurement program, Project BioShield, through a multiyear advance
appropriation. Policymakers may consider whether the legislative changes to planning and
transparency requirements have sufficiently enhanced coordination of the multiagency
countermeasure development enterprise and congressional oversight. Additionally, Congress may
consider whether the current prioritization process appropriately balances effort between threats
that have some available FDA-approved countermeasures, such as anthrax and smallpox, and
threats which lack any such countermeasure, such as Ebola.

Chemical Facilities Security
(name redacted), Specialist in Science and Technology Policy[redacted]@crs.loc.gov
(
, 7-....)

72

Ibid, pp. 1-2.
For more information on such activity at DHS, see https://www.dhs.gov/countering-violent-extremism.
74
For more information on the origins of the program see CRS Report R42553, Countering Violent Extremism in the
United States.
75
Julia Edwards Ainsley, Dustin Volz and Kristina Cooke, “Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program
Solely on Islam—Sources,” Reuters, February 2, 2017.
73

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Congress authorized DHS to regulate security at chemical facilities through P.L. 113-254, the
Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014. This act repealed
the prior statutory authority that had been granted in the Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2007 (P.L. 109-295, §550). The new authority expires in December 2018. As the termination date
approaches, the 115th Congress will likely consider whether the authority should be reauthorized,
modified, or allowed to expire.
Congress will likely consider whether the DHS Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
program (CFATS) and associated regulations appropriately balance homeland security and
stakeholder needs. Congress may also consider how well DHS has implemented the program and
whether the implementation is aligned with current congressional intent.
In considering whether to reauthorize CFATS, Congress may reconsider previously raised issues.
The Obama Administration and some stakeholders determined that existing regulatory
exemptions, such as for community water systems and wastewater treatment facilities, pose
potential risks.76 Environmental and “right-to-know” groups additionally advocate that Congress
include requirements for facilities to adopt or identify “inherently safer technologies” and widely
disseminate security-related information to first responders and employees.77 The regulated
industry generally opposes granting DHS the ability to require implementation of inherently safer
technologies or other specific security measures. Industry stakeholders question the maturity and
applicability of the inherently safer technology concept as a security measure and cite the need to
tailor security approaches for each facility. The Obama Administration also identified the broad
dissemination of chemical security-related information as a potential security concern. However,
following the 2013 explosion of the West Fertilizer Company in West, TX, DHS discovered that
information about that facility’s chemical inventory had not been effectively shared between
federal agencies. This led to reconsideration of existing information-sharing policies and
Executive Order 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security.”78 Additionally, if
Congress decides to reauthorize the program, then it may consider whether to make CFATS
permanent or to include another expiration provision.

Electric Grid Physical Security
Paul Parfomak, Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science and Industry Division
([redacted]@crs.loc.gov , 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43604, Physical Security of the U.S. Power Grid:
High-Voltage Transformer Substations
The electric utility industry operates as an integrated system of generation, transmission, and
distribution facilities to deliver electric power to consumers. In the United States, this system has
over 9,000 electric generating units connected to over 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission
lines rated at 230 kilovolts (kV)79 or greater strung between large towers.80 This network is
76

Oral testimony of Rand Beers, Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Directorate, Department of
Homeland Security, before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, February 11, 2011.
77
Department of Homeland Security, “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule,” 72 Federal Register
17718, April 9, 2007.
78
Executive Order 13650, “Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security,” 78 Federal Register 48029, August 1,
2013.
79
1 kV=1,000 volts.
80
North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Understanding the Grid,” fact sheet, August 2013,
(continued...)

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interspersed with hundreds of large electric power transformers whose function is to adjust
electric voltage as needed to move power across the network. High voltage (HV) transformer
units make up less than 3% of transformers in U.S. power substations, but they carry 60%-70% of
the nation’s electricity.81 Because they serve as vital transmission network nodes and carry bulk
volumes of electricity, HV transformers are critical elements of the nation’s electric power grid.
The various parts of the electric power system are all vulnerable to failure due to natural or
manmade events. However, HV transformers are considered by many experts to be among the
most vulnerable to intentional damage from malicious acts.82 Security analysts have long asserted
that a coordinated and simultaneous attack on multiple HV transformers could have severe
implications for reliable electric service over a large geographic area, crippling its electricity
network and causing widespread, extended blackouts.83 Such an event could have severe electric
reliability consequences, demonstrated in recent grid security exercise, as well as serious
economic and social consequences.84 A handful of recent physical attacks on individual
transformer substation—most notably a 2013 attack on an HV transformer substation in Metcalf,
CA—did not cause widespread blackouts, but did highlight the physical vulnerability of HV
transformer substations and drew the attention of both the media and federal officials to the utility
industry’s substation security efforts.85
Over the last decade or so the electric utility industry and government agencies have engaged in a
number of initiatives to secure HV transformers from physical attack and to improve recovery in
the event of a successful attack. These initiatives include coordination and information sharing,
spare equipment programs, and grid security exercises, among other measures. Grid security
guidelines or standards have been developed to address the physical security of the grid since at
least 2002, including standards promulgated by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) as voluntary best practices.
In November 2014, following the Metcalf attack, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) approved a new mandatory Physical Security Reliability Standard (CIP-014-1) proposed
by NERC “to address physical security risks and vulnerabilities related to the reliable operation”
of the power grid by performing risk assessments to identify their critical facilities, evaluate
potential threats and vulnerabilities, and implement security plans to protect against attacks.86 As
(...continued)
http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/Understanding%20the%20Grid%20AUG13.pdf. There is no industry
consensus as to what voltage rating constitutes “high voltage.” This report uses 230 kV as the high voltage threshold,
but other studies may use a different one. See, for example: U.S. Department of Energy, Large Power Transformers
and the U.S. Electric Grid, April 2014, p. 4.
81
C. Newton, “The Future of Large Power Transformers,” Transmission & Distribution World, September 1, 1997;
William Loomis, “Super-Grid Transformer Defense: Risk of Destruction and Defense Strategies,” Presentation to
NERC Critical Infrastructure Working Group, Lake Buena Vista, FL, December 10-11, 2001.
82
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Transmission, Storage, and Distribution Infrastructure, April 2015, p. S-11.
83
ICF, Assessment of Large Power Transformer Risk Mitigation Strategies, prepared for the U.S. Department of
Energy, October 2016, p. 7.
84
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Grid Security Exercise (GridEx II): After-Action Report,
March 2014, p.15; Matthew L. Wald, “Attack Ravages Power Grid. (Just a Test.),” New York Times, November 14,
2013.
85
RTO Insider, “Substation Saboteurs ‘No Amateurs,’” April 2, 2014, http://www.rtoinsider.com/pjm-grid2020-111303/; Chelsea J. Carter, “Arkansas Man Charged in Connection with Power Grid Sabotage,” CNN, October 12, 2013;
Max Brantley, “FBI Reports Three Attacks on Power Grid in Lonoke County,” Arkansas Times, October 7, 2013;
Rebecca Smith, “U.S. Risks National Blackout From Small-Scale Attack,” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2014.
86
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Physical Security Reliability Standard, Docket No. RM14-15-000; Order
(continued...)

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of December 2016, NERC had received initial risk assessments and security plans from
transmission owners and operators subject to the standard and was in discussions with FERC
officials about how best to audit them.87 While NERC’s physical security standard was viewed by
many as an important step in improving grid security, some policymakers have advocated
additional measures to facilitate grid recovery in an emergency. For example, a 2015 report by the
(DOE) also recommended a DOE-led effort to develop a critical HV transformer reserve as a
source of emergency spares in the event of natural disaster or physical attack.88
The 114th Congress included provisions in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act (P.L. 114-94), which became law on December 4, 2015, to facilitate recovery during electric
grid emergencies due to physical damage and other causes. The act provides the Secretary of
Energy additional authority to order emergency measures to protect or restore the reliability of
critical electric infrastructure during a grid security emergency (§1104). The act also requires the
Secretary of Energy to submit to Congress a plan for a Strategic Transformer Reserve (§1105).
The reserve would store in strategic locations spare large power transformers to temporarily
replace critical large power transformers damaged by intentional attack or destructive natural
events. This section would authorize the Secretary to establish the reserve six months after
submitting the plan to Congress. As of January 2017, DOE intended to submit its plan “in the
near future.”89 In addition the DOE’s efforts, six industry-led transformer-sharing programs are
operating or being developed in the United States.90
There is widespread agreement among state and federal government officials, utilities, and
manufacturers that HV transformers in the United States are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and
that such an attack potentially could have catastrophic consequences. Congress has long been
concerned about grid security in general, but recent security exercises, together with the Metcalf
attack, have focused congressional interest on the physical security of HV transformers, among
other specific aspects of the grid.91 As the electric utility industry and federal agencies continue
their efforts to improve the physical security of the grid, the 115th Congress may consider several
key issues as part of its oversight of the sector: industry’s implementation of the new physical
security standards, DOE’s plan for a strategic transformer reserve and related grid security
activities, independent private sector efforts to improve HV transformer design and recovery, and
the quality of federal information about threats to the grid.

(...continued)
No. 802, November 20, 2014.
87
David Ortiz, Deputy Director, Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Remarks at the
CRS seminar on The Changing Electric Power Sector: Transmission and Grid Modernization, December 9, 2016.
88
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Transmission, Storage, and Distribution Infrastructure, April 2015, p. 2-40.
89
Government Accountability Office, Electricity:Federal Efforts to Enhance Grid Resilience, GAO-17-153, January
2017, p. 43.
90
U.S. Department of Energy, Transforming the Nation’s Electricity System: The Second Installment of the QER,
January 2017, p. 4-48.
91
See, for example: Senators Dianne Feinstein, Al Franken, Ron Wyden, and Harry Reid, letter to the Honorable
Cheryl LaFleur, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, February 7, 2014, http://www.ferc.gov/
industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/chairman-letter-incoming.pdf.

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Continuity of Government Operations
(name redacted), Specialist in American National Government, Government and Finance
Division ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....)
Continuity of government operations refers to programs and initiatives to ensure that governing
entities are able to recover from a wide range of potential operational interruptions. Government
continuity planning may be viewed as a process that incorporates preparedness capacities,
including agency response plans, employee training, recovery plans, and the resumption of
normal operations. These activities are established in part to ensure the maintenance of civil
authority, provision of support for those affected by an incident, infrastructure repair, and other
actions in support of recovery. Arguably, any emergency response presumes the existence of an
ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee recovery efforts. Interruptions for
which contingency plans might be activated include localized acts of nature, accidents,
technological emergencies, and military or terrorist attack-related incidents.
Current authority for executive branch continuity programs is provided in the 2007 National
Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) on National Continuity Policy, NSPD-51.92 To support the
provision of essential government activities, NSPD-51 sets out a policy “to maintain a
comprehensive and effective continuity capability composed of continuity of operations93 and
continuity of government94 programs in order to ensure the preservation of our form of
government95 under the Constitution and the continuing performance of national essential
functions (NEF) under all conditions.”
Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, was
issued in 1988,96 and assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to federal
executive departments and agencies. E.O. 12656 requires the head of each federal department and
agency to “ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by
providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with
applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of
emergency operating capabilities.” Subsequent sections require each department to carry out
specific contingency planning activities in its areas of policy responsibility.
Although contingency planning authorities are chiefly based on presidential directives, Congress
could consider whether current authorities accurately reflect current government organization and
goals, the costs of these programs, potential conflicts that might result from departments and
92

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, National Security and Homeland Security Presidential Directive, May 9,
2007. NSPD-51 is also identified as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 20. A more detailed discussion
of national continuity policy is available in CRS Report RS22674, National Continuity Policy: A Brief Overview, by (na
me redacted) . Original document available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/nspd_51.pdf.
93
NSPD-51 identifies continuity of operations (COOP) as “an effort within individual executive departments and
agencies to ensure that Primary Mission-Essential Functions continue to be performed during a wide range of
emergencies, including localized acts of nature, accidents, and technological or attack-related emergencies.”
94
NSPD-51 identifies continuity of government (COG) as “a coordinated effort within the federal government’s
executive branch to ensure that national essential functions continue to be performed during a catastrophic emergency.”
95
The directive notes “that each branch of the federal government is responsible for its own continuity programs,” and
requires an executive branch official to “ensure that the executive branch’s COOP and COG policies ... are
appropriately coordinated with those of the legislative and judicial branches in order to … maintain a functioning
federal government.” The legislative branch and the federal judiciary maintain continuity programs consonant with
their positions as coequal branches of government. NSPD-51 does not specify the nature of appropriate coordination
with continuity planners in the legislative and judicial branch.
96
53 Federal Register 47491; November 23, 1988.

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agencies complying with different authorities, and the extent to which government contingency
planning ensures that the federal executive branch will be able to carry out its responsibilities
under challenging circumstances.

U.S. Secret Service
(name redacted), Analyst in Homeland Security Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov
(
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R44197, U.S. Secret Service: Selected Issues and
Executive and Congressional Responses.
Since 1865, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) has investigated counterfeiting, and since 1901, at the
request of congressional leadership, has provided full-time presidential protection.
Congress has increased its oversight of the USSS due to concern about terrorism threats, several
security breaches, and misconduct of USSS personnel. A series of incidents has tarnished the
image of the USSS and may have potentially affected its operations. For example, on September
19, 2014, a person gained unauthorized entrance into the White House after climbing the fence.
On September 30, 2014, following a House Oversight and Government Reform Committee
hearing on the USSS, which addressed this breach and previous incidents97 it became public that
on September 16, 2014, a private security contractor at a federal facility, while armed, was
allowed to share an elevator with the President during a site visit, in violation of USSS security
protocols. On March 4, 2015, it was reported that two senior USSS special agents, including one
who was responsible for all aspects of White House security, disrupted the scene of an
investigation of a suspicious package during an elevated security condition at the White House
complex. It was further alleged that these two agents were under the influence of alcohol.
Both Congress and the USSS responded to the incidents. The USSS conducted a review of its
training of personnel and its technology, perimeter security, and operations.98 Congress conducted
a number of oversight hearings on the incidents and USSS policy. At the end of the 114th
Congress, one such hearing was conducted by the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee.99 The purpose of this hearing was to examine allegations that USSS agents were not
receiving compensation for overtime, and review DHS IG reports addressing USSS’s protection
of sensitive material. Among the criticisms raised at the hearing were assertions that




the USSS’ investigative mission places an additional burden on USSS agents and
distracts from the Service’s protection mission,
the USSS suffers technology failures that cast doubts on the Service’s ability to
protect the nation’s financial infrastructure,
USSS agents are promoted to senior management positions despite alleged
misconduct, and

97

U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, White House Perimeter Breach: New
Concerns about the Secret Service, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., September 30, 2014.
98
United States Secret Service Panel, Report from the United States Secret Service Protective Mission Panel to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, December 15, 2014. The executive summary is the only
nonclassified portion of the report that is publicly available. The executive summary is available at http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/14_1218_usss_pmp.pdf.
99
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Oversight of the Secret Service, 114th
Cong., 2nd sess., November 15, 2016.

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

USSS senior leadership continues to withhold information pertaining to alleged
misconduct from the committee.100

Congress is likely to continue to pursue these USSS issues in the 115th Congress.

Federal Facility Security
(name redacted), Analyst in Homeland Security Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov
(
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43570, Federal Building and Facility Security:
Frequently Asked Questions.
The security of federal government buildings and facilities affects not only the daily operations of
the federal government but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the
public. Federal building and facility security is decentralized and disparate in approach, as
numerous federal entities are involved, and some buildings or facilities are occupied by multiple
federal agencies. The federal government is tasked with securing over 446,000 buildings and
facilities daily.
The September 2001 terrorist attacks, the September 2013 Washington Navy Yard shootings, and
the April 2014 Fort Hood shootings focused the federal government’s attention on building
security activities. This resulted in an increase in the security operations at federal facilities and
more intense scrutiny of how the federal government secures and protects federal facilities,
employees, and the visiting public.101
In general, federal facility security includes operations and policies that focus on reducing the
exposure of the facility, employees, and the visiting public to criminal and terrorist threats. Each
federal facility has unique attributes that reflect its individual security needs and the missions of
the federal tenants. According to the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (OJP),
there are approximately 20 federal law enforcement entities that provide facility security.102
Due to the large number and different types of federal facilities, there is no single security
standard that applies to every facility. There is, however, an interagency committee responsible
for providing a number of standards that address federal facility security. The Interagency
Security Committee’s (ISC) mission is to “safeguard U.S. nonmilitary facilities from all hazards
by developing state-of-the-art security standards in collaboration with public and private
homeland security partners.”103
Federal facility security is as diffuse as the number of law enforcement agencies securing them.
Individual facilities secured by the same law enforcement agency may be secured in different
manners based on specific security needs and threats. This makes it challenging to collect official
and comprehensive data on threats to or incidents occurring at federal facilities.

100

Ibid.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, The Navy
Yard Tragedy: Examining Physical Security for Federal Facilities, 113th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2013, and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Examining the Federal Protective Service: Are
Federal Facilities Secure?, 113th Cong., 2nd sess., May 21, 2014.
102
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf.
103
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interagency Security Committee, http://www.dhs.gov/about-interagencysecurity-committee.
101

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DHS State and Local Preparedness Grants
(name redacted), Analyst in Homeland Security Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov
(
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R44669, Department of Homeland Security
Preparedness Grants: A Summary and Issues.
Congress has enacted legislation and appropriated grant funding to states and localities for
homeland security purposes since 1996.104 One of the first programs to provide this type of
funding was the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Program which was established by Congress in the 1996
Department of Defense Reauthorization Act105 and provided assistance to over 150 cities for
biological, chemical, and nuclear security. Providing homeland security assistance to states and
localities was arguably spurred by the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. Following the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress increased focus on state and local homeland
security assistance by, among other things, establishing the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and authorizing DHS to administer federal homeland security grant programs. 106
With the increase of international and domestic terrorist threats and attacks against the United
States following the end of the Cold War, and the termination of the old federal civil defense
programs, a number of policy questions arose regarding homeland security assistance programs.
The majority of these questions have not been completely addressed, even though Congress has
debated and enacted legislation that provides homeland security assistance to states and localities
since 1996.
Congressional debate continues on policy questions related to homeland security assistance for
states and localities. Some may contend there is a need for the Congress to conduct further
oversight hearings and legislate on policy issues related to DHS assistance to states and localities.
These potential issues include (1) the purpose and number of assistance programs; (2) the use of
grant funding; and (3) the funding level for the grant programs.
Generally, each grant program has a range of eligible activities. When Congress authorizes a
federal grant program, the eligible activities may be broad or specific depending on the statutory
language in the grant authorization. When grant funds are distributed through a competitive
process, the administering federal agency officials exercise discretion in the selection of grant
projects to be awarded funding within the range of eligible activities set forth by Congress.107
Some may argue the purpose and number of DHS grant programs have not been sufficiently
addressed. Specifically, should DHS provide more all-hazards assistance versus terrorism-focused
assistance? Does the number of individual grant programs result in coordination challenges and
deficient preparedness at the state and local level? Would program consolidation improve
domestic security? Finally, does the purpose and number of assistance programs affect the
administration of the grants?
104

For the purpose of this report, homeland security assistance programs are defined as Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) programs, or programs that were transferred to DHS, which provide funding to states, localities, tribes,
and other entities for security purposes; however, public safety and National Guard programs and funding are not
included in this report. Additionally, the term “homeland security program” was not used until 2002. Prior to this, the
term “domestic preparedness” was used to describe programs and activities that assisted states and localities to prepare
for possible terrorist attacks.
105
P.L. 104-106.
106
P.L. 107-296.
107
CRS Report R42769, Federal Grants-in-Aid Administration: A Primer, by (name redacted).

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Another issue Congress may address is how effectively DHS’s assistance to states and localities is
being spent. One way to review the use of program funding is to evaluate state and local
jurisdictions’ use of DHS’s assistance. When DHS announces annual state and locality homeland
security grant allocations, grant recipients submit implementation plans that identify how these
allocations are to be obligated. However, the question remains whether or not the grant funding
has been used in an effective way to enhance the nation’s homeland security.
Annual federal support, through the appropriations process, for these homeland security grant
programs is another issue Congress may want to examine considering the limited financial
resources available to the federal government. Specifically, is there a need for the continuation of
federal support for these programs, or should Congress reduce or eliminate funding? In the past
13 years, Congress has appropriated approximately $33 billion for state and local homeland
security assistance. Since the establishment of DHS in 2003, Congress appropriated a high total
of funding of $3.5 billion in FY2004, and the lowest appropriated amount was $1.4 billion in
FY2013.

Border Security and Trade
Southwest Border Issues
Drug Trafficking and the Southwest Border
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
The United States is the world’s largest marketplace for illegal drugs and sustains a multi-billion
dollar market in illegal drugs.108 An estimated 27.1 million Americans (10.1% of the 12 and older
population) were current users of illicit drugs in 2015.109 The most recent National Drug Threat
Assessment Summary indicates that Mexican drug trafficking organizations continue to dominate
the U.S. drug market.110 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) outlined this threat:
Mexican [transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)] remain the greatest criminal drug
threat to the United States; no other groups are currently positioned to challenge them....
By controlling lucrative smuggling corridors across the [Southwest border], Mexican
TCOs are able to introduce multi-ton quantities of illicit drugs into the United States on a
yearly basis. The poly-drug portfolio maintained by these Mexican TCOs consists
primarily of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and, to a lesser extent,
fentanyl.111

Mexican criminal networks either (1) transport or (2) produce and transport drugs north across the
United States-Mexico border. After being smuggled across the border by criminal networks, the
drugs are distributed and sold within the United States. The illicit proceeds may then be laundered
or smuggled south across the border. While drugs are the primary goods trafficked by the criminal
networks, those networks also generate income from other illegal activities, such as the
108

Oriana Zill and Lowell Bergman, “Do the Math: Why the Illegal Drug Business Is Thriving,” PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/.
109
Current means within the past month. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United States: Results from
the 2015 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, September 2016.
110
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, November 2016.
111
Ibid., p. 1.

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smuggling of humans and weapons, counterfeiting and piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and
extortion.
One of the current domestic drug threats fueled, in part, by Mexican traffickers is heroin.112 Not
only has there been an increase in heroin use in the United States over the past several years, but
there has been a simultaneous increase in its availability. This availability is driven by a number
of factors, including increased production and trafficking of heroin by Mexican criminal
networks.113 Some Mexican farmers have reported abandoning marijuana cultivation in favor of
growing opium poppies; the switch may be partly due to the decline in wholesale prices of
marijuana in Mexico—which some claim is linked to increased marijuana legalization in the
United States—and an increase in U.S. heroin demand.114 Increases in Mexican heroin production
and its availability in the United States have been coupled with increased heroin seizures at the
Southwest border. Reportedly, these seizures increased by over 350% between 2008 and 2015.115
The 115th Congress may consider a number of options in attempting to reduce drug trafficking
from Mexico to the United States. For instance, Congress may question whether the Trump
Administration will continue or alter priorities set forth by the Obama Administration’s National
Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, the overarching strategic goal of which was to
“[s]ubstantially reduce the flow of illicit drugs, drug proceeds, and associated instruments of
violence across the Southwest border.”116 Policymakers may also be interested in examining
various federal drug control agencies’ roles in reducing Southwest border trafficking. This could
involve oversight of the DEA and its initiatives such as the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force (OCDETF) program, as well as the Office of National Drug Control Policy and its
National Drug Control Strategy and Budget, among others.

Illicit Proceeds and the Southwest Border
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
The flow of money outside legal channels not only presents challenges to law enforcement, but it
also has a significant nexus with homeland security policy. Proceeds from illegal enterprises are
sometimes used to fund broader destabilizing activities, such as smuggling, illegal border
crossings, or more violent activities, such as terrorist operations—including those controlled by
the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia.117 While this is an issue with
a global scope, this section focuses specifically on the policies affected by movement of illicit
funds across the Southwest border.
As noted in the DEA’s National Drug Threat Assessment Summary¸ “the annual volume of illicit
proceeds generated in the United States is approximately $300 billion” and of that amount, “drug
sales generate an estimated 21 percent, or $64 billion.”118 Money from the traffickers’ illegal sale
112

For more information on heroin trafficking in the United States, see CRS Report R44599, Heroin Trafficking in the
United States, by (name redacted).
113
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, November 2016, p. 42.
114
See, for example, Nick Miroff, “Tracing the U.S. Heroin Surge Back South of the Border as Mexican Cannabis
Output Falls,” The Washington Post, April 6, 2014.
115
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, November 2016, p. 45.
116
Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, 2013, p. 4.
117
U.S. Department of State, 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes, March 2016.
118
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, November 2016, p. 135.

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of drugs in the United States is moved across the border into Mexico, and these funds fuel the
drug traffickers’ criminal activities. This money is often not deposited directly into the U.S.
financial system; instead, it is illegally laundered through mechanisms such as bulk cash
smuggling of U.S. currency into Mexico and “repatriation of the funds into the United States via
couriers or armored vehicles.”119 Additionally, money may be moved through trade-based money
laundering or placed in financial institutions, cash-intensive front businesses, prepaid or stored
value cards, or money services businesses.120
The 115th Congress may examine interagency coordination to reduce the flow of illicit money
(and other goods) across the Southwest border. Various departments and agencies—including the
DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)—
share responsibility for combating drug-related activity and the flow of illicit proceeds both along
the Southwest border and throughout the United States. Many of these agencies are also
represented in Mexico, increasing U.S.-Mexican bilateral cooperation. Further, while some efforts
explicitly target money laundering and bulk cash smuggling, other investigations might also
uncover evidence of illicit proceeds. For instance, operations targeting southbound firearms
smuggling may intercept individuals smuggling not only weapons, but cash proceeds from illicit
drug sales as well.

Cross-Border Smuggling Tunnels
Kristin M. Finklea, Specialist in Domestic Security ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
Mexican traffickers rely on cross-border tunnels to smuggle illicit drugs—primarily marijuana—
from Mexico into the United States. At least 224 tunnels have been discovered along the
Southwest border since the 1990s,121 and some of the more recently discovered tunnels are highly
sophisticated. Early tunnels were rudimentary “gopher hole” tunnels dug on the Mexican side of
the border, traveling just below the surface, and popping out on the U.S. side as close as 100 feet
from the border. Slightly more advanced tunnels relied on existing infrastructure, which may be
shared by neighboring border cities such as Nogales, AZ, in the United States and Nogales,
Sonora, in Mexico. These interconnecting tunnels may tap into storm drains or sewage systems,
allowing smugglers to move drugs further and more easily than in tunnels they dug themselves.
The most sophisticated tunnels can have rail, ventilation, and electrical systems. In April 2016
authorities uncovered the longest drug smuggling tunnel yet. At over 800 yards, it was equipped
with railing, lighting, ventilation, and an elevator. Authorities seized over two thousand pounds of
cocaine and over eleven tons of marijuana.122
U.S. law enforcement uses various tactics to detect these cross-border tunnels. They may use
sonic equipment to detect the sounds of digging and tunnel construction and seismic technology
to detect blasts that may be linked to tunnel excavation. Another tool for tunnel detection is
119

U.S. Department of State, 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II, Money Laundering and
Financial Crimes, March 2016, p. 173.
120
According to the Department of the Treasury, a money services business is any person or entity engaging in
activities including exchanging currency; cashing checks; issuing, selling, or redeeming travelers’ checks, money
orders, or stored value cards; and transmitting money. For more information, see http://www.fincen.gov/
financial_institutions/msb/definitions/msb.html.
121
Drug Enforcement Administration, 2016 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, November 2016, p. 27.
122
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of California, “Feds Seize Longest Tunnel on
California-Mexico Border,” press release, April 20, 2016.

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ground penetrating radar.123 However, factors including soil conditions, tunnel diameter, and
tunnel depth can limit the effectiveness of this technology.
Despite these tools, U.S. officials have acknowledged that law enforcement currently does not
have technology that is reliably able to detect sophisticated tunnels, and authorities have
reportedly never found a tunnel with these technologies.124 Rather, tunnels are more effectively
discovered as a result of human intelligence and tips. U.S. officials have noted the value of U.S.Mexican law enforcement cooperation in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting the criminals
who create and use the cross-border tunnels.125 As a result, the 115th Congress may not only
consider how to best help U.S. law enforcement develop technologies that can keep pace with
tunneling organizations, but also examine whether existing bi-national law enforcement
partnerships are effective and whether they may be improved to enhance investigations of
transnational criminals. Policymakers may also question how prominently the issue of combating
cross-border smuggling tunnels may play within the larger border security framework.

Cargo Security
Lisa Sacco, Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
For more information, see CRS Report R43014, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Trade
Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security, and CRS Report R43014, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection: Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within DHS, is America’s primary trade enforcement
agency, and CBP seeks to balance the benefits of efficient trade flows against the demand for
cargo security and the enforcement of U.S. trade laws. Thus, the overarching policy question with
respect to incoming cargo is how to minimize the risk that weapons of mass destruction, illegal
drugs, and other contraband will enter through a U.S. port of entry (POE), while limiting the costs
and delays associated with such enforcement.
CBP’s current trade strategy emphasizes “risk management” and a “multi-layered” approach to
enforcement.126 With respect to cargo security, risk management means that CBP segments
importers into higher and lower risk pools and focuses security procedures on higher-risk flows,
while expediting lower-risk flows. CBP’s “multi-layered approach” means that enforcement
occurs at multiple points in the import process, beginning before goods are loaded in foreign ports
and continuing after the goods have been admitted into the United States. In recent years,
congressional attention to cargo security has focused on one of CBP’s primary tools for risk
management, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) trusted trader program,
and on the statutory requirement that 100% of incoming maritime cargo containers be scanned
123

For more information, see http://www.geophysical.com/militarysecurity.htm.
Ron Nixon, “As Donald Trump Calls for Wall on Mexican Border, Smugglers Dig Tunnels,” The New York Times,
September 1, 2016. See also the statement of Laura E. Duffy, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of California, U.S.
Department of Justice, before the U.S. Congress, Senate United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control, Illegal Tunnels on the Southwest Border, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011.
125
Ibid.
126
See U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Vision and Strategy, 2020: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategic
Plan; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Homeland Security,
Strengthening Trade Enforcement to Protect American Enterprise and Grow American Jobs, 113th Cong., 2nd sess.,
July 16, 2014, Testimony of CBP Office of International Trade Acting Assistant Commissioner Richard DiNucci. The
written testimony is available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/16/written-testimony-cbp-senate-committeeappropriations-subcommittee-homeland-security.
124

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abroad prior to being loaded on U.S.-bound ships. Congress also faces perennial questions about
spending levels for POE infrastructure and personnel.

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
Lisa Sacco, Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy ([redacted]@crs.loc.gov
, 7-....)
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary public-private and
international partnership that permits certain import-related businesses to register with CBP and
perform security tasks prescribed by the agency. In return C-TPAT members are recognized as
low-risk actors and are eligible for expedited import processing and other benefits.127 CBP
established C-TPAT in November 2001 following the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks,
and the program was authorized as part of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
2006 (SAFE Port Act, P.L. 109-347).
Proponents of C-TPAT favor increased participation in the program as a way to facilitate legal
trade flows.128 Some businesses, however, have criticized the program for providing inadequate
membership benefits, especially in light of the time and financial investments required to become
certified as C-TPAT members.129
Yet there may be no easy way to substantially expand C-TPAT benefits. In the case of land ports,
the primary trusted trader benefit is access to dedicated lanes where wait times may be shorter
and more predictable. However, adding lanes at land ports is difficult because many of them are
located in urban areas with limited space for expansion and with limited ingress and egress
infrastructure.130 In the case of maritime imports, the primary trusted trader benefit is a reduced
likelihood of secondary inspection.131 Only about 6% of all maritime containers are selected for
such an inspection,132 so C-TPAT membership may offer little practical advantage in this regard.
In February 2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report outlining
challenges in CBP management of the C-TPAT program. GAO recommended that CBP develop:
“(1) standardized guidance for field offices regarding the tracking of information on security

127

See U.S. CBP, “C-TPAT: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism,” http://www.cbp.gov/border-security/
ports-entry/cargo-security/c-tpat-customs-trade-partnership-against-terrorism. Commercial truck drivers who are
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) members also are eligible to join the Free and Secure Trade
System (FAST), which permits expedited processing at land ports of entry; and C-TPAT members who are residents of
the United States and are known importers that have businesses phys

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44847. Public record. Not legal advice.