# Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44775

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** August 21, 2017
- **Citation:** R44775

## Text

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy
name redacted
Analyst in European Affairs
August 21, 2017

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R44775

Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Summary
Over the last five years, Congress and the executive branch have closely monitored and
responded to new developments in Russian policy. These developments include the following:
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increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin’s return to the
presidential post in 2012;
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and support of separatists
in eastern Ukraine;
violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty;
Moscow’s intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad’s government;
increased military activity in Europe; and
cyber-related influence operations that, according to the U.S. intelligence
community, have targeted the 2016 U.S. presidential election and countries in
Europe.

In response, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions related to Russia’s
actions in Ukraine and Syria, malicious cyber activity, and human rights violations. The United
States also has led NATO in developing a new military posture in Central and Eastern Europe
designed to reassure allies and deter aggression.
U.S. policymakers over the years have identified areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or
could be compatible. The United States and Russia have cooperated successfully on issues such
as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the
Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the International Space Station, and the removal of
chemical weapons from Syria. In addition, the United States and Russia have identified other
areas of cooperation, such as countering terrorism, illicit narcotics, and piracy.
Like previous U.S. Administrations, President Donald J. Trump has sought to improve U.S.Russian relations at the start of his tenure. In its first six months, the Trump Administration
expressed an intention to pursue cooperation or dialogue with Russia on a range of pursuits (e.g.,
Syria, North Korea, cybersecurity). At initial meetings with President Putin in April and July
2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and President Trump said they agreed to find ways to
improve channels of communication and begin addressing issues dividing the two countries.
At the same time, the Administration has indicated that it intends to adhere to core international
commitments and principles, as well as to retain sanctions on Russia. Secretary Tillerson has
stated that Ukraine-related sanctions will remain in place “until Moscow reverses the actions that
triggered” them. Secretary Tillerson and other officials also have noted the severity of Russian
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the need for an appropriate response.
Since the start of the 115th Congress, many Members of Congress have actively engaged with the
Administration on questions concerning U.S.-Russian relations. As of August 2017, Congress has
held more than 20 hearings on matters directly relating to Russia, codified and strengthened
sanctions through the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 11544, Title II), and considered other measures to assess and respond to Russian interference in the
2016 elections, influence operations in Europe, INF Treaty violations, and illicit financial
activities abroad.
This report provides background information on Russian politics, economics, and military issues.
It discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia’s foreign relations and the
U.S.-Russian relationship.

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Russia: Background and U.S. Policy

Contents
Political Structure and Developments ............................................................................................. 1
Democracy and Human Rights ................................................................................................. 2
Government Reshuffles ............................................................................................................. 6
September 2016 State Duma Elections ..................................................................................... 9
The Opposition ......................................................................................................................... 11
The Economy ................................................................................................................................ 13
Economic Impact of Sanctions................................................................................................ 15
U.S.-Russian Trade and Investment ........................................................................................ 16
Energy Sector .......................................................................................................................... 18
Foreign Relations .......................................................................................................................... 21
Russia and Other Post-Soviet States ....................................................................................... 21
Ukraine Conflict ...................................................................................................................... 24
NATO-Russia Relations .......................................................................................................... 26
EU-Russia Relations ............................................................................................................... 29
Russia-China Relations ........................................................................................................... 30
Russia’s Intervention in Syria ................................................................................................. 31
Russia’s Global Engagement................................................................................................... 34
The Military................................................................................................................................... 35
Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe ..................................................................................... 36
U.S. Policy Toward Russia ............................................................................................................ 40
U.S. Policy Under the Obama Administration ........................................................................ 40
U.S. Policy Under the Trump Administration ......................................................................... 42
Congressional Action in the 115th Congress............................................................................ 46
Selected Issues in U.S.-Russian Relations .................................................................................... 47
U.S. Sanctions on Russia ........................................................................................................ 47
Ukraine-Related Sanctions................................................................................................ 47
Sanctions for Malicious Cyber Activity ............................................................................ 48
Sanctions for Human Rights Violations and Corruption................................................... 49
Other Sanctions ................................................................................................................. 49
Malicious Cyber Activity ........................................................................................................ 50
Interference in U.S. Elections ........................................................................................... 50
Other Activities ................................................................................................................. 52
Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation ........................................................................... 53
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 55

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Russia .................................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia ............................................................................. 17
Figure 3. Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine ........................................................................... 25
Figure 4. Russia’s Military Footprint in Europe ............................................................................ 39

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Tables
Table 1. Election Results to the State Duma, September 18, 2016.................................................. 9
Table 2. European Imports of Russian Natural Gas (2015) ........................................................... 20

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 56

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Political Structure and Developments
Russia, formally known as the Russian Federation, is the principal successor to the United States’
former superpower rival, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or Soviet Union). In its
modern form, Russia came into being in December 1991, after its leaders joined those of
neighboring Ukraine and Belarus to dissolve the USSR. From 1922 to 1991, Soviet Russia was
the core of the USSR, established in the wake
of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the
Russia: Basic Facts
civil war that followed. The USSR spanned
Land Area: 6.3 million square miles, about 1.8 times the
much the same territory as the Russian Empire size of the United States.
before it. Prior to the empire’s establishment
Population: 142.4 million (mid-2016 est.).
in 1721, Russian states had existed in various
Administrative Divisions: 83 administrative
subdivisions, including 21 ethnic-based republics and the
forms for centuries.
Today, Russia’s multiethnic federal structure
is inherited from the Soviet period and
includes regions, republics, territories, and
other subunits. The country’s constitution
provides for a strong presidency and central
authority. The government is accountable to
the president, not the legislature, and
observers consider the presidential
Administration rather than the Cabinet
(headed by a prime minister) to be “the true
locus of power.”1

cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Russian law
considers Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea and the
Crimean city of Sevastopol to be additional
administrative subdivisions.
Ethnicity: Russian 77.7%; Tatar 3.7%; Ukrainian 1.4%;
Bashkir 1.1%; Chuvash 1.0%; Chechen 1.0%; Other
10.2%; Unspecified 3.9% (2010 census).
Gross Domestic Product: $1.268 trillion (2016 est.);
$26,100 per capita (purchasing power parity) (2016 est.).
Political Leaders: President: Vladimir Putin; Prime
Minister: Dmitry Medvedev; Speaker of the State Duma:
Vyacheslav Volodin; Speaker of the Federation Council:
Valentina Matviyenko; Foreign Minister: Sergei Lavrov;
Defense Minister: Sergei Shoigu.
Source: CIA World Factbook.

Russia’s president is Vladimir Putin, who has
led the country as president (2000-2008,
2012-present) or prime minister (2008-2012)
for more than 17 years (see “Vladimir Putin” text box, below). In recent years, opinion polls have
reported increased levels of support for President Putin. Since the annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea
region in March 2014, he has consistently received approval from more than 80% of respondents
in opinion polls.2 This reported approval level is considerably higher than what Putin received in
polls over the previous two years, when his approval rating was in the low 60s.
Russia’s bicameral legislature is the Federal Assembly. The upper chamber, the Federation
Council, has 170 deputies, two each from Russia’s 83 regions and republics (including two major
cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg) and four from Ukraine’s occupied region of Crimea. These
deputies are not directly elected but are chosen by regional executives and legislatures. The lower
house, the State Duma, has 450 deputies, half of which are elected by proportional representation
and half of which are in single-member districts. The State Duma also includes members from
occupied Crimea: four from majoritarian districts and another four from party lists.3
The judiciary is the least developed of Russia’s three branches. Courts are widely perceived to be
subject to manipulation and control by government officials. The Supreme Court is the highest
1

Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2014), p. 2.
Ratings over time are available from the Levada Center at http://www.levada.ru/en/.
3
See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Activities Related to Russia’s Occupation
of Crimea,” November 14, 2016, at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0609.aspx.
2

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appellate body. The Constitutional Court rules on the legality and constitutionality of
governmental acts and on disputes between branches of government or federative entities. A 2015
law gives the Constitutional Court the legal authority to disregard verdicts by interstate bodies
that defend human rights and freedoms, if the court concludes that such verdicts contradict
Russia’s constitution (although the latter requires compliance of rules established by international
treaties over domestic law).4 A Supreme Commercial Court, which handled commercial disputes
and was viewed by experts as relatively impartial, was dissolved in September 2014, with its
areas of jurisdiction transferred to the Supreme Court; lower-level commercial courts continue to
function.
Figure 1. Map of Russia

Sources: Graphic produced by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Map information generated by
(name redacted) using data from the Department of State (2015) and Esri, ageographic data company (2014).

Democracy and Human Rights
Under Putin’s rule, Russia has experienced a steady decline in its democratic credentials. At the
start of the 2000s, the U.S. government-funded nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom
House classified Russia as a “hybrid” regime, with democratic and authoritarian elements. By the
4

Many observers believe that the intent of this law was to enable Russia to ignore rulings by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR), which Russia joined in 1996. Carl Schreck, “Russian Law On Rejecting Human Rights Courts
Violates Constitution, Experts Say,” RFE/RL, December 16, 2015, at https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-law-on-rejectinghuman-rights-courts-violates-constitution-experts-say/27432125.html; Library of Congress Law Library, “Russian
Federation: Constitutional Court Allows Country to Ignore ECHR Rulings,” May 18, 2016, at http://www.loc.gov/law/
foreign-news/article/russian-federation-constitutional-court-allows-country-to-ignore-echr-rulings/.

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end of Putin’s second term in 2008, Freedom House considered Russia to be a consolidated
authoritarian regime. This status continued during the tenure of Putin’s handpicked successor for
one term, Dmitry Medvedev, despite some signs of liberalization. Since Putin’s return to the
presidency in 2012, Freedom House has noted a new rise in authoritarian governance in Russia.
In its 2016 annual report, Freedom House assigned Russia the same “freedom rating” it gave to
China, Yemen, Cuba, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.5
Vladimir Putin
After more than 15 years in the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security (the KGB), Vladimir Putin held a variety
of governmental positions from 1990 to 1998, first in the local government of St. Petersburg (his native city) and then
in Moscow. In 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin appointed Putin head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), a
successor agency to the KGB, and prime minister a year later, in August 1999.
Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned on New Year’s Eve, 1999, and Putin became acting president. He was elected president
in March 2000, with 53% of the vote. Putin served eight years as president before stepping down in 2008, in
compliance with constitutional limits on successive terms. His successor was Dmitry Medvedev, a trusted former
presidential chief of staff, deputy prime minister, and board chairperson of the state-controlled energy company
Gazprom. As prime minister from 2008 to 2012, Putin continued to govern Russia in tandem with Medvedev, who
remained informally subordinate to Putin.
In September 2011, Medvedev announced that he would not run for reelection, paving the way for Putin to return to
the presidency. In exchange, Medvedev was to become prime minister. Putin’s return to the presidency had always
been plausible, but the announcement was met with some public discontent, particularly in Moscow. A series of
protests followed the December 2011 parliamentary elections, which domestic and international observers
considered to be marred by fraud and other violations. In March 2012, Putin won the presidency. His current term
extends to 2018 (as president, Medvedev extended the next presidential term to six years). Putin has not confirmed if
he is planning to run for reelection, although many observers believe he plans to do so.

Russia’s authoritarian consolidation has involved a wide array of nondemocratic practices and
human rights violations. The U.S. Department of State’s most recent human rights report notes
that the Russian government has “increasingly instituted a range of measures ... to harass,
discredit, prosecute, imprison, detain, fine, and suppress individuals and organizations critical of
the government.” The report also notes the “lack of due process in politically motivated cases.”6
According to the human rights report, Russian NGOs have been “stymied” and “stigmatize[d],”
including through a 2012 law that requires foreign-funded organizations that engage in activity
seeking to affect policymaking (loosely defined) to register and identify as “foreign agents.” In
addition, a 2015 law enables the government to identify as “undesirable” foreign organizations
engaged in activities that allegedly threaten Russia’s constitutional order, defense capability, or
state security, and to close their local offices and bar Russians from working with them.7
5

Freedom House scores post-Communist states on an index of “democratic progress,” which includes seven different
categories of governance and ranges between 1 (most democratic) and 7 (least democratic). States that receive a
“Democracy Score” between 4 and 5 are considered “transitional governments or hybrid regimes”; between 5 and 6,
“semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes”; and between 6 and 7, “consolidated authoritarian regimes.” Russia’s
Democracy Score has gone from a 4.88 in 2001 to a 6.57 in 2017. In addition, Freedom House ranks all countries in the
world on a “freedom” scale, which includes measures of political rights and civil liberties; Russia’s 2017 “freedom
rating” is 6.5 out of 7 (not free). Annual scores reflect the state of affairs at the start of the year. See the annual reports
for Russia in Freedom House, Nations in Transit, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit2017, and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2017, at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedomworld-2017.
6
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Russia, at http://www.state.gov/j/
drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=265466.
7
For background, see International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Civic Freedom Monitor: Russia,” at
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html.

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As of the start of August 2017, 88 NGOs are classified as foreign agents (of these, 7 have been
added since the start of the year).8 In 2014, Russia’s main domestic election-monitoring
organization, Golos, was the first organization to be so classified. Just before the September 2016
Duma election, a well-known polling organization, the Levada Center, also was branded a foreign
agent; in October 2016, a prominent human rights group, Memorial, was so labeled, as well.
Eleven organizations or their subsidiaries have been barred from Russia for “undesirable”
activity. In 2015-2016, barred organizations included the National Endowment for Democracy,
Open Society Foundations (including the Open Society Institute Assistance Foundations), U.S.Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law, National Democratic
Institute, International Republican Institute, and Media Development Investment Fund. In April
2017, three allegedly foreign-registered affiliates of the NGO and civic movement Open Russia
were added to the list; Open Russia was founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
who served 10 years in prison on charges deemed by the opposition and most observers to be
politically motivated. In June 2017, the German Marshall Fund’s Black Sea Trust for Regional
Cooperation also was barred.9
Russian law also limits freedom of assembly and expression. Public demonstrations require
official approval, and police have broken up protests by force. The fine for participation in
unsanctioned protests can be thousands of dollars; repeat offenders risk imprisonment. In 2016,
new “antiterrorism” legislation (known as the Yarovaya Laws) hardened punishments for
“extremism” (a crime that has been broadly interpreted to encompass antistate criticism on social
media), required telecommunications providers to store data for six months, and imposed
restrictions on locations of religious worship and proselytization.
A 2013 law restricts lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender (LGBT) rights by prohibiting “propaganda”
among minors (including in the media or on the Internet) that would encourage individuals to
consider “non-traditional sexual relationships” as attractive or socially equivalent to “traditional”
sexual relationships. In June 2017, the European Court on Human Rights ruled that the law is
discriminatory and violates freedom of expression.10
These laws and related discriminatory actions have impacted religious and sexual minorities. In
April 2017, for example, Russia’s Supreme Court upheld a March order of the Justice Ministry
banning the operations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia for what it ruled to be “extremist”
activity. Since then, Jehovah’s Witnesses have reported increased harassment and violence. The
Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the organization in July 2017.11
Also in April 2017, Russian media reported that local authorities in Chechnya, a majority-Muslim
republic in Russia’s North Caucasus, had rounded up more than 100 men on the basis of their
8

The list of organizations currently classified as “foreign agents” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of
Justice (at http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOForeignAgent.aspx). Some organizations classified as foreign agents have been
declassified after the government determined that these organizations no longer receive foreign funding, and others
have shut down. In February 2017, Human Rights Watch noted that 158 organizations had been classified at some point
as foreign agents. Human Rights Watch, “Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups,” February 6, 2017, at
https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rights-groups-battle-chronicle.
9
The list of organizations classified as “undesirable” is available on the website of the Russian Ministry of Justice at
http://minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted.
10
Sewell Chan, “Russia’s ‘Gay Propaganda’ Laws Are Illegal, European Court Rules,” New York Times, June 20,
2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/world/europe/russia-gay-propaganda.html.
11
Jason Le Miere, “Jehovah’s Witnesses Ban Appeal Rejected by Russia’s Supreme Court, Allowing Government to
Seize Worship Halls,” Newsweek, July 17, 2017, at http://www.newsweek.com/jehovahs-witnesses-russia-ban-appeal637816.

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suspected homosexuality.12 Reports indicate that detained individuals were beaten and tortured
and that at least three died as a result of the roundup (including two reportedly killed by relatives
after their release from detention).13 Putin’s presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that the
government had no information concerning the allegations, and the local administration’s press
secretary denied the reports.14 In May 2017, Putin said that he would speak to Russia’s
prosecutor-general and minister of internal affairs “concerning the rumors” about the detentions,
but it is unclear what, if any, subsequent measures the government took.15
Over the years, a number of opposition-minded or critical Russian journalists, human rights
activists, politicians, whistleblowers, and others, including opposition politician Boris Nemtsov in
2015, have been reported murdered or have died under mysterious circumstances.16 Although
those who commit crimes are often prosecuted, suspicions frequently exist that such crimes are
ordered by individuals who remain free.17
Corruption
Observers contend that Russia suffers from high levels of corruption. The U.S. State Department’s 2016 Human
Rights Report notes that corruption in Russia is “widespread throughout the executive branch ... as well as in the
legislative and judicial branches at all levels of government. Its manifestations [include] bribery of officials, misuse of
budgetary resources, theft of government property, kickbacks in the procurement process, extortion, and improper
use of [one’s] official position to secure personal profits.” Transparency International (TI), a nongovernmental
organization (NGO), ranks Russia 131 out of 176 countries on its 2016 Corruption Perception Index, similar to
Kazakhstan, Iran, Nepal, and Ukraine (though Russia’s TI ranking has improved over time; in 2010, the country ranked
154 out of 178).
Many Russians share these perceptions of corruption. In a February 2016 poll by the Russia-based Levada Center,
76% of respondents said that Russian state organs were either significantly or wholly affected by corruption. Of
respondents who engaged in activities such as vehicle registration and licensing, hospital stays, university admissions,
and funerals, 15%-30% reported having paid a bribe (as did nearly half of those who reported being detained by traffic
police). Estimates of bribe amounts vary. In December 2015, Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the
average amount of a bribe in criminal cases was around $2,500. In September 2016, a domestic NGO, Clean Hands,

12

Human Rights Watch, They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me: Anti-Gay Purge by Local Authorities in
Russia’s Chechen Republic, May 2017, at https://www.hrw.org/node/304090/; Masha Gessen, “The Gay Men Who
Fled Chechnya’s Purge,” New Yorker, July 3, 2017. The original reports (in Russian) are Elena Milashina, “Honor
Killing,” Novaya Gazeta, April 1, 2017, at https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/01/71983-ubiystvo-chesti,
and Elena Milashina and Irina Gordienko, “Violence Against Chechen Gays,” Novaya Gazeta, April 4, 2017, at
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/04/04/72027-raspravy-nad-chechenskimi-geyami-publikuem-svidetelstva.
13
Human Rights Watch, They Have Long Arms and They Can Find Me, p. 15.
14
The press secretary also reportedly told a Russian journalist that there were no homosexuals in Chechnya and, even if
there were, these individuals probably would be killed by their own relatives. Tanya Lokshina, “Anti-LGBT Violence
in Chechnya,” April 4, 2017.
15
TASS Russian News Agency, “Putin Vows to Discuss Gay Rights Issue in North Caucasus with Prosecutor
General,” May 5, 2017, at http://tass.com/politics/944803.
16
For example, the Committee to Protect Journalists cites cases of 38 murdered journalists from 1993 to 2017
(including 24 since Putin was elected president), at https://cpj.org/killed/europe/russia/murder.php. In January 2017,
Representative Marcy Kaptur included for the Congressional Record (January 12, 2017, H399-H400) a list of 33
journalists killed in Russia since Putin came to power.
17
Some critics and opponents of the Russian government also are said to have become victims of other measures, such
as poisoning. In February 2017, opposition figure Vladimir Kara-Murza, who lives part-time in the United States, fell
seriously ill for the second time in two years while visiting Moscow and had to be placed in an induced coma. KaraMurza is a frequent visitor to Congress and campaigned in favor of U.S. sanctions on Russian officials. Several
Members of Congress issued statements of support for Kara-Murza after learning of his illness. Carl Schreck,
“‘Poisoned’ Kremlin Critic Vladimir Kara-Murza: What You Need to Know,” RFE/RL, February 8, 2017, at
http://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-russia-kara-murza-kremlin-critic-poisoned/28298062.html.

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calculated the average reported bribe to be around five times that amount.
Government officials are occasionally arrested for bribery or compelled to resign from their posts. In 2016, cases
included a regional governor who was once an opposition figure, the mayor of Russia’s Pacific port city Vladivostok,
an Interior Ministry anticorruption official, and the head of the Federal Customs Service. Although observers often
presume there may be grounds for arrest or dismissal, these cases tend not to be interpreted as elements of a
serious anticorruption campaign but rather as manifestations of political and economic infighting or as a way to
remove ineffective or troublesome politicians.
Few of Russia’s most senior officials are arrested or dismissed for corruption. On the contrary, many observers,
including within the U.S. government, believe that Putin and several of his closest colleagues have amassed
considerable wealth while in power. In a January 2016 interview, then-Acting Under Secretary of the Treasury for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Adam Szubin said that “We’ve seen [President Putin] enriching his friends, his
close allies and marginalizing those who he doesn’t view as friends using state assets.” Szubin also noted that Putin
“supposedly draws a state salary of something like $110,000 a year. That is not an accurate statement of the man’s
wealth, and he has longtime training and practices in terms of how to mask his actual wealth.” Russian government
officials reject all such claims.
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Russia; Transparency
International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016”; Levada Center, “Impressions about the Scale of Corruption and
Personal Experience,” April 6, 2016 (in Russian); Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Today—the
International Anti-Corruption Day,” December 9, 2015; Association of Russian Lawyers for Human Rights, Corruption
in Russia: An Independent Annual Report of the All-Russian Anticorruption Social Organization Clean Hands, September 21,
2016; BBC News, “Russia BBC Panorama: Kremlin Demands ‘Putin Corruption’ Proof,” January 26, 2016.

Government Reshuffles
Many observers agree that Vladimir Putin is the most powerful person in Russia. However, Putin
does not rule alone. For most of his tenure, he has presided over a complex network of officials
and business leaders, many of whom are individuals Putin knew from his time in the Soviet KGB
or when he worked in the St. Petersburg local government in the early 1990s.18 An influential
leadership circle below Putin includes government officials, heads of strategic state-owned
enterprises, and businesspersons. Since 2012, the Russian-based Minchenko Consulting group
has produced a series of well-regarded studies that assess who, besides Putin, are the most
influential figures in the Russian policymaking process.19 This list specifies 8 to 10 individuals
who wield the greatest influence (see “Key Russian Officials Under Putin” text box), including
some who do not hold official positions, as well as around 50 other key individuals in the
security, political, economic, and administrative spheres.

18

For a thorough review, see Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy.
The most recent report is Minchenko Consulting, Politburo 2.0: Dismantling or Reset?, November 7, 2016 (in
Russian), at http://www.minchenko.ru/analitika/analitika_61.html. Another prominent list of influential Russian elites
counts Putin’s chief of staff, Anton Vaino, and his deputy, Sergei Kiriyenko, among the top 10 leading officials.
Dmitry Orlov, “Russia’s 100 Top Politicians in January 2017,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, February 3, 2017 (in Russian), at
http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2017-02-01/5_6917_politics.html. Also see Nikolay Petrov, “Down the Funnel: Russia’s
Trajectory After 2014,” Russian Politics & Law vol. 53, no. 4 (2015), pp. 18-22, and Brian Taylor, “Clans and
Networks,” The Code of Putinism (forthcoming publication).
19

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Observers have noted some recent changes to
this system of governance.20 The first change
is a reduction in influence of several of Putin’s
longtime senior associates, including Putin’s
former chief of staff (and former minister of
defense), Sergei Ivanov, who was once pegged
as a possible successor to Putin. Since 2014,
four senior officials close to Putin have
retired, and Ivanov and at least one other
appear to have been demoted (see
“Resignations or Demotions of Longtime
Putin Colleagues” text box).

Key Russian Officials Under Putin
Alexander Bortnikov: Director of the Federal
Security Service (FSB)
Sergei Chemezov: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Rostec (hi-tech and defense state corporation)
Sergei Lavrov: Foreign Minister
Dmitry Medvedev: Prime Minister
Nikolay Patrushev: Secretary of the Security Council
Igor Sechin: CEO of Rosneft (state oil company)
Sergei Shoigu: Minister of Defense
Sergei Sobyanin: Mayor of Moscow
Vyacheslav Volodin: Chair of Parliament
Viktor Zolotov: Director of the National Guard
Notes: Chemezov, Medvedev, Patrushev, Sechin, Shoigu,
and Sobyanin are listed by Minchenko Consulting (see
footnote 19) as among Russia’s eight most influential
policymakers under Putin, together with businessmen
Yuri Kovalchuk and Arkady Rotenberg.

A related change is a steady rise in the number
of senior officials who are at least a decade
younger than Putin (aged 64) and have risen as
Putin’s subordinates more than as his
colleagues. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
(aged 51) straddles this divide; he has worked
with Putin since St. Petersburg and was
Putin’s handpicked successor to the presidency (2008-2012) after Putin’s first two terms. Others
have served Putin or Medvedev for several years and have gained relatively powerful positions.
Several other younger officials have emerged
recently. They are generally seen as having no
real power bases of their own and as entirely
loyal to Putin. Some are bureaucrats who have
replaced Putin’s retiring colleagues. Observers
also have noted the rapid rise of at least three
younger officials who started their careers as
members of the presidential security service
(i.e., Putin’s bodyguards) and have gone on to
serve as regional governors; one is currently a
deputy head of the Federal Security Service
(FSB).21
In assessing the impact of these changes, a
few considerations may be useful to keep in
mind. First, there does not appear to be a
single explanation for the declining influence
of Putin’s longtime colleagues. The most
common factors that observers suggest are

Resignations or Demotions of Longtime
Putin Colleagues
Vladimir Kozhin: Head of the Presidential
Administrative Directorate (demoted May 2014)
Vladimir Yakunin: Head of the Russian Railways
(resigned August 2015)
Viktor Ivanov: Head of the Federal Drug Control
Service (retired May 2016; service dissolved)
General Yevgeny Murov: Head of the Federal Guard
Service (a more powerful version of the U.S. Federal
Protective Service and Secret Service) (retired May
2016)
Andrei Belyaninov: Head of the Federal Customs
Service (resigned July 2016)
Sergei Ivanov: Presidential Chief of Staff (and former
minister of defense) (demoted August 2016)
Note: Kozhin, Yakunin, V. Ivanov, Murov, and S. Ivanov
are subject to U.S. Ukraine-related sanctions.

20

For example, Anders Åslund, “Putin’s Great Purge,” American Interest, August 24, 2016, at http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2016/08/24/putins-great-purge.
21
The three are deputy FSB head Yevgeny Zinichev, Governor of Tula region Aleksey Dyumin, and acting Governor
of Yaroslavl region Dmitry Mironov. See, for example, Oleg Kashin, “How Do You Get to Be a Governor in Vladimir
Putin’s Russia?,” New York Times, September 8, 2016, at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/opinion/how-do-youget-to-be-a-governor-in-vladimir-putins-russia.html.

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declining efficiency or increasing mismanagement.22 However, these factors are not evident in
every case. Moreover, when they are relevant, the reasons behind them have varied, including
corruption, age, and even bereavement (Sergei Ivanov recently lost his son to a drowning
accident).
Second, the changes do not yet amount to a total turnover. Several of Putin’s other longtime
colleagues remain in positions of considerable power or influence (see “Longtime Putin
Colleagues Still in Power” text box).
Third, this gradual “changing of the guard” is occurring against the backdrop of what observers
characterize as frequently vicious struggles for wealth and influence among different power
centers, but most often between the FSB (in particular, its Interior Security Department) and
others: the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Investigative Committee (a kind of Federal Bureau of
Investigation), Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov, and a more liberal (i.e., economically
oriented) wing of the Russian government.23 Considerable speculation has occurred that such
rivalries on occasion lead to developments that Putin does not control. Potential examples include
the February 2015 murder of opposition politician Boris Nemtsov, which was blamed on people
close to Kadyrov, and the November 2016 arrest of Minister of Economic Development Alexey
Ulyukaev, which observers suspect is linked to a rivalry with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin,
considered one of Russia’s most influential policymakers.24
Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power
Sergei Chemezov: CEO of Rostec, Russia’s large state-owned military-industrial complex, who oversees scores of
hi-tech and defense companies across the country.
Nikolay Patrushev: Chair of the National Security Council. Colleagues reportedly have referred to Patrushev as
“Russia’s most underestimated public figure.” He is thought to have had considerable influence in shaping Russia’s
recent anti-Western foreign policy trajectory, including the annexation of Crimea.
Igor Sechin: CEO of Rosneft. Sechin has long been considered one of the most powerful officials in Russia, with not
only influence over the state-owned oil sector but also unofficial ties to elements of the FSB. Last year, Sechin was
subject to some speculation that he risked overstepping his bounds and losing power, but he ultimately appeared to
strengthen his position at the expense of various rivals.
Viktor Zolotov: Head of the National Guard. Zolotov is considered to be singularly loyal to Putin. He now heads a
new security apparatus that officially serves as a special police force to combat terrorism and organized crime but is
widely considered to be Putin’s “personal army” and, potentially, a repressive tool for fighting civil unrest.
Other Longtime Putin Colleagues Still in Power: Andrei Fursenko (Presidential Aide), German Gref
(Sberbank), Dmitry Kozak (Deputy Prime Minister), Alexei Kudrin (Vice Chair, Presidential Economic Council), Alexei
Miller (Gazprom), Sergei Naryshkin (Foreign Intelligence Service), Yevgeny Shkolov (Presidential Aide), and Nikolai
Tokarev (Transneft). Some influential businessmen also are longtime colleagues of Putin: Arkady and Boris Rotenberg,
Nikolai Shamalov, and Gennady Timchenko.
Notes: Chemezov is subject to U.S. and European Union (EU) Ukraine-related sanctions (as are Kozak, Naryshkin,
and A. Rotenberg). Sechin is subject to U.S. Ukraine-related sanctions (as are Fursenko, B. Rotenberg, and

22

For example, Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Removal of Ivanov as Chief of Staff Is More About Rejuvenation,”
Chatham House, August 15, 2016, at https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/putins-removal-ivanov-chiefstaff-more-about-rejuvenation.
23
For example, Karina Orlova, “The Siloviki Coup in Russia,” American Interest, September 21, 2016, at
http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/21/the-siloviki-coup-in-russia.
24
For example, Joshua Yaffa, “The Unaccountable Death of Boris Nemtsov,” New Yorker, February 26, 2016, at
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-unaccountable-death-of-boris-nemtsov, and Ilya Matveev, “The Big
Game: Ulyukaev, Sechin and Russia’s Neopatrimonial Privatisation,” OpenDemocracy Russia, November 21, 2016, at
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ilya-matveev/big-game-ulyukaev-sechin-and-russias-neopatrimonialprivatisation.

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Timchenko). Patrushev (and Shamalov) are subject to EU sanctions. In addition, Rostec is subject to U.S. (and,
partially, EU) Ukraine-related sanctions and Rosneft is subject to U.S. and EU Ukraine-related sanctions.

September 2016 State Duma Elections
On September 18, 2016, Russians elected the State Duma, the lower house of parliament.
Russia’s last parliamentary elections, in December 2011, triggered a wave of protests against
electoral fraud and heralded the rise of a revitalized opposition against Putin’s government. Five
years later, expectations of democratic change at the ballot box had subsided. With a voter turnout
of 48%, the ruling United Russia (UR) party won a resounding victory, with more than 75% of
the seats (as opposed to 53% in 2011). All other seats went to those considered loyal opposition
parties and deputies. No parties genuinely in opposition (sometimes termed the liberal
opposition) won any seats (see Table 1).25
Table 1. Election Results to the State Duma, September 18, 2016
Party List
%

Party List
Seats

Single-Member
Seats

Total Seats

% of Seats

United Russia (UR)

54.2%

140

203

343

76.2%

Communist Party
(KPRF)a

13.3%

35

7

42

9.3%

Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia (LDPR)a

13.1%

34

5

39

8.7%

A Just Russiaa

6.2%

16

7

23

5.1%

Other

11.2%

0

3

3

0.7%

Yablokob

2.0%

0

0

0

0.0%

PARNASb

0.7%

0

0

0

0.0%

98%

225

225

450

Total

100%

Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, at http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru.
Notes: Total party list percentage is calculated out of the total number of valid and invalid ballots.
a. The KPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia parties are considered the loyal opposition parties. These parties
criticize the government, if not Putin, but typically support its legislative initiatives.
b. Yabloko and PARNAS are liberal opposition parties considered to be genuinely in opposition to the
government. They fall under the “Other” category, which includes several small parties that did not meet
the 5% threshold for party list representation.

The ruling UR party traditionally polls lower than Putin, who does not formally lead the party, but
it appeared to benefit from a surge in patriotic sentiment unleashed by Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, Russia’s so-called defense of pro-Russian populations in eastern Ukraine, and appeals for
national solidarity in the face of Western sanctions and criticism.26 UR also experienced a certain
renewal in advance of elections; party primaries promoted the rise of many candidates new to
national politics and eliminated a number of sitting deputies.27
25

For additional background, see CRS Insight IN10573, Russia’s Parliamentary Elections, by (name redacted)
.
Denis Volkov, “How Long Will It Be Before 2011-2012 Style Mass Protests Reemerge?,” Intersection, September 8,
2016, at http://intersectionproject.eu/article/society/how-long-will-it-be-2011-2012-style-mass-protests-reemerge.
27
Darrell Slider and Nikolai Petrov, “United Russia’s ‘Primaries’: A Preview of the Duma Elections?,” Russian
(continued...)
26

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At the same time, the Russian government took measures after the last election to bolster the
victory of UR and minimize opposition gains across the country.28 Fourteen parties that received
at least 3% of the vote in the last election or held at least one seat in a regional council competed
in the 2016 election. Other parties technically could register after collecting 200,000 signatures,
but no such registrations were approved. In addition, state-controlled media and government
officials subjected opposition leaders to a barrage of negative publicity, branding them as agents
of the West.29 Restrictions on mass demonstrations tightened. A centrally controlled redistricting
process led to the carving up of urban centers that leaned toward the opposition. Finally, the
election date was moved up from December 2016, considerably shortening the campaign
period.30
UR also benefited from a change in electoral rules restoring a mixed electoral system that had
been in place through 2003 parliamentary elections. UR’s financial and administrative resources
across the countryside were expected to help the party win more seats via single-member races
than it would in a purely proportional contest; indeed, UR candidates won more than 90% of
these races.31 By comparison, in the contested 2011 election, when seats were allocated entirely
by party-list vote, UR officially won 49% of the vote (as opposed to 54% in 2016) but only 53%
of seats (as opposed to 76% in 2016).
Election observers also raised concerns about fraud. The election observation mission of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) noted that the counting process was
bad or very bad in 23% of the polling stations it observed. One widely cited statistical analysis by
a Russian scholar also suggested the election was marred in certain areas of the country by high
levels of fraud, including ballot-box stuffing.32
Besides UR, the three parties that gained seats have served in parliament already and are known
as the loyal opposition. These parties criticize the government, if not Putin, but typically support
its legislative initiatives. Two are longtime fixtures of Russian politics: the Communist Party
(KPRF, led by Gennadiy Zyuganov) and the right-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR,
led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky). The third, A Just Russia (led by Sergei Mironov), is a center-left
party that flirted with the opposition in 2011-2012 before returning to the fold (and expelling
some of its members, who remained in opposition).33
(...continued)
Analytical Digest no. 186 (July 15, 2016).
28
Vladimir Gelman, “Correction of Errors: How the Kremlin Re-equilibrated Authoritarian Elections in 2016,”
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 437, August 2016, at http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/correction-errors-howkremlin-re-equilibrated-authoritarian-elections-2016.
29
For example, Yelena Plotnikova and Robert Coalson, “Samara Governor Offers a Stark Choice: United Russia or the
CIA,” RFE/RL, September 10, 2016, at http://www.rferl.org/a/russia-samara-governor-merkushkin-united-russia-cia/
27978955.html.
30
Nikolay Petrov, “Putin’s Gamble on Russia’s Duma Elections,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September
8, 2016, at http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_putins_gamble_on_russias_duma_elections_7109.
31
Felix Riefer, “Russian Parliamentary Elections to Take Place Under New Rules,” Deutsche Welle, August 16, 2016,
at http://www.dw.com/en/russian-parliamentary-elections-to-take-place-under-new-rules/a-19478968.
32
OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation Mission, Russian Federation—State Duma Elections, “Statement
of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions,” September 18, 2016, at http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/265186;
Leonid Bershidsky, “Russia Proves Vote Fraud Can Happen Anywhere,” Bloomberg View, September 26, 2016, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-22/russia-proves-vote-fraud-can-happen-anywhere; Olga Sichkar,
Jack Stubbs, and Gleb Stolyarov, “Phantom Voters, Smuggled Ballots Hint at Foul Play in Russian Vote,” Reuters,
September 20, 2016, at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-fraud-idUSKCN11Q1RI.
33
Vladimir Kara-Murza, “Back on the Leash: The End for A Just Russia,” Institute of Modern Russia, January 29,
(continued...)

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The Opposition
As noted above, no liberal opposition party won Duma seats in the 2016 elections. However, two
liberal opposition parties, neither of which was in the previous parliament, were eligible to
compete: Yabloko (identified with its former longtime chairman Grigory Yavlinsky) and
PARNAS (led by a former prime minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, as well as, previously, Boris
Nemtsov, slain in 2015). Both parties consider themselves European-style liberal democratic
parties, though other parties criticized PARNAS in 2016 for including at least one populist
firebrand near the top of its list.34
In addition, 18 single-member races were contested by candidates representing the Open Russia
movement, founded by former oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovsky.35
The party of another prominent opposition leader, anticorruption activist and 2013 Moscow
mayoral candidate Alexei Navalny, had its registration revoked in 2015, ostensibly for technical
reasons, and thus was unable to participate in the election. Navalny himself is barred from
running for political office due to a 2013 criminal conviction that resulted in a suspended
sentence. Navalny supporters and most outside observers deemed the case (and a second one) to
be politically motivated, and in February 2016, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
concluded that the trial had violated Navalny’s rights.36
Opposition fragmentation was an issue prior to the election. Opposition leaders protected their
individual brands and appeared to fear that these brands could be damaged by formal unification
with other parties (electoral blocs have been banned since 2005). In 2015, Navalny’s Party of
Progress had joined with PARNAS and others in a “Democratic Coalition,” which was to run
candidates under the PARNAS banner. The coalition soon encountered difficulties, however. It
was barred from registering candidates in September 2015 regional elections, and in spring 2016
the coalition collapsed after PARNAS leader Kasyanov was targeted in a scandal involving
alleged hidden video footage of an affair with a party colleague.37
For now, observers tend to see Vladimir Putin’s rule as relatively stable, although new signs of
discontent have arisen. Ongoing economic difficulties (see “The Economy,” below) have led to
small-scale protests across Russia, as prices have risen, salaries have fallen, unemployment has

(...continued)
2013, at http://imrussia.org/en/politics/377-back-on-the-leash-the-end-for-a-just-russia; Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber,
“Dmitry Gudkov, L'Enfаnt Terrible of the State Duma,” Moscow Times, October 6, 2014, at
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/dmitry-gudkov-lenfnt-terrible-of-the-state-duma-40113.
34
Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russian Opposition Faces Infighting, Apathy at Upcoming Vote,” Associated Press, September
12, 2016, at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a178ad99cd8f49e59e7f84a50f775b16/russian-opposition-faces-infightingapathy-upcoming-vote.
35
Ola Cichowlas, “Russian Election Watch 2016: Noteworthy Candidates,” Moscow Times, September 12, 2016, at
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-election-watch-2016-noteworthy-candidates-55249.
36
Meduza, “Navalny Wants Supreme Court to Review His First Criminal Conviction, Saying He’s Being Kept from
Elections Intentionally,” August 22, 2016, at https://meduza.io/en/news/2016/08/22/navalny-wants-supreme-court-toreview-his-first-criminal-conviction-saying-he-s-being-kept-from-elections-intentially; Neil MacFarquhar and Ivan
Nechepurenko, “Aleksei Navalny, Viable Putin Rival, Is Barred from a Presidential Run,” New York Times, February 8,
2017, at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/europe/russia-aleksei-navalny-putin.html.
37
Meduza, “Russia’s Democratic Coalition: The Opposition Is Being Barred from Elections Again. Here’s What You
Need to Know,” July 29, 2015, at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2015/07/29/russia-s-democratic-coalition; Meduza, “The
Strange Death of Russia’s ‘Democratic Coalition,’” May 31, 2016, at https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/01/thestrange-death-of-russia-s-democratic-coalition.

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grown, and social spending has been reduced.38 In March and June 2017, nationwide protests
spearheaded by Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation reportedly attracted thousands, many of
whom were university-aged or younger, to demonstrate against corruption. Hundreds of
protestors were temporarily detained, including Navalny, who was fined and sentenced to,
respectively, 15 days and 30 days in prison for what the courts cited as illegal activity.39
Whether such protests are sufficient to catalyze a more substantial political movement remains to
be seen. Some observers believe that the government is seeking to minimize popular discontent
by continuing to increase social benefits in the lead-up to the next presidential election, scheduled
for March 2018, even as expenditures in education, health care, and defense stay flat or decline.40
Potential future scenarios tend to center on succession politics, whether engineered by Putin or
prompted by his incapacitation or untimely passing. As late as June 2017, Putin still would not
say if he was planning to run for reelection, although many observers believe he plans to do so.41
In the event of a controlled succession (in 2018 or after), observers speculate about a number of
well-known potential successors. However, the eventual choice also could be a relatively
unknown figure; Putin himself was a highly unexpected choice to succeed his predecessor, Boris
Yeltsin.
Many observers put little stock in the possibility of a democratic transition of power. In such a
scenario, candidates are thought more likely to emerge from right-wing nationalist forces or a
new post-Communist left, not from a liberal, pro-Western opposition or civil society, whose
influence has been seriously undermined by the Russian government.
Other scenarios involve a loss of control by Putin or members of his inner circle, as a result of a
collapsing economy, weakened state apparatus, or an external war gone wrong. Some observers
have speculated that rival political centers could compete for power in Putin’s absence and that
this competition could turn violent. In addition, some have voiced concerns that an uncontrolled
transition could lead to the rise of more nationalist forces.
Local Elections
Formally, Russia has a robust system of subnational elections; in practice, the country’s top-down system provides
centralized control over key issues. Regional and municipal councils are elected, as are governors of most of Russia’s
83 regions and republics (though candidates must secure the signatures of 5%-10% of all their region’s municipal
deputies, which is seen as a major constraint).
Kremlin-backed leaders dominate local government structures. All but one of Russia’s 83 governors are United Russia
(UR) members or other government-backed figures. In the Siberian region of Irkutsk in September 2015, Communist
Party member Sergei Levchenko became the only gubernatorial candidate since elections were reintroduced in 2012
to defeat a government-backed opponent. UR also has majorities, typically substantial ones, in all regional councils;
only a handful of regional deputies across the country are affiliated with the liberal opposition.
Certain regions and cities contain more opposition-minded voters, most notably the two major urban centers of

38

Sean Guillory, “Kremlinology: An Intervention,” OpenDemocracy Russia, September 13, 2016, at
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sean-guillory/kremlinology-intervention.
39
See, for example, Joshua Yaffa, “What the Russian Protests Mean for Putin,” New Yorker, March 27, 2017, at
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-the-russian-protests-mean-for-putin, and Maxim Trudolyubov,
“Alexei Navalny and the Cycle of Russian Protest,” Atlantic, June 15, 2017, at https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2017/06/navalny-russia-protests/530463/.
40
Andrey Movchan, “Pensions and Security: Russian Budget Reveals Government Priorities,” Carnegie Moscow
Center, December 15, 2016, at http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=66454.
41
TASS Russian News Agency, “Putin Says Too Early to Discuss 2018 Presidential Election,” June 1, 2017, at
http://tass.com/politics/949110.

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Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the September 2013 Moscow mayoral election, opposition candidate Alexei Navalny
won 27% of the vote (incumbent Sergei Sobyanin, Putin’s former chief of staff and deputy prime minister, won 51%).
Some regions in Siberia and the Far East, as well as in the Northwest, also elect greater numbers of opposition
candidates (including the Communists and other loyal opposition parties).
Although Russian law allows for the direct election of mayors in cities other than Moscow and St. Petersburg, most
municipalities have an indirectly elected mayor or council head who shares authority with a more powerful appointed
or indirectly elected city manager. A few opposition candidates have won competitive mayoral elections, although
some of the more prominent were subsequently removed from office and even imprisoned.
Sources: J. Paul Goode, “The Revival of Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections: Liberalization or Potemkin Reform?,”
Russian Analytical Digest no. 139 (November 18, 2013), pp. 9-11; Joel C. Moses, “Putin and Russian Subnational Politics
in 2014,” Demokratizatsiya vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 2015), pp. 181-203; Maria Tsvetkova, “When Kremlin Candidate
Loses Election, Even Voters Are Surprised,” Reuters, September 29, 2015; Ola Cichowlas, “Endangered Species: Why
Is Russia Locking Up Its Mayors?,” Moscow Times, August 2, 2016.

The Economy42
The Russian economy has gone through periods of decline, growth, and stagnation since 1991. In
the first seven years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1992-1998), Russia experienced an
average annual decline in gross domestic product (GDP) of 6.8%. A decade of strong economic
growth followed, in which Russia’s GDP increased on average 6.9% per year. The surge in
economic growth—largely the result of increases in world oil prices—helped to raise the Russian
standard of living and brought a significant degree of economic stability.
The Russian economy was hit hard by the global financial crisis and resulting economic downturn
that began in 2008. The crisis exposed weaknesses in the economy, including its significant
dependence on the production and export of oil and other natural resources and its weak financial
system. The Russian government’s reassertion of control over major industries, especially in the
energy sector, also contributed to an underachieving economy. As a result, Russia’s period of
economic growth came to an abrupt end by 2009. Although Russian real GDP increased 5.2% in
2008, it declined by 7.8% in 2009. Russia began to emerge from its recession in 2010, with 4.5%
GDP growth that year, but by 2013 growth had again slowed to 1.3%.43
Since 2014, two external shocks—low oil prices and international sanctions—have contributed to
considerable economic challenges. In particular, Russia has grappled with the following:






economic contraction, with growth slowing to 0.7% in 2014 before contracting
by 2.8% in 2015;
capital flight, with net private capital outflows from Russia totaling $152 billion
in 2014, compared to $60 billion in 2013;
rapid depreciation of the ruble, more than 50% against the dollar over the course
of 2014;
increasing inflation, from 6.8% in 2013 to 15.5% in 2015;
declining trade, with the dollar value of exports and imports down by 31% and
36%, respectively, from 2014 to 2015;

42

This section was prepared primarily by Rebecca Nelson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. For more, see
CRS Report R43895, U.S. Sanctions and Russia’s Economy, by (name redacted) .
43
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook, April 2017, at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx.

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



budgetary pressures, with the budget deficit widening from 1.2% in 2013 to 3.4%
in 2015;
drawing on international reserves to offset fiscal challenges, with reserves falling
from almost $500 billion in January 2014 to $356 billion in April 2015; and
more widespread poverty, which increased from 16.1 million living in poverty in
2014 to 19.2 million in 2015 (13.4% of the population).44

During 2016, Russia’s economy largely stabilized, even as sanctions remained in place. Russia’s
economy only slightly contracted (0.2%); net private sector capital outflows slowed, from more
than $150 billion in 2014 to $19.8 billion in 2016; inflation fell by more than half since 2015, to
7.0%; the value of the ruble stabilized; reserves began to rise; and the government successfully
sold new bonds in international capital markets in May 2016. Around 19.8 million (13.5% of the
population) were estimated to be living in poverty.45 Net inflows of foreign direct investment
(FDI) into Russia, which essentially came to a halt in late 2014 and early 2015, started to resume
in 2016. Most notably, a consortium of the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA, Qatar’s national
sovereign wealth fund) and Glencore, a Swiss-based mining and commodity trading firm,
purchased 19.5% of the state-controlled Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil company, for €10.2 billion
(about $10.6 billion at the time).46
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Russia’s economy is projected to grow by
1.4% in 2017.47 The IMF argues that after two years of recession, the economy is recovering due
to a rise in oil prices and improved investor sentiment but that the medium-term prospects are
subdued given oil prices still well below their peak and structural weaknesses in Russia’s
economy.48 Low oil prices also have strained the government budget, which ran a deficit of 3.7%
of GDP in 2016, but the fiscal outlook has improved as oil prices have stabilized, with a budget
deficit of 1.9% of GDP projected for 2017.49 The government has tapped one of Russia’s
sovereign wealth funds, the Reserve Fund, to address the budget shortfall, and its resources have
fallen to about $16 billion from $143 billion in 2008.50 The government is considering
44

IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2017; Central Bank of Russia, External Sector Statistics, “Net
Inflows/Outflows of Capital by Private Sector,” at https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=
itm_49171#CheckedItem; IMF Exchange Rates Database, at https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/ert/GUI/Pages/
CountryDataBase.aspx ; The Customs Committee of Russia, as accessed from Global Trade Atlas; Central Bank of
Russia, External Sector Statistics, “International Reserves of the Russian Federation,” http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/?
Prtid=svs; and World Bank, Russia Economic Report 35, April 6, 2016, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2016/04/06/russia-economic-report-35.
45
World Bank, Russia Economic Report 37, May 2017, at http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/rer.
46
The consortium borrowed most of the funds from Intesa Sanpaolo, an Italian bank, and others, including Russian
banks. BP, the UK-based international energy company, owns 19.75% of Rosneft. The purpose and method of the sale
has raised some questions among observers. See Katya Golubkova, Dmitry Zhdannikov, and Stephen Jewkes, “How
Russia Sold Its Oil Jewel: Without Saying Who Bought It,” Reuters, January 25, 2017, at http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-russia-rosneft-privatisation-insight-idUSKBN1582OH; Sarah McFarlane and Summer Said, “Russia Could
Buy Back Stake It Sold in Rosneft,” Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2017, at https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-to-buyback-stake-it-sold-in-rosneft-1496827804.
47
IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, July 2017, at http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2017/07/07/
world-economic-outlook-update-july-2017.
48
IMF, Russian Federation: 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report, July 2017, at
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/10/Russian-Federation-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-PressRelease-Staff-Report-45054.
49
Ibid.
50
Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Russian Wealth Fund Has This Year’s Biggest Drop as Buffers Wilt,” Bloomberg, September
6, 2016, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-06/russian-wealth-fund-has-this-year-s-biggest-drop-as(continued...)

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consolidating its two sovereign wealth funds as the government continues to face budget
shortfalls. Russia’s other sovereign wealth fund, the National Wealth Fund, was designed to help
balance the pension system and has about $75 billion.51
In the longer term, Russia’s economy faces long-standing structural challenges, including slow
economic diversification, weak protection of property rights, burdensome administrative
procedures, state involvement in the economy, and adverse demographic dynamics.52 The IMF
argues that sanctions dampen the potential for accelerating investment growth.53 Some analysts
also have noted that the low value of the ruble may hamper Russia’s attempts to innovate and
modernize its economy and that the economy’s continued reliance on oil makes it vulnerable to
another drop in oil prices.54
Despite Western sanctions and Russia’s own retaliatory ban against agricultural imports, the EU
as a whole remains Russia’s largest trading partner. In 2016, 47% of Russia’s merchandise
exports went to EU member states and 38% of its merchandise imports came from EU member
states. By country, Russia’s top three merchandise export destinations were the Netherlands
(10%), China (10%), and Germany (7%), and its top three sources of merchandise imports were
China (21%), Germany (11%), and the United States (6%).55

Economic Impact of Sanctions
It is difficult to assess whether, and to what extent, sanctions on Russia and Russia’s retaliatory
measures have impacted the country’s economy over the past few years (for details on U.S.
sanctions against Russia, see “Ukraine-Related Sanctions,” below). Sanctions were imposed at
the same time the price of oil, a major export and source of revenue for the Russian government,
dropped significantly, by more than 60% between the start of 2014 and the end of 2015.56
That said, many economists, including at the IMF, have argued that the twin shocks of sanctions
and low oil prices have adversely affected Russia’s economy.57 In 2015, the IMF estimated that
sanctions and Russia’s retaliatory ban on agricultural imports reduced output in Russia over the
short term between 1.0% and 1.5%.58 The IMF’s models suggest that the effects on Russia over
(...continued)
buffers-wilt; Andrey Ostroukh, “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16.71 Billion as of July 1,” Reuters, at
https://www.reuters.com/article/russia-funds-idUSR4N1IY00Q.
51
Olga Tanas and Anna Andrianova, “Russia Eyes a $90 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund,” Reuters, June 19, 2017, at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-19/russia-to-discuss-merging-wealth-funds-into-90-7-billioncoffer; Ostroukh, “Russia’s Reserve Fund Grows to $16.71 Billion as of July 1,” July 4, 2017.
52
IMF, Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation, July 2016, at https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16229.pdf.
53
IMF, Russian Federation: 2017 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report, July 2017.
54
Pavel Koshkin and Ksenia Zubacheva, “The Worst of the Economic Crisis in Russia Lies Ahead,” Russia Direct,
January 22, 2016, at http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/worst-economic-crisis-russia-lies-ahead.
55
European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, “European Union, Trade In Goods With Russia,” May 3,
2017, at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113440.pdf, and Customs Committee of Russia,
as accessed from Global Trade Atlas.
56
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Global Price of Brent Crude,” at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
POILBREUSDM, accessed February 2, 2017.
57
For example, see IMF, “IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Russian Federation,” November 29, 2016, at
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/11/29/PR16529-Russian-Federation-IMF-Staff-Concludes-Visit.
58
IMF, Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation, August 2015, p. 5, at
http://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/IMF002/22733-9781513502441/22733-9781513502441/22733(continued...)

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the medium term could be more substantial, reducing output by up to 9.0%, as lower capital
accumulation and technological transfers weaken already declining productivity growth. At the
start of 2016, a State Department official argued that sanctions were not designed to push Russia
“over the economic cliff” in the short run but rather were designed to exert long-term pressure on
Russia.59
In November 2014, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov estimated the annual cost of
sanctions to the Russian economy at $40 billion (2% of GDP), compared to $90 billion-$100
billion (4%-5% of GDP) lost due to lower oil prices.60 Similarly, Russian economists estimated
that the economic sanctions would decrease Russia’s GDP by 2.4% by 2017, but the effect would
be 3.3 times less than the effect from the oil-price shock.61 In November 2016, Putin stated that
the sanctions are “severely harming Russia” in terms of access to international financial markets,
although the impact was not as severe as the harm from the decline in energy prices.62
In December 2016, the Office of the Chief Economist at the U.S. State Department published
estimates of the impact of the U.S. and European Union (EU) sanctions in 2014 on a firm-level
basis.63 The main finding was that the average company or associated company in Russia subject
to sanctions lost about one-third of its operating revenue, more than one-half of its asset value,
and about one-third of its employees relative to nonsanctioned peers.
The longer-term effect of sanctions, if they are kept in place, is unclear. The economic bite of
restrictions on U.S. long-term financing for certain sectors or technology for specific Russian oil
exploration projects may manifest more prominently in coming years. At the same time, the longterm impact may depend on whether Russia can develop viable and reliable alternative economic
partners, particularly among countries that have refrained from sanctions (such as China, India,
and Brazil), to fulfill economic activities restricted by U.S. and EU sanctions.

U.S.-Russian Trade and Investment
Even before sanctions were imposed, the United States had relatively little direct trade and
investment with Russia. Over the past decade, Russia has accounted for less than 2% of total U.S.
merchandise imports, less than 1% of total U.S. merchandise exports, less than 1% of U.S. FDI,
and less than 1% of FDI in the United States.64 At the same time, in 2016, the United States was
Russia’s third-largest source of merchandise imports (and 10th-largest destination for exports).

(...continued)
9781513502441_A001.xml.
59
Robin Emmott, “Sanctions Impact on Russia to Be Longer Term, U.S. Says,” Reuters, January 12, 2016, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-idUSKCN0UQ1ML20160112.
60
European Parliamentary Research Service, Sanctions over Ukraine: Impact on Russia, March 2016, at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579084-Sanctions-over-Ukraine-impact-Russia-FINAL.pdf.
61
Evsey Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The Impact of Financial Sanctions on the Russian Economy,” Russian Journal
of Economics (2015), pp. 359-385.
62
Nikolaus Blome, Kai Diekmann, and Daniel Biskup, “Putin—The Interview: ‘For Me, It Is Not Borders That
Matter,’” Bild, November 1, 2016, at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/wladimir-putin/russian-president-vladimirputin-the-interview-44092656.bild.html.
63
Daniel Ahn and Rodney Ludema, Measuring Smartness: Understanding the Economic Impact of Targeted Sanctions,
Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of State, December 2016, Working Paper 2017-01, at
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267590.pdf.
64
Trade data are from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Customs Committee of Russia, and Eurostat, as accessed from
Global Trade Atlas, unless otherwise noted. U.S. investment data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (on a
(continued...)

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Over the past three years, U.S. merchandise trade with Russia has fallen by almost half (see
Figure 2). U.S. merchandise exports to Russia fell from $11.1 billion in 2013 to $5.8 billion in
2016. U.S. merchandise imports from Russia fell from $27.1 billion in 2013 to $14.5 billion in
2016. U.S. investment ties with Russia also continued to weaken. U.S. investment in Russia was
$9.2 billion in 2015, down from a peak of $20.8 billion in 2009.65 Russian investment in the
United States was $4.5 billion, down from a peak of $8.4 billion in 2009.
U.S. merchandise imports from Russia tend to be dominated by oil and unfinished metals. Of the
$14.5 billion in merchandise that the United States imported from Russia in 2016, about half was
mineral fuels and oils ($7.2 billion), particularly noncrude oil ($6.6 billion). Other top U.S.
merchandise imports from Russia in 2016 included aluminum ($1.33 billion); iron and steel ($1.3
billion); inorganic chemicals, precious and rare-earth metals and radioactive compounds ($1.2
billion), particularly enriched uranium ($1.03 billion); precious metals, stones, and related
products ($696 million), particularly unfinished platinum ($607 million); fertilizers ($502
million); and fish, crustaceans, and aquatic invertebrates ($410 million). These products
accounted for more than 85% of U.S. imports from Russia in 2016.
U.S. merchandise exports to Russia tend to focus on machinery and manufactured products. Of
the $5.8 billion in commodities exported by the United States to Russia in 2016, the top export
was nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, and parts ($1.4 billion). Other top U.S. merchandise
exports to Russia in 2016 included aircraft, spacecraft, and related parts ($1.3 billion); vehicles
and parts ($617 million); optic, photo, medic, and surgical instruments ($438 million); electric
machinery and sound equipment ($421 million); and pharmaceutical products ($190 million).
These products accounted for more than 75% of U.S. exports to Russia in 2016.
Figure 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Russia

Source: Created by CRS using U.S. Census Bureau data, as accessed from Global Trade Atlas.

Even though overall trade and investment flows between the United States and Russia are limited,
economic ties at the firm and sector levels are in some cases substantial. Several large U.S.
companies, such as PepsiCo, Ford Motor Company, General Electric, and Boeing, have been
actively engaged with Russia: exporting to Russia, entering joint ventures with Russian partners,
and relying on Russian suppliers for inputs. The U.S.-Russia Business Council, a Washington-

(...continued)
historical-cost basis).
65
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Data are U.S. direct investment position abroad on a historical-cost basis.

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based trade association that provides services to U.S. and Russian member companies, has a
membership of around 170 U.S. companies conducting business in Russia.66
In 2012, Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Congress passed and the
President signed legislation that allowed the President to extend permanent normal trade relations
to Russia (P.L. 112-208). Part of this legislation requires the U.S. Trade Representative to report
annually on the implementation and enforcement of Russia’s WTO commitments. The 2016
report stresses that although Russia acted as a responsible member of the WTO community in
some areas, such as reducing bound tariffs (maximum rates allowed by the WTO between trading
states) by the required deadline, other areas were more problematic: Russia’s actions continued to
depart from the WTO’s core tenets of liberal trade, transparency, and predictability in favor of
inward-looking, import-substitution economic policies.67 Separately, some analysts have raised
questions about whether Russia’s retaliatory ban on agriculture imports from the United States
and other countries is compliant with its obligations under the WTO, whereas others argue that
the ban may be permitted under the national security exemption. To date, no state has formally
challenged the ban at the WTO.

Energy Sector68
Russia is a significant producer of energy in various forms, including crude oil, natural gas, coal,
and nuclear power. In 2016, Russia was the third-largest oil producer, behind the United States
and Saudi Arabia; the second-largest natural gas producer, behind the United States; and the
sixth-largest coal producer. It is also a significant exporter of oil and the largest natural gas
exporter, the latter providing Russia with market power, which it has exploited for geopolitical
purposes. Natural gas is more of a regional commodity than oil because natural gas requires
expensive infrastructure for transport. (Oil, by contrast, is a global market in which Russia does
not have the same type of leverage over countries as it does with its natural gas exports.)
Table 2, below, provides data for all countries in Europe that received Russian natural gas (EU
members are in bold) in 2015, the latest year for which data are available.69 Seven EU countries
(Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Slovenia) relied on Russia for 100%
of their natural gas imports in 2015, as did five non-EU countries (Belarus, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, and Serbia). Russian gas imports made up more than half the
total gas consumption in 20 countries. However, only three EU countries (Hungary, Latvia, and
Lithuania) and three non-EU countries (Armenia, Belarus, and Moldova) depended on Russian
gas for more than 20% of their total primary energy consumption.
To maintain its leverage and position as Europe’s dominant gas supplier, Russia has sought to
develop multiple pipeline routes to reduce its dependence on transit states such as Ukraine and to
satisfy regional markets. To the north, the Nord Stream pipeline runs under the Baltic Sea from
Russia to Germany; Russia’s state-controlled natural gas company, Gazprom, is seeking to build a
second, parallel pipeline, Nord Stream 2, with the financial support of five European energy
companies. However, the project still must receive approval from the governments of Denmark,
66

U.S.-Russia Business Council, at http://www.usrbc.org/site/membership/services.
U.S. Trade Representative, 2016 Report on the Implementation and Enforcement of Russia’s WTO Commitments,
December 2016, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-WTO-Report-Russia.pdf.
68
This section was coauthored with (name redacted), Specialist in Energy Policy. For more on Russian-European
energy relations, see CRS Report R42405, Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply
Diversification, coordinated by (name redacted).
69
In 2015, Russia also exported natural gas to China, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
67

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Finland, and Sweden, whose waters it would cross. The European Union (specifically, the EU’s
executive branch, the European Commission) also is considering whether and to what extent the
proposed pipeline would be subject to existing EU regulations.
Opponents of the pipeline—including, among others, the governments of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and many Members of the U.S. Congress—argue that the pipeline
runs counter to the stated EU goal of diversifying European energy supply sources by increasing
reliance on Russian gas. In addition, they contend that by bypassing existing pipelines to Eastern
Europe through Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 could leave Ukraine and other countries in Central and
Eastern Europe more vulnerable to supply cutoffs or price manipulation by Russia.
To the south, Russia had long planned the South Stream pipeline that would have run under the
Black Sea to Bulgaria. That project was canceled at the end of 2014. Despite initial skepticism
and a temporary decline in Turkish-Russian relations, however, the planned South Stream
pipeline has been replaced to an extent by the Turk Stream project, which follows a similar route
across the Black Sea but stops at the Turkish-Greek border. Gazprom has signed some contracts
for the project, including one for the laying of pipe.

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Table 2. European Imports of Russian Natural Gas (2015)
Russian Imports as
% of Total Imports

Russian Imports as % of
Total Gas Consumption

Russian Imports as % of
Primary Energy
Consumption

Armenia

83%

83%

40%

Austria

68%

57%

11%

Belarus

100%

100%

66%

Belgium

30%

58%

17%

Bosnia and Herzegovina

100%

100%

3%

Bulgaria

100%

97%

14%

Czech Republic

48%

47%

9%

Denmark

53%

21%

3%

Estonia

100%

100%

19%

Finland

100%

100%

9%

France

20%

22%

3%

Georgia

15%

15%

4%

Germany

41%

50%

12%

Greece

61%

61%

6%

Hungary

100%

81%

23%

Italy

38%

34%

14%

Latvia

100%

100%

30%

Lithuania

84%

84%

37%

Macedonia

100%

100%

2%

Moldova

100%

100%

68%

Netherlands

8%

6%

2%

Poland

77%

56%

8%

Romania

100%

2%

0%

Serbia

100%

72%

9%

Slovakia

90%

88%

20%

Slovenia

100%

100%

6%

Switzerland

8%

8%

1%

Turkey

54%

54%

17%

Ukraine

44%

21%

8%

Country

Sources: CRS, on the basis of data from Cedigaz (http://www.cedigaz.org), industry data provider, 2015; British
Petroleum (BP), Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, at http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/energyeconomics/statistical-review-of-world-energy.html; and U.S. Energy Information Administration, International
Energy Outlook 2016, at http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo.
Notes: European Union member states are in bold.

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Foreign Relations
In recent years, many Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers have paid growing
attention to Russia’s active and increasingly forceful foreign policy, both toward neighboring
states, such as Georgia and Ukraine, and in regard to operations further afield, such as the
intervention in Syria and interference in political processes in Europe and the United States.
These actions have even resurrected talk of a new Cold War.70
Although Russian foreign policy has been increasingly active, observers note that the principles
guiding it have been largely consistent since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. One principle is
to reestablish Russia as the center of political gravity for the post-Soviet region and to minimize
the military and political influence of rival powers, particularly NATO and more recently the EU.
A second principle is to establish Russia as one of a handful of dominant poles in global politics,
capable in particular of competing (and, where necessary, cooperating) with the United States.
Beyond these fundamentals, debates exist on a number of related issues. Such issues include
whether strong responses by outside powers can deter Russian aggression or whether these
responses run a risk of escalating conflict; how much states that disagree with Russia on key
issues can cooperate with Moscow; whether the Russian government is primarily implementing a
strategic vision or reacting to circumstances and the actions of others; and the extent to which the
Russian leadership takes actions abroad to strengthen its domestic position.

Russia and Other Post-Soviet States
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, one fundamental goal of Russian foreign policy has been
to retain and, where necessary, rebuild close ties with neighboring states that were once part of
the USSR. Many observers inside and outside Russia interpret this policy as laying claim to a
traditional sphere of influence. Although Russian policymakers avoid reference to a sphere of
influence, they have used comparable terms at various times. In the early 1990s, Russia’s foreign
minister and other officials employed the term near abroad to describe Russia’s post-Soviet
neighbors, and in 2008 President (and current Prime Minister) Dmitry Medvedev referred to
Russia’s neighbors as constituting a “region” where Russia has “privileged interests.”71
The original mechanism for reintegrating the post-Soviet states was the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), which was established by the Presidents of Russia, Belarus, and
Ukraine in December 1991. The CIS includes as members or participants all post-Soviet states
except the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all now NATO and EU members) and
Georgia.72 The organization has had limited success in promoting regional integration, however.

70

See, for example, Dmitri Trenin, “Welcome to Cold War II,” Foreign Policy, March 4, 2014, at
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/04/welcome-to-cold-war-ii, and James Stavridis, “Are We Entering a New Cold
War?,” Foreign Policy, February 17, 2016, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/17/are-we-entering-a-new-cold-warrussia-europe.
71
William Safire, “On Language: The Near Abroad,” New York Times, May 22, 1994, at http://www.nytimes.com/
1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html; Economist, “Medvedev on Russia’s Interests,” September 1,
2008, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2008/09/medvedev_on_russias_interests.
72
The full members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Neither Turkmenistan nor Ukraine signed the CIS charter in
1993, although both countries participate in the organization (Turkmenistan considers itself an “associate member”).
Georgia withdrew from the CIS after its 2008 war with Russia.

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Russia has had relatively more success developing multilateral relations with a narrower circle of
states. In recent years, Russia has mainly accomplished this aim via two institutions: the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a security alliance that includes Russia,
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU), an evolving single market that includes all CSTO members except Tajikistan (a
prospective candidate).73
Current members of these organizations mostly have joined voluntarily, if not always
enthusiastically.74 Their goals in joining have been diverse. Although these aims could include the
facilitation of trade and investment, as well as protection against a variety of external threats
(including terrorism and drug trafficking), they also may include a desire to accommodate Russia,
ensure opportunities for labor migration, promote intergovernmental subsidies, and bolster regime
security.
Russia dominates both the CSTO and the EEU. It has around 75% of the EEU’s total population,
approximately 85% of EEU members’ total GDP, and more than 95% of CSTO members’ military
expenditures.75 Russia maintains active bilateral economic, security, and political relations with
CSTO and EEU member states, and observers often consider these bilateral ties to be of greater
significance than Russia’s multilateral relations within these two institutions. Russia’s main
military facilities in CSTO member states consist of bases in Tajikistan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan
and radar stations in Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Russia’s relations with its CSTO and EEU partners are not always smooth. In addition to
expressing differences over the principles and rules of the two institutions, Russia’s closest
partners have been reluctant to bind themselves entirely to Russia on matters of foreign policy
and economic development. None of them followed Russia’s lead in recognizing Georgia’s
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states in 2008. Russia secured
relatively greater support from partners in its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. In March
2014, Armenia and Belarus voted with Russia (and eight other states) to reject United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 68/262, which affirmed Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In
December 2016, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voted with Russia (and 19 other states) to
reject UNGA Resolution 71/205, which “condemn[ed] the temporary occupation” of Crimea and
reaffirmed nonrecognition of its annexation.76

73

For more on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), see CRS In Focus IF10309, Eurasian Economic Union, by
(name redacted) .
74
The most visible reluctance concerned Armenia’s membership in the EEU. The Armenian government, which was
planning to conclude an association agreement with the EU, abruptly reversed course and declared its intent to join the
EEU after a meeting of the Russian and Armenian presidents in September 2013. Kyrgyz President Almazbek
Atambayev referred to EEU membership as “the lesser of two evils.” TASS, “No Option for Kyrgyzstan But to Join
Customs Union—Kyrgyzstan President,” October 27, 2014, at http://tass.com/economy/756666.
75
Stratfor, “Why the Eurasian Union Will Never Be the EU,” September 17, 2016, at https://www.stratfor.com/
analysis/why-eurasian-union-will-never-be-eu; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure
Database (2015), at https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex.
76
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 68/262 passed 100-11, with 58 abstentions. Kazakhstan abstained, whereas
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were absent. Resolution 71/205 passed 73-23, with 76 abstentions, including by Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. U.N. General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/262, “Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” March 27, 2014,
at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/262; U.N. General Assembly Resolution
A/RES/71/205, “Situation of Human Rights in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol
(Ukraine),” December 19, 2016, at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/71/205. The voting
records are available at, respectively, https://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/middleeast/voting.pdf, and
http://www.un.org/en/ga/third/71/docs/voting_sheets/L.26.pdf.

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Russia’s partners also have cultivated strong ties with other countries. Kazakhstan, in particular,
has developed strong relations with China and the West, particularly in the energy sector. China is
the largest trading partner of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although Armenia and Belarus have
close bilateral relations with Russia in the security and economic spheres, they also have
established economic ties to Europe, and Belarus’s authoritarian leader Alexander Lukashenko
periodically criticizes Russia for what he considers unfair bilateral trading practices and strongarm diplomacy. Both Armenia and Kazakhstan have established institutional partnerships with
NATO; Armenia is a troop contributor to the NATO-led Kosovo Force and Resolute Support
Mission in Afghanistan. For more than 13 years, Kyrgyzstan hosted a major military base and
transit center for coalition troops fighting in Afghanistan.
Russia also has partnerships with three post-Soviet states that are not members of the CSTO or
the EEU: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These three states have opted to pursue
independent foreign policies and do not seek membership in Russian-led or other security and
economic blocs.77 Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are significant energy producers; they partner
with Russia but also have developed major alternative transit routes for oil (in Azerbaijan’s case)
and natural gas. In addition, Russia has cultivated a partnership with Uzbekistan, although the
latter competes with Kazakhstan for regional leadership in Central Asia and has long-standing
disputes with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Russia’s relations with Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have been the most difficult. These three
states have sought to cultivate close ties with the West. Georgia has consistently pursued NATO
membership and served as one of NATO’s closest nonallied partners in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Moldova and Ukraine are also close NATO partners.78 All three states have concluded association
agreements with the EU that include the establishment of free-trade areas and encourage
harmonization with EU laws and regulations.
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine also have territorial conflicts with Russia, which stations military
forces within these states’ territories without their consent (see Figure 4, below). Since the first
years of independence, Georgia and Moldova have confronted separatist regions supported by
Moscow (in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in Moldova, Transnistria). Following a steady
worsening of relations with Georgia, together with increasing clashes between Georgian and
separatist forces, Russia went to war with Georgia in August 2008 to prevent Georgia from
reestablishing control over South Ossetia. The war resulted in the expulsion of Georgian residents
and the destruction of their villages, as well as Russian recognition of the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia has periodically imposed embargoes on key imports from Georgia
and Moldova, although both states have managed to partially normalize relations with Russia.
Moldova’s current president, Igor Dodon, seeks to reorient Moldova closer to Russia, although
his formal powers to do so are relatively limited in Moldova’s political system.

77

Turkmenistan is constitutionally neutral. Uzbekistan was a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization
from 2006 to 2012. Azerbaijan contributes troops to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan.
78
At the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, NATO members agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would “become
members of NATO.” In 2010, Ukraine adopted a “non-bloc” (i.e., nonaligned) status, but its parliament rejected that
status in December 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine. NATO,
“Bucharest Summit Declaration,” April 3, 2008, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm; Steven
Pifer, “Ukraine Overturns Its Non-bloc Status: What Next with NATO?,” Kyiv Post, December 26, 2014, at
https://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/steven-pifer-ukraine-overturns-its-non-bloc-status-what-next-withnato-376208.html.

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Ukraine Conflict79
Many observers consider that of all the postSoviet states, Ukraine has been the most
difficult for Russia to accept as fully
independent.80 Even before 2014, the RussianUkrainian relationship suffered turbulence,
with disputes over Ukraine’s ties to NATO and
the EU, the status of Russia’s Crimea-based
Black Sea Fleet, and the transit of Russian
natural gas via Ukraine to Europe. Under
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych
(2010-2014), such disputes were largely
papered over. By the end of 2013, Yanukovych
appeared to make a decisive move toward
Russia, postponing the conclusion of an
association agreement with the EU and
agreeing to substantial financial assistance
from Moscow.
The decision to postpone Ukraine’s agreement
with the EU was a catalyst for the so-called
Euromaidan protests, which led to a
government crackdown on demonstrators,
violent clashes between protestors and
government forces, and eventually the demise
of the Yanukovych regime. Ukraine’s armed
conflict with Russia emerged soon after
Yanukovych fled to Russia in February 2014.
Moscow annexed Crimea the next month and
facilitated the rise of new separatist
movements in eastern Ukraine (the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions, together known as the
Donbas, see Figure 3). In late August 2014,
Russia stepped up support to separatists in
reaction to a new Ukrainian offensive.

Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions
1. Immediate and full bilateral cease-fire.
2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides.
3. Effective international monitoring regime.
4. Dialogue on (a) modalities of local elections in
accordance with Ukrainian legislation and (b) the future
status of certain districts in Donetsk and Luhansk.
5. Pardon and amnesty via a law forbidding persecution
and punishment of persons involved in the conflict.
6. Release of all hostages and other illegally detained
people based on a principle of “all for all.”
7. Safe delivery of humanitarian aid to those in need,
based on an international mechanism.
8. Restoration of full social and economic links with
affected areas.
9. Restoration of full Ukrainian control over its border
with Russia alongside the conflict zone, beginning from
the first day after local elections and ending after the
introduction of a new constitution and permanent
legislation on the special status of districts in Donetsk
and Luhansk.
10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, weapons,
and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory and
disarmament of all illegal groups.
11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, including
decentralization and permanent legislation on the special
status of districts in Donetsk and Luhansk.
12. Local elections in districts of Donetsk and Luhansk,
to be agreed upon with representatives of those districts
and held according to OSCE standards.
13. Intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact
Group (Ukraine, Russia, OSCE), including through
working groups on implementation of the Minsk
agreements.

In September 2014, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine, together with separatist
representatives, negotiated a cease-fire agreement, the Minsk Protocol (named after the city
where it was reached). However, the protocol failed to end fighting or prompt a political
resolution to the crisis.
The parties met again in February 2015 and reached a more detailed cease-fire agreement known
as Minsk-2. This agreement mandates a total cease-fire, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and
79

This section draws on CRS Report RL33460, Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) .
In 2008, a Russian newspaper alleged that Putin told President George W. Bush “that Ukraine is not even a state.
What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us.” James Marson, “Putin
to the West: Hands off Ukraine,” Time, May 25, 2009, at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,1900838,00.html. The original article was published in Kommersant, April 7, 2008 (in Russian), at
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/877224.
80

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foreign troops and fighters, and full Ukrainian control over its border with Russia, among other
provisions (see “Summary of Minsk-2 Provisions” box).
Figure 3. Separatist Regions in Eastern Ukraine

Sources: Graphic produced by CRS. Map information generated by (name redacted) using data from the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (2016), the Department of State (2015), and geographic data companies
Esri (2014) and DeLorme (2014).

To date, most observers perceive that little has been achieved in implementing the provisions of
Minsk-2, despite commitments made by all sides. Although the conflict’s intensity has subsided at
various times, a new round of serious fighting arose at the end of January 2017 and lasted for
several days. As of mid-May 2017, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
estimated that the conflict had led to at least 10,090 combat and civilian fatalities.81
Moscow officially denies Russia’s involvement in the conflict outside of Crimea, where there are
an estimated 28,000-29,000 Russian troops; most observers agree, however, that Russia has
unofficially deployed troops to fight, helped recruit Russian “volunteers,” and supplied Donbas

81

The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that this figure includes at least 2,777
civilian deaths (including the 298 individuals who died in the July 17, 2014, shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight
17). Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: 16
February 2017 to 15 May 2017, pp. 2, 7, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UAReport18th_EN.pdf.

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separatists with weapons and armed vehicles.82 Estimates of the number of Russian troops in
eastern Ukraine have declined since their height in 2015.83 In March 2017 testimony to a Senate
Appropriations Subcommittee, Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin said that
there were now about 4,200 Russian troops in the region (together with around 40,000 militants,
presumably a combination of local and Russian fighters).84

NATO-Russia Relations85
The Ukraine conflict has heightened long-standing tensions between NATO and Russia. Three
days after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, then-NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh
Rasmussen declared that NATO could “no longer do business as usual with Russia.”86
Accordingly, Russian actions in Ukraine resulted in a series of actions by NATO and its members
intended to counter Moscow and to reassure Central and Eastern European allies that NATO will
protect them against potential future acts of Russian aggression.
Even before the Ukraine conflict, post-Cold War efforts to build a cooperative NATO-Russia
partnership had at best mixed results. Allies sought to assure a suspicious and skeptical Russia
that NATO did not pose a security threat or seek to exclude Russia from Europe. The principal
institutional mechanism for NATO-Russia relations is the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which
was established in May 2002, five years after the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act provided the
formal basis for bilateral cooperation. Recognizing that NATO and Russia face many of the same
global challenges and share similar strategic priorities, Russian and NATO leaders structured the
NRC as a forum of equal member states, with goals that included political dialogue on security
issues, the determination of common approaches, and the conduct of joint operations.87 Formal
meetings of the NRC were suspended in April 2014 and resumed in 2016.
Prior to the suspension over events in Ukraine, NATO and Russia had identified a number of
areas for cooperation. In 2010, they endorsed a Joint Review of 21st Century Security Challenges,
intended to serve as a platform for cooperation.88 The review identified several common security
82

For a recent official Ukrainian estimate of the size and composition of the Russian military force in Crimea, see
Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries, hearings, 115th Cong., 1st sess.,
March 7, 2017. Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5056818. For additional
background on Russia’s militarization of Crimea, see Reuters, “In Crimea, Russia Signals Military Resolve with New
and Revamped Bases,” November 1, 2016, and Dave Gilbert and Fred Pleitgen, “Russia Puts on Show of Military
Strength in Crimea,” CNN, September 9, 2016.
83
In March 2015, a few weeks after the Minsk-2 peace agreement was signed, the U.S. Army Europe Commander,
Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, estimated that there were around 12,000 Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Reuters,
“Some 12,000 Russian Soldiers in Ukraine Supporting Rebels: U.S. Commander,” March 3, 2015. One detailed study
of the Russian military presence in Ukraine and combat deaths is James Miller et al., An Invasion by Any Other Name:
The Kremlin’s Dirty War in Ukraine, The Interpreter (Institute of Modern Russia), September 2016, at
http://www.interpretermag.com/an-invasion-by-any-other-name-the-kremlins-dirty-war-in-ukraine/.
84
Testimony of Pavlo Klimkin, in U.S. Congress, Russian Policies & Intentions Toward Specific European Countries,
March 7, 2017.
85
This section draws on CRS Report R43478, NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in
Central and Eastern Europe, coordinated by (name redacted)
, and CRS Report R44550, NATO’s Warsaw Summit: In Brief,
by (name redacted)
.
86
NATO, “A Strong NATO in a Changed World,” speech by NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the
Brussels Forum, March 21, 2014, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_108215.htm.
87
NATO, “NATO-Russia Council,” April 15, 2016, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm.
88
NATO, “NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement,” November 20, 2010, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_68871.htm.

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challenges, including instability in Afghanistan, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. In the past, observers highlighted operations related to Afghanistan as a key
example of enhanced NATO-Russia cooperation. From 2009, Russia allowed the transit over its
territory (via air and land) of cargo for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. In partnership with the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Russia and
NATO member states also jointly trained Afghan, Pakistani, and Central Asian counternarcotics
officers, with a view toward reducing narcotics transit to and through Russia. In 2011, NATO and
Russia established a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund to provide maintenance training and
spare parts for Afghanistan’s Russian-produced helicopters.89
Nonetheless, disagreements within the alliance and between NATO and Russia persisted on some
core issues. In particular, although a 2010 agreement to pursue cooperation on missile defense
was seen as a significant breakthrough, ensuing negotiations were marked by disagreement and
increasingly vocal Russian opposition to NATO plans.
After Russia’s actions in Ukraine, NATO moved to implement what its leadership characterized
as the greatest reinforcement of NATO’s collective defense since the end of the Cold War.90
Measures taken to reassure allies in Central and Eastern Europe and to deter further Russian
aggression include the following:








New Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational combat battalions
of about 1,000-1,200 troops each in Poland and the three Baltic states. The four
battalions, in operation since early 2017, are led by the United Kingdom (in
Estonia), Canada (Latvia), Germany (Lithuania), and the United States (Poland).
Significant increase in NATO military exercises in Central and Eastern Europe
and a bolstered naval and air presence, including through NATO’s Baltic Air
Policing mission.
Expansion of the NATO Response Force (NRF)—a multinational defense
force—from 13,000 to 40,000 troops and creation of a new rapid-reaction Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) within the NRF of approximately 5,000
ground forces capable of deploying at short notice.
New command-and-control capacities in Central and Eastern Europe, including
multinational headquarters in Poland and Romania.

The United States has been a key architect of and contributor to NATO’s reassurance and
deterrence initiatives, and it has sought to bolster U.S. force posture in Europe in response to
Russian actions. The enhanced U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe—dubbed Operation
Atlantic Resolve—has primarily consisted of increased rotational deployments of air, ground, and
naval assets and a significant increase in military exercises.91 To fund these increased U.S.
military activities, Congress appropriated around $5.2 billion from FY2015 to FY2017 for a new
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI, also referred to as the European Deterrence Initiative). In
89

NATO, “NATO-Russia Counter-Narcotics Training Reaches Milestone,” April 19, 2012, at http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/news_86310.htm; NATO, “NATO-Russia Council Expands Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project for
Afghanistan,” April 23, 2013, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_100106.htm.
90
For details, see NATO, “Boosting NATO’s Presence in the East and Southeast,” updated August 11, 2017, at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm; NATO, “NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence,” fact sheet,
May 2017, at http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf; NATO, “NATO
Response Force,” updated January 16, 2017, at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm.
91
For details on Operation Atlantic Resolve, see the Department of Defense’s OAR website at http://www.defense.gov/
home/features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/.

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its proposed FY2018 budget, the Trump Administration requested $4.8 billion for ERI, a 40%
increase over the Obama Administration’s FY2017 request.
Recent Air and Sea Incidents
Since 2014, Russia has adopted an increasingly aggressive posture with its air and sea patrols and military exercises.
According to the Lithuanian Defense Ministry, for example, NATO fighter jets scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft
nearing or, in some cases, entering Baltic countries’ airspace 140 times in 2014, 160 times in 2015, and 110 times in
2016. A 2014 report by the European Leadership Network provided a list of selected “high risk” or “serious”
incidents during that year, including the following:


In March 2014, a Russian military reconnaissance aircraft flying with its transponder switched off to avoid
commercial radar came within 100 meters of colliding with an SAS 737 passenger plane taking off from
Copenhagen. Another similar episode occurred in December 2014.

On four separate instances during 2014, Russian fighter aircraft intercepted U.S. and Swedish reconnaissance
aircraft.

In April 2014, an unarmed Russian fighter aircraft made 12 low-altitude passes of the destroyer USS Donald Cook
in the Black Sea, coming within 1,000 meters at an altitude of 150 meters. In September 2014, Russian fighters
flew within 300 meters of the Canadian frigate HCMS Toronto in the Black Sea.

In June 2014, Russian aircraft approached the Danish island of Bornholm in what appeared to be a simulated
attack. In September 2014, Russian aircraft over the Labrador Sea practiced cruise-missile attacks against the U.S.
mainland and Russian aircraft violated Swedish airspace while conducting a mock bombing run.

In September 2014, Russian officials detained a Lithuanian shipping vessel operating in international waters in the
Barents Sea and towed it to Murmansk.

A “massive outburst” of Russian air activity occurred along NATO’s borders in October 2014 in conjunction
with a large Russian military aviation exercise.
Selected reported incidents from 2015 to 2017 include the following:


In June 2015, six unarmed SU-24s flew 500 meters from the destroyer USS Ross in international waters in the
Black Sea.

In October 2015, U.S. fighter aircraft intercepted two TU-142 reconnaissance/antisubmarine aircraft that
reportedly came within one nautical mile of the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan east of the Korean peninsula.

In January 2016, an SU-27 reportedly came within 5 meters of a U.S. RC-135 over the Black Sea.

On two occasions in April 2016, SU-27s came within 15-25 meters of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft in
international airspace over the Baltic Sea and reportedly performed a barrel roll over the top of the U.S. aircraft.

On two other occasions in April 2016, Russian SU-24 bombers made several low-altitude passes of the USS
Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea, reportedly coming within 10 meters of colliding with the ship.

In September 2016, an SU-27 fighter aircraft intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 conducting routine operations in
international airspace over the Black Sea, reportedly coming within 3 meters of a collision at one point.

In September 2016, fighter jets from Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and Spain consecutively
intercepted two TU-160 bombers that flew near Norway and onward near the UK, Ireland, France, and Spain.

In February 2017, an SU-24 fighter aircraft flew within 200 meters of the USS Porter guided missile destroyer in
the Black Sea. Another two SU-24 aircraft and an IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft also flew near the destroyer.

In April and May 2017, U.S. fighter aircraft intercepted Russian Tu-95 bombers, IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft,
and Su-35 fighter aircraft near Alaska in five separate incidents, including on four consecutive days in April. These
were reportedly the first such flights since 2015.

In May 2017, an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within approximately 6 meters of a U.S. Navy P-8 surveillance plane
over the Black Sea. Despite the close distance (around 20 feet), a U.S. Navy spokesperson characterized the
encounter as “safe and professional.”

In June 2017, an SU-27 fighter aircraft flew within 1.5 meters (5 feet) of a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft
over the Baltic Sea in an encounter a U.S. official referred to as “unsafe.”
Sources: Damien Sharkov, “NATO: Russian Aircraft Intercepted 110 Times Above Baltic in 2016,” Newsweek,
January 4, 2017; European Leadership Network, “Dangerous Brinkmanship: Close Military Encounters Between Russia
and the West in 2014,” November 2014; and European Leadership Network, “Russia-West Dangerous Brinkmanship
Continues,” March 12, 2015; additional media reports (full citation information available from the author).
Note: Prepared with (name redacted), Analyst in European Affairs
.

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EU-Russia Relations92
Like NATO, the EU has had to reconsider its relationship with a more assertive Russia and the
implications for European security and stability. Especially after the July 2014 shootdown of
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine, the EU closely coordinated with the United States in
imposing sanctions on Russia (see “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” below). Even after the imposition
of sanctions, Russia is the EU’s fourth-largest trade partner (behind the United States, China, and,
since 2015, Switzerland) and main supplier of natural gas (see Table 2, above).
Crafting common EU policies has been challenging, given various EU member states’ different
national histories and economic relations with Russia. Many in the EU have long advocated for a
pragmatic “strategic partnership” with Russia based largely on commercial and energy ties, as
well as practical cooperation on certain foreign policy issues. Others, such as Poland and the
Baltic states, by contrast, have tended to view Russia more as a potential threat to themselves and
their neighbors.
The sharpness of such divisions within the EU appeared to diminish before 2014, but Russia’s
annexation of Crimea caused a distinct shift in perceptions across the board. Pragmatists moved
more into alignment with those who have tended to view Russia with greater wariness.
Furthermore, many in Europe have expressed concern about Russia’s efforts to expand its
influence on the continent by other than military means. Media reports and outside experts
contend that the Russian government is seeking to influence European political discourse,
policymaking, and electoral processes with an array of tools. Such measures reportedly have
included the use of disinformation, the spread of fake news, cyberattacks on government or
political party computer systems, and the cultivation of relations with European political parties
and allies broadly sympathetic to Russian views. Efforts by the Russian government to influence
Europe’s political landscape appear aimed at sowing disunity and destabilizing the EU and
NATO.
In recent years, a new and increasingly evident ideological link has appeared between European
far-right parties and the Russian leadership.93 Most of these far-right parties tend to be
antiestablishment and anti-EU, and they often share some combination of extreme nationalism; a
commitment to “law and order” and traditional family values; and anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic,
or anti-Islamic sentiments. A few parties on the left or far left also appear to harbor more friendly
views toward Russia.
Concrete evidence of direct financial support from the Russian government to European political
parties is difficult to identify. Widespread speculation exists, however, that the Russian
government has funneled money through Russian banks or other organizations and individuals to
far-right parties in Europe. Many suggest that Russia also has been proactive in offering
organizational expertise, political know-how, and media assistance to parties on Europe’s far
right. Russian support reportedly has included establishing and coordinating pro-Russian parties,
nongovernmental civil organizations, and think tanks, and supporting friendly media outlets.94
92

This section was coauthored with (name redacted), Specialist in European Affairs. Also see
CRS Report R44249, The
European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects, by (name redacted).
93
See, for example, Dalibor Rohac, Edit Zgut, and Lorant Gyori, Populism in Europe and Its Russian Love Affair,
American Enterprise Institute, January 2017, at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Populism-in-Europeand-Its-Russian-Love-Affair.pdf; and Alina Polyakova et al., The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses, Atlantic Council,
November 2016, at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/kremlin-trojan-horses.
94
Political Capital Institute, The Russian Connection: The Spread of Pro-Russian Policies on the European Far Right,
(continued...)

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Many experts note that the Russian government under Putin has become very sophisticated in its
efforts to exert influence in Europe. At the same time, analysts point out that many European
countries have been dealing with Russian disinformation

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44775. Public record. Not legal advice.