# U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization: Background and Issues for Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44103

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** June 24, 2015
- **Citation:** R44103

## Text

U.S. Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile Sustainment, Modernization, and
Recapitalization: Background and Issues for
Congress
-name redactedUS Air Force Fellow
June 24, 2015

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R44103

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Summary
Determining the future role of U.S. nuclear weapons within the U.S. national security strategy is
currently a topic of much debate. Many senior leaders are determined to design a strategy that
defines a new role for U.S. nuclear weapons and makes those weapons responsive and relevant in
today’s global threat environment. The current U.S. nuclear enterprise consists of a triad of
options: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
(SLBMs), and long-range bombers. All three legs of the nuclear triad are aging, since they were
largely built to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Policymakers in Congress and the
Executive Branch are now deciding whether to modernize or replace parts of each leg.
The Obama Administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines its approach to
reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while
simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. In his April 2009 speech in Prague,
President Obama highlighted the current nuclear dangers in the global environment and declared
the United States will “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The
Nuclear Posture Review provides the roadmap for implementing President Obama’s agenda for
reducing nuclear risks to the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the international
community.
This raises several issues for Congress particularly regarding the Triad’s ICBM component. First,
Congress may consider whether the current plans for the nuclear enterprise are sufficient to
address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be other ways to sustain the
current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States should continue to
deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of expected financial
constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with
each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources. Finally, Congress may
address questions about whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment and
modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges.

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Current U.S. Nuclear Force Structure .............................................................................................. 2
Strategic Nuclear Submarines ................................................................................................... 3
Long-Range Strategic Bombers................................................................................................. 3
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles ............................................................................................. 4
Modernizing the ICBM Force.......................................................................................................... 5
ICBM Modernization Options ................................................................................................... 6
Addressing Operational Issues in the Current ICBM Force ............................................................ 8
Internal Review ......................................................................................................................... 9
External Review ...................................................................................................................... 10
Three Challenges with the Nuclear Force ............................................................................... 11
The Cheating Issues .......................................................................................................... 11
ICBM Combat Crew Duty ................................................................................................ 11
Creating a ‘Real’ Nuclear Enterprise................................................................................. 12
Funding the Nuclear Enterprise ............................................................................................... 13
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 13
Are Current Plans to Sustain the Nuclear Enterprise Appropriate and Adequate? .................. 13
Should the ICBM Force be Modernized in an Era of Fiscal Constraint? ................................ 16
The Cost of Modernization ............................................................................................... 16
What Role Would a Modernized ICBM Force Play in National Defense? ............................. 18
Should ICBMs Be Sustained in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty? ........................................... 19
Emerging Nuclear Threats................................................................................................. 20
Strategic Security Challenges with Russia and China ....................................................... 20

Figures
Figure 1. Minuteman III Acquisition Investment, FY1992-FY2001 and FY2012-FY2016
(FYDP) ......................................................................................................................................... 7
Figure 2. Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Minimums and Maximums for Four Potential ICBM
Future Force Options, FY2012-FY2050....................................................................................... 8

Tables
Table 1. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function ........................... 17

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 22

Congressional Research Service

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Introduction
The United States is currently facing two key challenges related to the U.S. intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) force. The first is sustainment of the current force and the
implementation of needed improvements in operations and support. The second is the planned
modernization of the ICBM force, including building new weapons, expected in the late 2020s.
Both would likely necessitate increased funding, but the Budget Control Act (BCA) limits
funding for the Department of Defense (DOD) through 2021. Moreover, the United States also
plans to modernize other components of its nuclear forces during the 2020s, which would also
likely necessitate further significant increases in spending in the 2020s. Congress has a key role in
any decisions related to these issues.
The discussion about whether to modernize or replace the ICBM force is a significant part of the
national debate about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons. Supporters argue that ICBMs have been
the cornerstone of the U.S. nuclear force posture since the 1960s, when the U.S. fielded the first
Minuteman III missile.1 While deterrence in the 21st century is more difficult for the U.S. than it
was in the past, having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with new challenges is still
seen as crucial.2 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identifies a variety of emerging
situations in which ICBMs might play a role in deterring adversaries, stabilizing regions and
reassuring allies and partners.3 Both Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the U.S. relationship with China is evolving, North Korea has developed nuclear
weapons, and Iran has pursued a nuclear program that may eventually provide a weapon
capability.4 The United States also continues to extend deterrence to allies and partner nations
with a “credible U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella.’”5 Thus, according to many observers, the United States
would need to sustain and modernize its ICBM force to manage challenges in the new global
security and threat environment.
While long-range nuclear bombers and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) are
relatively concentrated in location (and therefore may be vulnerable to attack), the size,
protection, and dispersion of ICBM forces makes them virtually impossible to destroy short of an
all-out nuclear attack. Additionally, since an ICBM force can only be crippled by a large and
unmistakable nuclear attack, land-based ICBMs can provide clarity about when a country is under
attack and who the attacker is.6
Others, however, argue that ICBMs are a relic of the Cold War and play little or no role in helping
the United States meet “21st century security challenges.”7 Further, they argue that, in an era of
1
Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, and Christopher A. Mouton, et al., The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile Force, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2014, p. 13, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
MG1210.html.
2
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs,
Nov/Dec 2009.
3
Ibid., p. 1.
4
Ibid., p. 1.
5
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 12.
6
Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,
and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/
publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.
7
Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission Report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and
(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

1

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

constrained resources and declining defense budgets, U.S. security would be better served by
investing in new advanced conventional weapons than by sustaining and modernizing the ICBM
force.
Experts agree that the international security environment has changed dramatically since the end
of the Cold War. As President Obama noted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the
threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased.8
Some nations may be shifting their security strategy to rely more on nuclear weapons in an effort
to counter the U.S. conventional forces.9
The Nuclear Posture Review further noted that, “as long as nuclear weapons exist,” the United
States will sustain secure and effective nuclear forces. In this view, these nuclear forces will
continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and
partners around the world.10 In “A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century,” Clark Murdock writes,
“much like the United States in the 1950s when it faced massive Warsaw Pact conventional
forces, other states are increasing their reliance on nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons offset
conventional military superiority. When the U.S. military declares that it is seeking ‘full spectrum
dominance”, it simply reinforces the dependence of our would-be competitors on nuclear
weapons.”11
There are several issues for Congress. First, Congress may consider whether the current plans for
the nuclear enterprise (consisting of leadership, people and things that work on the nuclear
mission) are sufficient to address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be
other ways to sustain the current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States
should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of
expected financial constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs
will compete with each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources.
Finally, Congress may question whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment
and modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges.

Current U.S. Nuclear Force Structure
The U.S. nuclear force is a “Triad” consisting of strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
that carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the land-based ICBM force, and longrange bomber aircraft. Each leg of the triad has both strengths and weaknesses, leading some
analysts to recognize the complementary capabilities of the three legs. According to the Nuclear
Posture Review, “strategic nuclear submarines and the SLBMs they carry represent the most
survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad.” Some argue single-warhead ICBMs contribute to
stability, and like SLBMs are not vulnerable to air defenses. Unlike SLBMs and ICBMs, bombers
(...continued)
Posture, May 2012, p. 5, at http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf.
8
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 4.
9
Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,
p. 16.
10
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. v.
11
Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,
p. 16.

Congressional Research Service

2

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

can be visibly forward deployed, as a signal in crisis to strengthen deterrence of potential
adversaries and assurance to allies and partners.12 Others contend that, because each leg of the
triad contributes unique attributes that enhance deterrence and reduce risk, together they comprise
a robust deterrent that complicates a potential adversary’s offensive and defensive planning. In
this view, they provide a “synergistic force” that provides protection against the failure of any
single one of its legs. As a result, many analysts believe that these complementary capabilities
justify retaining all three legs for the foreseeable future.

Strategic Nuclear Submarines
The ballistic missile submarine force has been a part of the U.S. nuclear deterrent since the 1960s.
Experts argue that the SSBN leg of the Triad provides the United States with its most survivable
and enduring nuclear strike capability because they serve as an undetectable launch platform for
intercontinental missiles. The United States Navy currently deploys 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, with
12 available for deployment at any given time.13 Seven are based in Bangor, Washington, and
patrol in the Pacific Ocean, while five are based in Kings Bay, Georgia, and patrol in the Atlantic
Ocean. These submarines carry a total of 288 Trident II D5 SLBMs, each of which can carry up
to eight nuclear warheads. The Ohio-class submarines have a service life of 42 years—2 20-year
cycles with a 2-year mid-life nuclear refueling.
The Ohio-class SSBNs were first deployed in 1981 and are to reach the end of their planned
service life at a rate of approximately one boat per year between 2027 and 2040. The Navy plans
to replace each retiring boat, starting in 2031, with a new class of ballistic missile submarine,
referred to as the SSBNX, or the Ohio-class replacement. The Navy originally planned to begin
using the replacement boats in 2029, but in 2012 the Pentagon announced a two-year delay to the
SSBNX program. This would push back completion of the first SSBNX to 2031.14 The FY2015
budget includes $1.4 billion for the Ohio-replacement program.
The Navy is also modernizing the Trident II D5 SLBMs with which both boats are armed. They
are planned to remain in the arsenal until 2042. The FY2016 budget includes $1.2 billion for this
Trident II Life Extension Program (LEP).15

Long-Range Strategic Bombers
The United States currently bases 18 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base in
Missouri, and 76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers at Minot Air Force Base, ND, and Barksdale Air
Force Base, LA, that can be equipped for nuclear missions. The B-2 bombers are equipped to
carry B61 gravity bombs, while the B-52s can deliver gravity bombs or nuclear-armed airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

12

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. p. 22.
Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
USNuclearModernization.
14
For details on the Ohio-replacement program, see CRS Report R41129, Navy Ohio Replacement (SSBN[X]) Ballistic
Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
15
Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
USNuclearModernization.
13

Congressional Research Service

3

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Some analysts attribute a number of advantages to the strategic bomber leg of the triad. Unlike
land- or sea-based missiles, bombers can be recalled after launch. Bombers can launch quickly
from their bases in an effort to survive a nuclear first strike. U.S. bombers also carry the nuclear
weapons with the lowest yield, which means they offer a more diverse range of less devastating
options for the President.16
The Air Force is developing a new long-range penetrating bomber with nuclear capabilities,
known as the LRS-B. The 2012 Aircraft Procurement Plan anticipates a procurement of 80-100
bombers at an estimated per unit cost of $550 million, for a total of $40-60 billion. The
Pentagon’s FY2014 budget includes $359 million for research and development of the bomber.
The Air Force plans to spend $32.1 billion over the next ten years on research and development of
the new bomber.17 The Air Force has also begun development of a new nuclear-armed cruise
missile, known as the LRSO, which would replace the existing ALCM after 2030 and allow the
bomber force to launch stand-off weapons in future contingencies.
In addition to developing a new long-range bomber, the Air Force is also modernizing the current
B-2 fleet. These aircraft became operational in 1997 and have a planned service life of six
decades. In order to continue delivering long-range direct attack munitions in an anti-access
environment, the B-2 will need upgrades in communication, offensive, and defensive systems.
According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon is to invest over $1 billion over the next
five years on upgrades for the B-2 survivability and mission effectiveness.18

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The United States Air Force currently bases 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, with 150 each located at
F.E. Warren Air Force Base, WY; Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT; and Minot Air Force Base,
ND. In order to meet warhead levels set by START II, the U.S. permanently reduced the number
of warheads in all Minuteman III missiles from three warheads to a single warhead.19 The Air
Force plans to retain 400 ICBMs as the United States reduces its forces under the 2010 New
START Treaty. Many observers have noticed that, because these ICBMs are geographically
dispersed in hardened, underground silos, the ICBMs would be difficult for any adversary to
destroy in an attack on the United States. ICBMs are also cited as the “promptest leg of the triad,
offering the U.S. the ability to launch a nuclear attack more quickly than the other two legs.”20
Over the past 15 years, the Air Force has pursued several programs that are designed to improve
the accuracy and reliability of the Minuteman fleet and to support the operational capability of the
Minuteman ICBM through 2030. These programs have addressed aging and technology issues in
16

Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,
and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/
publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.
17
Arms Control Association, U.S. Nuclear Modernization Fact Sheet, at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
USNuclearModernization.
18
Ibid.
19
Federation of American Scientists, LGM-30 Minuteman III, February 17, 2015, at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/
lgm-30_3.htm.
20
Kingston Reif, Travis Sharp, and Kirk Bansak, Pruning the Nuclear Triad? Pros and Cons of Submarines, Bombers,
and Missiles, The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 16, 2013, at http://armscontrolcenter.org/
publications/factsheets/051613_nuclear_triad_pros_cons/.

Congressional Research Service

4

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

the missiles’ propulsion, guidance, and reentry vehicle systems.21 Currently, the Air Force is
pursuing the ICBM fuse modernization program, which is to replace the current MK21 warhead
fuse so that the missiles can operate through 2030. The Air Force plans to procure 693
modernized fuses for the Minuteman fleet, at a cost of $830 million. It has requested $13.7
million for this program in FY2016, and expects to spend around $65 million through 2020.22 The
Air Force is also funding, through its RDT&E budget, a number of programs under the ICBM
demonstration and validation (Dem/Val) title that would allow it to create technologies that might
support both the existing Minuteman fleet and the future ICBM program (known as the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent.).

Modernizing the ICBM Force
In October 2010, the Air Force produced an ICBM Master Plan that outlined its approach to
sustaining and modernizing the Minuteman (MM) force. This report indicated that the Air Force
would sustain the Minuteman III missiles through 2030 and deploy a follow-on system after
2030.23
The plan states that “beginning in 2020, large-scale investment will be required to sustain MM III
through 2030. These modernization efforts must support both sustainment through 2030 and
recapitalization for a Minuteman Follow-on after 2030.”24 Also stated is “MM III sustainment
funding must continue until Initial Operational Capability (IOC)25 of a new or replacement
weapon system....”26 This is currently projected to occur in the Dem/Val program described
above.
The Air Force has reportedly decided to pursue a “hybrid” plan for the next generation ICBM. It
would maintain the basic design of the missile, the current communications system, and the
existing launch silos, but would replace the rocket motors, guidance sets, post-boost vehicles, and
re-entry systems. In other words, the Air Force would deploy a new missile in its existing
Minuteman infrastructure. Reports also indicate that, although this missile would be deployed in
fixed silos, the design would allow the missiles to be deployed on mobile launchers sometime in
the future.27 The Air Force has requested $75 million for this program in FY2016, but expects to
spend $945 million through FY2020.

21

For descriptions of these programs, see CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
Developments, and Issues, by (name redacted).
22
Air Force, RDT&E Budget Item Justification ICBM Fuze Modernization, pp. 1-9.
23
Jeffrey F. Smith, Brig Gen, U.S. Air Force, ICBM Master Plan, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command,
Barksdale AFB, LA, October 2010.
24
Ibid., p. 25.
25
IOC is described as the first attainment of the capability to effectively employ a weapon, item of equipment, or
system of approved specific characteristics that is manned or operated by an adequately trained, equipped, and
supported military unit or force per the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms from the DOD.
26
Jeffrey F. Smith, Brig Gen, U.S. Air Force, ICBM Master Plan, Headquarters Air Force Global Strike Command,
Barksdale AFB, LA, October 2010, p. 26.
27
Elaine Grossman, “Key Targeting Tech for Future U.S. Nuclear Missile has Gone Unfunded,” Nextgov.com, August
19, 2014.

Congressional Research Service

5

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

While the Air Force appears committed to pursuing the development of a new ground-based
strategic deterrent, there is growing recognition among analysts that fiscal constraints may alter
this approach.

ICBM Modernization Options
The RAND Corporation published a 2014 study that outlined six options to modernize the ICBM
force.28 System characteristics go from rather well defined and narrowly scoped to much broader
and ambiguous. The first two options, which would not replace the current Minuteman system,
would either continue basic sustainment until the system is ineffective or unsustainable or
continue indefinite incremental modernization (IIM) until the system is ineffective or
unsustainable. The last four options would replace the Minuteman with a new system, with
increasing levels of sophistication. These four options would
1. Acquire “Minuteman IV” (MM IV) (which RAND defines to be “Minuteman
III–like”). Replace the current system with one of similar capability and with a
virtually identical employment concept.
2. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM to be based in existing Minuteman silos with a
similar employment concept.
3. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM with an alternative basing scheme but using
existing U.S. Air Force military base infrastructure and footprint.
4. Acquire an all-new-design ICBM with an alternative basing scheme requiring use
of public lands or enhanced U.S. Air Force military base infrastructure and
footprint.29
Detailed analysis from the RAND study indicates that an “all-new ICBM system will likely cost
almost twice (and perhaps even three times) as much as incremental modernization and
sustainment of the Minuteman III system.” Specifically, the RAND study estimated that the
lifecycle costs for incrementally modernizing the Minuteman III would be $60 to $90 billion,
while a new silo-based ICBM would cost between $84 billion and $125 billion. Rail- and roadmobile versions would cost significantly more, from $124 billion to $219 billion. This
modernization program results in essentially a “new” missile that provides expanded targeting
options along with improved accuracy and survivability.
RAND found that the cost to replace the Minuteman force would likely be considerably lower
than the cost of upgrading and modernizing the current arsenal over the period of FY2012
through FY2050. The historical and projected future cost of maintaining the current Minuteman
force and the comparisons of modernization costs are illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

28

Lauren Caston, Robert S. Leonard, and Christopher A. Mouton, et al., The Future of the U.S. Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile Force, The RAND Corporation, Washington, DC, 2014, (hereinafter, RAND study) at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1210.html.
29
Entire section adapted from RAND study, p. 87.

Congressional Research Service

6

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Figure 1. Minuteman III Acquisition Investment, FY1992-FY2001 and
FY2012-FY2016 (FYDP)

Source: RAND Study 2014.
Note: Accumulated all costs associated with Minuteman III include acquisition costs and those for operations
and support (O&S). O&S costs include system-related operations and maintenance (O&M) and military
personnel (MilPers) expenditures.

Congressional Research Service

7

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Figure 2. Life-Cycle Cost Estimates Minimums and Maximums for Four Potential
ICBM Future Force Options, FY2012-FY2050

Source: RAND Study, 2014.
Note: This research was conducted in FY2011. In each case, life-cycle costs are shown as a stacked bar of the
four primary cost categories: RDT&E, procurement, MilCon, and O&S.

Addressing Operational Issues in the Current
ICBM Force
Ever since 2007, when crews at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota mistakenly loaded six
cruise missiles carrying nuclear warheads on B-52s, transported them to Barksdale Air Force
Base in Louisiana, and left them unguarded for 36 hours before anyone realized they were
missing, the Air Force has faced questions about morale and operations within its nuclear
enterprise. Studies completed at the time identified a number of issues plaguing the community,
including a disregard for safety and security rules and an overall sense of “lack of professional
pride.”30 Although the Air Force implemented a number of changes in its command structure and
operational procedures, new issues have emerged.
Specifically, in January 2014 the Air Force announced that it uncovered cheating on the monthly
proficiency exams required of missileers at the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base
in Montana. Reports of drug use among some airmen and morale problems at Air Force bases
renewed concerns with the state of the Air Force nuclear enterprise.31
30

Adam Lowther, A Year Later: Responding to Problems in the ICBM Force, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
February 2, 2015, at http://thebulletin.org/year-later-responding-problems-icbm-force7984.
31
Ibid.

Congressional Research Service

8

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

In response to these concerns, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel initiated two reviews, one
internal and one external to DOD. These reviews were not about nuclear warheads or nuclear
weapons, and the reviews did not focus on the U.S. nuclear force posture or policy. Rather, both
reviews focused on the people, systems, and infrastructure of the DOD to support the nuclear
triad. The internal review also focused on training, testing, command oversight, mission
performance, and investment. Thousands of personnel were interviewed, from officers to enlisted
personnel as well as civilians and contractors from across the armed services.32

Internal Review
The internal review disclosed systemic problems across the nuclear enterprise. In general, these
problems can be divided into several categories: “long-standing, known problems that remained
unaddressed and so became, over time, under-reported; known problems that were addressed but
the corrective actions made the problem worse (or created new problems); and problems that
were common knowledge in the field but which were never communicated to leadership.”33
The internal review found that the nuclear deterrent is safe, secure, and effective, today. However,
it said, action needs to be taken now to ensure that this remains the case in the future. The review
organized its inquiry, findings, and recommendation into four categories: personnel, inspections,
organization and investment.
In terms of personnel issues, the review identified issues with accountability, manning and skills
mix, career development, morale and recognition, the personnel reliability program, and security
forces. More specifically, there was a blurring of the lines between accountability and perfection
and a lack of promotion opportunities and a lack of a defined, sustainable career path for nuclear
officers in the Air Force. Also, the implementation of the personnel reliability program was found
to be burdensome, overly technical, and excessively risk-averse.
Regarding inspections, the review found that the nuclear enterprise is subject to a culture of
excessive inspections. In the Air Force, an additional issue is the demand for perfection at all
times and lack of a meaningful self-assessment program.
Regarding investment, the review surveyed an aging nuclear enterprise and determined that as the
infrastructure continues to age, sustainment will become increasingly more difficult, timeconsuming and expensive. Findings included the “lack of a ‘weapons system’ approach to the
ICBM force, leading to disparate and insufficient sustainment and investment decisions for
different system components; component issues resulting from an aging, unique, and small-sized
programs; and serious shortfalls in basic O&M requirements.”34

32

Department of State, Department of Defense Reforms to the NuclearEnterprise, November 14, 2014, at
http://fpc.state.gov/234084.htm.
33
Department of Defense, Summary of DOD Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
Summary-Internal-NER.pdf.
34
Summary of DOD Internal Nuclear Enterprise Review.

Congressional Research Service

9

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

External Review
The independent review was tasked with examining the nuclear deterrent mission in the
Departments of the Navy and the Air Force. The mission was to identify leadership, organization,
investment, morale, policy, procedural, and/or other shortcomings that adversely affected the
mission. The review team found the following:
•

There were significant disconnects between what the DOD and service leadership
expected and what the leadership did to empower the forces to meet those
expectations.

•

There were also disconnects between what leadership says and presumably
believes and what the sailors, airmen, and Marines who must execute the mission
actually experience.

•

The interpretation of how the personnel system measures adequacy of manning
differed from the total workload in the field associated with mission and other
demands.

•

Additional disconnects existed between the drive for efficiency in logistics
support and what those in the field experience in actually getting needed parts in
a timely manner.

•

Many divides existed between leadership and the forces on the quality of the
training.

•

Finally, there were serious inefficiencies noted from micromanagement,
excessive security demands, and the need to address a plethora of requirements
not directly contributing to the mission.35

The review team outlined several initiatives that could be instituted immediately at various levels
of leadership. The team recommended that the Secretary of Defense
•

Take back the nuclear mission with direct meetings with senior leaders to ensure
programs are in place and follow up on status.

•

Establish support programs and bring together the federated nuclear activities
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Air Force.

•

Establish the nuclear mission has first priority and ensure equal personnel,
logistics, and funding support to match.

•

Acknowledge problems have continued since additional focus has been placed on
the nuclear enterprise in 2007-2008.

•

Direct a move from a culture of micromanagement by commanders/supervisors
to a culture of empowerment of qualified people to do their work.

35
Larry D. Welch and John C. Harvey, Jr., Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise,
Department of Defense, June 2, 2014, p. 1, at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Independent-Nuclear-Enterprise-ReviewReport-30-June-2014.pdf.

Congressional Research Service

10

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

•

Hold senior leaders accountable and make it clear that individual behavior is a
matter of personal responsibility and that failure to meet performance is a
military discipline issue to be addressed by commanders.36

Over the course of the past year, the parallel reviews have provided Air Force leaders with almost
1,000 pages of observations and recommendations for the missile force. Based on this, the Air
Force has commenced a significant number of reforms that involve training, funding and
increasing staffing the missile force.37

Three Challenges with the Nuclear Force
The Cheating Issues
Cheating on tests in both the Navy and the Air Force raised questions about the integrity and
ethics of the personnel in the nuclear force. The incidents occurred despite Services cultures
placing a premium on integrity. The review team found that in both incidents the tests had
evolved from a focus on measuring task-based qualifications to career-defining events that had
direct, major impact on the professional futures of the participants.38 The cheating thus arose from
pressures associated with the testing program itself, according to the review’s authors. Most
missileers perceived these tests as important for career progression and believed that these tests
had a direct impact on their livelihood. The review recommended that Navy and Air Force senior
leadership ensure that training and skill testing should focus on measuring whether the person’s
knowledge is necessary and sufficient for the mission, but does not transform into a
counterproductive demand for higher grades.

ICBM Combat Crew Duty
The independent review raised two significant issues regarding Air Force missiles officers
assigned to ICBM combat crew duty: the intensity of the assignment itself, and the uncertainty
associated with the missileer career path. ICBM combat crew duty is complex and characterized
by high pressure to avoid errors in execution. Many officers on missile duty feel that the rewards
of such work are not commensurate with the effort required, despite the knowledge that the work
is vital to national security. Therefore, missile crews seek ways to minimize their exposure to
primary combat crew duty. One way to do so is to score high marks on proficiency examinations,
which can lead to designation as a crew instructor and a reduction in duty on missile alert. This
attitude is completely opposite to Air Force flight crews who are generally motivated to spend as
much time as possible performing crew duty in the air.39
Another issue is the long-term viability of the ICBM officer career. While the Air Force needs a
large number of junior officers on combat crews, it does not need as many in other ICBM-related
assignments such as instructors or working daily operations. Consequently, missileers must

36

Ibid., pp. 10-11.
A Year Later.
38
Welch and Harvey, p. 13.
39
Ibid., p. 15.
37

Congressional Research Service

11

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

anticipate either leaving the service after only one or two duty assignments or applying for a
significant change of career paths.
The review team offered several recommendations to overcome these issues. First, they
recommended that the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF)
should initiate a program to enhance recognition and reward for ICBM duty. This program would
address everything from narrowing choices for follow-on career paths, with a guarantee the
operators would get one of their three choices, to special pay incentives. The team also suggested
the Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command, should return full authority to Missile
Combat Crew Commanders for the execution of the duties of the crew and to hold them
accountable.40 Doing so would display trust in Mission Crew Commanders and afford them the
opportunity to train and test in their working environment.

Creating a ‘Real’ Nuclear Enterprise
A third issue that the review team uncovered was the absence of a “nuclear enterprise” across the
services and DOD. The “nuclear enterprise” consists of leadership, people and things that work
on the nuclear mission. The review team characterized the current nuclear activities across the
OSD, Joint Staff, Air Force, and Navy as a “loose federation of separate activities scattered across
multiple organizations without clarity in responsibility and accountability.”41
The team’s recommendations began with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint
Staff. During the Cold War, the Joint Staff had personnel with expertise on nuclear operational
and systems requirements, but this has atrophied over the past three decades. Up through the early
1990s, a triad of officials within the OSD looked across the whole of the nuclear enterprise:
•

The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy (ATSD/AE) was
responsible for the nuclear warheads and stockpile management on behalf of
DOD.

•

The Director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, within Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics (AT&L), was responsible for the development of new
nuclear platforms and weapons systems.

•

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy focused on
nuclear weapons policy and strategy. Together the three offices focused across
the enterprise, synchronizing policy, mission, weapons, and platforms.42

These offices no longer plan the guidance and sustainment of all nuclear forces. The Nuclear
Weapons Council was created to address this issue. The Nuclear Weapons Council serves as the
focal point of DOD and the National Nuclear Security Administration to maintain the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. Although the Nuclear Weapons Council addresses many of these
issues, there is no forum or office effectively integrating across OSD to form a complete nuclear
enterprise. Therefore, the review team recommended that OSD and the Joint Staff realign their

40

Ibid., p. 17-18.
Ibid., p. 18.
42
Ibid., p. 19.
41

Congressional Research Service

12

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

structures to plan nuclear activities across the entire enterprise: policy, strategy, mission,
platforms, weapons, and support.43
The review team also identified issues within the Air Force that have created strains within the
missile force: logistics structure changes, base closures, and organizational realignment that have
reduced dedicated support for nuclear forces. The team recommended that the Air Force create a
nuclear enterprise that encompasses Air Force Headquarters, Air Force Materiel Command, U.S.
Air Forces in Europe and Air Force Global Strike Command.

Funding the Nuclear Enterprise
Proposed changes to the nuclear weapons arsenal may require the commitment of significant
funding. DOD is asking for 10% annual spending increases over the next five years to implement
the recommendations of the recent reviews. This is in addition to the tens of billions of dollars the
Pentagon has asked Congress to provide to modernize each leg of the nuclear triad. In the near
future, says DOD, the funds are needed to improve morale, such as providing incentive pay,
creating new officer positions, and the refurbishment of the 45 underground Minuteman III
launch centers—none of which reportedly have been thoroughly vacuumed in more than
50 years.44
The current strategic nuclear forces in the triad are reaching the end of their service lifetimes.
Over the next two decades, Congress will face decisions about the extent to which all of the U.S.
nuclear delivery systems would be modernized or replaced with new systems.45 The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is required under the National Defense Authorization Act of
2015 to periodically update its estimate of the cost of nuclear forces. CBO estimates that over the
2015-2024 time period, the Administration’s plans for nuclear forces would cost $348 billion, an
average of about $35 billion a year.46 (Note: both estimates are provided in nominal dollars; they
do not include the effects of inflation.)

Issues for Congress
Given the complexity and cost of the proposed changes to the nuclear workforce and arsenal,
several issues arise before Congress.

Are Current Plans to Sustain the Nuclear Enterprise Appropriate
and Adequate?
As the Air Force begins to revamp the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad, three significant issues
suggest themselves for potential consideration in Congress. As is noted above, the Air Force is
43

Ibid.
Rachel Oswald, “Decisions on Upgrading Nuclear Arsenals Will Wait for Next Defense Secretary’s Attention,” CQ
Roll Call, vol. 60, no. 46 (December 3, 2014).
45
Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015-2024, January 2015, at
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49870.
46
Ibid.
44

Congressional Research Service

13

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

pursuing several tracks to sustain the current Minuteman force. The first track includes the
ongoing projects funded through the Air Force O&M accounts and the Dem/Val program, while
modernization programs needed to recapitalize the ICBM force are planned to be funded in the
late 2020s. Included in the President’s Budget request in FY2016 are requests to fund nuclear
enterprise improvements. These include upgrades to facilities, improvements in manning and
safety procedures, as well as technology improvements.47
The other issue is addressing the recommendations from the internal and external review teams
for the nuclear enterprise. Many argue that in the year since those reports were issued, much has
improved. DOD leadership is requesting funds to continue to improve the nuclear enterprise.
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated the Pentagon would add 10% a year over the next five
years to nuclear spending in order to correct the problems. The Pentagon currently spends
between $15 billion and $16 billion, so this increase would equate to at least a $7.5 billion
increase between 2016 and 2020.48 The 2016 budget request calls for $8 billion in new spending
on the nuclear force over the next five years, including about $1 billion for FY2016.49
In addition to money, Secretary Hagel promised more troops, more trainers, more equipment and
more leadership to nuclear forces, all of which have experienced decades of neglect and
deterioration.50 Also, the Department of Defense began the Force Improvement Program (FIP).
Under the DOD FIP program, the Air Force has approved incentive pay and bonuses for
missileers, exchange programs across bases and with the Navy, and infrastructure upgrades at
missile bases.51
Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James has supported implementing the identified changes from
both the internal and external reviews of the nuclear forces. James has said “there is no mission
more important to our nation’s security than the nuclear mission,” and the changes to the nuclear
force are “aimed at improving morale and shifting from a culture of always preparing for the next
test and next inspection.”52 After a year, there is a stark contrast from earlier attitudes in each of
the missile wings, with the workforce mostly positive toward leadership actions. Approximately
98% of the Force Improvement Program’s recommendations either have been or are being
implemented.53
To ensure focus on each of these programs, Secretary Hagel established the Nuclear Deterrent
Enterprise Review Group (NDERG) to establish senior leader accountability and bring together
all the elements of the nuclear force into a coherent enterprise. This group is led by Deputy
47

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, February 2015, at
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/FY16_Budget_Request_Rollout_Final_2-2-15.pdf.
48
Marcus Weisgerber, DOD To Spend Billions More on Nukes, Defense One, November 14, 2014, at
http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/11/dod-spend-billions-more-nukes/99092/.
49
David Alexander, After Neglect, U.S. Nuclear Force Seeing Improvement: Official, Reuters, February 11, 2015, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-usa-defense-nuclear-idUSKBN0LG07I20150212.
50
Weisgerber.
51
Brian Everstine, Spotlight on Nuclear Force Prompts Ongoing Reform, Air Force Times, September 15, 2014, at
http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20140915/NEWS/309150037/Spotlight-nuclear-forces-prompts-ongoingreforms.htm.
52
Brian Everstine, James presents first round of Air Force nuclear service medals, Air Force Times, November 6,
2014, at http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20141106/NEWS/311060046/James-presents-first-round-of-Air-Forcenuclear-service-medals.html.
53
Lowther, A Year Later.

Congressional Research Service

14

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Secretary Bob Work and is to review the actions taken and the progress made in the health of
nuclear forces. In addition, Secretary Hagel directed Office of the Secretary of Defense/ Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD/CAPE) to lead an effort to track and assess the
implementation of the over 100 recommendations from the internal and external reviews. CAPE
is to also conduct analysis to determine if corrective actions are having the desired effect as well
as to continue assessing the health of the nuclear deterrent enterprise.54
Congress may remain concerned about the implementation of these programs and ask for updates.
In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016, the House Committee
on Armed Services stated
As a result of the NER and NDERG, the fiscal year 2016 budget request contained
approximately $1.00 billion in additional funding for the Department of Defense nuclear
enterprise, with a total of $8.00 billion in additional funding planned over the next 5 years.
The committee believes sustained leadership, follow-through, and investment will be
required to ensure the revitalization of our nuclear enterprise, including in certain instances
improving or changing the culture and leadership standards. The committee believes the
NDERG seems to be successful in this regard, but cautions that institutionalization of such a
process may be required to ensure sustained attention after key leaders depart. The
committee expects the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and all leaders within the
Department of Defense to ensure continued focus and resources for the Department’s
“highest priority mission.55

Many experts believe these programs have made a difference and are improving conditions for
airmen.56 The increased retention of missile combat crews (and other supporting metrics) may
indicate that the Air Force initiative is having an effect. Renewed focus on the nuclear forces is
paying dividends, some say, but more work is seen as necessary to continue to move the program
forward.
However, some are skeptical that more money, more people, and more commitment is the right
way to address the issue. Many see that nuclear weapons are no longer useful in the current
security environment, especially given their destructive power. They argue that it is “unlikely that
these problems can be solved by more money, more stars, more organizational changes, reducing
burdens on airmen, or recommitting to the importance of deterrence without addressing the
underlying problem.”57 The underlying problem, according to these skeptics, is that nuclear
weapons no longer play a prominent role in U.S. national security policy.
Others also argue that these reforms will not be sufficient in addressing the underlying problems
because no amount of cleaning, paint, or increase in pay can offset the sense, in the ICBM force,
that there is no meaning to the mission.58 The morale problems facing the troops who are part of
the nuclear enterprise are unlikely to be fully resolved by any changes that DOD can make.
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated in discussing the review that in order to change the
54

Fact Sheet: Implementing Changes to the Nuclear Enterprise at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/NER-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
H.R. 1735
56
Adam Lowther, A Year Later: Responding to Problems in the ICBM Force, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
February 2, 2015, at http://thebulletin.org/year-later-responding-problems-icbm-force7984.
57
Marcus Weisgerber, DOD To Spend Billions More on Nukes, Defense One, November 14, 2014, at
http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/11/dod-spend-billions-more-nukes/99092/.
58
Ibid.
55

Congressional Research Service

15

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

situation, “we must change the cultural perception of a nuclear enterprise…We must restore the
prestige that attracted the brightest minds of the Cold War era, so our most talented young men
and women see the nuclear pathway as promising in value.”59 Some argue that Hagel’s
assessment only draws further attention to the real issue—the United States is no longer in “the
Cold War era.” They state the U.S. is in a strategic transition from the Cold War to an era
characterized by threats such as al Qaeda, ISIS, and Ebola. They say those who work with nuclear
weapons (i) have not been part of the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq that have been the formative
experience for the military in recent years, and (ii) hope they are unlikely ever to be called on to
carry out their assigned mission.60

Should the ICBM Force be Modernized in an Era of Fiscal
Constraint?
Both the cost to modernize or replace the ICBM arsenal and the future role the ICBM force will
play in the nation’s defense strategy may also prove of interest to Congress.

The Cost of Modernization
The United States is currently planning a number of programs to update and modernize most
aspects of the U.S. nuclear force. In addition to pursuing sustainment and modernization
programs for the ICBM force, the Air Force is beginning work on a new long-range bomber and a
new cruise missile, and the Navy is beginning the construction of a new ballistic missile
submarine while pursuing a life extension program for its submarine launched D-5 missile.
Congress may consider whether the U.S. should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear
force structure, particularly in light of expected financial constraints. It may consider whether
nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with each other, or with conventional
weapons programs, for scarce resources.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is currently investing in life extension programs for U.S.
nuclear warheads. During the Cold War, DOE sustained the U.S. warhead stockpile by designing,
testing, and deploying new warheads to replace aging warheads.61 Because the United States has
observed a testing moratorium since 1992, it maintains its current inventory through the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, a scientific experimentation and simulation undertaking that assesses the
status of the nuclear weapon arsenal without underground nuclear tests.62 Instead of designing
and deploying new warheads, DOE manages and maintains the stockpile by pursuing Life
Extension Programs (LEPs) for existing warheads and investing in the supporting and aging
infrastructure. Many analysts agree that investments in both the infrastructure and workforce will
help sustain the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,63 but

59

Eryn MacDonald, Independent Review of DOD’s Nuclear Enterprise: Money, Maintenance, and Morale, Union of
Concerned Scientists, November 21, 2014, at http://allthingsnuclear.org/independent-review-of-dods-nuclearenterprise-money-maintenance-and-morale/.
60
Ibid.
61
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. 37.
62
Ibid., p. 37.
63
Ibid., p. 41.

Congressional Research Service

16

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

these investments could add to the cost of the nuclear enterprise at the same time that DOD is
modernizing its nuclear delivery systems.
As calculated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the costs of these programs could
reach more than $30 billion per year in the 2020s, and amount to a total of more than $1 trillion
over 30 years.64 Yet, as Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee,65 this plan could generate
“affordability problems” in the 2020s. This can raise questions of whether the United States can,
or should, pursue all of these programs.66 As a result, some have suggested that the United States
forgo the ICBM modernization programs and eventually eliminate the ICBM leg of the triad.
Over the 2015-2024 time period, the Administration’s plans for nuclear forces would cost $348
billion per CBO estimates (see Table 1). Of that total, CBO projects that $299 billion would be
budgeted by DOD and DOE:67
•

$160 billion for strategic nuclear delivery systems and weapons;

•

$8 billion for tactical nuclear delivery systems and weapons;

•

$79 billion for nuclear weapons laboratories and their supporting activities; and

•

$52 billion for nuclear-related command, control, communications, and earlywarning systems.

The remaining $49 billion represents CBO’s estimate of additional costs that would be incurred
over the coming decade if the nuclear program costs grow as expected. 68
Table 1. Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, by Department and Function
Billions of Dollars
Total
FY2015-FY2024

FY2015
Category

DOD

DOE

Total

DOD

DOE

Total

5.5

1.0

6.4

75

8

83

CBO’s projections of budgeted amounts for nuclear forcesa
Nuclear delivery systems and weapons
Strategic systems
Total, 2015–2024
DOE Total
Ballistic missile submarines

64
Congressional Budget Office, Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015-2024, January 2015, at
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49870.
65
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Witness Statement of the
Nuclear Weapons Council, 114th Cong., March 4, 2015, p.8-9.
66
Lacie Heeley, Nukes or Conventional Weapons? Buy the Ones We Use, Breaking Defense, May 14, 2015, at
http://www.breakingdefense.com/2015/05/nukes-or-conventional-weapons-buy-the-ones-we-use/.
67
Projected Costs of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015-2024.
68
Ibid.

Congressional Research Service

17

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

Total
FY2015-FY2024

FY2015
Intercontinental ballistic missiles

1.3

0.2

1.5

24

3

26

Bombers

2.0

0.5

2.5

32

7

40

Other nuclear activitiesb

1.0

—

1.0

11

—

11

Subtotal

9.8

1.7

11.4

142

18

160

Tactical delivery systems and weapons

0.4

0.4

0.7

4

3

8

Stockpile services

—

1.1

1.1

—

15

15

Facilities and infrastructure

—

2.1

2.1

—

28

28

Other stewardship and support activitiesc

—

3.4

3.4

—

37

37

Subtotal

—

6.5

6.5

—

79

79

Total, nuclear delivery systems and weapons

10.1

8.5

18.7

146

101

247

Command and control

1.2

—

1.2

12

—

12

Communications

2.1

—

2.1

20

—

20

Early warning

1.9

—

1.9

19

—

19

Subtotal

5.2

—

5.2

52

—

52

Total budgeted amounts for nuclear forces

15.4

8.5

23.9

198

101

299

Estimated additional costs based on historical cost growth

—

—

—

28

21

49

Total Estimated Cost of Nuclear Forces

15.4

8.5

23.9

227

121

348

Nuclear weapons laboratories and supporting activities

Command, control, communications, and early-warning systems

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense and the
Department of Energy.
Notes: DOD = Department of Defense; DOE = Department of Energy; —= not applicable.
a.

This category is based on CBO’s analysis of DOD’s and DOE’s budget proposals and accompanying
documents as well as CBO’s projections of those budget figures under the assumption that programs will
proceed as described in budget documentation. The category also includes several programs for which plans
are still being formulated. In those cases, CBO based its estimate on historical costs of analogous programs.
The budgeted amounts do not reflect independent estimates by CBO of the costs of U.S. nuclear forces.

b.

This category includes nuclear-related research and operations support activities by DOD that CBO could
not associate with a specific type of delivery system or weapon.

c.

Activities include security forces, transportation of nuclear materials and weapons, and scientific research
and high-performance computing to improve understanding of nuclear explosions. This category also
includes $400 million in 2015 and $4 billion over the 2015–2024 period for federal salaries and expenses.
(This category of costs had previously been referred to as Office of the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration.)

What Role Would a Modernized ICBM Force Play in
National Defense?
Congress may also wish to reconsider the role ICBMs play in the national defense. Most experts
agree that U.S. nuclear strategy has changed since the Cold War days of potential massive
retaliation and mutual assured destruction, but many argue that nuclear weapons still matter for

Congressional Research Service

18

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

the United States because they are the most credible means of deterring the use of nuclear
weapons by other states.69 While few anticipate a U.S.-USSR-style potential nuclear exchange,
some experts suggest that a “second nuclear age” has begun in which numerous nations may
possess nuclear weapons and the ability to use them in regional conflicts.70 The 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review recognized this change when it asserted that nuclear terrorism and nuclear
proliferation now pose greater threats to U.S. security than established nuclear-armed states. U.S.
strategic nuclear forces are not well designed to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, but future
U.S. nuclear strategy will need to account for the threats that may exist as a result of nuclear
proliferation.
Some argue that ICBMs are antiquated systems unchanged since the Cold War. They contend that
the ICBM force is a relic of the Cold War and is not relevant in an environment where the United
States no longer faces the threat of a massive attack from the Soviet Union. These analysts argue
that because the Pentagon cannot plan “for every contingency, it must plan for the most
conceivable future. In this case, that might mean a step back from nuclear weapons toward
greater focus on those weapons we might actually use.”71 Others argue that U.S. ICBMs could
only be used against Russia because if they were to be sent anywhere else in the world, they
would still have to overfly Russia, risking the creation of ambiguous attack indicators that could
trigger a nuclear response.72
On the other hand, some experts argue that ICBMs continue to provide a deterrent to nuclear
attack on the homeland. They note that the sheer numbers of Minuteman III silos (400+) that are
spread across the American West are invulnerable to all but massive nuclear missile attacks.73
This curbs those who may wish to attack the United States: conventionally or with nuclear
weapons. They note that, without ICBMs, U.S. land-based strategic nuclear targets shrink “from
503 to six, which could all be destroyed with conventional strikes. Only ICBMs require a nuclear
strike.”74 Moreover, any attack against the ICBM force represents a direct attack against the
United States. Therefore, ICBMs deny prospective enemies “any hope of half-way measures
against us: if they mean nuclear war, then they must decide upon nuclear war.”75

Should ICBMs Be Sustained in an Era of Strategic Uncertainty?
As analysts within and outside DOD continue to debate the value of the nuclear deterrent to the
defense of the United States, Congress may wish to reevaluate whether to continue to support the
nation’s ICBM force. Some analysts have questioned whether the United States can, or should
69

Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,
p. 17.
70
Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York : Henry Holt and
Company, 2012).
71
Lacie Heeley, Nukes or Conventional Weapons? Buy the Ones We Use, Breaking Defense, May 14, 2015, at
http://www.breakingdefense.com/2015/05/nukes-or-conventional-weapons-buy-the-ones-we-use/.
72
M.J.S., Fewer nukes, more security , Global Zero, May 16, 2012, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/clausewitz/
2012/05/global-zero
73
Robert Spalding and Adam Lowther, Rethinking the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, Breaking Defense,
December 2014, at http://breakingdefense.com/2014/12/rethinking-the-ground-based-strategic-deterrent/.
74
Ibid.
75
Liz Whitfield, The Cost of Modernization: Can We Afford to Replicate the Triad?, Project on Nuclear Issues,
October 2014, at http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/the-cost-of-modernization-can-we-afford-to-replicate-the-triad/.

Congressional Research Service

19

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

forgo its ICBM modernization program even if the missiles’ future role is uncertain. These
arguments focus more on the uncertainties and challenges in the emerging strategic environment
than on the specific military value of the ICBM force.

Emerging Nuclear Threats
Those who suggest that the United States can forgo its ICBM modernization program argue that
the force was designed during the Cold War and is not suited to match the challenges of the
current security environment. They argue that threats now come in the form of terrorists, suicide
bombers, and regimes not friendly to the U.S. looking for nuclear weapons. They believe that the
use of a nuclear ICBM in this environment is unlikely and that the United States should better
align its nuclear policies to meet the most urgent priorities: preventing nuclear terrorism and
nuclear proliferation.76
Analysts point out that many security concerns are associated with nuclear terrorism that cannot
addressed with ICBMs. They note that weapon-grade nuclear materials may be stored in insecure
locations around the world, vulnerable to loss or theft. Also, sensitive equipment and technologies
associated with nuclear weaponry are widely available on the black market. While most do not
believe that any terrorist organization currently has access to a nuclear weapon or nuclear
technology, some argue that it remains a possibility in nuclear-armed states that have lax security
or face political upheaval.
Nuclear proliferation is another contemporary threat. According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review Report, both North Korea and Iran have violated nonproliferation obligations, defied
directives of the United Nations Security Council, pursued missile delivery capabilities, and
resisted international efforts to resolve through diplomatic means the crises they have created.77
This could introduce instability not only within their regions, but also around the globe, creating
situations in which neighboring countries may view their only option as pursuing a nuclear
weapon to protect their interests. This could undermine the credibility of the NPT and threaten
destabilization of international security.

Strategic Security Challenges with Russia and China
Many analysts agree that the United States continues to face challenges in strategic security from
both Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States could seek to address
these challenges through dialogue and transparency. Though the dialogue with each country
would be different, the message could be similar: fostering good will and partnerships. For
example, a strategic dialogue with Russia could allow the United States to explain that “our
missile defenses and any future U.S. conventionally armed long-range ballistic missile systems
are designed to address newly emerging regional threats, and are not intended to affect the
strategic balance with Russia.”78 In turn, the United States could ask Russia to explain their
modernization programs as well as their strategic doctrine.

76

Ibid., p. v.
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report , April 2010, p. iv.
78
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p. x.
77

Congressional Research Service

20

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

A strategic dialogue with China could, likewise, allow both nations to communicate with one
another about their views on each other’s nuclear strategies, policies, and programs. China’s
leaders have been vocal about their concerns over the U.S. ballistic missile defenses. As stated in
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, “maintaining strategic stability in the U.S.China relationship is as important to this Administration as maintaining strategic stability with
other major powers.”79 It is seen as important for the U.S. to highlight willingness to work
together with the PRC, while simultaneously underlining U.S. support to its allies and partners in
the East Asia region.
Others, however, doubt that dialogue, even when combined with transparency, would resolve
emerging concerns with either Russia or China. In the past year, Russia has taken a number of
steps, such as its invasion of Ukraine, its aggressive military exercises, and its violation of the
1987 INF Treaty, that challenge the security interests of the United States and its allies. China has
also become more assertive in its region with its actions in the East China and South China Seas
in ways that have raised concerns about challenges to U.S. interests and allies. At the same time,
both nations are modernizing their nuclear forces and, in some cases, expanding their nuclear
arsenals.
As a result, many analysts continue to view nuclear weapons, and the nuclear balance, as a
significant marker in the U.S. relationship with both Russia and China. They note that a U.S.
commitment to modernizing its triad, in general, and its ICBM force, in particular, is necessary to
assure stability and U.S. security. Some experts argue that, from a global perspective, the United
States must “maintain nuclear parity with the Russians and sustain nuclear superiority over the
Chinese.” They contend that dealing with a Russian government believing it possessed nuclear
superiority would be more difficult than it is at present and that dealing with a China that had
achieved nuclear parity would tear big holes in the U.S. nuclear umbrella.80 Therefore, some
argue that, in order to remain a credible player on the world stage, the U.S. must ensure that its
nuclear forces and capabilities remain a priority. Others may see less need for a specific balance
in nuclear forces, but still believe that maintaining strategic stability with Russia and China
should be a key U.S. priority.81
Admiral Cecil Haney, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) highlighted the
value of the U.S. nuclear triad in this uncertain strategic environment in a press conference in
March 2015. He noted that “while our nation’s nuclear enterprise is safe, secure, and effective, we
cannot take it for granted any longer. For decades, we have sustained while others have
modernized their strategic nuclear forces....” He indicated that, in this environment, “as a nation,
we cannot simply afford to underfund our strategic capabilities. Any cuts to the President’s
budget, including those imposed by sequestration, will hamper our ability to sustain and
modernize our joint military forces and put us at real risk of making our nation less secure and

79

Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 34.
Clark A. Murdock, A Nuclear Deterrent for the 21st Century, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2015,
p. 17.
81
According to Gregory Koblentz, “the highest U.S. priority is to maintain strategic stability with Russia and China,
the two states with the capability and potential intent to launch a nuclear attack on the homeland. Though strategic
stability is just one aspect of the United States’ multifaceted relations with both countries, its enduring importance
requires sustained high-level attention even during periods of international tension or in the face of unfavorable
domestic politics.” Gregory D. Koblentz, Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age, Council on Foreign Relations,
Council Special Report No. 71, November 2014, p. 4.
80

Congressional Research Service

21

U.S. Air Force ICBM Sustainment, Modernization, and Recapitalization

able to address future threats.”82 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has not spoken out on this
issue, since replacing Secretary Hagel in February 2015.
The current ICBM force was deployed in the 1970s, which means it has been in service for over
40 years—much longer than anticipated. The Air Force determined the best way forward is to
develop a replacement missile that utilizes modernized silos to ensure viability of the ICBM force
structure until 2075. This program is called the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).83 The
President’s FY2016 budget allocates for funds for continued development of the GBSD. Congress
will play a key role in determining the future of the GBSD.

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
US Air Force Fellow
/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

82

U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Adm. Haney in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
Washington, D.C., March 24, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5605.
83
Constance Baroudos, M.A., The Minuteman III ICBM’s Future, Lexington Institute, April 27, 2015, at
http://lexingtoninstitute.org/the-minuteman-iii-icbms-future/.

Congressional Research Service

22

EveryCRSReport.com
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the
Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on
issues that may come before Congress.
EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The
reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to
the public.
Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts
who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made
any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.
CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in
the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without
permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a
third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or
otherwise use copyrighted material.
Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public
understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in
connection with CRS' institutional role.
EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim
copyright on any CRS report we have republished.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR44103. Public record. Not legal advice.