# Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43926

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 18, 2017
- **Citation:** R43926

## Text

Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress
,name redacted,
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
January 18, 2017

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43926

Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress

Summary
Cuba remains a one-party communist state with a poor record on human rights. The country’s
political succession in 2006 from the long-ruling Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl was
characterized by a remarkable degree of stability. In 2013, Raúl began his second and final fiveyear term, which is scheduled to end in February 2018, when he would be 86 years of age. Castro
has implemented a number of market-oriented economic policy changes over the past several
years. An April 2016 Cuban Communist Party congress endorsed the current gradual pace of
Cuban economic reform. Few observers expect the government to ease its tight control over the
political system. While the government has released most long-term political prisoners, shortterm detentions and harassment have increased significantly over the past several years.
U.S. Policy
Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of
legislation strengthening and at times easing various U.S. economic sanctions. U.S. policy over
the years has consisted largely of isolating Cuba through economic sanctions, while a second
policy component has consisted of support measures for the Cuban people, including U.S.
government-sponsored broadcasting and support for human rights and democracy projects.
In December 2014, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
moving away from a sanctions-based policy toward one of engagement and a normalization of
relations. The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba, but he emphasized that the United States could do more
through engagement than isolation. The policy change included the restoration of diplomatic
relations (July 2015); the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international
terrorism (May 2015); and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba.
In order to implement this third step, the Treasury and Commerce Departments eased the
embargo regulations five times (most recently in October 2016) in such areas as travel,
remittances, trade, telecommunications, and financial services. The overall embargo, however,
remains in place, and can only be lifted with congressional action or if certain conditions in Cuba
are met, including that a democratically elected government is in place. With the goal of
advancing the normalization process, President Obama visited Cuba in March 2016, the first visit
of a U.S. President to Cuba in almost 90 years. On January 12, 2017, President Obama announced
a change in U.S. immigration policy by ending the special treatment for undocumented Cuban
migrants entering the United States.
Legislative Activity
The Obama Administration’s shift in Cuba policy has spurred strong interest in Congress. Some
Members lauded the initiative as in the best interest of the United States and a better way to
support change in Cuba, while others criticized the President for not obtaining more concessions
from Cuba to advance human rights and protect U.S. interests. In the 114th Congress, numerous
legislative initiatives were introduced on both sides of the policy debate.
In 2015, five FY2016 House appropriations bills had Cuba provisions that would have blocked
some of the Administration’s policy changes and introduced new economic sanctions, and one
Senate appropriations bill had provisions that would have eased certain economic sanctions.
Ultimately, none of these provisions were included in the FY2016 omnibus appropriations
measure, P.L. 114-113.
In 2016, three FY2017 House appropriations measures (Commerce, H.R. 5393; Financial
Services, H.R. 5485; and Homeland Security, H.R. 5634) had provisions that would have blocked

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Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress

some of the Cuba policy changes, and one FY2017 Senate appropriations measure (Financial
Services, S. 3067) had provisions lifting restrictions on travel and financing for agricultural
exports. In addition, the Senate version of the FY2017 State Department and Foreign Operations
appropriations bill, S. 3117, would have funded U.S. diplomatic facilities in Cuba and additional
personnel costs and would have fully funded the $15 million request for democracy programs. In
contrast, the House version of the bill, H.R. 5912, would have prohibited assistance for expanding
the U.S. diplomatic presence in Cuba and provided $30 million for democracy programs. The
114th Congress did not complete action on FY2017 appropriations, but it did approve a continuing
resolution (P.L. 114-254) in December 2016 funding most programs at the FY2016 level, minus
an across-the-board reduction of almost 0.2% through April 28, 2017. The 115th Congress will
face completing action on FY2017 appropriations.
With regard to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, both the FY2016 and the FY2017
military construction appropriations measures, P.L. 114-113 and P.L. 114-223, have provisions
prohibiting funding for the station’s closure. Both the FY2016 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA), P.L. 114-92, and the FY2017 NDAA, P.L. 114-328, also have prohibitions on
funding for the closure of the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. P.L. 114-328 also
restricts FY2017 funding for Cuba’s participation in certain joint or multilateral exercises or
related security conferences. (See Appendix A.)
Several other bills introduced in the 114th Congress would have lifted or eased sanctions: H.R.
274, H.R. 403, and H.R. 735 (overall embargo); H.R. 634, H.R. 664, and S. 299 (travel); H.R.
635 (agricultural and medical exports and travel); S. 491 and S. 1543/H.R. 3238 (some embargo
restrictions); S. 1049 (financing of agricultural sales); S. 1389/H.R. 3055 (telecommunications);
H.R. 3306 (energy resources and technologies); H.R. 3687 (agricultural exports and investment);
and S. 2990 (foreign carriers traveling to or from Cuba). Other bills would have increased
restrictions on engagement with Cuba: S. 1388/H.R. 2466 (travel and trade); S. 1489/ H.R. 2937
(Cuban military and intelligence); and H.R. 4772 and H.R. 5728/S. 3289 (U.S. flights). For more
on these on other bills and resolutions, see Appendix C.

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Contents
Recent Developments ...................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment .................................................................................. 5
Brief Historical Background ..................................................................................................... 5
Political Conditions ................................................................................................................... 6
April 2016 Communist Party Congress .............................................................................. 8
Death of Fidel Castro .......................................................................................................... 9
Human Rights ..................................................................................................................... 9
Economic Conditions .............................................................................................................. 13
Cuba’s Foreign Relations ........................................................................................................ 17
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba .............................................................................................................. 22
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations .................................................................................... 22
Obama Administration Policy ................................................................................................. 24
President Obama Unveils a New Policy Approach Toward Cuba .................................... 25
Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations ......................................................................... 26
Rescission of Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism ............ 27
Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information ........................................... 27
Embargo Remains in Place ............................................................................................... 30
March 2016 Presidential Visit ........................................................................................... 30
Advancing Engagement .................................................................................................... 32
Debate on the Direction of U.S. Policy ................................................................................... 34
Incoming Trump Administration ............................................................................................. 36
Selected Issues in U.S.-Cuban Relations ....................................................................................... 36
Diplomatic and Military Engagement ..................................................................................... 37
Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .................................................................................. 39
U.S. Exports and Sanctions ..................................................................................................... 44
State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation ................................................................................. 50
Trademark Sanction ................................................................................................................ 55
U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights ....................................................... 57
Oversight of U.S. Democracy Assistance to Cuba ............................................................ 59
Radio and TV Martí ................................................................................................................ 60
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................................... 63
Antidrug Cooperation.............................................................................................................. 70
U.S. Property Claims............................................................................................................... 72
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 73

Figures
Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba ................................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (%) 2005-20016 .................................................................... 14
Figure 3. U.S. Exports to Cuba, 2001-2015 .................................................................................. 45
Figure 4. Maritime Interdictions of Cubans by the U.S. Coast Guard, FY2002-FY2016 ............ 65
Figure 5. Cuban Migration, from Ecuador to the United States .................................................... 67

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Tables
Table 1. Undocumented Cuban Migrants, FY2010-FY2017......................................................... 66

Appendixes
Appendix A. Enacted Measures and Approved Resolutions in the 114th Congress....................... 75
Appendix B. Other Actions in 2015 and 2016............................................................................... 78
Appendix C. Additional Bills and Resolutions in the 114th Congress ........................................... 89

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 93

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Recent Developments
On January 16, 2017, U.S. and Cuban officials signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen
bilateral law enforcement cooperation and information sharing. (See “Advancing Engagement,”
below.)
On January 12, 2017, the Obama Administration announced a major change in U.S. immigration
policy by ending the so-called wet foot/dry foot policy in which thousands of undocumented
Cuban migrants have entered the United States in recent years. The Administration also
announced it was ending the 10-year-old Cuban Medical Professional Parole program, which
allowed Cuban medical professionals in third countries to be approved for admittance into the
United States. (See “Migration Issues,” below.)
On January 9, 2017, U.S. and Cuban officials signed an oil spill preparedness and response
agreement for cooperation and coordination to prevent, contain, and clean up marine oil and other
hazardous pollution. (See “Advancing Engagement,” below.)
On January 5, 2017, the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation
(CCDHRN) reported that there were at least 9,940 short-term detentions for political reasons in
2016, higher than annual levels over the past several years. (See “Human Rights,” below.)
On December 23, 2016, President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act
for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), which continued prohibitions on funding for the closure of the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and restricted FY2017 funding for Cuba’s participation
in certain joint or multilateral exercises or related security conferences. (See “Diplomatic and
Military Engagement” and Appendix A, below.)
On December 10, 2016, President Obama signed into law a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254)
providing FY2017 appropriations for most programs at the FY2016 level, minus an across-theboard reduction of almost 0.2% through April 28, 2017. This law affects human rights and
democracy funding for Cuba, as well as funding for the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, both of
which are funded through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
appropriations. The 115th Congress will face completing action on FY2017 appropriations. (See
“U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights” and “Radio and TV Martí,” below.)
On December 7, 2016, the United States and Cuba held a fifth Bilateral Commission meeting in
Havana, with the objective of advancing the normalization process. (See “Advancing
Engagement,” below.)
On November 25, 2016, Cuba’s former long-time ruler Fidel Castro died at 90 years of age. (See
“Death of Fidel Castro,” below, and CRS Insight IN10616, Fidel Castro’s Death: Implications for
Cuba and U.S. Policy.)
On October 26, 2016, the U.N. General Assembly approved (as it has since 1991) a resolution
urging the United States to lift the embargo on Cuba. For the first time, the United States
abstained (along with Israel) and 191 other nations voted in favor. (See “Cuba’s Foreign
Relations,” below.)
On October 14, 2016, President Obama issued a presidential policy directive on the normalization
of relations with Cuba, which set forth medium-term objectives and the roles and responsibilities

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for various U.S. departments and agencies to move forward in the normalization process.1 (See
“Advancing Engagement,” below.)
On October 14, 2016, the Treasury and Commerce Departments announced a sixth round of
regulatory changes to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and the Export Administration
Regulations that further eased certain economic sanctions. Among the changes were removal of
the value limit for the importation of Cuban products (including cigars and rum) by authorized
travelers as accompanied baggage for personal use; general authorization waiving the restriction
prohibiting foreign vessels from entering a U.S. port for trade for 180 days after calling on a
Cuban port for trade purposes; general authorizations for transactions incident to obtaining U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals and for the
importation of such pharmaceuticals into the United States; and general authorization to enter into
contingent contracts for transactions currently prohibited by the embargo. (See “Increase in
Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information,” below.)
On September 14, 2016, the House Committee on Agriculture held a hearing on “American
Agricultural Trade with Cuba.”2 (See “U.S. Exports and Sanctions,” below).
On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law a full-year FY2017 military
construction appropriations measure (Division A of P.L. 114-223, H.R. 5325, approved by the
Senate and House on September 28, 2016) with a provision continuing a prohibition against
funding to carry out the closure or realignment of the United States Naval Station at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba. (See Appendix A.)
On September 27, 2016, President Obama nominated Jeffrey DeLaurentis, the current chargé
d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, to be U.S. ambassador to Cuba. (See “Diplomatic and
Military Engagement,” below.)
On August 31, 2016, the Department of Transportation finalized a decision for eight U.S. airlines
to provide up to 20 regularly scheduled roundtrip flights between Havana and 10 U.S. cities.
Regular flights from the United States to Cuban cities other than Havana began in late August,
and American Airlines reportedly will be the first to begin direct flights to Havana from Miami in
late November. (See “Restrictions on Travel and Remittances,” below.)

Introduction
Political and economic developments in Cuba and U.S. policy toward the island nation, located
just 90 miles from the United States, have been significant congressional concerns for many
years. Especially since the end of the Cold War, Congress has played an active role in shaping
U.S. policy toward Cuba, first with the enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992
(P.L. 102-484, Title XVII) and then with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114). Both measures strengthened U.S. economic sanctions
on Cuba that had first been imposed in the early 1960s but also provided roadmaps for a
normalization of relations dependent upon significant political and economic changes in Cuba. A
decade ago, Congress partially modified its sanctions-based policy toward Cuba when it enacted

1

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Presidential Policy Directive—United States-Cuba Normalization,”
October 14, 2016, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/presidential-policy-directive-unitedstates-cuba-normalization.
2
For hearing testimony and transcript, see http://agriculture.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=3512.

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the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title
IX) allowing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba.
Over the past decade, much of the debate in Congress over U.S. policy has focused on U.S.
sanctions, especially over U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. In 2009, Congress took legislative
action in an appropriations measure (P.L. 111-8) to ease restrictions on family travel and travel for
the marketing of agricultural exports, marking the first congressional action easing Cuba
sanctions in almost a decade. The Obama Administration took further action in April 2009 by
lifting all restrictions on family travel and on cash remittances by family members to their
relatives in Cuba. In January 2011, the Administration announced the further easing of restrictions
on educational and religious travel to Cuba and on non-family remittances. In December 2014,
just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, President Obama announced a major shift in
U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba to
a policy of engagement and a normalization of relations.
This report is divided into three major sections analyzing Cuba’s political and economic
environment, U.S. policy, and selected issues in U.S.-Cuban relations. Legislative initiatives in
the 114th Congress are noted throughout the report, and four appendixes provide a listing of
enacted measures and approved resolutions (Appendix A), bills receiving some action in 2015
and 2016 (Appendix B), and additional bills and resolution introduced in the 114th Congress
(Appendix C). For more on Cuba from CRS, see
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

CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by (name redacted) ;
CRS Insight IN10616, Fidel Castro’s Death: Implications for Cuba and U.S.
Policy, by (name redacted) ;
CRS Insight IN10466, President Obama’s Historic Visit to Cuba, by (name re
dacted) ;
CRS Insight IN10369, Pope Francis in Cuba, by (name redacted) ;
CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the
Normalization of Relations, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
;
CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by
(name redacted) ;
CRS Insight IN10514, Financing U.S. Agricultural Exports to Cuba, by (name re
dacted)
;
CRS Report R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations
and Future Prospects, by (name redacted)
;
CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1586, House Approves Measure to Prevent Return of
GTMO to Cuba without Congress’s Say So, by (name redacted) ;
CRS Report R44137, Naval Station Guantanamo Bay: History and Legal Issues
Regarding Its Lease Agreements, by (name redacted) and (name redacted);
CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1405, Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgments
Against Cuba?, by (name redacted) ; and
CRS Report R44714, U.S. Policy on Cuban Migrants: In Brief, by (name re
dacted).

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Figure 1. Provincial Map of Cuba

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS).
Notes: This map shows 15 provinces and the special municipality of Isla de la Juventud. See a current interactive provincial map of Cuba, showing municipalities and
other information, from Juventud Rebelde (Cuba), available at http://www.juventudrebelde.cu/multimedia/graficos/nueva-division-politico-administrativa/.

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Cuba: Issues and Actions in the 114th Congress

Cuba’s Political and Economic Environment
Brief Historical Background3
Cuba became an independent nation in 1902. From its discovery by Columbus in 1492 until the
Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was a Spanish colony. In the 19th century, the country
became a major sugar producer, with slaves
Cuba at a Glance
from Africa arriving in increasing numbers to
Population: 11.4 million (2015, WB)
work the sugar plantations. The drive for
independence from Spain grew stronger in
Area: 109,884 sq. km, slightly smaller than Pennsylvania
the second half of the 19th century, but it only
GDP: $83.51 billion (2015, current U.S. $, EIU)
came about after the United States entered the Real GDP Growth: 4.3% (2015, EIU); 0.5% (2016 est.,
EIU, although the Cuban government reportedly said the
conflict when the USS Maine sank in Havana
economy shrunk 0.9%)
Harbor after an explosion of undetermined
Key Trading Partners: Exports (2014): Venezuela,
origin. In the aftermath of the Spanish42.6%; Canada, 10.8%; the Netherlands, 9.6%; China,
American War, the United States ruled Cuba
6.2%. Imports (2014): Venezuela, 39.8%; China, 10.2%,
for four years until Cuba was granted its
Spain, 7.9%; Brazil, 4.5%; Mexico, 3.4%; Canada, 3.1%
independence in 1902. Nevertheless, the
(ONEI)
United States still retained the right to
Life Expectancy: 79 years (2014, WB)
intervene in Cuba to preserve Cuban
Literacy (adult): 99.8% (2013, UNDP)
independence and maintain stability in
Legislature: National Assembly of Peoples Power, 612
accordance with the Platt Amendment4 that
members
became part of the Cuban Constitution of
Sources: World Bank (WB); National Office of Statistics
1901. The United States subsequently
and Information (ONEI), Republic of Cuba; U.N.
Development Programme; Economist Intelligence Unit
intervened militarily three times between
(EIU).
1906 and 1921 to restore order, but in 1934,
the Platt Amendment was repealed.
Cuba’s political system as an independent nation was often dominated by authoritarian figures.
Gerardo Machado (1925-1933), who served two terms as president, became increasingly
dictatorial until he was ousted by the military. A short-lived reformist government gave way to a
series of governments that were dominated behind the scenes by military leader Fulgencio Batista
until he was elected president in 1940. Batista was voted out of office in 1944 and was followed
by two successive presidents in a democratic era that ultimately became characterized by
corruption and increasing political violence. Batista seized power in a bloodless coup in 1952,
and his rule progressed into a brutal dictatorship. This fueled popular unrest and set the stage for
Fidel Castro’s rise to power.
Castro led an unsuccessful attack on military barracks in Santiago, Cuba, on July 26, 1953. He
was jailed, but subsequently freed and went into exile in Mexico, where he formed the 26th of
July Movement. Castro returned to Cuba in 1956 with the goal of overthrowing the Batista
3

Portions of this background are drawn from U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Cuba,” April 28, 2011. For
further background, see Rex A. Hudson, ed., Cuba, A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2002); “Country Profile: Cuba,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, September
2006, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Cuba.pdf; Leslie Bethell, ed., Cuba, A Short History
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York:
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971).
4
U.S. Senator Orville Platt introduced an amendment to an army appropriation bill that was approved by both houses
and enacted into law in 1901.

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dictatorship. His revolutionary movement was based in the Sierra Maestra mountains in eastern
Cuba and joined with other resistance groups seeking Batista’s ouster. Batista ultimately fled the
country on January 1, 1959, leading to 47 years of rule under Fidel Castro until he stepped down
from power provisionally in July 2006 because of poor health.
While Castro had promised a return to democratic constitutional rule when he first took power, he
instead moved to consolidate his rule, repress dissent, and imprison or execute thousands of
opponents. Under the new revolutionary government, Castro’s supporters gradually displaced
members of less radical groups. Castro moved toward close relations with the Soviet Union while
relations with the United States deteriorated rapidly as the Cuban government expropriated U.S.
properties. In April 1961, Castro declared that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in
December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. Over the next 30 years, Cuba
was a close ally of the Soviet Union and depended on it for significant assistance until the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. In 1976, however, the Cuban government enacted
a new Constitution setting forth the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) as the leading force in state
and society, with power centered in a Political Bureau headed by Fidel Castro. Cuba’s
Constitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Since then,
legislative authority has been vested in a National Assembly of People’s Power that meets twice
annually for brief periods. When the Assembly is not in session, a Council of State, elected by the
Assembly, acts on its behalf. According to Cuba’s Constitution, the president of the Council of
State is the country’s head of state and government. Executive power in Cuba is vested in a
Council of Ministers, also headed by the country’s head of state and government, that is, the
president of the Council of State.
Fidel Castro served as head of state and government through his position as president of the
Council of State from 1976 until February 2008. While he had provisionally stepped down from
power in July 2006 because of poor health, Fidel still officially retained his position as head of
state and government. National Assembly elections were held in January 2008, and Fidel Castro
was once again among the candidates elected to the 614-member legislative body. (As in the past,
voters were offered a single slate of candidates.) On February 24, 2008, the new Assembly was
scheduled to select from among its ranks the members of the Council of State and its president.
Many observers had speculated that because of his poor health, Fidel would choose not to be
reelected as president of the Council of State, which would confirm his official departure from
heading the Cuban government. Statements from Castro himself in December 2007 hinted at his
potential retirement. That proved true on February 19, 2008, when Fidel announced that he would
not accept the position as president of the Council of State, essentially confirming his departure as
titular head of the Cuban government.

Political Conditions
After Fidel stepped down from power, Cuba’s political succession from Fidel to Raúl Castro was
characterized by considerable stability. After two and a half years of provisionally serving as
president, Raúl Castro officially became Cuba’s president in February 2008, when Cuba’s
legislature selected him as president of the 31-member Council of State.5 While Raúl Castro
5

For more on Cuba’s political succession, see CRS Report RS22742, Cuba’s Political Succession: From Fidel to Raúl
Castro, by (name redacted) . For background discussion of potential Cuban political scenarios envisioned in the
aftermath of Fidel Castro’s stepping down from power in 2006, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political
Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, by (name redacted) .

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began implementing economic reforms in 2008, there has been no change to his government’s
tight control over the political system, and few observers expect such changes to occur with the
government backed up by a strong security apparatus.
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) held its sixth congress in April 2011. While the party
concentrated on making changes to Cuba’s economic model, some political changes also
occurred. As expected, Raúl became first secretary of the PCC, officially replacing his brother
Fidel. Most significantly, Raúl proposed two five-year term limits for top positions in the party
and in the government, calling for systematic rejuvenation, a change that was confirmed by a
January 2012 national PCC conference. Also at the 2012 conference, the PCC approved a
resolution by which its Central Committee would be allowed to replace up to 20% of its 115
members within its five-year mandate.6
In February 2013, Cuba held elections for over 600 members of the National Assembly of
People’s Power, the national legislature, as well as over 1,600 provincial government
representatives, both for five-year terms. Under Cuba’s one-party system, the overwhelming
majority of officials elected are PCC members. Critics maintain that elections in Cuba are a sham
and entirely controlled by the PCC. The new National Assembly selected Raúl Castro for a
second five-year term as president of the Council of State (Cuba’s head of government). In
conformity with the new two-term limit for top officials, Castro indicated that this would be his
last term, which means that he would serve until February 2018, when he would be 86 years of
age.
Most significantly, a much younger official, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez (currently aged 56),
was selected to serve as first vice president of the Council of State, replacing then 82-year-old
José Ramón Machado, part of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 Cuban
revolution. The position of first vice president is significant because, according to the Cuban
Constitution, the person holding the office is the official successor to the president. Prior to his
appointment, Díaz-Canel—an engineer by training—was serving as one of the Council of State’s
six other vice presidents. His appointment as the official constitutional successor to Castro
represents a move toward bringing about generational change in Cuba’s political system. DíazCanel became a member of the Politburo in 2003 and also held top PCC positions in the
provinces of Villa Clara and Holguín. He became education minister in 2009 until he was tapped
to be a vice president of the Council of State. Díaz-Canel has been described in media reports as
an experienced manager with good relations with the military and as someone that worked his
way up through the party.7
Some Cuba watchers maintain that Díaz-Canel is still very much in the shadow of Raúl, and has
not yet taken on a prominent role, and contend that the Cuban military is perhaps the most
important institution to watch as the transition to a post-Castro government unfolds.8 Under Raúl,
who served as defense minister from the beginning of the Cuban revolution until 2008, the Cuban
military has played an increasing role in government, with several military officers and confidants
of Raúl serving as ministers.
6

Juan O. Tamayo, “Cuban Communists OK Term Limits for Party and Government Officials,” Miami Herald, January
29, 2012, and “Cuba’s Communists Meet to Update Party, Not Much Buzz on Street,” Miami Herald, January 28,
2012; Patricia Grogg, “Cuba: Party Aims for Efficient, Inclusive Socialism,” Inter Press Service, February 1, 2012.
7
Damien Cave and Victoria Burnett, “As Castro Era Drifts to Close, a New Face Steps in at No. 2,” New York Times,
February 28, 2013; Marc Frank, “Castro Successor Lacks Charisma But Is Experienced Manager,” Reuters, February
26, 2013.
8
Tracy Wilkinson, “New Face Waits in Cuba,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 2015.

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Speaking on the 60th anniversary of the start of the Cuban revolution on July 26, 2013, President
Castro asserted that a generational transfer of power had already begun, stating that “there is a
slow and orderly transfer of the leadership of the revolution to the new generations.”9 In October
2015, however, Castro stayed with the historical leadership when, after the resignation of 76year-old Minister of the Interior (MININT) General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra because of health
reasons, he replaced Colomé with 77-year-old MININT First Vice Minister General Carlos
Fernández Gondín. In September 2015, the Council of State had given Fernández the honorific
title of Hero of the Republic because of his role fighting in Angola.

April 2016 Communist Party Congress
The PCC’s seventh party congress was held April 16-19, 2016. Few details were made public
ahead of the congress, prompting criticism over the lack of information and consultation
compared with the 2011 party congress.10 While some observers expected there to be a preview of
forthcoming economic changes, no new reform measures were announced. Raúl Castro noted,
however, that Cuba must reestablish a single currency as soon as possible in order to resolve
wage and other economic distortions. Castro reported that just 21% of the more than 300
economic guidelines adopted at the 2011 party congress had been implemented. He said that for
the 2016-2021 period, 268 guidelines were being proposed for updating the country’s economic
model, including 193 modified since the 2011 party congress, 31 the same, and 44 new
guidelines.11 Castro reasserted that Cuba would move forward updating its economic model
“without haste, but without pause.” The slow pace of Cuba’s economic reform process, however,
demonstrates the government’s extreme cautiousness in taking economic actions could have
negative social or political consequences.
Castro also proposed 60 years of age as the maximum age to join the Central Committee and 70
years of age as the maximum age to assume a leadership position in the party and in state and
government institutions and mass organizations. He noted that these changes would be
implemented through future reforms to the constitution and that there would be a five-year period
of transition for the introduction of these age limits for top positions. In contrast, on the last day
of the congress, Castro (currently 85 years of age) and José Ramón Machado Ventura (currently
86 years of age) were reelected as first and second secretaries of the PCC. Both will continue to
serve on the 17-member Political Bureau (Politburo)—10 other Politburo members will continue
to serve on the ruling body, while 5 new members, including 3 women, were elected, bringing the
total number of women to 4.12 The membership of the Central Committee grew from 116 to 142,
with 55 new members younger than 60 years of age.13 While Castro reiterated his intention to step
down as President in February 2018, at this juncture it appears that he will retain his position as
first secretary of the PCC.
9

Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Raúl Castro Promises Succession Has Started,” Reuters, July 26, 2013.
“Party Congress Less Than a Month Away,” Granma, March 30, 2016; “Andrea Rodriguez and Michael
Weissenstein, “Unusual Dissent Erupts Inside Cuban Communist Party,” World Politics Review, March 30, 2016; and
“Cuba Politics: Uncertainty Surrounds Upcoming PCC Congress,” EIU ViewsWire, April 8, 2016.
11
Raúl Castro Ruz, “Full Text of Central Report: The development of the national economy, along with the struggle for
peace, and our ideological resolve, constitute the Party’s principal missions,” Granma, April 18, 2016, available at
http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-struggle-for-peaceand-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-partys-principal-missions.
12
“Raúl Present New Politburo of the CC of the PCC,” Cubadebate, April 19, 2016.
13
William M. Leogrande, “Updating the Party: Cuba’s New (and Not So New) Leaders,” Huffington Post, April 23,
2016.
10

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Death of Fidel Castro
Cuba’s former long-time ruler Fidel Castro died on November 25, 2016, at 90 years of age.
Although Fidel Castro’s historical legacy is significant—regardless of whether one views him
positively or negatively—he has not held formal power since he stepped down in 2006. After
stepping down, Fidel continued to author essays published in Cuban media that cast a shadow on
Raúl’s rule. Many Cubans reportedly believe that Fidel encouraged so-called hardliners in Cuba’s
Communist Party and government bureaucracy to slow the pace of reforms. With Fidel’s passing,
some Cuban entrepreneurs hope that the pace of reforms might accelerate. Fidel’s death points to
the generational change that has already begun in the Cuban government and a passing of the
older generation of the 1959 revolution.
Upon Fidel’s passing, President Obama issued a statement extending condolences to Fidel’s
family and extending “a hand of friendship to the Cuban people.” He said that “history will
record and judge the enormous impact of this singular figure on the people and world around
him.” The President acknowledged that while the United States and Cuba have had profound
political disagreements, his Administration has “worked hard to put the past behind us, pursuing a
future in which the relationship between our two countries is defined not by our differences but
by the many things that we share as neighbors and friends....”14

Human Rights
The Cuban government has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply
restricting freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights since
the early years of the Cuban revolution. The government has continued to harass members of
human rights and other dissident organizations. These include the Ladies in White (Damas de
Blanco), currently led by Berta Soler, formed in 2003 by the female relatives of the so-called
“group of 75” dissidents arrested that year; and the Patriotic Union of Cuba (UNPACU), led by
José Daniel Ferrer García, established in 2011 by several dissident groups with the goal of
fighting peacefully for civil liberties and human rights. Two Cuban political prisoners conducting
hunger strikes have died in recent years, Orlando Zapata Tamayo in February 2010 and Wilman
Villar Mendoza in January 2012. Tamayo died after an 85-day hunger strike that he had initiated
to protest inhumane conditions in Cuba’s prisons. Villar Mendoza died following a 50-day hunger
strike after he was convicted of “contempt” of authority and sentenced to four years in prison.
Other hunger strikers have included Vladimir Morera Bacallao, discussed below, who conducted
a hunger strike for more than 80 days in late 2015, and Guillermo Fariñas, who ended an almost
two-month hunger strike in October 2016.
While the human rights situation in Cuba remains poor, the country has made some advances in
recent years. In 2008, Cuba lifted a ban on Cubans staying in hotels that previously had been
restricted to foreign tourists in a policy that had been pejoratively referred to as “tourist
apartheid.” In recent years, as the government has enacted limited economic reforms, it has been
much more open to debate on economic issues. In January 2013, Cuba took the significant step of
eliminating its long-standing policy of requiring an exit permit and letter of invitation for Cubans
to travel abroad. The change has allowed prominent dissidents and human rights activists to travel
abroad and return to Cuba.
Political Prisoners. The Cuban government has released a number of political prisoners in recent
years. With the intercession of the Cuban Catholic Church, the Cuban government released some
14

White House, “Statement by the President on the Passing of Fidel Castro,” November 26, 2016.

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125 political prisoners in 2010 and 2011, including the remaining members of the “group of 75”
that were still in prison. In the aftermath of the December 2014 shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba,
the Cuban government released another 53 political prisoners (although as noted below, six were
rearrested in 2015).15
Among the 53 released were five jailed dissidents whom Amnesty International (AI) had named
as prisoners of conscience in 201316 as well as several other dissidents whose cases AI was
following. Two of the five prisoners of conscience, Emilio Planas Robert and Iván Fernández
Depestre, had been imprisoned since September 2012 and July 2013, respectively, and had been
convicted of “dangerousness” (a preemptive measure defined as the special proclivity of a person
to commit crimes). The other three “prisoners of conscience,” brothers Alexeis, Django, and
Vianco Vargas Martín, were members of UNPACU. They were detained in late 2012 and
convicted in June 2014 after a summary trial in which they were charged with “public disorder.”17
Three other dissidents whose cases were followed by AI were released from prison on December
9, 2014—Ladies in White member Sonia Garro Alfonso; her husband, Ramón Alejandro Muñoz
González; and a neighbor, Eugenio Hernández. They had been held since March 2012.18
In 2015, the Cuban government released two additional political prisoners named as prisoners of
conscience by Amnesty International, but one of them was rearrested in late 2016. Ciro Alexis
Casonova Pérez, who had been placed under house arrest in June 2014 after demonstrating in the
streets, was convicted in December 2014 of public disorder and sentenced to one year in prison.
In April 2015, AI declared Casonova Pérez a prisoner of conscience, and he was ultimately
released in June 2015.19
Danilo Maldonado Machado (known as El Sexto), a graffiti artist, was unconditionally released
from prison in October 2015, after almost 10 months in prison. Although he was never formally
charged, Maldonado reportedly was accused of “aggravated contempt” for painting the names
Fidel and Raúl on two pigs that he intended to release in Havana’s Central Park as part of an art
show. Maldonado, who had attended Miami Dade College in 2014 on a scholarship program,
went on a hunger strike before his release. On November 26, 2016, however, Maldonado was
arrested again after he made a video celebrating the death of Fidel Castro, and he was
subsequently again declared a prisoner of conscience by AI, which has called for his immediate
and unconditional release.
As noted above, 6 of the 53 political prisoners released in December 2014 at the time of the
improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations were rearrested in 2015. One of the prisoners, Vladimir
Morera Bacallao, detained in April 2015 for hanging a sign outside his home in protest of
municipal elections, began a hunger strike in early October 2015 that endured more than 80 days.

15

The list of 53 prisoners reportedly had been drawn up by the Obama Administration and included those jailed for
having peacefully exercised their rights of freedom of expression and assembly. David Adams, Matt Spetalnick, and
Lesley Wroughton, “How Prisoners Names Were Drawn Up in U.S.-Cuba Secret Talks,” Reuters News, January 12,
2015.
16
AI defines prisoners of conscience as those jailed because of their political, religious, or other conscientiously held
beliefs, ethnic origin, sex, color, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth, sexual orientation, or other
status, provided they have neither used nor advocated violence.
17
AI, “Prisoners of Conscience Released in Cuba,” January 9, 2015.
18
AI, “Government Critics Under House Arrest,” December 15, 2014.
19
AI, “Political Dissident Must Be Released,” April 2, 2015; “El Régimen Excarcela al Opositor Ciro Alexis Casanova
Pérez,” Diario de Cuba, June 11, 2015.

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Going beyond AI’s narrow definition of prisoners of conscience, the Cuban government has held
a larger number of political prisoners, generally defined as a person imprisoned for his or her
political activities. In April 2016, the Havana-based Cuban Commission for Human Rights and
National Reconciliation (CCDHRN) estimated that the Cuban government held 82 people
imprisoned for political motives (up from 60 people in June 2015), with 11 others released from
prison but still on parole—for a total of 93 convicted for political reasons. CCDHRN’s report
includes dozens of opposition activists, a number of whom are members of UNPACU, as well as
those convicted on such charges as hijacking, terrorism, sabotage, other acts of violence, and
espionage.20
The State Department’s human rights report on Cuba covering 2015 stated that it was difficult to
determine an accurate number of political prisoners because of the Cuban government’s lack of
transparency, its systematic violation of due process rights, and its continued denial of access to
Cuban jails to independent monitors. The report noted, however, that two independent
organizations estimated that there were 60 to 70 political prisoners.21
Short-Term Detentions. Short-term detentions for political reasons have increased significantly
over the past several years, a reflection of the government’s change of tactics in repressing dissent
away from long-term imprisonment. The CCDHRN reports that there were at least 2,074 such
detentions in 2010, 4,123 in 2011, 6,602 in 2012, and 6,424 in 2013. For 2014, the group reported
that there were at least 8,899 such detentions, almost 39% higher than the previous year. In 2015,
the CCDHRN reported at least 8,616 short-term detentions, with 1,447 in November alone. In
2016, there were at least 9,940 short-term arbitrary detentions for political reasons, higher than
annual levels over the past several years. In March 2016, for example, there were 1,416
detentions, including almost 500 detentions during President Obama’s visit.22
Bloggers and Civil Society Groups. Over the past several years, numerous independent Cuban
blogs have been established that are often critical of the Cuban government. Cuban blogger Yoani
Sánchez has received considerable international attention since 2007 for her website, Generación
Y, which includes commentary critical of the Cuban government. In May 2014, Sánchez launched
an independent digital newspaper in Cuba, 14 y medio, available on the Internet, distributed
through a variety of methods in Cuba, including CDs, USB flash drives, and DVDs.23
The Catholic Church, which, as noted above, played a prominent role in the release of political
prisoners in 2010 and 2011, has been active in broadening the debate on social and economic
issues through its publications Palabra Nueva (New Word) and Espacio Laical (Space for
Laity).24 The Church has also played an increasing role in providing social services, including
soup kitchens, services for the elderly and other vulnerable groups, after-school programs, job
training, and even college coursework. In 2014, the two former editors of Espacio Laical,
Roberto Veiga and Lenier Gonzalez, launched an online forum known as Cuba Posible.25
20

Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional (CCDHRN), “Comunicado,” April 25, 2016,
available at http://www.14ymedio.com/nacional/LISTA-PRESOS-COMUNICADO2_CYMFIL20160425_0001.pdf.
21
U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016.
22
CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Diciembre de 2016,” January 5, 2017.
23
Sánchez’s website, which has links to numerous other independent blogs and websites, is available at
http://generacionyen.wordpress.com/, and her online digital newspaper is available at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
24
See http://www.palabranueva.net/newPage/index.php and http://www.espaciolaical.org/.
25
Marc Frank, “Cuba’s Catholic Church May Restrict Rare Forum for Open Debate,” Reuters, June 16, 2014; Daniel
Trotta and Rosa Tania Valdés, “Cuban Editors, Pressured to Leave Magazine, Announce New Venture,” Reuters, July
1, 2014. The Cuba Posible website is available at http://cubaposible.net/.

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Estado de SATS, a forum founded in 2010 by human rights activist Antonio Rodiles, has had the
goal of encouraging open debate on cultural, social, and political issues.26 The group has hosted
numerous events and human rights activities over the years, but has also been the target of
government harassment. In November 2012, Rodiles was arrested and held for 19 days on
charges with “resisting authority,” but he was released after Amnesty International issued an
urgent appeal on his case. In early July 2015, Rodiles was severely beaten for attempting to
participate in the weekly protest march of the Ladies in White.27
Human Rights Reporting on Cuba
Amnesty International (AI), Cuba, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/cuba/.
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (Comisión Cubana de Derechos
Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional, CCDHRN), the independent Havana-based human rights organization
produces a monthly report on short-term detentions for political reasons.
CCDHRN, “Cuba: Algunos Actos de Represion Politica en el Mes de Diciembre de 2016,” January 5, 2017.
CCDHRN, “Comunicado” April 25, 2016 (list of political prisoners), available at http://www.14ymedio.com/
nacional/LISTA-PRESOS-COMUNICADO2_CYMFIL20160425_0001.pdf.
14ymedio.com, independent digital newspaper, based in Havana available at http://www.14ymedio.com/.
Human Rights Watch (HRW), https://www.hrw.org/americas/cuba.
HRW’s 2017 World Report maintains that “the Cuban government continues to repress dissent and punish
public criticism,” available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/cuba.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report 2015, March 17, 2016, Chapter IV has a
section on Cuba, available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2015/doc-en/InformeAnual2015-Cap4-CubaEN.pdf.
U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2015, April 13, 2016, available at
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=253005.

Trafficking in Persons. The State Department released its 2016 Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
Report on June 30, 2016, and for the second consecutive year Cuba was placed on the Tier 2
Watchlist (in prior years, Cuba had Tier 3 status).28 Tier 3 status refers to countries whose
governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards for combatting trafficking and are
not making significant efforts to do so. In contrast, Tier 2 Watchlist status refers to countries
whose governments, despite making significant efforts, do not fully comply with the minimum
standards and still have some specific problems (an increasing number of victims or failure to
provide evidence of increasing anti-trafficking efforts) or whose governments have made
commitments to take additional anti-trafficking steps over the next year.
The State Department maintained in its 2015 report that Cuba was upgraded to Tier 2 Watchlist
status because of its progress in addressing and prosecuting sex trafficking, including the
provision of services to sex trafficking victims, and its continued efforts to address sex tourism
and the demand for commercial sex.
In its 2016 report, the State Department maintained that Cuba remained on the Tier 2 Watchlist
for the second consecutive year because the country did not demonstrate overall increasing anti26

See the group’s website at http://www.estadodesats.com/.
Nora Games Torres, “Cuban Dissidents Report Being Attacked by Government Security Forces,” Miami Herald,
July 6, 2015.
28
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2016, pp. 146-147, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/258876.pdf.
27

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trafficking efforts compared to 2015. Nevertheless, the 2016 report noted that the Cuban
government continued efforts to address sex trafficking, including prosecution and conviction,
and the provision of services to victims. The State Department noted that the Cuban government
released a report on its anti-trafficking efforts in October 2015; that multiple government
ministries were engaged in anti-trafficking efforts; and that the government funded child
protection centers and guidance centers for women and families, which served crime victims,
including trafficking victims. However, the report also noted that the Cuban government did not
prohibit forced labor, report efforts to prevent forced labor, or recognize forced labor as a possible
issue affecting Cubans in medical missions abroad.

Economic Conditions
Cuba’s economy is largely state-controlled, with the government owning most means of
production and employing a majority of the workforce. Key sectors of the economy that generate
foreign exchange include the export of professional services (largely medical personnel to
Venezuela); tourism, which has grown significantly since the mid-1990s, with 3.5 million tourists
visiting Cuba in 2015; nickel mining, with the Canadian mining company Sherritt International
involved in a joint investment project; and a biotechnology and pharmaceutical sector that
supplies the domestic health care system and has fostered a significant export industry.
Remittances from relatives living abroad, especially from the United States, have also become an
important source of hard currency, amounting to some $3 billion in 2015. The once-dominant
sugar industry has declined significantly over the past 20 years; in 1990, Cuba produced 8.4
million tons of sugar, while in 2016 it produced just 1.6 million tons (compared to 1.9 million
tons in 2015).29
Cuba is highly dependent on Venezuela for its oil needs. In 2000, the two countries signed a
preferential oil agreement that until recently provided Cuba with some 90,000 barrels of oil per
day, about two-thirds of its consumption. Cuba’s goal of becoming a net oil exporter with the
development of its offshore deepwater oil reserves was set back significantly in 2012, when the
drilling of three exploratory oil wells was unsuccessful. The setback in Cuba’s offshore oil
development combined with political and economic difficulties in Venezuela have raised concerns
among Cuban officials about the security of the support received from Venezuela. Cuba is
increasingly focusing on the need to diversify its trading partners and to seek alternative energy
suppliers in the case of a cutback or cutoff of Venezuelan oil.30
Over the years, Cuba has expressed pride for the nation’s accomplishments in health and
education. According to the United Nations Development Program’s 2015 Human Development
Report, Cuba is ranked 67 out of 188 countries worldwide and is characterized as having “high
human development,” with life expectancy at 79.4 years and adult literacy estimated at almost
100%.
In terms of economic growth, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to
1993, with an estimated decline in gross domestic product ranging from 35% to 50% when the
Soviet Union collapsed and Russian financial assistance to Cuba practically ended. Since then,
29

Information and statistics were drawn from several sources: U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations with Cuba,”
September 7, 2016; Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, “Turismo Internacional Indicadores Seleccionados,
Enero-Diciembre 2015, March 2016; Marc Frank, “Cuba 300,000 Tonnes Short of Raw Sugar Goal as Harvest EndsSources,” Reuters News, June 9, 2016.
30
For example, see “Cuba, Economy, Seeking New Partners,” Latin American Caribbean & Central America Report,
May 2013.

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however, there has been considerable improvement. From 1994 to 2000, as Cuba moved forward
with some limited market-oriented economic reforms, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually.
Economic growth was especially strong in the 2004-2007 period, registering an impressive 11%
and 12%, respectively, in 2005 and 2006 (see Figure 2). The economy benefitted from the growth
of the tourism, nickel, and oil sectors and support from Venezuela and China in terms of
investment commitments and credit lines. However, the economy was hard hit by several
hurricanes and storms in 2008 and the global financial crisis in 2009, with the government having
to implement austerity measures. As a result, economic growth slowed significantly. Growth
improved modestly from 2010-2014, averaging 2.4% annually during the period, although growth
was just 1% in 2014 because of Cuba’s challenges in shifting from a centrally planned to a more
decentralized economy.
Stronger growth of 4.4% returned in 2015, but the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) maintains
that economic growth dropped to an estimated 0.5% economic growth in 2016 because of
austerity measures, lower export earnings, and reduced support from Venezuela. (At the end of
2016, Cuba’s economic minister reportedly said that the economy had shrunk 0.9% during the
year.)31 The economic crisis in Venezuela has affected Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba. Looking
ahead, the EIU forecasts economic growth of 1% in 2017 and 2.4% in 2018, far less than the 5%
that the government and some economists maintain is needed to develop the economy and create
new jobs.32
Figure 2. Cuba: Real GDP Growth (%) 2005-2016

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Data Tool, 2017.

The government of Raúl Castro has implemented a number of economic policy changes, but there
has been some disappointment that more far-reaching reforms have not been forthcoming. As
noted above, the government employs a majority of the labor force, almost 80%, but it has been
allowing more private sector activities. In 2010, the government opened up a wide range of
activities for self-employment and small businesses. There are now almost 200 categories of work

31

Sarah Marsh and Marc Frank, “Cuba Says Economy Shrank This Year in Wake of Venezuela Crisis,” Reuters News,
December 27, 2016.
32
“Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), October 2016.

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allowed, and the number of self-employed has risen from some 156,000 at the end of 2010 to
some 507,000 in 2016.33
Analysts contend, however, that the government needs to do more to support the development of
the private sector, including an expansion of authorized activities to include more white-collar
occupations and state support for credit to support small businesses. A major challenge for the
development of the private sector is the lack of money in circulation. Most Cubans do not make
enough money to support the development of small businesses; those private sector activities
catering to tourists and foreign diplomats have fared better than those serving the Cuban market.
Among Cuba’s significant economic challenges are low wages (whereby workers cannot satisfy
basic human needs) and the related problem of how to unify Cuba’s two official currencies
circulating in the country.34 Most people are paid in Cuban pesos (CUPs), and the minimum
monthly wage in Cuba is 225 pesos (U.S. $9),35 but for increasing amounts of consumer goods,
convertible pesos (CUCs) are used. (For personal transactions, the exchange rate for the two
currencies is CUP24/CUC1.) Cubans with access to foreign remittances or who work in jobs that
give them access to convertible pesos are far better off than those Cubans who do not have such
access.
In October 2013, the Cuban government announced that it would move toward ending its dualcurrency system and move toward monetary unification, but the action has been delayed for
several years. In March 2014, the government had provided insight about how monetary
unification would move forward when it published instructions for when the CUC is removed
from circulation; no date was provided, but it was referred to as “day zero.” Currency reform is
ultimately expected to lead to productivity gains and improve the business climate, but an
adjustment would create winners and losers.36 As noted above, at the PCC’s April 2016 Congress,
Raúl Castro called for moving toward a single currency as soon as possible to resolve economic
distortions.
A significant reform effort under Raúl Castro has focused on the agricultural sector, a vital issue
because Cuba reportedly imports some 70%-80% of its food needs according to the World Food
Programme.37 In an effort to boost food production, the government has turned over idle land to
farmers and given farmers more control over how to use their land and what supplies to buy.
Despite these and other efforts, overall food production has been significantly below targets.
In March 2014, Cuba approved a new foreign investment law with the goal of attracting needed
foreign capital to the country. The law cuts taxes on profits by half, to 15%, and exempts
companies from paying taxes for the first eight years of operation. Employment or labor taxes are
also eliminated, although companies still must hire labor through state-run companies, with
agreed-upon wages. A fast-track procedure for small projects reportedly will streamline the
approval process, and the government has agreed to improve the transparency and time of the

33

“Background 10 Years, 10 Reforms form Cuba’s Raúl Castro by DPA Correspondents,” Deutsche Press-Agentur,
August 1, 2016.
34
For more on Cuba’s currency problem, see “Replacing Cuba’s Dual Currency System: What Are the Issues That
Really Matter?” Latin American Economy & Business, July 2013.
35
U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, Cuba,” April 13, 2016.
36
“Cuba: Exchange Rate Unification Approaching,” Latin America Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
March 2014.
37
“Cuba, Current issues and what the World Food Programme is doing,” World Food Programme, available at
https://www.wfp.org/countries/cuba.

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approval process for larger investments.38 It remains to be seen to what extent the new law will
attract investment. Over the past several years, Cuba has closed a number of joint ventures with
foreign companies and has arrested several executives of foreign companies reportedly for
corrupt practices. According to some observers, investors will want evidence, not just legislation,
that the government is prepared to allow foreign investors to make a profit in Cuba.39
In October 2014, the Cuban government issued a list of some 246 projects in which it was
seeking some $8.7 billion in investment in such sectors as energy, tourism, agriculture, and
industry.40 Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment Rodrigo Malmierca reportedly
maintained in November 2015 that 40 of these projects were in “advanced negotiations” and that
Cuba has signed 36 foreign investment projects since the 2014 investment law was approved, but
did not indicate the value of these projects. In November 2015, Malmierca announced a list of
326 projects in which it is seeking $8.2 billion in foreign investment, including new opportunities
in health care, tourism, transportation, construction, agriculture, and renewable energy.41
In December 2015, Cuba reached a Paris Club arrangement with a group of 14 creditor countries
to forgive $8.5 billion out of $11.1 billion of debt owed, including late interest. Pursuant to the
agreement, Cuba will pay $2.6 billion over a period of 18 years. The creditor countries include
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.42 The agreement resolves an outstanding
economic challenge for the Cuban government and could make it easier for Cuba to gain access
to credit and attract investment.43 (In 2014, Russia wrote off 90% of Cuba’s $32 billion Soviet-era
debt. See “Cuba’s Foreign Relations” below.)
As noted above, no new economic measures emanated from the PCC’s seventh party congress
held April 16-19, 2016. After the party congress, press articles reported that one of Cuba’s leading
advocates for economic reforms, Omar Everleny Pérez, was dismissed from his position at the
Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, spreading concern about the Cuban government’s
retrenchment from its commitment to reform.44
A number of Cuba’s economists are pressing for the government to enact more far-reaching
reforms and embrace competition for key parts of the economy and state-run enterprises. They
criticize the government’s continued reliance on central planning and its monopoly on foreign
trade.45 Cuba’s economic potential, according to one analysis, is held back by several factors,
including the lack of political will; dilapidated infrastructure; a transportation sector in need of
repair and modernization; an inefficient and poorly resourced construction sector; and a

38

“Cuba Approves New Foreign Investment Law,” Latin American Regional Report: Caribbean & Central America,
April 2014; “What’s Changed in Cuba’s New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 29, 2014.
39
Marc Frank, “Cuba Plans Big Tax Breaks to Lure Foreign Investors,” Reuters News, March 26, 2014; and Daniel
Trotta, “Cuba’s Past Raises Skepticism About New Foreign Investment Law,” Reuters News, March 31, 2014.
40
“Cuba Seeks $8.7 Bn in Foreign Investment,” EFE News Service, November 4, 2014.
41
“Cuba Seeks $8.2 Billion in Foreign Investment for 326 Projects,” Reuters News, November 3, 2015.
42
Paris Club, “The Group of Creditors of Cuba and the Republic of Cuba Agree to Clearance of All Arrears,” press
release, December 12, 2015.
43
“Cuba Seals ‘Historic’ Debt Pact with Paris Club,” Agence France Press, December 14, 2015.
44
Andrea Rodriguez, “Renowned Cuban Pro-Reform Economist Fired as Chill Set In,” World Politics Review, April
21, 2016.
45
Marc Frank, “As Cuban Economy Stagnates, Economists Press for Deeper Reforms,” Reuters News, October 24,
2014.

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government bureaucracy that suffers from morale problems, a weak decisionmaking process, and
a lack of familiarity with international practice.46
For Additional Reading on the Cuban Economy
Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, annual proceedings, available at http://www.ascecuba.org/
publications/annual-proceedings/.
Brookings Institution
Richard E. Feinberg and Richard S. Newfarmer, Tourism in Cuba, Riding the Wave Toward Sustainable Prosperity,
available at https://www.brookings.edu/research/tourism-in-cuba/.
Richard E. Feinberg, The Cuban Economy Could Sing—with a Stronger Score, October 13, 2016, available at
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/10/13/the-cuban-economy-could-sing-with-astronger-score/.
Richard E. Feinberg and Ted Piccone, eds., Cuba’s Economic Change in Comparative Perspective, November 2014,
available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/11/cuba-economic-change-comparativeperspective.
Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: The Beginning of the End? June 2014, available
at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/06/16-cuba-venezuela-alliance-piccone-trinkunas.
The Cuban Economy, La Economia Cubana, website maintained by Arch Ritter, from Carlton University,
Ottawa, Canada, available at http://thecubaneconomy.com/.
Revista Temas (Havana), links to the Cuban journal’s articles on economy and politics, in Spanish available at
http://temas.cult.cu/.
Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas e Información, República de Cuba (Cuba’s National Office of Statistics and
Information), available at http://www.one.cu/.

Cuba’s Foreign Relations
During the Cold War, Cuba had extensive relations with and support from the Soviet Union, with
billions of dollars in annual subsidies to sustain the Cuban economy. This subsidy system helped
fund an activist foreign policy and support for guerrilla movements and revolutionary
governments abroad in Latin America and Africa. With an end to the Cold War, the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, and the loss of Soviet financial support, Cuba was forced to abandon its
revolutionary activities abroad. As its economy reeled from the loss of Soviet support, Cuba was
forced to open up its economy and economic relations with countries worldwide. In 2014, Cuba’s
leading trading partners in terms of Cuban exports were Venezuela (almost 43%), Canada, the
Netherlands, and China, while the leading sources of Cuba’s imports were Venezuela (almost
40%), China, Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Canada, Italy, the United States, Argentina, and Germany.47
Russia. Relations with Russia, which had diminished significantly in the aftermath of the Cold
War, have been strengthened somewhat over the past several years. In 2008, then-Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev visited Havana, while Raúl Castro visited Russia in 2009 and again
in 2012. Current Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Cuba in July 2014 on his way to attend
the BRICS48 summit in Brazil. Just before arriving in Cuba, Putin signed into law an agreement
writing off 90% of Cuba’s $32 billion Soviet-era debt, with some $3.5 billion to be paid back by

46

Fulton Armstrong, “Cuba’s Limited Absorptive Capacity Will Slow Normalization,” Center for Latin American &
Latino Studies, Cuba Initiative, American University, October 20, 2015.
47
Statistics drawn from Oficina Nacional de Estadística e Información, República de Cuba, Anuario Estadístico de
Cuba 2014, Capítulo 8: Sector Externo, Edición 2015.
48
The BRICS is an association of five major emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

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Cuba over a 10-year period that would fund Russian investment projects in Cuba.49 In the
aftermath of Putin’s trip, there were press reports alleging that Russia would reopen its signals
intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba, which had closed in 2002, but President Putin denied
reports that his government would reopen the facility.50
While trade relations between Russia and Cuba are not significant, two Russian energy
companies have been involved in oil exploration in Cuba, and a third announced its involvement
in 2014. Gazprom had been in a partnership with the Malaysian state oil company, Petronas, that
conducted unsuccessful deepwater oil drilling off Cuba’s western coast in 2012. The Russian oil
company Zarubezhneft began drilling in Cuba’s shallow coastal waters east of Havana in
December 2012, but stopped work in April 2013 because of disappointing results. During
President Putin’s July 2014 visit to Cuba, Russian energy companies Rosneft and Zarubezhneft
signed an agreement with Cuba’s state oil company CubaPetroleo (Cupet) for the development of
an offshore exploration block, and Rosneft agreed to cooperate with Cuba in studying ways to
optimize existing production at mature fields.51 Some energy analysts are skeptical about the
prospects for the offshore project given the unsuccessful attempts by foreign oil companies
drilling wells in Cuba’s deepwaters.
In January 2015, as U.S.-Cuba normalization talks were beginning in Havana, a Russian
intelligence ship docked in Havana. U.S. officials downplayed the arrival of the ship, maintaining
that it was legal and not out of the ordinary.52 Russian officials publicly welcomed the
improvement in U.S.-Cuban relations, although the change in U.S. policy could be viewed as a
potential setback for Russian overtures in the region.
In early October 2016, a Russian military official maintained that Russia was reconsidering
reestablishing a military presence in Cuba (and Vietnam), although there was no indication that
Cuba would be open to the return of the Russian military.53
China. Relations with China have also strengthened in recent years. During the Cold War, the
two countries did not have close relations because of Sino-Soviet tensions, but bilateral relations
have grown close in recent years, with Chinese trade and investment in Cuba increasing. Chinese
President Hu Jintao visited Cuba in 2004 and again in 2008, while Chinese Vice President Xi
Jinping visited Cuba in June 2011 and again in July 2014, this time as China’s president, after
attending the BRICS summit in Brazil. Raúl Castro had also visited China in 2012 on a four-day
visit, in which the two countries reportedly signed cooperation agreements focusing on trade and
investment issues. During Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit, the two countries reportedly signed 29 trade,
debt, credit, and other agreements. While in Cuba, the Chinese president said that “China and

49

That agreement had been discussed in a 2013 visit by now Prime Minister Medvedev to Cuba, and had been
announced in December 2013. Anna Andrianova and Bill Faries, “Russia Forgives $32B of Debt, Wants to Do
Business in Cuba,” Bloomberg News, July 13, 2014; Marc Frank, “Russia Signs Deal to Forgive $29 Billion of Cuba’s
Soviet-Era Debt–Diplomats,” Reuters, December 9, 2013; “Castro Declares He Had a Good Visit with Russia’s
Medvedev,” Agence France Presse, February 23, 2013.
50
“Putin Denies Russia to Reopen Soviet-Era Spy Post in Cuba,” Reuters News, July 17, 2014.
51
“Russia Cements Energy Ties with Latin America,” Oil Daily, July 15, 2014.
52
“Russian Spy Ship Arrives in Havana Ahead of U.S.-Cuba Talks,” Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications,
January 21, 2015.
53
Andrew Roth, “Russia Has Its Permanent Air Base in Syria; Now It’s Looking at Cuba and Vietnam,” Washington
Post, October 8, 2016; and Mimi Whitefield, “Russian Media Report: Kremlin Considering Reopening Bases in Cuba,
Vietnam,” Miami Herald, October 7, 2016.

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Cuba being socialist countries, we are closely united by the same missions, ideals, and
struggles.”54
European Union. The European Union (EU) and Cuba held seven rounds of talks—two in 2014,
four in 2015, and one on March 3-4, 2016—on a Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement
covering political, trade, and development issues. Ultimately, an agreement was reached after the
last round of talks and initialed by Cuba and the EU in Havana on March 11, 2016.55 In 1996, the
EU adopted a Common Position on Cuba, stating that the objective of EU relations with Cuba
included encouraging “a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.” The position also stipulated that full EU economic cooperation with
Cuba would depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom. 56 The new
cooperation agreement, which has to be officially approved by EU governments, would replace
the 1996 Common Position. It includes political dialogue and a framework to deepen relations in
a number of areas, including trade.
Venezuela and Other Latin American Countries. For more than 15 years, Venezuela has been a
significant source of support for Cuba. Dating back to 2000 under populist President Hugo
Chávez, Venezuela began providing subsidized oil (some 100,000 barrels per day) and
investment. For its part, Cuba has sent thousands of medical personnel to Venezuela. In the
aftermath of Chávez’s death in March 2013, Venezuela’s mounting economic challenges since
mid-2014 because of the rapid decline in oil prices, and the defeat of the ruling party in
Venezuela’s December 2015 legislative elections, Cuba has been concerned about the future of
Venezuelan financial support. Cuba’s economic growth has slowed to a projected 0.5% in 2016,
to a large extent due to the decrease in Venezuelan support.57
With El Salvador’s restoration of relations with Cuba in June 2009, all Latin American nations
now have official diplomatic relations with Cuba. Cuba has increasingly become more engaged in
Latin America beyond the already close relations with Venezuela. Cuba is a member of the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), a Venezuelan-led integration and cooperation
scheme founded in 2004. In August 2013, Cuba began deploying thousands of doctors to Brazil in
a program aimed at providing doctors to rural areas of Brazil, with Cuba earning some $225
million a year for supplying the medical personnel.58 Brazil also has been a major investor in the
development of the port of Mariel west of Havana. Since 2012, Cuba has hosted peace talks
between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. In early
November 2015, Raúl Castro visited Mexico on a trip designed to warm relations and increase
economic linkages.
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Cuba became a full member
of the Rio Group of Latin American and Caribbean nations in November 2008, and a member of
the succeeding CELAC that was officially established in December 2011 to boost regional
cooperation, but without the participation of the United States or Canada. In January 2013, Raúl
Castro assumed the presidency of the organization for one year, and Cuba hosted the group’s
54

Marc Frank, “Chinese President Ends Regional Tour in Cradle of Cuban Revolution,” Reuters News, July 23, 2014.
European Union, External Action, “EU Relations with Cuba,” at http://eeas.europa.eu/cuba/index_en.htm.
56
European Union, Official Journal of the European Commission, “Common Position of 2 December 1996, Defined by
the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, on Cuba,” (96/697/CFSP), December 2, 1996.
57
“Cuba Country Report,” Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), October 2016. Also see William M. Leogrande,
“Venezuelan Contagion Hits Cuba’s Economy, Putting Reforms in Jeopardy,” August 1, 2016.
58
Anthony Boadle, “Cuban Doctors Tend to Brazil’s Poor, Giving Rousseff a Boost,” Reuters News, December 1,
2013.
55

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second summit in January 2014 in Havana, attended by leaders from across the hemisphere as
well as United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The Secretary General reportedly raised
human rights issues with Cuban officials, including the subject of Cuba’s ratification of U.N.
human rights accords and “arbitrary detentions” by the Cuban government.59
Summits of the Americas. Cuba had expressed interest in attending the sixth Summit of the
Americas in April 2012 in Cartagena, Colombia, but ultimately was not invited to attend. The
United States and Canada expressed opposition to Cuba’s participation. Previous summits were
limited to the hemisphere’s 34 democratically elected leaders, and the Organization of American
States (OAS) (in which Cuba does not participate) has played a key role in summit
implementation and follow-up activities. Several Latin American nations vowed not to attend the
seventh Summit of the Americas to be held in Panama on April 10-11, 2015, unless Cuba was
allowed to participate, and as a result, Panama announced in August 2014 that it would invite
Cuba to attend. Cuba’s participation was a looming challenge for the Obama Administration, but
in December 2014, when President Obama announced a new policy approach toward Cuba, he
said that the United States was prepared to have Cuba participate in the summit. Cuba ultimately
participated in the summit in Panama, with a historic sidelines meeting between President Obama
and President Raúl Castro. (For more on the summit, see CRS Report R43952, Seventh Summit of
the Americas: In Brief, by (name redacted)
.)
OAS. Cuba was excluded from participation in the OAS in 1962 because of its identification with
Marxism-Leninism, but in 2009, the OAS overturned the 1962 resolution in a move that could
eventually lead to Cuba’s reentry into the regional organization in accordance with the practices,
purposes, and principles of the OAS. While the Cuban government welcomed the OAS vote to
overturn the 1962 resolution, it asserted that it would not return to the OAS.60
International Organizations. Cuba is an active participant in international forums, including the
United Nations (U.N.) and the controversial United Nations Human Rights Council. Cuba also
has received support over the years from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), both of
which have offices in Havana. The U.N. has played a significant role in providing relief and
recovery from Hurricane Sandy that struck in October 2012.
Since 1991, the U.N. General Assembly has approved a resolution each year criticizing the U.S.
economic embargo and urging the United States to lift it. In 2015, the vote calling for the United
States to lift the embargo occurred on October 27, with 191 votes in favor and 2 votes (Israel and
the United States) against.61 Leading up to the vote, there had been speculation that the United
States would abstain. In 2016, the vote on the U.N. resolution took place on October 26, with 191
votes in favor and—for the first time—the United States (and Israel) abstaining. In remarks at the
U.N. General Assembly session, Ambassador Samantha Power, the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, stated that the resolution was “a perfect example of why the
U.S. policy of isolation toward Cuba was not working” and that U.S. policy instead had isolated
the United States, including at the United Nations. She stated, however, that “abstaining on the
resolution does not mean that the United States agrees with all the policies and practices of the
59

“UN Chief Pushes Cuba on ‘Arbitrary Detentions,’” Agence France Presse, January 28, 2014.
For further background, see section on “Cuba and the OAS” in archivedCRS Report R40193, Cuba: Issues for the
111th Congress, by (name redacted) ; also see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States: Background and
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted)
.
61
th
U.N. General Assembly, 70 Session, Resolution No. A/RES/70/5, “Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial
and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America Against Cuba,” October 27, 2015, available at
http://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/70.
60

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Cuban government,” adding that the United States was “profoundly concerned by the serious
human rights violations that the Cuban government continues to commit with impunity against its
own people.”62
Among other international organizations, Cuba was a founding member of the World Trade
Organization, but it is not a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the
Inter-American Development Bank. In January 2016, the executive president of the Development
Bank of Latin America (CAF) stated in an interview that the bank was in the process of looking at
a way for Cuba to become a member; the CAF’s current membership includes 17 Latin American
and Caribbean countries as well as Spain and Portugal. In September 2016, Cuba signed a
memorandum of understanding with the CAF with the objective of supporting technical
cooperation programs for Cuba’s social and economic development and laying the foundation for
Cuba’s future memberships in the CAF.63
Compliance with U.N. Sanctions on North Korea. In July 2013, the discovery of a weapons
shipment aboard a North Korean ship that had left Cuba on its way back to North Korea raised
questions about the nature of Cuban-North Korean relations and about Cuba’s compliance with
U.N. sanctions against North Korea. Panama had detained the North Korean ship as it prepared to
enter the Panama Canal due to suspicion that the ship was carrying illicit narcotics; instead, the
ship was found to be carrying military weapons. The U.N. Security Council’s Panel of Experts for
North Korea visited Panama in August 2013 and issued a report on the incident in March 2014.
The Panel of Experts concluded that both the shipment and the transaction between Cuba and
North Korea were violations of U.N. sanctions banning weapons transfers to North Korea.64 In
July 2014, the U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions on the operator of the North Korean ship,
and the company is now subject to an international asset freeze.65 U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations Samantha Power described the North Korean ship incident as a “cynical, outrageous and
illegal attempt by Cuba and North Korea to circumvent United Nations sanctions.”66

62

U.S. Department of State, United States Mission to the United Nations, Ambassador Samantha Power, “Remarks at a
UN General Assembly Meeting on the Cuba Embargo,” October 26, 2016.
63
Marc Jones, “Interview – Latam Development Bank CAF Sees Cuba Joining in Weeks,” Reuters News, January 15,
2016; CAF, Development Bank of Latin America, “CAF and Cuba Sign First Agreement of Understanding To
Establish a Joint Working Agenda,” September 3, 2016.
64
United Nations Security Council, notes by the President of the Security Council, report of the panel of experts
established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009), S/1014/147, March 6, 2014, available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/147. The panel found that the “hidden cargo ... amounted to six trailers
associated with surface-to-air missile systems and 25 shipping containers loaded with two disassembled MiG-21
aircraft, 15 engines for MiG-21 aircraft, components for surface-to-air missile systems, ammunition and miscellaneous
arms-related material.” According to the report, the “extraordinary and extensive efforts to conceal the cargo of arms
and related material ... and the contingency instructions ... found onboard the vessel for preparing a false declaration for
entering the Panama Canal ... point to a clear and conscious intention to circumvent the resolutions.”
65
U.N. Security Council, “Security Council Committee Designates Entity Subject to Measures Imposed by Resolution
1718 (2006),” press release, July 28, 2014.
66
Michelle Nichols, “U.N. Blacklists Operator of North Korean Ship Seized in Panama,” Reuters, July 29, 2014.

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U.S. Policy Toward Cuba
Background on U.S.-Cuban Relations67
In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a
repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the Soviet
Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such
events and actions as U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in
the ill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United
States confronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba;
Cuban support for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in
Africa and the Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United
States in the so-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were
interdicted and housed at U.S. facilities in Guantánamo and Panama; and the 1996 shootdown by
Cuban fighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes operated by the Cuban-American group Brothers to
the Rescue, which resulted in the deaths of four U.S. crew members.
Beginning in the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba consisted largely of isolating the island
nation through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an embargo on trade and financial
transactions. President Kennedy proclaimed an embargo on trade between the United States and
Cuba in February 1962,68 citing Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA),
which authorizes the President “to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between
the United States and Cuba.”69 At the same time, the Department of the Treasury issued the
Cuban Import Regulations to deny the importation into the United States of all goods imported
from or through Cuba.70 The authority for the embargo was later expanded in March 1962 to
include the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).71
In July 1963, the Department of the Treasury revoked the Cuban Import Regulations and replaced
them with the more comprehensive Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)—31 C.F.R. Part
515—under the authority of TWEA and Section 620(a) of the FAA.72 The CACR, which include a
prohibition on most financial transactions with Cuba and a freeze of Cuban government assets in
the United States, remain the main body of Cuba embargo regulations and have been amended
many times over the years to reflect changes in policy. They are administered by the Department
of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and prohibit financial transactions as
well as trade transactions with Cuba. The CACR also require that all exports to Cuba be licensed
by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, under the provisions of the

67

For additional background, see archived CRS Report RL30386, Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events
1959-1999, by (name redacted) .
68
27 Federal Register 1085, February 7, 1962 (Proclamation 3447, Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, February 3,
1962).
69
In October 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration, exports to Cuba were strictly controlled under the authority
of the Export Control Act of 1949 in response to the expropriation of U.S. properties. This in effect amounted to an
embargo on exports of all products with the exception of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
70
27 Federal Register 1116, February 7, 1962.
71
27 Federal Register 2765-2766, March 24, 1962.
72
28 Federal Register 6974-6985, July 9, 1963.

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Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended.73 The Export Administration Regulations (EAR)
are found at 15 C.F.R. Sections 730-774.74
Congress subsequently strengthened sanctions on Cuba with enactment of the Cuban Democracy
Act (CDA) of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Title XVII), the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114), and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 or TSRA (P.L. 106-387, Title IX).






Among its provisions, the CDA prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiaries from engaging
in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any seaborne
vessel to load or unload freight if it has been involved in trade with Cuba within
the previous 180 days, except pursuant to a Treasury Department license. (In
October 2016, the Treasury Department issued a general license for vessels
involved in trade with Cuba.)
The LIBERTAD Act (P.L. 104-114), enacted in the aftermath of Cuba’s shooting
down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996, combines a variety of
measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba
once it begins the transition to democracy. Most significantly, the law codified
the Cuban embargo, including all restrictions under the CACR. This provision is
noteworthy because of its long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba.
The executive branch is prevented from lifting the economic embargo without
congressional concurrence until certain democratic conditions set forth in the law
are met, although the President retains broad authority to amend the regulations
therein. Another significant sanction in Title III of the law holds any person or
government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government
liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the
law, however, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama have suspended the
implementation of Title III at six-month intervals.
Although TSRA authorizes U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, it also
includes prohibitions on U.S. assistance and financing and requires “payment of
cash in advance” or third-country financing for the exports. The act also prohibits
tourist travel to Cuba.

In addition to these acts, Congress enacted numerous other provisions of law over the years that
impose sanctions on Cuba, including restrictions on trade, foreign aid, and support from
international financial institutions. The government of Cuba also was designated by the State
Department as a state sponsor of international terrorism in 1982 under Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act and other laws because of its alleged ties to international terrorism.75 (For
additional information, see CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions
Limiting the Normalization of Relations, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
.)
In addition to sanctions, another component of U.S. policy has consisted of support measures for
the Cuban people. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medical exports to Cuba
73

31 C.F.R. §515.533.
See especially 15 C.F.R. §746.2 on Cuba, which refers to other parts of the EAR. See http://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/text-idx?SID=d318b728a0d070fda95fa3bf8232e829&node=pt15.2.746&rgn=div5#se15.2.746_12.
75
Cuba’s designation on the state sponsor of terrorism list has allowed U.S. nationals injured by an act of international
terrorism to file lawsuits against Cuba in the United States for damages. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar
WSLG254, Can Victims of Terrorism in the United States Sue Foreign Governments?, by (name redacted) ; and CRS
Legal Sidebar WSLG1405, Can Creditors Enforce Terrorism Judgments Against Cuba?, by (name redacted) .
74

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under the terms of the CDA, U.S. government support for democracy-building efforts, and U.S.sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The enactment of TSRA by the 106th
Congress also led to the United States becoming one of Cuba’s largest suppliers of agricultural
products. Authorization for purposeful travel to Cuba and cash remittances to Cuba have
constituted important means to support the Cuban people, although there has been significant
congressional debate over these issues for many years.
Despite the poor state of U.S.-Cuban relations, there have been several examples of bilateral
cooperation over the years in areas of shared national interest. Three areas that stand out are alien
migrant interdiction (with migration accords negotiated in 1994 and 1995), counternarcotics
cooperation (with increased cooperation dating back to 1999), and cooperation on oil spill
preparedness and prevention (since 2011).

Obama Administration Policy
During its first six years, the Obama Administration continued the dual-track policy approach
toward Cuba that has been in place for many years. It maintained U.S. economic sanctions and
continued measures to support the Cuban people, such as U.S. government-sponsored radio and
television broadcasting and funding for democracy and human rights projects.
Alan Gross Case
At the same time, however, the Obama
Administration initiated a significant shift in
U.S.-Cuban relations took a turn for the worse in
December 2009 when Alan Gross, an American
policy toward Cuba beginning in 2009. As
subcontractor working on Cuba democracy projects
part of the policy of reaching out to the Cuban
funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development
people, President Obama fulfilled a campaign
(USAID), was arrested in Havana. Gross was providing
pledge by lifting all restrictions on family
Internet communications equipment to Cuba’s Jewish
travel and remittances. At the April 2009
community. He was convicted in March 2011 on charges
of acting “against the independence and territorial
Summit of the Americas, President Obama
integrity of the state,” and sentenced to 15 years in
announced that “the United States seeks a new
prison. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress
beginning with Cuba.” While recognizing that
repeatedly raised the issue with the Cuban government
it would take time to “overcome decades of
and asked for his release. In the aftermath of Gross’s
conviction, the United States and Cuba continued to
mistrust,” the President said “there are critical
cooperate on issues of shared national interest, such as
steps we can take toward a new day.” He
antidrug efforts and migration interdiction, but
stated that he was prepared to have his
improvement of relations in other areas became stymied.
Administration “engage with the Cuban
Securing his release remained a top U.S. priority until he
government on a wide range of issues—from
was ultimately released by the Cuban government on
December 17, 2014.
drugs, migration, and economic issues, to
human rights, free speech, and democratic
reform.”76 In the aftermath of the Summit in 2009, there was some momentum toward improved
relations: in July, the two countries restarted semi-annual migration talks that had been suspended
by the United States five years earlier; in September, the two countries held talks on resuming
direct mail service.
The Obama Administration introduced new measures in 2011 to further reach out to the Cuban
people through increased purposeful travel (including people-to-people educational travel) and an
easing of restrictions on non-family remittances. Beginning in mid-2013, there was also renewed
engagement with Cuba on several fronts, including direct mail service talks, resumed migration
talks (that had not taken place for 18 months), and air and maritime search and rescue.
76

White House, “Remarks by the President at the Summit of the Americas Opening Ceremony,” April 17, 2009.

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In remarks made in November 2013 on policy toward Cuba, President Obama maintained that
“we have to be creative ... we have to be thoughtful ... and we have to continue to update our
policies.” He contended that “the notion that the same policies that we put in place in 1961 would
somehow still be as effective as they are today in the age of the Internet and Google and world
travel doesn’t make sense.”77
Throughout the Obama Administration’s first six years, human rights violations in Cuba remained
a fundamental concern. President Obama and the State Department continued to issue statements
expressing concern about violations as they occurred, including the death of hunger strikers in
2010 and 2012 and targeted repression against dissidents and human rights activists. As noted
above, securing the release of Alan Gross from prison in Cuba also remained a top U.S. priority.
The State Department maintained that it was using every appropriate channel to press for his
release, including the Vatican.

President Obama Unveils a New Policy Approach Toward Cuba
On December 17, 2014, just after the adjournment of the 113th Congress, President Obama
announced major developments in U.S.-Cuban relations and unveiled a new policy approach
toward Cuba. First, he announced that the Cuban government had released Alan Gross on
humanitarian grounds after five years of imprisonment. The President also announced that, in a
separate action, the Cuban government released “one of the most important intelligence assets
that the United States has ever had in Cuba” in exchange for three Cuban intelligence agents who
had been imprisoned in the United States since 1998. Media reports identified the U.S.
intelligence asset as Rolando Sarraff Trujillo, a cryptographer in Cuba’s Directorate of
Intelligence, who reportedly provided information that helped the FBI dismantle three Cuban spy
networks in the United States.78
Most significantly, in the aftermath of having secured the release of Gross and the U.S.
intelligence asset, President Obama announced a major shift in U.S. policy toward Cuba, moving
away from a sanctions-based policy aimed at isolating Cuba to a policy of engagement. The
President said that his Administration
will end an outdated approach that, for decades, has failed to advance our interests, and
instead we will begin to normalize relations between our two countries. Through these
changes, we intend to create more opportunities for the American and Cuban people, and
begin a new chapter among the nations of the Americas.

The President maintained that the United States would continue to raise concerns about
democracy and human rights in Cuba but stated that “we can do more to support the Cuban
people and promote our values through engagement.” According to the President, “After all, these
50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It’s time for a new approach.”79
The President outlined three major steps to move toward normalization: (1) the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) a review of Cuba’s designation by the Department of State as
a state sponsor of international terrorism; and (3) an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of
information to and from Cuba.
77

White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at a DSCC Fundraising Reception,” Miami,
Florida, November 8, 2013, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/08/remarks-president-dsccfundraising-reception-0.
78
Adam Goldman and Missy Ryan, “Spy Helped Unmask 3 Cuban Spy Networks, U.S. Officials Say,” Washington
Post, December 18, 2014.
79
White House, “Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes,” December 17, 2014.

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When President Obama announced his Cuba policy change, he also indicated that his
Administration was prepared to have Cuba participate in the Summit of the Americas to be held
April 10-11, 2015, in Panama. The White House emphasized that human rights and democracy
would be key themes of the summit and asserted that Cuban civil society must be allowed to
participate with civil society from other countries. Cuba’s potential participation in the summit
had been a policy challenge for the Administration since it had opposed Cuba’s participation in
the 2012 Summit of the Americas in Colombia.
Cuba ultimately participated in the summit in Panama, with President Obama and Cuban
President Raúl Castro holding a historic bilateral meeting in Panama on April 11. President
Obama stated that “there are still going to be deep and significant differences between our two
governments,” with the United States continuing to raise concerns around democracy and human
rights and Cuba raising concerns about U.S. policy. He maintained, however, that “what we have
both concluded is that we can disagree with the spirit of respect and civility, and that over time it
is possible for us to turn the page and develop a new relationship in our two countries.” Several
Cuban dissidents attended and participated in the Civil Society and Social Actors Forum,
although there were problems with a reported attack on anti-Castro protestors by Cuban
government supporters just ahead of the summit and efforts by Cuban government supporters to
disrupt an event in which Cuban dissidents were scheduled to speak.80

Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations
As U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, relations were severed by the
Eisenhower Administration in January 1961 in response to the Cuban government’s demand to
decrease the number of U.S. Embassy staff within 48 hours. In 1977, under the Carter
Administration, both countries established Interests Sections in each other’s capitals.
In 2015, four rounds of talks were held on reestablishing relations, with the U.S. delegation
headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roberta Jacobson and the
Cuban delegation led by Josefina Vidal, director of the North American division of Cuba’s
Ministry of Foreign Relations. The first round took place on January 22, 2015, in Havana, a day
after previously scheduled semi-annual migration talks, and focused on the required steps for the
reestablishment of relations, the opening of embassies, and expectations on how the U.S.
Embassy in Havana would operate.81 Subsequent rounds took place on February 27 in
Washington, DC; March 16 in Havana; and May 21-22, 2015, in Washington, DC. Issues
discussed included staffing numbers, lifting in-country travel restrictions on diplomats,
unimpeded shipments for the diplomatic post, and access to the post by Cubans.82 In other
developments, a U.S. government delegation visited Havana March 24-26, 2015, focusing on the
development of telecommunications and Internet connections between the United States and
Cuba. On March 31, U.S. and Cuban delegations met in Washington, DC, to discuss how they
would proceed on a future human rights dialogue.
80

“U.S. Trouble by Reported Attacks on Protesters in Panama,” Reuters News, April 9, 2015; and Nick Miroff and
Karen DeYoung, “In Havana, Old Habits Die Hard,” Washington Post, April 12, 2015.
81
U.S. Department of State, Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Talks to
Re-Establish Diplomatic Relations,” January 22, 2015.
82
According to the State Department, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana has a cap of 51 direct U.S. hires, a cap
previously jointly agreed by the United States and Cuba. The U.S. Interests Section in Havana also employs almost 400
foreign nationals. U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector General,
Inspection of U.S. Interests Section Havana, Cuba, May 2014; U.S. Department of State, “Press Availability with
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,” February 27, 2015.

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Ultimately, on July 1, 2015, President Obama announced that the United States and Cuba agreed
to reestablish diplomatic relations, effective July 20, and to reopen embassies in their respective
capitals on the same day. The President maintained that “this is a historic step forward in our
efforts to normalize relations with the Cuban government and people.”83 On the same day,
Secretary of State Kerry notified Congress, pursuant to Section 7015(a) of the Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2015 (Division J, P.L. 113235), of the plan to redesignate the U.S. Interests Section in Havana as an embassy. That
provision of law required congressional notification 15 days in advance before closing or opening
a mission or post. On July 20, the U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections in Washington, DC, and
Havana, respectively, were converted to embassies. Cuba held a flag-raising ceremony on that
day at its embassy attended by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez. Secretary of State John
Kerry visited Havana on August 14, 2015, for a flag-raising ceremony at the U.S. Embassy. This
marked the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to Cuba since 1945.

Rescission of Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of International Terrorism
Cuba had been on the list since 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act
(EAA) of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. Appendix 2405(j)) and other laws because of its alleged
ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. On December 17,
2014, President Obama directed Secretary of State Kerry to review Cuba’s designation “guided
by the facts and the law.” The President stated that “at a time when we are focused on threats
from al Qaeda to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces the use of terrorism
should not face this sanction.”
On April 9, 2015, during a trip to Jamaica ahead of the Summit of the Americas in Panama,
President Obama said that the State Department had completed its review and he would soon be
making his decision. That occurred on April 14, when the President transmitted to Congress a
report justifying the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. No
resolutions of disapproval were introduced in Congress to block the rescission, which took place
on May 29, 2015, 45 days after the submission of the report to Congress. Subsequently, to reflect
the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in U.S. regulations, the
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets
Control Regulations (CACR) in June 2015 and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry
and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations in July 2015.84 (For
additional information, see “State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation,” below.)

Increase in Travel, Commerce, and the Flow of Information
The White House announced a number of policy changes to implement this third step. The
changes build upon previous steps that President Obama took in 2009, when he lifted all
restrictions on family travel and remittances to family members in Cuba, and in 2011, when he
took action to increase purposeful travel to Cuba, such as people-to-people educational trips.
Just as in 2009 and 2011, the President’s new initiative required changes to U.S. embargo
regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s OFAC (CACR; 31 C.F.R. Part 515) and
the Department of Commerce’s BIS (EAR; 15 C.F.R. Parts 730-774). Such changes fall within
83

White House, “Statement by the President on the Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba,” July 1,
2015.
84
80 Federal Register 34053-34054, June 15, 2015; and 80 Federal Register 43314-43320, July 22, 2015.

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the scope of the President’s discretionary licensing authority to make changes to the embargo
regulations.
To implement the policy changes to increase travel and commerce, the two agencies issued five
rounds of amendments to the CACR and the EAR in January 2015, September 2015, January
2016, March 2016, and October 2016; this was in addition to the regulatory changes noted above
related to the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.85
The regulations included changes in the following areas:




Travel and Remittances. The amended Treasury regulations authorize a general
license for the existing 12 categories of authorized travel in the CACR, meaning
that travelers who fall under these categories do not have to apply to the
Department of the Treasury for permission. Travel agents and air and vessel
carriers are also able to provide services for travel to Cuba under a general
license. Authorized travelers will also be permitted to use U.S. credit and debit
cards as U.S. financial institutions offer these services. Donative remittances to
Cuban nationals are authorized without limit; initially the cap was increased from
$500 to $2,000 per quarter in January 2015, and then it was removed altogether
in September 2015. The regulations also authorize without limit remittances for
certain activities related to humanitarian projects, the promotion of civil society,
and the development of private businesses. In March 2016, the CACR were
amended to permit individuals to travel to Cuba for individual, people-to-people
education travel (previously, such trips had to take place under the auspices of an
organization). Authorized travelers to Cuba, as well as U.S. travelers to third
countries, can bring back Cuban products to the United States for personal use,
including alcohol and tobacco products. (Also see “Restrictions on Travel and
Remittances,” below.)
Trade and Telecommunications. The Commerce regulations expand
commercial exports to Cuba of certain goods and services to empower Cuba’s
nascent private sector, including authorization for certain building materials for
private residential construction, goods for use by private-sector Cuban
entrepreneurs, and agricultural equipment for small farmers. To implement this
change, Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) created a license
exception in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for “support to the
Cuban people,” authorizing the export without license of such items described
above. This license exception also included the export to Cuba of items for
telecommunications, including access to the Internet, use of Internet services,
infrastructure creation, and upgrades.

85

80 Federal Register 2286-2302, January 16, 2015; 80 Federal Register 56898-56904 and 56915-56926, September
21, 2015; 81 Federal Register 4580-4586, January 27, 2016; 81 Federal Register 13972-13974 and 13989-13994,
March 16, 2016; and 81 Federal Register 71365-71367 and 71372-71378, October 17, 2016. For background on the
regulatory changes, see U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Cuba Sanctions,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Pages/cuba.aspx; U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Frequently Asked Questions Related to
Cuba,” at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.pdf; U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, “Cuba,” at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policyguidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/cuba; and U.S. Department of Commerce, “Cuba, Frequently
Asked Questions,” at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_download/1446-bis-cuba-consolidatedfaqs.

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The Treasury regulations also revise the definition of “payment of cash in
advance” required by TSRA for authorized trade with Cuba to specify that it
means “cash before transfer of title” for payment. Certain goods and services
produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs (as determined by the State
Department) are eligible to be imported into the United States.86 In October 2016,
OFAC amended the regulations to allow for transactions to obtain U.S. Food and
Drug Administration approval of Cuban-origin pharmaceuticals. OFAC also
authorized transactions for importation into the United States of FDA-approved
Cuban-origin drugs, including marketing, sales, or other distribution.
The Commerce regulations permit the commercial export of certain consumer
communication devices, related software, applications, hardware, and services,
and items for the establishment and update of communications-related systems;
previously such exports were limited to donations. They also permit the export of
items for telecommunications, including access to the Internet, use of Internet
services, infrastructure creation, and upgrades.
An expanded Treasury Department general license authorizes transactions to
provide commercial telecommunications services in Cuba or link third countries
and Cuba. U.S. companies may establish joint ventures with entities in Cuba to
provide telecommunication and Internet-based services and to enter into
licensing agreements related to, and to market, such services. An updated general
license allows for U.S. persons to make payments to a telecommunications
operator located in Cuba for services provided to Cuban individuals.
In January 2015, BIS revised the EAR to state a general policy of approval for
license applications to export items to Cuba necessary for the environmental
protection of U.S. and international air quality, waters, and coastlines, including
items related to renewable energy or energy efficiency.
In January 2016, BIS expanded the categories of exports that fall under a
“general policy of approval” license policy to include certain items for civil
aviation and commercial aircraft safety; telecommunications; U.S. news bureaus;
human rights organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and agricultural
commodities (such as insecticides, pesticides, and herbicides) that fall outside the
scope of those allowed under the existing BIS license exception for agricultural
commodities covered by TSRA.
In January 2016, BIS amended the EAR to include a new category of exports for
which licenses will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The new category
includes items exported to state-owned enterprises, agencies, and other
organizations of the Cuban government that provide goods and services for the
use and benefit of the Cuban people. (For more details, see “U.S. Exports and
Sanctions,” below.)
In October 2016, OFAC added a general license for authorization to enter into
contingent contracts for transactions currently prohibited by the embargo. It also
added a general license waiving the restriction in the Cuban Democracy Act of
1992 prohibiting foreign vessels from entering U.S. ports for purposes of loading
86

On February 13, 2015, the State Department issued a list of eligible goods and services produced by independent
Cuban entrepreneurs that may be imported. See http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/515582/237471.htm.

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or unloading freight for 180 days after calling on a Cuban port for trade purposes.
BIS also generally authorized by license exception the export of certain
consumer

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43926. Public record. Not legal advice.