# Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43756

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** February 5, 2018
- **Citation:** R43756

## Text

Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy:
Middle East and Africa
/name redacted/
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
February 5, 2018

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43756

Al Qaeda and U.S. Policy: Middle East and Africa

Summary
After a more than a decade and a half of combating Al Qaeda (AQ) in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the United States faces a diverse array of threats from Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and
Africa. While senior Al Qaeda figures reportedly remain based in Pakistan, the network includes
a number of affiliates across the Middle East and Africa including Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Al Shabaab. Al Qaeda also
retains a small but possibly growing presence in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have stated that Al
Qaeda still maintains a foothold in Syria through its ties to Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (formerly
known as the Nusra Front), though the exact nature of that relationship may be evolving. This
report examines the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa as described
by U.S. officials and outside observers, as well as the U.S. approach to date in responding to these
threats.
The rise of the Islamic State and its rapid territorial expansion across Syria and Iraq has at times
eclipsed the attention directed towards Al Qaeda, at least in the public debate. However, U.S.
officials have warned that Al Qaeda remains focused on attacking the United States, and that
some of its affiliates in the Middle East have the capability to do so. It is also possible that Al
Qaeda could leverage the Islamic State’s setbacks in Iraq and Syria to bolster its recruits,
resources, and prestige.
AQ affiliates that have primarily targeted local governments have also turned their efforts to
Western interests in the region, aiming at soft targets—such as hotels—frequented by Americans
or Europeans. U.S. officials have cautioned that some Al Qaeda affiliates may increasingly turn to
this type of attack as a way of remaining “competitive” for funds and recruits, in light of the wide
publicity garnered by such attacks carried out by the Islamic State.
Congressional concerns regarding these issues might shape ongoing reevaluations of the laws that
underpin U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) as well as successive National Defense Authorization Acts that have
progressively broadened the scope of the U.S. military’s involvement in training and equipping
foreign forces for counterterrorism purposes. Overall, Congress has addressed the enduring
presence of Al Qaeda affiliates through a number of channels, including oversight of executive
branch counterterrorism policies and practices; authorization and appropriations of U.S. funds for
counterterrorism activities; and oversight of assistance for partner nations engaged in such
activities.
Note: This report does not cover Al Qaeda affiliates outside of the Middle East, Afghanistan, and
Africa. See also CRS Report R44563, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, by (name r
edacted) and (name redacted)
, and CRS Report R44501, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by (nam
e redacted) et al.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Al Qaeda’s Emergence and Organizational Development .............................................................. 1
Roots in Afghanistan ................................................................................................................. 1
Rise of Affiliate Groups ............................................................................................................ 3
Al Qaeda – Islamic State Split .................................................................................................. 4
Posture and U.S. Threat Assessments .............................................................................................. 6
Al Qaeda in Afghanistan ........................................................................................................... 7
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ........................................................................................... 8
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ............................................................................................. 8
The Nusra Front / Levant Conquest Front / Levant Liberation Organization ........................... 9
Al Shabaab ...............................................................................................................................11
Al Qaeda Messaging on the Islamic State ..................................................................................... 12
Al Qaeda Responds to the Emergence of the Islamic State .................................................... 12
Al Qaeda in the Twilight of the Islamic State ......................................................................... 13
Selected Policy Responses ............................................................................................................ 14
U.S. Military Operations ......................................................................................................... 15
Efforts to Build Regional Partners’ Military Capability.......................................................... 16
Targeted Sanctions .................................................................................................................. 18
Countering Violent Extremism................................................................................................ 19
Legislation and Issues for Congress .............................................................................................. 21
Authorization for the Use of Military Force ........................................................................... 21
FY2017-2018Appropriations for Foreign Operations and Defense ........................................ 23
Outlook .......................................................................................................................................... 24

Contacts
Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 25

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Introduction
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, groups claiming allegiance to Al Qaeda have
proliferated in the Middle East and Africa. Some of these groups have pledged allegiance to Al
Qaeda (AQ) leader Ayman al Zawahiri, and others have not. Even among the groups that have
formal alliances with Al Qaeda, there is significant variation in the extent to which they are
operationally integrated with Al Qaeda’s senior leadership in practice. Some of these groups,
despite the formal alliances, emerged in the context of local conflicts and are self-sustaining. In
other cases, Al Qaeda and its affiliates have focused on “exploiting local and regional conflicts.”1
While many of the groups discussed in this report focus the majority of their attacks on local
targets, U.S. officials have identified them as posing a credible threat to the United States or its
allies, or to U.S. interests in the Middle East and Africa.
The rise and rapid expansion of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym
Da’esh) in Iraq and Syria beginning in 2013 unsettled Al Qaeda’s leadership and followers, who
seemed to view IS tactics and ideology as a challenge to Al Qaeda and its putative status as the
world’s preeminent Islamist terror organization. The State Department’s 2015 Country Reports on
Terrorism stated that, “tensions between AQ and ISIL escalated in a number of regions during
2015 and likely resulted in increased violence in several parts of the world as AQ tried to reassert
its dominance.” Tensions appear to have dissipated at least somewhat in 2017 as the Islamic State
has been weakened by the U.S.-led military coalition campaign and other multilateral efforts.
Some have speculated that Al Qaeda may be one beneficiary of the Islamic State’s decline in
terms of recruits, prestige, and/or resources. However, as the campaign against the Islamic State
winds down, AQ may also become, again, a more significant focus of U.S. counterterrorism
efforts.
The campaign against the Islamic State has reignited a debate over the type and scope of policies
and legislation needed to provide the tools to fully address the threats posed by transnational
terrorist groups. In addition, ongoing debates within Al Qaeda itself—over leadership and
tactics—may prompt a reexamination of U.S. understanding of the group, and the ways in which
it may have evolved since the September 11, 2001 attacks. For additional information on the
Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted)
and (name redacted)
.

Al Qaeda’s Emergence and Organizational
Development
Roots in Afghanistan
In 1988, Osama bin Laden formally established Al Qaeda from a network of veterans of the
Afghan insurgency against the Soviet Union.2 The group conducted a series of terrorist attacks
against U.S. and allied targets, including the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole docked in Aden, Yemen. After the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the United States redoubled its counterterrorism (CT) efforts, forcing the
1

Testimony of Dan R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
hearing on “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” May 11, 2017.
2
The Arabic al qaeda (also transliterated as al qaida or al qa’ida) is generally translated as “the base” or “the
foundation.”

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group’s leadership to flee Afghanistan—where they had been hosted by the Taliban—and seek
refuge in Pakistan. U.S. forces located and killed Bin Laden in Pakistan in 2011, and Bin Laden’s
deputy Ayman al Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group. U.S. officials and others have argued
that persistent CT operations against Al Qaeda since 2001 have “decimated” the group’s
leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but that Al Qaeda’s affiliates have proven resilient, with
one expert describing them as “resurgent” in 2017.3
Profile: Al Qaeda Leader Ayman al Zawahiri
Ayman al Zawahiri was born in 1951 to a prominent Egyptian family. He studied medicine at Cairo University
alongside his twin sister, obtaining a degree in general surgery in 1974. He then served three years as a surgeon in the
Egyptian army, before marrying the daughter of a wealthy family in 1978. In 1980 he traveled to Peshawar, near
Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, where he volunteered as a medic treating Afghan refugees of the Soviet-Afghan
conflict. Six years later he would return to Peshawar and join forces with Bin Laden. However, Zawahiri’s Salafist
views developed in Egypt, shaped by the political context of the time. Muslim Brotherhood theorist Sayyid Qutb, who
called for an Islamic revival to replace secular government with divine law, was executed by the Egyptian government
in 1966. Zawahiri, whose maternal uncle had served as Qutb’s lawyer, became active in one of many underground
Islamist organizations. Zawahiri’s activism continued during his university years. Banned from participating in politics,
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamist organizations were highly active in student and professional
unions. Inspired by Qutb’s ideology and galvanized by the 1967 defeat of Egypt by Israel, they aimed to replace Egypt’s
secular government with a system of Islamic rule. The Iranian revolution of 1979 showed that it was possible for a
popular movement to replace secular rulers with an Islamic government.
By the late 1970s, several underground Islamist groups, including
Zawahiri’s, merged to form what would be known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad
(EIJ). In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made peace with Israel, a
decision approved by a popular referendum widely seen as fixed. In 1981, a
small group of military officers loyal to EIJ assassinated Sadat during a
military parade. Zawahiri was among the hundreds of Egyptians imprisoned
under suspicion of involvement in the assassination. Although he was
released after three years, some analysts argue that Zawahiri’s time in
prison—where he and others were reportedly subject to torture—further
radicalized him.
Zawahiri and his wife permanently left Egypt in 1985 and arrived in
Pakistan in 1986 after an intervening period in Saudi Arabia. In Pakistan, he
continued his medical work while also reconstituting EIJ with Egyptian
foreign fighters who had traveled to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In his book Bitter Harvest, Zawahiri denounced
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for pursuing electoral politics at the expense of armed struggle.
Following years of informal cooperation between Al Qaeda and EIJ, the two groups formally merged in June 2001 to
form Qaeda al Jihad (though the groups are still generally considered distinct entities). While the merger may have
been driven in part by EIJ’s strained financial situation, it was also controversial within the group, whose members
reportedly mostly wished to focus on Egypt. Nevertheless, EIJ fighters retained a prominent role in Al Qaeda’s
leadership. Zawahiri served as Bin Laden’s deputy, providing experienced fighters and strategists from EIJ to craft the
group’s operations. While Zawahiri’s primary target remained the Egyptian government, he apparently came to
believe that the only way to bring Islamic regimes to power was to oust from the region the perceived backer of
secular regional regimes, the United States—the so-called “Far Enemy.” When Bin Laden was killed in a 2011 U.S. raid
in Pakistan, Zawahiri assumed leadership of the group. He has spent recent years restating his views on strategy and
tactics for the global jihadist movement and has clashed publicly with Islamic State leaders.
Sources: Lawrence Wright, “The man behind Bin Laden,” New Yorker, September 16, 2002; Lawrence Wright,
The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11; Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist

3

CQ Congressional Transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on the ISIS Global Reach, June 8,
2017, available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5120600?17&search=Q8wjKQ9F; White House
Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism,
December 6, 2016.

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Movement, New York: 2015.

Rise of Affiliate Groups
Starting in the mid-2000s, groups operating in the Middle East and Africa began to formally
pledge allegiance to Al Qaeda leaders. With the exception of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
and the Nusra Front, AQ affiliate groups had developed around local conflicts before forging ties
with Al Qaeda. Prior to the 2013 creation of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle
East and Africa included the following groups.










Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2004. Previously
known as Tawhid wal Jihad, the group emerged in 2002. Following the U.S.
invasion of Iraq in 2003, it expanded under the leadership of the late Abu Musab
al Zarqawi, and was rebranded following Zarqawi’s death in 2006 as the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI). Zarqawi’s successors now lead the Islamic State organization
and have been disavowed by AQ leadership.
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in
2006. Previously known as the Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the
group originated from an Islamist insurgent faction in Algeria’s 1990s civil
conflict.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed in 2009 following a
merger between Al Qaeda branches in Saudi Arabia—established in 2003 and
known by the acronym QAP—and Yemen, established in the early 1990s by
fighters returning from Afghanistan.
Al Shabaab formally joined Al Qaeda in 2012 after several unreciprocated
pledges of support. The group emerged in the mid-2000s as an offshoot of a
militant wing of Somalia’s Council of Islamic Courts.
The Nusra Front emerged in Syria in late 2011 as an offshoot of the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI). The Nusra Front was designated by the State Department as an
alias of AQI in December 2012, although it did not publicly declare its allegiance
to Al Qaeda until 2013. In July 2016, the Nusra Front renamed itself Jabhat
Fatah al Sham (Levant Conquest Front) and stated that the group would no
longer be affiliated with external entities, leading to criticism from some Al
Qaeda supporters. In January 2017, it merged with several other militant groups
to form Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS, Levant Liberation Organization).

At times in recent years, intelligence officials have assessed that “the core leadership of al-Qaida
continues to wield substantial influence over affiliated and allied groups such as the Yemen-based
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.”4 A more common analytical view in 2018 seems to be that Al
Qaeda is no longer the “rigidly hierarchical organization” it was on 9/11, but instead is “flat,
decentralized, and geographically dispersed.” 5 This leads to questions about whether the huband-spoke model (wherein the core directs the activities of multiple local affiliates) is still
applicable. Still others see the relationship in reverse, with core leadership providing legitimacy
4

Testimony of former NCTC Director Matthew Olsen before the House Homeland Security Committee and House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Hearing on Terrorism Outlook, November 18, 2015.
5
Julia McQuaid, et al., “Independent Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts against Al-Qaeda,” CNA, October 2017,
pp. 12-16.

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to local affiliates but relying on them for financial support and operational action.6 As opposed to
the Islamic State, which he characterized as a “mass movement,” former National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Director Nicholas Rasmussen described AQ has operating “as a
clandestine, covert organization, with barriers to entry that made it difficult for individuals, in
many cases, to become members.”7 It remains to be seen how this organizational ethos might
change going forward in light of the Islamic State’s losses.

Al Qaeda – Islamic State Split8
In 2013, divisions emerged between Al Qaeda’s central leadership and leaders of the AQI
successor group—known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This would lead, a year later, to the
emergence of ISI as Al Qaeda’s primary rival. What began as a disagreement over operations in
Syria would grow into a public rift as ISI leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi ultimately rejected the
authority of Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
According to both U.S. officials9 and ISI leaders,10 Baghdadi (also known as Abu Du’a), tasked
ISI member Muhammad al Jawlani in 2011 to begin operations in Syria under the banner of a
new group known as the Nusra Front. In accordance with directives from AQ leadership, Jawlani
and other Nusra members operated as a local Syrian opposition group, without initially
acknowledging their ties to ISI or Al Qaeda.11
The Nusra Front soon became one of the most effective opposition groups in Syria—claiming
nearly 600 attacks in major city centers between November 2011 and December 2012.12 In April
2013, Baghdadi publicly revealed the link between ISI and the Nusra Front. In an audio
statement, he declared,
...the Al-Nusrah Front is nothing but an extension and a part of the Islamic State of
Iraq...We announce the abolition of both names, the Islamic State of Iraq and the AlNusrah Front, and we merge them under one name, the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant [ISIL].13

While acknowledging Nusra’s affiliation with Al Qaeda, Jawlani rejected the merger with ISI,
stating that he had not been consulted and that his fighters would continue to operate under the
6

Daniel Byman, “Judging Al Qaeda’s Record, Part I: Is the Organization in Decline?” Lawfare, June 27, 2017.
Testimony of NCTC Director Nicholas Rasmussen, before the House Homeland Security hearing on “Worldwide
Threats: Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror,” November 30, 2017.
8
Prepared by Carla Humud and Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
9
“Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Press Statement by State Department
Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, December 11, 2012.
10
Baghdadi states, “[w]e deputized Al-Jawlani, who is one of our soldiers, along with a group of our people. We sent
them from Iraq to the Levant so that they could meet up with our cells there. We put plans in place for them, we drew
up an operational policy for them, and we funded them with half of the monthly amount of money that we collected.”
Open Source Enterprise (OSE) Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant,’” April 9, 2013.
11
Zawahiri later stated, “The declaration of the ISIL was in clear violation of the orders by Al-Qa’ida’s command to its
soldiers in Iraq and the Levant, not to declare any official presence of Al-Qa’ida in the Levant.” OSE Report
TRN2014050238064112, “Al-Fajr Releases Al-Zawahiri Statement Urging ISIL to Return to Iraq, Al-Nusrah to Stop
Infighting,” May 2, 2014.
12
“Terrorist Designations of the al-Nusrah Front as an Alias for al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Press Statement by State
Department Spokesperson Victoria Nuland, December 11, 2012.
13
OSE Report GMP20130409405003, “ISI Emir Declares ISI, Al-Nusrah Front: ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant,’” April 9, 2013.
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banner of the Nusra Front. Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri also denounced the merger, and decreed that
ISI should confine its operations to Iraq.14 Despite Zawahiri’s position, Baghdadi’s forces—then
known as ISIL or ISIS—ramped up activities in Syria. Fighters from the two groups clashed
frequently, leading Zawahiri to issue appeals for unity and a halt to intra-jihadist violence.
On February 3, 2014, Zawahiri formally severed Al Qaeda’s ties with ISIL, stating,
The Al-Qa’ida of Jihad group announces that it has no connection with the group called
the ISIL, as it was not informed or consulted about its establishment. It was not pleased
with it and thus ordered its suspension. Therefore, it is not an affiliate with the Al-Qa’ida
group and has no organizational relationship with it. Al-Qa’ida is not responsible for the
ISIL’s actions.15

In May 2014, ISIL spokesperson Abu Muhammad al Adnani stated that their group “is not and
has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,” and said that, given that ISIL was a sovereign political
entity, its leaders had given leaders of Al Qaeda deference rather than pledges of obedience. In
June 2014, Adnani announced the establishment of a caliphate, declaring that ISIL would now be
known simply as the Islamic State.16 In summer 2014, Islamic State forces began a wide
territorial expansion, capturing large areas of northern and eastern Syria, and northern and
western Iraq.
In Syria, many foreign jihadists defected from the Nusra Front to the Islamic State, leaving Nusra
to regroup as a primarily Syrian organization. While the Islamic State focused on gaining
territory—frequently at the expense of other opposition groups—the Nusra Front continued to
form alliances with other Syrian armed groups and focused its attacks on the Asad government.
This approach accorded with Zawahiri’s call for AQ-affiliated groups to blend into the local
population and build support by adopting local struggles. Given its largely Syrian membership—
up to 70% by some estimates17—and its integration into the struggle against the Syrian
government, some observers suggested that Nusra’s roots in Syria run deeper than those
established by the Islamic State, which relied heavily on foreign fighters and was sustained
largely through force.18 As of early 2018, the Islamic State had lost most of the territory it held in
Syria, while the Nusra Front’s successor group, Hay’at Tahrir al Sham, remains active in some
opposition-held areas and has struggled to manage its own differences with AQ leadership.
Beyond Syria, this pattern of AQ-IS competition has repeated itself throughout the Middle East
and Africa. From Afghanistan to Yemen to Mali, each of the AQ affiliates below finds itself
operating in the same areas as local actors who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State.
These AQ-aligned groups may compete for resources (including fighters) with their Islamic State
rivals, and in some cases, clashes between the two groups have broken out.19

14

OSE Report PLN2013061030660134 Doha Al-Jazirah.net in Arabic, June 9, 2013.
OSE Report TRR2014020311346316, “Al-Qa'ida General Command Text Statement Claims Group Has ‘No
Connection’ to ISIL,” February 3, 2014.
16
OSE Report TRR2014062966139093, “ISIL Spokesman’s Statement Declares ‘Islamic Caliphate,’ Abu-Bakr AlBaghdadi Appointed ‘Caliph,’” June 29, 2014.
17
Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, July 2016.
18
“Exploiting Disorder: al Qaeda and the Islamic State,” International Crisis Group, March 14, 2016.
19
Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida moves in to recruit from Islamic State and its affiliates,” Guardian, January 19, 2018.
15

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Posture and U.S. Threat Assessments
Even at the height of IS territorial control in Syria and Iraq, U.S. officials warned that the
emphasis on the Islamic State does not indicate a reduced focus on the threat posed to the United
States by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In September 2016, then-NCTC Director Nicholas
Rasmussen stated to Congress,
The tremendous efforts we are undertaking to counter the ISIL threat are absolutely
warranted, but I want to stress that we still view al-Qa‘ida and the various al-Qa‘ida
affiliates and nodes as a principal counterterrorism priority [...] We would not tier our
priorities in such a way that downgrades al-Qa’ida in favor of a greater focus on ISIL.
When we are looking at the terrorism threats that we face as a nation, including to the
Homeland, al-Qa’ida still figures prominently in that analysis.20

In testimony one year later, Rasmussen reiterated that, “...as focused as we are on addressing
ISIS, Al Qaida has never stopped being a primary counterterrorism priority for the CT community
... the various Al-Qaida groups have also managed to sustain recruitment, maintain relationships
and derive sufficient resources to enable their operations. This is a strikingly resilient
organization.”21 Rasmussen pointed to a number of new trends since 2016, including the
“resurgence of aviation threats, reaching a level of concern that we in the intelligence community
have not faced since Al Qaida in the Arabian peninsula’s printer package plot in 2010 ... both ISIS
and Al Qaida-aligned groups have demonstrated a continued capability to conduct aviation
attacks.”22
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Daniel Coats stated to Congress in early 2017 that while
U.S. and global counterterrorism operations have significantly reduced Al Qaeda’s ability to carry
out large-scale attacks inside the United States, Al Qaeda and its affiliates “remain a significant
CT [counterterrorism] threat overseas as they remain focused on exploiting local and regional
conflicts.”23 In December 2017, Rasmussen’s successor Lora Shiao described the evolution in AQ
methods and organization as “evidence of its resiliency” and stated that the group “retains the
intent to carry out attacks” against the U.S. and American interests.24
Some observers have challenged these and similar assessments, arguing that successive
Administrations have “followed the same script, one based on false, costly assumptions” and
criticizing the Trump Administration for adhering to “what has become the standard operating
procedure in Washington.”25 Many of these analyses contend that certain elements of U.S.
counterterrorism strategy have the potential to exacerbate the very problem they aim to
confront.26 Specifically, they criticize what they view as a disproportionate emphasis on
20

NCTC Director Rasmussen, Statement for the Record, “Fifteen Years After 9/11: Threats to the Homeland,” Senate
Homeland Security Governmental Affairs Committee, September 27, 2016.
21
NCTC Director Rasmussen before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, September
27, 2017.
22
Ibid. The other new trends referenced were the Coalition success in shrinking ISIS territory in Iraq and Syria, and the
“significant uptick” in attacks inspired by ISIS against Western interests around the world.
23
Daniel Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the
U.S. Intelligence Community,” Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, May 11, 2017.
24
Statement of Lora Shiao, Acting Director of Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, December 6, 2017.
25
Micah Zenko, “Bush and Obama Fought a Failed ‘War on Terror.’ It’s Trump’s Turn,” New York Times, August 25,
2017.
26
See, for example, “Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and al-Qaeda Should Avoid,”
(continued...)

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counterterrorism, to the detriment of more fundamental deradicalization efforts. Former CIA
deputy director Michael Morell was quoted as saying that “For every 100 hours I spent in the
Situation Room talking about how to deal with terrorists that already exist, maybe we spent 10
minutes talking about winning hearts and minds and deradicalization.”27
Others see U.S. counterterrorism efforts in 2017 as having substantially degraded Al Qaeda and
its affiliates (described below), using these setbacks to question the “overall relevance [of AQ]
under Ayman al-Zawahiri’s leadership.”28 The 2018 National Defense Strategy suggests a less
central role for groups like AQ in shaping U.S. policy going forward, stating that “inter-state
strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”29 It is
not clear whether this stated change in strategic focus presages a reduction in counterterrorism
resources relative to those intended to address inter-state threats.

Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
From “core” Al Qaeda’s expulsion from its Afghanistan base in 2001 until 2015, U.S. officials
asserted that the group had only a minimal presence (defined as fewer than 100) in Afghanistan
itself, operating there mostly as a facilitator for insurgent groups and confined mainly to
northeastern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in late 2015, U.S. Special Operations forces and their
Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) partners discovered and destroyed a
large AQ training camp in Qandahar Province—a discovery that indicated that Al Qaeda had
expanded its presence in Afghanistan. In October 2015, the then-top U.S. and NATO commander
in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, stated that, “Al Qaeda has attempted to rebuild its
support networks and planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its strike
capabilities against the U.S. homeland and Western interests.”30 In April 2016, U.S. commanders
publicly raised their estimates of AQ fighters in Afghanistan to between 100 and 300, and
reported an increasingly close relationship between Al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.31
In December 2016, U.S. officials announced that 250 AQ operatives (50 leaders and 200 other
fighters) were killed or captured in 2016, including the AQ commander for northeast Afghanistan,
Faruq Qahtani. It is unclear how many of these fighters belonged to separate affiliates. In 2014,
Zawahiri announced the formation of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), an affiliate
likely born at least partially in response to the ascendance of the Islamic State, which also has
made inroads in Afghanistan.32 U.S. and Afghan officials reported killing over 80 members of Al
Qaeda in December 2017, including the deputy leader of AQIS, though estimates for all of 2017
have not been made public.33

(...continued)
International Crisis Group, March 22, 2017.
27
Zenko, op. cit.
28
Daniel Byman, “The Year in Review: Counterterrorism,” Lawfare, December 29, 2017.
29
“Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” Department of Defense, January
18, 2018.
30
Statement of General Campbell before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Situation in Afghanistan,”
October 6, 2015.
31
Department of Defense Press Briefing by General Cleveland via teleconference from Afghanistan, April 14, 2016.
32
For more, see CRS In Focus IF10604, Al Qaeda and Islamic State Affiliates in Afghanistan, by (name redacted) .
33
Sayed Salahuddin and Dan Lamothe, “Top al-Qaeda leader reported killed in Afghanistan in U.S.-Afghan
operation,” Washington Post, December 5, 2017.

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Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula34
Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Lora Shiao described AQAP in
December 2017 as “the only known al-Qa’ida affiliate to have attempted a direct attack against
the U.S.” adding that it “continues to threaten and call for attacks against the U.S.”35 The group
has operated in Yemen since 2009, and has been the most active in the southern provinces that
were formerly part of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, which reunited with northern
Yemen in 1990. Despite unification, political and economic power remains in the hands of
northern leaders and tribes, and AQAP has benefitted from southern resentment directed against
the government. According to the State Department’s 2016 Country Reports on Terrorism, AQAP
has continued to take advantage of the political and security vacuum created by the ongoing
fighting between the Saudi-led coalition in support of the Yemeni government and the rebel
Houthi-led opposition. The conflict between these forces contributed to AQAP’s ability to take
and hold territory along Yemen’s southern coast, which it has done with varying degrees of
success since 2015.
Perhaps more than any other AQ affiliate, AQAP has attempted to carry out attacks in the United
States and Europe. In early 2015, AQAP claimed to have directed and funded the attack against
the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in Paris.36 Additionally, between 2009 and 2012, AQAP was
behind three attempts to down U.S.-bound commercial airliners, and officials noted that year that
the group likely “still harbors this intent and substantial capability to carry out such a plot.”37

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb38
An Algerian-led regional network, AQIM has long exhibited internal tensions and has spawned a
number of offshoots and splinter movements in recent years. AQIM also reportedly has provided
financial support and training to other extremist groups active in North and West Africa. AQIM
and local allies exploited the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Libya in 2011 and the subsequent
civil war in Mali to expand their safe-havens and areas of influence. The collapse of the Qadhafi
regime in Libya provided a new source of arms and recruits, while in Mali, AQIM and allied
groups asserted control over the country's northern territory amid a separatist rebellion and
political crisis in 2012. AQIM and linked groups have conducted bombings against local state
targets and security forces; kidnappings for ransom, often of Westerners; and, since 2013, a string
of mass-casualty attacks targeting foreigners in Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire.
AQIM and several of its Sahel-based offshoots have pledged greater unity since 2015, possibly in
a bid to outpace French counterterrorism operations, undermine Mali’s peace agreement with
northern rebels, and/or respond to competition from local groups aligned with the Islamic State.
U.S. government assessments report that AQIM “remains largely a regionally-focused terrorist
group” primarily focused on local and Western targets within North and West Africa, including
34

For background on the Houthi conflict in Yemen, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional
Intervention, by (name redacted) .
35
Statement of Lora Shiao, Acting Director of Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, December 6, 2017.
36
“Al Qaeda in Yemen Claims Responsibility for Charlie Hebdo Attack,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2015.
37
Testimony of former NCTC Director Matthew Olsen before the House Homeland Security Committee and House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Joint Hearing on Terrorism Outlook, November 18, 2015.
38
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in African Affairs. For more detailed information, including a list of splinter
groups and offshoots, please see CRS In Focus IF10172, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Related
Groups, by (name redacted)
.

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U.S. interests and personnel.39 (At least six U.S. citizens have been killed in AQIM-linked
attacks.) In March 2017, AFRICOM Commander Gen. Thomas Waldhauser stated that AQIM
“remains a significant threat to U.S. interests and the security of our African partners.”40 French
military counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, initiated in 2013, have killed or captured
several key AQIM commanders. Nevertheless, militants continue to commit asymmetric attacks
against local and international targets in northern Mali, and they have expanded their areas of
operation into previously stable areas of central/southern Mali (including several terrorist attacks
in the capital, Bamako) and neighboring countries.41 AQIM and linked groups also reportedly are
active in Tunisia and Libya.

The Nusra Front / Levant Conquest Front / Levant Liberation
Organization
The Nusra Front (aka Jabhat al Nusra) emerged early in the Syrian conflict as one of the most
effective armed opposition groups, and initially concealed its ties to Al Qaeda. In early 2016, U.S.
military officials estimated that the group numbered approximately 6,000 to 9,000 fighters,
spread across Syria.42 The group has established a stronghold in the Syrian province of Idlib, and
Brett McGurk, Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL stated,
Nusra is establishing schools and training camps, recruiting from abroad, launching
major military operations, and enjoying a sophisticated on-line presence, all the while
providing safe haven for some of al Qaida’s most experienced terrorists. With direct ties
to Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama Bin Laden’s successor, Nusra is now al Qaida’s largest
formal affiliate in history.43

Nusra also has targeted groups receiving U.S. assistance. After a Nusra attack in July 2015
targeted U.S.-backed fighters, U.S. military officials in September 2015 reported that only “four
or five” trainees remained “in the fight” against the Islamic State.44 In response to these and other
pressures, the Administration subsequently reconfigured its Syria train-and-equip program.45
In July 2016, the Nusra Front announced that it was reconstituting itself as an independent group.
Nusra Front leader Abu Muhammad al Jawlani stated that his group would hereinafter be known
as Jabhat Fatah al Sham (“Levant Conquest Front,” JFS), and would have “no affiliation to any
external entity.”46 U.S. officials downplayed the announcement as a rebranding effort, noting the
continuing role and presence of Al Qaeda operatives within JFS. The announcement was seen by
39

State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.”
Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Africa Command, March 9, 2017.
41
See, for example, “Ten Years of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb,” Jamestown Foundation, May 5, 2017.
42
Dr. Michael G. Vickers, former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, before the House Armed Services
Committee, January 12, 2016.
43
Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, Testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 2016.
44
General Lloyd James Austin, Commander U.S. CENTCOM, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
September 16, 2015.
45
For additional information on the Syria train-and-equip program, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and
U.S. Policy, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
, and CRS Report R43727, Train and Equip Program
for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
.
40

46

The Nusra Front’s decision to rebrand itself as an independent group does not appear intended as a slight to Al
Qaeda. Rather, the language of Jawlani’s statement was deferential to AQ leadership. Jawlani described the step as a
consensus decision between the two groups, undertaken for the purpose of unifying Syrian opposition fighters.

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some as part of a broader effort to win the support of key armed groups. Nusra’s leadership may
have calculated that by renouncing its ties to Al Qaeda and continuing to focus its attacks on the
Syrian government, it could eventually win the support of most Syrian opposition groups—
particularly if these groups concluded that their primary goal of removing Syrian President Asad
would be best served through an alliance with the Nusra Front than with the United States.
Speculation that the Nusra Front’s public severance of external affiliations could result in greater
cooperation and integration with other elements of the Syrian opposition seemed to be borne out
in January 2017 with the creation of Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (Levant Liberation Organization,
HTS), a coalition including JFS (whose fighters represent most of HTS’s forces) and other
Islamist militant groups. As in the Nusra Front’s ostensible split from Al Qaeda and rebirth as JFS
in 2016, there are disagreements about the extent to which HTS represents a new, independent
actor in Syria or another vehicle for Al Qaeda-linked militants to hide their affiliation for political
reasons.47 Secretary of Defense James Mattis seemed to acknowledge this issue at an October
2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, when he said “what we’ve seen is, these
groups come apart, go back together, they change their names as often as a rock-and-roll band.”48
While JFS was designated an official alias of Nusra in November 2016, no such action has been
taken with regard to HTS.49
The presence in Syria of high-ranking Al Qaeda operatives (like Al Qaeda’s deputy leader Abu al
Khayr al Masri, killed by a U.S. drone strike in Idlib in February 2017) could be seen as an
indicator that substantive links still exist between Nusra and Al Qaeda’s senior leaders outside
Syria.50 In late 2017, assassinations and arrests targeting non-Syrian HTS members seen as more
closely aligned with AQ may indicate that differences between AQ and HTS are real and growing
as some in HTS seek to position the coalition as an organically Syrian movement.51 Some have
characterized this situation as AQ “having effectively lost control of its former Syrian affiliate.”52
Others have speculated about the role of foreign-backed forces in the killings.53 AQ leader
Zawahiri condemned Nusra’s rebranding in November 2017 and argued that “nobody should be
told to leave the Levant...What is this heretical innovation that we should not have foreign
links?”54
The Nusra Front presents a unique challenge to the United States, given that the group has both
threatened and coordinated with other Syrian opposition groups—some of which may receive
U.S. support. U.S. officials have acknowledged that the Nusra Front in some places is
“geographically close or intermixed” with civilian or other opposition groups.55 Obama

47

Sam Heller, “Syria’s Former al-Qaeda Affiliate Is Leading Rebels on a Suicide Mission,” Century Foundation,
March 1, 2017; Colin P. Clarke, “The Moderate Face of Al Qaeda,” RAND, October 24, 2017.
48
CQ Congressional Transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force, October 30, 2017. Available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5206113?1.
49
“State Department Amendments to the Terrorist Designation of al-Nusrah Front,” November 10, 2016.
50
Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Senior Qaeda Leader Is Killed in Drone Strike,” New York Times, March 1,
2017.
51
Haid Haid, “Who Is Assassinating Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham’s Leaders?” Chatham House, November 2017; Kyle
Orton, “Former Al-Qaeda in Syria Branch Arrests Members of Al-Qaeda in Syria,” Henry Jackson Society, November
28, 2017.
52
Charles Lister, “New opportunities for ISIS and al-Qaeda,” Middle East Institute, January 8, 2018.
53
Jamie Dettmer, “Turkey Deploys More Forces in Northern Syria,” Voice of America, November 3, 2017.
54
OSE Report TRW2017112944994651, November 29, 2017.
55
Department of State Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson John Kirby, May 6, 2016.

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Administration officials noted, “we have seen even to some degree some troubling cooperation
between certain opposition groups and al-Nusrah.”56

The Khorasan Group
In 2015, former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell described the Khorasan Group as a group of operatives
dispatched by Al Qaeda leader Zawahiri from Pakistan to Syria in order to assist the Nusra Front in its battle against
Syrian President Bashar al Asad. Khorasan also reportedly intended to use Syria as a base of operations for attacks
against the West.57 The official asserted that, like Al Qaeda senior leadership and AQAP, the Khorasan Group has the
capability to conduct successful attacks in the United States. In 2016, military officials stated that Al Qaeda and
Khorasan operatives “have one main goal, and this is to plan attacks in the west. That is what they do.”58 In 2015,
then-National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen stated, “In many cases we believe these
individuals that we are identifying as the Khorasan group play a role alongside or as part of Jabhat al Nusra in carrying
out action inside Syria to advance the goals of the opposition.” Rasmussen also noted that, “membership in these
particular organizations is not always a clean, distinct, or definable proposition.”59 However, some outside observers
argue that by early 2015 Khorasan had largely ceased external operations planning in response to directives from AQ
leadership to prioritize opposition activities inside Syria.60 In early 2017, military officials reported U.S. strikes against
what they described as Al Qaeda members in Syria but did not make reference to the Khorasan Group specifically,
and some observers have characterized the previous description (that Khorasan Group represented a separate
organization from other AQ elements in Syria) as a “false distinction.”61

Al Shabaab62
The Somalia-based Al Shabaab group remains a key terrorist threat in East Africa. In addition to
assassinations and suicide bombings inside Somalia (including an October 2017 bombing in
Mogadishu that left over 500 dead), it has also conducted attacks in countries contributing to the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is mandated with countering the group and
helping to stabilize the country. Al Shabaab’s 2013 attack against the Westgate mall in Nairobi
killed at least 67, and the group has continued to attack Kenyan towns along the border—
including a 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University that killed 148. Al Shabaab has also
conducted suicide attacks in Djibouti.
While AMISOM-led forces have succeeded in pushing the group out of Somalia’s capital,
Mogadishu, and other major southern cities, Al Shabaab has proven resilient and adaptable. In
March 2017, AFRICOM Commander General Waldhauser cautioned that if AMISOM begins its
scheduled withdrawal in 2018, in the absence of fully developed Somalian security forces, “large
portions of Somalia are at risk of returning to al-Shabaab control or potentially allowing ISIS to
gain a stronger foothold in the country.”63 Al Shabaab has resisted efforts by the Islamic State to
56

Department of State Daily Press Briefing by Spokesperson John Kirby, May 13, 2016.
Michael Morell, “Fourteen Years and Counting: The Evolving Terrorist Threat,” CTC Sentinel, September 2015.
58
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Col. Warren via Teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, April 7, 2016.
59
Paul Cruickshank, “A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Nick Rasmussen, Director, NCTC,” CTC
Sentinel, September 2015.
60
Charles Lister, “Profiling Jabhat al-Nusra,” Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, July 2016.
61
Bill Roggio, “US kills al Qaeda facilitator and external ops planner in Syrian airstrikes,” Long War Journal, January
19, 2017.
62
Prepared by Lauren Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10170, Al
Shabaab, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)
.
63
AFRICOM 2017 Posture Statement. Available at https://www.africom.mil/media-room/document/28720/africom2017-posture-satement.
57

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make inroads in Somalia and responded violently in recent years to the emergence of pro-IS cells
in the country.64
Al Shabaab leaders have threatened attacks in the United States and against U.S. citizens and
targets in the region. Several U.S. citizens have been killed in Al Shabaab attacks in East Africa
since 2010. In February 2016, Al Shabaab demonstrated its ability to conceal a bomb in a laptop
computer that was detonated by a suicide bomber onboard a Somali airliner. (It detonated before
the plane reached cruising altitude and thus did not destroy the aircraft.) Al Shabaab’s ability to
recruit abroad and the presence of foreign fighters, among them U.S. citizens, in Somalia have
been of significant concern to U.S. policymakers.

Al Qaeda Messaging on the Islamic State
Al Qaeda Responds to the Emergence of the Islamic State
After the rise of the Islamic State, Al Qaeda’s public messaging refocused on clarifying the rules
for jihad and on discrediting the Islamic State’s leadership and tactics. In September 2013,
Zawahiri issued General Guidelines for Jihad. In this document he laid out the group’s priorities,
beginning with the United States:
The purpose of targeting America is to exhaust her and bleed her to death, so that it meets
the fate of the former Soviet Union and collapses under its own weight as a result of its
military, human, and financial losses. Consequently, its grip on our lands will weaken
and its allies will begin to fall one after another.65

Nevertheless, the majority of the document outlined a code of conduct for jihadist fighters
operating locally. Zawahiri stated that fighters should avoid clashing with local governments.
Emphasizing that jihad is a long-term struggle, Zawahiri urged groups to, when possible, “pacify”
any conflict with local rulers so as to create “safe bases” and a permissive operating environment.
Zawahiri also ordered fighters to “avoid fighting the deviant sects” (Shi’a, Ismailis, Ahmadis, and
Sufis) unless attacked, and even then, “we must make it clear that we are only defending
ourselves. Those from amongst them who do not participate in the fight against us and their
families, should not be targeted.” Zawahiri also instructed followers to “avoid meddling” with
Christian, Sikh, and Hindu communities in Muslim lands. He states that followers should make
clear to these communities that, “we do not seek to initiate a fight against them, since we are
engaged in fighting the head of disbelief (America); and that we are keen to live with them in a
peaceful manner after an Islamic state is established.”
Finally, Zawahiri stated that fighters must not harm other Muslims, and should refrain from
killing noncombatants—even if they are families of those who fight Al Qaeda. He instructed
fighters to avoid targeting their enemies in public spaces such as mosques and markets, where an
attack could harm other Muslims or noncombatants.
In September 2015, Zawahiri issued the first of a series of audio statements entitled “The Islamic
Spring.” In these audio statements, Zawahiri drew on historical and Koranic sources to attack the
legitimacy of the Islamic State. Zawahiri’s objections to the Islamic State include the following:

64

Jason Warner and Caleb Weiss, “A Legitimate Challenger? Assessing the Rivalry between al-Shabaab and Islamic
State in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel, November 2017.
65
Ayman al Zawahiri, “General Guidelines for Jihad,” Al Sahab Media, September 2013.

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







Declaring a caliphate by force without consultation with other jihadist
authorities. Zawahiri argued that a caliphate can only be established through
consultation and consensus, not through the unilateral actions of a small group. In
Episode 4, he declared that “taking power by force without consultation violates
sharia.”66 He added that while Al Qaeda fully intends to establish an Islamic
caliphate, “it will be a caliphate that follows the prophet’s path and not some
wrongful kingdom taken by force through car bombs and blasts.”
Declaring a caliphate prematurely. Zawahiri stated that conditions are not yet
right for the declaration of a caliphate. He argued that a true caliphate does not
come into existence merely by declaring it as such. In Episode 3, he stated that
before establishing a caliphate, there are “truths that must exist in reality and on
the ground,” not just “hopes and desires.”67
Killing other Muslims. Throughout the series, Zawahiri repeatedly condemned
the shedding of blood among different jihadist factions. In Episode 2, he called
on fighters to avoid infighting, “for the sin of killing a Muslim is great.”68 He
added that it is not permissible to seize money or equipment from rival jihadist
groups.
Sowing discord within jihadist ranks, benefiting the enemy. Zawahiri’s
repeated calls for an end to infighting stem from his concern that such conduct
ultimately benefits the United States.69

Al Qaeda in the Twilight of the Islamic State
In 2017, campaigns by local forces—backed by U.S. and coalition military operations—resulted
in partner forces reclaiming much of the territory formerly held by the Islamic State. The demise
of the group’s caliphate in its former heartland may provide an opening for Al Qaeda to recruit
fighters formerly affiliated with the Islamic State, while also increasing likelihood that AQ may
once again find itself at the center of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.
In the sixth installment of his “Brief Messages To a Victorious Nation” series, Zawahiri criticized
the Islamic State’s approach of pursuing territorial control and establishing local governance.
Addressing the Syrian people, he urged them to “focus on a guerilla war” and ordered, “Do not
occupy yourselves with holding on to territory.”70 In 2018, AQ supporters may find this view
vindicated, and seek to press their advantage by directly combating the Islamic State, as Al
Qaeda’s “General Command” ordered in a January 2018 message that listed the Islamic State
alongside other enemies like Shi’ites and “Crusaders.”71 Previously, the differences between Al
Qaeda and the Islamic State appeared to be more tactical than strategic, and it remains to be seen

66

OSE Report TRR2015100561575345, October 5, 2015.
OSE Report TRL2015092183805913, September 21, 2015.
68
OSE Report TRR2015091311667655, September 12, 2015.
69
“As we face this campaign now, is this dispute pleasing or displeasing to the Americans? Does it please or displease
the enemies when Al-Baghdadi and those with him rebel against Al-Qa'ida, break their confirmed pledge of allegiance,
openly rebel against their amir, attack the governance of Mullah Omar, whose name they used to shout, declare a
caliphate based on a pledge from unknown individuals, and call on the mujahideen to dissent and break their pledges,
resulting in all kinds of disputes and tumult?” OSE Report TRN2015091004392901, September 9, 2015.
70
OSE Report TRR2017042370968161, April 23, 2017.
71
OSE Report TRW2018010863137326, January 8, 2018.
67

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whether that January 2018 order heralds a more fundamental break between the two groups or
whether AQ might return to previous calls for cooperation with IS based on shared values.72
That ideological affinity raises the possibility, and the expectation among terrorism analysts, that
extremist operations in the region will continue regardless of the fate of the Islamic State
organization. Al Qaeda’s willingness to cooperate with Islamic State fighters may leave the group
in a position to absorb some of these fighters if the Islamic State’s leadership is ultimately
defeated in Syria and Iraq (see “Outlook,” below).

Selected Policy Responses
U.S. strategy to combat Al Qaeda in the Middle East and Africa combines limited military
deployments, training and equipping of local forces, financial sanctions, and programs on
countering violent extremism (CVE). The U.S. approach to particular affiliates has varied
depending on factors such as the operating environment, the capabilities of local forces, and legal
considerations, as discussed below.
U.S. Government Terminology: Affiliated v. Associated Forces
The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, P.L. 107-40) enacted by Congress in September 2001 is the
primary law authorizing U.S. operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban.73 U.S. Administrations later established
categories of Al Qaeda-linked groups, each of which carries potentially distinct legal and policy implications. The
terms below do not appear in the original AUMF text; rather, they have been delineated in a series of subsequent
legal rulings and executive branch strategy papers.
Associated Forces: organized, armed groups that have entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and are
co-belligerents with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.74 Once
established as co-belligerents, associated forces are considered legal targets of U.S. military force per the laws of
armed conflict—which are commonly interpreted to permit a country at war to use force against those fighting
alongside its enemy.
Affiliates: groups that have aligned with Al Qaeda. This includes associated forces as well as groups and individuals
against whom the Obama Administration considers the United States is not authorized to use force based on the
authorities granted by the AUMF.75 The United States may use force against affiliates that have been further classified
as associated forces.
Adherents: individuals who form collaborative relationships with Al Qaeda or act on its behalf or in furtherance of
its goals—including by engaging in violence—regardless of whether such violence is directed at the United States.76
Al Qaeda “Inspired”: Groups or individuals not affiliated with identified terror organizations but inspired by the Al
Qaeda narrative.77

72

“Despite these grievous errors, I call upon all of the mujahideen in the Levant and Iraq to cooperate and coordinate
their efforts to stand as one in confronting the Crusaders, secularists, Nusayris [derogatory reference to Alawites], and
Safavids, even if they do not recognize the legitimacy of Al-Baghdadi’s state and his group, not to mention his
caliphate. The matter is bigger than not recognizing the legitimacy of their state or their claim to establishing a
caliphate, for the ummah is being subjected to a savage Crusader campaign and we must set out to push back its
assailants.” OSE Report TRR2015091311667655, September 12, 2015.
73
For additional background on the AUMF, see CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force:
Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by (name redacted) .
74
Testimony of Stephen W. Preston, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, May 21, 2014.
75
2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Note: previous versions of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism
were issued in 2003 and 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.
76
Ibid.
77
See for example, “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,” Department of
Defense, February 2013. http://www.defense.gov/news/Homelanddefensestrategy.pdf.

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The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism includes the following footnote: “Affiliates is not a legal term of art.
Although it includes Associated Forces, it additionally includes groups and individuals against whom the United States
is not authorized to use force based on the authorities granted by the Authorization for the Use of Military Force,
P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The use of Affiliates in this strategy is intended to reflect a broader category of
entities against whom the United States must bring various elements of national power, as appropriate and consistent
with the law, to counter the threat they pose. Associated Forces is a legal term of art that refers to cobelligerents of
al-Qa‘ida or the Taliban against whom the President is authorized to use force (including the authority to detain)
based on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, P.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).”

U.S. Military Operations
The United States, often in cooperation with local or other international partners, is engaged in
military operations against a number of Al Qaeda groups.








Afghanistan. Approximately 2,000 of the15,000 U.S. troops are performing
counterterrorism combat missions, including against Al Qaeda and its associated
forces in Afghanistan. U.S. forces continue to try to find and to target—primarily
using manned and unmanned aircraft—senior Al Qaeda operatives in
Afghanistan, as well as select Taliban targets.
Yemen. According to one account, there were 114 U.S. strikes against AQAP in
2017, compared to 44 in 2016.78 Additionally, a U.S. commando was killed in a
January 2017 counterterrorism raid on AQAP militants, the first such U.S.
military casualty in the country.79
Libya. A U.S. strike in Libya in June 2015 sought (reportedly unsuccessfully) to
kill AQIM splinter-faction Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar.80 A
French air strike reportedly again targeted Belmokhtar in late 2016, but his death
has not been publicly confirmed. Observers note that in early 2017, in a video
announcing the merger of four jihadist networks active in Mali, Al Murabitoun
was represented by one of Belmokhtar's deputies.81
Somalia. U.S. military action in Somalia began under the George W. Bush
Administration, broadened under the Obama Administration and again under the
Trump Administration. The Trump Administration has authorized DOD to
conduct lethal action against Al Shabaab within a geographically-defined “area of
active hostilities” in support of partner forces in Somalia.82 The tempo of U.S. air
strikes in Somalia has been increasing since 2015, spiking in 2017 with more
than 30 publicly acknowledged strikes. In May 2017, the Pentagon announced
the first U.S. combat death in the country since the early 1990s. The death
occurred during a joint operation with Somali forces against Al Shabaab.

78

Bill Roggio and Alexandra Gutowski, “2017: A record year for US counterterrorism strikes,” Long War Journal,
January 3, 2018; “Update on recent counterterrorism strikes in Yemen,” U.S. Central Command, December 20, 2017.
79
Missy Ryan, Sudarsan Raghavan, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “U.S. service member killed in Yemen raid marks first
combat death of Trump administration,” Washington Post, January 29, 2017.
80
Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Airstrike in Libya Targets Planner of 2013 Algeria Attack,” June 14, 2015.
81
Interview with Yvan Guichaoua in Libération, "Cette vidéo est censée situer le Sahel sur la carte du jihad global,"
March 5, 2017.
82
Statements by DOD on recent strikes include this phrasing. See DOD, “Pentagon Statement on Somalia Strike,” June
11, 2017.

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



Syria. Coalition strikes killed Khorasan Group member and French national
David Drugeon, described by U.S. military officials as an Al Qaeda operative and
explosives expert in July 201583 and Sanafi al Nasr, a Saudi national whom
military officials described as a leading financial figure in the Khorasan Group,
in October 2015. In February 2017, a U.S. drone strike reportedly killed deputy
Al Qaeda leader Abu al Khayr al Masri.84
North Africa and the Sahel. The U.S. military, which has conducted
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities out of a facility in
Niger since 2013, received public approval from the Nigerien government in
November 2017 to arm U.S. drones stationed there. The scope of any future
operations by armed U.S. drones in the Sahel (which could conceivably include
the protection of U.S. and/or partner forces on the ground, close air support to
U.S.- or partner-led operations, and/or targeted strikes against terrorist
organizations) remains to be seen.85

Efforts to Build Regional Partners’ Military Capability86
Successive Administrations have described their efforts to train local partners as core component
of U.S.-led counterterrorism strategy. In 2017, CENTCOM Commander Gen. Joseph Votel stated
that building partner capacity
is a lower-cost alternative to U.S. boots on the ground, has longer-term sustainability, and
is necessary for interoperable, combined coalition operations...By building capacity and
enabling partners to assume a larger role in providing for the stability and security of
their sovereign spaces, we will enhance regional stability while still maintaining our
critical access and influence in [the Middle East and North Africa]87

The 2018 National Defense Strategy names building “the capability required to counter violent
extremism,” among other threats, as a priority of U.S. policy in Africa. The 2017 National
Security Strategy similarly states that, in the Middle East, the United States “will assist regional
partners in strengthening their institutions and capabilities, including in law enforcement, to
conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts.”88
To counter Al Qaeda and its affiliates, the United States works with local military and security
forces in countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Building capable partner forces in
these countries may be seen to further a range of objectives that, taken together, help partners to
better manage their regional security challenges. These include sustaining gains made by U.S.
forces, minimizing the need for a large U.S. presence, and preventing the establishment of AQ
83

Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
September 22, 2015.
84
A former EIJ member, al Masri was held in Iran until 2015, when he was released in return for an Iranian diplomat
and moved to Syria to help direct Nusra efforts. “Senior al Qaeda leader killed by CIA drone strike: U.S. official,”
Reuters, March 1, 2017.
85
Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Niger Approves Armed U.S. Drone Flights, Expanding Pentagon’s Role in
Africa,” New York Times, November 30, 2017.
86
For additional information, see CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress,
coordinated by (name redacted)
.
87
Statement of General Joseph L. Votel, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, March 9, 2017.
88
“National Security Stategy of the United States of America,” December 2017.

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safe havens that could be used as a launch pad for attacks against the United States. Some charge
that such efforts focus disproportionately on military efforts to combat external threats to the
detriment of “ensuring that internal security services address such threats effectively, or protect
and do not marginalize or alienate vulnerable populations.”89
Capacity-building efforts have at times involved direct military strikes in what U.S. officials have
termed the “self-defense” of U.S. personnel accompanying partner forces. In some cases, the
executive branch has expanded its threshold for the use of direct force beyond the specific
targeting of Al Qaeda. For example, the Obama Administration broadened its justification for
direct U.S. military action in Somalia in 2015, indicating in a notification to Congress consistent
with the War Powers Resolution that its operations in Somalia were carried out not only “to
counter Al Qaeda and associated elements of Al Shabaab” (as previously reported), but also “in
support of Somali forces, AMISOM forces, and U.S. forces in Somalia.”90 The number of U.S.
military personnel on the ground in Somalia has also increased significantly in 2017—from
roughly 200 to more than 500, according to an AFRICOM spokesman—as the U.S. approach has
evolved toward deploying more special operations “adviser teams” across the country to “advise,
assist, and accompany” Somali and AU forces during counterterrorism operations.91






Afghanistan. In December 2014, the United States and its international partners
transferred the lead domestic security role in Afghanistan from NATO forces to
the ANDSF. In August 2017, President Trump announced a new strategy for
Afghanistan that involves sending additional U.S. troops (bringing the total to
15,000) to Afghanistan to assist in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission to train,
advise, and assist the ANDSF.
Yemen. In April 2016, “small numbers” of U.S. military personnel were
authorized to deploy to Yemen to support operations against AQAP.92 In
December 2017, the Trump Administration reported that a “small number of
United States military personnel” operated in the country,93 and CENTCOM later
confirmed “multiple ground operations” in 2017.94
North Africa and the Sahel. The U.S. approach to AQIM and affiliated groups
relies largely on bolstering the domestic counterterrorism capabilities of the
North African and Sahel countries where these groups operate. The State
Department-led Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in NorthWest Africa includes military and police train-and-equip programs, counterradicalization programs, and public diplomacy efforts. Additional assistance is
provided bilaterally to countries in the region, through other overlapping regional

89

Ilan Goldberg, et al., “Remodeling Partner Capacity,” Center for a New American Security, November 14, 2016.
The White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Resolution, December 11, 2015. That authority was expanded by
President Trump in March 2017 to “provide additional precision fires in support of African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) and Somali security forces operations to defeat al-Shabaab.” Statement by Pentagon Spokesman Capt. Jeff
Davis on U.S. Counterterrorism Operations in Somalia, March 30, 2017.
91
Wesley Morgan, “U.S. military builds up,” op. cit. “Advise, assist, and accompany” is the phrase used in presidential
reports to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” since December 2016.
92
The White House, Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate Regarding the War Powers Resolution, June 13, 2016.
93
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Text of a Letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, December 11, 2017.
94
“Update on recent counterterrorism strikes in Yemen,” U.S. Central Command, December 20, 2017.
90

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

progress, and by DOD. The growing scope of DOD "advise and assist"
operations, in which U.S. military personnel may accompany counterterrorism
operations led by partner forces, was thrust into the national spotlight in October
2017, when four U.S. servicemembers were killed in western Niger (a country
that hosts one of the largest numbers of U.S. troops in Africa, around 800 by
some accounts)95 by an Islamic State-affiliated group whose leader once
belonged to an AQIM splinter faction. Continuing conflict and political
uncertainty in Libya has precluded the development of robust partnership
capacity building programs with forces in that country.
Somalia. U.S. efforts against Al Shabaab include a limited U.S. military “train,
advise, and accompany” mission inside Somalia, and help to train, equip, and
supply AMISOM and select Somali forces. U.S. officials in March 2016 stated
that a “small number” of U.S. forces were involved in a separate ground raid
against Al Shabaab militants in Somalia, reiterating that U.S forces operated in a
“train, advise, and accompany mode, as they have been in the past in Somalia.”96
A U.S. servicemember was killed in May 2017 while accompanying Somali
forces in an operation against Al Shabaab, the first confirmed American military
death in the country since 1993.97

Targeted Sanctions
Another aspect of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy against Al Qaeda involves limiting the
group’s ability to finance its operations. There are a number of ways in which terror groups
generate income; according to a House of Representatives Task Force to Investigate Terrorism
Financing report issued in 2016, “the most common sources of financing include state sponsors,
private donors, charitable entities, self-funding mechanisms, and various criminal activities.”98
The Islamic State, through its ability to raise unprecedented funds via novel techniques such as
taxation, “is uniquely different from the financing typical of Al-Qaeda.”99 Some AQ groups,
however, have adopted elements of the IS model. The House of Representatives Task Force report
highlighted Al Shabaab as one of the most financially capable and well-resourced terrorist groups,
alongside the Islamic State and others.
One component of the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda is ensuring that the group and its supporters are
unable to access the U.S. financial system. According to the 9/11 Commission, some $300,000 of
the overall $400,000-$500,000 cost of the September 11, 2011, attacks passed through U.S. bank
accounts.100 A 2015 assessment by the Department of the Treasury stated,
The central role of the U.S. financial system within the international financial system and
the sheer volume and diversity of international financial transactions that in some way
95

Paul McLeary, “Niger Ambush Highlights Growing U.S. Military Involvement in Africa,” Foreign Policy, October
5, 2017.
96
Department of Defense Press Briefing by Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook in the Pentagon Briefing Room,
March 10, 2016.
97
“U.S. service member killed in Somalia,” United States Africa Command, May 5, 2017.
98
“Stopping Terror Finance: Securing the U.S. Financial Sector,” Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing,
Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 20, 2016.
99
Ibid.
100
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Thomas H. Kean, and Lee Hamilton. 2004. The
9/11 Commission report: final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

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pass through U.S. financial institutions expose the U.S. financial system to TF [terrorist
financing] risks that other financial systems may not face.101

Targeted financial sanctions administered and enforced by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC), are used to identify, disrupt, and prevent terrorists—including those linked to Al
Qaeda—from accessing the U.S. financial system.
In 1998, the Treasury designated Al Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) following
Al Qaeda’s bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The designation banned U.S.
financial transactions with the group and allowed U.S. law enforcement to freeze any U.S.-held
assets. Osama bin Laden was also added to the Department of the Treasury’s list of Specially
Designated Nationals (SDN). After the 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda was listed as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, which
authorizes the U.S. government to block the assets (within U.S. jurisdiction) of individuals and
entities that commit or pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism, as well as the assets
of individuals or entities that provide support, services, or assistance to designated terrorist
groups. In its 2016 Terrorist Assets Report, the Department of the Treasury stated that $6 million
in Al Qaeda-linked funds in the United States had been blocked as of 2016 under SDGT, SDT,
and FTO programs.102
Given that many Al Qaeda financiers are based outside of the United States, U.S. agencies have
also sought to build ties with partner countries to broaden the reach of financial sanctions and
bolster enforcement. In 1999, the United Nations Security Council established the Al Qaeda
Sanctions Committee pursuant to resolution 1267 (UNSCR 1267). The resolution requires all
U.N. member states to freeze the assets of, prevent the entry into or transit through their
territories by, and prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, and transfer of arms and military
equipment to any individual or entity associated with Al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. The
committee maintains a list of individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda, toward which
member states must apply an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo. In December 2015,
UNSCR 2253 expanded the list to include the Islamic State, and the list is now known as the ISIL
(Da’esh) & Al Qaida Sanctions List. As of December 2017, the sanctions list included 255
individuals and 80 entities.
In addition to imposing financial sanctions, the above designations also include restrictions on
travel designed to limit terrorist mobility. Through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) the
State Department provides funding and technical training for countries to screen passengers at
ports of entry. As part of TIP, the State Department has provided high-counterterrorism-priority
countries with the PISCES screening system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and
Evaluation System) to facilitate immigration processing and to exchange information with State
Department officials on suspected terrorist transit.103

Countering Violent Extremism
The Obama Administration emphasized countering violent extremism (CVE) programs to attempt
to counter the reach of groups like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Early reporting suggested that
101

U.S. Department of the Treasury, National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment, June 12, 2015.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Terrorist Assets Report 2016, Office of Foreign Assets Control,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/tar2016.pdf.
103
Written testimony of Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Justin Siberell before the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation & Trade, May 17, 2016.
102

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the Trump Administration planned to shift these programs to focus solely on what it describes as
“radical Islamic terror,” or to eschew the term CVE in favor of “terrorism prevention.” It is not
apparent, however, that fundamentally different approaches have been taken to date, though the
FY2018 Budget requested $126 million for the State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism
and Countering Violent Extremism, down from $269 million in FY2016. It remains to be seen
how these efforts may be reprioritized or otherwise altered under President Trump; CVE-related
material on the State Department website appears, as of January 2018, to date from the Obama
Administration.104
In a July 2015 speech, President Obama stated, “ultimately, in order for us to defeat terrorist
groups like ISIL and al Qaeda it’s going to also require us to discredit their ideology [ ... ]
Ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas—a more attractive and
more compelling vision.”105 Obama added that the United States would work with international
partners and Muslim communities to counter terrorist propaganda. Statements made under the
Trump Administration have had similar messages, such as a State Department fact sheet on the
counter-IS effort that reads, in part, “building resistance to extremist propaganda and countering
terrorist use of the internet is vital to our effort.”106
In May 2016, the State Department and USAID released a joint strategy on countering violent
extremism, which defined CVE as
proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and
mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent
extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence. This includes both disrupting the
tactics used by violent extremists to attract new recruits to violence and building specific
alternatives, narratives, capabilities, and resiliencies in targeted communities and
populations to reduce the risk of radicalization and recruitment to violence.107

USAID oversees CVE programs in the Middle East and Africa alongside the State Department’s
Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, while the Department of
Homeland Security focuses on outreach to domestic, particularly Muslim, communities. Some
CVE components fall within broader regional programs, and some are designed to counter a
range of violent extremists—including, but not limited to, Al Qaeda. Examples of CVE programs
in the Middle East and Africa for which funding was obligated in 2017 include the following:




$1 million in NADR/CTPF-OCO to support the expansion of the International
Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity Building
Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM) for potential use in Lebanon, Mali, Somalia,
and Jordan (among others);108
$6 million in FY16 for CVE programs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria under the TSCTP;109

104

William Braniff, et al., “From CVE to ‘Terrorism Prevention’: Assessing New U.S. Policies,” Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, November 14, 2017.
105
White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Progress in the Fight Against ISIL,” July
6, 2015.
106
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “The Global Coalition – Working to Defeat ISIS,” March 22,
2017.
107
Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violence Extremism, May 2016.
108
CN- 17-183, August 23, 2017.
109
CN 17-176, August 23, 2017.

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


$4 million in ESF and ESF-OCO for Africa Security Challenges Pilot Programs,
including a program to provide CVE messaging in the Lake Chad Basin;110 and
$12.5 million in NADR and CTPF-OCO for a Counterterrorism Partnership with
Kenya, including programs to “strengthen the response of Kenya’s criminal
justice system to terrorism and violent extremism.”111

Legislation and Issues for Congress
Authorization for the Use of Military Force112
U.S. military action against Al Qaeda and its affiliates has continued for years in multiple
countries located in several regions of the world. The authority for such continuing and
expanding action against Al Qaeda, the proper interpretation of such authority, and the role of
Congress in overseeing and updating such authority, however, have been points of contention
between Congress and the executive branch for most of that period. Such debate continues
regarding the use of force against Al Qaeda, associated groups, and its affiliates, although much
of the attention on issues related to presidential use of military force has in recent years shifted to
the military campaign against the Islamic State.
Many observers, including some Members of Congress, have identified several concerns about
continued use of force under existing authorities and what some see as expansive concepts of
inherent presidential authority to use military force:




No termination date for existing authorizations. Neither the 2001 AUMF nor
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243), both of which have been relied upon as authority to
combat Al Qaeda, certain associated groups, and its “successor” the Islamic
State, include language sunsetting their respective authorities on a certain date or
laying out conditions under which the authorities would terminate. Some argue
that this could lead to these authorities being relied upon permanently by
successive Administrations to use force against Al Qaeda and many other related
terrorist groups.
Geographic scope of military action. Although the original theater of military
action against Al Qaeda was Afghanistan, Al Qaeda members cross national
borders or recruit new members in other countries. In addition, the network of Al
Qaeda affiliates operates in multiple countries in the Middle East, South Asia,
and North, West, Central, and East Africa. Because of terror networks’ ability to
operate transnationally, the use of force against Al Qaeda and certain linked
groups has led to a massive increase in the geographic scope of military
operations without additional authorization from Congress.

110

CN 17-205, September 17, 2017. Many of these programs are coordinated through USAID’s Office of Transition
Initiatives (USAID/OTI), and more information on these and related efforts can be found in the Transition Initiatives
Account Annual Report to Congress for FY 2017, December 20, 2017.
111
CN 17-072, April 28, 2017.
112
Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation. For additional information, se e CRS Report
R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by (name redac
ted) .

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





Timeliness of language in existing authorizations. The 2001 AUMF authorizes
the use of military force against those who perpetrated the September 11, 2001,
terror attacks and those who cooperated or aided them, while the 2002 AUMF
authorizes force to defend against the “continuing threat posed by Iraq,”
originally a reference to the Saddam Hussein regime. While the language of both
authorizations can be and has been interpreted to provide authority for the
continuing use of military force, some argue that these existing authorizations
must be amended or replaced to reflect current realities and future developments
concerning U.S. military counterterrorism efforts.113
Presidential authority under Article II of the Constitution. Some argue that
the 2001 AUMF has been stretched to include military action that was not
originally contemplated by Congress. Both the Bush and Obama Administrations,
however, argued that the President’s authority as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the Constitution authorizes action
against Al Qaeda and other related terror groups in many cases even if an existing
legislative authorization does not extend to such action.114 If there is an imminent
threat to the United States, its citizens, military or civilian personnel, or interests,
the President has argued he has stand-alone constitutional authority to use
military force as Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, successive
Administrations have argued the President can also use military force as part of
conducting the foreign policy of the United States. In some instances of U.S.
strikes against Al Qaeda-linked groups, it is unclear from Administration
statements which legal justification the Administration relied upon to conduct the
strike. Some in Congress have disagreed with this interpretation of inherent
presidential power, and have called on Congress to define and place limits on the
President’s authority to use military force against terror groups such as Al Qaeda
and its affiliates.
Constitutional role of Congress. Many Members of Congress have proposed
legislation to amend, replace, and/or repeal the 2001 AUMF and 2002 AUMF,
and have called on Congress to fulfill its constitutional role afforded it through
the power to declare war and other related war powers. These Members have
argued that perceived problems with presidential overreach concerning the use of
military force against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as other uses of military
force, in part stem from Congress’s unwillingness to conduct effective oversight
and revisit existing legislation to ensure the President is using military force in
accordance with the Constitution and the will of Congress, insofar as Congress
has authority in those areas.

Trump Administration officials have supported reliance on the 2001 AUMF as the primary
authority for continued use of military force against Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and associated
forces. At an October 2017 hearing, Defense Secretary Mattis and Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson argued that the 2001 AUMF provides all legal authority necessary to conduct ongoing
campaigns against these groups. In response to calls by some Members of Congress to amend or
113

See, e.g., Letter from Rosa Brooks et al. to President Barack Obama, February 10, 2015,
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/AUMF-Sunset-Letter.pdf.
114
See U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing on authorization for use of military force, 113 th
Cong., 2nd sess., May 21, 2014 (testimony of Mary McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, and
Stephen Preston, General Counsel, Department of Defense).

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repeal the 2001 AUMF and replace it with a new AUMF, Secretary Tillerson said that “any new
authorization should not be time-constrained” and that “a new AUMF must not be geographically
restricted.”115

FY2017-2018Appropriations for Foreign Operations and Defense
In May 2017, Congress appropriated FY2017 funds for foreign operations and defense in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, HR 244); the act’s provisions have been
carried over into FY2018 via continuing resolutions. There were no specific appropriations
limited to Al Qaeda, although the act funded a number of programs and activities related to U.S.
efforts against the group, including in the FY2018 budget request released by the Trump
Administration in February 2017. Select specific requests related to Al Qaeda include the
following:









$3.5 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
(NADR)-OCO funds for Yemen to counter terrorist threats including those from
AQAP.
$34.1 million in State Department- and USAID-administered funds for TSCTP
activities to build the capacity of participant countries in North-West Africa to
counter the threat posed by terrorist groups in the region, including AQIM and its
splinter and offshoot factions.
$10 million in State Department- and USAID-administered funds for the
Partnership for East Africa Counter-Terrorism (PREACT).
$110 million in State Department-administered funds for AMISOM and Somali
security forces fighting Al Shabaab.116
$150 million in ESDF funding to stabilize liberated parts of Syria with the aim of
acting “as a bulwark against extremism.”
$45.9 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for Operation
Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan (formerly known as Operation Enduring
Freedom) to train, advise, and assist Afghan forces and to conduct
counterterrorism operations against the remnants of Al Qaeda.

115

CQ Congressional Transcripts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on the Authorization for the Use
of Military Force, October 30, 2017. Available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-5206113?1.
116
The budget requests funding for UNSOS, but the overall CIPA request is 52% below the FY2017 estimate, and the
breakouts for UNSOS and other missions are not included, “pending negotiations on reducing overall UN peacekeeping
budget levels or U.S. assessed contributions.”

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Outlook
Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups continue to evolve, reflecting internal debates as well as
reactions to competitors such as the Islamic State. Possible future trends include:


Increase in small-scale attacks. Then-Acting Secretary of Homeland Security
Elaine Duke warned in October 2017 that while AQ and other groups still aim to
carry out spectacular, 9/11-style operations, they are increasingly pursuing small
scale attacks to “keep their members engaged.”119 Other U.S. officials have
warned that Al Qaeda affiliates, seeking to compete with the attention garnered
by the Islamic State, are countering with high-publicity attacks on soft targets
such as hotels.120 AQIM in 2015-2017 claimed attacks against hotels in Ivory
Coast, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The group and its offshoots also continue to
conduct attacks against members of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali,
MINUSMA.



Potential for AQ
Hamza bin Laden: Next in Line?
leadership resurgence in
Born
in
1989,
Hamza bin Laden is the most prominent of AQ
Afghanistan. Despite the
founder Osama bin Laden’s sons and is seen by some as a potential
reportedly reduced
successor to current leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Hamza bin Laden
capabilities of Al Qaeda
released his first audio message in August 2015, urging attacks in
leadership, there is concern
Western capitals, and has since reiterated that call in several other
messages, often calling on followers to avenge his father’s 2011
that AQ leaders could once
again find sanctuary with the death at the hands of U.S. forces. Some have detected in Hamza’s
less confrontational rhetorical treatment of IS evidence that he may
Taliban, which controls or
be positioning himself as a kind of “unifying figure” for the “global
contests more territory in
jihadi movement” in the wake of the IS caliphate’s collapse.117 In his
November 2017 message,118 Hamza made no reference to the
Afghanistan as of early 2018
Islamic State, which Zawahiri has criticized for years.
than at any point since 2001
121
by some measures. Once
safely established, AQ leadership could reconstitute its capabilities and
eventually regain the capacity to conduct large-scale attacks. Zawahiri had
previously pledged allegiance to Afghan Taliban leader Akhtar Muhammad
Mansur, and in June 2016 pledged allegiance to Mansur’s successor, Haibatullah
Akhunzada.122 In his Islamic Spring series, Zawahiri offered a general plan for
establishing a caliphate, stating that the first step is strengthening the Islamic
Emirate in Afghanistan [the Taliban].123

117

Ali Soufan, “Hamza bin Ladin: From Steadfast Son to Al-Qa’ida’s Leader in Waiting,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, Issue
8 (September 2017).
118
OSE Report TRW2017110770125847, November 7, 2017.
119
“Terrorist Groups planning another 9/11-style attack, top US official warns,” Telegraph, October 17, 2017.
120
Brian Dodwell, “A view from the CT foxhole: Brigadier General Donald C. Bolduc, Commander, Special
Operations Command Africa,” CTC Sentinel, May 25, 2016.
121
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction quarterly reports.
122
OSE TRR2016061112755024, “Ayman Al Zawahiri Pledges Allegiance to New Taliban Leader, Vows to ‘Establish
a Caliphate,’” June 11, 2016.
123
OSE TRO2015100644888543, “Al-Qa'ida Leader Declares Conditions ‘Not Ready’ for Caliphate, ISIL Leaders
‘Fanatics,’” October 6, 2015.

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



Stretching of U.S. resources. Observers such as former CIA Deputy Director
Michael Morell have argued that the Arab Spring has bolstered Al Qaeda by
challenging governance at the local level.124 In some cases, this has created safe
havens from which the group can operate, and which supply recruits, money, and
weapons. The geographic dispersal of Al Qaeda-linked groups, Morrell has
argued, has stretched the diplomatic, intelligence, and military resources of the
United States. To a greater extent than the Islamic State, which was at least
partially geographically tethered to specific territory it sought to defend, some Al
Qaeda groups are fluid and move across a wide expanse of terrain—arguably
increasing their resilience under attack. To counter them effectively may require
the development of U.S. relationships with a range of regional partners, which in
turn may implicate other interests or pursuits.
Competition and adaptation. Al Qaeda’s attempt to reassert leadership within
the jihadist community could place pressure on the group to accelerate the
implementation of what it had previously described as long-term goals. Others
argue that, despite competition and conflict between the Islamic State and Al
Qaeda, their shared objectives overshadow their differences, suggesting that in
the next five years the two groups could establish some degree of tactical
cooperation.125

Despite the heightened focus on the Islamic State since its territorial expansion in 2014, U.S.
military and intelligence officials have remained concerned about the threat posed by Al Qaeda
and its affiliated groups, some of which have already attempted attacks inside the United States—
notably the multiple foiled airliner attacks attempted by AQAP. Those concerns are likely to
deepen in the aftermath of the Islamic State’s collapse in Iraq and Syria and in light of AQ
affiliates’ growth in Africa and elsewhere. As policymakers examine the broad landscape of
terrorist threats, they may consider whether and how the risks posed to the United States and U.S.
interests from the Islamic State and Al Qaeda differ, and how U.S. counterterrorism policy can be
best positioned to address and balance both threats.

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Acknowledgments
The author wishes to acknowledge (name redacted), CRS Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, who wrote a
previous version of this report.

124

See, for example, Michael Morell, The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight Against Terrorism—From al
Qa’ida to ISIS (2015).
125
”Islamic State seeking alliance with al Qaeda, Iraqi vice president says,” Reuters, April 17, 2017.

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25

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43756. Public record. Not legal advice.