# Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43721

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** September 10, 2014
- **Citation:** R43721

## Text

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding
Before and After the Benghazi Attacks
/name redacted/
Specialist in Foreign Policy
September 10, 2014

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43721

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Summary
Congressional investigations into the September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi,
Libya, have focused on a number of issues, including the extent to which overall funding levels
may have played a role in the security measures in place at that U.S. facility. While several
factors may have been involved in the Benghazi situation, this report focuses only on funding for
security of U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad, hereinafter referred to in this report as
diplomatic/embassy security. (For other CRS reports on the Benghazi attacks and a list of CRS
experts, go to CRS.gov and search “Benghazi.”)
The report of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi (ARB) report highlighted the
funding complexities at the Department of State:
For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources
necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a
deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable
in the extreme in any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a
few State Department managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general
orientation. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision
making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.... One overall
conclusion in this [ARB] report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and
provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet
mission imperatives. (Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack
of September 2012, December 19, 2012, p. 3. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization.202446.pdf.)

Other post-Benghazi reports have pointed out how security funding for overseas staff and posts
depends on the designation of the facility as office space, warehouse, or residence, and whether a
facility is considered by State Department officials as permanent, temporary, or interim. Even the
definition of each of those designations may differ within the Department of State. Further, some
reports suggest that the inability to get more funds to improve security—whether because
Congress does not appropriate enough, delays passing budgets, or because the Department of
State is unwilling or unable to fully fund resource requests from its overseas posts—may
contribute to an attitude by officials in the field that a combination of elevated threat and
restricted resources to meet that threat should not be questioned. In that case, security officers
requesting more funds simply may give up.
This report presents a history and analysis of the requested and actual funding for
diplomatic/embassy security since FY2008—what actually became available for the Department
of State to spend after rescissions, sequestration, and transfers. It also provides funding data that
was requested by the Administration, passed by the House of Representatives, passed by the
Senate, and enacted by Congress for the two accounts that provide the bulk of the funding: the
Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU). Combined,
these two subaccounts in most years comprise more than 90% of the funding available for
diplomatic/embassy security.
This report will continue to track diplomatic/embassy security appropriations and will be updated
as changes occur.

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Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background on State Department’s Budget and Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding ............... 2
Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Data ................................................................................... 3
Administration Requests, House-Proposed, Senate-Proposed, and Enacted
Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding ........................................................................................ 9
Security Funding for the Benghazi Facility ................................................................................... 13

Figures
Figure 1. Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Within the FY2014 Budget Estimate ................. 3
Figure 2. State Department Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Totals,
FY2008-FY2015 Request ............................................................................................................. 6
Figure 3. Total Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding, Enduring and Supplemental/OCO,
FY2008-FY2015 Request ............................................................................................................. 7
Figure 4. Department of State Diplomatic/Embassy Security Requests vs. Actual Funding
Levels, FY2008-FY2015 Request ................................................................................................ 8
Figure 5. Total Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding as a Percentage of Administration
of Foreign Affairs and State Department (150 Function) Expenditures ....................................... 9

Tables
Table 1. State Department Primary Diplomatic/Embassy Worldwide Security Requests,
House-Proposed, and Senate-Proposed Funding, FY2008-FY2014 .......................................... 11
Table 2. FY2012 WSP Funding for Benghazi ............................................................................... 15
Table A-1. State Department Funds for Diplomatic/Embassy Security, FY2008-FY2011............ 16
Table A-2. State Department Funds for Diplomatic/Embassy Security, FY2012-FY2015............ 17

Appendixes
Appendix. State Department Funds for Diplomatic/Embassy Security, FY2008-FY2015............ 16

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 18

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Introduction
As Congress investigates the issues surrounding the September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities
in Benghazi, Libya, some Members have questioned whether security funding was adequate or
was a factor that may have contributed to inadequate security at that facility.
The State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 authorizes the Department of State to “use
appropriated and other funds to provide the maximum security of U.S. government-owned or
leased properties and vehicles abroad.”1 After several attacks occurred on U.S. facilities and other
American interests in Beirut, Lebanon and Kuwait in the early 1980s, Congress passed the
Diplomatic Security Act of 1986,2 further emphasizing the role the Secretary of State plays in
providing funding for the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel worldwide
(hereinafter referred to in this report as diplomatic/embassy security).
Following the August 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, an independent
panel, chaired by Admiral William Crowe, reported that it was “most disturbed by two interconnected issues: First, the inadequacy of resources to provide protective measures against
terrorist attacks; and second, the relative low priority accorded security concerns throughout the
US Government by the Congress, the Department, other agencies in general, and the part of many
employees—both in Washington and in the field.”3
Responding to that panel, Congress, within the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA), established more stringent security requirements and
mandated additional training, authorized $900 million to be spent annually for Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) for the next five years (FY2000-FY2004), and mandated
the Secretary of State to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB) whenever serious
injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property occurs. It required co-location of
virtually all agency personnel in a country and 100-foot perimeters around diplomatic facilities,
but also provided waiver authority for those measures.4
After the September 11, 2012, attacks on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, a new ARB was
convened. Its report, referring to the State Department’s need for risk mitigation at U.S. facilities
around the world, states:
For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources
necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a
deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable
in the extreme in any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a
few State Department managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general
orientation. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision
making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.... One overall
conclusion in this [ARB] report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and

1

Title I, Section 2(k) of the Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956.
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, P.L. 99-399, 22 U.S.C. §4802.
3
Admiral William J. Crowe, Press Briefing on The Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the
Diplomatic/embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, January 8, 1999.
4
P.L. 106-113, Div. B, Sec. 1000(A)(7), by reference, Title VI of H.R. 3427.
2

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provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet
mission imperatives.5

Terms Used in This Report
Distinguishing between various terms used in this report is important to understanding the diplomatic/embassy
security funding issue. First, neither embassy security nor diplomatic security is comprehensive enough when
discussing the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. For the purposes of this report and to avoid
confusion between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, as well as diplomatic security agents, the term
diplomatic/embassy security will be used to include both the security of U.S. diplomatic facilities and diplomatic
personnel worldwide.
Enduring, base, or core describe funding for regular, ongoing programs as opposed to Overseas Contingency
Operations (OCO) or supplemental funding that is requested and appropriated in addition to the regular funds
for a particular account. Supplemental budget requests and appropriations were an annual part of the foreign affairs
budget throughout the George W. Bush Administration. OCO funding was first requested as part of the international
affairs budget in FY2012 by the Obama Administration to cover short-term, temporary, war-related costs. Enduring
funds are subject to spending caps established in the Budget Control Act of 2011, while OCO funds are not; both,
however, are sequestrable (subject to across-the-board rescissions, if Congress exceeds spending caps).
Appropriations or enacted funding levels vs. actual. Enacted funding levels are the amounts appropriated by
Congress at the time an appropriation is signed into law. Actual funding levels are the final allocations that may reflect
rescissions, or transfers.
Temporary vs. Interim facility. According to GAO and State Department officials, “temporary facilities” are
those that can be disassembled or are not yet determined to be permanent; “interim facilities” are those that will be
used until a new embassy or consulate compound can be built (although there appears to be some disagreement
about this term).
Total security funding includes both enduring and supplemental/OCO funds.
State Department 150 is the State Department funding within the budget 150 function (international affairs).

Background on State Department’s Budget and
Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding
Congress annually appropriates funds for the security of diplomatic personnel and facilities
within the Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs appropriation, which is
about 1% of the total federal budget. Security funding amounts to about 9% of that appropriation.
(See Figure 1 below.)

5

Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, p. 3.
See http://www.state.gov/documents/organization.202446.pdf.

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Figure 1. Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Within the FY2014 Budget Estimate

Source: Department of State’s Congressional Budget Justification, FY2015 and CRS calculations.
Notes: Funding for State Department and related programs, including embassy security, equals 32% of the
international affairs FY2014 estimated budget. Other much smaller amounts of security funding may be found in
other agencies that contribute to a Capital Security Cost Sharing Program.

Congress has not enacted a stand-alone State Department appropriation prior to the start of the
fiscal year since 1995 and has not passed a stand-alone Foreign Relations Authorization law since
2002.6 Both could have been legislative vehicles for debate regarding Administration of Foreign
Affairs, including diplomatic/embassy security funding and priorities. Instead, Congress has
provided ongoing security funding within Continuing Resolutions (CRs) that have delayed by
several months the full-year appropriation eventually provided. Funding within a CR is usually
based on the previous year’s funding levels. Furthermore, if spending was not in the previousyear’s appropriation (as was the case with Benghazi in 2012), it would not be funded by a CR.
Only after the final appropriation is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President
would State Department officials know what level of funding they can allocate on a
daily/weekly/monthly basis over the 275 worldwide diplomatic posts (or 1,600 work facilities)7
and over the remainder of the fiscal year.

Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Data
Congress provides funding for diplomatic/embassy security within the Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations. The bulk (typically more than 90%) of
the funding is provided by two subaccounts: Worldwide Security Protection (WSP), within the
Diplomatic and Consular Programs (D&CP) account, and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU)
within the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account. Funds within both
6
For appropriations, see Omnibus Appropriations Acts: Overview of Recent Practices, CRS Report RL32473,
Omnibus Appropriations Acts: Overview of Recent Practices, by (name redacted), pp. 10-11. Regarding foreign
relations authorizations that Congress last passed, see P.L. 107-228, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
2003, September 30, 2002.
7
Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities
May Face Greater Risks Due to Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies, GAO-14-655, June 2014,
p. 9.

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of these accounts are typically available until expended. Other appropriations are within the
subaccounts Diplomatic Security (DS) and Counterterrorism (both within D&CP), and
Diplomatic Security (DS) within the Border Security Program (BSP). A brief description of each
follows:
•

WSP, the largest component of security-related funding within Department of
State appropriations, supports numerous security programs addressing the
security of life, property, and information, including a worldwide guard force
protecting overseas diplomatic missions and residences, as well as domestic
facilities. In FY2015, for the first time, many DS-related salaries and related
costs from DS and other bureaus have been requested under WSP rather than in
Diplomatic and Consular Programs as part of what the Department calls a
Security Realignment Initiative.

•

WSU, within ESCM, provides funding for bricks and mortar-type of security. It
funds the Department of State’s portion of the Capital Security Cost Sharing
program that combines with funds from other agencies represented overseas for
planning, design and construction of secure new embassy compounds. It also
funds ongoing security activities and security-related maintenance.

•

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), funded under D&CP, is the law
enforcement and security arm of the Department of State. DS protects people,
property, and information. It conducts international investigations, provides
threat analysis, and focuses on cyber security, counterterrorism, personnel
security, and security technology. The Bureau manages much of the WSP
funding.

•

The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT), funded within D&CP, leads the U.S.
government in counterterrorism diplomacy and provides an on-call capability to
respond to terrorist incidents worldwide.

•

Funding within the Border Security Program (BSP) is allocated to DS to fund the
protection of consular affairs facilities in the United States. The subaccount also
funds the coordination and investigation of security issues related to U.S. visas
and passports.

The Appendix presents annual diplomatic/embassy security requests and actual funding levels
from FY2008 to the FY2015 request.8 Base funding (also referred to as regular or enduring
appropriations) is available to U.S. facilities worldwide. Total security funding includes the base
funding plus supplemental and/or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for
diplomatic/embassy security that has been available primarily for Iraq, but also for Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Supplemental security funds (excluding those available only for Iraq) were
requested and enacted for FY2008 and FY2009. OCO funds were requested and enacted for
FY2012, FY2013, FY2014, and have been requested for FY2015.9
8
Actual funding reflects authorized transfers of funds and, therefore, may differ from enacted levels as passed by
Congress in appropriations laws. These years were chosen in order to include two years funding from the previous
Administration.
9
Since FY2012, the Obama Administration has distinguished between what it has interchangeably called “enduring” or
“base” funding and funding to support “overseas contingency operations” (OCO) within the foreign affairs budget. In
its budget justification documents, prior to its FY2015 request, the Administration describes OCO as “extraordinary,
but temporary, costs of the Department of State and USAID in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.”

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Following are some observations derived from the data shown in the Appendix and in the related
Figures 2-5:
•

The peak years since FY2008 for requests for security funding and funds that
Congress made available were in FY2013-FY2015 request, the fiscal years
following the Benghazi attacks. (See Figure 2.)

•

The FY2015 request represents the largest request for total security funding at
$4.7 billion, following recent-year increases in base funding. OCO had been
nearly half of the request in FY2013, but in FY2015, requests for OCO are about
one-third of the total. (See Figure 3.)

•

FY2013 and FY2014 were peak years for total security funding made available
by Congress. In FY2013, of the total $4.5 billion, nearly 50% was OCO funding,
largely because Congress provided transfer authority of OCO funds previously
identified for Iraq to be used for broader security needs following the Benghazi
attacks. In FY2014, of the total $4.68 billion, 19% was OCO. (See Figure 3.)

•

For total security funding, Congress provided less than was requested every year
except FY2009 and FY2014. The FY2013 total security request was $4.6 billion,
including the request for transfer authority of OCO funds. That year, Congress
provided a total of $4.5 billion, including transfer authority. (See Figure 4.)

•

Total security funding as a portion of Administration of Foreign Affairs
expenditures was highest (40%) in FY2014 and also was the highest (32%) as a
portion of total State Department funding that same year.10 (See Figure 5.)

Figure 2 illustrates the trend line for State Department total diplomatic/embassy security
expenditures using data from the Appendix. After trending upward between FY2008 and
FY2009, the funding declined to the recent-year low in FY2011and was virtually flat in FY2012.
In 2009, the United States was transitioning control of the “green zone” to the Iraqi government.
Also that year, President Obama announced his intention of ending military operations in 2010.
With the diminishing role of the U.S. military in Iraq and increasing security needs in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan, Congress supported more funds for DS, WSP, and WSU than were
sought.
Congress provided increased security funding in FY2013, the fiscal year following the Benghazi
attacks and the first full fiscal year after the troops left Iraq in December 2011, when security
efforts became the responsibility of the Department of State.

10

Administration of Foreign Affairs is the category within the State Department’s budget that funds operation costs of
State Department personnel and programs including Diplomatic and Consular Programs, the Office of the Inspector
General, and Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials. The total State Department budget includes funding for
Administration of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Contributions to International Organizations such as the United Nations, U.S.
Contributions to International Peacekeeping, and related programs like The Asia Foundation and the National
Endowment for Democracy.

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Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Figure 2. State Department Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding Totals,
FY2008-FY2015 Request

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.
Note: Totals include base (enduring) and supplemental/OCO actual funding.

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Figure 3 illustrates diplomatic/embassy security funding data from the Appendix broken out by
base and supplemental/OCO funding. FY2010 and FY2011 were the only years without broadly
available security supplemental or OCO funds. (There may have been some, not shown below,
that were exclusively for Iraq, however.)
The FY2012 budget provided OCO funds for WSP, but not WSU. FY2013, starting about three
weeks after the Benghazi attacks, was the peak year for supplemental/OCO and total security
funding.
The FY2014 estimates show an increase in enduring funds while OCO declines. The FY2015
request includes more OCO funds than were available in the FY2014 estimate, while the total
funding is slightly more. Some observers question the increased use of OCO, in the absence of
newly identified needs, as possibly a way to avoid exceeding the International Affairs spending
caps established by the Budget Control Act of 2011.11
Figure 3.Total Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding, Enduring and
Supplemental/OCO, FY2008-FY2015 Request

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.
Note: Enduring is also referred to as base funding.

11

For more details on the Budget Control Act and the foreign affairs budget, see CRS Report R42994, The Budget
Control Act, Sequestration, and the Foreign Affairs Budget: Background and Possible Impacts, by (name redacted).

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Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Figure 4 shows Administration requests for diplomatic/embassy security were greater than actual
funding levels (including OCO and transfer authority) every year except FY2009 and FY2014.
For the other years, the smallest funding gap compared with the request was $11.0 million in
FY2008. The largest gaps between the request and actual funding occurred in FY2011 ($185.4
million) and FY2012 ($236.9 million). While Congress appropriated other OCO funds for
security in Iraq, they were not broadly available for security in other facilities.
In FY2013, the Administration sought transfer authority to use $1.419 billion of Iraq OCO funds
for WSP and WSU expenses as part of what it termed an Increased Security Proposal.
In FY2014, the funds made available that exceeded those requested were mostly WSP OCO funds
for “extraordinary costs of operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and other areas of unrest.”12
Figure 4. Department of State Diplomatic/Embassy Security Requests vs. Actual
Funding Levels, FY2008-FY2015 Request

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with the Department of state on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.

12

Explanatory notes for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2014,
P.L. 113-76, Division K, Title VIII, p. 63.

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Figure 5 illustrates the trends regarding the proportion of expenditures that were allocated toward
diplomatic/embassy security out of the Administration of Foreign Affairs (State operations)
budget and the State Department total budget. These trends mirror those of actual dollars spent
over the same years, with the proportions decreasing in FY2011and FY2012, but expanding in
FY2009 with the transition in Iraq, and FY2013-FY2014, the years following the Benghazi
attack.
Figure 5.Total Diplomatic/Embassy Security Funding as a Percentage of
Administration of Foreign Affairs and State Department (150 Function)
Expenditures

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.
Notes: Administration of Foreign Affairs is the category within the State Department’s budget that funds
operation costs of State Department personnel and programs including Diplomatic and Consular Programs, the
Office of the Inspector General, and Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials. The total State Department
(150 Function) budget includes funding for Administration of Foreign Affairs, U.S. Contributions to International
Organizations such as the United Nations, U.S. Contributions to International Peacekeeping, foreign food aid,
international environmental commissions, and related programs like The Asia Foundation and the National
Endowment for Democracy.

Administration Requests, House-Proposed,
Senate-Proposed, and Enacted Diplomatic/Embassy
Security Funding
Some budget analysts regard enacted rather than actual funding as more closely reflecting the
intent of Congress, since actual funding levels include transfers that occurred at the agency.
Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) make up the
bulk of the diplomatic/embassy security budget and are the only diplomatic/embassy security
line-items that appear in the Administration’s budget request, the Department of State, Foreign

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Operations and Related Programs House and Senate appropriations legislation, and the enacted
appropriations laws. Table 1 provides the Administration’s requests, as well as House-proposed,
Senate-proposed, and enacted levels for WSP and WSU from FY2008-FY2014, in reverse order.
In contrast to actuals in the Appendix, FY2014 was the only year that WSP and WSU enacted
funding levels were greater than those requested.
For FY2013 which began October 1, 2012, less than a month after the Benghazi attacks,
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requested transfer authority from Congress for $1.4 billion of
OCO funds previously appropriated for Iraq as part of what was termed an Increased Security
Proposal. Congress agreed to much of that increase, but sequestration mandated by the Budget
Control Act of 2011 was applied to the funds, which caused the enacted levels to be about 3%
below what would have been appropriated.
The grand total of WSP and WSU funds requested from FY2008-FY2014 is $220.4 million more
than what Congress enacted. Congress appropriated 6% less funding than was requested in the
years leading up to Benghazi, but appropriated 6% more in the years following the attacks.
The Senate-proposed security funds exceeded House-proposed levels every year except FY2008.
The Senate levels, however, were not always as much as was requested by the Administration,
nor as much as appropriated, in some years. FY2008 was the only year that the House-proposed
diplomatic/embassy security funding levels were greater than the Administration request, the
Senate-proposed, or enacted levels. (In FY2014, the House-proposed levels matched the
Administration request.)
Also noteworthy is the delay in the passage of every appropriation from FY2008-FY2014. When
a new fiscal year starts and appropriations have not been passed and signed into law, Congress
typically passes continuing resolutions (CRs) to keep the government funded until a budget is
passed. Typically, CRs base funding levels for budget accounts on the past-year spending levels,
perhaps increasing or decreasing by a certain percentage. Congress has consistently enacted
international affairs appropriations long after the start of the fiscal year. Delayed appropriations,
some have argued, make planning to meet security and other needs challenging. In recent years,
for example, Congress approved and sent its final FY2011 and FY2013 budgets to the President
in April and March, respectively, six to seven months into the fiscal year.
Another concern expressed by foreign affairs budget experts is the combining of several or all
appropriations into an omnibus, consolidated, or full-year continuing resolution that occurred
every year from FY2008-FY2014. Passage of stand-alone State-Foreign Operations
appropriations legislation, analysts suggest, provides a greater opportunity for congressional
oversight and deliberation on sensitive issues, such as security spending. (See Table 1 below.)

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Table 1. State Department Primary Diplomatic/Embassy Worldwide Security
Requests, House-Proposed, and Senate-Proposed Funding, FY2008-FY2014
(In millions of U.S. $)
Administration
Request

FY2014
D&CP/WSP
enduring
WSP—OCO
ESCM/WSU
enduring
WSU-OCO
FY2014
Total

FY2013
D&CP/WSP
enduring
WSP—OCO
ESCM/WSU
enduring
WSU-OCO
Total for
FY2013

FY2012
D&CP/WSP
enduring
WSP—OCO
ESCM/WSU
enduring
Total for
FY2012

House

Senate

Enacted

Request
$1,791.2

H.R. 2855
(H.Rept. 113185)
$1,791.2

S. 1372 (S.Rept.
113-81)
$1,867.3

$391.0
$1,614.0

$391.0
$1,614.0

$900.3
$1,320.5

$900.3
$1,614.0

−
$3,796.2

−
$3,796.2

$588.5
$4,676.6

−
$4,381.6

P.L. 113-76
$1,867.3

Request
$1,428.5

H.R. 5857
(H.Rept. 112494)
$1,279.3

S. 3241 (S.Rept.
112-172)
$1,428.5

P.L. 113-6; Div.
F; full year CR,
net
sequestration &
rescissions
$1,341.2

$1,404.6
$688.8

$654.9
$688.8

$651.0
$688.8

$909.4
$669.5

$736.0
$4,257.9

−

$2,768.3

$4,147.1

Subcommittee
draft (No #)
$1,310.2

S. 1601 (S.Rept.
112-85)
$1,400.0

P.L. 112-74, Div
I
$1,355.0

$246.9
$938.2

−
$670.5

$236.2
$775.0

$236.2
$775.0

$2,638.8

$1,980.7

$2,411.2

$2,366.2

Request
$1,453.7

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Consolidated
and Further
Continuing
Appropriations
Act, 2013
presented to the
President 3/22/13;
signed 3/26/13

$1,227.0

−
$2,623.0

Date presented
to the President
and signed
Consolidated
Appropriations
Act, 2014
Presented to the
President 1/17/14;
signed 1/17/14

Consolidated
Appropriations
Act, 2012
presented to the
President
12/21/11;
signed 12/23/11

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Administration
Request

FY2011
D&CP/WSP
enduring
ESCM/WSU
enduring
Total for
FY2011

FY2010
D&CP/WSP
enduring
ESCM/WSU
enduring
Total for
FY2010

Date presented
to the President
Enacted
and signed
Dept of Defense
and Full-Year
Continuing
Appropriations
Act, 2011
presented to the
P.L. 112-10; President 4/15/11;
signed 4/15/11
Title XI
$1,500.0

House

Senate

H.R. 1
$1,491.0

S. 3676
$1,681.0

$824.2

$796.5

$934.1

$795.0

$2,384.9

$2,287.5

$2,615.1

$2,295.0

S. 1434
$1,595.0

Consolidated
Appropriations
Act, 2010
presented to the
President12/15/09;
P.L. 111-117 signed12/16/09
$1,586.2

Request
$1,560.7

Request
$1,648.0

H.R. 3081
$1,577.4

$938.2

$847.3

$847.3

$847.3

$2,586.2

$2,424.7

$2,442.3

$2,433.5

S. 3288
$1,137.5

Omnibus
Appropriations
Act, 2009
presented to the
President 3/11/09;
signed 3/11/09
P.L. 111-8
$1,117.0

FY2009 base
D&CP/WSP
enduring
ESCM/WSU
enduring
Supp Approp
Act, 2009
D&CP/WSP
ESCM/WSU

Request
$1,162.8

no bill
introduced
n.a.

$948.4

n.a.

FY2009 Bridge
Supplemental
D&CP/WSP
Total for
FY2009

Request

Request
$118.0
898.7

$45.8
$3,173.7

Congressional Research Service

$830.0

$770.0

H.R. 2346; House
version
$138.0
$989.6

H.R. 2346; Senate
version
$118.0
$820.5

P.L. 111-32

H.R. 2642; House
version
$78.4
$1,206.0*

H.R. 2642; Senate
P.L. 110-252,
version
Subchapter B
$78.4
$78.4
$2,984.4
$3,033.3

$146.4
$921.5

12

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Administration
Request

FY2008 base
D&CP/WSP
enduring
ESCM/WSU
enduring
FY2008
supplemental
appropriations
D&CP/WSP
Total for
FY2008

Request
$964.8

Grand total

$806.9

House

Senate

H.R. 2764;
H.R. 2764;
House version
Senate version
$964.8
$909.6
$806.9

$649.3

Date presented
to the President
Enacted
and signed
Consolidated
Appropriations
Act, 2008
presented to the
President
12/24/07;
P.L. 110-161 signed12/26/07
$974.8
$676.0

Request

H.R. 2642; House

H.R. 2642; Senate

$162.4
$1,934.1

$210.5
$1,982.2

$212.4
$1,771.3

$210.4
$1,861.2

$20,771.8

$16,300.3

$19,669.2

20,517.9

P.L. 110-252,
Subchapter A

Source: State Department Congressional Budget Justifications, FY2008-FY2015; legislation and committee
reports, as noted; and CRS calculations.
Notes: WSP = Worldwide Security Protection; ESCM = Diplomatic/embassy Security, Construction, and
Maintenance; WSU = Worldwide Security Upgrades; OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations; D&CP =
Diplomatic and Consular Programs.
a. This total reflects the lack of an FY2009 State-Foreign Operations appropriations bill introduced in the House.

Security Funding for the Benghazi Facility
Complexities surrounding the security funds available for Benghazi include whether the facility
was designated as temporary, the date its lease would be up, and the timing of available funding,
among other things. Officials at the Department of State may disagree as to what qualifies as a
temporary facility and what funds are available to those facilities. For example, Overseas
Building Operations (OBO) uses temporary to mean those facilities that can be moved, such as
trailers and modular structures. Other State Department officials may use temporary to mean
short-term.13
A Senate committee report on the Benghazi attack found that because the Benghazi facility was
designated as temporary, no security standards applied to it. Furthermore, additional physical
barriers to enter the facility were not in place due to time and money constraints. The lack of
dedicated security resources for Benghazi contributed to those constraints, according to the
report.14
13

The Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security, Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risk Due to
Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies, GAO-14-655, June 2014, p. 9.
14
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report
on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi, December 30, 2012, p. 14-15.

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13

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Compounding the definitional issue is that the State Department lacks a process to re-evaluate
security at temporary facilities that are being used longer than first anticipated.15 The Benghazi
facility was first opened in 2011 and was to close later that year. In December 2011, the State
Department decided to extend the Benghazi mission until December 2012. The Department did
make note of needed corrective security measures for the mission and made a number of security
enhancements [using WSP funds].16 (See Table 2 below.)
According to the Benghazi ARB report, “OBO does not fund security upgrades [ESCM/WSU] for
‘temporary’ facilities.”17 Appearing to support that statement, the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence said in its January 15, 2014 report: “... the uncertain future of the [Benghazi] Mission
facility, due to its one-year expiration in December 2012, contributed to a lack of continuity for
security staff, and constrained decision-makers in Washington regarding the allocation of security
enhancements to that facility.”18
Differing views on the definition of “temporary” and the related eligibility for security funding
has led to confusion about whether or not the Benghazi facility qualified for WSU funding.
According to State Department officials, the facilities in Benghazi would have been eligible for
the Compound Security Program under WSU funding. Although ESCM/WSU does not fund
security upgrades for temporary facilities, it does fund security upgrades for permanent facilities.
For the purposes of funding, the Department defines temporary facilities as those that are not
permanent structures, such as modular units or structures that can be relocated. The facilities in
Benghazi were permanent structures. Based on that definition, lease terms or length of mission
would not determine the qualification to use WSU funding.19According to State Department
officials, OBO received no requests to execute or fund a compound security upgrade in Benghazi
with WSU funding.20
With regard to the available funding in FY2012, according to the Department of State, the
Benghazi facilities were short-term leased residential villas that were used for housing and office
space. The leases for the three villas in Benghazi ($336,000/year, $168,000/year, and
$336,000/year) were funded from FY2012 ESCM appropriations. WSP funds were available and
were used for security enhancements prior to the attack.
Delayed enactment of appropriations also may have had consequences for the implementation of
security upgrades. According to one Senate Committee report, a State Department Regional
Security Officer (RSO) stated that
Continuing Resolutions had two detrimental effects on efforts to improve security in
Benghazi. First, the Department of State would only allow funds to be expended at a rate of
15

The Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security, Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risk Due to
Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies, GAO-14-655, June 2014, p. 50.
16
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report
on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi, December 30, 2012,p. 13-14.
17
Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, p.
33. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization.202446.pdf.
18
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, together with Additional Views, 113th Cong., January 15, 2014, p. 17.
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf.
19
Email communication with the Department of State on June 5, 2014.
20
Email communication with the Department of State’s Bureau of Budget and Planning, May 30, 2014.

Congressional Research Service

14

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

80 percent of the previous year’s appropriations level, so as not to risk a violation of the
Anti-Deficiency Act [not obligating more than may eventually be appropriated by Congress].
Second, in the absence of a supplemental appropriation or reprogramming request, security
funds for Benghazi had to be taken ‘out of hide’ from funding levels for Libya because
Benghazi was not included in the previous budget.21

Table 2. FY2012 WSP Funding for Benghazi
(In U.S. $)
Type of Funding

Obligations

Expenditures

General Description

Countermeasures

$867,185

$866,667

Funding for armored
vehicles, defensive
equipment, special
protective equipment,
engineering service
operations, personnel
tracking locators,
perimeter security, jersey
barriers, sandbags, door
upgrades, drop arm
barriers, barbed wire,
security lights, travel, and
miscellaneous security
equipment.

Local Guard Program

$810,589

$569,279

Funding for guards,
residential security,
vehicles, special protective
equipment for guards,
security equipment,
shipping and travel.

Regional Security

$140,140

$140,140

TDY travel support costs
and RSO annual recurring
support costs

Total

$1,817,914

$1,576,086

Source: Email communication with Department of State, May 30, 2014.

21

United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report
on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi, December 30, 2012, p. 17.

Congressional Research Service

15

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Appendix. State Department Funds for
Diplomatic/Embassy Security, FY2008-FY2015
Table A-1. State Department Funds for Diplomatic/Embassy
Security, FY2008-FY2011
(Revised August 2014; In millions of current U.S. $)
FY2008
Req.

FY2009

Actual

FY2010

FY2011

Req.

Actual

Req.

Actual

Req.

Actual

WSP base

$964.8

$968.5

$1,162.8

$1,117.0

$1,648.0

$1,586.2

$1,560.7

$1,497.0

- supplemental/OCO

$162.4

$210.4

$193.8

$224.8

―

―

―

―

ESCM WSU base

$806.9

$670.5

$948.4

$905.2

$938.2

$847.3

$824.2

$793.4

- supplemental/OCO

―

$76.7

$893.3

$962.8

―

―

―

―

Diplomatic Security
(DS)a

$188.5

$169.6

$187.1

$255.9

$190.6

$214.9

$193.0

$224.9

D&CP
Counterterrorism

―

―

―

―

―

―

―

$3.2

Border Security DSb

$16.1

$32.0

$48.7

$53.8

$50.5

$47.4

$184.1

$58.1

$1,976.3

$1,840.6

$2,347.0

$2,331.9

$2,827.3

$2,695.8

$2,762.0

$2,576.6

Total Supp/OCO

$162.4

$287.1

$1,087.1

$1,187.6

―

―

―

―

Total Securityc

$2,138.7

$2,127.7

$3,434.1

$3,519.5

$2,827.3

$2,695.8

$2,762.0

$2,576.6

Admin of Foreign
Affairsc

$9,637.6

$8,991.2

$10,676.4

$10,932.8

$13,893.5

$12,357.2

$12,374.4

$11,225.9

22%

24%

32%

33%

20%

22%

22%

23%

$10,708.8

$12,501.3

$11,345.6

$15,079.2

$16,256.3

$16,423.0

$17,104.3

$14,847.1

20%

17%

30%

22%

17%

16%

16%

17%

Total base

Total Security as %
of Admin of Foreign
Affairs
State Dept 150
functionc
Total Security as %
of State Dept 150

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.
Notes: WSP = Worldwide Security Protection; ESCM=Diplomatic/embassy Security, Construction, and
Maintenance; WSU = Worldwide Security Upgrades; OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations; DS =
Diplomatic Security; D&CP = Diplomatic and Consular Programs; n.a. = not available. State Dept 150 =
Department of State total in the International Affairs 150 function.
The data in this table are estimates as of May 30, 2014. Estimates of funding levels may differ depending on, for
example, definitions used, whether to include fees, and whether to include security costs in Iraq that come under
Iraq Operations.
a.

Does not include OCO funding within D&CP for DS listed under Iraq Operations in FY2008-FY2014.

b.

These numbers do not include domestic border security funds. Much of the funds for Border Security come
from fee collections; as of FY2012, all Border Security funds are from fee collections.

c.

Includes supplemental and OCO funds.

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Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Table A-2. State Department Funds for Diplomatic/Embassy Security,
FY2012-FY2015
(Revised August 2014; In millions of current U.S. $)
FY2012

FY2013

FY2015

FY2014

Req.

Actual

Req.

Actual

Req.

$1,453.7

$1,355.0

$1,428.5

$1,341.2

$1,791.2

$1,867.3

$2,128.1

n.a.

- supplemental/OCO

$246.9

$236.2

$1,404.5

$ 909.4

$391.0

$900.3

$989.7

n.a.

ESCM WSU base

$938.2

$775.0

$688.8

$669.5

$1,614.0

$1,614.0

$1,217.5

n.a.

- supplemental/OCO

―

—

$736.0

$1,227.0

—

―

$250.0

n.a.

Diplomatic Security
(DS)a

$215.6

$229.2

$226.3

$220.0

$179.5

$175.1

$92.0

n.a.

D&CP
Counterterrorism

―

$18.1

$19.0

$22.7

$21.5

$18.9

$18.4

n.a.

Border Security DSb

$99.7

$103.7

$96.0

$101.5

$103.2

$101.5

―

n.a.

$2,707.2

$2,481.0

$2,458.6

$2,354.9

$3,709.4

$3,776.8

$3,456.0

n.a.

Total Supp/OCO

$246.9

$236.2

$2,140.5

$2,136.4

391.0

$900.3

$1,239.7

n.a.

Total Securityc

$2,954.1

$2,717.2

$4,599.1

$4,491.3

$4,100.4

$4,677.1

$4,695.7

n.a.

Admin of Foreign
Affairsc

$14,748.4

$13,371.9

$13,950.5

$13,467.3

$12,024.4

$11,680.7

$11,614.1

n.a.

20%

20%

33%

33%

34%

40%

40%

n.a.

$19,349.8

$17,695.3

$18,508.3

$16,853.6

$15,824.3

$14,786.4

$15,767.8

n.a.

15%

15%

25%

27%

29%

32%

30%

n.a.

WSP base

Total base

Total Security as %
of Admin of Foreign
Affairs
State Dept 150
functionc
Total Security as %
of State Dept 150

Estimate

Req.

Enacted

Source: Congressional Budget Justification, Volume I, Department of State, fiscal years FY2008-FY2015;
communication with Department of State on November 8, 2012, March 13, 2013, and December 6, 2013;
legislation; and CRS calculations.
Notes: WSP = Worldwide Security Protection; ESCM = Diplomatic/embassy Security, Construction, and
Maintenance; WSU = Worldwide Security Upgrades; OCO=Overseas Contingency Operations; DS =
Diplomatic Security; D&CP = Diplomatic and Consular Programs; n.a. = not available. State Dept 150 =
Department of State total in the International Affairs 150 function.
The data in this table are estimates as of May 30, 2014. Estimates of funding levels may differ depending on, for
example, definitions used, whether to include fees, and whether to include security costs in Iraq that come under
Iraq Operations.
a.

Does not include OCO funding within D&CP for DS listed under Iraq Operations in FY2008-FY2014.

b.

These numbers do not include domestic border security funds. Much of the funds for Border Security come
from fee collections; as of FY2012, all Border Security funds are from fee collections.

c.

Includes supplemental and OCO funds.

Congressional Research Service

17

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Specialist in Foreign Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

18

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43721. Public record. Not legal advice.