# Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive Branch Initiatives

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43195

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** December 23, 2014
- **Citation:** R43195

## Text

Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and
Personnel Abroad: Legislative and Executive
Branch Initiatives
(name redacted)
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
December 23, 2014

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43195

Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad

Summary
The September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, prompted sustained
congressional attention on the specific circumstances of the events in question, as well as broader
questions regarding how U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad are secured. Ensuring
that the Department of State is better prepared for the possibility of similar attacks in the future
has been a central congressional concern.
The Department of State undertook a number of measures in response to the attack, including
immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident
through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board’s
recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years.
Congress has conducted oversight through investigations by a number of committees and through
a number of hearings. The House of Representatives voted to create a select committee on the
Benghazi attack on May 8, 2014; the committee held its first hearing on September 17, 2014.
Members have also put forward legislative proposals on issues ranging from the composition of
Accountability Review Boards to procedures for awarding local security guard force contracts. In
the 113th Congress, two wide-ranging bills incorporating many of these areas have been
considered: H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2014, and S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen
Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013.
The 113th Congress, through the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, fully funded the
Administration’s FY2014 request for diplomatic security-related accounts, providing
approximately $5.4 billion. H.R. 83, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2015, meets the Administration’s $3.1 billion request for Worldwide Security Protection
funds and exceeds the $1.47 billion request for Worldwide Security Upgrades by $23 million.
This report briefly summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department actions in response
to the attack, and will be updated as necessary to reflect further developments and actions on
ongoing policy proposals. Readers seeking background information on recent embassy attacks,
State Department policies and procedures relevant to embassy security, or information on recent
year embassy security funding trends should consult CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.

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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Department of State Actions in Response to the Benghazi Attack .................................................. 2
The Benghazi Accountability Review Board ............................................................................ 2
State Department Implementation of ARB Recommendations ................................................. 3
Funding Requests ...................................................................................................................... 5
Legislative Response to the Benghazi Attack .................................................................................. 6
Legislative Investigations and Oversight .................................................................................. 7
Diplomatic Security Legislation in the 113th Congress ............................................................. 9
Funding ............................................................................................................................. 10
Accountability Review Board Process .............................................................................. 11
Personnel Accountability................................................................................................... 12
Contracting ........................................................................................................................ 12
High-Threat Posts: Assessment and Reporting ................................................................. 13
Security Training ............................................................................................................... 13
Marine Security Guard Program ....................................................................................... 13
Additional Measures ......................................................................................................... 14

Tables
Table 1. H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 Legislative Status (as of December 2014) .................................. 10

Appendixes
Appendix A. Department of State Fact Sheet on Benghazi ARB Implementation ........................ 15
Appendix B. Selected Congressional Hearings on Benghazi Attack, 112th and 113th
Congresses .................................................................................................................................. 23
Appendix C. Selected Diplomatic Security-Related Legislation, 112th and 113th
Congresses (in Chronological Order) ......................................................................................... 25

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 27
Key Policy Staff ............................................................................................................................. 27

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Introduction
While attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel abroad are not infrequent,1 the severity
of the September 11, 2012, attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has caused a
reexamination of measures in place to protect U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad.
Ambassador Christopher Stevens was the first sitting U.S. ambassador to have been killed since
1979. Moreover, a concern exists that the attack may reflect a growing danger to U.S. diplomatic
facilities—the result of an increasingly diffuse threat from extremists across the Middle East and
of Arab revolutions that have decreased the capacity, and perhaps the will, of local governments
to protect U.S. interests. Congressional and State Department actions will be critical to
responding to this evolving threat and to preventing similar tragedies in the future.
Congress has legislated extensive changes to the U.S. approach to securing facilities and
personnel in at least two previous instances of attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. The
1983-1984 bombings of U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, led to the adoption of the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,2 which, among other measures, established
the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Similarly, the 1998 bombings of U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led to, among other measures, a significant construction
funding program under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999
(SECCA).3
After the Benghazi attack, Congress initiated oversight through investigations by several
committees and through a number of hearings featuring testimony from officials ranging from the
working level to the Secretary of State. Members have also put forward a number of legislative
proposals on issues ranging from the composition of Accountability Review Boards to procedures
for awarding contracts for local security guards. Two of these measures have been considered and
approved by committees.
The Department of State undertook several measures in response to the attack, including
immediate steps to bolster security at posts around the world; an investigation of the incident
through an Accountability Review Board; and longer-term measures implementing the board’s
recommendations, including requests for significantly greater funding than in recent years.
The following summarizes and tracks congressional and State Department efforts to make U.S.
embassies and personnel around the world more secure. It will be updated as necessary to reflect
further developments and actions on ongoing policy proposals.4

1

There were 521 attacks on U.S. diplomatic embassies, consulates, or personnel in 92 countries between 1970 and
2012, according to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The
incidents led to nearly 500 deaths. See Erin Miller, August 2013 Security Threat to Americans Abroad, The National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Background Report, August 2013, p. 3,
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/br/STARTBackgroundReport_Aug2013SecurityThreats.pdf.
2
22 U.S.C. §4801 et seq., P.L. 99-399.
3
H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.
4
The responses of U.S. government agencies other than the Department of State to the Benghazi attack are not covered
in this report, unless noted.

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Department of State Actions in Response to the
Benghazi Attack
The protection of U.S. government employees and facilities under chief of mission authority
overseas from terrorist, criminal, or technical attack is the responsibility of the Secretary of State.5
The Benghazi attack prompted the State Department to take several actions. In the immediate
aftermath, the department ordered all posts to review their security posture and to take all
necessary steps to enhance it if necessary.6 Shortly thereafter, five Interagency Security
Assessment Teams (ISATs) were deployed to 19 posts in 13 countries to undertake urgent reviews
of high-threat posts.7
In order to ensure consistent focus on the most endangered locations, State also reorganized its
Diplomatic Security Bureau by establishing a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat
Posts to oversee security arrangements for a number of so-designated countries. While press
reports initially suggested the department had designated 17 High Threat Posts, State officials
have suggested that this number is not static and that it would be reconsidered annually, at a
minimum. As of September 2014, the number of High Threat Posts stood at 30.8

The Benghazi Accountability Review Board
In addition to the above steps, in the first week of October 2012, then-Secretary of State Clinton
convened an accountability review board (ARB) to investigate the Benghazi attack.9 The board
was chaired by former Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering and included five members,
four of whom were designated by the Secretary of State and one by the intelligence community.10
On December 18, the Benghazi Accountability Review Board published its findings in an
unclassified version of its report.11 The board concluded that, while responsibility for the attack
rests solely and completely with the terrorists who perpetrated it, systemic failures in Washington
led to key decisions that left the Special Mission in Benghazi with significant security shortfalls.
Key leadership failures in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) as well as in the Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) led to confusion over decision-making in relation to security and
5

22 U.S.C. §4802, P.L. 99-399.
Transcript, State Department Briefing to Update on Recent Events in Libya, September 12, 2012.
7
See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Benghazi Attack, Part II: The Report of the Accountability
Review Board, 112th Cong., 2nd sess., December 20, 2012; and U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Benghazi: The Attack and the Lessons Learned, 112th Cong., December 20, 2012.
8
U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Benghazi, Implementation of the Accountability Review Board
recommendations, 113th Cong., September 17, 2014.
9
As required by Title III of the Omnibus Diplomatic and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §4831 et seq.
10
The other members of the board were: Admiral Michael Mullen (Ret), a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; Richard Shinnick, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer who served as interim Director for the Department of
State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations in 2008; Catherine Bertini, a Professor of Public Administration and
International Affairs at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and former Executive Director of the
United Nations World Food Program; and Hugh Turner, a former deputy director of the CIA’s Directorate of
Operations.
11
Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf.
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policy in Benghazi; these were likely factors in the insufficient priority given to the Benghazi
mission’s security-related requests, according to the board. Still, these leadership failures did not
amount to a clear breach of duty by any single U.S. government employee, the board found.
The board also determined that decisions by the department’s senior leadership regarding the
nature and extension of Special Mission Benghazi’s unclear status left it outside normal
procedures for funding and executing security measures, including office facility standards and
accountability measures under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
199912 and the Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB).13

State Department Implementation of ARB Recommendations
On the release of the ARB’s report, the Department of State accepted the panel’s
recommendations and pledged to implement them fully. The department formed a task force to
implement the board’s 29 recommendations, as they were translated into 64 specific action items
assigned to bureaus for implementation.
In reviewing failures of leadership and management, the department removed four of its
employees from the positions they held at the time of the attack. The officials removed from their
positions include three officials from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and one from the Bureau
of Near Eastern Affairs. The four State Department employees, who had been on administrative
leave, were returned to duty on August 20 and reassigned to other positions within the
department.14 Prior to the officials’ reinstatement, a number of Members of Congress had sought
clarification on their administrative status, in order to assess whether the department had held the
appropriate officials to account in a full and fair manner.15 In addition, while the ARB fixed
responsibility for these failures at the level of Assistant Secretary and below, some congressional
observers have suggested that more senior department officials should have been held more fully
to account.
By January 2013, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reported to Congress that, of the ARB’s
recommendations, “more than 80 percent are on track to be completed by the end of March, with
a number completed already.”16 Later, Secretary of State John Kerry also stated that he is
“committed to implementing every single one of the recommendations in the report of the
Accountability Review Board and doing more.”17
The department described its progress in implementing the ARB’s recommendations in a fact
sheet first released on May 20, 2013. The fact sheet has been updated repeatedly; the text of the
12

H.R. 3427, which was enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113.
More information on the board’s extensive findings and recommendations is available in CRS Report R42834,
Securing U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.
14
Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, August 20, 2013.
15
See Letter from Edward R. Royce, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 14 other Members of the
Committee to The Honorable John F. Kerry, Secretary of State, May 29, 2013.
16
Department of State, Report to the Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State In Response to the
Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Board on the Death of Four Official Americans in Benghazi,
Libya September 11, 2012, January 2013.
17
Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks to the Foreign Service Institute Overseas Security Seminar, Department of
State, May 20, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/05/209671.htm.
13

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most recent publicly released update is included is available as Appendix A. The document states
that the department had addressed or was addressing all 24 unclassified recommendations. It also
indicates that 113 new diplomatic security personnel (including 75 DS agents) had been hired by
the Department of State in FY2013, with the remaining 38 expected to be hired in FY2014. On
December 10, 2014, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Greg Starr testified that
the Department had closed 25 of the 29 ARB recommendations.18
State has also sought to improve its ability to weigh the balance between risk and reward in highthreat, high-risk areas when beginning, restarting, continuing, modifying, or discontinuing
operations at individual posts. The department established a Vital Presence Validation Process,
which State officials suggest will offer a “transparent and repeatable process” providing a
“documented, systematic, risk-based analysis” to guide decisions on overseas presence.19 The
Department has begun using this process, for example in its decision to return a U.S. diplomatic
presence to Bangui, Central African Republic, suspended from December 2012 to September
2014. According to Assistant Secretary Starr, the department “engaged in an analysis that
determined that we should and could go back.... We worked with our colleagues at the
Department of Defense to assess the security situation on the ground and develop a
comprehensive plan for our return.... While we must closely monitor conditions on the ground,
our return to Bangui demonstrates that our enhanced risk management procedures are working.”20
In accordance with the Benghazi ARB’s fourth recommendation, the department convened a
panel of external security experts in April 2013 to identify best practices from other agencies and
countries. The so-called Best Practices Panel, chaired by former Director of U.S. Secret Service
Mark Sullivan, provided its report to the department on August 29, 2013. The report was released
publicly by the department nearly one year later, on August 1, 2014,21 along with a fact sheet
describing the department’s implementation of the panel’s recommendations.22 The panel
observed that many security-related decisions were in the hands of the Department of State’s
Under Secretary for Management, a position overseeing what the panel viewed as a too-large
number of support functions, creating what it deemed a “span of control” problem. Accordingly,
the panel’s chief recommendation was the elevation of the diplomatic security function through
the creation of an Under Secretary for Diplomatic Security, which would focus all security issues
through a single focal point at the senior executive level.
While State accepted 38 of the recommendations from the panel and has reportedly implemented
30 of them fully, the department determined that establishing an Under Secretary for Diplomatic
Security would be counter-productive. It asserted that such a move would deepen the “stovepiping” that the ARB and other observers lamented in the wake of the Benghazi attacks, and
reinforce the perception that Diplomatic Security has full and sole responsibility for security,
18

U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi,
Reviewing Efforts to Secure U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel, 113th Cong., December 10, 2014.
19
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to
Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies, GAO-14-655, June 25, 2014, pp. 20-21,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-655.
20
U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Benghazi, Implementation of the Accountability Review Board
recommendations, 113th Cong., September 17, 2014.
21
Department of State, Report of the Independent Panel on Best Practices, August 29, 2013, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/230341.pdf.
22
Office of the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, U.S. Department of State, Best Practices
Panel Implementation Fact Sheet, August 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/press/2014/230132.htm.

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rather than ensuring that all parts of the department share this priority. Instead, Secretary of State
Kerry has instituted a practice whereby the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security has direct
access to the Secretary of State to share security concerns “as threats and circumstances
require.”23 In addition, the department did not accept the panel’s proposal that waivers to
established security standards only be provided subsequent to the implementation of mitigating
measures, arguing that in time-sensitive situations, exceptions might be appropriate when some
mitigating measures are in place and others may be planned for the future.
An additional panel of outside experts was charged by the department with a thorough “review
[of] DS’s organization and management structure.” This panel, chaired by former Under
Secretary of State for Management Grant Green, reportedly delivered its “Report on Diplomatic
Security Organization and Management” to the Under Secretary of State for Management in May
2013.24 The report has not been made public by the Department, but the department’s September
2014 fact sheet in Appendix A asserts that 30 of the 35 recommendations made by the report’s
authors were accepted by State. According to GAO, State has made organizational changes in
response to the report, including the raising of three DS Assistant Director positions to Deputy
Assistant Secretary positions. However, the department declined proposals to establish a Chief of
Staff position in the DS Bureau and to restructure responsibilities for the new High Threat
Programs Directorate, and deferred consideration of two recommendations regarding Bureau of
Intelligence and Research activities until the bureau’s vacant leadership slot is filled.25

Funding Requests
The ARB report and other post-Benghazi assessments impacted the Department of State’s funding
requests for security for FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015. As part of what it termed an Increased
Security Proposal (ISP), State in December 2012 submitted a revised FY2013 budget request to
Congress outlining resource shifts totaling approximately $1.419 billion, primarily a reallocation
of unobligated funds originally intended for programs in Iraq. The request sought $553 million
for 35 new detachments of Marine Security Guards (roughly 225 Marines) to medium- and highthreat posts to serve as visible deterrents to hostile acts;26 $130 million to increase the size of the
Diplomatic Security workforce by 155 DS personnel, mostly focused on medium- and high-threat
posts; and $736 million to fund facility security upgrades and construction of new embassy
compounds.27
23

The American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) also expressed its opposition to the creation of an Under
Secretary for Diplomatic Security, arguing that “cross cutting decisions involving security and achieving other national
priorities need to be consolidated, not further divided.” QDDR Security Working Group, Security Recommendations,
American Foreign Service Association, 2014, http://www.afsa.org/Portals/0/qddr_security.pdf.
24
Al Jazeera America posted what it stated was a copy of the report on May 5, 2014. See Edward T. Pound, “Report
Details Enduring Flaws in State Dept. Diplomatic Security,” Al Jazeera America, May 5, 2014,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/5/report-details-enduringflawsinstatedeptdiplomaticsecurity.html.
25
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Diplomatic Security: Overseas Facilities May Face Greater Risks Due to
Gaps in Security-Related Activities, Standards, and Policies, GAO-14-655, June 25, 2014, p. 20, http://www.gao.gov/
products/GAO-14-655.
26
Gregory Starr, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on September 19, 2013, that the deployment of all 35 new Marine Security Guard detachments
would likely be a three-year process.
27
Congress provided the Department of State with the authority to transfer more than $1 billion from Iraq Operations
OCO funds to accounts addressing global security needs within the context of the FY2013 Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6, §1708).

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The Administration’s FY2014 budget request sought to sustain the initiatives launched under the
FY2013 Increased Security Proposal, including expansion of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
and further growth in the number of Marine Security Guard detachments deployed to diplomatic
facilities. The request for Worldwide Security Upgrades funding (for bricks and mortar security
needs, including construction of secure new embassy compounds) was 108% higher than FY2012
funding. Requested Worldwide Security Protection funds (for security programs including a
worldwide guard force) were 37% larger than FY21012 levels. President Obama issued a
statement on May 16, 2013, calling on Congress to “fully fund Embassy security” and support
implementation of the ARB recommendations.28
In its FY2015 budget, the Administration sought funding to continue to implement the initiatives
launched under the Increased Security Proposal and meet the post-Benghazi Accountability
Review Board’s recommendations. The request included approximately $3.1 billion in Worldwide
Security Protection (WSP) funds, to provide security personnel with technical tools and training;
and approximately $1.5 billion in Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU) funds to upgrade and
maintain safe, secure diplomatic facilities. The request also featured $44 million to fund recurring
costs for the 151 additional Diplomatic Security personnel the Department of State sought to hire
after the Benghazi attacks.
Among its funding-related prescriptions, the ARB recommended that “the State Department must
work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost Sharing (CSCS) Program at its full
capacity, adjusted for inflation to approximately $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2015, including an up
to ten-year program addressing that need, prioritized for construction of new facilities in high
risk, high threat areas.”29 The Capital Security Cost Sharing Program requires all U.S. agencies
with presence at diplomatic facilities abroad (including the State Department) to pay a share
toward the cost of those facilities. The size of each agency’s required contribution is directly
linked with the number of positions it authorizes overseas.30 Within the FY2015 request for
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) funding was $986.5 million to
provide for State’s share of CSCS program. The amount requested was down from the $1.4
billion appropriated for this purpose for FY2014, a result of higher assessed contributions from
other agencies into the common account. Department officials underlined that the CSCS request
meets the full $2.2 billion level called for by the post-Benghazi ARB. Additional information
about recent year funding requests and levels is available in CRS Report R42834, Securing U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel Abroad: Background and Policy Issues.

Legislative Response to the Benghazi Attack
Congressional activity in the 112th and 113th Congresses on the issue of the protection of U.S.
personnel and facilities abroad has included a number of legislative actions and proposals, as well

28
The White House, “President Obama Calls on Congress to Fully Fund Embassy Security,” press release, May 16,
2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/16/president-obama-calls-congress-fully-fund-embassysecurity.
29
Department of State, Report of the Accountability Review Board on the Benghazi Attack, December 19, 2012, p. 9.
30
The Capital Security Cost Sharing program was authorized by the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999 (SECCA), H.R. 3427, enacted as Title VI of Appendix G of P.L. 106-113, and amended
by §629 of P.L. 108-447.

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as a variety of hearings and investigations into the Benghazi attack by a number of different
committees.31

Legislative Investigations and Oversight
Congress has produced seven publicly released reports pertaining to the Benghazi attack. The first
was presented in the 112th Congress by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs’ Chairman Joseph Lieberman and Ranking Member Susan Collins on
December 30, 2012.32 Their report found that the Department of State did not take sufficiently
into account clear evidence of a worsening security situation in Benghazi and requests for
additional support from U.S. personnel posted there. This situation was compounded by the
evident inability of the Libyan government to perform its duty to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities
and personnel. In this context, the department should have increased protective measures or
withdrawn the U.S. presence there, even without specific intelligence about an imminent attack,
the report concludes. The Senate report’s recommendations included additional interagency joint
assessments of the security requirements of high-risk U.S. diplomatic facilities; a funding process
delivering sufficient, steady, and timely funding to secure diplomatic facilities and personnel
worldwide; additional Department of Defense (DOD) assets and personnel devoted to the African
continent; and clear and consistent communication by Administration officials about terrorist
attacks.
A second report was put forward on April 23, 2013, when the chairmen of five House committees
active in the 113th Congress in oversight of the Benghazi attack presented to the House
Republican Conference an “Interim Progress Report” on their inquiries.33 Among the report’s
preliminary findings were that the senior leadership of the Department of State approved security
reductions at the Benghazi diplomatic facilities prior to the 9/11/12 attack, and that the public
presentation of the attack by the Administration was deliberately inaccurate in order to protect
State Department interests. The report related the chairmen’s view that continued examination
and oversight by their respective committees of the Benghazi attack, and the Administration’s
response to it, remained necessary.
A third report, released by House Oversight and Government Reform Committee Chairman
Darrell Issa on September 16, 2013, focused exclusively on the conclusions of the State
Department Accountability Review Board (ARB).34 According to the report, the ARB process fell
31
Additional actions and statements by Members of Congress not specifically pertaining to hearings or legislation are
not covered in detail in this report. Most recently, for example, Senator Lindsey Graham announced on October 28,
2013, that he would “block every appointment in the U.S. Senate” until the survivors of the Benghazi attack were made
available to Congress. On October 30, 2013, House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul and 84 cosigners
sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry questioning why the State Department’s Rewards for Justice Program had
not been activated to facilitate the apprehension of the perpetrators of the Benghazi attack.
32
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Flashing Red: A Special Report
on the Terrorist Attacks at Benghazi, By Joseph I. Lieberman, chairman, and Susan M. Collins, ranking Member, 112th
Cong., 2nd sess., December 30, 2012.
33
The report, by Chairman Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, Committee on Armed Services; Chairman Ed Royce,
Committee on Foreign Affairs; Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Committee on the Judiciary; Chairman Darrell Issa,
Committee on Oversight & Government Reform; Chairman Mike Rogers, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, is available on-line at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Libya-Progress-ReportFinal-1.pdf.
34
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Benghazi Attacks: Investigative
Update; Interim Report on the Accountability Review Board, Staff Report Prepared for Chairman Darrell Issa,
(continued...)

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short by failing to examine the role of officials above the mid-level who were involved in security
decisions. The report described the ARB process as neither independent, nor exhaustive, and
questioned the State Department’s actions in the wake of the report.
On January 15, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued its Review on the
Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012.35 The report
concluded that the attacks were likely preventable, based on known security shortfalls at the State
Department facility in Benghazi, and based on extensive intelligence reporting on terrorist
activity in Libya. The report included 14 findings, ranging from the alarming pre-attack strategic
intelligence picture, to the absence of U.S. military assets positioned to intervene rapidly; and 18
recommendations on issues including security standards, intelligence capabilities and processes,
the use of local security guards, and the need to bring the attackers to justice, among others.
A fifth report, authored by the Majority Staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was
released February 7, 2014.36 The report, Benghazi: Where is the State Department
Accountability?, included a number of key findings. Among them: extensive threat reporting
regarding Benghazi was well understood before the attack by senior officials in Washington,
including then-Secretary Clinton; officials in Washington denied requests for additional security
from personnel in Libya; the Accountability Review Board on the Benghazi attack was “seriously
deficient in several respects, most notably in its failure to review or comment on the actions of the
Department’s most senior officials, including Secretary Clinton herself”; and the disciplinary
actions affecting the four officials cited by the ARB did not comprise appropriate accountability.
According to the report’s key findings, the “talking points” controversy in the wake of the attack
“revealed a Department leadership more interested in protecting its reputation than establishing
facts and accountability.” Finally, the report found that the fact that there had not been a
permanent State Department Inspector General for a number of years at the time of the attack
contributed to the absence of a culture of accountability at the department. The report called for
the Administration to “recognize the failures of senior officials and hold them accountable.”
The majority Members of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations released a sixth report, focused on the Defense Department (DOD) actions relating
to the Benghazi attack, on February 10, 2014.37 Among the six key findings included in the report
were military posture assessments prior to the 2012 anniversary of the 9/11/01 attacks did not
adequately take into account the Libyan security situation; vulnerabilities in Benghazi resulted
from an unchanged military force posture, no warnings of an imminent threat, and a reduction in
DOD personnel in Libya favored by the Department of State; DOD officials rapidly assessed that
the Benghazi events were a terrorist attack, and “the President subsequently permitted the military
(...continued)
September 16, 2013, http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Benghazi-ARB-Majority-StaffReport2.pdf.
35
U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in
Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, together with Additional Views, 113th Cong., January 15, 2014,
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/benghazi2014/benghazi.pdf.
36
Majority Staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Benghazi: Where is the State Department Accountability?,
February 7, 2014, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/republicans.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/
HFAC%20Majority%20Staff%20Report%20on%20Benghazi.pdf.
37
House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Majority Interim Report: Benghazi
Investigation Update, February 10, 2014, http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=C4E165438F99-430C-BEBA-0045A6433426.

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to respond with minimal direction”; the location of Benghazi, the posture of U.S. forces, and lack
of clarity about events on the ground “severely degraded” the U.S. military’s response to the
attack, and military commanders “did not take all possible steps to prepare for a more extended
operation.” The report also found that U.S. military personnel in Tripoli at the time of the attack
were not told to “stand down,” but rather ordered into an alternative warfighting posture; still, the
report suggests, the roles and responsibilities of these forces were insufficiently well understood
in DOD’s post-attack reviews. Finally, according to the report’s findings, DOD was undertaking
measures to remedy problems exposed by the Benghazi attack; however, these efforts were
confronted with shrinking resources allocated to the U.S. military and a deteriorating global
security environment.
The activities of the Intelligence Community before, during, and after the attacks were the focus
of a seventh report, released by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on
November 21, 2014.38 The committee concluded that the CIA provided sufficient security for CIA
facilities in Benghazi and provided significant assistance to the State Department on the night of
the attacks. It found no evidence of a denial of military or other support to those under attack
from what the committee describes as a mixed group of individuals, including those affiliated
with al-Qa’ida. The committee also found that there was no intelligence failure prior to the
attacks, in that there was no specific, tactical warning regarding the September 11 attacks. After
the attacks, the early intelligence assessments and the Administrations’ public narrative on the
causes and motivations for the attack were not fully accurate, according to the committee, and the
process used to generate talking points about the attack was flawed. Finally, the committee found
no evidence that the CIA conducted any unauthorized activities in Benghazi; it also found no
evidence of intimidation by the CIA of personnel deployed in Benghazi, or of attempts to
dissuade them from telling their stories to Congress.
A number of committees have held hearings relating to the Benghazi attack; a list of selected
hearings focused on the Benghazi attack is available in Appendix B.39 On May 8, 2014, after a
number of proposals (H.Res. 36, S.Res. 225) suggesting that effective oversight would require the
creation of a select committee with additional, across-government subpoena powers, the House
passed H.Res. 567, establishing the select committee and setting out its composition, purpose,
procedures, and organization.40 The House Select Committee on Benghazi, chaired by
Representative Trey Gowdy, held its first hearing on September 17, 2014.

Diplomatic Security Legislation in the 113th Congress
In the 113th Congress, two bills relating directly to embassy security matters were considered and
approved by committees in the House and Senate (in addition to bills to appropriate funds for the
38

U.S. Congress, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the Terrorist Attacks on
U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012, a report by Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking Member
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 113th Cong., November 21, 2014,
http://intelligence.house.gov/investigative-report-terrorist-attacks-us-facilities-benghazi-libya-september-11-12-2012.
39
Not all committee activities are included in this summary. For example, according to one report, two Diplomatic
Security agents (Alec Henderson and John Martinec) who witnessed the Benghazi attack appeared before House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform staff on October 8, 2013. See Richard A. Serrano, “Benghazi
witnesses grilled in secret on Capitol Hill,” Los Angeles Times, October 28, 2013.
40
For a list of CRS expertise relevant to the Select Committee, see CRS Report R43536, Select Committee on
Benghazi: CRS Experts, by (name redacted). See also CRS Insight IN10055, House Select Committee Precedents and
Procedures and H.Res. 567, Establishing a Select Committee on the 2012 Benghazi Attack, by (name redacted).

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Department of State, including diplomatic security accounts, that have also received House and
Senate committee action):
1. H.R. 2848, the Department of State Operations and Embassy Security
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2014, introduced by House Foreign Affairs
Committee Chairman Royce on July 30, 2013, considered and approved by voice
vote by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on August 1, and passed by the
House on September 29.41
2. S. 1386, the Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty
Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013,
introduced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Menendez on July
30, 2013; adopted by voice vote and ordered reported favorably to the full Senate
on August 1.
Prior to the committees’ consideration of these measures, a number of other legislative proposals
related to the Benghazi attack and its implications for the protection of U.S. personnel and
facilities abroad had been introduced and are listed in Appendix C. The two bills that were
considered by committees, H.R. 2848 and S. 1386, both would impact related policy matters.
However, their provisions differ significantly, and the following sections compare their main
elements.
Table 1. H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 Legislative Status (as of December 2014)
Full Committee
Markup
H.R.
2848

S. 1386

08/01/2013 08/01/2013

H.R.
2848
Report
H.Rept.
113-226

Conference Report
Approval
House
Passage

S. 1386
Report

Senate
Passage

Conf.
Report

House

Senate

Public
Law

09/29/2013

Source: CRS.

Funding
H.R. 2848 authorized $2.65 billion for FY2014 for the Department of State’s Embassy Security,
Construction, and Maintenance (ESCM) account, and $2.18 billion for Worldwide Security
Protection. It also permitted the transfer of additional funds to the ESCM account after
consultation with appropriate committees.
S. 1386 authorized for FY2014:
•

$1.383 billion for the Capital Security Cost Sharing Program, of which $300
million would go to immediate threat mitigation at high-threat, high-risk posts;

•

$5 million for language training for diplomatic security personnel at high-threat,
high-risk posts;

41

H.R. 2848 also includes a number of foreign affairs authorization measures not relating directly to embassy security
issues; those measures are not covered in this report.

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•

$100 million for improved training facilities for high-threat, high-risk post
personnel, as well as $350 million for the acquisition, construction, and operation
of a new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center, and $54.54 million of
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) funds also to be
applied to improved training facilities.

H.R. 3547, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, exceeded the Administration’s request
for Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance of $2.4 billion by $25 million in OCO
funds, to be used to harden high-risk posts. It also provided a total of $2.77 billion for Worldwide
Security Protection (of which $0.90 billion are OCO funds), specifying that the $585 million
above the requested amount should be applied to the normalization of Iraq operations. When
compared to FY2013 levels, however, the ESCM account showed a reduction of 5.5% (or
approximately $155 million). Worldwide Security Protection funds for FY2014 grew by $517
million, or 23%, over FY2013 levels.
H.R. 83, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, meets the
Administration’s $3.1 billion request for Worldwide Security Protection funds—growing the
account by 12.7% over FY2014-enacted levels. While the Act exceeds the $1.47 billion request
for Worldwide Security Upgrades by $23 million, this represents a reduction of 7.7% from
FY2014 levels.

Accountability Review Board Process
While the Administration has asserted that the Benghazi Accountability Review Board was
independent and thorough, some congressional observers have suggested that the ARB process is
fundamentally flawed. Some observers have questioned whether an investigative body made up
principally of current and former officials of the institution under investigation can truly be
independent. Others argue that oversight of the ARB process is made more difficult by the
absence of a requirement that ARB reports be provided directly to Congress. Finally, public
scrutiny of the process is made more difficult by the classification of nearly all previous ARB
reports, some suggest.
A number of measures have been introduced in the House seeking to reform the process by which
accountability review boards are conducted. H.R. 1768, the Accountability Review Board Reform
Act of 2013, would have amended the 1986 Diplomatic Security Act to increase the independence
of ARBs from the State Department through, among other measures, changing the composition of
the membership of ARBs (under current statute, four members named by the Secretary of State
and one named by the Director of National Intelligence) to have fewer State-appointed members,
and specifying conflict of interest guidelines. Although H.R. 2848 did not include these measures,
Chairman Royce reportedly stated his intent to take up more comprehensive review of the ARB
process in the fall of 2013.42
S. 1386 described the current ARB mechanism as an effective tool. Still, it proposed reforms to
the membership of ARB panels, requiring that the Department of State’s Inspector General serve
as one of State’s four appointees to ARBs. It would also have required that the staff supporting
any given ARB should not be drawn from bureaus or units impacted by the incident under review.
42

Carolyn Phenicie, “Embassy Security Provisions Advance With Panel’s State Department Bill,” Congressional
Quarterly Roll Call, August 1, 2013.

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Finally, it called for ARB reports to be provided directly to Congress, not later than two days after
they are provided to the Secretary of State (under current statute, the reports themselves are not
required to be shared with Congress).

Personnel Accountability
The Benghazi Accountability Review Board found that significant leadership failures contributed
to the gravity of the event; however, the board assessed that such failures did not amount to a
clear breach of duty by any single U.S. government employee. It therefore did not recommend
disciplinary action against any individual. The Benghazi ARB recommended clarifying the
authority of future boards to empower them to recommend disciplinary action in cases of
unsatisfactory leadership by senior officials.
Both H.R. 2848 and S. 1386 took up this recommendation to broaden the standard by which
future boards can recommend discipline. H.R. 2848 took up a measure originally introduced as
H.R. 925, the Securing Accountability in Foreign Embassies (SAFE Embassies) Act, which
would have required an ARB to recommend investigatory or disciplinary action if it found that an
individual’s misconduct or unsatisfactory performance of duty significantly contributed to serious
injury, loss of life, significant property destruction, or serious security breach at or related to a
U.S. government mission abroad.
The related measure in S. 1386, originally proposed as Section 203 of S. 980, appears somewhat
narrower in scope than the House measure. It would have allowed ARBs to recommend
disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory leadership by a senior official with respect to a
security incident involving loss of life, serious injury, or significant destruction of property at or
related to a U.S. government mission abroad.

Contracting
The Department of State has requested authority to allow it to use best-value contracting for local
guard contracts, rather than “lowest price technically acceptable” criteria.43 Current statute
requires the department to award contracts using a lowest price technically acceptable selection
process, with exceptions for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.44 A “best value” approach would
allow other factors, such as prior performance, to be included in the review of a bid.
Legislative measures were introduced in both the House and Senate on this subject. H.R. 2848
took up a measure outlined in H.R. 731, the Protecting Americans Abroad Act, which would have
authorized the State Department to use a best value contracting award method for local guard
forces when deemed necessary in high-risk areas. S. 1386 took up a similar provision (from S.
980) which would have allowed the Secretary of State to award contracts on the basis of best
value; however, it would not be geographically limited. Both bills would also have required the
department to report each instance of “best value” contracting to relevant committees.
43

For background on how best value and best price approaches to local security guard contracts impact the Department
of State, see U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Review of
Best-Value Contracting for the Department of State Local Guard Program and the Utility of Expanding the Policy
Beyond High-Threat Posts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, AUD/CG-12-27, February 29, 2012, http://oig.state.gov/
documents/organization/185288.pdf.
44
22 U.S.C. §4864.

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This measure was taken up as Section 7006 of H.R. 3547, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2014, which authorized the Secretary of State to award local guard contracts for high-risk, highthreat posts on the basis of best value as determined by a cost-technical tradeoff analysis. The
measure was repeated as Section 7006 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2015, H.R. 83.

High-Threat Posts: Assessment and Reporting
H.R. 2848 would have required the Secretary of State to submit a list of high-risk, high-threat
posts within 30 days of the enactment of this section, in classified form. It also would have
required the Secretary to regularly review existing and potential posts to determine whether they
should be included in this category. Under the measure, when opening or reopening such a post,
the Secretary must convene a working group that would evaluate the rationale for the post; ensure
proper funding, physical security measures, and personnel are provided to the post; and establish
“tripwires” that might trigger a change to the post’s status (such as an evacuation of non-essential
personnel, or a closure). The Secretary would also be required to notify Congress not less than 30
days before opening or reopening such a post.
S. 1386, on the other hand, would have required the Secretary to submit a report within 90 days
evaluating high-threat, high-risk facilities, including detailed information on the threats to and
staffing at the post, as well as host nation capabilities and willingness to defend it. It also would
have required a summary of all security requests regarding each high threat, high risk post during
the previous calendar year. The State Department Inspector General’s Office would also have
been charged with reviewing the designation of such posts, as well as contingency planning, risk
mitigation and early warning systems pertaining to such posts, and reporting its assessments to
Congress.

Security Training
H.R. 2848 would have required personnel assigned to high-risk, high-threat posts to receive
security training to help them cope with potential attacks. In addition, it requires senior officials
who might be in a management role at high-risk, high-threat posts to receive training on threat
evaluation and the effective identification and application of resources to address those threats.
Finally, it calls for diplomatic security personnel assigned to high risk, high threat posts to receive
adequate language training to allow them to better manage discussions with locals regarding
security matters.
S. 1386 addressed similar ground regarding Department of State personnel training; however, it
did so by authorizing $100 million for improved training facilities for high-risk, high-threat post
personnel, as well as $350 million for the acquisition, construction, and operation of a Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center. Funds ($54.54 million) from the American Reinvestment and
Recovery Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) would also have been applied to improved training facilities.
The measure would also have authorized $5 million for language training for diplomatic security
personnel at high-risk, high-threat posts.

Marine Security Guard Program
The Marine Security Guard Program is a collaborative effort between the Departments of Defense
and State. In the wake of the Benghazi attack, the Secretary of Defense was directed to grow the
Marine Security Guard program in order to increase the number of detachments at U.S.

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embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities by up to 1,000 Marines during Fiscal Years
2014 through 2017, and reassess the program’s focus on the protection of classified information.45
The President must also separate the program’s budget request from that of the Marine Corps as a
whole; and it requires reexamination of the Marine units’ rules of engagement.
The Department of State also intends to expand its participation in the Marine Security Guard
program.46 Accordingly, S. 1386 would have required the Secretary of State (in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense) to elaborate and implement a plan to incorporate the additional Marine
Security Guard teams required by the FY2013 NDAA. Under the measure, the Secretary would
have also borne responsibility (in consultation with the Secretary of Defense) for an annual
review of the program’s size and composition, as well as an assessment of the adequacy of the
distribution of marine teams to posts, and an evaluation of the objectives of the program and its
rules of engagement. H.R. 2848 called for a similar annual review of the program.

Additional Measures
The House and Senate measures each have additional provisions. H.R. 2848 required the
Departments of State and Defense to jointly develop contingency plans for attacks at high-risk,
high-threat posts; requires the Secretary of State to conduct a Strategic Review of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security; authorized the Secretary to make physical security enhancements at schools
where children of government-employed U.S. citizens attend; and directed the Secretary to station
key personnel at high-risk, high-threat posts for sustained periods of time.
S. 1386 would also have specified a number of qualifications for the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for High Threat, High Risk Posts; required regular briefings on State’s Security
Environment Threat List; required reporting on risks at posts in high counterintelligence threat
nations; and required a report by the Comptroller General on the progress made by the
Department of State in implementing the Benghazi ARB’s recommendations.

45

H.R. 4310 (P.L. 112-239), “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013,” Title IV, Subtitle A, Section
404, “Additional Marine Corps Personnel for the Marine Corps Security Guard Program.”
46
The Inspector General of the Department of State concluded in a September 2014 report that while 13 additional
detachments MSG had been deployed as of June 2014, DS did not have formal, documented procedures in place to
ensure proper prioritization of MSG assets globally; and that State had made “limited progress” in adding new
detachments to high threat posts, instead disproportionately fielding new detachments to lower threat posts. Office of
Inspector General, U.S. Department of State and The Broadcasting Board of Governors, Audit of the Department of
State Management of the Marine Security Guard Program and Plans for Program Expansion, September 2014,
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/232007.pdf.

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Appendix A. Department of State Fact Sheet on
Benghazi ARB Implementation
Title: Fact Sheet: Benghazi Accountability Review Board Implementation, as posted on the
Department of State website, September 17, 2014
______________________________________________________________________________

Following the September 11, 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi, Libya,
the independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board (ARB) on December 19, 2012,
issued 29 recommendations (24 of which were unclassified) to the Department of State. The
Department accepted each of the ARB’s recommendations and immediately began
implementation work. Effective implementation will require fundamentally reforming the
organization in critical ways – work which is already well underway – as well as sustained
support from Congress. While risk can never be completely eliminated from our diplomatic
and development duties, we must always work to minimize it. We owe that to the men and
women working overseas to advance our interests, promote our values, and keep America
safe.
Below is a brief update on implementation of the 24 unclassified recommendations:
Unclassified Recommendations of the ARB (Text abridged) and Department Actions
OVERARCHING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Department must strengthen security for personnel and platforms beyond traditional
reliance on host government security support in high risk, high threat posts.
•

We have implemented an institutionalized, repeatable, and transparent process,
called the Vital Presence Validation Process or VP2, to make risk-managed
decisions regarding the U.S. presence at high-threat locations, including whether
to begin, restart, continue, modify the current staffing footprint, or cease
operations. This process enables us to make systematic, clear-eyed assessments
about whether and how the United States should operate in dangerous overseas
locations where U.S. interests are at stake.

•

We have created a “Security Accountability Framework” that clearly defines key
actors, their roles and responsibilities, and governance mechanisms. This
framework provides an essential foundation for implementing our new risk
management methodologies.

•

We created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Threat Programs in the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security (DS), who is responsible for ensuring that high-threat
posts receive the focused attention they need.

2. The Board recommends that the Department re-examine DS organization and
management, with a particular emphasis on span of control for security policy planning for
all overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities.

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•

The Department established a six-person panel to thoroughly review Diplomatic
Security’s organization and management structure.

•

The panel concluded its work on May 3, 2013, making 35 recommendations to
improve Diplomatic Security operations and its management structure. The
Department accepted 30 of these recommendations and is working to
implementing them. Recommendations include:

•

Reviewing Diplomatic Security personnel allocation both domestically and
abroad to ensure priority positions overseas are filled first; and,

•

Establishing a Diplomatic Security strategic planning unit.

3. Regional bureaus should have augmented support within the bureau on security matters, to
include a senior DS officer to report to the regional Assistant Secretary.
•

We have significantly improved the way that security professionals and policy
experts exchange information. DS staff now attend regular Regional Bureau
meetings, and Regional Bureau staff attend DS daily briefings to better
communicate on security and policy issues.

•

We have also taken steps to institutionalize the shared responsibility for security
issues. Of note, the Department has adjusted the work requirements for senior
level staff (Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries) to reflect
everyone’s shared responsibility for overseas security.

4. The Department should establish a panel of outside independent experts (military, security,
humanitarian) with experience in high risk, high threat areas to identify best practices (from
other agencies and other countries), and evaluate U.S. security platforms in high risk, high
threat posts.
•

The Department established a five-person panel to identify best practices used by
other agencies and countries.

•

The Best Practices Panel transmitted its final report to the Department in
September 2013.

•

The panel made 40 recommendations, and we are in the process of implementing
38 of 40 recommendations.

•

Many recommendations built upon those made by the Benghazi ARB including:
establishing a Department-wide risk management model and policy; increased
hard-skills training for the foreign affairs community; and developing a security
accountability framework.

5. The Department should develop minimum security standards for occupancy of temporary
facilities in high risk, high threat environments, and seek greater flexibility to make funds
rapidly available for security upgrades at such facilities.

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•

The Department has re-affirmed that Overseas Security Policy Board Standards
apply to all facilities.

•

Working with Congress, the Department identified flexible funding authorities in
the Increased Security Proposal to make improvements to our overseas facilities
and key authorities were enacted by Congress.

•

More flexible transfer authority for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
funding was continued in subsequent annual appropriations and in the
Presidents’ Budget.

6. Before opening or re-opening critical threat or high risk, high threat posts, the Department
should establish a multi-bureau support cell, residing in the regional bureau.
•

The Department developed standard operating procedures for “Support Cells”
for opened/reopened posts.

•

The process has been incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Handbook at 2 FAM
420; the FAM covers both regular and high-threat posts, and clearly sets out the
actions to be taken by relevant bureaus and offices.

7. All State Department and other government agencies’ facilities should be collocated when
they are in the same metropolitan area, unless a waiver has been approved.
•

We have conducted a comprehensive review of all our overseas facilities and are
developing long-term plans to relocate personnel at appropriate non-collocated
facilities.

•

Furthermore, whenever new facilities are planned and built, they are done so
with all approved staff being collocated, unless a waiver is in place.

8. The Secretary should require an action plan from Diplomatic Security, Overseas Buildings
Operations, and other relevant offices on the use of fire as a weapon against diplomatic
facilities, including immediate steps to deal with urgent issues.
•

The Department issued formal guidance to all posts on “weapons of
opportunity”

•

We have also expanded training that addresses survival in smoke and fire
situations. Such information has been added in Crisis Management Training
exercises, which are conducted at all high threat, high risk posts annually. In
addition, DS agents currently receive medical training on the effects and
treatment of smoke inhalation, injuries, and treatment, and participate in
exercises that require students to escape from smoke-filled buildings.

•

The Department continuously works with outside entities such as the U.S. Army
and New York Fire Department to identify emerging threats and trends and to
enhance our training.

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9. The Department should revise its guidance to posts and require key offices to perform indepth status checks of post tripwires.
•

The Department reviewed and revised requirements for posts on how to respond
to changing security benchmarks (i.e., “tripwires”).

•

The Department established a Washington-based “Tripwires Committee” to
review tripwires upon breach, to help ensure that posts and regional bureaus in
Washington respond more quickly should security deteriorate at post.

•

To allow Washington to track and respond to breached tripwires overseas, the
Department developed an application called ALERT (Action Log for Emergency
Response to Tripwires).

•

The Department also uses ALERT to review all tripwires of high-threat, high risk
posts on an annual basis.

10. The State Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital Security Cost
Sharing (CSCS) Program [for embassy construction] at its full capacity, adjusted for inflation
to approximately $2.2 billion in fiscal year 2015.
•

The FY 2014 Consolidated Appropriations bill includes $2.2 billion in funding
for the CSCS program. This includes reimbursements from other agencies and
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding.

•

For FY 2015, the President’s Budget requests $2.2 billion for the CSCS program
including reimbursements and OCO funding.

11. The Board supports the State Department’s initiative to request additional Marines and expand
the Marine Security Guard (MSG) Program – as well as corresponding requirements for staffing
and funding.
•

Working with the Department of Defense, we have deployed seventeen new
Marine Security Guard detachments since the Benghazi attacks. We are working
with the DOD to deploy an additional eighteen detachments in the coming years.

•

The Marine Corps also established the MSG Security Augmentation Unit in
Quantico, Virginia, which can provide MSGs on short notice at the request of
Chiefs of Mission. These Marines are drawn primarily from the combat arms and
military police occupational specialties, and have extra training in closequarters battle, trauma, and weapons and tactics. Nine squads were established
in January 2014. Many of these squads have already been dispatched repeatedly
to augment security in response to changing threat environments.

STAFFING HIGH RISK, HIGH THREAT POSTS
12. The Board strongly endorses the Department’s request for increased DS personnel for
high- and critical-threat posts and for additional Mobile Security Deployment teams, as well
as an increase in DS domestic staffing in support of such action.

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•

With Congressional support, the Department created 151 new Diplomatic
Security positions. 113 employees, including 75 new DS agents, were hired in
2013. An additional 9 have been hired in 2014. The remaining 29 employees are
planned to be hired this year.

13. The Department should assign key policy, program, and security personnel at high risk,
high threat posts for a minimum of one year. For less critical personnel, the temporary duty
length (TDY) length should be no less than 120 days.
•

All high threat posts now have a minimum of a one-year tour of duty. We ensure
overlap between incumbent and incoming positions to facilitate continuity of
operations at high threat posts.

•

Temporary duty assignments at high-threat posts are set at a minimum of 120
days.

14. The Department needs to review the staffing footprints at high risk, high threat posts,
with particular attention to ensuring adequate Locally Employed Staff (LES) and
management support. High risk, high threat posts must be funded and the human resources
process prioritized to hire Locally Employed Staff interpreters and translators.
•

The Department surveyed every post to review staffing numbers of (including
LES interpreters and translators) on staff, and found that there was adequate
staffing. We continue to review staffing levels to ensure that security and other
priority functions are being appropriately addressed.

15. With increased and more complex diplomatic activities in the Middle East, the
Department should enhance its ongoing efforts to significantly upgrade its language capacity,
especially Arabic, among American employees, including DS, and receive greater resources
to do so.
•

The Department is ramping up the language capacity of its American employees,
including Diplomatic Security agents, especially in Arabic. Increasing language
capacity takes time – certain languages take up to 2 years to learn to the required
level of proficiency.

•

In the short term, the Department is committed to better equipping the growing
cadre of security experts to engage local populations and cooperate with host
nation security forces.

•

We have completed two 10-week sessions of Arabic “Awareness, Language,
Emergency and Response Training” ALERT training and one session of Urdu
since October 2013.

•

We are preparing to offer more iterations of Arabic ALERT in 2014, and will
offer additional languages.

TRAINING AND AWARENESS

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16. A panel of Senior Special Agents and Supervisory Special Agents should revisit DS highthreat training with respect to active internal defense and fire survival as well as Chief of
Mission (COM) protective detail training.
•

The Department established a panel of Supervisory Special Agents to participate
in a Program Review of the High Threat Tactical Course; as a result, DS revised
high-threat training and COM protective detail training and raised standards for
passing the High Threat Tactical Course.

•

The panel’s findings resulted in the identification and development of 170
operational requirements, associated proficiency standards, and training plans
needed by DS special agents operating in high-threat, high risk environments.
These findings were codified into a new High Threat Training Strategy that
encompasses a career-long cycle of instruction for all DS special agents and
includes new training courses for entry-, mid-, and senior-level agents.

17. The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute should collaborate
in designing joint courses that integrate high threat training and risk management decision
processes for senior and mid-level DS agents and Foreign Service Officers and better prepare
them for leadership positions in high risk, high threat posts.
•

The Department has enhanced security training efforts, including by requiring
personnel headed to high threat posts to receive additional, specialized security
and fire survival training.

•

The Diplomatic Security Training Center and Foreign Service Institute have
formed a working group to coordinate ongoing collaboration efforts on highthreat training and risk management, including the integration of updated course
materials in a broad range of existing training and development of new courses.

SECURITY AND FIRE SAFETY EQUIPMENT
18. The Department should ensure provision of adequate fire safety and security equipment
for safe havens and safe areas in non-Inman/SECCA facilities, as well as high threat Inman
facilities.
•

The Department has surveyed fire and life safety equipment requirements at all
high-threat, high-risk U.S. diplomatic posts abroad. The Department has ensured
that all high-threat, high-risk posts have adequate fire safety equipment and have
procured additional personal protective equipment.

•

We were able to do this with the Increased Security Proposal money funded by
Congress in FY 2013, for which we are grateful.

19. There have been technological advancements in non-lethal deterrents, and the State
Department should ensure it rapidly and routinely identifies and procures additional options
for non-lethal deterrents in high risk, high threat posts and trains personnel on their use.

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•

The Department has addressed this recommendation.

20. DS should upgrade surveillance cameras at high risk, high threat posts for greater
resolution, nighttime visibility, and monitoring capability beyond post.
•

Over the next year, the Department will have upgraded all high-threat, high-risk
facilities with more modern surveillance cameras.

INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS
21. Careful attention should be given to factors showing a deteriorating threat situation in
general as a basis for improving security posture. Key trends must be quickly identified and
used to sharpen risk calculations.
•

The Department has addressed this recommendation.

22. The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis should report directly to the DS
Assistant Secretary and directly supply threat analysis to all DS components, regional
Assistant Secretaries, and Chiefs of Mission in order to get key security-related threat
information into the right hands more rapidly.
•

The DS Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, now reports directly to the
Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security for threat reporting and supplies
threat analysis to regional Assistant Secretaries and Chiefs of Mission.

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY
23. The Board is of the view that findings of unsatisfactory leadership performance by senior
officials in relation to the security incident under review should be a potential basis for
discipline recommendations by future ARBs, and would recommend a revision of
Department regulations or amendment to the relevant statute to this end.
•

The Department is working with Congress to increase accountability. In January
2013, the Department proposed legislation to grant future Accountability Review
Boards the authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of
unsatisfactory leadership, and thus increase accountability for security incidents.

24. The Board was humbled by the courage and integrity shown by those on the ground in
Benghazi and Tripoli, in particular the DS agents and Annex team who defended their
colleagues… We trust that the Department and relevant agencies will take the opportunity to
recognize their exceptional valor and performance, which epitomized the highest ideals of
government service.
•

The President and the Secretary of State have publicly mentioned the bravery and
heroic efforts of our personnel on numerous occasions.

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•

The Department bestowed the Holbrooke award on Ambassador Chris Stevens;
the Thomas Jefferson award to the personnel who gave their lives in September;
the Secretary’s award to one officer who was seriously injured; and the
Secretary’s Heroism Award to 12 personnel who defended the Benghazi facilities.

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Appendix B. Selected Congressional Hearings on
Benghazi Attack, 112th and 113th Congresses
Hearing Title

Committee

Date

Reviewing Efforts to Secure U.S.
Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel

House Select Committee on
Benghazi

December 10, 2014

Implementation of the Accountability
Review Board recommendations

House Select Committee on
Benghazi

September 17, 2014

Benghazi, Instability, and a New
Government: Successes and Failures
of U.S. Intervention in Libya

House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee

May 1, 2014

The Benghazi Talking Points and
Michael J. Morell’s Role in Shaping
the Administration’s Narrative

House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence

April 2, 2014

Defense Department’s posture for
September 11, 2013: What are the
Lessons of Benghazi?

House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations

September 19, 2013

Reviews of the Benghazi Attack and
Unanswered Questions

House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee

September 19, 2013

Benghazi: Where is the State
Department Accountability?

House Foreign Affairs Committee

September 18, 2013

S. 980, “Chris Stevens, Sean Smith,
Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty
Embassy Security and Personnel
Protection Act of 2013” (Hearing and
markup)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

July 16, 2013

Benghazi: Exposing Failure and
Recognizing Courage

House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee

May 8, 2013

Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi,
Libya

Senate Armed Services Committee

February 7, 2013

Terrorist Attack in Benghazi: The
Secretary of State’s View

House Foreign Affairs Committee

January 23, 2013

Benghazi: The Attacks and the
Lessons Learned

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

January 23, 2013

Benghazi and Beyond: What Went
Wrong on September 11, 2012 and
How to Prevent it from Happening
at other Frontline Posts (Part II)

House Foreign Affairs Committee

December 20, 2012

Benghazi: The Attack and the
Lessons Learned

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

December 20, 2012

Closed hearing on the
circumstances, including the
intelligence and security situation,
surrounding the recent terrorist
attack in Benghazi, Libya

Senate Select Intelligence Committee

November 16, 2012

Benghazi and Beyond: What Went
Wrong on September 11, 2012 and
How to Prevent it from Happening
at other Frontline Posts (Part I)

House Foreign Affairs Committee

November 15, 2012

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Hearing Title

Committee

Date

Closed oversight hearing on the
circumstances, including the
intelligence and security situation,
surrounding the recent terrorist
attack in Benghazi, Libya, and the
intelligence and security situation in
other Arab Spring countries

Senate Select Intelligence Committee

November 15, 2012

The Security Failures of Benghazi

House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee

October 10, 2012

Source: CRS. See respective committee websites for witness lists and testimony.
Note: Includes only hearings in which the Benghazi attack was the main subject.

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Appendix C. Selected Diplomatic Security-Related
Legislation, 112th and 113th Congresses (in
Chronological Order)
Measure (and date introduced)
H.Res. 36
(introduced 1/18/2013)
S. 227
(introduced 2/4/2013)

H.R. 731

Title

Summary

Establishing a select committee to
investigate and report on the attack
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi,
Libya

Establishes a select committee to
investigate and report on the attack
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi,
Libya

Embassy Security Funds Transfer Act
of 2013

Authorizes funds appropriated under
the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 2012 under
the headings “Diplomatic and
Consular Programs" and "Embassy
Security, Construction, and
Maintenance" to be transferred
between such headings

Protecting Americans Abroad Act

Authorizes the State Department to
use to the “Best-Value Contracting”
award method for local guard forces
in high-risk areas when deemed
necessary

Securing Accountability in Foreign
Embassies (SAFE Embassies) Act

Amends the Diplomatic Security Act
to require a determination by the
Accountability Review Board that an
individual’s misconduct or
unsatisfactory performance of duty
significantly contributed to serious
injury, loss of life, significant property
destruction, or serious security
breach in order for the Board to
recommend that an investigatory or
disciplinary action be initiated by the
appropriate federal agency or
instrumentality

FY2013 Consolidated and Further
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013

Congress provided the Department
of State with the authority to
transfer more than $1 billion from
Iraq Operations OCO funds to
accounts addressing global security
needs, as requested in State’s
Increased Security Proposal.

(introduced 2/14/2013)

H.R. 925
(introduced 2/28/2013)

P.L. 113-6, §1708
(introduced 3/4/2013)

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Measure (and date introduced)
H.R. 1186
(introduced 3/14/2013)

H.R. 1768
(introduced 4/26/2013)

H.R. 1781
(introduced 4/26/2013)

H.R. 2723
(introduced 7/18/2013)

S. 1372 (see also S.Rept. 113-81)
(introduced 7/25/2013)
H.R. 2855 (see also H.Rept. 113-185)
(introduced 7/30/2013)

S.Res. 225
(introduced 9/12/2013)

H.R. 3547 / P.L. 113-76
(introduced 11/20/2013)

Congressional Research Service

Title

Summary

To posthumously award the
Congressional Gold Medal to each of
Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods in
recognition of their contributions to
the Nation.

Directs the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate to
arrange for the posthumous award,
on behalf of Congress, of a gold
medal in commemoration of the
contributions of Glen Doherty and
Tyrone Woods, two former Navy
SEAL members who sacrificed their
lives on September 11, 2012, while
serving as part of a U.S. diplomatic
security detachment in Libya

Accountability Review Board Reform
Act of 2013

Amends the Diplomatic Security Act
to improve the effectiveness of ARBs
by increasing their independence
from the State Department through,
among other measures, changing the
composition of the membership of
ARBs to have fewer State-appointed
members, and specifying conflict of
interest guidelines

Mustafa Akarsu Local Guard Force
Support Act

Seeks to assist the family members
of Foreign Service Nationals (FSN)
killed in the line of duty by making
them eligible to obtain special visas
to immigrate to the United States

Embassy Security and Enhancement
Act of 2013

Enhances security for facilities and
personnel at U.S. diplomatic and
consular posts abroad through
improved training, procedures, and
resources

Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2014

Recommends appropriation levels
for diplomatic security-related
spending

Making appropriations for the
Department of State, foreign
operations, and related programs for
the fiscal year ending September 30,
2014, and for other purposes

Recommends appropriation levels
for diplomatic security-related
spending

A resolution to express the sense of
the Senate that Congress should
establish a joint select committee to
investigate and report on the attack
on the U.S. diplomatic facility and
American personnel in Benghazi,
Libya, on September 11, 2012.

Expresses the sense of the Senate
that Congress should establish a
joint select committee to investigate
the Benghazi attack.

Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2014

Fully funds Administration’s FY2014
request on embassy security funding;
provides $2.674 billion for Embassy
Security, Construction and
Maintenance account and $2.77
billion for Worldwide Security
Protection.

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Measure (and date introduced)
H.Res. 567
(introduced 5/6/2014, passed by
House 5/8/2014)

Title

Summary

Providing for the Establishment of
the Select Committee on the Events
Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist
Attack in Benghazi

Establishes Select Committee on the
Events Surrounding the 2012
Terrorist Attack in Benghazi, and
sets out its composition, purpose,
procedures, and organization.

Source: CRS.
Notes: Does not include legislative proposals pertaining to other agencies, such as the FY2014 National Defense
Authorization Act and its provisions relating to the Marine Security Guard program.

Author Contact Information
(name redacted)
Analyst in Foreign Affairs
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Key Policy Staff
Area of Expertise

Name

Phone

Diplomatic Security Funding

Susan Epstein

7-....

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov

Libya

Christopher Blanchard

7-....

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov

U.S. Marine Corps

(name redacted)

7-....

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov

Congressional Research Service

Email

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43195. Public record. Not legal advice.