# U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43049

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** June 4, 2014
- **Citation:** R43049

## Text

U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and
Modernization: Background and Issues
for Congress
(name redacted)
Specialist in Military Aviation

June 4, 2014

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R43049

U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Summary
The United States’ existing long-range bomber fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s are at a critical
point in their operational life span. With the average age of each airframe being 50, 28, and 20
years old, respectively, military analysts are beginning to question just how long these aircraft can
physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems. As potential adversaries acquire 21st
century defense systems designed to prevent U.S. access to the global commons (sea, air, space,
and cyberspace) and to limit U.S. forces’ freedom of action within an operational area, the ability
of these Cold War era bombers to get close enough to targets to be effective will continue to
deteriorate. Although the Air Force is committed to the development and acquisition of its
proposed Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B), it is anticipated that flight-testing of the new
bomber will not start until the mid-2020s, with initial operational capability near 2030. With this
timeline in mind, the Air Force has extended the operational lives of the B-52 and B-1 out to 2040
and the B-2 out to 2058. Air Force and aerospace industry experts insist that with sufficient
funding for sustainment and modernization over their expected lifespans, all three of the existing
bombers can physically last and continue to remain credible weapon systems. However,
appropriations decisions made by Congress based on required military capabilities to meet
national security objectives will ultimately determine how long the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will
remain in service.
The central issue for Congress is how much funding should be appropriated for the continued
sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the remainder of their
service lives. Interest in this subject stems from Congress’s authority to approve, reject, or modify
Air Force funding requests for bomber sustainment and modernization as well as its oversight of
the nation’s long-range strike requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment,
modernization, and size of the bomber force have been perennial legislative topics since the early
1990s. As the Air Force progresses through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins
the gradual phase-out of 50-year-old bombers, it is anticipated Congress will continue dealing
with bomber sustainment and modernization legislation. Congress’s decisions on appropriations
for the bomber force could affect the nation’s long-range strike capabilities and have unintended
consequences on U.S. national security as well as the U.S. aerospace industry.
The context through which Congress will make these decisions includes U.S. national security
and defense strategies and the expectation of the role the B-52, B-1, and B-2 will play in
executing those strategies. Some of the many global and strategic variables that could become
central in Congress’s decision making on the bomber force include the following:
•

the Obama Administration’s 2012 rebalance in national security strategy toward
the Asia-Pacific region and the military implications applicable to the bomber
force;

•

the expected contribution of bombers in accomplishing the critical missions of
U.S. forces as outlined in the Department of Defense’s strategic guidance,
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense;

•

the effectiveness and sustainability of the Air Force’s continuous bomber
presence operation—based in the Pacific at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam—
and corresponding displays of worldwide power projection missions by all three
bombers;

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

•

the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) challenge presented by potential adversaries
and the developments related to bombers’ employment in an A2/AD threat
environment; and

•

the bombers’ role in nuclear deterrent operations and the impact of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on the B-52 and B-2.

The starting point for Congress’s debate on bomber modernization and sustainment is the existing
Air Force bomber force, which includes
•

76 B-52H Stratofortress bombers capable of both conventional and nuclear
operations and capable of employing long-range standoff weapons. The B-52H
first entered service on May 9, 1961.

•

63 B-1B Lancer bombers capable of supersonic and low-level flight,
conventional only operations, and employing long-range standoff weapons. The
B-1B became operational in 1986.

•

20 B-2A Spirit, low observable (stealth) bombers capable of both conventional
and nuclear operations. The B-2A entered service in December 1993 and became
fully operational capable (FOC) on December 17, 2003.

Potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the sustainment and
modernization of the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force may include the following:
•

the potential for a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities as
development of the Air Force’s proposed LRS-B continues;

•

the feasibility and affordability of Air Force bomber sustainment and
modernization plans and whether those plans bridge any potential long-range
strike capabilities gap until the LRS-B becomes operational;

•

the amount of money Congress and the nation should continue spending on 28and 50-year-old bombers;

•

the sufficiency of acquisition plans for the 80 to 100 LRS-Bs to backfill U.S.
long-range strike requirements as the legacy bomber force ages out of service;

•

the possibility of further delaying development and acquisition of the proposed
LRS-B given sufficient levels of funding for sustainment and modernization of
the current bomber force;

•

the modernization, sustainment, and development of the weapons employed by
the bomber force that affect the bombers’ effectiveness and ability to operate in
advanced, 21st century A2/AD threat environment;

•

the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and modernization, and
subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base
realignment and closure efforts; and

•

the ability of the nation’s industrial base to sustain an aging bomber force.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ...................................................................................................................................... 2
United States’ Military Strategy Shift: Do the Bombers’ Capabilities Meet Strategic
Requirements? ........................................................................................................................ 2
Potential Strategic Influence of Bombers on the Administration’s Strategy Shift..................... 4
Bomber Expectations: Employment in DOD’s Strategic Guidance .......................................... 5
Bomber Contribution to Critical Missions .......................................................................... 5
Forward Deployed Diplomacy: Continuous Bomber Presence and Worldwide
Power Projection .............................................................................................................. 8
Meeting the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenge .............................................. 10
Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Environment ............................................................. 12
Nuclear Deterrent Operations............................................................................................ 14
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Impact on Bombers ............................................ 15
Existing U.S. Bomber Force .................................................................................................... 15
B-52H Stratofortress ................................................................................................................ 16
Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ............................................................ 17
B-1B Lancer ............................................................................................................................ 19
Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .............................................................. 20
B-2A Spirit............................................................................................................................... 22
Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .............................................................. 22
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 25
Potential for Inducing a Shortfall in Long-Range Strike Capabilities ..................................... 25
Will Current Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization Plans Get Us to the
LRS-B? ................................................................................................................................. 26
To Fund or Not to Fund: What Are DOD and Air Force Priorities? ........................................ 27
As Legacy Bombers Phase Out, Are 80-100 LRS-Bs Sufficient? ........................................... 29
If Legacy Bombers are Modernized, Can the Air Force Further Delay Development
of the LRS-B? ....................................................................................................................... 30
Modernization of Bomber-Launched Weapons ....................................................................... 31
Potential Implications of Bomber Modernization on Air Force Basing and any Future
Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC)............................................................................. 32
Industrial Base Concerns Associated with Bomber Sustainment ............................................ 33
Historical Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment and Modernization, FY2002-2012 ............... 34
Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013 ........................................................................................... 37
FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383) .................................................. 37
FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations (H.Rept. 112-331) ....................................... 37
FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81) .................................................... 38
FY2013 Department of Defense Appropriations (S.Rept. 112-196: To accompany
H.R. 5856) ...................................................................................................................... 39
FY2013 Department of Defense Authorizations (P.L. 112-239) ....................................... 39
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 39

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Figures
Figure 1. Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle Concept.................................................... 11
Figure 2. Legacy Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Operating Environment............................. 13
Figure 3. B-52H Stratofortress....................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4. B-1B Lancer ................................................................................................................... 19
Figure 5. B-2A Spirit ..................................................................................................................... 22
Figure 6. DOD Planned Long Range Strike Inventories and Funding (Includes B-52H, B1B and B-2) ................................................................................................................................ 28
Figure 7. Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment and
Modernization............................................................................................................................. 34
Figure 8. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations Comparison ............................................................. 35
Figure 9. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations and Average Historical Mission Capable
Rates ........................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure B-1. Graphical Summary of B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Master Plan .............. 50
Figure B-2. Historical Comparison of B-52 Appropriated Funding and the Average
Annual Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-52 Fleet ........................................................... 51
Figure C-1. B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan, $250 Million/Fiscal Year Funding
Scenario ...................................................................................................................................... 56
Figure C-2. Historical Comparison of B-1 Appropriated Funding and the Average Annual
Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-1 fleet ........................................................................... 57
Figure D-1. Graphical Summary of B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Master Plan ................ 62
Figure D-2. Historical Comparison of B-2 Appropriated Funding and the Average Annual
Mission Capable (MC) Rates for the B-2 fleet .......................................................................... 63

Tables
Table 1. Historical Examples of Missions Accomplished by Bombers ........................................... 7
Table 2. Current U.S. Air Force Bomber Force ............................................................................. 16
Table 3. Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts .................................................... 18
Table 4. Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ...................................................... 21
Table 5. Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts ...................................................... 24
Table 6. DOD Aviation Long Range Strike Aircraft Inventory (Includes B-52H, B-1B,
and B-2) ...................................................................................................................................... 26

Appendixes
Appendix A. Existing Bomber Force ............................................................................................. 41
Appendix B. Plans for B-52H Bomber Sustainment and Modernization ...................................... 47
Appendix C. Plans for B-1 Bomber Sustainment and Modernization ........................................... 52

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Appendix D. Plans for B-2 Sustainment and Modernization......................................................... 58
Appendix E. Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013 ...................................................................... 64

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 70
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 70

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Introduction
The central issue addressed by this report is how much Congress should consider appropriating
for the continued sustainment and modernization of the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers over the
remainder of their service lives. Many military experts note the advanced age of the United
States’ long-range bomber fleet. The B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer, and B-2A Spirit are now
about 50, 28, and 20 years old respectively. In fact, Air Force Global Strike Command declared
2012 the “Year of the B-52” in honor of the 50th anniversary of the last delivery of a B-52 and the
60th anniversary of the first test flight of the YB-52.1 The B-1B celebrated its 25th anniversary in
2010. The last B-2 delivery was in 1997. Although the Department of Defense and the Air Force
are committed to the development and fielding of a new Long-Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B),
flight-testing of the new bomber will likely not start until the mid-2020s. Initial development of
the B-2 began in the early 1980s and the first aircraft was delivered on December 17, 1993. If the
B-2 experience is the norm, potential delivery of the first operational LRS-B may be expected
sometime in the 2030 timeframe. With this in mind, can the U.S. Air Force’s B-52Hs, B-1Bs, and
B-2As physically last and continue to be credible weapon systems until the LRS-B is fielded?
More importantly, does the nation’s “legacy” bomber force possess the capabilities required to
meet national security strategy objectives, especially in the face of potential adversaries
possessing advanced, 21st century anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapon systems?2 The U.S.
Air Force and aerospace industry’s answer is “yes,” provided sufficient sustainment and
modernization funding is available over the remaining lifespan of these weapon systems.
Without sufficient sustainment and modernization funding, many analysts argue the U.S. bomber
fleet will quickly become a decrepit force ill-suited to the potential challenges posed by 21st
century adversaries. The average age of the bomber force is 33. Because of the physical wearand-tear placed on these aircraft from the demands of military flight—compounded by 11 years
of continuous combat—aging airframe structures need reinforcement, engines need to be
replaced, and computer and electronic components need upgrading. Even if corrosion, metal
fatigue, and parts obsolescence do not take their toll on the fleet, military analysts point out that
potential adversaries are acquiring advanced, A2/AD weapon systems that would make it harder
for the bombers to reach their targets, thus relegating them to a “standoff” weapons employment
role.3 But even “standoff” weapons have their limits, especially against deeply buried and/or
hardened targets found in places like North Korea and Iran. Consequently, most experts agree all
three bombers are in need of upgrades to their systems in order to counter A2/AD-equipped
adversaries and require constant operational research and testing to evaluate and incorporate new
and modern weapons into their arsenal.
1
The YB-52 was the second B-52 prototype aircraft built. The aircraft was completed and rolled out for ground testing
on March 15, 1952. The first flight was one month later on April 15. The YB-52 was the first B-52-type to actually fly.
2
Congress found that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that antiaccess/area denial strategies and weapon systems “seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a
region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without
dominant capabilities to project power, the integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called
into question, reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” P.L. 111-383,
111th Congress, 2nd session, 2011, Section 1238.
3
For example, Lt. Gen. Christopher D. Miller, deputy chief of staff for Air Force strategic plans and programs noted,
“The current fleet [of bombers] has been upgraded over the years with new weapons and electronic warfare systems,
but it is increasingly at risk to modernizing air defenses.” Quoted in John A. Tirpack’s, “Time to Get Started,” Air
Force Magazine, February 2012, p. 31.

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This report addresses potential congressional oversight and appropriations concerns for the
sustainment and modernization of the U.S. Air Force’s bomber force. It does not address Air
Force efforts to develop and acquire the proposed LRS-B. Congressional interest in this subject
stems from Congress’s authority to approve, reject, or modify Air Force funding requests for
bomber sustainment and modernization, as well as their oversight of the nation’s long-range strike
requirements and capabilities. In addition, sustainment, modernization, and size of the bomber
force have been perennial legislative topics since the early 1990s. As the Air Force progresses
through development and acquisition of the LRS-B and begins the gradual phase-out of 50-yearold bombers, it is anticipated that Congress will continue dealing with bomber sustainment and
modernization legislation. Congress’s decisions on appropriations for the bomber force could
impact the nation’s long-range strike capabilities and have additional consequences for the U.S.
aerospace industry.
A key issue for Congress is whether to continue providing sustainment and modernization
funding for the Air Force’s B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A bombers, and if so, at what levels. Pertinent
to the discussion is the potential for a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities if
Congress or the Air Force chooses to minimize funding for sustainment and upgrades that would
keep these weapon systems viable against A2/AD-equipped adversaries. Also, given Air Force
plans to keep the B-52 and B-1 flying well beyond 2030, Congress may consider whether current
bomber sustainment and modernization plans will meet the nation’s long-range strike
requirements until the LRS-B is operational. Additionally, Congress may also consider whether
the planned 80-100 LRS-Bs will adequately replace the capabilities lost as the legacy bombers
start retiring from service in the 2030s. Congress’s oversight and decisions on these issues could
also have implications for any potential future base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions as
well as impact the U.S. aircraft manufacturing industrial base. Ultimately, the priority the Air
Force places on bomber sustainment and modernization, and any decisions considered by
Congress, could have potential consequences for future national defense strategies and on U.S.
long-range strike capabilities.

Background
United States’ Military Strategy Shift: Do the Bombers’
Capabilities Meet Strategic Requirements?
The Obama Administration’s 2012 shift in national security and defense strategy towards the
Asia-Pacific region has significant implications for America’s legacy bomber force.4 Stemming
from the growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific region, China’s growing military
capabilities and its increasing assertiveness of claims to disputed maritime territories, U.S.
concerns with freedom of navigation and the ability to project power in the region, and the end of
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, President Obama directed the Department of
Defense (DOD) to raise the Asia-Pacific region’s priority in U.S. military planning.5 Many
analysts agree this rebalance has placed renewed emphasis on U.S. naval forces due to the
4

For in-depth analysis of the Obama Administration’s rebalance towards Asia-Pacific, see CRS Report R42448, Pivot
to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia, coordinated by (name redacted).
5
For in-depth analysis of DOD’s new strategic guidance, see CRS Report R42146, Assessing the January 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG): In Brief, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

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maritime character of the Pacific theater of operations. However, budgetary pressures and
potential defense cuts may reduce long-term naval procurement plans and planned naval force
levels in the Pacific region.6 Consequently, just as B-17 and B-29 bombers demonstrated the
value of long-range airpower projection in the Pacific Theater during World War II, the U.S. Air
Force may be planning on the current fleet of B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s to provide an essential
complement to U.S. naval forces in the vast geographical expanses of the Asia-Pacific.7
In addition to the Asia-Pacific, the Administration’s new defense strategy also calls for retaining
emphasis on the Middle East while ensuring U.S. defense commitments to European allies. This
aspect of the new strategy may prove the most challenging from a resource perspective as the
DOD is forced to implement automatic spending cuts laid out in the Budget Control Act (BCA) of
2011 (P.L. 112-25/S. 365 of August 2, 2011). The BCA necessitates $55 billion a year in defense
cuts over the nine years from FY2013 to FY2021. Specifically for the bomber force, Air Force
leaders have said that such cuts would result in an 18% reduction in both bomber flying hours and
in bomber sustainment and modernization efforts, resulting in aircraft availability and mission
capable rates falling below standards.8 Some military analysts, consequently, are skeptical as to
whether U.S. force levels will be sufficient to meet multiple, competing priorities in both the
Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, all the while reassuring U.S. commitments in Europe.9
However, some historical examples suggest the current bomber force is capable of balancing
national security priorities among competing geographical regions.
Since 2003, B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s have maintained a continuous bomber presence in the Pacific
with regularly scheduled rotations to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, while simultaneously
participating in continuous combat operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. An example of
this is the March 2003 deployment of B-52s and B-1s to Guam (in response to North Korean
nuclear weapons activities) while additional B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s participated in the opening
phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom and flew combat sorties in Afghanistan.10 Essentially, this dual
deployment of bombers to two geographical regions demonstrated the United States and the
bomber force’s ability to fight wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan while retaining the
capability to respond to potential crises in the Asia-Pacific.

6

For example, there is considerable concern that long-term Navy budgets will not sustain a Navy of 313 ships, as
called for in recent plans. See, for instance, Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, December 2011: 20 and 22.
7
Ashton B. Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective”
(speech, The Asia Society, New York, NY, August 1, 2012); and, Tom Vanden Brook, “B-1 bomber mission shifts
from Afghanistan to China, Pacific,” USA Today online, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-0511/b-1-bomber-obama-new-strategy/56097706/1.
8
Department of the U.S. Air Force, Public Affairs Guidance: Sequestration-Final (Washington, DC: USAF Public
Affairs Office, February 7, 2013).
9
For example, Dan Blumenthal, director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, assesses that the current
U.S. response to China’s military modernization, manifested in the Obama Administration’s rebalance to the AsiaPacific and the U.S. military’s operational concept called Air-Sea Battle (ASB), is inadequate in several respects.
Primarily, Blumenthal argues that cuts to the defense budget will make it difficult to resource the Administration’s
“rebalance” and the military’s ASB concept while continuing to address challenges that remain in the Middle East and
Europe. Dan Blumenthal et al., Strategic Asia 2012-13: China’s Military Challenge (Washington, DC: The National
Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), chapter on: The U.S. Response to China’s Military, p 309.
10
Rebecca Grant, “Bomber Diplomacy,” Air Force Magazine, December 2011, 32.

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Potential Strategic Influence of Bombers on the Administration’s
Strategy Shift
The Administration’s strategic guidance identifies three priorities for which the USAF bomber
force could have significant strategic influence. These include reaffirming U.S. commitment to
the security and prosperity of allies in the Asia-Pacific region; ensuring access to the global
commons which facilitate world-wide economic opportunities and guarantee U.S. power
projection capabilities; and ensuring a quick, military response capability to any hostilities from
potential adversaries in the region.
According to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the U.S. commitment to what she termed
“forward-deployed” diplomacy would include the strengthening of bilateral security alliances
with U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific and necessitate the forging of a broad-based military
presence.11 Forward based bombers, whether deployed on a continuous basis or periodically as
part of training exercises, could play a significant role in reaffirming U.S. commitments to allies
in the Asia-Pacific region. Primarily through regular rotational deployments (such as the
continuous bomber presence rotation at Andersen AFB, Guam) and participation in bilateral and
multilateral training exercises, the visible presence of U.S. bombers abroad could potentially
reinforce the U.S. commitment to deterrence (conventional and nuclear) against any potential
adversary in the region and could provide an economical and effective way to increase U.S.
influence there.12
Freedom of navigation and access to the South China Sea is considered by many analysts vital to
the economy of every nation in North America and East Asia. More than half of the world’s
shipping passes through the South China Sea every year (approximately 70,000 ships carrying
$5.3 trillion worth of goods). Of that, $1.2 trillion worth is trade that directly affects the United
States.13 In addition, over 80% of crude oil supplies to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flow
through the South China Sea—making these countries especially dependent on South China Sea
shipping routes.14 Any attempt to restrict universal access to this maritime common could impact
the security, political stability, and economic prosperity of the United States and its allies in the
region and potentially inhibit U.S. power projection capabilities by restricting the U.S. Navy’s
ability to patrol and operate in the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. Long-range bombers,
conducting maritime reconnaissance and capable of anti-shipping operations, could actively and
passively maintain situational awareness of the vast Asia-Pacific maritime region and possibly
keep in check any potential adversary looking to threaten the United States and its allies’ access
to the Asia-Pacific’s commons.
11

Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century
12
United States Pacific Command participates in multiple exercises and other engagement activities throughout the
Asia-Pacific region which the bomber force has or could take part in. These bilateral and multilateral exercises include
TALISMAN SABER, a biennial Australia/United States bilateral exercise; COBRA GOLD, a joint/combined exercise
with Thailand; BALIKATAN, a joint exercise with the Republic of the Philippines; KEEN SWORD/KEEN EDGE, a
joint/bilateral exercise with Japan; and, RIM OF THE PACIFIC, a biennial large-scale multinational power projection
and sea control exercise.
13
Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Armed Clash in the South China
Sea: Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14,” http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883,
February 14, 2013.
14
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress-Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2008,” p 11, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf.

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Finally, the legacy bomber force is one option than can produce a quick, military response to
hostile actions taken by potential adversaries in the region. Unconstrained by the need for a
forward operating location within theater, the capability of bombers to reach anywhere in the
Asia-Pacific, in a relatively short period of time and with a wide array of weapons, could provide
national leaders a viable option for responding to encroachments on U.S. interests in the region
and for honoring defense and security commitments to U.S. allies.

Bomber Expectations: Employment in DOD’s Strategic Guidance
Bomber Contribution to Critical Missions
The Administration’s new strategic guidance emphasizes the military’s need to recalibrate its
capabilities and make selective investments to succeed in a number of missions critical to
achieving national security objectives.15 Any argument for or against any level of funding for
bomber modernization could include an assessment and cost/benefit analysis of those upgrades
and their contribution to accomplishing the expected missions of U.S. forces as defined in the
DOD’s strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
Defense. These missions include the following:16
•

Counter terrorism and irregular warfare;

•

deter and defeat aggression;

•

project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges;

•

counter weapons of mass destruction;

•

operate effectively in cyberspace and space;

•

maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent;

•

provide a stabilizing presence; and,

•

conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations.

15

Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012
(Washington, DC), 4-6.
16
Ibid.

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All three of the nation’s bombers have made, and are expected to continue making, significant
contributions to all of the critical missions set forth in DOD’s strategic guidance. Looking as far
back as 1962 (coinciding with the last B-52 delivery), numerous examples describe one or more
of the current bombers accomplishing these missions (see Table 1). However, with the rising
prevalence of 21st century A2/AD capabilities in several potential adversary countries, even the
U.S. Air Force assesses that modern threat capabilities are outpacing the 20th century capabilities
and abilities of the B-52, B-1 and, in some circumstances, even the B-2, to accomplish these
missions.17 Without funding for critical modernization and sustainment efforts, all three bombers
run the risk of becoming ineffective in the face of A2/AD equipped adversaries.18

17

The U.S. Air Force acknowledges in its 2012 Posture Statement that, “as A2/AD capabilities proliferate, our [U.S.
Air Force] fourth-generation fighter and legacy bomber capability to penetrate contested airspace is increasingly
challenged” and “Procuring a new penetrating bomber is critical to maintaining our [U.S. Air Force] long-range strike
capability in the face of evolving A2/AD environments.” Department of the Air Force, United States Air Force Posture
Statement, Washington, DC, 2012, 15-16.
18
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities are meant to frustrate the U.S.’ ability to project substantial military
capability over considerable strategic and operational distances. A2 capabilities are designed to exclude U.S. forces
from a foreign theater or deny effective use and transit of the global commons such as air, maritime, space and
cyberspace. AD capabilities are designed to complicate U.S. force’s ability to establish a presence and effectively
operate in, over, or in range of an adversary’s territory or interests. Twenty-first century AD capabilities can attack U.S.
vulnerabilities in all five key operating domains—air, sea, land, space, and cyberspace.

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Table 1. Historical Examples of Missions Accomplished by Bombers
(1962-Present)

Conflict/Crisis

Bomber

Counter
Terror/Irreg
Warfare

Deter/Defeat
Aggression

Power
Projection

Counter
WMD

X

X

X

Operate in
Cyberspace

Cold War
1947-1991

B-52, B-1

Cuban Missile
Crisis 1962

B-52

Vietnam War
1959-1975

B-52

Desert Storm
1991

B-52

X

X

X

Desert Fox 1998

B-52, B-1

X

X

X

Allied Force 1999

B-52, B-1, B-2

X

X

X

Afghanistan 2001present

B-52, B-1, B-2

X

X

X

X

Iraq 2003-2011

B-52, B-1, B-2

X

X

X

Nuclear
Deterrent

Stabilizing
Presence

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

Source: Prepared by CRS based on analysis of the historical use of bombers by the United States Air Force, 1947 to 2013.

CRS-7

Stability/
COIN
Operations

X
X

X

U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Forward Deployed Diplomacy: Continuous Bomber Presence and Worldwide
Power Projection
With the conclusion of U.S. military involvement in Iraq and U.S. forces drawing down in
Afghanistan, DOD has announced it intends to shift military capacity from the Middle East to the
Asia-Pacific region as part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing strategy. On multiple
occasions, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has stated DOD’s intent to begin rotating
B-1 bombers (which have been the only bomber participating in Operation Enduring Freedom
since May 2006) into the Asia-Pacific region to augment B-52s already on continuous rotation
there.19 This continuous rotation—referred to by the DOD as the Continuous Bomber Presence
(CBP)—is based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and represents a major investment in
ensuring U.S. security commitments in the Pacific.
Capable of reaching anywhere in the U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM’s) area of
responsibility with weapons ranging from conventional to nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, the CBP
is one way of reassuring allies of the U.S. commitment to their defense and deterring potential
adversaries in the region, including possibly China. The CBP can potentially send the signal that
no naval vessel can patrol the South China Sea and Pacific without coming under the reach of
land-based bombers. According to former Pacific Air Forces commander General Gary L. North,
“Chinese military writings talk a lot about how to extend their power to the second island chain
… the 1,800 mile [factor], which would enable them to prevent other nations’ ability to have
freedom of movement at that great range.”20 Invoking the lessons learned from the Pacific Theater
of World War II, the CBP, and long-range airpower projection in general, could be seen as an
essential complement in dealing with potential adversary naval forces.
Air Force Global Strike Command recently announced B-2s will begin regular worldwide
training deployments to each of the regional U.S. combatant commands’ areas of responsibility
starting in 2013.21 According to 8th Air Force Commander Major General Stephen Wilson, B-2s
will rotate to forward operating locations all over the world in small numbers for a few weeks at a
time, a set number of times a year beginning with a short Pacific deployment in 2013.22 The plan
calls for B-2 deployments to all the geographic combatant commands including those in Central
and South America, Southwest Asia, and Europe in addition to the Asia-Pacific.23 These
worldwide training deployments are an exercise in power projection and meant to demonstrate
U.S. commitments to allies in multiple regions of the world while providing a visible deterrent to
any potential U.S. adversary.
Military analysts point out that engaging in this type of “forward deployed diplomacy” with the
bomber force has the potential to influence the Asia-Pacific region beyond the near-term concern
19

Ashton B. Carter, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “The U.S. Strategic Rebalance to Asia: A Defense Perspective”
(speech, The Asia Society, New York, NY, August 1, 2012) and (address, remarks on China’s Military Challenge,
Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, DC, October 3, 2012).
20
Statement of General Gary L. North, former Pacific Air Forces Commander, in Rebecca Grant’s, “Bomber
Diplomacy,” Air Force Magazine, December 2011, 31.
21
Arie Church, “Spirit World Tour, Coming to a Theater Near You.” Air Force Magazine.com, November 9, 2012,
http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Pages/HomePage.aspx.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

of a rising China. Give the efforts by numerous Asian-Pacific states seeking to increase their
diplomatic, economic, and strategic influence in the region, the potential exists for a number of
regional players to acquire advanced military capabilities that could influence long-term U.S.
interests and/or threaten U.S. access to the region in the future. For example, North Korea’s
continuing efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capability, along with its nuclear
weapons program, represent a potential direct threat to the United States and threaten to
undermine regional security. South Korea, in an effort to offset its strategic vulnerabilities, has
undergone a vigorous procurement and acquisition of state-of-the-art weaponry and has invested
over $25 billion a year since 2006 on indigenous research and development programs for its local
defense industries.24 Japan, after years of watching its international influence eroded by a slowmotion economic decline, is attempting to raise its relevance in the region by offering military aid
to regional neighbors and by stepping up training and engagement activities by its own armed
forces in an effort to build regional alliances and shore up other countries’ defenses.25 India, who
until the recent global economic downturn possessed the second-fastest-growing economy in the
world, became the largest weapons importer in the world in March 2011. It is anticipated that
India will spend up to $80 billion on military modernization by 2015, and it is considered by
many analysts to be on the verge of attaining military superpower status.26 Indonesia, supported
by its military leadership and a $16.7 billion budget, is moving forward with a three-year plan to
strengthen and modernize its military arsenal to include $2.5 billion for 10 light frigates, $2
billion for four submarines, and $6 billion for the addition of Russian Sukhoi and U.S. F-16
fighters.27 Taiwan, who is falling rapidly behind the unprecedented Chinese military buildup over
the past decade, conducted tests of a new “carrier killer” anti-ship missile in late 2012. Thought to
be an advanced version of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, such a weapon could pose a
significant challenge to any naval vessel operating in the Taiwan Straits if developed in sufficient
numbers.28 The point being, there is no doubt that with the enormous amount of economic,
military, and political power concentrated in the Asia-Pacific region, the proliferation of A2/AD
weapon systems could impact the future of U.S. influence and capacity in the region, regardless
of who possesses such capabilities.
CBP rotations and regular B-2 deployments stand to play a long-term role in the United States’
ability to influence and project military power in the Asia-Pacific, provided bomber sustainment
and modernization efforts keep pace with current and evolving A2/AD military capabilities that
are becoming prevalent in the region. However, with such emphasis being placed on military
24

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, South Korea’s Unsustainable Military Build-Up, January 28, 2013,
http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/01/28/south-koreas-unsustainable-military-build-up-by-jeong-lee/.
25
Martin Fackler, Japan Is Flexing Its Military Muscle to Counter a Rising China (The New York Times, November 26,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/japan-expands-its-regional-military-role.html?pagewanted=all
26
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in March 2011 that India is now the largest
weapons importer in the world, receiving 9% of the volume of international arms transfers during the period 2006 to
2010. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India world’s largest arms importer according to new SIPRI
data on international arms transfers, March 14, 2011, http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2011/armstransfers,
and, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Current Issues No. 24: India’s Defense Spending and Military
Modernization (3/29/2011), http://csis.org/files/publication/110329_DIIG_Current_Issues_24_Indian_Defense_
Spending.pdf.
27
Michael Johnson, Indonesian Military Plans to Spend $16.7 Billion Through 2015, Asia Pacific Defense Forum,
October 22, 2012, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2012/10/22/indonesia-militaryspends
28
Harry Kazianis, To Counter China’s Military Build-up, Taiwan Must Go Asymmetric, World Politics Review,
November 29, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12529/to-counter-chinas-military-build-up-taiwanmust-go-asymmetric.

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modernization by many of the major states in the region, it is hard to predict what the strategic
and military landscape of the Asia-Pacific will look like in 20 or 30 years. Such a time frame
could potentially see the B-52, B-1, and B-2 still in service; if so, they will be expected to be
effective weapon systems if employed.

Meeting the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Challenge
A major challenge in meeting the goals of the Administration’s new strategy is the rising
prevalence of 21st century anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats. Anti-access refers to those
adversary actions and capabilities, usually employed from long ranges, designed to prevent an
opposing force entry to an operational area by restricting its access to the global commons (sea,
air, space, and cyberspace). Area denial refers to those adversary actions and capabilities, usually
of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action
within an operational area.29 Although not a new concept, A2/AD is a rising concern due to the
proliferation of technology that places precise, long-range weapons in the hands of potential foes.
Such weapons include ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air defense systems, anti-ship
missiles, submarines, guided rockets, missiles and artillery, 4th- and 5th-generation combat
aircraft, and space and cyber warfare capabilities. Many of these A2/AD threats are specifically
designed to challenge the U.S. military’s power projection capabilities and potentially threaten
U.S. access to key areas of strategic interest both in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.
The U.S. military addresses the A2/AD challenge in its Joint Operational Access Concept
(JOAC). Although not enemy- or region-specific, JOAC describes how joint forces will operate in
response to the emerging A2/AD threat. Its central idea hinges on the joint forces’ ability to
leverage cross-domain synergy—the complementary employment of military capabilities across
the sea, air, land, space, and cyberspace domains that enhances the effectiveness of military
operations and compensates for any known weaknesses in U.S. capabilities.30 The Air Force and
Navy have embraced cross-domain synergy and have codified their approach to the A2/AD
challenge in their Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC). ASBC seeks to achieve interoperability
between air and naval forces that can execute networked, integrated attacks, in-depth, to disrupt,
destroy, and defeat an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities.31 ASBC and the idea of cross-domain
synergy as an answer to the A2/AD challenge have very real implications for the modernization
and operational employment of the bomber force; primarily, modernization and sustainment
efforts should equip the bomber force with the capabilities necessary to operate in the extreme-,
high-, and low-risk denied regions of the 21st century A2/AD environment.

29

Department of Defense, “Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC),” Version 1.0, November 22, 2011, p. i.
Ibid., p. ii.
31
General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF and Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN, “Air-Sea Battle: Promoting Stability
in an Era of Uncertainty,” (The American Interest, February 20, 2012), http://www.the-american-interest.com/
article.cfm?piece=1212. Stated another way, ASBC seek to integrate and take advantage of the differing capabilities
afforded by a diverse joint force (air, ground and naval forces), armed with the latest in resilient communications
(networked), in order to target and strike (integrated attack) multiple enemy targets and systems (attack-in-depth) that
will reduce or eliminate an enemy’s A2/AD capability thus enabling the U.S. military to operate freely in what was
previously, a highly defended area.
30

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Figure 1. Joint Operational Access and Air-Sea Battle Concept

Source: Pentagon briefing, Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, subject: Air-Sea Battle: A Primer (lecture, USAF Fellowship Orientation, Pentagon),
July 31, 2012.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Environment
One of the objectives of an A2/AD adversary is to establish what the military terms extreme-risk
geographic zones in order to deny any advantage to U.S. forces operating in them. In extreme-risk
zones, only the most capable, low-signature (stealthy) forces maintain the ability to survive and
operate effectively using self-defense systems, maneuver and, in some cases, additional support
to do so.32 Due to its stealth and self-defense capabilities, the B-2 is the most capable bomber able
to operate in the extreme-risk zone.
In high-risk zones, the majority of U.S. high-signature (non-stealthy) forces require significant
defense support. For the bombers, this means their defensive countermeasures and maneuvers
will be effective if assisted by mutually supporting forces, but on their own, they may be
operationally ineffective and limited.33 The U.S. bombers most capable of operating in the highrisk zone are the B-2 (because of its stealth and self-defense capabilities) and the B-1 given its
speed, maneuverability, low-altitude flying capability, and electronic self-defense capabilities.
In the low-risk zone—usually found at extended ranges from the adversary’s borders—all U.S.
forces can generally operate freely, although the adversary can potentially still pose a threat. The
B-1 and B-52 are quite capable of operating in low-risk zones and would most likely employ their
arsenal of long-range, standoff cruise missiles (the B-2 does not carry long-range stand-off cruise
missiles). In the overall Air-Sea Battle Concept, higher-signature forces—such as the B-1 and B52—would be teamed with low-signature forces as required—such as the stealthy F-22 fighter—
in order to enhance the effectiveness and compensate for the vulnerabilities of each platform.
Nevertheless, the challenge is that the Air Force’s legacy bombers could have increasing
difficulty operating in A2/AD environments without more modern systems and weapons
capabilities.

32

Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, “Air-Sea Battle: A Primer,” (lecture, USAF Fellowship
Orientation, Pentagon), July 31, 2012.
33
Ibid.

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Figure 2. Legacy Bomber Employment in an A2/AD Operating Environment
UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED

A2/AD Operating Environment
Networked

SPACE DOMAIN

Integrated

Attack in Depth

Commercial
Communications

Coalition
Command &
Control

Disrupt

Destroy

Defeat

Military / Gov’t
Command & Control

Links

Military / Gov’t
Early Warning
Links
Voice

CYBERSPACE

Voice

Comms

Comms

Systems

Adversary Command
& Control

Systems
Command & Control

AIR DOMAIN

Includes Adversary
Anti-Access/Area Denial
Strategies
LAND DOMAIN

MARITIME DOMAIN

Permissive
(Low Risk)

Contested
(High Risk)

UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

Highly Contested
(Extreme Risk)

Source: Pentagon briefing, Mr. William Dries, Air Force Air-Sea Battle Team, subject: Air-Sea Battle: A Primer (lecture, USAF Fellowship Orientation, Pentagon)
July 31, 2012.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Nuclear Deterrent Operations
Under DOD’s strategic guidance, maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
remains a primary mission for U.S. Armed Forces. Its guidance is coherent with and builds on the
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which states, “Until such time as the Administration’s
goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a
core mission of the Department of Defense.”34 Relevant to the bomber force, the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) reaffirmed the enduring contributions and viability of the nuclear strike
capabilities of the B-52 and the B-2 in accomplishing the nuclear deterrent mission (the B-1 is no
longer nuclear capable).35
Proponents argue three principal reasons for retaining and modernizing nuclear-capable, or, more
accurately, dual-capable B-52 and B-2 bombers. First, an air-delivered nuclear capability provides
a rapid and direct hedge against technical challenges with the other legs of the nuclear triad as
well as geopolitical uncertainties.36
Second, nuclear-capable bombers are important to extended deterrence of potential attacks on
U.S. allies and partners. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers can be visibly forward deployed, thereby
signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in a crisis.
Finally, not only is the LRS-B not anticipated to start flight testing until the mid-2020s, it is also
yet to be determined if it will initially be nuclear capable once it does. Former Chief of Staff of
the Air Force General Norton Schwartz testified before Congress in November 2011 that the new
LRS-B will be built with nuclear capability but will operate as a conventional strike aircraft
initially. He stressed that although the aircraft will be designed and built with all the hardware for
both nuclear and conventional missions from the outset, “Deferring the new aircraft’s nuclear
certification until the B-52 and B-2 start to retire would help the service manage costs.”37
However, in response to General Schwartz’s testimony, language in the 2013 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 112-239) stipulates the next-generation LRS-B will be “capable of
carrying strategic nuclear weapons as of the date on which such aircraft achieves initial operating
capability” and will be “certified to use such weapons by not later than two years after such date.”
If the nation wishes to maintain an air-delivered nuclear capability, as stated in the 2010 QDR and
NPR, it is unclear whether the B-52 and B-2 will be the only air-delivery option in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal until the 2030s or whether the LRS-B can be expected to start filling that role in
the late 2020s.

34

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: February 2010), vi.
Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: April 2010), 24.
36
The U.S. nuclear triad includes the long-range nuclear-capable bomber force (76, B-52s and 20, B-2s), 450
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and 14 Ohio Class submarines capable of launching 24
Trident II submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) each. Unlike ICBMs and submarine—which are designed to
remain hidden from view of an adversary—the bomber fleet offers a visible way of conveying U.S. resolve. For
example, the president could order the nation’s B-52s and B-2s on alert, put them in the air, and/or deploy them to
forward bases thus providing a visible sign of U.S. resolve with the intent of de-escalating tensions. Many analysts
agree that the visible presence of bombers provides the U.S. an effective tool for overtly demonstrating resolve.
37
David Majumdar, “Schwartz: New Bomber Not Nuke-Capable at First,” Air Force Times Online, November 2, 2011,
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/11/dn-air-force-new-bomber-nuclear-capable-11-211/.
35

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Impact on Bombers
In accordance with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (NST) signed in April 2010, the
United States and Russia plan on reducing and limiting ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and
SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear
armaments. Seven years after entry into force of the treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers,
as counted in accordance with Article II section one of the treaty, will not exceed 700 for
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Also, the total numbers will
not exceed 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed
SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.38 The United States retains the
right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.39
Consequently, the February 2011 entry-into-force of the New START drives the United States to
convert a number of nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to a conventional-only role. Although a final
force structure decision has not been made to reflect the requirements of New START, Air Force
Global Strike Command (AFGSC) recommended a preferred course of action in the FY13
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and funded through the future years defense program
(FYDP).40 The New START drives no change to the configuration of B-2 force numbers.
In her statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Ms. Madelyn Creedon,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, provided testimony on the need for
bomber sustainment and modernization in the context of implementing the New Start Treaty:
The United States will maintain two nuclear capable B-52H strategic bomber wings and one
B-2A wing. Both bombers, however, are aging and sustainment and modernization funding
will have to be provided to ensure they remain operationally effective through the remainder
of their service lives. Funding has been allocated to upgrade these platforms; for example, to
provide the B-2A with survivable communications, a more modern flight control system, and
a new radar. The B-52 will also need various upgrades including for its bomb bay and
survivable communications. These modernization and sustainment programs are needed to
maintain the effectiveness of the current bomber force until the introduction of a new longrange bomber.41

Existing U.S. Bomber Force
The Air Force’s existing bomber fleet includes 76 B-52H bombers, 63 supersonic B-1B bombers,
and 20 B-2 stealth bombers. Table 2 summarizes the three types of aircraft. Additional
information on the existing bomber force is presented in Appendix A.

38

For in-depth analysis of the New START Treaty, see CRS Report R41219, The New START Treaty: Central Limits
and Key Provisions, by (name redacted).
39
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8, 2010.
40
Air Force Global Strike Command, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, p 19.
41
Testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, in Senate, Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress, 2nd Session., June 21, 2012.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Table 2. Current U.S. Air Force Bomber Force
B-52H

B-1B

B-2

Number in inventory

76

63a

20

Number combat ready

44

36

16

First flight

1954

1984

1988

Last delivery

1962

1988

1997

Unrefueled range

8,800

7,455

6,000+

Payload

70,000

75,000

40,000+

Crew

5

4

2

Mach .86

Mach 1.2 (sea level)

High Subsonic

Max speed

Source: Prepared by CRS based on Air Force Almanac, May 2012 and U.S. Air Force B-52, B-1, and B-2 Fact
Sheets.
a.

Three B-1s were retired as requested by the U.S. Air Force in their 2012 budget request and in accordance
with direction put forth in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81).

B-52H Stratofortress42
Figure 3. B-52H Stratofortress

Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-52 Stratofortress Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).

The B-52 is currently the USAF’s only nuclear bomber capable of employing long-range standoff
weapons. It serves both as a nuclear and conventional bomber. It first entered operational service
on June 29, 1955. The B-52’s original service life expectancy was approximately 5,000 hours or
approximately 20 years depending on severity of the flying environment. Of the 744 various
42
Information in this section is taken from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-52 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012,
Air Force Almanac, May 2012, and U.S. Air Force B-52 Fact Sheet, December 4, 2012, http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=83.

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model B-52s built, 76 B-52H models remain in service today. The B-52H first entered service on
May 9, 1961, with operational aircraft currently stationed at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and
Minot AFB, North Dakota. The B-52’s life expectancy has been extended beyond original
expectations through numerous modernization efforts. It is now projected to be sustainable into
2040 based on projected average flying hours and severity of the flying environment.
The B-52H program’s challenge is to continue sustainment activities and maintain combat
effectiveness against the nation’s adversaries until the platform is retired, and to approach
modernization efforts effectively by recognizing capability gaps, prioritizing valid requirements,
and investing in material solutions that meet platform and war fighter needs. As plans for
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization move forward, some argue the B-52 enterprise
should be prepared to make required programmatic and operational adjustments in step with
changes in platform mission taskings and operational plans. The B-52’s strengths lie in its diverse
capabilities, precision, large payload, and long range; however, if these capabilities remain static,
mission effectiveness is likely to erode in the face of 21st century A2/AD threats.

Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts43
The following is a list of B-52 sustainment and modernization initiatives in the program of record
(POR) that are either just being completed or are currently in progress. Additional information on
each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and modernization
efforts, can be found in the B-52’s Master Plan summarized in Appendix B.
•

Combat network communications technology (CONECT)

•

Military-standard-1760 modernization

•

B-52 trainer upgrades

•

Arms control activities under the New START

•

Mode S/5 identification friend or foe (IFF)

•

Low cost modifications

•

B-52 anti-skid replacement

•

B-52 modernization research development test and evaluation efforts

•

1760 internal weapons bay upgrade (IWBU)

Table 3 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-52 procurement and B-52 research, development,
test, and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-52 sustainment and modernization
programs.

43

Information for current B-52 sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.

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Table 3. Current B-52 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
(in millions of dollars)
Total Cost
All Prior
Yrs

Total
Cost
FY2011

Total Cost
FY2012

Total
Cost
FY2013

Total
Cost
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

Total Cost
FY2016

Total
Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total
Cost

B-52 CONECT

8.971

6.416

82.531

0.000

0.000

17.519

25.604

23.298

2.543

166.882

MIL-STD-1760

0.000

11.541

0.000

3.238

30.983

6.690

0.000

0.000

0.000

52.452

B-52 Trainers

0.000

2.180

1.656

1.482

1.836

2.375

2.431

2.472

0.000

14.432

B-52 Structures

0.000

0.000

0.100

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.100

System Effectiveness
and Evolutionary
Requirements

0.000

0.000

0.100

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.100

Arms Control
Activities

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.500

0.203

0.102

0.203

0.000

1.008

Mode S/5 IFF

0.000

0.000

8.725

0.000

9.590

12.357

2.557

0.000

0.000

33.229

Low Cost Mods

1.646

0.821

0.785

0.435

0.019

0.604

0.453

0.460

0.000

5.223

B-52 Anti-Skid
Replacement

0.000

0.000

0.000

4.626

6.737

6.011

0.915

0.930

0.000

19.219

Total Cost
FY2011

Total Cost
FY2012

Total Cost Total Cost
FY2013
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

Total Cost
FY2016

Total Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total
Cost

129.864

93.808

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Continuing

Procurement Items

RDT&E Items
Misc. B-52
Modernization
RDT&E Efforts

0.065

1760 Internal Wpns
Bay Upgrade

16.490

Mode S/5 IFF

1.202

B-52 CONECT

34.700

B-52 Anti-Skid

0.751

11.373

29.800

5.653

3.901

Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.

CRS-18

U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

B-1B Lancer44
Figure 4. B-1B Lancer

Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-1B Lancer Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).

The B-1B Lancer was developed by Rockwell International, now Boeing Defense and Space
Group, and became operational in 1986. The B-1B was originally designed to serve as a lowaltitude Cold War supersonic bomber. Its low radar cross-section, variable-geometry wings,
avionics, and afterburning engines made it less vulnerable than the B-52 to enemy surface-to-air
missiles and fighter aircraft. However, following the end of the Cold War, the Air Force ended the
B-1’s nuclear mission in 1992 and began the aircraft’s transition to conventional-only weapons
capability. The Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) transformed the B-1B into a
conventional-only bomber capable of employing the latest in conventional weapons to include
Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided Joint Directed Attack Munitions (JDAM) and longrange standoff Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missiles (JASSM). The B-1B has the largest internal
payload of any current bomber. However, many of the systems on the B-1 are original equipment
and suffer from diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortfalls that impact reliability,
availability, and maintainability.
One hundred B-1Bs were initially built, of which 63 remain in service. The fleet operates from
Dyess AFB, Texas (35 aircraft), and Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota (28 aircraft). It possesses
diverse capabilities: large precision payload, range, speed, and endurance; however, if these
capabilities remain static, mission effectiveness may erode in the face of 21st century A2/AD
threats. The B-1B is expected to be in service until 2040.

44

Information in this section taken from Air Combat Command’s, B-1 Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP),
May 10, 2012; CRS Report RL34406, Air Force Next-Generation Bomber: Background and Issues for Congress, by
(name redacted); Air Force Almanac, May 2012; and U.S. Air Force B-1 Fact Sheet, May 21, 2012, http://www.af.mil/
information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=81.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts45
The following is a list of B-1 sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the program
of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in progress. Additional
information on each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and
modernization efforts, can be found in the B-1’s Strategic Action and Investment Plan (SAIP)
summarized in Appendix C.
•

Fully integrated data link

•

Simulator digital control loading

•

Central integrated test system

•

Inertial navigation system replacement

•

Radar improvement upgrade

•

Visual situation display upgrade

•

Self-contained attitude indicator

•

Gyro stabilization system replacement (GSSR)

•

B-1 training support

•

Digital communications

•

B-1 Link 16 cryptographic materials

•

Laptop controlled targeting pod

•

Low cost mods

•

Miscellaneous B-1 modernization research, development, test, and evaluation
efforts

Table 4 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-1 procurement and B-1 research, development,
test ,and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-1 sustainment and modernization
programs.

45

Information for current B-1B sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.

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Table 4. Current B-1 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
(in millions of dollars)
Total Cost
FY2011

Total Cost
FY2012

Total Cost
FY2013

Total Cost
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

Total Cost
FY2016

Total Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total
Cost

Fully Integrated Data Link

52.956

58.874

57.073

48.234

37.241

50.017

51.539

97.943

453.877

Simulator Digital
Control Loading

0.000

0.000

2.700

2.800

2.937

0.000

0.000

0.000

8.437

CITS Upgrade

20.933

15.683

17.549

17.834

13.895

16.914

17.054

50.052

169.914

Inertial Navigation System

17.000

35.999

21.447

19.192

2.231

0.000

0.000

0.000

95.869

Radar Improvement Upgrade

59.126

44.302

10.512

1.692

2.586

0.242

0.000

0.000

175.091

Vertical Situation Displays

27.086

33.872

34.429

36.322

29.932

41.621

42.406

107.234

352.902

Self-Contained
Attitude Indicator

0.000

0.000

0.000

1.700

2.025

1.835

1.730

1.367

8.657

Gyro Stabilization System

8.735

4.476

4.526

4.153

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

64.721

B-1 Training Supt

0.394

0.301

0.269

0.333

0.431

0.442

0.450

0.000

3.005

Digital Comms

5.257

1.600

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

34.348

B-1 Link 16 Crypto

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.221

0.325

0.089

0.000

0.000

0.635

Laptop Controlled
Targeting Pod

4.882

1.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

67.658

Low Cost Mods

1.114

1.900

1.251

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

4.277

Total Cost
FY2011

Total Cost
FY2012

Total Cost
FY2013

Total Cost
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

Total Cost
FY2016

Total Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total
Cost

33.063

33.011

16.265

19.589

11.453

0.087

Continuing

Continuing

Procurement Items

RDT&E Items
Misc. B-1 Modernization
RDT&E Efforts

Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

B-2A Spirit46
Figure 5. B-2A Spirit

Source: U.S. Air Force official website, B-2 Spirit Factsheet (http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/).

The B-2A is the only long-range, penetrating low observable (LO) bomber operated by the U.S.
Air Force. It serves as both a conventional and nuclear bomber. The aircraft entered service in
December 1993 and is based solely at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. It achieved initial operational
capability (IOC) in April 1997 and achieved full operational capability (FOC) on December 17,
2003. A total procurement of 132 B-2s was envisioned. However, following the Cold War, the
number was reduced to 75, and then to 20. Congress added one more by providing funding to
convert one of the test vehicles into a combat aircraft, for a total of 21, but a B-2 was lost in a
crash during takeoff at Andersen AFB, Guam, in February 2008, reducing the total number to 20.
Its payload weight is more limited than those of the B-1 or B-52. Originally fielded in Block 10
configuration, the current fleet is Block 30.47 Each block upgrade improved stealth characteristics,
expanded weapons employment options, and improved offensive and defensive avionics. Its
preeminent capabilities are precision, range, and stealth.
The B-2 currently experiences parts obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources. The B2 is also impacted by aging support and test equipment. For the first time since the B-2 aircraft
became fully operational capable, the weapon system’s survivability is in question in the face of
advancing 21st century A2/AD threats. The B-2A’s projected service-life goal is 2058.

Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts48
The following is a list of B-2 sustainment and modernization initiatives currently in the program
of record (POR) that are either just completing or are currently in progress. Additional
46

Information in this section taken from Air Force Global Strike Command’s, B-2 Bomber Master Plan, June 2012, Air
Force Almanac, May 2012, and U.S. Air Force B-2 Fact Sheet, April 23, 2010, http://www.af.mil/information/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=82.
47
Block refers to essential upgrades to the same model aircraft. Throughout the life of an aircraft, advances in
technology create opportunities to upgrade aircraft beyond their original design. This is referred to as a Block upgrade.
48
Information for current B-1B sustainment and modernization efforts derived from justification books for Air Force
procurement accounts and Air Force research, development test and evaluation accounts for FY2013 and prior years.

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information on each effort, as well as information on short-term and long-term sustainment and
modernization efforts, can be found in the B-2’s Master Plan summarized in Appendix D.
•

Extremely high frequency satellite communications (EHF SATCOM) and
computer upgrade program

•

Massive ordnance penetrator integration

•

Low observable signature and supportability modifications (LOSSM) diagnostics

•

B-2 trainer system upgrade

•

Link-16/center instrument display/in-flight re-planner (CID/IFR)

•

Radar modernization program (RMP)

•

Low observable signature and supportability modifications (LOSSM) program
structures/materials

•

Defensive management system modernization (DMS-M)

•

Stores management operational flight program (SMOFP) re-host and mixed
carriage modification

•

Common very-low frequency receiver (CVR Increment 1)

•

Low-cost engine modifications

•

Low-cost modifications

•

B-2 modernization research, development, test, and evaluation efforts

•

Baseline B-2 support

Table 5 is the FY2013 budget submission for B-2 procurement and B-2 research, development,
test, and evaluation programs derived from Air Force budget justification books. It summarizes
prior-year and estimated future-year expenditures for B-2 sustainment and modernization
programs.

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Table 5. Current B-2 Sustainment and Modernization Efforts
(in millions of dollars)
Procurement Items

Total Cost
All Prior Yrs

Total Cost Total Cost
FY2011
FY2012

Total Cost
FY2013

Total Cost
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

EHF SATCOM and Computers

705.523

27.033

29.501

65.037

7.469

8.373

Massive Ordnance Penetrator
Integration

14.887

7.453

0.000

7.000

0.000

LOSSM-Diagnostics

0.000

0.000

0.000

2.044

B-2 Trainer System Upgrade

32.331

0.000

0.000

Link 16/CID/IFR

92.446

0.000

Radar System Modification

530.378

LOS and Support Modifications

Total Cost
FY2016

Total Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total Cost

0.000

0.000

0.000

110.380

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

29.340

0.741

2.405

2.638

2.131

0.000

9.959

4.038

5.006

6.477

6.630

7.776

0.000

62.258

0.000

0.000

0.140

0.100

0.060

0.000

0.000

92.746

8.315

1.210

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

539.903

30.135

16.120

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

46.255

Defensive Management System

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

310.933

310.933

LOSSM Structures

0.000

0.000

3.304

2.895

4.089

4.659

4.740

4.901

0.000

21.588

LOSSM Materials

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.516

0.901

1.230

1.430

1.920

0.000

5.997

SMOFP Rehost

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

12.100

8.900

0.000

21.000

Common Very Low Frequency
Terminal

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

59.170

12.709

71.879

Low Cost Engine Modifications

6.082

0.599

0.000

0.383

1.631

1.650

1.690

1.718

0.000

13.753

Low Cost Modifications

14.151

1.999

0.000

0.383

2.585

2.615

2.681

2.723

0.000

27.137

Total Cost
FY2017

Cost To
Complete

Total Cost

B-52 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation: Operational Systems Development
RDT&E Items
B-2 Modernization RDT&E

Total Cost
FY2011

Total Cost
FY2012

Total Cost
FY2013

Total Cost
FY2014

Total Cost
FY2015

Total Cost
FY2016

244.732

27.135

21.759

101.808

101.493

34.544

19.001

Continuing

Continuing

Baseline Support

0.000

9.523

7.875

14.336

16.012

14.032

14.218

Continuing

Continuing

EHF SATCOM and Computer

0.000

202.534

6.336

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Continuing

Continuing

Defensive Management System

0.000

41.127

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

Continuing

Continuing

Source: Prepared by CRS based on justification books for Air Force procurement accounts and Air Force research, development, test, and evaluation accounts for
FY2013 and prior years.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Issues for Congress
Potential for Inducing a Shortfall in Long-Range
Strike Capabilities
As the bomber force continues to age and shrink, and development of the LRS-B continues, a
potential oversight issue for Congress is whether failure to sustain and modernize the Air Force’s
legacy bomber fleet will induce a shortfall in the nation’s long-range strike capabilities.
Consistent with prior administrations, the Obama Administration’s strategic guidance requires a
long-range, deep strike capability that is effective in the face of A2/AD threats and is not
constrained by the lack of overseas basing. In addition, under the New START treaty, nuclearcapable heavy bombers could continue to make up one-third of the U.S. nuclear triad along with
ICBMs and SLBMs.49 With only 20 B-2s, the recent retirement of three B-1s, and the conversion
of a yet-to-be-determined number of B-52s to conventional-only roles, the potential exists for the
total number of bombers to fall below the level necessary to fulfill long-range strike
requirements. Currently, the DOD and the Air Force plan on a bomber force of approximately 156
aircraft out to at least 2022 (see Table 6, below). However, with $487 billion of defense cuts over
the next 10 years as a result of the Budget Control Act of 2011, the potential for additional budget
constraints, and changing defense strategies, these numbers are subject to change. Furthermore,
the potential for shortfall in long-range strike capabilities does not simply lie in the sheer number
of legacy bombers in service.
The more pressing oversight issue is the “capability” of the legacy bomber force. That is, can the
legacy bomber force meet the national security challenges posed by the growing number of
potential A2/AD-equipped adversaries? The ability of the current bomber force to bridge a
potential long-range strike capabilities gap may depend upon the feasibility and cost effectiveness
of sustainment and modernization programs that will make these weapon systems viable in the
21st century A2/AD environment while extending their service lives until the LRS-B becomes
operational in the late 2020s.
Many analysts argue that the Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is another, highly flexible
alternative to the bomber and is capable of filling the nation’s long-range strike needs. Indeed, the
aircraft carrier’s ability to dominate the seas and launch its aircraft without the need for a forward
airbase is without question a valuable strategic asset. However, the relatively limited amount of
fuel carried by naval fighters limits their ability to penetrate deeply into enemy territory without
assistance from Air Force tankers.50 Without tanker support, the strategic reach of naval fighters is
limited to the coastal areas of any potential adversary. Furthermore, compared to a bomber, the
weapons load out capability of carrier-based aircraft is limited thus potentially requiring multiple
49

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010, p 19.
A good example of the challenges faced by carrier aviation is carrier operations during the early stages of Operations
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001. Aircraft carriers operating out of the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea supplied most
of the fighter sorties performing close air support and strike missions as well as supporting airlift and bomber missions
during the first few months of the Afghanistan campaign. However, the “short legs” of the naval fighters limited how
far north into Afghanistan they could fly. Those naval fighters that did make it further north relied on Air Force tankers
(as did many of the other platforms operating in Afghanistan) for multiple refueling and arrived at their tasking with
very limited time-on-station and ordinance.
50

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aircraft in order to service a single target. Finally, there is also a potential concern over the
carrier’s survivability and ability to operate in an A2/AD environment. The primary goal of an
adversary employing an anti-access strategy is to deny an outside country the ability to project
power into a region. One way of doing this is with anti-ship weapons. Weapons systems such as
submarines, China’s version of the SS-N-22, SS-N-27, and DF-21D, and Iranian small-boat
swarm tactics are all potential threats that could push a carrier task force even further out to sea,
thus potentially increasing the range at which naval aviation must travel. Although most analysts
will agree the aircraft carrier is an essential element in U.S. long-range strike capabilities, carrier
aviation may be seen as complementary to and not taking the place of the much more powerful
and flexible long-range bomber. While both capabilities are long-range, they are not necessarily
fungible in their military utility.
Table 6. DOD Aviation Long Range Strike Aircraft Inventory
(Includes B-52H, B-1B, and B-2)
(FY2013-FY2022)
Inventory

FY12

FY13

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

FY21

FY22

Long Range
Strike

159

158

157

156

156

156

156

156

155

154

Source: Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013-2042,
March 2012, p. 8.

Will Current Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization
Plans Get Us to the LRS-B?
Another possible oversight issue for Congress will be the feasibility and affordability of Air Force
bomber sustainment and modernization programs and whether those programs bridge any
potential capabilities gap until the LRS-B becomes operational. Congress requested such
oversight information in the FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383),
specifically requesting a report discussing “the cost, schedule, and performance of all planned
efforts to modernize and keep viable the existing B-1, B-2, and B-52 bomber fleets and a
discussion of the forecasted service-life and all sustainment challenges that the Secretary of the
Air Force may confront in keeping those platforms viable until the anticipated retirement of such
aircraft.” This report was submitted to Congress in September 2011. The information in this
report is also contained in Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) and Air Combat
Command’s (ACC’s) master plan documents for the B-52 and B-2 (AFGSC) and the B-1 (ACC).
Updated on an annual basis, these master plans outline each command’s plans, programs,
requirements, and strategic vision for each platform to meet national security objectives. The
plans also identify timeframes, outline capability needs, and describe the force and technologies
needed for continued system effectiveness and viability while providing guidance on long-range
sustainment, modernization, and recapitalization needs.
The 2012 updates to these plans take into consideration President Obama’s Asia-Pacific rebalance
and DOD strategic direction. Primarily, the plans state that without sufficient sustainment and
modernization funding, each weapon system’s survivability is at risk in the face of 21st century
A2/AD threats. Appendices B thru D provide summaries of each bomber’s sustainment and
modernization master plans.

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To Fund or Not to Fund: What Are DOD and Air Force Priorities?
The DOD is challenged with reducing defense spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years,
notwithstanding the possibility of further cuts through possible sequestration. At the same time,
the DOD’s priorities require continued modernization of aging capabilities to address the
proliferation of modern A2/AD threats in that the DOD and Air Force plan on the B-52, B-,1 and
B-2 to operate well into the 2030s, especially in the global strike and nuclear deterrent roles.51
According to DOD’s Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan for FY2013-FY2042:
The enduring need for long-range attack capabilities will be met by a combination of current
and future aircraft and weapons systems. The current fleet of Air Force bombers continues to
be modernized so that it can retain long range strike capabilities through the 2030s.52
The FY12 PB (Presidential Budget) initiated development of the Long-Range Strike-Bomber
(LRS-B), a key component of the LRS Family of Systems.... The current goal is to achieve
an initial capability in the mid-2020s, and to hold down the unit cost to ensure sufficient
production (80 to 100 aircraft) and a sustainable bomber inventory over the long term.
Meanwhile, the Department will invest in upgrades to the B-2 bomber to enhance its
effectiveness and survivability as well as modernize the B-52 fleet with new visual displays
and increased weapons storage capacity. The Air Force also continues to modernize the B-1
and address sustainability issues to ensure the overall health and continued viability of the B1 fleet.53

51
Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012
(Washington, DC).
52
Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013-2042, p. 8.
53
Ibid. (pdf page 21).

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Figure 6. DOD Planned Long Range Strike Inventories and Funding
(Includes B-52H, B-1B and B-2)
(FY2013-FY2022)

Source: Department of Defense, Annual Aviation Inventory and Funding Plan: Fiscal Years (FY) 2013–2042,
March 2012, p. 21.

The Air Force’s 2012 Posture Statement presented to the House Armed Services Committee
suggests funding legacy bomber modernization is a priority given the rise of A2/AD threats.
The Air Force’s ability to conduct global strike—to hold any target on the globe at risk—will
be of growing importance in the coming decade. Our conventional strike forces [bombers]
compose a significant portion of the Nation’s deterrent capability, providing national leaders
with a range of crisis response and escalation control options. Our [U.S. Air Force] nuclear
deterrent forces provide two-thirds of the Nation’s nuclear triad competently forming the
foundation of global stability and underwriting our national security and that of our allies.
However, increasingly sophisticated air defenses and long-range missile threats require a
focused modernization effort exemplified by the long-range strike family of systems.54

The posture statement goes on to emphasize that, within the Air Force core functions of Global
Precision Attack and Nuclear Deterrence Operations:
We [the U.S. Air Force] are modernizing conventional bombers to sustain capability while
investing in the Long-Range Strike Family of systems. The bomber fleet was retained at its
current size because we recognized the importance of long range strike in the current and
54

Department of the U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2013 Air Force Posture Statement, Presentation to the Committee on
Armed Services United States House of Representatives, February 28, 2012. pp. 4, 5.

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future security environments. The Air Force is enhancing long range strike capabilities by
upgrading the B-2 fleet with an improved Defensive Management System (DMS) and a new
survivable communications system, and is increasing conventional precision guided weapon
capacity within the B-52 fleet. We are investing $191.4 million in modernizing the B-1 to
prevent obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing sources issues and to help sustain the
B-1 to its approximate 2040 service life.55

According to the U.S. Air Force’s FY2013 Budget Overview:
The Air Force will continue bomber modernization and sustainment efforts, to include the B2 Defensive Management systems program, the B-2 Very Low Frequency/Low Frequency
communications program, and the B-52 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrades.56
With the February 2011 entry-into-force of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ... the
FY 2013 Budget Request funds compliance activity and force reduction options to meet the
central limits of the treaty. These include ... the conversion of some B-52Hs from nuclearcapable to conventional-only capability.57
In addition to the development of LRS-B (Long-Range Strike-Bomber), the Air Force will
continue to modernize the B-1B to ensure the fleet remains viable until recapitalization can
be accomplished. The FY2013 Budget Request includes the continuation of the B-1
Integrated Battle Station contract which concurrently procures and installs Vertical situation
display Upgrade (VSDU), Central Integrated Test System (CITS), and Fully Integrated Data
Link (FIDL). VSDU and CITS each address obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing
sources for the B-1 fleet. FIDL provides both the electronic backbone for VSDU and CITS,
as well as a capability enhancement of line-of-sight/beyond line-of-sight Link 16
communications. In addition, the FY2013 Budget Request includes upgrades to flight and
maintenance training devices to ensure continued sustainability and common configuration
with the aircraft fleet. These initiatives will help bridge the gap until the next generation
long-range strike aircraft is operational.58

As Legacy Bombers Phase Out, Are 80-100 LRS-Bs Sufficient?
As the legacy bomber force begins phasing out of service (planned for some time in the mid2020s thru the 2040s), Congress may want to reevaluate Air Force acquisition plans for the LRSB to ensure a sufficient backfill of U.S. long-range strike capabilities that meet the requirements
of national security objectives. The Air Force and Congress may consider how to balance
modernization and sustainment efforts for all three legacy bombers with their gradual phase-out
while ensuring a sufficient number of LRS-Bs are produced to minimize the effects of any
potential long-range strike capability gap during the transition.
Directly tied to this phase-out/phase-in process will be a final determination by Congress as to the
final number of LRS-Bs ultimately produced. Current Air Force plans call for 80-100 LRS-Bs.
However, since the 1970s, the number of new combat aircraft actually produced in a given
program has rarely come close to the number of aircraft originally planned. In the original 1969
55

Ibid., p. 16.
Department of the U.S. Air Force, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Overview, prepared by the Secretary of the Air Force
Office of Financial Management and Budget, February 3, 2012, p. 35.
57
Ibid., p 36.
58
Ibid., p 50.
56

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stated requirement, the Air Force planned a production run of 250 B-1A bombers as a
replacement for the “then aging” B-52. However, the program was canceled by President Jimmy
Carter in 1977; political support for the B-1A waned due to reduced military spending following
the Vietnam War and problems within the B-1A program itself. After being revived by President
Reagan in 1981, the eventual 100 B-1Bs that were built were the result of an Air Force proposal
that split the original 250 B-1As envisioned between 100 B-1Bs and 132 B-2 stealth bombers.
Thus, the original 1981 B-2 contract proposed to acquire as many as 132 B-2s. That number was
subsequently trimmed to 75 after the end of the Cold War and ultimately only 21 B-2s were built
after the program was cancelled in 1991. In fighter aircraft, the Air Force originally sought to
acquire 381 F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighters in 2006. However, the resulting high cost of the
aircraft ($150 million in FY2009 dollars), a U.S. ban on exports, and the ongoing development of
the potentially cheaper and more versatile F-35 resulted in only 195 aircraft built (8 test aircraft
and 187 combat aircraft). Currently, the Air Force plans on acquiring 1,763 of the new F-35
Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. It is yet to be determined if that number will withstand the
effects of reductions in defense spending.
Acquisition of anything less than the planned 80-100 LRS-Bs can be expected to drive
corresponding modernization and sustainment decisions for the legacy bomber fleet, resulting in
further life-extension programs and possibly impacting U.S. long-range strike capabilities,
especially in the face of A2/AD equipped adversaries.

If Legacy Bombers are Modernized, Can the Air Force Further
Delay Development of the LRS-B?
Another oversight issue for Congress will be whether development of the LRS-B can be further
delayed given sufficient levels of funding for legacy bomber sustainment and modernization.
Assuming the Air Force makes an effort to keep the B-52 and B-1 operational through 2040 and
the B-2 through 2058, it is fair to ask whether the Air Force can further delay development of the
LRS-B. All three of the legacy bombers receive meticulous care, with every aspect of their
existence recorded and tracked to ensure long-term health and safety of flight. Based on this
meticulous care, as well as ongoing structural fatigue testing and computer modeling, the Air
Force insists all three bombers will meet their extended service life goals.59 However, whether the
Air Force can further delay development of the LRS-B is not simply a matter of the legacy
bombers’ air worthiness. With enough funding and continued life extension programs, all three
bombers could theoretically fly beyond the Air Force’s target dates. Analysts suggest that the real
determinant of whether the development of the LRS-B can be further delayed is the legacy
bombers’ anticipated combat capability over the next 10 to 25 years of operations.
As potential adversaries acquire better and advanced A2/AD defenses, the legacy bombers’ ability
to get close enough to targets to employ weapons will likely continue to deteriorate. Already,
against today’s toughest air defenses, the B-52 and B-1 are largely relegated to standoff roles;
only the B-2 is expected to get through. In the years to come, the Air Force anticipates the B-2’s
ability to penetrate will also decline, even though the Air Force plans to upgrade all three
bombers with new systems and weapons. According to Air Force Lieutenant General Christopher
D. Miller, deputy chief of staff for strategic plans and programs, the current fleet is “increasingly
at risk to modernizing air defenses. We need to start now to replace the aging B-52, and B-1
59

John A. Tirpak, “Time to Get Started,” Air Force Magazine, February 2012, 31.

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bomber inventories.”60 When asked whether the steady advance in A2/AD capabilities around the
world means the Air Force must have the LRS-B ready for service by a specific deadline,
Lieutenant General Miller stated, “I think that decision has been given to us ... Now is the time to
get started.”61 As declining defense budgets are anticipated for the foreseeable future, Congress
will have to remain cognizant of the actual capabilities realized by funding specific legacy
bomber sustainment and modernization efforts with the Air Force’s stated requirement to fund
and begin LRS-B development now.

Modernization of Bomber-Launched Weapons
Another oversight issue for Congress is the modernization, sustainment, and development of the
weapons employed by the legacy bombers—weapons that directly impact their ability to operate
in the A2/AD threat environment. As the non-stealthy B-52 and B-1 are likely to operate in the
permissive (low-threat) and contested (high-risk) A2/AD employment zones, both platforms will
increasingly depend on long-range standoff weapons in order to survive and be effective.
Specifically for the B-52, Congress may consider continued appropriations for the conventional
and nuclear capable AGM-86B/C Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) service life extension
program (SLEP) and development of a new Advanced Cruise Missile. In her statement before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2012, Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, testified,
Because the growth of modern air defenses is putting even the bomber stand-off missions
increasingly at risk, DoD is carrying out an analysis of alternatives (AOA), for a follow-on
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The final report for the AOA for the new system, the
Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, is due in late 2012. The existing ALCM weapon
system will be sustained until the LRSO can be fielded during the 2020s.62

The AGM-86B/C ALCM started its second SLEP in FY2012 that is intended to extend its service
life to 2030. An initial SLEP will be finalized in FY2013 and includes a service life extension of
the W80 nuclear warhead.63 A total of 129 missiles are currently funded for modification with a
number being converted into conventional missiles. Congress and the Air Force have also
dedicated $887.6 million from FY2011 to FY2016 to the development of a new Advanced Cruise
Missile that will ultimately replace the AGM-86 family of ALCMs. In FY2012, Air Force
research and development funds were transferred from the AGM-86 to “Nuclear Modernization”
to identify viable concepts and solutions to replace the AGM-86.64
For both the B-52 and the B-1, the acquisition, test and evaluation, and fielding of the Miniature
Air Launched Decoy (MALD) and MALD-J (jammer) would enhance the ability of these aircraft
60

Ibid.,
Ibid., 35.
62
Testimony of Ms. Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs, in Senate, Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 112th Congress, 2nd Session, June 21, 2012.
63
The W80 is a small thermonuclear warhead with a variable yield of between 5 and 150 kiloton of TNT. It was
designed for deployment on cruise missiles and is the warhead used in the majority of nuclear-armed USAF ALCMs.
64
The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Air Launched Cruise Missile Fact Sheet,
http://armscontrolcenter.org/assets/pdfs/ALCMFactSheet.pdf and United States Air Force, Department of Defense
FY2012 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Procurement, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/budget/.
61

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to operate in contested (high-risk) and highly contested (extreme-risk) A2/AD employment zones.
MALD and MALD-J are designed to present a realistic decoy representing penetrating fighter,
attack, and bomber aircraft to enemy integrated air defense systems (IADS). MALD-J
incorporates a jammer while retaining the decoy capabilities. The B-52 is the initial
demonstration platform for this program and is currently undergoing initial operational test and
evaluation with initial operational capability scheduled for early 2013. The B-1 community is
exploring further integration of MALD and MALD-J on the B-1.
For all three legacy bombers, continued acquisition of the AGM-158A Joint Air-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM) and the AGM-158B JASSM-ER (extended range) and the development of the
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) is considered by some analysts essential to their
effectiveness in future A2/AD environments. The JASSM provides a long-range, conventional
air-to-surface, autonomous, precision guided, standoff cruise missile able to attack a variety of
fixed or re-locatable targets. The Air Force plans on procuring 4,900 missiles (2,400 baseline
versions and 2,500 ER) with an estimated program cost of $6.1 billion beyond FY2017.65 In
addition to the JASSM, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in
partnership with Lockheed Martin, is developing the LRASM. It stems from a 2008 urgent
operational needs statement from the U.S. Pacific Fleet requesting weapons technology to defeat
heavily defended ship targets. LRASM includes a datalink to provide updates as the missile
approaches the target area and an anti-radiation homing capability to detect and identify
emissions from threats to help guide the missile to the target. This long-range, anti-ship capability
dovetails with the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region and may prove invaluable in any
maritime conflict as potential adversaries continue to equip their naval vessels with highly
advanced weapon systems. LRASM is based on the AGM-158B JASSM and has an unclassified
range of 500 nautical miles. Lockheed Martin and the Air Force are planning to test-fire three
LRASM missiles in 2013 from the B-1B.66

Potential Implications of Bomber Modernization on Air Force
Basing and any Future Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC)
Another potential oversight issue is the potential implications of reduced bomber sustainment and
modernization, and subsequent diminishing numbers of airframes, on any future rounds of base
realignment and closure (BRAC) efforts. Although the DOD included two rounds of BRAC in its
2013 budget proposal, Congress did not authorize any closures or realignments. However, as the
DOD continues to look for ways to divest itself of assets in an effort to meet budgetary
challenges, BRAC continues to be a subject of speculation, possibly as early as 2015.67
The legacy bomber force is not getting bigger. The original 744 B-52s built were stationed at
approximately 21 bases across the United States during the height of the Cold War. There are now
76 B-52Hs in service stationed at two bases, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Minot AFB, North
65

United States Air Force, Department of Defense FY2013 President’s Budget Submission, Missile Procurement,
http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-120207-052.pdf, p 49.
66
Grace Jean, Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile Poised for Air Launch Tests, Possible Ship Integration (Defense &
Security Intelligence & Analysis: HIS Jane’s, September 20, 2012), http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defencesecurity-report.aspx?id=1065971576.
67
Henry Cuningham, New BRAC Round Looming (Fayetteville (N.C.) Observer, December 23, 2012),
http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/12/23/new-brac-round-looming.html

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Dakota. The original 100 B-1s built in the 1980s were stationed at six bases from 1986 until
2001. Now, there are 63 B-1s stationed at two bases, Dyess AFB, Texas, and Ellsworth AFB,
South Dakota. All four of these bases have excess capacity with the potential to accommodate the
entire B-52 fleet at either Barksdale or Minot and the entire B-1 fleet at Dyess or Ellsworth. If the
current trend of retiring airframes to pay for sustainment and modernization efforts continues (as
was done with the B-1 when 27 aircraft in 2001-2002 and three aircraft in 2012 were retired in
order to use the savings to pay for sustainment and upgrades), the total fleet size of both bombers
may suggest consolidation at one base simply from a cost feasibility perspective.
Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota survived the 2005 BRAC when the federal base-closing
commission voted to keep the base open, despite Pentagon recommendations to close the base
and consolidate the B-1 fleet at Dyess AFB in Texas. Ellsworth employs some 4,000 people and
has an estimated economic impact of $278 million on the local community.68 Although no BRAC
actions were taken for Minot AFB and Barksdale AFB in 2005, Air Force BRAC planners
initially proposed retiring Minot’s 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles and
realigning the base. Ultimately, planners decided this idea would not work and the Air Force’s top
BRAC committee, the Base Closure Executive Group, rejected the idea.69 As far as the B-2 is
concerned, all 20 are stationed at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. There has been no public discussion
of potential basing for the LRS-B, if and when it finally hits the flight line in the mid-to-late
2020s.

Industrial Base Concerns Associated with Bomber Sustainment
Another oversight issue is the ability of the nation’s industrial base to sustain the legacy bomber
force. A potential problem with sustaining a fleet of bombers with an average age of 33 years is
that the industrial base that developed and produced these aircraft may no longer possess the
capability to manufacture and supply parts in necessary quantities—if at all—to affordably keep
these aircraft flying. Especially in the case of the B-52 and B-1, many of the original parts
designed and produced in the 1950s (for the B-52) and the 1970s (for the B-1) are simply not
produced anymore. Both airframes struggle with diminishing manufacturing sources and material
shortages in an effort to replace and repair aircraft parts and equipment that the original
manufactures do not make anymore. As the nation’s current budget deficit debate shifts from
taxes towards spending cuts and the debt limit, commentators note the potential for deep defense
cuts may drive the defense industry to streamline and consolidate operations, potentially exit prior
production lines, and undergo internal restructuring in an effort to maintain their existing profit
margins. Consequently, a question to be answered is whether the defense industrial base will even
be capable of meeting the sustainment requirements of America’s legacy bomber force out to
2040 and to what extent Congress should consider this issue when evaluating proposed defense
cuts.

68

Bob Reha, South Dakota’s Ellsworth AFB to Say Open (Minnesota Public Radio, August 26, 2005),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/08/26_rehab_ellsworthopen/
69
Nicole Gaudiano, Air Force BRAC Planners Nixed Minot Realignment (Air Force Times, September 5, 2005),
http://www.airforcetimes.com/legacy/new/0-AIRPAPER-1034249.php

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Historical Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization, FY2002-2012
Figure 7 depicts historical authorizations and appropriations for B-52H, B-1B, and B-2
sustainment and modernization. Dollar amounts include funds authorized/appropriated in the
“Procurement” and “Research, Development, Test and Evaluation” sections as well as any funds
authorized/appropriated for sustainment and modernization efforts directly tied to “Overseas
Contingency Operations” provided for in National Defense Authorization and Appropriations acts
from FY2002 to FY2013. Figure 8 is a side-by-side graphical comparison of historical
appropriations for all three bombers.
Figure 9 is an overlay of historical appropriations for all three bombers and their average yearly
mission capable rate. Mission capable rate is defined as the percentage of aircraft in each of the
bomber fleet components that are capable of performing its intended wartime mission.
Figure 7. Congressional Authorizations and Appropriations for Bomber Sustainment
and Modernization
(in millions of “then-year” dollars, rounded to nearest tenth)

FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13

B-52
Authorized Appropriated
70.4
110.7
65.8
111.5
89.8
117.4
137.4
188.3
241
255.5
205.4
204.3
138.2
142.7
80.4
80.4
155.4
163.8
218.6
199.2
187.9
187.9
63.0
63.0

Authorized
296.4
260.7
194.1
254.4
226.8
196.1
178.8
168.7
280
248.6
235.8
167.0

B-1
Appropriated
196.4
276.4
200.9
259.4
182.4
196.1
187.8
168.7
261.5
252.1
235.8
167.0

Authorized
281.5
406.2
352.3
408.5
393.8
450.9
536.2
728.9
735.9
350.1
371.1
447.0

B-2
Appropriated
293.1
406.2
329.1
408.5
387.8
453.2
546.2
728.9
699.3
350.1
360.8
447.0

Sources: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2013. Dollar amounts include procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation funding.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Figure 8. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations Comparison
(in “then-year” dollars)

Sources: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years
2002 to 2013.

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Figure 9. B-52, B-1 and B-2 Appropriations and Average Historical Mission Capable Rates
(in “then-year” dollars and percentage of aircraft in each of the bomber fleet that are capable of performing its intended wartime mission)
$800,000,000

100.00%

90.00%

$700,000,000

80.00%
$600,000,000
70.00%
$500,000,000

60.00%

$400,000,000

50.00%

40.00%

$300,000,000

30.00%

B-52 Appropriated
Funds
B-1 Appropriated
Funds
B-2 Appropriated
Funds
B-52 Average MC
Rate
B-1 Average MC
Rate
B-2 Average MC
Rate

$200,000,000
20.00%
$100,000,000

10.00%

0.00%

$0
FY02

FY03

FY04

FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

FY12

Source: National Defense Authorization Acts, Appropriation Acts, and Committee Reports for Fiscal Years 2002 to 2013 and mission capable rates as reported to
Headquarters U.S. Air Force by Air Combat Command and Global Strike Command.

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U.S. Air Force Bomber Sustainment and Modernization: Issues for Congress

Legislative Activity FY2011-FY2013
The follow is a brief summary of legislative actions involving U.S. Air Force bomber sustainment
and modernization from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. It also highlights Congress’s interest in
the potential threat posed by countries seeking to implement anti-access/area denial capabilities
and strategies. The complete legislative language for each of these efforts can be found in
Appendix E.

FY2011 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-383)
Section 1056 of P.L. 111-383 directed the Secretary of the Air Force to submit to congressional
defense committees a report concerning bomber modernization, sustainment, and recapitalization
efforts in support of the National Defense Strategy. In the report, the Air Force was to discuss the
cost, schedule, and performance of all planned efforts to modernize and keep viable the existing
B–1, B–2, and B–52 bomber fleets. Congress also requested the forecasted service-life and all
sustainment challenges that the Secretary of the Air Force may confront in keeping those
platforms viable until the anticipated retirement of all three aircraft. As previously discussed, this
report was submitted to Congress in September 2011 and contains similar information as that
found in the Air Force Global Strike Command’s (AFGSC’s) and Air Combat Command’s
(ACC’s) master plan documents for the B-52 and B-2 (AFGSC) and the B-1 (ACC) presented in
Appendixes B through D.
Under Section 1238 of P.L. 111-383, Congress requested an additional report on United States’
efforts to defend against threats posed by the Anti-Access and Area-Denial capabilities of certain
nations-states. This report was requested in response to DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review that concluded ‘‘[a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to
project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be
conducted by the anti-access powers. Without dominant capabilities to project power, the
integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called into question,
reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.” Congress
also requested an assessment by the Secretary of Defenses on the United States’ efforts to defend
against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of
potentially hostile nation-states. These reports were submitted to the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees in April 2011.

FY2012 Department of Defense Appropriations (H.Rept. 112-331)
In the DOD’s FY2012 budget request, the Air Force proposed the retirement of six B-1 bombers
with the intent of putting the money saved by retiring these aircraft towards modernization and
sustainment efforts for the remaining 60 B-1 aircraft. In response to this proposal, the House
Appropriations Committee made the following recommendation in their conference report to
accompany H.R. 2055.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request includes a proposal to retire six B–1 bomber aircraft.
The conferees understand that the B– 1 fleet continues to operate almost constantly over
Afghanistan in support of troops on the ground and that the B–1 is a critical component of
the Nation’s long-range strike capabilities. The Air Force proposed to reinvest less than 40

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percent of the savings from aircraft retirements in the B–1 modernization program across the
Future Years Defense Program. The conferees are concerned that premature retirement of six
B–1 aircraft could negatively impact long-range strike capabilities. Therefore, the conferees
direct the Secretary of the Air Force to reinvest a larger portion of savings realized from B–1
aircraft retirements, to the extent authorized by law, in the sustainment and modernization of
the B–1 fleet.

FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112-81)
Further responding to the Air Force’s proposal to retire six B-1s, Section 132 in P.L. 112-81
sought to clarify the Air Force’s plan by restricting FY2012 funds for the retirement of any B-1
aircraft until the Secretary of the Air Force submitted a plan to congressional defense committees
detailing the following:
•

Identification of each B–1 bomber aircraft that will be retired and the disposition
plan for such aircraft;

•

an estimate of the savings that will result from the proposed retirement of B–1
bomber aircraft in each calendar year through calendar year 2022;

•

an estimate of the amount of the savings that will be reinvested in the
modernization of B–1 bomber aircraft still in service in each calendar year
through calendar year 2022;

•

a modernization plan for sustaining the remaining B–1 bomber aircraft through at
least calendar year 2022; and,

•

an estimate of the amount of funding required to fully fund the modernization
plan for each calendar year through calendar year 2022.

Language in Section 132 also went on to specify that if retirement of six B-1s was justified, after
subsequently retiring those aircraft, the Secretary of the Air Force will maintain in a common
capability configuration no less than 36 combat-coded B–1 aircraft out to September 30, 2013.70
After that date, no less than 35 combat-coded aircraft until September 30, 2014, then 34 until
September 30, 2015, and finally 33 combat-coded aircraft until September 30, 2016.71
Section 134 of P.L. 112-81 made available certain FY2011 funds for research and development
relating to the B-2 bomber. Specifically, $20 million was made available for FY2012 for research,
development, test and evaluation of a conventional weapons mixed load capability for the B–2. In
addition, Section 135 made available $15 million of FY2011 funds for research, development,
test and evaluation of alternative options for the B-2’s extremely high frequency terminal
Increment 1 program of record.72

70

Combat-coded aircraft is defined as aircraft assigned to meet the primary aircraft authorization to a unit for the
performance of its wartime mission.
71
As of this writing, the Air Force has retired only three of the originally proposed six B-1s.
72
The B-2 Extremely High Frequency (EHF) satellite communications (SATCOM) program supports the replacement
of the B-2’s ultra-high-frequency radio terminal set with an EHF SATCOM system that will be compatible with the
military’s legacy MILSTAR I/II satellite constellation and the future AEHF satellite constellation.

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FY2013 Department of Defense Appropriations (S.Rept. 112-196:
To accompany H.R. 5856)
Note: as of this writing, this legislation has not been passed into law.
The FY2013 budget request did not include funds under Aircraft Procurement for the B-52
CONECT program of record due to the Air Force’s decision to terminate the program.73 Instead, it
included $34,700,000 for research, development, test and evaluation for a restructured and
descoped B–52 CONECT program. The committee, however, directed that no funds may be
obligated or expended for the B–52 CONECT program of record post-milestone C acquisition
activities or for a restructured B–52 CONECT program until 30 days after the congressional
defense committees have been briefed on the Air Force’s proposed way ahead.
The committee also addressed the Air Force’s decision to terminate the B-52 Strategic Radar
Replacement [SR2] program. The B-52’s existing APQ-166 radar was produced in the 1960s, has
a 20 to 30 hour mean-time between failure rate, has limited in capabilities, and is costly to operate
and maintain. Although the Air Force conducted a lengthy analysis of alternatives in 2011 and
ultimately terminated the program, the committee encouraged the Secretary of the Air Force to
reconsider this decision.

FY2013 Department of Defense Authorizations (P.L. 112-239)
The subject of retiring B-1 aircraft was addressed again in P.L. 112-239. Sec

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR43049. Public record. Not legal advice.