# U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues

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URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42948

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** January 24, 2013
- **Citation:** R42948

## Text

U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues
-name redactedSpecialist in South Asian Affairs
-name redactedResearch Associate
January 24, 2013

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R42948

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues

Summary
In today’s fluid geopolitical environment, the relationship between the United States, the world’s
oldest democracy and an established global power, and India, its most populous democracy and
an aspiring global power, is seen as a key variable in the unfolding international dynamics of the
21st century. As U.S. foreign policy attention shifts toward the Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific)
region, and as India’s economic and military capabilities grow, Washington’s pursuit of a strategic
partnership with New Delhi demonstrates that the mutual wariness of the Cold War era has
rapidly faded. A vital and in some ways leading aspect of this partnership has been security
relations, and today the two countries are engaging in unprecedented levels of military-to-military
ties, defense trade, and counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation. Still, although considerable
enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals—and not least in the U.S.
Congress—there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks
purpose and focus. Some observers argue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold,
and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While
Obama Administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of
security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized,
at least in the near-term.
Nongovernmental analyses of the course and pace of U.S.-India security relations are oftentimes
incompatible or even conflicting in their assumptions and recommendations. Such incompatibility
is frequently the result of the differing conclusions rooted in short-term versus long-term
perspectives. The Obama Administration—along with numerous pro-India analysts in
Washington—has tended to emphasize the anticipated benefits of long-term engagement as
opposed to a short-term approach that seeks gains derived through more narrow transactions. This
latter tack can have the effect of raising and then thwarting expectations in Washington, as was
the case with the ultimate failure of U.S. defense firms to secure the multi-billion-dollar contracts
to supply new combat aircraft to India. At the same time, frustrations among many in the United
States have arisen from the sense that India’s enthusiasm for further deepening bilateral security
cooperation is limited, and that New Delhi’s reciprocity has been insufficient.
Looking ahead, there is widespread concurrence among many officials and analysts that the
security relationship would benefit from undergirding ambitious rhetoric with more concrete
action in areas of mutual agreement. In their view, defining which actions will provide
meaningful gains, even on a modest scale, appears to be the central task facing U.S. and Indian
policy makers in coming years.
To assist Members of Congress and their staffs in clarifying the status of and outlook for bilateral
security cooperation, this report—a companion to CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security
Relations: Current Engagement, by (name redacted) and (name redacted)—takes a systematic
approach to the major strategic perspectives held by policy makers in both countries and the ways
in which these perspectives are variously harmonious, discordant, or, in some cases, both. The
report opens with a brief review of the pre-2005 history of U.S.-India security relations. This is
followed by discussion of key U.S. security interests related to India. Next is a focus on India’s
defense posture writ large. With this context set, the report reviews key areas of convergent and
divergent security interests and perspectives. A brief discussion of the outlook for future security
cooperation closes. For information on U.S.-India relations more broadly, see CRS Report
RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations, coordinated by (na
me redacted).

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Contents
Overview.......................................................................................................................................... 1
Review of US-India Security Relations, 1947-2005........................................................................ 1
Current U.S. Security Interests Related to India .............................................................................. 4
Establishing a Stable Balance of Power in Asia ........................................................................ 4
Reducing the Threat Posed by Terrorism and Religious Extremism ......................................... 5
Curtailing Nuclear Proliferation in Asia .................................................................................... 6
Protecting U.S. Economic and Political Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region ........................... 6
Current Indian Security Objectives and Defense Posture ................................................................ 8
India’s Defense Posture ............................................................................................................. 8
Defense Strategy ................................................................................................................. 8
Defense Budget ................................................................................................................. 12
Overview of India’s Defense Inventory ............................................................................ 14
Overview of India’s Defense Procurement System........................................................... 17
India’s Main Security Objectives ............................................................................................ 21
India’s Periphery and Regional Security ........................................................................... 21
Asian Power Balances ....................................................................................................... 28
Securing Channels to West Asia ........................................................................................ 32
Global Security Issues ....................................................................................................... 36
Convergent and Divergent Security Perspectives .......................................................................... 38
Areas of Convergent Interests ................................................................................................. 39
China and Asian Balance-of-Power Calculations.............................................................. 39
Convergences on Terrorism............................................................................................... 40
Afghanistan ....................................................................................................................... 40
Maritime Issues ................................................................................................................. 42
Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation ..................................................................... 42
Areas of Divergent Perspectives and Other Obstacles ............................................................ 43
Divergent Perspectives on Pakistan Policy ....................................................................... 44
Divergences on Terrorism ................................................................................................. 45
Divergent Perspectives on Iran.......................................................................................... 46
Divergent Perspectives on the Promotion of Liberal Values ............................................. 48
Other Obstacles to Security Cooperation .......................................................................... 49
Mutual Misunderstanding of Bureaucratic Processes ....................................................... 50
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 51

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication ........................................................ 7
Figure 2. Map of the Indian Ocean ................................................................................................ 11
Figure 3. India’s Defense Spending ............................................................................................... 12
Figure 4. Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) by Defense Spending Account................... 13
Figure 5. India’s Capital Outlay Expenditures by Category .......................................................... 15

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Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 52

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Overview
For nearly five decades following Indian independence in 1947, the United States and India
struggled to find common ground for a fruitful relationship. Prevailing geopolitical conditions
during the Cold War undermined the potential for sustained bilateral engagement. Dramatic
geopolitical changes after the fall of the Soviet Union opened diplomatic space for major new
collaborative initiatives between the United States and India. Symbolic of these changes, the two
countries have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” that incorporates numerous
economic, security, and global initiatives. The United States views security cooperation with
India in the context of common principles and shared national interests and strategic objectives
such as defeating terrorism, preventing weapons proliferation, and maintaining regional stability.
After initial uncertainty under President Barack Obama, senior Pentagon officials assured New
Delhi that the current administration is fully committed to strengthening ties through the
enhancement of the defense relationship made substantive under President George W. Bush.
U.S.-India engagement on shared security interests is a topic of interest to the U.S. Congress,
where there is considerable support for a deepened U.S. partnership with the world's largest
democracy. Congressional advocacy of closer relations with India is generally bipartisan and
widespread; House and Senate caucuses on India and Indian-Americans are the largest of their
kind. Caucus leaders have encouraged the Obama Administration to work toward improving the
compatibility of the U.S. and Indian defense acquisitions systems, as well as to seek potential
opportunities for co-development or co-production of military weapons systems with India.
This report includes a brief outline of American security interests in relation to India, followed by
an in-depth discussion of India’s strategic interests and defense posture. These sections provide
context for a review of the variously convergent and divergent strategic interests of both
countries. It also discusses non-geopolitical obstacles to more substantive cooperation across the
partnership, including mutual mistrust and bureaucratic misunderstanding. It concludes with a
brief discussion of the outlook for future security bilateral cooperation. A companion piece to this
report—CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by (name re
dacted) and (name redacted)—discusses the detail
s of current U.S.-India security engagement.

Review of US-India Security Relations, 1947-2005
In the early decades following Indian independence, the potential for positive security relations
between Washington and New Delhi was hindered by three largely intertwined disagreements:
The first was rooted in the all-consuming Cold War calculus and ostensibly nonaligned India’s
Soviet tilt (the latter being a function of India’s strongly-held anti-colonialist sentiments
following nearly a century under London’s direct rule as the “crown jewel” of the British
Empire). Added to these were Washington’s close ties with Pakistan, India’s most contentious
rival, and the discomfort these elicited in New Delhi. Finally, New Delhi’s abstention from the
1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and subsequent pursuit of nuclear weapons capability
fueled American fears of further proliferation and the emergence of a destabilizing nuclear arms
race on the Asian subcontinent. It was through this nuclear nonproliferation prism that the United
States regarded India for decades to follow.
The 1989-1991 collapse of the Soviet Union nominally eliminated a major geostrategic obstacle
to closer U.S.-India relations. Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War initially set the United States

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and India on largely incompatible paths. Western democratic and free market ideals no longer
faced any major ideological challenger with the demise of the Soviet Bloc. As the world’s sole
superpower, the United States acted to define and consolidate its Cold War victory. For
Washington, this meant promoting liberal political and economic systems abroad with an eye
toward winning dividends for U.S. prosperity and security at home. In the early 1990s, India
emerged from the losing side of the Cold War. Cash-strapped and on the verge of economic
collapse without its Soviet benefactors, New Delhi turned away from its traditionally statist
economy and began to gradually incorporate itself into the liberal order, a move that no longer
allowed New Delhi to distance itself from Washington. While India had begun normalizing
relations with the United States in the 1980s, the precipitous Soviet collapse meant a sudden end
to Moscow’s financial support for India, compelling New Delhi’s leaders to engage the West
despite long-running fears of jeopardizing India’s strategic autonomy.
In the new geopolitical environment, the U.S.-India defense ties that began in the mid-1980s grew
slowly. The impetus for sustained relations notably emerged from the U.S. Pacific Command
(PACCOM). In 1991, PACCOM’s Army commander, General Claude Kicklighter, visited India to
initiate the first set of concrete proposals establishing cooperation between the U.S. and Indian
militaries.1 The continuation of these threadbare defense ties was significant given the unevenness
of the broader bilateral relationship of the period. Around the same time, confrontation between
Washington and New Delhi on the NPT and Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
escalated. In 1995, the Clinton Administration pushed for the indefinite extension of the existing
NPT at the United Nations. For India, this meant seemingly permanent nuclear weapons pariah
status. From the American perspective, India’s continued noncooperation on nuclear proliferation
only served to destabilize the South Asia region.
Nonetheless, the 21st century opened with relatively hopeful prospects for U.S.-India relations. To
New Delhi’s surprise, the Clinton Administration pressured Pakistan into withdrawing its forces
following the 1999 Kargil war in the disputed Kashmir region.2 Then, in 2000, President Bill
Clinton made a landmark visit to India, becoming the first U.S. President to visit the country in 22
years. Immediately prior to the visit, the Administration had eased U.S. sanctions on India related
to its 1998 nuclear tests. In his speech to the Indian Parliament, President Clinton referred to India
as a “natural ally” and identified numerous shared values and potential areas for cooperation
between the two countries.3 That same year, the U.S.-India Joint Counterterrorism Working
Group was established, formalizing an area of cooperation that long existed.4 While President
Clinton’s visit was generally considered successful, it did not have a transformational effect. His
Administration’s policies toward India remained mired in balancing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry
and addressing concerns about the region’s nuclear arsenals, despite Washington’s optimistic
intentions and increasing realization of shared interests with India.5

1

“New Era of U.S.-India Ties in Defense Matters,” India—West, January 10, 2009.
See Dennis Kux, “India’s Fine Balance,” Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2002
3
Remarks by President William J. Clinton to the Indian Joint Session of Parliament, March 22, 2000.
2

4

See the State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000,” April 30, 2001, at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/
2000.
5
The Clinton Administration’s December 1999 A National Security Strategy for a New Century made no unique
reference to India; each of the six times India is mentioned in the document it was paired with Pakistan (see
http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/nssr-1299.pdf).

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Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the wheels of the U.S.-India relationship were
thus steadily, albeit gradually, in motion. The incoming Bush Administration further energized
Clinton’s pro-India policies. When Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh met with
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in April 2001, President George W. Bush met
informally with Singh in the Oval Office, a gesture most welcome by New Delhi.6 The next
month, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage made a stop in India to garner approval for
the Bush Administration’s controversial missile defense plans. Instead of seizing upon an
opportunity to publicly criticize Washington for its perceived hypocrisy with regard to relevant
international agreements, Singh welcomed the policy and contended that the two countries were
“endeavoring to work out together a totally new security regime which is for the entire globe,” a
notion heretofore unimaginable in the context of the U.S.-India relationship.7 While many U.S.
allies criticized America’s missile defense policy, India conspicuously, if only rhetorically, stood
by Washington’s side. Nevertheless, the catastrophic events of 9/11 posed a major test of the
budding friendship. On one hand, the attacks brought into clear relief a growing realization of
common strategic interests and vulnerabilities related to Islamist terrorism. On the other hand,
Pakistan reemerged as a key geopolitical facilitator of U.S.-led military efforts in Afghanistan.
Thus, a key question in New Delhi was, “With whom will the Americans align themselves?”
Just days after 9/11, Washington waived proliferation-related sanctions for both India and
Pakistan (the latter country also benefitted from the waiver of democracy- and debt arrearagerelated sanctions). Despite this sudden readjustment in bilateral ties, Indian leaders felt
resentment and became concerned that the United States was appeasing Pakistan and ignoring
New Delhi’s concerns about what they saw as Pakistan-supported terrorism in India. For its part,
Washington was consumed with responding to the 9/11 attacks, in part by securing Pakistan’s
cooperation in Afghanistan. The crux of the challenge for Washington “was to avoid either
leaning on Pakistan too hard, which could hurt [operations] in Afghanistan, or not leaning on
Pakistan hard enough, which would alienate New Delhi.”8 It was a tall order considering the
extent to which the situation had deteriorated after Pakistan-based terrorists attacked India’s
Parliament complex in December 2001. Yet, by the opening month of 2002, the United States had
managed to secure India’s restraint while also eliciting a pledge to tackle terrorism from
Pakistan’s military ruler. Throughout much of the Bush Administration’s first term, the balancing
act between India and Pakistan continued to be evident in U.S. policy toward South Asia.
A major breakthrough in the U.S.-India relationship came soon after President Bush’s re-election.
In July 2005, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a Joint Statement
resolving to establish a “global partnership” between the United States and India, through
increased cooperation on numerous issues, including “full civilian nuclear energy cooperation”
(such cooperation would require changes in both U.S. law and international guidelines). The
“Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) initiative involved progress through a series of
reciprocal steps in which both countries took action designed to expand engagement on nuclear
regulatory and safety issues, enhanced cooperation in missile defense, peaceful uses of space
technology, and creation of an appropriate environment for increased high-technology
commerce.9 Sanctions that remained after the 2001 easing were rolled back further.10 Only weeks
6
7

Dennis Kux, “India’s Fine Balance,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002: p. 94.
“Bush Accepts Invitation To Visit India,” Times of India (New Delhi), May 18, 2001.

8

Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Stimson Center,
September 1, 2006.
9

See the January 2004 White House Statement by President George W. Bush on Strategic Partnership with India at
(continued...)

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earlier, the United States and India had signed a 10-year defense framework agreement that called
for collaboration in multilateral operations, expanded two-way defense trade, increased
opportunities for technology transfers and co-production, expanded collaboration related to
missile defense, and establishment of a bilateral Defense Procurement and Production Group.11
These agreements set the stage for unprecedented new levels of interaction and cooperation
between the two countries.

Current U.S. Security Interests Related to India
Throughout the Cold War, U.S security interests with relation to India were largely confined to
mitigating nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear conflict in South Asia. Geopolitical
realignments after 1991 dramatically increased India’s visibility and potential utility in U.S.
security calculations, eventually upgrading the country from a “growing global power with
common interests” (as described in President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy12) to a
“linchpin” of U.S. strategy extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian
Ocean region and South Asia (as described in a June 2012 speech by Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta13). This transformation in Washington’s perception of India as a key strategic partner was
undergirded by four major U.S. security interests:
•

Establishing a stable a balance of power in Asia;

•

reducing the threat posed by terrorism and religious extremism;

•

curtailing nuclear proliferation in Asia; and

•

protecting U.S. economic and political interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Establishing a Stable Balance of Power in Asia
Perhaps the primary concern for Washington in Asia has been China’s growing military
capabilities and assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea and potentially into the Indian
Ocean region (IOR). Beijing’s influence is also expanding in Central Asia and the Middle East.
The Obama Administration’s 2009 initiative to establish closer cooperation with China through a
purported “G2” structure was shelved owing to subsequent developments in Asia, particularly in
the South China Sea. China’s newly assertive sovereignty claims in that contested region have
resulted in heightened tensions between Beijing and its Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly
Vietnam and the Philippines. In 2010, tensions escalated to a point where Secretary of State
(...continued)
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040112-1.html.
10

The United States modified export licensing policies and removed the Indian Space Research Organization
headquarters from the Entity List. Further adjustments came in August 2005 when six more subordinate entities were
removed; another nine were removed by the Obama Administration in January 2011. Indian entities remaining on the
list to date are three Department of Atomic Energy entities, and all but two of India’s nuclear reactors not under IAEA
safeguards.
11

See CRS Report RL33072, U.S.-India Bilateral Agreements and "Global Partnership," by (name redacted).

12

White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
13
“Panetta Says U.S.-India Relations Must Deepen, Grow for Peace,” American Forces Press Service, June 6, 2012.

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Hillary Clinton issued the unprecedented claim that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea
is a U.S. “national interest.”14 Major U.S. allies Japan and South Korea continue to be wary of
Beijing even as their trade relations with China increase. September 2012 saw tensions between
China and Japan sharply heightened due to a resurgence of competing territorial claims in the
East China Sea.15 Taiwan remains a sensitive issue for Washington and Beijing, even as the
latter’s rhetoric has softened in recent years.
An increasingly assertive China can potentially leverage its military clout in a highly fractured
geopolitical neighborhood to pose obstacles to the American presence and to the realization of
U.S. goals in the region. Any U.S. military withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific would drastically
curtail Washington’s economic and political influence. At the same time, steep cuts in the U.S.
defense budget preclude any dramatic expansion of the U.S. military presence in the region. The
resulting strategy for Washington has been to “pivot” or “rebalance” toward the Asia-Pacific,
while strengthening existing alliances and partnerships with countries across Asia. During his
mid-2012 trip to Southeast Asia, Defense Secretary Panetta reassured U.S. allies and friends in
the region by clarifying the U.S. “rebalance” strategy in order dispel any concerns about a
potential American drawdown in the region.16

Reducing the Threat Posed by Terrorism and Religious Extremism
Islamist terrorism has been a growing threat to the United States in recent decadess, peaking with
Al Qaeda’s attacks of September 2001. South Asia in particular has been the focus of America’s
global counterterrorism efforts. The 2010 White House National Security Strategy identified
Afghanistan and Pakistan as the “epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda”17
Over the past decade, the United States has deployed combat troops to Afghanistan, peaking at a
total of some 100,000 in 2011.18 It has also spent almost half a trillion dollars on the military and
development efforts in that country. The resources focused on combating terrorism in the South
Asia region clearly reflect the critical importance the issue holds on the U.S. foreign policy
agenda. Even as the United States draws down militarily in Afghanistan, combating terrorism will
likely remain a key U.S. policy interest in the region for some time. In the 2011 U.S. National
Security Strategy on Counterterrorism, President Obama reiterated the continuing significance of
the issue:
14

At a speech in Hanoi Vietnam, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that “The United States has a national
interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the
South China Sea.” See July 23, 2010, Statement on the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/
2010/07/145095.htm
15
See CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), (name re
dacted), and (name redacted).
16
In a June 2, 2012, speech at the Shangri La Security Dialogue, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta remarked that
America’s “rebalance” strategy to involve “over the next few years an increase in the number and the size of [U.S.]
exercises in the Pacific. [The U.S.] will also increase and more widely distribute port visits, including in the important
Indian Ocean region. And by 2020 the Navy will reposture its forces from today’s roughly 50/50 percent split between
the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40 split between those oceans. That will include six aircraft carriers in this
region, a majority of our cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat Ships, and submarines.” See transcript at
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1681.
17
White House, “National Security Strategy,” May 2010, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/
national_security_strategy.pdf.
18
See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name re
dacted).

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Despite our successes, we continue to face a significant terrorist threat from al-Qaida, its
affiliates, and its adherents. Our terrorist adversaries have shown themselves to be agile and
adaptive; defeating them requires that we develop and pursue a strategy that is even more
agile and adaptive.... With an unrelenting focus on the task at hand, and mindful of the
challenges still ahead, we will not rest until that job is done.19

As the largest, most populous and most economically successful country in the region, India is an
avid champion of counterterrorism efforts in the region. Cooperation in combating terrorism has
been an important pillar of the U.S.-India relationship since 2001. The United States and India
share the objective of stabilizing Afghanistan, in order to deny sanctuary for terrorist networks
targeting American and Indian citizens and interests. India is currently a key partner of the United
States in shoring up support for Afghanistan through foreign aid and long-term strategic
agreements with Kabul. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation has also been strengthened in
issue-areas beyond those directly related to Afghanistan, especially in the wake of the 2008
terrorist attack in Mumbai. The targeting of establishments frequented by Westerners in addition
to busy local hubs during that attack illustrated the shared interests involved. One U.S. State
Department official described Indian commercial centers with a large presence of Americans as
“big, squishy targets” for anti-American terrorist groups.20 While there appears to be tremendous
potential for collaboration on counterterrorism, contrasting policies toward Pakistan and
fundamental differences in bureaucratic systems serve to constrict the depth of cooperation
between the United States and India, as discussed in the “Divergent Perspectives on Pakistan
Policy” section below.

Curtailing Nuclear Proliferation in Asia
A continuing top-tier U.S. interest lies in halting, or at least slowing, the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in South Asia, and in mitigating the potential for nuclear war between India and
Pakistan. Proliferation-related U.S. sanctions on both countries were permanently waived in
2001, and the United States implicitly recognized India’s status as a nuclear weapons state
through its later endorsement of excepting India from International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. Still, Washington has a long history of
encouraging regional restraint in the proliferation of nuclear arms and systems for their delivery,
given the high security risks such proliferation is seen to entail. More broadly, the United States
continues to strongly endorse the India-Pakistan peace initiative most recently revived in 2004 as
means of normalizing relations between the two countries and so perhaps reducing the
destabilizing potential of their nuclear arsenals.

Protecting U.S. Economic and Political Interests in the
Asia-Pacific Region
The rise of Asia lies at the heart of Washington’s revaluation vis-à-vis India. Booming Asian
economies—and the accompanying spike in demand for energy resources—have prioritized
freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region as a key concern for the United States. Asian
countries depend heavily on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), importing energy from
19
20

United States National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism, White House, June 2011.
Interview with State Department officials, Washington, DC, June 2012.

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the Middle East and trading goods within Asia and across the globe (see Figure 1).21 The United
States is in turn increasingly dependent on Asian markets for trade and investment to sustain and
grow its own economy. In the near term, the United States views the Indian Navy as an important
partner in maritime policing and disaster relief management in the IOR, which lies at the western
gate of the Asia-Pacific arc. The Defense Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review stated
that as India’s “military capabilities grow, [the country] will contribute to Asia as a net provider
of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.”22 India’s role in the interdiction of WMD-related
transfers, counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and humanitarian relief help to further safeguard U.S.
interests in the region. Recent cuts to the U.S. defense budget provide another motive for
Washington to share the burden by encouraging collective security measures across the region.
Figure 1. Map of Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication

Source: G.M. Hiranandadi, “External Naval Presence in Indian Ocean,” Indian Defense Review, February 2012.

From a global perspective, India is considered an important global example of successful, largescale democracy, as well as a potential partner in encouraging the spread of representative
political systems. Washington also hopes to enlist New Delhi’s voice in support of international
human rights norms, particularly in the Asian region. India is also projected to play an important
role in the New Silk Road initiative being launched by the current U.S. administration. Linking
East and Southwest Asia, India’s economic potential and geographic setting are considered key to
opening a booming new trade corridor, which the U.S. State Department envisions will have a
stabilizing effect on the entire region.23

21

More than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits the IOR. See David Michel and Russell Sticklor, eds.,
Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges (Stimson Center, July 2012), at
http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/indian_ocean_rising.
22
“US Gives India Policing Power in the Indian Ocean,” Times of India (Delhi), February 3, 2010.
23
“The Role of Central Asia in Afghanistan,” speech by Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Robert Blake,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, July 12, 2012.

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Current Indian Security Objectives and
Defense Posture
India’s Defense Posture
Defense Strategy
In the absence of any overarching official security doctrine, information on defense budgeting,
military deployments, procurement patterns and government statements and reports are employed
here to broadly portray India’s defense posture, aspirations, and the reforms being undertaken to
achieve these goals.
In recent years, China has increasingly been the central focus of Indian defense planners, a shift
from their decades-long Pakistan focus. In May 2012, Defense Minister A.K. Antony informed
the Indian Parliament that the government would seek an increase in the slated FY2012/13
defense budget to respond to the “new ground realities and the changing security scenario.”24
Many South Asia observers suggest that, in contrast to previous decades, India is now sufficiently
confident in its military capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan. In Washington, a consensus view has
emerged that New Delhi is increasingly able to more substantively address other regional security
issues beyond the traditional concerns about its rival to the west.25 Foremost among these are
posing a credible military deterrent to China; preparing for the possibility of a multi-front
confrontation along both the disputed India-Pakistan “Line of Control” (LOC) and sectors of the
disputed India-China “Line of Actual Control” (LOAC); and expanding India’s naval presence in
the IOR. Trends in military planning and procurement reflect recalibrations in New Delhi’s
calculation of the key threats to its now more expansively defined national interests. However,
some say the absence of clear national security objectives combines with largely ad-hoc, wishlist-based planning to continue undercutting the armed forces’ ability to effectively coordinate
around broader defense aims.
Until recently, India perceived Pakistani military adventurism and state support of terrorism
inside India as a top security priority, and for decades has focused on military preparedness for
potential conflict with Pakistan. A much-discussed “Cold Start” doctrine, informally aired in
2004, apparently represents an Indian effort to address the escalatory problems posed by
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and the perceived inability of the Indian military to respond effectively
to Pakistani provocations in 2002. It calls for the establishment of smooth interservices
coordination and forward deployments that would allow for rapid, but limited retaliatory strikes
by “integrated battle groups.” Some reports indicate that the doctrine has come under criticism
from top American military commanders and Administration officials who view it as a source of
further India-Pakistan tension and thus as a hindrance to the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan.26
The current status of the “Cold Start” approach in India’s military strategy is unclear, particularly

24
“Antony to Seek Hike in Defense Outlay to Counter Twin Threats from Pakistan, China,” Times of India (Mumbai),
May 9, 2012.
25
Interviews with current and former U.S. government officials, Washington, DC, June-August 2012.
26
“Indian Contingency Against Pakistan Worries U.S.,” New York Times, November 6, 2010.

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as discussions on New Delhi’s dual-front strategy, as discussed above, have predominated, and
also due to changes in the broader geopolitical dynamics.
All three main military services are currently instituting reforms in order to meet India’s
expanding strategic horizons. The military is moving toward intra- and inter-service networkcentric organization aimed at increasing interoperability.27 India also continues to improve its
nuclear weapons delivery systems and aims to acquire a triad of land, air, and sea-based nuclear
strike options by 2014. The attention of India’s army and air force leaders has been shifting
steadily to the east; in 2010, the army was given an explicit directive from Defense Minister
Antony to prepare for a two-front war.28 According to the 2011-2012 MOD Annual Report, the
Indian Army
is fully seized of the security needs of the country as well as the requirement of development
of infrastructure in the border areas. Strategically important infrastructure requirements along
the Line of Actual Control have been identified and are being developed in a phased
29
manner.

With its 12th and 13th five-year defense plans (covering the period 2012-2022), India reportedly
aims to raise a corps headquarters, two additional offensive mountain divisions, an artillery
division, and two armored brigades in the north and east of the country: “These ambitious plans
aim to transform the army from a threat-based force to a capability-based force able to conduct
the entire spectrum of war including counter-insurgency operations (COIN) and nuclear conflict
by 2020.”30
The Indian government has authorized the construction of new airbases and “Advance Landing
Grounds” in the country’s northeast close to China. It is also undertaking significant air force
modernization in order to meet its force projection goals. According to the MOD report:
As the [Indian air force or IAF] enters the twelfth Five Year Plan period, [it] is poised to
acquire capabilities that would allow it to conduct network centric enabled operations across
the spectrum of conflict. Military technological growth poses new challenges and provides
unique opportunities to leverage new and current military capabilities in pursuit of national
interests. In pursuance of this strategy, IAF in the current year has put in place a blueprint for
the entire overhaul of the Air Defense network, acquisition of frontline combat aircraft with
state of the art precision weapons and other enabling technologies. It has also bolstered its
transport and helicopter fleets.... 31

The other major realignment in India’s defense posture is taking place along India’s maritime
Exclusive Economic Zone of more than two million square kilometers, the greater IOR, and
potentially beyond.32 Favorable budgeting signals the growing importance of naval capabilities in
New Delhi’s security calculus. According to the MOD report, the Indian Navy has been “playing
a maritime leadership role in the IOR” and expects to increase its capabilities with the
27

“Navy, Air Force Stage Network-Centric Exercise,” Hindu (Chennai), February 9, 2012.
“Briefing: Defending Delhi, Running the Budgetary Obstacle Course,” Jane's Defense Weekly, March 9, 2012.
29
See Indian Ministry of Defense Annual Report 2011-2012 at http://mod.nic.in/reports/AR-eng-2012.pdf.
30
“Briefing: Defending Delhi, Running the Budgetary Obstacle Course,” Jane's Defense Weekly, March 9, 2012.
31
Indian Ministry of Defense, Annual Report 2011-2012, at http://mod.nic.in/reports/AR-eng-2012.pdf.
32
In recent years, India’s naval presence has been seen in the Mediterranean Sea (e.g., evacuating Indian nationals from
Libya) and East of the Malacca Straits (along with energy exploration off Vietnam’s eastern coast).
28

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“enforcement of international laws, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the [IOR] ... [at]
the forefront of our international commitments.” New Delhi’s classified five-year defense plan
(covering the period 2012-2017) also reportedly emphasizes the induction of network-centric
naval platforms and the building of capabilities to undertake expeditionary operations and achieve
force levels needed for “power projection” far from Indian territory.33 Achieving such capabilities
would ideally involve the ability to “dominate” maritime choke points and vital Indian Ocean
SLOCs.34 The induction of the nuclear powered submarines is seen as a step toward realizing
these ambitious defense goals (in 2012, India became only the sixth country to operate a nuclearpowered submarine).35 India also plans to have a three aircraft-carrier capability in the
foreseeable future, with two carriers on order for domestic production.36 In recent years, the IN
has increased its presence on Indian Ocean islands such as Lakshadweep and Andaman and
Nicobar; the latter strategically located archipelago extends to within 150 miles of Indonesia’s
Sumatra Island and is not much farther from the Malacca Straits (see Figure 2).37
In addition to realignments in the army, navy, and air force, domestic security forces are also
undergoing significant reform after the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. India’s Coast Guard
(ICG) is being thoroughly revamped and reinforced. It is now responsible for policing India's
7,517 km-long coastline, 1,197 island territories and 2 million km² Exclusive Economic Zone
against pirates and militant intrusion, among other threats.38 A recently launched National
Maritime Domain Awareness Project includes boosting infrastructure, introducing a networked
coastal surveillance system; acquiring platforms for the ICG, IN, coastal police forces and other
maritime agencies; and developing the National Command Control Communication and
Intelligence infrastructure, which will link some 51 navy and Coast Guard nodes.39 The ICG has
begun instituting reforms but continues to face obstacles with procurement. The central
government has also attempted to reform land-based security forces, including state-controlled
police forces, and intelligence agencies. Efforts to establish a National Counter Terrorism Center
to coordinate various intelligence agencies have been strongly resisted by various national
intelligence agencies, as well as state governments, which hold primary jurisdiction over local
law enforcement.40 State governments have also resisted reforms prescribed by the central
government and state police forces continue to be poorly equipped and trained.41

33

“12th Defence Plan: Focus on Navy’s ‘Expeditionary’ Ops,” Indian Express (Delhi), May 4, 2012.
“Rising Tide—India's Naval Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 5, 2012.
35
Ibid.
36
See Amer Latif, U.S. India Defense Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, June 2012.
37
“Rising Tide—India’s Naval Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 5, 2012.
38
Ibid.
39
“India’s 20/20 Vision: Coastguard Joins the Premier League, Jane’s Navy International, April 26, 2012.
40
See C. Christine Fair, “Prospects for Effective Internal Security Reform in India,” Commonwealth and Comparative
Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, April 2012.
41
Ibid.
34

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Figure 2. Map of the Indian Ocean

Source: Adopted by CRS from open-sources.

Considerable challenges plague the transformation of India’s military and domestic security
forces in their efforts to achieve the ambitious defense posture outlined above. One important
obstacle arises from the poor condition of current equipment and the insufficient pace of both
indigenous and foreign procurement. A leaked letter to the Prime Minister in March 2012 by thenArmy Chief V.K. Singh controversially aired the issue in public. Additionally, numerous
interviews with Indian analysts suggest a widespread frustration with sub-optimal consultation

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between the armed forces and the civilian administration, which is said to undermine urgently
needed cooperation on defense planning.42

Defense Budget
In 2011, India ranked as the sixth largest military spender in the world, accounting for 2.8% of
total global military spending (by comparison, the United States was the largest military spender
at 41%, followed by China at 8.2%).43 India remains South Asia’s biggest defense spender by a
large margin, accounting for more than three-quarters of regional spending in 2011 (Pakistan
accounted for about one-eighth).44 New Delhi allocated just under $40.5 billion for defense
expenditures in its FY2012/13 budget.45 This represents a nominal increase of about 18% over the
previous year’s level. In real terms, the increase would be partially mitigated by high rates of
inflation and year-end upward revision of the FY2011/12 defense budget. As Figure 3 below
suggests, the FY2012/13 budget allocation marks a full decade of steadily increased defense
spending, despite the global economic downturn and India’s own economic slowdown since
2010.46 Such robust growth in India’s defense spending signals New Delhi’s confident reevaluation of the country’s security needs in order to protect and support a growing economy.
Figure 3. India’s Defense Spending

Source: Government of India, Union Budget and Economic Survey data adopted by Amer Latif, “U.S. India
Defense Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 2012.

42

Author interviews, Washington, DC, June-August 2012. Also see Anit Mukherjee, “Failing to Deliver: Post-Crises
Defense Reforms in India, 1998-2010, " Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis Occasional Paper, March 2011.
43
Background paper on “Recent Trends in Military Expenditure for 2011,” SIPRI, April 2012 at http://www.sipri.org/
research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/trends.
44
The Military Balance 2012 (Institute for International and Strategic Studies, London, 2012).
45
Based on the average exchange rate for 2011-2012 through March 15, 2012. This is about 2.1 trillion Indian rupees.
46
See SIPRI Military Expenditure Database at http://milexdata.sipri.org.

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Given India’s historic status as a land power, and its longstanding focus on territorial disputes
with Pakistan and China, the Indian Army has traditionally received the bulk of the overall
defense budget. For FY2012/13, the army was allocated fully half of all funding, followed by the
IAF at 25% and the Navy at 19% (the Defense Research and Development Organization, or
DRDO, receives about 6% of the budget). Over the past decade, and in pursuit of power
projection capabilities as noted above, there has been a gradual shift of focus favoring the Indian
Navy. The FY2012/13 defense budget boosted IN funding by 4% of the overall share, while that
for the army and air force decreased by 1% and 4%, respectively. The IN budget alone has grown
37-fold over the past 25 years, from $181 million in 1987 to some $6.8 billion in 2012.47 The total
defense budget increased 14-fold over the same period (Figure 4 below, generated with
information provided by the Indian government, offers an alternative analysis suggesting similar
trends discussed here).48
Figure 4. Compound Annual Growth Rates (CAGR) by Defense Spending Account

Source: Government of India, Union Budget & Economic Survey data adopted by Amer Latif, “U.S. India
Defense Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 2012.

The budget is broadly divided into revenue and capital spending. Revenues include personnel
salaries, maintenance, and transportation for all three services. Capital funds are allocated for
defense equipment procurement, which is of particular relevance to U.S. and foreign defense
vendors. A large chunk (estimated at 40%) has reportedly been spent on capital outlays in recent
years.49 A service-by-service breakdown of the FY2012/2013 capital expenditure allocates 38%

47

Laxman K Behera, “India’s Defense Budget, 2012-2012,” Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, March 20, 2012.
“Rising Tide—India's Naval Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 5, 2012.
49
Ibid.
48

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($6.4 billion) to the air force, followed by 31% ($5.2 billion) to the navy and 24% ($4 billion) to
the army.50 For a multi-year breakdown of capital outlays for 2004-2013, see Figure 5 below.

Overview of India’s Defense Inventory51
With more than 1.3 million active personnel, India’s is the world’s third-largest military (after
China and the United States).52 India is in the midst of transforming its military into one with
extra-regional and even global reach. This has meant increased emphasis on modern naval and air
assets to better project Indian power. Historically, the Indian military has fought primarily landbased conflicts. India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over Kashmir in 1947-1948 and 1965.
In 1971, India intervened to side with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in Pakistan’s secessionist
war. In 1999, India and Pakistan engaged in a small-scale war in Kargil, located near the
Kashmiri LOC. Beyond these violent conflicts with Pakistan, India fought and lost a brief, but
furious, war with China in 1962. India also sent peacekeeping troops to Sri Lanka in 1987, a force
that ultimately became embroiled in a counterinsurgency campaign against local Tamil militant
groups (New Delhi withdrew those forces in 1990). India is a leading contributor of troops for
U.N. peacekeeping operations around the world. Since 1950, India has participated in 45 out of
the total 69 U.N. missions, involving more than 165,000 Indian soldiers. As of December 2012,
7,839 Indian troops and police officers were deployed on U.N. peacekeeping missions.53

50

Laxman K Behera, “India’s Defense Budget, 2012-2012,” Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, March 20,
2012.
51
The bulk of the information in this section is culled from The Military Balance 2012 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London, 2012) .
52
Additional paramilitary forces number roughly another 1.3 million, with the Home Ministry overseeing most of
these, notably the State Armed Police (450,000), the Central Reserve Police Force (230,000), the Border Security Force
(208,000), the Rashtriya Rifles (65,000), the Assam Rifles (64,000), and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (36,000). A
total of 23 new paramilitary battalions were raised in 2011.
53
See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.

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Figure 5. India’s Capital Outlay Expenditures by Category

Source: Government of India, Union Budget & Economic Survey data adopted by Amer Latif, “U.S. India
Defense Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
June 2012.

The Indian army, comprised of 1.13 million active duty personnel, operates some 3,300 main
battle tanks (the vast majority of them Russian-built T-72s and outdated T-55s, but also including
at least 444 modern T-90s, along with 124 indigenously designed Arjuns); 3,000 towed artillery
tubes; 1,500 armored infantry fighting vehicles; and 232 multirole helicopters. The army is also in
the process of fortifying its eastern border areas. To date, two mountain infantry divisions—
comprising 40,000 personnel—have been raised in the northeastern states of Nagaland and Assam
for deployment along the LOAC. There are plans to arm at least two new regiments along this
frontier with the BrahMos land attack cruise missile by 2017; this would make India’s army the
first in the world to induct supersonic missiles. The MOD is also pushing for the development of
roads, bridges, helipads, and 14 railway lines which will facilitate access to the LOAC.54
India’s navy has grown rapidly in recent years, currently operating 21 principal surface
combatants (1 aircraft carrier, 10 guided-missile destroyers, 10 missile frigates) and 15 tactical
submarines, one of which is a nuclear-powered acquisition from the Russian Navy. There are
more than 60 patrol and coastal combatants, nearly half of them missile-capable corvettes (the
coast guard operates another 63 smaller patrol boats). The IN also has a significant amphibious
capacity: 17 landing ships (the largest acquisition from the U.S. Navy) can carry 4,000 troops or
88 tanks. The navy is developing an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (INS Arihant)
to be armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, as part of its “sea-based strategic deterrence.”55 A
54

“Mirrored Maneuvers: India and China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 24, 2012.
The indigenously-built Arihant is expected to be commissioned into the IN by the middle of 2013. Its acquisition
(continued...)
55

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naval air wing is comprised of 31 combat capable aircraft, including 11 advanced MiG-29
Fulcrum fighters, 11 Sea Harrier ground attack jets, and 9 Russian-built anti-submarine warfare
platforms.
The Indian air force (IAF) flies 798 combat-capable aircraft. Of these, 698 are ground attack jets,
more than one-third of which are deteriorating Russian-built MiG-21s, but also including 153
late-model Su-30 MKI Flankers, as well as 52 French-built Mirage and 106 Anglo-French Jaguar
aircraft (the MiG-21s are to be phased out by 2017). The 64-plane fighter fleet is entirely MiG-29
Fulcrums. The IAF also possesses modest airborne early warning (AEW) and in-flight refueling
capabilities, the latter provided by six Russian-made Il-78 Midas tankers. Russian-built Il-76
platforms have been fitted with advanced Israeli-supplied suites to provide three Phalcon airborne
AEW planes. In 2009, the IAF deployed Su-30MKIs to an area in the northeast of the country
that adjoins Tibet and upgraded its high-altitude airstrips along the LOAC. These airfields are to
also support operations by the newly acquired, U.S.-built C-130J Super Hercules and heavy-duty
C-17 Globemaster III airlifters currently being delivered by U.S.-based Lockheed Martin and
Boeing, respectively. A joint air defense center is also slated for the area.56
The Indian Army Strategic Forces Command oversees as many as 180 intermediate-range Agni
and 280 short-range Prithvi ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. India is
reported to possess up to 100 nuclear warheads, according to most public estimates, and is
believed to continue to produce weapons-grade plutonium.57 In early 2012, India successfully
launched the Agni V, a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads more
than 3,100 miles. This missile now allows India to target China’s eastern population centers, a
development heavily publicized by the Indian media and noted with great interest in Beijing.
In May 2012, DRDO reportedly announced its readiness to launch Phase 1 of its anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) defense system. Its current ABMs are reportedly able to target 2,000-km range
incoming missiles and can be deployed over two cities, which are yet to be chosen. India plans to
have an ABM system capable of targeting 5,000 km range missiles by 2016.58 Some analysts have
argued that, although the tests have been successful, the controlled testing parameters have not
adequately considered potential ABM-evading technology and real-time contingencies.
Furthermore, a well-functioning ABM system is heavily dependent on infrastructure ranging from
high-tech competencies related to communication and surveillance and basic inputs such as a
constant stream of electricity, both of which India is still seeking to build and secure.59 As part of
the missile defense program, the DRDO announced the development of anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons capabilities.60

(...continued)
would establish the third leg of India’s triad (land-air-sea) nuclear deterrence capability. However, current plans are for
this platform to be armed with nuclear missiles with a range of only 435 miles, considered “highly inadequate” by some
senior IN officials. See “Rising Tide—India’s Naval Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 5, 2012.
56
“Mirrored Maneuvers: India and China,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 24, 2012; “Antony to Seek Hike in Defense
Outlay to Counter Twin Threats from Pakistan, China,” Times of India (Delhi), May 9, 2012.
57
See the Arms Control Association fact sheet at http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.
58
“India Plans Deployment of Anti-Missile Defenses,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, May 18, 2012.
59
“Experts Question India Missile Defense System,” Global Security Newswire, May 14, 2012.
60
“Briefing: Space Invaders,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 3, 2011.

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Overview of India’s Defense Procurement System
India’s defense procurement process faces systemic challenges rooted in poor practices for
identifying and approving needed equipment. Understanding the factors that influence the defense
procurement system in India helps put in perspective the current state of military armament and
the defense trade environment.
An embarrassing defeat in the 1962 Indo-China war jolted New Delhi into focusing on the
development of a self-reliant defense industry. Six decades later, the sector is rife with
inefficiency and corruption. Nuclear-related international sanctions and technology control
regimes compelled Indian industries to seek greater self-sufficiency and nudged the country’s
indigenous production capabilities toward particular high-profile items such as missile and
nuclear technology. In recent years, defense procurement has again emerged at the center of the
defense reform debate in India, emphasizing domestic production capabilities. In a July 2012
meeting with DRDO officials, Prime Minister Singh reportedly urged scientists there to “take a
hard look at the pipeline of projects and focus time and material resources on selected areas
where [India] has demonstrated capacity to deliver projects within reasonable time and cost.”61
Despite such remonstrations, corruption, bureaucratic delays, and inefficiencies in the
procurement and production process are seen to severely impair the modernization process and
routinely result in undisbursed allocations.
India reportedly produces only about one-third of its defense equipment, far short of the 70% selfreliance target set in the 1990s.62 One account suggests that a goal of around 45% in domestic
production would be more favorable for New Delhi’s needs.63 As a result, and given newfound
resources with the economic boom of the past decade, India has emerged as the world’s leading
weapons importer.64
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, India accounted for fully 10%
of the world’s total arms imports from 2007 to 2012, and the country is likely to remain the top
weapons importer for the foreseeable future.65 India’s capital defense budget through 2025 has
been estimated at $200 billion; most projections foresee India spending up to $60 billion on new
defense-related purchases over the next six years.66
In the absence of formalized national security objectives, each of the major military services
projects its own requirements based on criteria independent of integrated defense assessments.
This system essentially boils down, in 5- or 15-year plans, to service-specific “wish lists.”
Defense spending is further subject to negotiations between the MOD and the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), both of which tend to be dominated by domestic political considerations rather than by

61

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Address at the Defense Research and Development Organization Award
Function, Indian Prime Minister’s Office website, July 31, 2012.
62
See Laxman Behera, “Defense Planning in India,” Journal of Defense Studies, Vol. 4. No 3, July 2010.
63
Interview with Indian defense analyst Balachandran Gopalan affiliated with the Institute of Defense Studies and
Analysis in Washington, DC, July 2012.
64
SIPRI press release, March 14, 2011.
65
Ibid. See also CRS Report R42678, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011 , by (name redac
ted) and (name redacted).
66
The Military Balance 2012 (Institute for International and Strategic Studies, London, 2012).

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strategic calculations. The armed forces’ limited participation in the process is also seen to result
in suboptimal decision-making in the civilian MOD.67
The “alarming” condition of the Indian army grew highly controversial when, in March 2012,
outgoing Army Chief General V.K. Singh presented a litany of equipment shortfalls seen to be
eroding force preparedness. Featured on the list was an army “devoid of critical ammunition to
defeat enemy tanks”; an air defense system that was “97% obsolete”; and a lack of adequate
weaponry for infantry and special forces battalions.68 In response, the MOD established three
“empowered committees” headed by senior MoD and Indian Army officials to accelerate
procurement.69 The sudden push may have resulted in the long overdue acquisition of 145 M777
Howitzers from the United States, with plans to acquire and deploy another 300-400 along the
LOAC.70 Plans to buy howitzers were first derailed 25 years ago due to the “Bofors” arms
procurement corruption scandal, so damaging that it brought down a government.71
Other Indian major army procurements earmarked for FY2012/13 include an indigenous program
to develop and build a Tactical Communication System for network-centric competence; 133
Light Utility Helicopters; 2,600 locally designed and built Futuristic Infantry Combat vehicles
(FICVs); and artillery purchases of 400 towed 155mm artillery guns and 100 155mm selfpropelled tracked guns.72 The army has already ordered 347 of the latest Russian T-90 tanks (with
another 1,000 such tanks to be built in India under a technology-sharing agreement) and upgrades
on 600 existing T-72s. The bulk of the listed procurements will go toward the replacement of
outdated equipment. Despite the recent boost in procurement, reportedly senior army officers
have said that “acquisitions remain entangled in the MoD's bureaucratic web and hindered by
uncertainty in the decision-making process.”73
The Indian Navy’s procurement performance similarly appears to be realizing mixed results.
Since the 1960s, its indigenous ship-building capacity has grown steadily. The IN expects to
induct five ships every year over the next six to seven years.74 However, in the build-up process,
the IN fleet is projected to drop from its current strength of 150 to 70 before rising back to a
target of 200 platforms.75 Some observers predict that, by 2014-2015, India’s sub-surface fleet
may decrease to an “alarming” 5-6 from its current fleet of 16 and well below a sanctioned
strength of 24.76 The IN has also begun investing in maritime reconnaissance capabilities,
particularly Boeing’s P8-I. Nonetheless, naval weapons systems and aircraft are mostly imported,
a fact largely overlooked in most reviews of the navy’s domestic production.77 An additional
67

See Laxman Behera, “Defense Planning in India,” Journal of Defense Studies, Vol. 4. No 3. July 2010.
“Army Chief's Letter to PM: General V. K. Singh Exposes Chinks in Armor,” Times of India (Delhi), Mar 29, 2012.
69
“MOD Panel to Fast-Track Changes,” Indian Express (Mumbai), April 18, 2012.
70
“India Order 145 M777 Ultra-Light Howitzers from BAE Systems,” IBN Live (New Delhi), May 11, 2012.
71
Ibid. The Bofors Scandal involved bribes paid to Indian government officials in 1986 on a procurement of 400
howitzers from Swedish company AB Bofors, a procurement that was later cancelled. The scandal is widely viewed as
having been a significant factor in Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1989 electoral defeat.
72
See Frost Sullivan, “Indian Budget 2012-13: Aerospace and Defense Highlights,” Defensetalk.com, May 10, 2012.
73
“Briefing: Defending Delhi, Running the Budgetary Obstacle Course,” Jane's Defense Weekly, March 9, 2012.
74
“Rising Tide—India's Naval Expansion Strategy,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 5, 2012.
75
Amer Latif, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2012.
76
See Iskander Rehman, “Deflecting the Assassin’s Mace: The Pentagon’s New AirSea Battle Concept and Its
Strategic Relevance to India,” IDSA Issue Brief, July 7, 2010.
77
Uday Bhaskar, “Indian Navy Afflicted with Common Defense Disease: Hopelessly Low Indigenization and Criminal
(continued...)
68

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order of 12 Poseidons is under discussion. Overall, the IN plans to acquire 500 aircraft and
helicopters, 100 of which would be combat fighter jets.78
Big-ticket platforms soon to be commissioned by the IN include the nuclear-powered attack
submarine Arihant, six French-built Scorpene submarines to be delivered between 2015-2017,
and the aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya—the refurbished Russian Admiral Gorshkov that has
faced persistent delays and huge cost overruns that have repeatedly pushed back the expected
delivery date. All three of these platforms are either imported or built under technology-transfer
agreements. Drawn-out renegotiations have significantly delayed the production and deliveries.
The IAF faces its own set of major procurement challenges, especially with regard to reducing
delays in modernizing its aging Russian-built fleet. The service is urgently upgrading and
augmenting its current fleet of fighter aircraft to fill the anticipated gap when its ageing MiG-21s
are retired. In early 2012, the French-made Dassault Rafale medium multirole combat aircraft
(MMRCA) was selected for the IAF; 126 are to be purchased at a cost of at least $12 billion, with
the great majority planned to be co-produced under license in India. However, disagreements on
pricing are already causing delays. The leading Defense Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU),
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, has also entered an agreement with Russia to build 200-300 fifth
generation fighter aircraft in a deal worth $35 billion.79 Apart from fighter jets, the IAF is in the
process of acquiring trainer aircraft, helicopters, and transport aircraft. As noted above, it recently
inducted six Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules transport planes from the United States (a
contract for another six is currently under consideration), and has purchased ten Boeing C-17
Globemaster III heavy transport aircraft. In line with other services, the IAF is in the process of
establishing an integrated network-centric communications system and boosting its overall
reconnaissance capabilities.80
In early 2011, the MOD unveiled its first Defense Production Policy, which prioritizes indigenous
design, development and manufacture of defense equipment.81 Currently, DPSUs are reported to
supply the bulk of needs of the military, paramilitary, and police, which include most wheeled
vehicles, small arms, light artillery and communications systems.82 Nonetheless, bureaucratic
lethargy, corruption, and public sector inefficiency are commonly faulted for poor performance of
DPSUs. The recent reform process has been gradual, but still yielding to pressures on the
government to improve procurement and production performance. While Indian DPSUs
undertake joint-production ventures under license with a number of foreign defense firms,
indigenous production still lags in designing and building complex indigenous systems,
particularly weapons systems. In the naval sector, procurements of foreign ship designs for
domestic production have run into obstacles reportedly attributed variably to export control
regulations or pricing.83 Apart from the navy, results are similarly mixed. India’s missile
(...continued)
Cost Overruns,” Economic Times (Mumbai), August 31, 2012.
78
K.B. Menon, “Evolution of the Air-to-Air Missiles: Options for the IAF.” India Defense Review, April-June 2012.
79
“Antony to Seek Hike in Defense Outlay to Counter Twin Threats from Pakistan, China,” Times of India (Delhi),
May 9, 2012.
80
“Indian MoD Approves Deals Worth $3.5 Billion,” Jane’s Defense Industry, June 26, 2012.
81
See Bharath Gopalaswamy and Guy Ben-Ari, “India’s Defense Production Policy: Challenges and Opportunities,”
CASI University of Pennsylvania, August 1, 2011.
82
Woolf Gross, “U.S.-India Defense Trade: Sizing Up the Competition,” India Defense Review, April-June 2012.
83
Interview with U.S. Pentagon Naval Official, Washington, DC, August 2012. See also “Private View: India’s Naval
(continued...)

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technology production has been steadily improving marked by the induction of supersonic
BrahMos cruise missiles and the planned induction of the Agni V. The Indian Space Research
Organization (ISRO) is also making headway, albeit gradually, in satellite technology that is
intended to support the shift to network-centric warfare. DPSU Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
continues to struggle with the roll out of the long-awaited Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, which has
been in production for about 25 years. The final version will have a General Electric engine. Both
of India’s indigenous tank projects were abandoned for cheaper more advanced Russian versions.
The Dhruv helicopter stands out as one of the few big-ticket domestic success stories, even as it
has a French turbo-shaft.84
Most recently, New Delhi has been seeking to reform the domestic defense reform sector by
allowing entry of Indian private firms into the defense sector through investment-based joint
ventures with public undertakings, as well as through direct production. Domestic private firms
are still trying to gauge New Delhi’s seriousness with regard to privatization, particularly in light
of mixed signals emanating from Indian government agencies.85 One area of emerging
uncertainty has been the competitiveness of local private companies with existing foreign
investment, well under the stipulated 26% limit. By one account, the recent rejection of a
Mumbai-based private shipyard is indicative of India’s Foreign Investment Promotion Board’s
(FIPB) tendency to “reject a considerable percentage of bids due to concerns over FDI and related
restrictions associated with ownership and control over the bidder.”86 As of mid-2012, it appeared
that the FIPB was approving more joint ventures under current FDI structures, albeit after
considerable delays and rejections earlier in the year. The successful entry of the private sector
into India’s defense production sectors appears to be largely dependent on the government’s
willingness to provide incentives and implement level competitive processes for private
companies to enter a sector traditionally occupied by large government-funded DPSUs.
Many analysts predict that, absent major policy and organizational adjustments, India’s current
efforts to modernize its armed forces will marginally impact the country’s overall capacity to
address security threats. Among the recommended changes are development of a more
transparent and efficient procurement process, creation of a new Chief of Defense Staff position
(to better integrate inter-services planning), and the opening of India’s defense research agencies
to greater oversight.87

(...continued)
Shipbuilders Confront Old Inefficiencies,” Jane’s Navy International, August 23, 2012.
84
Woolf Gross, “U.S.-India Defense Trade: Sizing Up the Competition,” India Defense Review, April-June 2012.
85
With regard to joint ventures (JVs) with DPSUs, the Indian navy has been the first to move forward on the process.
DPSU Mazagoan Docks Ltd. and Pipavav Ltd. entered into the first ever investment-based public-private JV in India in
May 2012. Shortly after, Larsen & Toubro Shipbuilding entered into a JV to build submarines. Currently, publicprivate partnerships are said to be 50:50 joint ventures with DPSUs retaining key decision making powers (“India
Refuses Naval Construction Bid from Bharati Shipyard,” Jane’s Navy International, November 28, 2012).
86
“India Turns Down Naval Construction Bid from Bharati Shipyard,” Jane’s Defense Industry, November 28, 2011.
See also Gaurav Karnik, ed., Doing Business in India (Ernst & Young India, Guragon, 2011).
87
See Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, “The Drag on India’s Military Growth,” Brookings Institution Policy Brief
#176, September 2010.

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India’s Main Security Objectives
As has been noted above, India’s overarching security objectives do not always jibe with those of
the United States, even as basic values and goals are clearly shared. As a developing country with
myriad problems rooted in over-population, poverty, and resource shortages, India’s perspective
on international security emphasizes the country’s acute desire for a pacific external environment
in which it can concentrate on improving its people’s domestic condition. In a September 2012
speech, Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna asserted that,
[T]he foremost priority of Indian foreign policy is to create a favorable external environment
for the pursuit of collective prosperity and the individual welfare of all Indian people.... [In
order to achieve this prosperity, India] needs an equitable and open trading system, a stable
financial system, secure energy supplies, and food security.

He added that India’s political establishment was in agreement that “[a] commitment to
internationalism, independence of judgment in the conduct of external relations, support to the
democratization of the world order and contributions to the maintenance of international peace
and security” lies at the core of Indian foreign policy.88As analysts tend to differ somewhat on the
prioritization of Indian security interests, four major security objectives are discussed below, in
rough order of their geographic proximity to India:
•

India’s periphery and regional security;

•

Asian power balances;

•

securing channels to West Asia; and

•

global security interests.

India’s Periphery and Regional Security89
India is the largest country on the Asian subcontinent by landmass, population, and economy.
India’s great power aspirations are unlikely to be met if New Delhi is unable to manage
relationships in its own neighborhood. In a 2009 speech, former Foreign Secretary and current
Indian Ambassador to the United States Nirupama Rao summarized the importance of stability in
South Asia to India’s prosperity:
That we strive for a peaceful and stable neighborhood and for building peaceful and mutually
beneficial relations with our neighbors goes without saying. This is an issue of critical
importance since in the absence of such a neighborhood, our efforts to play any substantive
regional or global role, in accordance with our size and economic strength, and also our
unhindered economic development would stand to be affected. Therefore, having a peaceful
and stable neighborhood is one of our top most foreign policy goals.90

88

Speech by Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna at the Brown-Indian Initiative Inauguration, Brown
University, September 28, 2012. See the video at http://vimeo.com/51218205.
89
For broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33529, India: Domestic Issues, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Relations,
coordinated by (name redacted).
90
Keynote address by then-Foreign Secretary and current Indian Ambassador to the United States Nirupama Rao at
IDSA conference on “South Asia 2020: Moving Towards Cooperation or Conflict?,” November 4, 2009.

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The deeply intertwined cultural, political, and geographic characteristics of the region compel
India to pursue peaceful relations with its neighbors in order to sustain its own rise. New Delhi’s
ability to establish and maintain predominant power in a stable region is viewed by Indian leaders
as being vital to achieving a peaceful and predictable environment in which it can prosper. In
promoting an amicable regional environment, three major factors appear to shape New Delhi’s
policies: the impact of regional dynamics on India’s domestic security challenges; China’s
growing influence in the subcontinent; and the persistent threat posed to India by political
instability in its neighbors.91

Domestic Security Challenges in a Regional Context
Since the time of independence, New Delhi’s control of large swaths of Indian territory has been
threatened by multiple secessionist movements and insurgencies. These lapses in the center’s
ability to establish and sustain the state’s full writ remain a significant security threat to the
country.92 At present, conflicts in the Jammu and Kashmir and northeastern states, and in the
Maoist or so-called “Red corridor” in inland eastern India, constitute the most pressing domestic
security challenges. Additionally, communal rifts, especially along the Hindu-Muslim divide,
continue to provide ample fodder for political agitation and violence. Beyond security threats
arising due to domestic grievances, trans-regional and global terrorist networks also pose
important security concerns for New Delhi.
In the context of political stresses and instability at home, India’s periphery tends to be critical in
its potential to provide safe haven or other support to anti-government elements within the
country. The continuing structural deficiencies of central and state law enforcement,
counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency forces leave Indian planners feeling vulnerable and
insecure, even despite (slowly and only partially implemented) reforms following the 2008
Mumbai terrorist attack. One analyst argues that, “India’s vulnerabilities ... tempt her enemies—
both internal and external—to repeated and sustained misadventures, [making them] the single
most critical factor that underpins major security threats that confront India.”93 Ambassador Rao
provided a description of this intertwining in her 2009 policy speech:
There is also a need to recognize that our relations with immediate neighbors in South Asia
also have a clear domestic dimension. For example, our relations with Myanmar need to take
into account the presence of tribal groups across our borders that can influence developments
and impact on security in our bordering states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and
Mizoram. At the same time, these links could also be a powerful binder. Our dealings with
Nepal need to take into consideration perspectives of bordering States such as U.P., Bihar,
Sikkim. Similarly, our initiatives with Bangladesh need to take into account perspectives of
West Bengal and our North-eastern States on issues such as migration, water sharing, trade
or transportation.94
91
Indian geopolitics has evolved over millennia. Kautilya, an advisor to the emperor Chandragupta in the 4th century
BCE, developed a “foreign policy geometry” of concentric circles around the “state,” the first comprised of “natural
enemies.” See a review in (name redacted), “Indian Geopolitics, the United States, and Evolving Correlates of Power in
Asia,” Geopolitics 9,2, Summer 2004.
92
While the number of terrorist fatalities presents a declining trend, from 5,839 in 2001 to 1,074 in 2011, one analyst
describes this shift as taking place within a ‘context of enormous and augmenting uncertainty.’ See Ajai Sahni, “India’s
Internal Security Challenges,” India’s Security Challenges at Home and Abroad, NBR Special Report #39, May 2012.
93
Ibid.
94
Keynote address by then Foreign Secretary and current Indian Ambassador to the United States Ambassador
(continued...)

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New Delhi has periodically criticized neighboring governments for allegedly insufficient action
to block cross-border movements by fleeing insurgents, for example from the northeastern states
into Bangladesh and/or Burma. In the case of Pakistan, the Indian government has been vocal
about what it typically calls state-supported attacks carried out in India by Pakistan-based
militants and by Pakistani terrorist networks leveraging grievances of the Muslim community
within India, especially in the Muslim-majority border state of Jammu and Kashmir. In mid-2012,
Indian authorities called on the Pakistani government to investigate the possibility that “elements
based in Pakistan” had fomented a panic among India’s northeastern migrant workers through
text messages and social media threatening revenge for ethnic violence against Muslims living in
the northeast.95
Over the past two decades, the consequence of terrorist attacks on Indian economic prosperity has
been felt more acutely. As a result, the country is attempting to reform and strengthen its
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts, an effort that many analysts suggest has had little
impact.96 New Delhi’s appears to have prioritized trade and aid incentives to promote amicable
relations with its neighbors, paralleling domestic efforts of security reform.97 In addition to taking
steps to normalize ties with Pakistan, India reportedly has approached its other neighbors,
Bangladesh and Nepal in particular, to counter infiltration attempts by Pakistan-based militants.98
New Delhi is also working more closely with extra-regional partners, such as the United States, to
share information and best practices on counterterrorism.

Minimizing External Influence in South Asia
As the dominant power in the South Asian subsystem, India has a keen interest in minimizing the
influence that potentially adversarial external powers are able to exert in the region. Thus,
concerns are mounting in India that China is encroaching upon what New Delhi sees as its
traditional sphere of influence. Beijing’s expanding land and sea access to strategic ports in the
Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean, and Arabian Sea attract acute attention in India. Beijing’s
strengthening aid, trade, and even military links with India’s subcontinental neighbors are seen to
challenge New Delhi’s aspirations of expanding its regional influence. This dynamic has decadesold roots, but became more urgent as China’s development and acquisition of hard power
capabilities accelerated after the 1980s. Former Indian External Affairs and Defense Minister
Jaswant Singh articulated the concept in a 1998 paper on New Delhi’s strategic outlook: “The
Indian subcontinent has an inherent order and an equilibrium, perhaps even a dynamic
disequilibrium. Therefore to permit any force to intrude, in any form, results inevitably in
prolonged destabilization.”99
(...continued)
Nirupama Rao at IDSA conference on “South Asia 2020: Moving Towards Cooperation or Conflict?,” November 4,
2009. Source: MEA website.
95
“India Asks Pakistan to Investigate Root of Panic,” New York Times, August 19, 2012.
96
Interview with South Asia counterterrorism analyst, Washington, DC, July 2012. Also see Ajai Sahni, “National
Confusion on Terror by Center,” February 27, 2012; C. Christine Fair, “Prospects for Effective Internal Security
Reforms in India,” Georgetown University, July 14, 2012.
97
Address by External Affairs Minister on “India’s External Environment and Current Foreign Policy Challenges,”
Institute of South Asian Studies—Singapore, March 9, 2012.
98
“Nepal, India Tackle Terrorism,” Economic Times (Mumbai), January 18, 2010.
99
Jaswant Singh, “What Constitutes National Security in a Changing World Order: Indian Strategic Thought,” CASI
Occasional Paper Number 6, June 1998.

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Beyond the unresolved Indo-Chinese border dispute—the world’s longest and oldest—the most
contentious element of Chinese engagement in the subcontinent has been the Sino-Pakistani
relationship, regularly described as an “all-weather friendship” by officials in both capitals.
Beijing has provided Pakistan with military aid, equipment, and sensitive military technologies,
including widely assumed assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program from the 1980s,
along with continued aid for that country’s ballistic missile production capabilities (aid that is
banned under Missile Technology Control Regime regulations).100 Pakistan is currently codeveloping fighter aircraft with China and is a major purchaser of Chinese naval equipment,
including missile boats and submarines that operate very close to India’s northwestern coast.101
The construction of port facilities in Gwadar, Pakistan, by the Chinese adds to Indian fears of
“encirclement” by China. In September 2012, after a Singaporean company withdrew from a 40year contract to operate the port, a Chinese state-owned company took over port operation at
Gwadar and reportedly plans to invest $10 billion in the project.102 There are even reports that
China has expressed interest in establishing military bases in northwestern Pakistan, perhaps to
facilitate Chinese counterterrorism operations in its own neighboring Xinjiang province, although
such reporting elicits skepticism from some quarters.103
Beijing has also courted India’s other two major continental neighbors, Bangladesh and Nepal, as
well as the Indian Ocean island state of Sri Lanka. China is Sri Lanka’s largest foreign donor,
having provided upwards of a billion dollars annually (roughly half of all the aid Colombo
receives) and is also its biggest investor.104 As in the case of Pakistan, China has constructed a
major harbor in Sri Lanka, at Hambantota, ostensibly for purely commercial purposes. Colombo
benefited significantly from Beijing’s major military aid between 2005 and 2009, when its civil
war ended.105 In contrast, India refused to sell Colombo heavy weapons during this period, due
largely to domestic sentiments in southern India (home to tens of millions of ethnic Tamils)
opposed to arming Sri Lanka’s mainly ethnic Sinhalese military against the island’s Tamil
insurgents. In 2012, China came to Sri Lanka’s diplomatic aid when it voted against a U.N.
Human Rights Council resolution that sought Colombo’s accountability regarding atrocities
committed during the final phases of the civil war. The New Delhi government voted in favor of
the U.S.-sponsored resolution, again likely due to domestic pressure from its own Tamil
constituents. The trend of Chinese support for Sri Lanka continues to be apparent. During a
September 2012 visit to Sri Lanka, China’s defense minister pledged $100 million in assistance
for Army welfare projects.106 It appears that India’s policy limitation in Sri Lanka has nudged
Colombo to look to Beijing to meeting its growing needs for military and economic aid, and
investment, a cause of ongoing concern for New Delhi.
Similarly, China has steadily ratcheted up its economic engagement in Bangladesh. Dhaka is also
reported to be buying Chinese military equipment—including fighter jets, helicopters, and air
defense systems—worth approximately $600 million. Of particular relevance to India’s security
100
See CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by
(name redacted); “Wiki: China Helping Pak Upgrade Its Missiles,” Indian Express (Mumbai), September 12, 2011.
101
Urmila Venugopalan, “Sorry Pakistan, China Is No Sugar Daddy,” Foreign Policy, July 22, 2011.
102
“China Set to Run Gwadar Port as Singapore Quits,” Asia Times, September 5, 2012.
103
“China Plans Military Base in Northern Pakistan, report says.” India Today (New Delhi), January 4, 2012. See also
Amir Mir, “China Seeks Military Bases in Pakistan,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), October 26, 2011).
104
“India and Sri Lanka after the LTTE,” Crisis Group Asia Report N206, 2011.
105
“Clouds on the Sri Lankan Horizon for China,” Colombo Telegraph (Colombo), March 31, 2012.
106
“China Funds to Modernize Sri Lankan Military Training Establishment,” Hindu (Mumbai), September 1, 2012.

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concerns, Beijing and Dhaka are discussing a deep-sea port project for Sonadia Island in the Bay
of Bengal. The proposal is intended to build transportation links from China through Myanmar
into the Bay.107 This development comes on the heels of the Chittagong river port built by China
on the same Bangladeshi coast.108
Nepal is viewed as a “buffer state” between India and China. As such, India seeks to minimize (or
at least balance against) Chinese influence there. The sizeable Tibetan community in Nepal can at
times complicate this dynamic.109 While the Kathmandu government allows Tibetans to live in
Nepal, it has a policy of not allowing any “anti-China” activity inside Nepal. Nepali authorities
prevented the election of a Tibetan community government-in-exile in 2010, a step taken by some
as a hardening of Kathmandu’s stance toward Tibetan refugees.110 There is growing evidence of
Chinese ties with Nepali Maoists. A high profile bribery case alleges that a Maoist leader asked a
Chinese official for substantial amounts of money to influence Madheshi lawmakers in support of
the Maoist’s bid for the prime ministership. Nepal’s most recent former Prime Minister has
traveled to China at least four times; the current Prime Minister, also from the Maoist party, has
stated that Nepal needs to be sensitive to the security concerns of both India and China. New
Delhi has held suspicions about the possibly “Maoist intentions” of Kathmandu’s leaders.111
Meanwhile, indications are that China is looking to increase its engagement with Afghanistan
ahead of the planned 2014 NATO withdrawal from that country. So far, Beijing’s involvement in
Afghanistan has been primarily economic, with large investments planned in natural-resources
extraction projects. In 2008, a Chinese state-owned company invested more than $3.5 billion in
the Aynak Copper Mine in eastern Afghanistan. That project is delayed, yet the China National
Petroleum Company is set to explore oil and natural gas in Afghanistan’s Amu Darya River
Basin, and has pledged to build that country’s first oil refinery within three years.112
There has been a more visible shift by Beijing toward supporting Afghan reconstruction in recent
years. In part, this move to support the present Kabul government appears to be driven by
Beijing’s concern that the Taliban’s return could lead to an uptick in Uighur terrorism affecting
northwestern China.113 In June 2012, the two countries upgraded their ties to a strategic and
cooperative partnership. In September 2012, Zhou Yongkang, a member of the PRC Politburo
who oversees China’s efforts to counter religious extremism and terrorism in northwestern China,
became the first high-ranking Chinese official to visit Afghanistan since 1966. He reportedly
promised China’s active participation in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, signing a number of
agreements which is said to have included plans for the training Afghan police.114 While India’s
unease in the face of growing Chinese influence in the region extends to Beijing’s involvement in
107

“Bangladesh Gets Boost from China Investment,” Asia Times (Hong Kong), April 24, 2012.
“Is Chittagong One of China’s Pearls,” BBC, May 17, 2012.
109
China is particularly sensitive to India’s influence in Tibet. India allows the Dalai Lama to live in India and has
allowed him to visit India’s Arunachal Pradesh state abutting Tibet. The Indian territory of Ladakh, which is near the
Chinese-held, Indian-claimed territory of Aksai Chin, is also ethnically Tibetan.
110
“Nepal Stops Voting for Tibetan Government in Exile,” Hindustan Times (New Delhi), October 4, 2010.
111
See CRS Report RL34731, Nepal: Political Developments and Bilateral Relations with the United States, by (name
redacted).
112
“China Shows Interest in Afghan Security, Fearing Taliban Would Taliban Would Help Separatists,” New York
Times, June 8, 2012.
113
Ibid.
114
“China and Afghanistan Sign Economic and Security Deals,” BBC News, September 23, 2012.
108

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Afghanistan, both countries share a similar goal in mitigating support for Islamist militancy inside
Afghanistan. Nonetheless, China’s growing diplomatic and development role in Afghanistan
could further obstruct New Delhi’s influence in its neighborhood.
Publicly, the Indian government tends to downplay its concerns about Chinese involvement in
South Asia. Likewise, Beijing repeatedly asserts that such involvement is not aimed at containing
India. In his September 2012 visit to South Asia, the Chinese defense minister reportedly told an
audience of Sri Lankan soldiers that,
China attaches great importance to its relations with South Asia nations, and commits itself
to forging harmonious co-existence and mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation with
them. The [People's Liberation Army’s] efforts in conducting friendly exchanges and
cooperation with its counterparts in the South Asian nations are intended for maintaining
regional security and stability and not targeted at any third party.115

To date, India’s primary response to increasing Chinese influence in South Asia has been an
endeavor to forge deeper ties with its own neighbors. In a rare public acknowledgment of the
dynamic, a senior New Delhi official addressed the matter by stating,
China’s relations with our South Asian neighbors are also growing in many areas with
increased trade and economic activity, political level interaction, and cultural and educational
exchanges, apart from transportation links and connectivity. But the compelling logic and
rationale for closer ties between our South Asian neighbors and India must not be deterred or
diluted by such developments. These are ties dictated by geography, the need for security
and stability, mutual economic advantage, transit and connectivity, shared cultural traditions,
the movement of people, common approaches to the management of natural disasters and
climate change, and developmental priorities that can only be achieved by close cooperation
and constant dialogue.116

Encouraging Political Stability Within and Between Neighbors
Political instability and militarization in neighboring countries threaten India through the
spillover of refugees and expansion of terrorist safe havens, which in turn exacerbate the potential
for conventional armed conflict. There can be no doubt that India’s is a troubled neighborhood:
One Indian analyst pointed out that all 6 countries sharing a land border with India—Bhutan,
Bangladesh, Burma, China, Nepal, and Pakistan—are among the 60 listed in Foreign Policy
magazine’s 2009 Failed State Index (China has since been removed). Sri Lanka also appears on
the list.117 New Delhi considers the adoption of representative political systems by its neighbors
to be a key step toward stabilizing the region and improving its relations with countries on the
Asian subcontinent.118

115

“Asian Giants Seek Better Ties: China’s Defense Minister in India,” Reuters Canada, September 2, 2012.
Keynote address by then-Foreign Secretary and current Indian Ambassador to the United States Ambassador
Nirupama Rao at IDSA conference on “South Asia 2020: Moving Towards Cooperation or Conflict?,” November 4,
2009.
117
Ajai Sahni, “India’s Internal Security Challenges,” in India’s Security Challenges at Home and Abroad, NBR
Special Report #39, May 2012. See the Index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive.
118
See Indian Ministry of External Affairs Annual Report 2011-2012 at http://www.mea.gov.in/annual-reports.htm?57/
Annual_Reports.
116

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From New Delhi’s perspective, the dominant influence of Pakistan’s military in the formulation
of Pakistan’s foreign and national security policies—influence that has at many times come
through direct military control of the Islamabad government—has been a central factor in
regional instability. With the increased incidence of Islamist militancy in Pakistan, India has
become increasingly concerned about political instability in its western neighbor. According to
External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, as the internal security situation in Pakistan continues to
deteriorate, “power has fragmented landing in many hands, leading to the emergence of multiple
centers of power. This has been reflected in attempts to cross border infiltration as also in the
increase in cease fire violations ... climaxed by the appalling terrorist attack in Mumbai.”119 New
Delhi holds a similar view on the impact of instability in Afghanistan fearing that the planned
NATO withdrawal from that country will leave Kabul acutely vulnerable to both Taliban
militancy and Pakistani manipulation, with attendant security worries for India. Indian
government policies in Afghanistan are thus intended to help the “Afghan government and people
in building a stable democratic and pluralistic society.”120
Despite its continued wariness toward the Maoist government in Nepal, especially as that
government grows closer to Beijing, India has extended its support for the multi-party political
process underway in Kathmandu, extolling the (modest) progress being made toward democracy
there.121 It has similarly supported Bhutan’s adoption of an electoral process and claimed to have
played a positive role during the recent political turmoil in Maldives, which was welcomed by all
political parties in the country.122 In the case of Sri Lanka, India consistently encouraged an end to
the civil war there, then later urged Colombo to consolidate post-conflict stability by reconciling
with ethnic minority groups in the country. The latest return to democracy in Bangladesh has
appeared to work in favor of the Indian government with the 2008 election of Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League, a traditionally pro-India party. In the case of Burma, India has
until recently come under international criticism for working with the authoritarian military
regime there. New Delhi’s security, economic, and strategic concerns related to Burma have been
cited by analysts for India’s straying from its generally pro-democracy positions in the region.123
While democratic governments in neighboring countries have not always translated into cordial
relations with India, New Delhi has tended to cultivate greater influence with neighbors during
periods of democratic as opposed to authoritarian leadership (New Delhi’s embrace of the Nepali
monarchy in the 1990s is a notable exception). Furthermore, India’s own experience with
democracy, and political stability and continuity over the long term, anchors its position as a
proponent of development and stability through representative politics.124

119
Inaugural Address by Former Minister for External Affairs Shri Pranab Mukherjee at the Seminar on “SubRegionalism Approach to Regional Integration in South Asia: Prospects and Opportunities,” Sikkim University,
December 19, 2008.
120
Ibid.
121
Address by External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna on “India’s External Environment and Current Foreign Policy
Challenges,” at the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore, March 9, 2012.
122
Ibid.
123
“Burma Leader's India Visit Draws Rights Criticism,” BBC, July 25, 2010.
124
Remarks by Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Launching of U.N. Democracy Fund, Indian
Ministry of External Affairs website, September 14, 2005.

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Asian Power Balances
As Asian countries grow in economic influence, there are newly urgent concerns about ensuring
security guarantees that will underpin a peaceful expansion of these eastern economies. China’s
rapid economic and military rise heralds the potential for a strategic imbalance in Asia favoring
Beijing. These developments are being closely watched by China’s neighbors, not least of all
India, which additionally faces Beijing’s greater presence in South Asia.125 One senior Indian
analyst articulated this growing concern in a 2012 report:
If the centrality of China to East Asian security was never in doubt, its role was relatively
marginal to the rest of Asia until the last decade. China’s rapid rise, however, has raised the
prospects of Beijing challenging the primacy of the United States in East Asia and emerging
as a player of strategic consequence in South Asia, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the
Indian Ocean. The increasing influence of China in these regions has compelled India to
rethink its own strategy toward its neighboring regions and to recalibrate its ties with the
United States [emphasis added].126

East and Southeast Asia embarked on robust, export-oriented growth trajectories in the early
1990s and, barring a brief hitch, continue to prosper. At the center of this boom is the Chinese
economy, which has made it a country with considerable regional and global influence. Beijing’s
new wealth has in part been devoted to building Chinese military capabilities, especially in the
areas of air and naval power projection, and anti-access/area denial capabilities. The security
implications for the IOR may sharpen to the extent that China seeks a greater naval presence in
the region stretching from the Straits of Malacca and Gulf of Thailand in the east, to Somalia and
the Persian Gulf to India’s west. Furthermore, the vast geographic expanse of China itself,
abutting far-flung countries such as India, Russia, and South Korea, sitting across narrow straits
from Japan and Taiwan, makes that country and its increasing influence a huge factor in any
meaningful global security calculus for the early 21st century. As China’s influence expands,
economic doldrums in the West and Washington’s absorption with domestic fiscal matters have
led to considerable regional anxiety about strategic U.S. drawdown from the Indo-Pacific in
coming years, a nervousness that has continued in some quarters even after the Obama
Administration’s late 2011 announcement of a U.S. “rebalancing” toward Asia.127
India’s regional and global power aspirations thus run up against China’s presence. Some analysts
suggest that India’s continued rise will be increasingly linked to the nature of its engagement with
China. While some aspects of India-China relations, including bilateral trade, have warmed
measurably in recent years, the two countries have yet to settle conflicting territorial claims.
Militarized tensions between India and China appear to have increased over the past two years
despite a 30-fold jump in the value of their bilateral trade over the past decade. Many
125

Analysts taking a “realist” political perspective view China as an external balancer in the South Asian subsystem,
with Beijing’s material support for Islamabad allowing Pakistan to challenge the aspiring regional hegemony of a
(regionally) more powerful India. More wary observers, especially in India, see Chinese support for Pakistan as a key
aspect of Beijing’s perceived policy of “encirclement,” or constraint, of India as a means of preventing or delaying
New Delhi’s ability to challenge Beijing’s region-wide influence.
126
C. Raja Mohan, “Managing Multipolarity: India’s Security Strategy in a Changing World,” in India’s Security
Challenges at Home and Abroad, NBR Special Report #39, May 2012.
127
Christopher Preble, “About That Pivot to Asia,” National Interest, June 11, 2012. The U.S. Seventh Fleet continues
to be the IOR’s premier naval power, and the United States has undertaken some modest but still concrete “pivoting” of
its resources. See CRS Report R42448, Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward
Asia, coordinated by (name redacted).

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commentators speculate that a new “Great Game” is unfolding between Asia’s two largest and
most populous countries.128 Adding to New Delhi’s sense of insecurity have been suspicions
regarding China’s long-term nuclear weapons capabilities and strategic intentions in South and
Southeast Asia. Beyond the decades-long pursuit of accommodation with rival Pakistan, key
interstate (as opposed to primary domestic) determinants of New Delhi’s power status in Asia
may include building a credible military deterrent; consolidating ties with China’s East Asian
neighbors; and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean Region.

Building a Credible Military Deterrent
China’s military has taken major strides over the past two decades and now far outpaces India’s
own more modest military inventory and capabilities. Beijing has also prioritized improvements
in transportation networks connecting eastern China to Tibet and the LOAC, allowing for the
rapid deployment of Chinese forces to border areas. The asymmetry in military capabilities
between the two countries is longstanding and was starkly exposed during the 1962 Indo-China
war. Since that time India has attempted to close the gap, but with little success, given China’s
continuing energetic procurement of advanced weaponry. Despite numerous attempts at reform,
political obstacles, corruption, international sanctions and budget constraints have impeded New
Delhi’s pursuit of some measure of parity, even as New Delhi has recently acquired the ability to
target China’s eastern cities with nuclear-tipped missiles. Until recently, posturing against
Pakistan and dealing with domestic security threats have tended to monopolize India’s military
resources and attention.
Nevertheless, and as described above, India has been reorienting its resources in order to build a
credible deterrent to any potential Chinese aggression.129 New Delhi tested its first nuclear
explosive device in 1974 and became an overt nuclear weapons power in 1998. Currently, it is
focusing on boosting its nuclear deterrent capabilities by producing medium-range ballistic
missiles and establishing a triad (air, land, sea) of launch platforms. The Indian army and air force
are also deploying their resources to areas along the disputed LOAC. Meanwhile, the Indian navy
is expanding its presence in the IOR, a region of critical importance to India that has recently seen
signs of increased Chinese naval presence. While the New Delhi government avoids claims that
its recent military reorientation is “directed against” China, analysts widely conclude that the
augmentation of the Indian military is driven significantly by concerns about China’s rapidly
modernizing military.

Consolidating Ties with China’s East Asian Neighbors
India’s “Look East” policy, initiated by Prime Minister Rao in 1991, coincided with the country’s
economic liberalization and has for two decades reflected New Delhi’s focused efforts to deepen
commercial and diplomatic relations with East and Southeast Asia. The Indian government has
also expanded its bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with countries in East Asia, in
part as a means to address common security challenges as well as in response to China’s growing
presence. India actively seeks participation in most pan-East Asian economic and security
structures, which include the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and affiliated
forums such as the ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defense
128
129

“Mountains to Climb: China’s Complex Relationship with India,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 7, 2010.
See the “Current Indian Defense Posture” section above for more detail.

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Ministers Meeting, and the most recent East Asia Summit. Like China and United States, India is
an ASEAN Dialogue Partner. Moreover, India has been a member of the ARF since 1996, a forum
in which 27 member states come together to consult on matters affecting regional peace and
security, which includes upgraded efforts to combat international terrorism and threats to
maritime security.
New Delhi’s cultivation of bilateral defense relations with countries in the region appears to have
accelerated significantly over the past decade. In East Asia, Japan and South Korea have
increased security cooperation with India. In June 2012, Japan and India conducted joint naval
exercises off the Japanese coast, a move with symbolic value in demonstrating the Asia-Pacific
security strategy pursued by both countries.130 Prior to this, Japan was invited to the 2007 and
2009 “Malabar” naval exercises, originally a bilateral U.S.-India initiative.131 In 2007 there were
also initial quadrilateral talks held among the United States, India, Japan, and Australia.132
However, these talks do not appear to have been formalized since. As recently as October 2012,
India conducted trilateral talks with Japan and the United States.133 In 2010, India and South
Korea signed a Strategic Partnership agreement. New Delhi is also exploring defense production
and procurement options with South Korea.134
In Southeast Asia, India’s bilateral engagements with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia,
and the Philippines have likewise strengthened over the past decade. Areas of cooperation range
from training of armed forces at Indian bases to military exercises, anti-piracy, and
counterterrorism efforts.135 According to many analysts, territorial disputes between these
ASEAN countries and China, fueled by fears of Chinese domination of the South China Sea and
surrounding SLOCs, have led to rapid arms acquisitions by these countries, particularly naval
acquisitions, including submarines. Since 2011, New Delhi has reportedly considered training
Vietnam in submarine operations, in addition to ongoing naval cooperation. Malaysia has also
reached out to New Delhi for similar training assistance. India’s defense ties with Southeast Asian
countries appear to have been energized in light of heightened tensions in the region.
India, along with its defense partners in East and Southeast Asia, has tended to be extremely
cautious about conveying any appearance of an adversarial posture toward China. China’s trade
and economic status in Asia has emerged as a major disincentive for smaller neighboring
economies benefitting from the country’s rise. Beijing is said to increasingly employ coercive
economic diplomacy in response to territorial disputes with countries such as the Philippines.136
Furthermore, internal fractures among ASEAN members tend to undermine collaborative
approaches toward security threats facing multiple nations in the region. While New Delhi
130

“As China Eyes India Ocean, Japan and India Pair Up on Defense,” New York Times–India Ink, July 27, 2012.
See “India, Japan, U.S. Foster Relationships During MALABAR,” U.S. Navy website, June 5, 2009, at
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=45022
132
“India Measures Itself Against a China That Doesn’t Notice,” New York Times, August 31, 2011. As the U.S.-India
partnership continues to develop—and a newly assertive India pushes back against Chinese diplomatic pressures—
Chinese complacence has correspondingly receded.
133
“India-U.S.-Japan Meet Rankles China,” Hindu (Chennai), October 30, 2012.
134
Media Briefing by Secretary (East) on Prime Minister’s visit to Republic of Korea, Indian Ministry of External
Affairs website, March 25, 2012
135
See “India to Continue Training Singapore troops,” Defense News, July 11, 2012; “India, Indonesia: Towards
Strategic Convergence,” IDSA, January 24, 2011; “India to Help Train Vietnam in Submarine Operations,” Times of
India, September 15, 2011; “India, Malaysia Seek Closer Ties,” Defense News, January 30, 2012.
136
Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy,” The Diplomat, July 25, 2012.
131

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remains keen on strengthening its ties with countries across the region, so far the security policy
aspects of its Look East approach remain vague in their ambitions to counter China and focus
heavily on collective security challenges facing the region.

Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean Region and Beyond
For India, the competition for influence in Asia is more likely to take place much closer to home.
China’s involvement in developing and/or operating major new ports in Pakistan (at Gwadar), Sri
Lanka (at Hambantota), Bangladesh (at Chittagong), and Burma (at Sittwe) represents a potential
“string of pearls” strategy which some strategic analysts and media commentators point to as
evidence of Beijing’s aim to encircle India with nascent naval bases. In 2010, two Chinese
warships paid a first-ever port visit to Burma, exacerbating fears among some that Chinese naval
power was being wielded too closely to Indian shores.137 China has also shown greater
willingness in recent years to send its armed frigates on escort and counter-piracy missions in or
beyond the IOR.138 Beijing’s plan to develop an overland transportation and energy link from the
northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal through Burma to Yunnan is another aspect of this
perceived strategy.139
Many analysts view the Indian Ocean Region as a key stage upon which 21st century geopolitical
power struggles will play out. Apart from strengthening its bilateral relations with IOR countries
and military presence in the Ocean, India is actively pursuing multilateral initiatives with
countries bordering the Indian Ocean through the 20 nation Indian Ocean Rim-Association for
Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). Established in 1997, the priority areas of the organization
include maritime safety and security, trade and investment facilitation, fisheries management,
disaster risk reduction, academic and cultural exchanges, and tourism.140
China’s maritime presence in the Indian Ocean assumes increasing importance in light of India’s
need to protect its expanding sea-borne trade links with the nations of Southeast Asia. In July
2011, a Chinese warning reportedly issued to an Indian Navy vessel accompanying a state-owned
energy exploration company partnering with Vietnam in the South China Sea highlighted the
potential for India-China disputes beyond the LOAC. Some interpreted the presence of Indian
navy ships off the Vietnamese coast as “possibly the start of an Indian bid for influence in the
South China Sea.”141 China’s stiff reaction to the Indian naval vessel’s presence was an indication
of the obstacles India could face as it expands its presence in Asia. In recent years, Indian
authorities have shown greater confidence voicing a position on freedom of navigation issues
outside the IOR, particularly by commenting more directly on South China Sea disputes. In June

137

“India-China Relations Hit By Defense Row,” Agence Presse France, August 27, 2010; “India Responds to Chinese
Missile Moves,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 26, 2010; “China Warships Dock in Burma, Rattling Rival Naval
Power India,” Christian Science Monitor, August 30, 2010.
138
According to the 2012 Military Balance, China has maintained a counter-piracy mission in the IOR since December
2008. In February and March 2011, it sent a frigate to the Mediterranean to escort 36,000 Chinese migrant workers
being evacuated. There was no precedent in the current Chinese regime’s naval military history of sending a military
asset for nonmilitary evacuations.
139
See “India, China Rivalry and a Tale of Two Ports,” Reuters, March 25, 2011.
140
See IOR-ARC brochure at http://www.iorarc.org/media/69449/ior-arc_brochure.pdf.
141
“India, China Navies Square Off in Nearby Seas and Beyond,” Reuters, September 6, 2011; “Indian Ships Visit
Vietnam,” Defense News, July 11, 2011.

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2012, in what appears to indicate a growing trend, an Indian diplomat emphasized the relevance
of the South China Sea to India against a background of territorial disputes in the region:
There is common commitment to maintaining freedom of the seas, combating terrorism and
promoting inclusive economic growth. India, Japan and [South Korea] depend heavily on the
Sea Lanes of Communications for their energy security. These are also the mainstay for trade
and connectivity amongst our countries and other countries in the region. India has a valued
geostrategic location straddling the SLOCs. The Indian Ocean Rim is characterized by large
Exclusive Economic Zones and unexplored and untapped marine resources. Similar potential
exists for example in the South China Sea which today is witnessing competing claims. Our
common objective is to see that the seas and oceans become regions of co-operation instead
of competition p

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42948. Public record. Not legal advice.