# U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42784 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** Reports - **Published:** May 1, 2025 - **Citation:** R42784 ## Text U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress Updated May 1, 2025 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R42784 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Summary Over the past 15 years, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). China’s actions in the SCS—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. PRC domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential broader U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursuing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. Potential specific U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: dissuading China from carrying out additional baseconstruction activities in the SCS, moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, or declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; and encouraging China to reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, halt actions intended to put pressure against Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands, provide greater access by Philippine fisherman to waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal or in the Spratly Islands, adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, and accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Congressional Research Service U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1 U.S. Interests in SCS and ECS .................................................................................................. 1 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 1 Specific Elements................................................................................................................ 1 Maritime Territorial and EEZ Disputes Involving China .......................................................... 7 Maritime Territorial Disputes.............................................................................................. 7 EEZ Dispute ........................................................................................................................ 8 Relationship of Maritime Territorial Disputes to EEZ Dispute .......................................... 8 China’s Approach to SCS and ECS ........................................................................................... 9 Overview ............................................................................................................................. 9 Selected Elements ............................................................................................................. 10 Assessments of China’s Strengthened Position in SCS .................................................... 16 U.S. Position Regarding Issues Relating to SCS and ECS ..................................................... 17 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 17 Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program ........................................................................... 19 Taiwan Strait Transits ....................................................................................................... 20 Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 21 U.S. Strategy for Competing Strategically with China in SCS and ECS ................................ 21 Overview ........................................................................................................................... 21 U.S. Strategy During First Trump Administration ............................................................ 27 U.S. Strategy During Biden Administration ..................................................................... 29 Assessing U.S. Strategy .................................................................................................... 31 Risk of Incident, Crisis, or Conflict Involving U.S. Forces .................................................... 32 Risk Relating to U.S. and PRC Military Operations In SCS ............................................ 32 Risk Relating to Maritime Territorial Disputes Involving Allies ...................................... 32 Whether United States Should Ratify UNCLOS .................................................................... 33 Legislative Activity in the 118th Congress ..................................................................................... 35 Legislative Activity for FY2025 ............................................................................................. 35 FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (H.R. 8070/S. 4638/H.R. 5009 /P.L. 118-159)........................................................................................................ 35 Other Legislative Activity ....................................................................................................... 35 Introduced in House .......................................................................................................... 35 Introduced in Senate ......................................................................................................... 36 Figures Figure 1. Reported Military Facilities at SCS Sites Occupied by China ....................................... 15 Figure 2. Reported PRC Aircraft, Missile, and Radar Ranges ...................................................... 16 Figure A-1. Maritime Territorial Disputes Involving China .......................................................... 38 Figure A-2. Locations of 2001, 2002, and 2009 U.S.-PRC Incidents at Sea and In Air ............... 41 Figure E-1. Map of the Nine-Dash Line ........................................................................................ 71 Figure E-2. EEZs Overlapping Zone Enclosed by Map of Nine-Dash Line ................................. 72 Congressional Research Service U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Figure G-1. EEZs in South China Sea and East China Sea ........................................................... 94 Figure G-2. Claimable World EEZs .............................................................................................. 95 Tables Table 1. China’s Apparent Goals and Supporting Actions for South China Sea ........................... 10 Appendixes Appendix A. Maritime Territorial and EEZ Disputes in SCS and ECS ........................................ 37 Appendix B. U.S. Security Treaties with Japan and Philippines ................................................... 45 Appendix C. Treaties and Agreements Related to the Maritime Disputes .................................... 47 Appendix D. July 2016 Tribunal Award in Philippines-China SCS Arbitration Case ................... 57 Appendix E. China’s Approach to Maritime Disputes in SCS and ECS ....................................... 61 Appendix F. Assessments of China’s Strengthened Position in SCS ............................................ 81 Appendix G. U.S. Position Regarding SCS, ECS, and EEZ Operational Rights .......................... 84 Appendix H. U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program .......................................................... 99 Appendix I. Writings by Observers Regarding U.S. Strategy for SCS and ECS ........................ 105 Contacts Author Information....................................................................................................................... 111 Congressional Research Service U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Introduction This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). Over the past 15 years, the SCS has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition.1 China’s actions in the SCS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the ECS are another concern for U.S. observers. PRC domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS, ECS, and Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. The issue for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. For a brief overview of maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS that involve China, see “Maritime Territorial Disputes,” below, and Appendix A. Other CRS reports provide additional and more detailed information on these disputes.2 Background U.S. Interests in SCS and ECS Overview Although disputes in the SCS and ECS involving China and its neighbors may appear at first glance to be disputes between faraway countries over a few rocks and reefs in the ocean that are of seemingly little importance to the United States, the SCS and ECS can engage U.S. interests for a variety of strategic, political, and economic reasons, including but not necessarily limited to those discussed in the sections below. Specific Elements U.S. Regional Allies and Partners, and U.S. Regional Security Architecture The SCS, ECS, and Yellow Sea border three U.S. treaty allies: Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. (For additional information on the U.S. security treaties with Japan the Philippines, see Appendix B.) In addition, the SCS and ECS (including the Taiwan Strait) surround Taiwan, 1 For more on U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia, also known as great power competition, see CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 2 See CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China Sea Disputes, by Ben Dolven, Caitlin Campbell, and Ronald O'Rourke; CRS In Focus IF12550, China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea, by Caitlin Campbell, Ben Dolven, and William Piekos; CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, by Ben Dolven et al.; CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan; and CRS Report R43894, China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), by Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias. Congressional Research Service 1 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas regarding which the United States has certain security-related policies under the Taiwan Relations Act (H.R. 2479/P.L. 96-8 of April 10, 1979),3 and the SCS borders Southeast Asian nations that are current, emerging, or potential U.S. partner countries, such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Indonesia. In a conflict with the United States, PRC bases in the SCS and forces operating from them4 would add to a network of PRC anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities intended to keep U.S. military forces outside the first island chain (and thus away from China’s mainland and Taiwan).5 PRC bases in the SCS and forces operating from them could also help create a bastion (i.e., a defended operating sanctuary) in the SCS for China’s emerging sea-based strategic deterrent force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).6 In a conflict with the United States, PRC bases in the SCS and forces operating from them would be vulnerable to U.S. attack. Attacking the bases and the forces operating from them, however, would tie down the attacking U.S. forces for a time at least, delaying the use of those U.S. forces elsewhere in a larger conflict, and potentially delay the advance of U.S. forces into the SCS. Short of a conflict with the United States, PRC bases in the SCS, and more generally, PRC domination over or control of its near-seas region could help China to do one or more of the following on a day-to-day basis: • • • • • control fishing operations, oil and gas exploration activities, seabed mining, and seabed internet cable-laying operations7 in the SCS—a body of water with an area more than twice that of the Mediterranean Sea;8 coerce, intimidate, or put political pressure on other countries bordering on the SCS; announce and enforce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS; announce and enforce a maritime exclusion zone (i.e., a blockade) around Taiwan; facilitate the projection of PRC military presence and political influence further into the Western Pacific; and 3 For more on the Taiwan Relations Act, see CRS In Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence; and CRS In Focus IF12481, Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues, by Caitlin Campbell. 4 For an overview of some of the A2/AD capabilities that China has built on sites that it occupies in the SCS, see J. Michael Dahm, Introduction to South China Sea Military Capability Studies, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, July 2020, 17 pp. See also Zachary Haver (Insikt Group), The People's Liberation Army in the South China Sea: An Organizational Guide, Recorded Future, January 19, 2022, 32 pp. 5 The term first island chain refers to a string of islands, including Japan and the Philippines, that encloses China’s near-seas region. The term second island chain, which reaches out to Guam, refers to a line that can be drawn that encloses both China’s near-seas region and the Philippine Sea between the Philippines and Guam. For a map of the first and second island chains, see Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Annual Report to Congress, released on December 18, 2024, p. 67. The exact position and shape of the lines demarcating the first and second island chains often differ from map to map. 6 See, for example, Felix K. Chang, “China’s Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Capability in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 5, 2021. 7 Regarding seabed internet cable-laying operations, see, for example, Anna Gross, Alexandra Heal, Demetri Sevastopulo, Kathrin Hille, and Mercedes Ruehl, “China Exerts Control over Internet Cable Projects in South China Sea,” Financial Times, March 13 2023. 8 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) states that the area of the South China Sea is 6.963 million square kilometers (about 2.688 million square miles)—more than twice that of the Mediterranean Sea, which is 2.967 million square kilometers (about 1.146 million square miles). (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Geophysical Data Center, “World Ocean Volumes,” accessed April 30, 2025, at https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/sites/g/files/anmtlf171/files/2023-01/World%20Ocean%20Volumes.pdf.) Congressional Research Service 2 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • help achieve a broader goal of becoming a regional hegemon in its part of Eurasia. In light of some of the preceding points, PRC bases in the SCS, and more generally, PRC domination over or control of its near-seas region could complicate the ability of the United States to • • • • intervene militarily in a crisis or conflict between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan; fulfill U.S. obligations under U.S. defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines and South Korea; operate U.S. forces in the Western Pacific for various purposes, including maintaining regional stability, conducting engagement and partnership-building operations, responding to crises, and executing war plans; and prevent the emergence of China as a regional hegemon in its part of Eurasia. A reduced U.S. ability to do one or more of the above could encourage countries in the region to reexamine their own defense programs and foreign policies, potentially leading to a further change in the region’s security architecture that might not be in the U.S. interest. Some observers believe that China is trying to use disputes in the SCS and ECS to raise doubts among U.S. allies and partners in the region about the dependability of the United States as an ally or partner, or to otherwise drive a wedge between the United States and its regional allies and partners, so as to weaken the U.S.-led regional security architecture and thereby facilitate greater PRC influence over the region. Some observers remain concerned that maritime territorial disputes in the ECS and SCS could lead to a crisis or conflict between China and a neighboring country such as the Philippines or Japan, and that the United States could be drawn into such a crisis or conflict as a result of obligations the United States has under bilateral security treaties with the Philippines and Japan. Principle of Nonuse of Force or Coercion A key element of the international order that the United States and its allies established in the years after World War II9 is the principle that force or coercion should not be used as a means of settling disputes between countries, and certainly not as a routine or first-resort method. Some observers are concerned that China’s actions in SCS and ECS challenge this principle and—along with Russia’s war against Ukraine—could help reestablish the very different principle of “might makes right” (i.e., the law of the jungle) as a routine or defining characteristic of international relations.10 Principle of Freedom of the Seas Another key element of the post-World War II international order is the principle of freedom of the seas, meaning the treatment of the world’s seas under international law as international waters 9 For more on international order that the United States and its allies established in the years after World War II, see the section entitled “Defense and Promotion of Liberal International Order” in CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 10 See, for example, Dan Lamothe, “Navy Admiral Warns of Growing Sense That ‘Might Makes Right’ in Southeast Asia,” Washington Post, March 16, 2016. Related terms and concepts include the law of the jungle or the quotation from the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Congressional Research Service 3 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas (i.e., as a global commons), and freedom of operations in international waters. Freedom of the seas is sometimes referred to as freedom of navigation, although the term freedom of navigation is sometimes defined—particularly by parties who might not support freedom of the seas—in a narrow fashion, to include merely the freedom for commercial ships to pass through sea areas, as opposed to the freedom for both civilian and military ships and aircraft to conduct various activities at sea or in the airspace above. A more complete way to refer to the principle of freedom of the seas, as stated in the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) report, is “all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations by international law.”11 DOD stated in 2015 that freedom of the seas includes more than the mere freedom of commercial vessels to transit through international waterways. While not a defined term under international law, the Department uses “freedom of the seas” to mean all of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace, including for military ships and aircraft, recognized under international law. Freedom of the seas is thus also essential to ensure access in the event of a crisis. 12 The principle of freedom of the seas dates back about 400 years, to the early 1600s,13 and is reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Article 89 of which states, “No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” The principle of freedom of the seas has long been a matter of importance to the United States. DOD stated in 2018 that Throughout its history, the United States has asserted a key national interest in preserving the freedom of the seas, often calling on its military forces to protect that interest. Following independence, one of the U.S. Navy’s first missions was to defend U.S. commercial vessels in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea from pirates and other maritime threats. The United States went to war in 1812, in part, to defend its citizens’ rights to commerce on the seas. In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson named “absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” as one of the universal principles for which the United States and other nations were fighting World War I. Similarly, before World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt declared that our military forces had a “duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the seas.” 14 DOD similarly stated in 2019 that Since its founding, the United States has stood for—and fought for—freedom of the seas. As a result of that commitment, freedom of navigation has been enshrined as a fundamental tenet of the rules-based international order for the last 75 years. In that time, it has proved essential to global security and stability and the prosperity of all nations.15 11 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to Congress, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, Fiscal Year 2023, generated on March 8, 2024, released on May 8, 2024, PDF page 3 of 6. 12 Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, undated but released August 2015, p. 2. 13 The idea that most of the world’s seas should be treated as international waters rather than as a space that could be appropriated as national territory dates back to Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a founder of international law, whose 1609 book Mare Liberum (“The Free Sea”) helped to establish the primacy of the idea over the competing idea, put forth by the legal jurist and scholar John Seldon (1584-1654) in his book 1635 book Mare Clausum (“Closed Sea”), that the sea could be appropriated as national territory, like the land. For further discussion, see “Hugo Grotius’ ‘Mare Liberum’— 400th Anniversary,” International Law Observer, March 10, 2009. 14 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to Congress, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, Fiscal Year 2018, Pursuant to Section 1275 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, December 31, 2018 (generated February 28, 2019), p. 1. 15 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to Congress, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, Fiscal Year 2019, Pursuant to Section 1275 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 (P.L. 114(continued...) Congressional Research Service 4 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Some observers are concerned that China’s interpretation of law of the sea and its actions in the SCS pose a significant challenge to the principle of freedom of the seas. Matters of particular concern in this regard include China’s so-called nine-dash map of the SCS, China’s apparent narrow definition of freedom of navigation, and China’s position that coastal states have the right to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) (see “China’s Approach to SCS and ECS,” below, and Appendix A and Appendix E).16 Observers are concerned that a challenge to freedom of the seas in the SCS could have implications for the United States not only in the SCS, but around the world, because international law is universal in application, and a challenge to a principle of international law in one part of the world, if accepted, could serve as a precedent for challenging it in other parts of the world. In general, limiting or weakening the principle of freedom of the seas could represent a departure or retreat from the roughly 400-year legal tradition of treating the world’s oceans as international waters (i.e., as a global commons) and as a consequence alter the international legal regime governing sovereignty over much of the surface of the world.17 More specifically, if China’s position on the issue of whether coastal states have the right to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in their EEZs were to gain greater international acceptance under international law, it could substantially affect U.S. naval operations not only in the SCS, but around the world, which in turn could substantially affect the ability of the United States to use its military forces to defend various U.S. interests overseas. Significant portions of the world’s oceans are claimable as EEZs, including high-priority U.S. Navy operating areas in the Western Pacific, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea.18 The legal right of U.S. naval forces to operate freely in EEZ waters—an application of the principle of freedom of the seas—is important to their ability to perform many of their missions around the world, because many of those missions are aimed at influencing events ashore, and having to conduct operations from 328), generated February 28, 2020, p. 1. DOD similarly stated in 2019 in another document that Throughout our history, the United States has asserted a key national interest in preserving the freedom of the seas, and has often relied on the U.S. military forces to protect that interest. As President Ronald Reagan said in releasing the U.S. Oceans Policy in 1983, “we will not acquiesce in unilateral actions of other states designed to restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in navigation and overflight.” (Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, June 1, 2019, p. 43.) 16 A country’s EEZ includes waters extending up to 200 nautical miles from its land territory. EEZs were established as a feature of international law by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Coastal states have the right UNCLOS to regulate foreign economic activities in their own EEZs. 17 See, for example, Karishma Vaswani, “How China Is Rewriting the Law of the Sea,” Bloomberg, February 23, 2025; Elisabeth Braw, “From Russia’s Shadow Fleet to China’s Maritime Claims: The Freedom of the Seas Is Under Threat,” Atlantic Council, January 23, 2025; David Bosco, “China is Reshaping the Maritime Legal Order,” Lawfare, July 25, 2024 (a book review of China’s Law of the Sea: The New Rules of Maritime Order, by Isaac B. Kardon); Peter A. Dutton, “China Is Rewriting the Law of the Sea,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2023; James Stavridis, “Russia-U.K. Standoff Shows the New War at Sea Has Gone Global,” Bloomberg, July 2, 2021; James Holmes, “Do Russia Or China Have ‘Limited’ Or ‘Unlimited’ Political Goals?” 19FortyFive, April 4, 2021; Malcolm Jorgensen, “China Is Overturning the Rules-Based Order from Within,” Interpreter, August 12, 2020; James Holmes, “China Wants Ownership of the South China Sea. Here’s Why That Can’t Happen,” National Interest, July 17, 2020; Lyle J. Goldstein, “China Studies the Contours of the Gray Zone; Beijing Strategists Go to School on Russian Tactics in the Black Sea,” National Interest, August 27, 2019; Roncevert Ganan Almond, “The Extraterrestrial [Legal] Impact of the South China Sea Dispute,” The Diplomat, October 3, 2017. 18 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) calculates that EEZs account for about 30.4% of the world’s oceans. (See “Comparative Sizes of the Various Maritime Zones” at the end of “Maritime Zones and Boundaries,” accessed April 30, 2025, at https://www.noaa.gov/maritime-zones-and-boundaries, which states that EEZs account for 101.9 million square kilometers of the world’s approximately 335.0 million square kilometers of oceans.) Congressional Research Service 5 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas outside a country’s EEZ (i.e., more than 200 miles offshore) would reduce the inland reach and responsiveness of U.S. ship-based sensors, aircraft, and missiles, and make it more difficult for the United States to transport Marines and their equipment from ship to shore. Restrictions on the ability of U.S. naval forces to operate in EEZ waters could potentially require changes (possibly very significant ones) in U.S. military strategy, U.S. foreign policy goals, or U.S. grand strategy.19 Trade Routes and Hydrocarbons Major commercial shipping routes pass through the SCS, which links the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. One source estimated that, as of 2016, about $3.4 trillion worth of international shipping trade passed through the SCS each year. This same source states The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that roughly 80 percent of global trade by volume and 70 percent by value is transported by sea. Of that volume, 60 percent of maritime trade passes through Asia, with the South China Sea carrying an estimated one-third of global shipping. Its waters are particularly critical for China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, all of which rely on the Strait of Malacca, which connects the South China Sea and, by extension, the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean.20 DOD similarly states that the SCS “plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia because of the region’s reliance on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS shipping lanes, including more than 80% of the crude oil [flowing] to the PRC, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.”21 In addition, the ECS and SCS contain potentially significant oil and gas exploration areas.22 19 See, for example, United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia, July 15, 2009, Testimony of Peter Dutton, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, pp. 2 and 6-7. 20 “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?” China Power (CSIS), August 2, 2017, updated January 25, 2021, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/. See also Kerem Coşar and Benjamin D. Thomas, “The Geopolitics of International Trade in Southeast Asia,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2020, 17 pp., accessed April 30, 2025, at https://www.nber.org/papers/w28048. 21 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Annual Report to Congress, released December 18, 2024, p. 18. 22 See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Economic and Security Implications of China’s Activities in the South China Sea, November 2021, 3 pp. See also Christian Edwards, “The South China Sea Is Fabled for Its Hidden Energy Reserves and China Wants to Block Outsiders Like the US from Finding Them,” Business Insider, November 13, 2018. For contrary views regarding the importance of the SCS in connection with trade routes and hydrocarbons, see John Quiggin, “Myths That Stir Trouble in the South China Sea, A Major Shipping Route, Yes, But Vital? False Claims About the Value of These Waters Only Make Diplomacy Harder,” Interpreter, December 23, 2021; Ethen Kim Lieser, “How Much Oil and Gas Is Contained in the South China Sea? The Entire Contested Region Is Chock-Full Of Valuable Resources. Or Is It?” National Interest, February 22, 2021; Marshall Hoyler, “The South China Sea Is Overrated, Assigning the South China Sea Geostrategic Importance Based on Its Popular Sea Lanes or Assumed Oil and Gas Reserves Is Suspect,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2019. See also Mark Crescenzi and Stephen Gent, “China’s Deep-Sea Motivation for Claiming Sovereignty Over the South China Sea, At the Bottom of the Contested Waters Lies a Supply of the Rare Earth Minerals Crucial to China’s Tech Ambitions,” Diplomat, May 6, 2021. The SCS and ECS also contain significant fishing grounds that are of interest primarily to China and other countries in the region. See, for example, Michael Perry, “Cooperative Maritime Law Enforcement and Overfishing in the South China Sea,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), April 6, 2020; James G. Stavridis and Johan Bergenas, “The Fishing Wars Are Coming,” Washington Post, September 13, 2017; Keith Johnson, “Fishing Disputes Could Spark a South China Sea Crisis,” Foreign Policy, April 7, 2012. Congressional Research Service 6 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Interpreting China’s Role as a Major World Power China’s actions in the SCS and ECS could influence assessments that U.S. and other observers make about China’s role as a major world power, particularly regarding China’s approach to settling disputes between states (including whether China views force and coercion as acceptable means for settling such disputes, and consequently whether China believes that “might makes right”), China’s views toward the meaning and application of international law, and whether China views itself more as a stakeholder and defender of the current international order, or alternatively, more as a revisionist power that will seek to change elements of that order that it does not like.23 U.S.-China Relations in General Developments in the SCS and ECS could affect U.S.-China relations in general, which could have implications for other issues in U.S.-China relations.24 Maritime Territorial and EEZ Disputes Involving China This section provides a brief overview of maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China. For additional details on these disputes (including maps), see Appendix A. In addition, other CRS reports provide additional and more detailed information on the maritime territorial disputes.25 For background information on treaties and international agreements related to the disputes, see Appendix C. For background information on a July 2016 international tribunal award in an SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China, see Appendix D. Maritime Territorial Disputes China is a party to multiple maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, including in particular the following: • • • • a dispute over the Spratly Islands in the SCS, which are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and which are occupied in part by all these countries except Brunei; a dispute over Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, which is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and controlled since 2012 by China; a dispute over the Paracel Islands in the SCS, which are claimed by China and Vietnam, and occupied by China; and a dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which are claimed by China, Taiwan, and Japan, and administered by Japan. 23 See, for example, Charlie Dunlap, “CDR Tracy Reynolds on ‘China & the Moon & the Law,’” Lawfire, January 23, 2023; Akshobh Giridharadas, “The South China Sea Reveals China’s Grand Strategy, To Understand China’s Grand Strategy, Particularly Xi’s Long-Term Game, One Needs to Understand Beijing’s Belligerence in the South China Sea,” National Interest, July 1, 2021. 24 For an overview U.S.-China relations, see CRS In Focus IF10119, China Primer: U.S.-China Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence and Karen M. Sutter. Additional CRS reports discuss specific issues bearing on U.S.-China relations. 25 See CRS In Focus IF10607, China Primer: South China Sea Disputes, by Ben Dolven, Caitlin Campbell, and Ronald O'Rourke; CRS In Focus IF12550, China-Philippines Tensions in the South China Sea, by Caitlin Campbell, Ben Dolven, and William Piekos; CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, by Ben Dolven et al.; CRS Report R42930, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: Issues for Congress, by Ben Dolven, Mark E. Manyin, and Shirley A. Kan; and CRS Report R43894, China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), by Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias. Congressional Research Service 7 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas EEZ Dispute26 In addition to maritime territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS, China is involved in a dispute, principally with the United States, over whether China has a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within China’s EEZ. The position of the United States and most other countries is that while the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which established EEZs as a feature of international law, gives coastal states the right to regulate economic activities (such as fishing and oil exploration) within their EEZs, it does not give coastal states the right to regulate foreign military activities in the parts of their EEZs beyond their 12-nautical-mile territorial waters.27 The position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world’s nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. The dispute over whether China has a right under UNCLOS to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating within its EEZ appears to be at the heart of incidents between PRC and U.S. ships and aircraft in international waters and airspace dating back at least to 2001. Relationship of Maritime Territorial Disputes to EEZ Dispute The issue of whether China has the right under UNCLOS to regulate foreign military activities in its EEZ is related to, but ultimately separate from, the issue of territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS: • • The two issues are related because China can claim EEZs from inhabitable islands over which it has sovereignty, so accepting China’s claims to sovereignty over inhabitable islands in the SCS or ECS could permit China to expand the EEZ zone within which China claims a right to regulate foreign military activities. The two issues are ultimately separate from one another because even if all the territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS were resolved, and none of China’s claims in the SCS and ECS were accepted, China could continue to apply its concept of its EEZ rights to the EEZ that it unequivocally derives from its mainland coast—and it is in this unequivocal PRC EEZ that several of the past U.S.-PRC incidents at sea have occurred. From the U.S. perspective, the EEZ dispute is arguably as significant as the maritime territorial disputes because of the EEZ dispute’s proven history of leading to U.S.-PRC incidents at sea and because of its potential for affecting U.S. military operations not only in the SCS and ECS, but around the world. 26 In this report, the term EEZ dispute is used to refer to a dispute principally between China and the United States over whether coastal states have a right under international law to regulate the activities of foreign military forces operating in their EEZs. There are also other kinds of EEZ disputes, including disputes between neighboring countries regarding the extents of their adjacent EEZs. 27 The legal term under UNCLOS for territorial waters is territorial seas. This report uses the more colloquial term territorial waters to avoid confusion with terms like South China Sea and East China Sea. Congressional Research Service 8 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas China’s Approach to SCS and ECS Overview China’s approach to maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and to strengthening its position over time in the SCS, can be characterized as including the following, some of which are discussed further in following sections: • • • • • • • China appears to have identified the assertion and defense of its maritime territorial claims in the SCS and ECS, and the strengthening of its position in the SCS, as important national goals. To achieve these goals, China appears to be employing a multielement strategy that includes diplomatic, informational, economic, military, paramilitary/law enforcement, and civilian elements. China’s approach includes the use of gradualist, “salami-slicing” activities and gray zone operations, many of which are carried out by China’s maritime militia. China’s approach includes an apparent preference for discussing maritime territorial disputes with other countries in the region though bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) engagements. As the largest country in the region, China may believe that it can more easily gain the upper hand in bilateral rather than multilateral discussions, particularly since multilateral discussions can provide settings for other countries in the region to act collectively to oppose China’s actions in the SCS and ECS. China’s approach includes resisting and objecting to the involvement of outside actors, such as the United States, in maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and discouraging other countries in the region from working collectively with outside actors such as the United States to oppose China’s actions in the SCS and ECS. In implementing its approach to maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, China appears to be persistent, patient, and tactically flexible—it is “playing a long game.” To achieve its goals in the SCS and ECS, China is willing to expend significant resources and absorb at least some amount of reputational and other costs that other countries might seek to impose on China in response to China’s actions.28 Table 1 summarizes China’s apparent goals relating to the SCS, and the types of actions it undertakes in support of those goals, as assessed in a January 2020 report by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on China’s strategy for the SCS. 28 For additional discussion, see Shuxian Luo, “The Rising Power’s Audiences and Cost Trade-offs: Explaining China’s Escalation and Deescalation in Maritime Disputes,” Asian Security, published online December 21, 2021, at https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2021.2012159; Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, Total Competition, China’s Challenge in the South China Sea, Center for a New American Security, January 2020, pp. 5-28; Denny Roy, “How China Is Slow Conquering the South China Sea,” National Interest, May 7, 2020; and Kerry K. Gershaneck, “China’s ‘Political Warfare’ Aims at South China Sea,” Asia Times, July 3, 2018. Congressional Research Service 9 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Table 1. China’s Apparent Goals and Supporting Actions for South China Sea As assessed in January 2020 CNAS report Apparent goals Rally support domestically Deter U.S. Intimidate neighbors and encourage appeasement/ compliance PLA operationsa X X X China Coast Guard operationsb X X X Supporting actions Maritime militia swarming Dredging fleet and island construction team operationsc Reinforce image of China as an economic powerhouse X X X X X X Operations by state banks and state-owned enterprisesd State media operationse Tempt neighbors to cooperate in exchange for future economic benefits X X X Source: Adapted by CRS from table on page 20 of Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, Total Competition, China’s Challenge in the South China Sea, Center for a New American Security, January 2020. a. Includes military exercises, weapons tests, port visits, patrols throughout the SCS, military parades, and participation in echelon formation. b. Includes deployment of large vessels and participation in echelon formation. c. Includes large-scale dredging and island building, and construction of permanent facilities on disputed features. d. Highly visible economic projects around the region, such as bridges, ports, and rail lines. e. Includes propaganda about the PLA, China’s influence (including its military and economic might and its political importance), U.S. decline or weakness, and other states conceding to China’s preferences. A December 13, 2023, opinion piece states that a possible additional goal for China’s actions in the SCS is to discourage Western businesses from shifting their operations from China to the Philippines or other countries in the region as part of a friendshoring strategy for reducing Western reliance on business operations based in China.29 Selected Elements “Salami-Slicing” Strategy and Gray Zone Operations Observers frequently characterize China’s approach to the SCS and ECS as a gradualist, “salamislicing” strategy that employs a series of incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli, to gradually change the status quo in China’s favor.30 Other observers have referred to this 29 Elisabeth Braw, “Why China Is Stepping Up Its Maritime Attacks on the Philippines,” Foreign Policy, December 13, 2023. 30 See, for example, Atul Kumar, Challenges to China’s ‘Below the Threshold’ Military Strategy in Its Near Seas, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), April 2025 (published online April 7, 2025), 29 pp.; Julian Ryall, “As Regional Tensions Rise, China Probing Neighbors’ Defense,” Deutsche Welle (DW), October 13, 2022. Another press report refers to the process as “akin to peeling an onion, slowly and deliberately pulling back layers to reach a goal at the center.” (Brad Lendon, “China Is Relentlessly Trying to Peel away Japan’s Resolve on Disputed Islands,” CNN, July 8, 2022.) Congressional Research Service 10 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas approach as incrementalism,31 creeping annexation,32 creeping invasion,33 or working to gain ownership through adverse possession,34 or as a “talk and take” strategy, meaning a strategy in which China engages in (or draws out) negotiations while taking gradual actions to gain control of contested areas.35 Observers argue that in support of this gradualist approach, China makes frequent use of gray zone operations, meaning operations that reside in a gray zone between peace and war.36 Gray zone operations can create a conundrum for countries that seek ways to counter them effectively without appearing to employ excessive force or risk escalating the level of violence. Some observers argue that rather than using the term gray zone operations, China’s actions should be referred to as illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive (ICAD) operations.37 One U.S. official has characterized China’s actions as amounting to a “boiling frog” strategy.38 An April 10, 2021, press report states, China is trying to wear down its neighbors with relentless pressure tactics designed to push its territorial claims, employing military aircraft, militia boats and sand dredgers to dominate access to disputed areas, U.S. government officials and regional experts say. The confrontations fall short of outright military action without shots being fired, but Beijing’s aggressive moves are gradually altering the status quo, laying the foundation for China to potentially exert control over contested territory across vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean, the officials and experts say…. The Chinese are “trying to grind them down,” said a senior U.S. Defense official…. “Beijing never really presents you with a clear deadline with a reason to use force. You just find yourselves worn down and slowly pushed back,” [Gregory Poling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies] said.39 31 See, for example, Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang, “China’s Art of Strategic Incrementalism in the South China Sea,” National Interest, August 8, 2020. 32 See, for example, Alan Dupont, “China’s Maritime Power Trip,” The Australian, May 24, 2014. 33 Jackson Diehl, “China’s ‘Creeping Invasion,” Washington Post, September 14, 2014. 34 See Ian Ralby, “China’s Maritime Strategy: To Own the Oceans by Adverse Possession,” The Hill, March 28, 2023. 35 See, for example, Anders Corr, “China’s Take-And-Talk Strategy In The South China Sea,” Forbes, March 29, 2017. See also Namrata Goswami, “Can China Be Taken Seriously on its ‘Word’ to Negotiate Disputed Territory?” The Diplomat, August 18, 2017. 36 See, for example, Masaaki Yatsuzuka, “How China’s Maritime Militia Takes Advantage of the Grey Zone,” Strategist, January 16, 2023. See also Anika Arora Seth, “Weapons of Choice in China’s Territorial Disputes? Axes, Knives, ‘Jostling,’” Washington Post, June 22, 2024. 37 See, for example, David Dizon, “ICAD Tactics: ‘Chinese Plane Dropped 8 Flares on PAF Aircraft’s Flight Path,’” ABS-CBN News, August 12, 2024; Karishma Vaswani, “It Is Time to Give China’s Muscle-Flexing a New Name,” Taipei Times, July 31, 2024 (also published as Karishma Vaswani, “There’s Nothing Gray About China’s Maritime Muscle-Flexing; Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive—Why the ICAD Moniker for Beijing’s Actions in the South China Sea Needs to Be Adopted,” Bloomberg, July 24, 2024); Adam Lockyer, Yves-Heng Lim, and Courtney J. Fung, “Moving Beyond the Grey Zone: The Case for ICAD,” Interpreter, July 17, 2024; Bill Gertz, “China’s GrayZone Operations ‘Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive, Deceptive,’ Paparo Says,” Washington Times, May 6, 2024; Ken Moriyasu, “China’s Territorial Claims Illegal, Deceptive: U.S. Indo-Pacific Chief,” Nikkei Asia, May 4, 2024. See also James Holmes, “Is China at War in the South China Sea?” National Interest, June 29, 2024. 38 Matthew Loh, “China Is Gradually Amping up Its Military Aggression in a ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy, US Indo-Pacific Commander Says,” Business Insider, April 28, 2024; Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Pacific Commander Says China Is Pursuing ‘Boiling Frog’ Strategy,” Financial Times, April 28, 2024. 39 Dan De Luce, “China Tries to Wear Down Its Neighbors with Pressure Tactics,” NBC News, April 10, 2021. Congressional Research Service 11 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Use of Coast Guard Ships and Maritime Militia China asserts and defends its maritime claims primarily with its maritime militia and its coast guard rather than its navy, although the navy can serve as an “over-the-horizon” backup force when needed. Operations by the maritime militia are particularly prominent in the SCS. For more on China’s coast guard and maritime militia, see Appendix E. Preference for Treating Territorial Disputes on Bilateral Basis As mentioned above, China appears to prefer discussing maritime territorial disputes with other countries in the region though bilateral (as opposed to multilateral) engagements. As the largest country in the region, China may believe that it can more easily gain the upper hand in bilateral rather than multilateral discussions, particularly since multilateral discussions can provide settings for other countries in the region to act collectively to oppose China’s actions in the SCS and ECS. China generally has resisted multilateral approaches to resolving maritime territorial disputes, stating that such approaches would internationalize the disputes, although the disputes are by definition international even when addressed on a bilateral basis. A preference for discussing maritime territorial disputes with other countries in the region on a bilateral basis can be consistent with a so-called divide-and-conquer strategy for engaging with other countries in the SCS region.40 China’s participation with the ASEAN states in the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and in negotiations with the ASEAN states on the follow-on binding code of conduct (COC) (see Appendix C) represents a departure from this general preference, though it might also be argued that the drawn-out negotiations on the COC are consistent with a “talk and take” strategy. Depiction of United States as Outsider Seeking to “Stir Up Trouble” China resists and objects to the involvement of outside actors, such as the United States, in maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and discourages other countries in the region from working collectively with outside actors such as the United States to oppose China’s actions in the SCS and ECS. Statements in China’s state-controlled media sometimes depict the United States as an outsider or interloper whose actions (including freedom of navigation operations) are meddling or seeking to “stir up trouble” (or words to that effect) in an otherwise purportedly peaceful regional situation. Potential or actual Japanese involvement in the SCS is sometimes depicted in China’s state-controlled media in similar terms. Depicting the United States in this manner can be viewed as consistent with goals of attempting to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies and partners in the region and of ensuring maximum leverage in bilateral (rather than multilateral) discussions with other countries in the region over maritime territorial disputes. Island Building and Base Construction Perhaps more than any other set of actions, China’s island-building (aka land-reclamation) and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands in the SCS have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is rapidly gaining effective control of the SCS. China’s large-scale island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS appear to have begun around December 2013, and were publicly reported starting in May 2014. Awareness of, and concern about, the activities appears to have increased substantially following 40 See, for example, Shi Jiangtao, “Beijing Uses ‘Divide and Conquer’ Tactic with Asean as South China Sea Tensions Heat Up,” South China Morning Post, September 26, 2024. Congressional Research Service 12 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas the posting of a February 2015 article showing a series of “before and after” satellite photographs of islands and reefs being changed by the work.41 China occupies seven sites in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in island-building and facilitiesconstruction activities at most or all of these sites, and particularly at three of them—Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef, all of which now feature lengthy airfields for supporting operations by large or high-performance aircraft, as well as substantial numbers of buildings and other structures. An October 25, 2024, press report states The Chinese military is constructing a new counter-stealth radar system on a disputed reef in the South China Sea that would significantly expand its surveillance capabilities in the region, satellite imagery suggests. Analysis by Chatham House suggests China is upgrading its outpost on Triton Island, on the south-west corner of the Paracel archipelago, building what may be a launching point for an anti-ship missile battery, as well as the sophisticated radar system. 42 Figure 1 and Figure 2 show reported military facilities at sites that China occupies in the SCS, and reported aircraft, missile, and radar “range rings” extending from those sites. Although other countries, such as Vietnam, have engaged in their own island-building and facilities-construction activities at sites that they occupy in the SCS, these efforts are dwarfed in size by China’s islandbuilding and base-construction activities in the SCS.43 Other Actions That Have Heightened Concerns Additional PRC actions in the SCS and ECS over the last 15 years that have heightened concerns among U.S. observers include the following, among others: • • • • China’s actions in 2012, following a confrontation between PRC and Philippine ships at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, to gain de facto control over access to the shoal and its surrounding fishing areas; China’s announcement on November 23, 2013, of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the ECS that includes airspace over the Senkaku Islands;44 frequent patrols by PRC Coast Guard ships—some observers refer to them as harassment operations—at the Senkaku Islands; PRC pressure against the small Philippine military presence at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, where a handful of Philippine military personnel occupy a beached (and now derelict) Philippine navy amphibious ship;45 41 Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Before and After: The South China Sea Transformed,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), February 18, 2015. 42 Rebecca Ratcliffe, “China Building ‘Counter-Stealth’ Radar on Disputed South China Sea Reef, Satellite Pictures Suggest,” Guardian, October 25, 2024. See also Colin Clark, “China Tightens ‘Counter-Stealth’ Military Radar Net around South China Sea, Says Report,” Breaking Defense, October 23, 2024; John Pollock and Damien Symon, “How Beijing Is Closing Surveillance Gaps in the South China Sea,” Chatham House, October 17, 2024. 43 See, for example, “Vietnam’s Island Building: Double-Standard or Drop in the Bucket?,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), May 11, 2016. For additional details on China’s island-building and base-construction activities in the SCS, see, in addition to Appendix E, CRS Report R44072, Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and Policy Options, by Ben Dolven et al. 44 See CRS Report R43894, China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), by Ian E. Rinehart and Bart Elias. 45 See, for example, “Shifting Tactics at Second Thomas Shoal,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), August 22, 2024; “Tracking Tensions At Second Thomas (continued...) Congressional Research Service 13 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • a growing civilian PRC presence on some of the sites in the SCS occupied by China in the SCS, including both PRC vacationers and (in the Paracels) permanent settlements; and a new PRC maritime law that went into effect in September 2021 that seeks to impose new notification and other requirements on foreign ships entering what China describes as “sea areas under the jurisdiction” of China, prompting some observers state that the law could lead to increased tensions in the SCS, particularly if China takes actions to enforce its provisions.46 Apparent Narrow Definition of “Freedom of Navigation” China regularly states that it supports freedom of navigation and has not interfered with freedom of navigation, and in November 2023 signed a joint communique along with 18 other AsiaPacific countries recognizing freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).47 China, however, appears to hold a narrow definition of freedom of navigation that is centered on the ability of commercial cargo ships to pass through international waters. In contrast to the broader U.S./Western definition of freedom of navigation (aka freedom of the seas), the PRC definition does not appear to include operations conducted by military ships and aircraft. It can also be noted that China has frequently interfered with commercial fishing operations by non-PRC fishing vessels—something that some observers regard as a form of interfering with freedom of navigation for commercial ships. Position Regarding Regulation of Military Forces in EEZs As mentioned earlier, the position of China and some other countries (i.e., a minority group among the world’s nations) is that UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, in their EEZs. Shoal,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), January 30, 2024. 46 See, for example, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Revised Maritime Traffic Safety Law,” International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College), Vol. 97, 2021: 956-968; Nguyen Thanh Trung and Le Ngoc Khanh Ngan, “Codifying Waters and Reshaping Orders: China’s Strategy for Dominating the South China Sea,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), September 27, 2021; Navmi Krishna, “Explained: Why China’s New Maritime Law May Spike Tensions in South China Sea,” Indian Express, September 7, 2021; Brad Lendon and Steve George, “The Long Arm of China’s New Maritime Law Risks Causing Conflict with US and Japan,” CNN, September 3, 2021; John Feng, “U.S. Says China Maritime Law Poses ‘Serious Threat’ to Freedom of the Seas,” Newsweek, September 2, 2021; Richard Javad Heydarian, “China’s Foreign Ship Law Stokes South China Sea Tensions,” Asia Times, September 2, 2021; Alex Wilson, “Beijing’s New Law for Foreign Vessels Won’t Impact US Navy in South China Sea, Pentagon Says,” Stars and Stripes, September 2, 2021. See also James Holmes, “Are China And Russia Trying To Attack The Law Of The Sea?” 19FortyFive, August 31, 2021. Regarding a follow-on regulation relating to this law that went into force in June 2024, see Arran Hope, “New China Coast Guard Regulation Buttresses PRC Aggression in the South China Sea,” China Brief, June 21, 2024; U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “TOPIC: China Coast Guard Regulation No. 3,” USINDOPACOM J06/SJA Tacaid Series, updated May 30, 2024, 6 pp. 47 Marc Jayson Cayabyab, “AsPac Signs Communique on Freedom of Navigation,” Philippine Star, November 26, 2023, which states that the communique was signed at the annual meeting of Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum (APPF), and that the other countries were the Philippines, Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Congressional Research Service 14 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Figure 1. Reported Military Facilities at SCS Sites Occupied by China Source: Illustration accompanying Karen Leigh, Peter Martin and Adrian Leung, “Troubled Waters: Where the U.S. and China Could Clash in the South China Sea,” Bloomberg, December 17, 2020. Congressional Research Service 15 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Figure 2. Reported PRC Aircraft, Missile, and Radar Ranges From PRC-occupied sites in SCS Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), “Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea,” at https://amti.csis.org/chinese-powerprojection/. The information box on the right side of the figure is part of the graphic as presented at the AMTI website. Additional Elements For additional information on China’s approach to the SCS and ECS, including elements discussed briefly above as well as the so-called map of the nine-dash line that China uses to depict its claims in the SCS, see Appendix E. Assessments of China’s Strengthened Position in SCS Some observers assess that China’s actions in the SCS have achieved for China a more dominant or more commanding position in the SCS. For example, U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee to consider nominations, including Davidson’s nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),48 stated that “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.”49 For additional assessments of China’s strengthened position in the SCS, see Appendix F. 48 The name of the command has since been changed to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). 49 Advance Policy Questions for Admiral Philip Davidson, USN Expected Nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, p. 18. See also pp. 8, 16, 17, 19, and 43. See also Hannah Beech, “China’s Sea Control Is a Done Deal, ‘Short of War With the U.S.,’” New York Times, September 20, 2018. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas U.S. Position Regarding Issues Relating to SCS and ECS Overview The U.S. position regarding issues relating to the SCS and ECS includes the following elements, among others: • • Freedom of the seas: • The United States supports the principle of freedom of the seas, meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law. The United States opposes claims that impinge on the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea that belong to all nations. • U.S. forces routinely conduct freedom of navigation (FON) assertions throughout the world. These operations are designed to be conducted in accordance with international law and demonstrate that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, regardless of the location of excessive maritime claims and regardless of current events.50 • The United States, like most other countries, believes that coastal states under UNCLOS have the right to regulate economic activities in their EEZs, but do not have the right to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZs. The United States will continue to operate its military ships in the EEZs of other countries consistent with this position. (For additional information regarding the U.S. position on the issue of operational rights of military ships in the EEZs of other countries, see Appendix G.) • U.S. military surveillance flights in international airspace above another country’s EEZ are lawful under international law, and the United States plans to continue conducting these flights. Maritime territorial disputes: • China’s maritime claims in the SCS are unfounded, unlawful, and unreasonable, and are without legal, historic, or geographic merit.51 China’s claims to offshore resources across most of the SCS are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them. China has no legal grounds to unilaterally impose its will on the region, and has offered no coherent legal basis for its nine-dashed line claim in the SCS since formally announcing it in 2009. • The U.S. position on China’s maritime claims in the SCS is aligned with the July 12, 2016, award of the arbitral tribunal that was constituted under 50 Statements such as this one, including in particular phrases such as “the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” have become recurring elements of U.S. statements issued either in connection with specific FON operations or as general statements of U.S. policy regarding freedom of the seas. See, for example, 7th Fleet Public Affairs, “7th Fleet Destroyer conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in South China Sea,” Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, January 20, 2022, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/ Display/Article/2904786/7th-fleet-destroyer-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-south-china-sea/. 51 Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Advancing a Shared Vision, November 4, 2019, states on page 23: “PRC maritime claims in the South China Sea, exemplified by the preposterous ‘nine-dash line,’ are unfounded, unlawful, and unreasonable. These claims, which are without legal, historic, or geographic merit, impose real costs on other countries. Through repeated provocative actions to assert the nine-dash line, Beijing is inhibiting ASEAN members from accessing over $2.5 trillion in recoverable energy reserves, while contributing to instability and the risk of conflict.” Congressional Research Service 17 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • • • • UNCLOS (a treaty to which China is a party) in the case that the Philippines brought against China. The tribunal’s award rejected China’s maritime claims as having no basis in international law and sided squarely with the Philippines on almost all claims. As specifically provided in UNCLOS, the tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on both parties. Consistent with the tribunal’s award, China cannot lawfully assert a maritime claim—including any EEZ claims derived from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly Islands—vis-a-vis the Philippines in areas that the tribunal found to be in the Philippines’ EEZ or on its continental shelf. China’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral actions by China to exploit those resources. Since China has failed to put forth a lawful, coherent maritime claim in the SCS, the United States rejects any claim by China to waters beyond a 12nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over such islands). The United States stands with its Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law, and rejects any push to impose a situation of might makes right in the SCS or the wider region. China’s unilateral efforts to assert illegitimate maritime claims threaten other nations’ access to vital natural resources, undermine the stability of regional energy markets, and increase the risk of conflict.52 The United States will not accept attempts to assert unlawful maritime claims at the expense of law-abiding nations.53 Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft— including those of its Coast Guard—anywhere in the South China Sea.54 The United States takes no position on competing claims to sovereignty over disputed land features in the ECS and SCS, but the United States does have a position on how competing claims should be resolved: These disputes, like international disputes in general, should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law. Parties should avoid taking provocative or unilateral actions that disrupt the status quo or jeopardize peace and security. The United States does not believe that large-scale island-building with the intent to militarize outposts 52 In a November 20, 2019, speech in Hanoi, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated, “China’s unilateral efforts to assert illegitimate maritime claims threaten other nations’ access to vital natural resources, undermine the stability of regional energy markets, and increase the risk of conflict.” (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, “Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Remarks at Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam,” November 20, 2019, Hanoi, Vietnam.) 53 In a November 20, 2019, speech in Hanoi, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated, “We will not accept attempts to assert unlawful maritime claims at the expense of law-abiding nations.” (U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam, “Secretary of Defense Mark T. Esper Remarks at Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam,” November 20, 2019, Hanoi, Vietnam.) 54 See, for example, Department of State, “U.S. Support for the Philippines in the South China Sea,” press statement dated August 19, 2024. Congressional Research Service 18 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • on disputed land features is consistent with the region’s desire for peace and stability. Claims of territorial waters and EEZs should be consistent with customary international law of the sea and must therefore, among other things, derive from land features. Claims in the SCS that are not derived from land features are fundamentally flawed. The Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan. Unilateral attempts to change the status quo there raise tensions and do nothing under international law to strengthen territorial claims. For examples of U.S. statements describing the U.S. position on issues relating to the SCS and ECS, see Appendix G. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program Under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) program, U.S. Navy ships and other U.S. military forces challenge what the United States views as excessive maritime claims made by other countries, and otherwise carry out assertions of operational rights. The FON program began in 1979,55 involves diplomatic activities as well as operational assertions by U.S. Navy ships and other military forces, and is global in scope, encompassing activities and operations directed not only at China, but at numerous other countries around the world, including U.S. allies and partner states. DOD stated in 2015 that As part of the Department’s routine presence activities, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard conduct Freedom of Navigation operations. These operational activities serve to protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law by challenging the full range of excessive maritime claims asserted by some coastal States in the region. The importance of these operations cannot be overstated. Numerous countries across the Asia-Pacific region assert excessive maritime claims that, if left unchallenged, could restrict the freedom of the seas. These excessive claims include, for example, improperly-drawn straight baselines, improper restrictions on the right of warships to conduct innocent passage through the territorial seas of other States, and the freedom to conduct military activities within the EEZs of other States. Added together, EEZs in the USPACOM region constitute 38 percent of the world’s oceans. If these excessive maritime claims were left unchallenged, they could restrict the ability of the United States and other countries to conduct routine military operations or exercises in more than one-third of the world’s oceans.56 DOD publishes an annual report on the FON program that includes a listing of FON operations conducted to challenge excessive maritime claims by various countries, including China. DOD’s report for FY2023 summarizes excessive maritime claims that DoD challenged during the period of October 1, 2022, through September 30, 2023, to preserve the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations by international law. In sum, the United States challenged 29 excessive maritime claims of 17 claimants. The report cites in brackets each claimant’s specific laws, regulations, and other proclamations articulating the excessive maritime claims. To maintain the operational security of U.S. military forces, DoD Annual FON 55 For a history of the origin of the FON program, see James Kraska, “An Archival History of the Creation and Early Implementation of the Freedom of Navigation Program,” Chapter 10 (pages 206-237) of Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Ronán Long, editors, Cooperation and Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, Volume: 23, 2020 (publication date: 28 November 28, 2019). 56 Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, undated but released August 2015, pp. 23-24. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Reports include only general geographic information on the location of operational challenges and do not specify the precise number of challenges to each excessive maritime claim.57 For additional information on the FON program, see Appendix H. Taiwan Strait Transits In addition to conducting FON operations in the Spratly and Paracel islands, U.S. Navy ships (and also occasionally U.S. Coast Guard cutters or allied navy ships) steam through the Taiwan Strait to assert navigational rights under international law. The Taiwan Strait appears to have a minimum width (which occurs toward its northern end) of more than 67 nautical miles; at other points, its width is greater, and toward its southern end exceeds 120 nautical miles.58 Subtracting 12 nautical miles of territorial seas (i.e., what are commonly referred to as territorial waters) from either side of the strait leaves a central corridor of international waters running through the strait with an apparent minimum width of more than 43 nautical miles that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal state, where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law.59 57 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report to Congress, Annual Freedom of Navigation Report, Fiscal Year 2023, generated on March 8, 2024, released on May 8, 2024, PDF page 3 of 6. 58 Source: CRS measurements of the strait’s width using the distance measurement tool of Google Maps (https://www.google.com/maps). The minimum width of more than 67 nautical miles that was found by CRS measurement is toward the strait’s northern end; the widths of more than 120 nautical miles are generally toward the strait’s southern end. The Google Maps distance measurement tool provides measurements in statute miles, which CRS converted into nautical miles. 59 For example, a statement issued on June 3, 2023, by the U.S. Navy’s 7 th Fleet regarding a Taiwan Strait transit that was being conducted at that time by a U.S. Navy destroyer and a Canadian navy frigate stated that the transit was being conducted “through waters where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law. The ships transit through a corridor in the Strait that is beyond the territorial sea of any coastal State.” (U.S. 7th Fleet Public Affairs, “7th Fleet Destroyer Transits Taiwan Strait,” June 3, 2023.) Two days later, following an incident during that transit in which a Chinese navy destroyer crossed in front of the U.S. Navy destroyer in an unsafe manner, a statement issued by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) stated In accordance with international law, [the U.S. Navy destroyer] USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) and [the Canadian navy frigate] HMCS Montreal (FFH 336) conducted a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit June 3 through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. During the transit, [the] PLA(N) [i.e., Chinese navy] LUYANG III [class destroyer] DDG 132 (PRC LY 132) executed maneuvers in an unsafe manner in the vicinity of Chung-Hoon. The PRC LY 132 overtook Chung-Hoon on their [i.e., Chung-Hoon’s] port side and crossed their [i.e., Chung-Hoon’s] bow at 150 yards. Chung-Hoon maintained course and slowed to 10 kts to avoid a collision. The PRC LY 132 crossed Chung-Hoon’s bow a second time starboard to port at 2,000 yards and remained off Chung-Hoon’s port bow. The LY 132’s closest point of approach was 150 yards and its actions violated the maritime ‘Rules of the Road’ of safe passage in international waters. (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Public Affairs, “USINDOPACOM Statement on Unsafe Maritime Interaction,” June 5, 2023.) Congressional Research Service 20 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Issues for Congress U.S. Strategy for Competing Strategically with China in SCS and ECS Overview Whether and how to compete strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is a choice for U.S. policymakers to make, based on an assessment of U.S. interests and the potential benefits and costs of engaging in such a competition in the context of overall U.S. policy toward China,60 U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific,61 and U.S. foreign policy in general. A key issue for Congress is whether the Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS is appropriate and correctly resourced, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify the strategy, the level of resources for implementing it, or both. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere. Potential Broader Goals For observers who conclude that the United States should compete strategically with China in the SCS and ECS, potential broader U.S. goals for such a competition include but are not necessarily limited to the following, which are not listed in any particular order and are not mutually exclusive: • • • • • fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes, under which disputes between countries should be resolved peacefully, without coercion, intimidation, threats, or the use of force, and in a manner consistent with international law, and resisting the emergence of an alternative “might-makes-right” approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, meaning the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all nations in international law, including the interpretation held by the United States and many other countries concerning operational freedoms for military forces in EEZs; 60 For more on overall U.S.-China relations, see CRS In Focus IF10119, China Primer: U.S.-China Relations, by Susan V. Lawrence and Karen M. Sutter, and CRS Report R41108, U.S.-China Relations: An Overview of Policy Issues, by Susan V. Lawrence. 61 For more on U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific, see CRS Insight IN11814, Biden Administration Plans for an IndoPacific Economic Framework, coordinated by Brock R. Williams; CRS In Focus IF11678, The “Quad”: Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, coordinated by Emma Chanlett-Avery; CRS In Focus IF11052, The United Kingdom, France and the Indo-Pacific, by Bruce Vaughn, Derek E. Mix, and Paul Belkin. Congressional Research Service 21 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia, and potentially as part of that, preventing China from controlling or dominating the ECS or SCS; and pursuing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China. Potential Specific Goals For observers who conclude that the United States should compete strategically with China in the SCS and ECS, potential specific U.S. goals for such a competition include but are not necessarily limited to the following, which are not listed in any particular order and are not mutually exclusive: • • dissuading China from • carrying out additional base-construction activities in the SCS, • moving additional military personnel, equipment, and supplies to bases at sites that it occupies in the SCS, • initiating island-building or base-construction activities at Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, • declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS,62 or • declaring an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the SCS;63 and encouraging China to • reduce or end operations by its maritime forces at the Senkaku Islands in the ECS, • halt actions intended to put pressure against the small Philippine military presence at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands (or against any other Philippine-occupied sites in the Spratly Islands); • adopt the U.S./Western definition regarding freedom of the seas, including the freedom of U.S. and other non-PRC military vessels to operate freely in China’s EEZ; and • accept and abide by the July 2016 tribunal award in the SCS arbitration case involving the Philippines and China (see Appendix D). 62 For a discussion regarding the possibility of China declaring straight baselines around land features it claims in the SCS, see “Reading Between the Lines: The Next Spratly Legal Dispute,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), March 21, 2019. 63 For more on the possibility of China declaring an ADIZ over the SCS, see, for example, Minnie Chan, “South China Sea: Beijing ‘Doesn’t Want to Upset Neighbours’ with Air Defence Zone,” South China Morning Post, November 25, 2020; Carl O. Schuster, “[Opinion] The Air Defense Identification Zone—China’s next South China Sea aggression?” Rappler, July 7, 2020; Aie Balagtas See and Jeoffrey Maitem, “US Watching if Beijing Declares Air Defense Zone in South China Sea,” BenarNews, June 24, 2020 (also published as BenarNews, “US Watching if Beijing Declares Air Defense Zone in South China Sea,” Radio Free Asia, June 24, 2020); Roy Mabasa, “US Commander: ADIZ over South China Sea Will Impact All Nations in Region,” Manila Bulletin, June 24, 2020; Minnie Chan, “Beijing’s Plans for South China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone Cover Pratas, Paracel and Spratly Islands, PLA Source Says,” South China Morning Post, May 31, 2020; Ben Werner, “New Air Bases, Baby Cabbage Key to Chinese Long-Term Claims in South China Sea,” USNI News, June 3, 2020; “China’s Next Move in the South China Sea,” Economist, June 18, 2020. Congressional Research Service 22 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas U.S. Strategy for Competing in SCS and ECS Given China’s Approach China’s approach to maritime disputes in the SCS and ECS, and to strengthening its position over time in the SCS, discussed earlier in this report, raises a possible question as to how likely a U.S. strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS might be to achieve its goals if that strategy were characterized by being one or more of the following: • • • • one-dimensional rather than multidimensional or whole-of-government; halting or intermittent rather than persistent; insufficiently resourced; or reliant on imposed costs that are not commensurate with the importance that China appears to have assigned to achieving its goals in the region. Aligning Actions with Goals In terms of identifying specific actions for a U.S. strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS, a key element would be to have a clear understanding of which actions are intended to support which U.S. goals, and to maintain an alignment of actions with policy goals. For example, U.S. FON operations (FONOPs), which often feature prominently in discussions of actual or potential U.S. actions, can directly support a general goal of defending the principle of freedom of the seas, but might support other goals only indirectly, marginally, or not at all.64 A summary of U.S. actions and how they align with U.S. goals might produce a U.S. version of the summary of China’s apparent goals and supporting actions shown in Table 1. Cost-Imposing Actions Cost-imposing actions are actions intended to impose political/reputational, institutional, economic, or other costs on China for conducting certain activities in the ECS and SCS, with the aim of persuading China to stop or reverse those activities. Such cost-imposing actions need not be limited to the SCS and ECS. As a hypothetical example for purposes of illustrating the point, one potential cost-imposing action might be for the United States to respond to unwanted PRC activities in the ECS or SCS by moving to suspend China’s observer status on the Arctic Council.65 In a May 6, 2019, speech in Finland, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated (emphasis added) 64 For discussions bearing on this issue, see, for example, Caitlin Doornbos, “Freedom-of-Navigation Ops Will Not Dent Beijing’s South China Sea Claims, Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, April 4, 2019; James Holmes, “Are Freedom of Navigation Operations in East Asia Enough?” National Interest, February 23, 2019; Zack Cooper and Gregory Poling, “America’s Freedom of Navigation Operations Are Lost at Sea, Far Wider Measures Are Needed to Challenge Beijing’s Maritime Aggression,” Foreign Policy, January 8, 2019. See also John Grady, “U.S. Indo-Pacific Diplomacy Efforts Hinge On FONOPS, Humanitarian Missions,” USNI News, December 4, 2019. 65 For more on the Arctic Council in general, see CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke. Paragraph 37 of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure states the following: Once observer status has been granted, Observers shall be invited to the meetings and other activities of the Arctic Council unless SAOs [Senior Arctic Officials] decide otherwise. Observer status shall continue for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Council’s [Ottawa] Declaration [of September 19, 1996, establishing the Council] or these Rules of Procedure shall have its status as an Observer suspended. Paragraph 5 of Annex II of the Arctic Council’s rules of procedure—an annex regarding the accreditation and review of (continued...) Congressional Research Service 23 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas The United States is a believer in free markets. We know from experience that free and fair competition, open, by the rule of law, produces the best outcomes. But all the parties in the marketplace have to play by those same rules. Those who violate those rules should lose their rights to participate in that marketplace. Respect and transparency are the price of admission. And let’s talk about China for a moment. China has observer status in the Arctic Council, but that status is contingent upon its respect for the sovereign rights of Arctic states. The U.S. wants China to meet that condition and contribute responsibly in the region. But China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions. 66 Expanding the potential scope of cost-imposing actions to regions beyond the Western Pacific might make it possible to employ elements of U.S. power that cannot be fully exercised if the examination of potential cost-imposing strategies is confined to the Western Pacific. It might also, however, expand, geographically or otherwise, areas of tension or dispute between the United States and China. Actions to impose costs on China can also impose costs, or lead to China imposing costs, on the United States and its allies and partners. Whether to implement cost-imposing actions thus involves weighing the potential benefits and costs to the United States and its allies and partners of implementing those actions, as well as the potential consequences to the United States and its allies and partners of not implementing those actions. observers—states the following: Every four years, from the date of being granted Observer status, Observers should state affirmatively their continued interest in Observer status. Not later than 120 days before a Ministerial meeting where Observers will be reviewed, the Chairmanship shall circulate to the Arctic States and Permanent Participants a list of all accredited Observers and up-to-date information on their activities relevant to the work of the Arctic Council. (Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, p. 9. The document was accessed April 30, 2025, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/f06e5457-1246-44d3-a8c1-00016dd585db. Paragraph 4.3 of the Arctic Council’s observer manual for subsidiary bodies states in part Observer status continues for such time as consensus exists among Ministers. Any Observer that engages in activities which are at odds with the Ottawa Declaration or with the Rules of Procedure will have its status as an Observer suspended. (Arctic Council. Observer Manual for Subsidiary Bodies, p. 5. The document was accessed April 30, 2025, at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/ead1bb3b-8189-4cab-8eee-a78e01d21789.) See also Alyson JK Bailes, “Understanding The Arctic Council: A ‘Sub-Regional’ Perspective,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, Issue 2, 2013: 48, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/ jomass/v15i2/f_0030237_24448.pdf; Brianna Wodiske, “Preventing the Melting of the Arctic Council: China as a Permanent Observer and What It Means for the Council and the Environment,” Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, Vol. 315, Issue 2, 2014 (November 1, 2014): 320, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol36/iss2/5/; Sebastian Knecht, “New Observers Queuing Up: Why the Arctic Council Should Expand—And Expel,” Arctic Institute, April 20, 2015; Evan Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” undated, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://2009-2017.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/ac/ establishmentarcticcouncil/index.htm, which states, “The following paper was authored by Evan Bloom in July 1999 when serving as an attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. Mr. Bloom is now the Director of the Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State”; Kevin McGwin, “After 20 years, the Arctic Council Reconsiders the Role of Observers,” Arctic Today, October 24, 2018. 66 State Department, “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus, Remarks, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019,” accessed April 30, 2025, at https://2017-2021.state.gov/looking-northsharpening-americas-arctic-focus/index.html. Congressional Research Service 24 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Contributions from Allies and Partners Another factor that policymakers may consider are the contributions to a combined U.S.-alliedpartner state strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS that are made by allies such as Japan, the Philippines, Australia, the UK, France, and Germany, as well as potential or emerging partner countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and India. Most or all of the countries just mentioned have taken steps of one kind or another in response to China’s actions in the SCS and ECS.67 Until the later months of 2021, a particular question had concerned the kinds of actions that thenPhilippine president Rodrigo Duterte might be willing to take, given what had been, until the later months of 2021, his frequently nonconfrontational policy toward China regarding the SCS. Since the later months of 2021, and particularly since Ferdinand Marcos Jr. assumed the office of president of the Philippines on June 30, 2022, Philippine actions, while continuing to show an interest in seeking cooperative arrangements with China where possible,68 have also reflected a greater willingness to confront China regarding the SCS and to work with the United States and other countries in doing so.69 67 See, for example, Nikkei staff writers, “Japan to Grant Radar to Philippines amid South China Sea Tensions,” Nikkei Asia, December 1, 2024; Zach Hope, “In the Job Seven Days, Asia’s Newest Leader Is Already Standing Up to China,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 28, 2024; Joe Keary, “Military Challenges to China’s South China Sea Claims Are Increasing,” Strategist, October 22, 2024; Rahman Yaacob, “Commentary: Latest Natuna Islands Incident Hints at Change in Indonesia’s Approach to China,” Channel News Asia (CNA), October 27, 2024; Richard Heydarian, “How South China Sea Disputes Are Uniting Asean States,” South China, Morning Post, October 14, 2024; Michael Delizo, “Philippines, Vietnam Set to Sign Defense Cooperation Agreement,” ABS-CBN News, August 28, 2024; Akira Kitado, “Japan Boosts Defenses on Remote Islands Near Taiwan amid China Fears,” Nikkei Asia, March 31, 2024; Julian Ryall, “Japan to Help Improve Maritime Capabilities of 4 Asean States amid South China Sea Row,” South China Morning Post, February 13, 2024; Richard Javad Heydarian, “Indonesia, Philippines Draw Together vis-a-vis China,” Asia Times, January 12, 2024. 68 See, for example, Adinda Khaerani Epstein, “The Philippines Reshapes Its Policies on the U.S. and China,” Geopolitical Intelligence Services (GIS), February 28, 2025; Joseph Pedrajas, “Philippines Remains Optimistic about Positive Relations with China,” Manila Bulletin, September 26, 2024; Ramon Royandoyan, “Marcos Says South China Sea Claim Isn’t ‘Imaginary,’ Urges Diplomacy,” Nikkei Asia, July 22, 2024; Ramon Royandoyan and Yuki Fujita, “Philippines to Seek Diplomatic Solutions in South China Sea,” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2024; Mikhail Flores and Karen Lema, “Philippines President Orders De-Escalation in South China Sea, Military Chief Says,” Reuters, July 4, 2024; Jacob Lazaro and Nestor Corrales, “PH, China Ministers Talk De-Escalation—But ‘Monster’ Back in EEZ,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 4, 2024 (referring to a very large China Coast Guard cutter sometimes called the Monster); Sebastian Strangio, “Philippines Says it Wants ‘Dialogue’ With China Following Maritime Clash,” Diplomat, June 26, 2024; Neil Jerome Morales, “Philippines Says It Wants to Work with China to Manage Tensions in South China Sea,” Reuters, June 25, 2024; Jim Gomez, “Philippines Says It Won’t Back Down, But Won’t Start a War, after Clash with Chinese Coast Guard,” Associated Press, June 23, 2024. 69 See, for example, Micah McCartney, “US Ally ‘Actively Challenging’ China in Contested Waters,” Newsweek, January 29, 2025; Jeoffrey Maitem, “Philippines Launches ‘Surface Action Groups’ to Strengthen South China Sea Patrols and Defence,” South China Morning Post, January 24, 2025; Haroro J. Ingram, “Archipelago of Resistance: The Philippines Is Rising to Meet the China Threat, But It Has a Crucial Year Ahead,” War on the Rocks, December 11, 2025; Harrison Prétat and Gregory B. Poling, “Manila and Beijing Clarify Select South China Sea Claims,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 21, 2024; Rebecca Tan, “Philippines Pivots from Battling Militants to Projecting Power at Sea,” Washington Post, November 16, 2024; Karen Lema, Mikhail Flores, and Joe Cash, with additional reporting by Costas Pitas, “China Summons Philippine Ambassador over New Maritime Laws,” Reuters, November 8, 2024; Ramon Royandoyan and Yukio Tajima, “Philippines’ Marcos Signs Laws to Assert South China Sea Rights,” Nikkei Asia, November 8 2024; Jeoffrey Maitem, “Philippines Strengthens South China Sea Strategy with US$56 Million Thitu Island Upgrade,” South China Morning Post, October 27 (updated October 28), 2024; Joshua Kurlantzick and Abi McGowan, “Why Tensions in the South China Sea Are Bolstering the U.S.Philippines Alliance,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 5, 2024; Mikhail Flores and Karen Lema, “Philippines Says Pact with Japan Takes Defence Ties to Unprecedented High,” Reuters, July 8, 2024; Don McLain Gill, “Marcos’s Annual Address Shows Steely Resolve On Maritime Rights,” Nikkei Asia, July 29, 2024; Dylan Butts, “Philippines to (continued...) Congressional Research Service 25 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas Certain U.S. actions appear intended in part to encourage U.S. allies and partners in Southeast Asia to take stronger steps to challenge or oppose China on matters relating to the SCS.70 U.S. actions to provide maritime-related security assistance to countries in the region have been carried out in part under the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (IP MSI), an initiative (previously named the Southeast Asian MSI) that was originally announced by the Obama Administration in May 201571 and subsequently legislated by Congress72 to provide, initially, $425 million in maritime security assistance to those four countries over a five-year period. In addition to strengthening security cooperation with U.S. allies in the region, the United States has taken actions to increase U.S. defense and intelligence cooperation with Vietnam and Indonesia.73 Some observers have argued that there may be limits to how far U.S. allies and partners in the region might be willing to go to challenge or oppose China on matters relating to the SCS, particularly if doing so could antagonize China or create a risk of becoming involved in a U.S.- ‘Respond Appropriately’ to Chinese ‘Harassment’ in South China Sea, Military Chief Says,” CNBC, July 5, 2024; Jim Gomez, “Philippine Military Chief Warns His Forces Will Fight Back If Assaulted Again in Disputed Sea,” Associated Press, July 4, 2024. 70 See, for example, Poppy McPherson, Karen Lema, and Devjyot Ghoshal, “How the U.S. Courted the Philippines to Thwart China,” Reuters, November 29, 2024; Hau Dinh and Yves Dam Van, “US to ASEAN: Reconsider Deals with Blacklisted China Firms,” Associated Press, September 10, 2020; Lynn Kuok, “Southeast Asia Stands to Gain as US Hardens South China Sea Stance,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 17, 2020; Bhavan Jaipragas, “US Shift on South China Sea May Help Asean’s Quiet ‘Lawfare’ Resolve Dispute,” South China Morning Post, July 17, 2020. In a September 26, 2023, speech at Harvard, Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro stated In 2020, when China embarked on a concerted effort to intimidate Malaysia out of its rightful offshore resources, the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Task Force 76 began a remarkable prototype operation, pioneering a new approach to support our partners’ civilian vessels in standing up to China’s coercive maritime insurgency in the South China Sea. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units from several ship classes took part—including a littoral combat ship, a destroyer, a cruiser, and the large-deck amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) with its full complement of Marines. Joining forces with a frigate from the Royal Australian Navy, Task Force 76 established and maintained a persistent presence in determined support of a partner’s sovereign, internationallyrecognized rights. China backed down. (U.S. Navy, “SECNAV Delivers Remarks at Harvard Kennedy School,” speech by Carlos Del Toro, September 26, 2023.) 71 Secretary of Defense Speech, IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: “A Regional Security Architecture Where Everyone Rises,” As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, Singapore, Saturday, May 30, 2015, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/606676/iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-a-regional-securityarchitecture-where-everyone-rises/. See also Prashanth Parameswaran, “America’s New Maritime Security Initiative for Southeast Asia,” The Diplomat, April 2, 2016; Prashanth Parameswaran, “US Launches New Maritime Security Initiative at Shangri-La Dialogue 2015,” The Diplomat, June 2, 2015; Aaron Mehta, “Carter Announces $425M In Pacific Partnership Funding,” Defense News, May 30, 2015. See also Megan Eckstein, “The Philippines at Forefront of New Pentagon Maritime Security Initiative,” USNI News, April 18, 2016 (updated April 17, 2016). 72 Section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (S. 1356/P.L. 114-92 of November 25, 2015; 10 U.S.C. 2282 note), as amended by Section 1289 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (S. 2943/P.L. 114-328 of December 23, 2016). 73 See, for example, White House, “Joint Leaders’ Statement: Elevating United States-Vietnam Relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” September 11, 2023; Peter Baker and Katie Rogers, “Biden Forges Deeper Ties With Vietnam as China’s Ambition Mounts,” New York Times, September 10, 2023; Jon Emont, Catherine Lucey, and Katy Stech Ferek, “Biden Seeks Stronger Vietnam Ties in Bid to Counter China,” Wall Street Journal, September 10, 2023; Matt Viser and Meryl Kornfield, “Biden Visits Vietnam to Bolster Alliance Confronting China,” Washington Post, September 10, 2023; Sui-Lee Wee, “Vietnam and U.S. Forge Deeper Ties as Worries Rise About China,” New York Times, September 8, 2023. Congressional Research Service 26 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas China dispute or confrontation.74 For U.S. policymakers, a key question is how effective the steps taken by allies and partner countries have been, whether those steps could be strengthened, and whether they should be undertaken independent of or in coordination with the United States. U.S. Strategy During First Trump Administration U.S. strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS during the first Trump Administration included but was not necessarily limited to the following general lines of effort:75 • • • • • • • exposing and criticizing China’s actions in the SCS (including so-called namingand-shaming actions),76 and reaffirming the U.S. position on issues relating to the SCS and ECS, on a recurring basis; imposing economic sanctions on PRC firms and officials linked to China’s activities in the SCS; conducting naval presence and FON operations in the SCS and Taiwan Strait transits with U.S. Navy ships and (more recently) U.S. Coast Guard cutters; conducting overflight operations in the SCS and ECS with U.S. Air Force bombers; bolstering U.S. military presence and operations in the Indo-Pacific region in general, and developing new U.S. military concepts of operations for countering PRC military forces in the Indo-Pacific region. maintaining and strengthening diplomatic ties and security cooperation with, and providing maritime-related security assistance to, countries in the SCS region; and encouraging allied and partner states to do more individually and in coordination with one another to defend their interests in the SCS region. Specific actions taken by the Trump Administration included the following, among others: • As an apparent cost-imposing measure, DOD announced on May 23, 2018, that it was disinviting China from the 2018 RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) exercise.77 74 See, for example, Derek Grossman, “Biden Hopes for Vietnam Breakthrough, Washington and Hanoi Have Been Inching Closer, But It’s a Complicated Dance,” Foreign Policy, May 9, 2023. 75 For additional discussion of the Trump Administration’s strategy for competing strategically with China in the SCS and ECS, see, for example, Felix K. Chang, “From Pivot to Defiance: American Policy Shift in the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 24, 2020; Michael McDevitt, “Washington Takes a Stand in the South China Sea,” CNA (Arlington, VA), September 8, 2020. 76 See, for example, Wendy He, and Haridas Ramasamy, “Naming and Shaming China: America’s Strategy of Rhetorical Coercion in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 42, no. 3, 2020: 317–345. 77 RIMPAC is a U.S.-led, multilateral naval exercise in the Pacific involving naval forces from more than two dozen countries that is held every two years. At DOD’s invitation, China participated in the 2014 and 2016 RIMPAC exercises. DOD had invited China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC exercise, and China had accepted that invitation. DOD’s statement regarding the withdrawal of the invitation was reprinted in Megan Eckstein, “China Disinvited from Participating in 2018 RIMPAC Exercise,” USNI News, May 23, 2018. See also Gordon Lubold and Jeremy Page, “U.S. Retracts Invitation to China to Participate in Military Exercise,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2018. See also Helene Cooper, “U.S. Disinvites China From Military Exercise Amid Rising Tensions,” New York Times, May 23, 2018; Missy Ryan, “Pentagon Disinvites China from Major Naval Exercise over South China Sea Buildup,” Washington Post, May 23, 2018; James Stavridis, “U.S. Was Right to Give China’s Navy the Boot,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2018. Congressional Research Service 27 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • • • • • In November 2018, national security adviser John Bolton said the U.S. would oppose any agreements between China and other claimants to the South China Sea that limit free passage to international shipping.78 In January 2019, the then-U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, reportedly warned his PRC counterpart that the U.S. Navy would treat China’s coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels as combatants and respond to provocations by them in the same way as it would respond to provocations by PRC navy ships.79 On March 1, 2019, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty [with the Philippines].”80 (For more on this treaty, see Appendix B.) On July 13, 2020, then-Secretary Pompeo issued a statement that strengthened, elaborated, and made more specific certain elements of the U.S. position regarding China’s actions in the SCS. (For the text of this statement, see Appendix G.) On August 26, 2020, then-Secretary Pompeo announced that the United States had begun “imposing visa restrictions on People’s Republic of China (PRC) individuals responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC’s use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources.”81 On January 14, 2021, then-Secretary Pompeo announced additional sanctions against PRC officials, including executives of state-owned enterprises and officials of the Chinese Communist Party and China’s navy “responsible for, or complicit in, either the large-scale reclamation, construction, or militarization of disputed outposts in the South China Sea, or the PRC’s use of coercion against Southeast Asian claimants to inhibit their access to offshore resources in the South China Sea.”82 78 Jake Maxwell Watts, “Bolton Warns China Against Limiting Free Passage in South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2018. 79 See Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard; Navy Chief Says Washington Will Use Military Rules of Engagement to Curb Provocative Behavior,” Financial Times, April 28, 2019. See also Shirley Tay, “US Reportedly Warns China Over Hostile Non-Naval Vessels in South China Sea,” CNBC, April 29, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “China’s South China Sea Strategy Takes a Hit as the US Navy Threatens to Get Tough on Beijing’s Sea Forces,” Business Insider, April 29, 2019; Tyler Durden, “‘Warning Shot Across The Bow:’ US Warns China On Aggressive Acts By Maritime Militia,” Zero Hedge, April 29, 2019; Ankit Panda, “The US Navy’s Shifting View of China’s Coast Guard and ‘Maritime Militia,’” Diplomat, April 30, 2019; Ryan Pickrell, “It Looks Like the US Has Been Quietly Lowering the Threshold for Conflict in the South China Sea,” Business Insider, June 19, 2019. 80 State Department, Remarks With Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr., Remarks [by] Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, March 1, 2019, accessed April 30, 2025, at https://2017-2021.state.gov/remarks-withphilippine-foreign-secretary-teodoro-locsin-jr/index.html. 81 Department of State, “U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Certain PRC State-Owned Enterprises and Executives for Malign Activities in the South China Sea,” press statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, August 26, 2020. 82 Department of State, “Protecting and Preserving a Free and Open South China Sea,” January 14, 2021. See also Matthew Lee, “US Imposes New Sanction on Beijing over South China Sea,” Associated Press, January 14, 2021. Congressional Research Service 28 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • Also on January 14, 2021, the Commerce Department added China’s state-owned Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to the Entity List, restricting exports to that firm, citing CNOOC’s role in “helping China intimidate neighbors in the South China Sea.”83 U.S. Strategy During Biden Administration Overview The Biden Administration continued a number of the general lines of effort listed above in the section on U.S. strategy during the first Trump Administration. Among other things, the Biden Administration took steps to expose China’s actions in the SCS,84 reaffirmed the U.S. position on issues relating to the SCS and ECS, worked to strengthen ties with allies and partners in the region, and continued U.S. efforts to provide maritime-related security assistance to those countries.85 The Navy and Air Force continued to operate in the broader waters of the SCS and the airspace above, and the Navy has continued to conduct FON operations in the SCS and Taiwan Strait transits, with some observers comparing the frequency of FON operations and Taiwan Strait transits to their frequency during the Trump Administration. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command seeks to counter PRC efforts to engage in so-called lawfare86 regarding the SCS and ECS.87 Cooperation with the Philippines Reported developments in 2023 and 2024 regarding U.S. cooperation with the Philippines included the following: • In February 2023, the United States and the Philippines announced an agreement to expand their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Arrangement (EDCA) to permit 83 Department of Commerce, “Commerce Adds China National Offshore Oil Corporation to the Entity List and Skyrizon to the Military End-User List,” January 14, 2021. See also Ben Lefebvre, “U.S. Bans Exports to China's State-Owned Oil Company CNOOC,” Politico Pro, January 14, 2021. 84 Philip Heijmans, “US Spends Big to Highlight Beijing’s Tactics in South China Sea,” Bloomberg, March 6, 2024. 85 See, for example, Pia Lee-Brago, “‘Many Nations’ Ask US Coast Guard for Help,” Philippine Star (Philstar.com), August 29, 2024; Ian Laqui, “US Taking Twofold Stand vs China's Bullying in South China Sea—Coast Guard Admiral,” Philippine Star (Philstar.com), August 28, 2024; August 28, 2024; Ryo Nakamura, “U.S. Seeks Military Access in Philippine Eastern Seaboard,” Nikkei Asia, September 23, 2023; Seth Robson, “US, Vietnam Coast Guard Cooperation Grows Tighter after Biden Visit,” Stars and Stripes, September 22, 2023; Joe Gould, “U.S. to Announce Donation of Cargo Aircraft, Cutters to the Philippines,” Politico Pro, May 1, 2023; John Bradford, “U.S. Coast Guard Is Helping Southeast Asians Protect Their Seas,” Foreign Policy, March 9, 2023. 86 Definitions of lawfare include but are not limited to “the strategic use of legal proceedings to intimidate or hinder an opponent” (“Lawfare,” Collins Dictionary, accessed May 1, 2025, at https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/lawfare) and “the use of legal systems and institutions to affect foreign or domestic affairs, as a more peaceful and rational alternative, or as a less benign adjunct, to warfare” (Lawfare,” Wikipedia, updated April 18, 2025, accessed May 1, 2025, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawfare). 87 See, for example, Bill Gertz, “In the Skies, on the Seas and into the Courts: U.S. Confronts Chinese ‘Lawfare,’” Washington Times, August 30, 2024. See also “Counter-Lawfare” in USINDOPACOM, “J06 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate,” undated, accessed May 1, 2025, at https://www.pacom.mil/Contact/Directory/J0/J06-Staff-JudgeAdvocate/#legalvigilancedispatches; Jessica Williams, “Legitimizing and Operationalizing US Lawfare, The Successful Pursuit of Decisive Legal Combat in the South China Sea,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Spring 2021: 17. Congressional Research Service 29 U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas • • • • U.S. military access to four additional military facilities in the Philippines.88 In April 2023, the two governments identified the four additional sites.89 Also in February 2023, the United States and the Philippines agreed to restart U.S.-Philippine joint patrols in the SCS, which had been suspended in 2016, during Duterte’s period as president. The Philippines reportedly has also held talks with Japan and Australia about conducting joint patrols in the SCS with those countries.90 In March 2023, it was reported that “Japan, the Philippines and the United States plan to set up a trilateral framework involving their national security advisers” for “boosting deterrence against China and preparing for a potential crisis over Taiwan.”91 Also in May 2023, the United States and the Philippines released updated bilateral defense guidelines92 that, among other things, addressed the circumstances under which U.S. forces would come to the aid of the Philippines under the 1951 U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty.93 In early June 2023, Philippine coast guard cutters participated in a first-ever trilateral exercise with U.S. and Japanese coast guard cutters that took place in SCS waters off Bataan province.94 88 Jim Garamone, “U.S.-Philippine Alliance Strengthens as it Enters New Phase,” [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42784. Public record. Not legal advice.