# Proliferation of Precision Strike: Issues for Congress

> Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more.

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42539

## Record

- **Collection:** Congressional research report
- **Document type:** CRS Report
- **Published:** May 14, 2012
- **Citation:** R42539

## Text

Proliferation of Precision Strike:
Issues for Congress
(name redacted)
USAF Fellow
May 14, 2012

Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R42539

CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Proliferation of Precision Strike: Issues for Congress

Summary
Iron emerged in the eighth century B.C., helping to usher in the use of cavalry instead of chariots.
Today’s new technologies, including the development of precision-guided weaponry, have given
rise to new methods of war fighting, thus bringing dramatic change to the operational battlefield.
As will other decision makers, Members of Congress will confront significant challenges in
making their choices about how to adapt to the continually evolving environment, particularly
with respect to what are called “precision strike” capabilities.
The United States took the early lead in the development of precision strike and has enjoyed a
monopoly on these systems for over 20 years. However, many experts agree that the U.S.
advantage is eroding as these systems spread. A demonstration of this proliferation occurred in
2006, when Hezbollah successfully used a Chinese-designed C-802 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
(ASCM) against an Israeli corvette off the coast of Lebanon. This event demonstrated a non-state
terrorist organization’s successful use of precision strike technology. In addition, access to the
global commons is fundamental to global commerce and security—the proliferation of
technology could threaten U.S. unfettered access.
Effective use of precision strike weapons goes beyond that of the weapon itself. The weapon is
one part of a much greater, elaborate system of capabilities the actor must either possess or to
which it must have access. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), in particular, plays a critical role in precision strike.
Many experts believe the proliferation of precision strike has already begun and will continue to
accelerate as more and more countries continue to develop and purchase precision strike
weaponry. Three such countries include China, Iran, and Russia. China’s recent military buildup
and its strategy with an apparent focus on anti-access/area denial capabilities entails a number of
precision strike weapon systems to include the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, which some
defense analysts have labeled a “game changer.” Iran, although at a much smaller and less
elaborate scale, has also entered the precision-guided munitions regime with an outward
belligerence toward closing the economically vital Strait of Hormuz, where 40% of the world’s
oil passes daily. Russia continues to supply arms to the international community and is focusing
on developing its own fifth generation fighter comparable to the U.S. F-22 Raptor. Finally, a
Russian defense company is currently marketing a new cruise missile system that can be hidden
inside a standard shipping container. The housing of the system blends in with the hundreds of
thousands of shipping containers used every day in carrying the world’s commerce. Some defense
experts have expressed fear that a weapon with such camouflage capability could give any
merchant vessel the capability to wipe out an aircraft carrier.
The proliferation of precision strike creates potential issues for Congress. These issues include
whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is properly taking adversary precision strike weapons
into account in its own plans and programs, and whether Congress should approve, reject, or
modify proposed DOD programs for responding to those weapons.

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Proliferation of Precision Strike: Issues for Congress

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background................................................................................................................................ 2
Definitions........................................................................................................................... 2
Brief History of Precision Strike...................................................................................................... 3
U.S. Use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)..................................................................... 4
Desert Storm........................................................................................................................ 4
Kosovo ................................................................................................................................ 5
Operations Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom .................................................................... 6
PGMs from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) ............................................................................. 6
Beginnings of Global PGM Use: Non-State Actors......................................................................... 7
Hezbollah/Israel—2006............................................................................................................. 7
Results of U.S. Superiority/Near Monopoly of Precision Strike............................................... 8
Global Positioning Systems ............................................................................................................. 8
Precision Strike and GPS Equivalent Systems .......................................................................... 9
Cost of U.S. Global Positioning System.................................................................................... 9
Russian Global Orbiting Navigation System........................................................................... 10
Chinese Regional System ........................................................................................................ 12
Current/Developing Precision Strike Threats ................................................................................ 13
China ....................................................................................................................................... 15
DF-21D ............................................................................................................................. 16
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons ........................................................................................ 19
J-20 Stealth Fighter ........................................................................................................... 20
Proliferation to Libya ........................................................................................................ 22
Iran........................................................................................................................................... 23
High Precision Anti-Tank Rockets .................................................................................... 23
Iranian-Made Cruise Missile............................................................................................. 24
Strait of Hormuz................................................................................................................ 24
Russia ...................................................................................................................................... 26
Drones ............................................................................................................................... 26
Club K Cruise Missile....................................................................................................... 26
SA-24 “Grinch” Surface to Air Missiles to Venezuela...................................................... 28
Potential Implications for Enemy Precision Strike Capabilities Against U.S. Forces ................... 29
Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) ........................................................................................... 29
Carrier Operations ................................................................................................................... 30
Amphibious Assault................................................................................................................. 31
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 33
Congressional Oversight of Plans and Programs—Technology.............................................. 33
Fifth Generation Fighter.................................................................................................... 34
Aegis Combat System ....................................................................................................... 35
Naval Research Advisory Committee’s Counter G-RAMM Study................................... 36
Strategic Precision Strike Plans and Programs ........................................................................ 36
AirSea Battle ..................................................................................................................... 36
Long-Range Strike System................................................................................................ 38
Further Inquiry............................................................................................................................... 40

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Figures
Figure 1. GPS Satellite in Flight...................................................................................................... 9
Figure 2. Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Navigation System (2007) .............................................. 11
Figure 3. Emerging Precision Strike Regime................................................................................. 14
Figure 4. Chinese DF-21D............................................................................................................. 17
Figure 5. Chinese DF-21D............................................................................................................. 18
Figure 6. Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Missile .......................................................................... 19
Figure 7. Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter........................................................................................... 21
Figure 8. Strait of Hormuz............................................................................................................. 25
Figure 9. Club-K ............................................................................................................................ 27
Figure 10. SA-24 ‘Grinch’ Surface to Air Missile (SAM)............................................................. 28
Figure 11. F-22 Raptor................................................................................................................... 35

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 40

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Introduction
This report provides background information and considers issues for Congress related to the
worldwide proliferation of “precision strike” capabilities. Precision strike systems utilize
projectiles, bombs, missiles, torpedoes, and other weapons that can actively correct for initialaiming or subsequent errors by homing on their targets or aim-points after being fired, released,
or launched. Some analysts state that “the United States took an early lead in exploiting the
promise of precision-strike systems and the use of precision weaponry has given the United States
a battlefield edge for twenty years. However, these weapons are now spreading: other countries,
and non-state actors, are acquiring them and developing countermeasures against them.”1 As
precision-strike capabilities spread, will the United States see its edge erode? The fact that this
ability of the United States to project power could also diminish, possibly leaving U.S. forces—
and eventually the United States itself—increasingly vulnerable to precision weapons in the
hands of its adversaries, will raise a number of serious considerations for Members of Congress.
Such proliferation could lead to events such as the following:
•

U.S. ground forces having to fight without the inherent safety of air
superiority/supremacy, leaving them vulnerable to attack by enemy air forces for
the first time in nearly 70 years.2

•

U.S. naval forces being restricted from protecting the world’s waterways by antiaccess/area denial measures, such as those under development in China, which
could directly affect the U.S. ability to support key allies and greatly affect
international trade and commerce.

•

Use of Guided Rockets, Artillery, Mortars and other Missiles (G-RAMM) against
a U.S. expeditionary force’s Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).

The proliferation of precision strike creates potential issues for Congress. Oversight issues
include whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is properly taking adversary precision strike
weapons into account in its own plans and programs. Authorization and appropriations issues
include whether Congress should approve, reject, or modify proposed DOD programs for
responding to those weapons. Congress’s decisions regarding combating the proliferation of
precision strike in its oversight role could be wide-ranging, substantially affecting a variety of key
factors, including
•

capabilities and funding requirements;

•

service force levels and missions;

•

technology proliferation strategy;

•

forward-deployed basing considerations;

•

level of support given to allies;

1

Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
2
“American troops have not had to fight without air superiority since 1942,” Col. Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, “Ten
Propositions: Emerging Airpower,” Airpower Journal, Spring 1996, p. 2.

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•

strength of U.S. influence around the globe; and

•

the defense industrial base.

Finally, should Congress legislate requirements for DOD to develop precision strike
countermeasures and then provide funding for that research and development?

Background
Definitions
Precision Strike—Precision strike is the striking of an adversary while utilizing guided
munitions.
Long-Range Strike—“The capability to achieve a desired effect(s) rapidly and/or persistently, on
any target, in any environment, anywhere, at any time.”3 For example, bomber aircraft such as the
B-52, B-1, and B-2 are long-range strike aircraft capable of taking off from the continental United
States (CONUS) and striking targets anywhere in the world.
Precision Guided Munition (PGM)—A weapon that uses a seeker to detect electromagnetic
energy reflected from a target or reference point and, through processing, provides guidance
commands to a control system that guides the weapon to the target. For definition’s sake, the
“term guided munitions will hereafter refer to projectiles, bombs, missiles, torpedoes and other
weapons that can actively correct for initial-aiming or subsequent errors by homing on their
targets or aim-points after being fired, released or launched. Prominent examples of guided
munitions in U.S. combat experience during the past six decades include naval surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) such as the American Talos, the Soviet built SA-2 SAM, laser guided bombs
(LGBs), the Sidewinder and Sparrow III air-intercept missiles (AIMs), the Tomahawk Land
Attack Missile (TLAM), the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) and the Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).”4
Smart Bomb—A steerable, radio-controlled, laser- or satellite-guided bomb designed to
precisely hit a target and minimize collateral damage. A member of the PGM family.
Dumb Bomb—“A bomb that is neither powered nor guided and depends on accurate dropping on
the target for its effectiveness.”5
Air Superiority—“That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that
permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a
given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”6

3

Ravi Chona, “Aerospace Structures for the Century: An Air Force Perspective on Research Needs,” Senior Scientist
and Director, Structural Sciences Center, Air Vehicle Directorate, SDM Keynote Lecture, 46th
AIAA/ASME/ASCE/AHS/ASC SDM Conference, Austin, TX, April 18, 2005.
4
Barry D. Watts, “Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects,” Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) Report, March 2007, p. 1.
5
http://www.encyclopedia.com referenced October 4, 2011.
6
Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, p. GL-6.

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Air Supremacy—“That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of
effective interference.”7
Anti-Access—“any action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the deployment of
friendly forces into theater, preventing them from operating from certain locations within that
theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than they
would normally prefer.”8
Area Denial—“activities that seek to deny freedom of action within areas under the enemy’s
control.”9

Brief History of Precision Strike
Guided weapons, including the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 ballistic missile, but also the Fritz
X air-to-surface weapon, were first used in combat by Germany during World War II.
However, the United States took the lead in developing the precision weapons in the decades
that followed.10
Indeed, many of the weapon systems associated with the information revolution—precisionguided munitions (PGMs), unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and sensors—date back to the
1960s and 1970s, and many saw their debut in the Vietnam War.11
Between 1968 and 1973, for example, the Air Force and Navy expended more than 28,000
laser guided bombs (LGBs) in Southeast Asia, mainly against bridges and transportation
chokepoints.12

These quotes highlight the fact that precision weapons are not a new idea, even though they have
gained prominence in relatively recent years. In 2007, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA) analyst Barry Watts released a report detailing the history of precisionguided weapons starting at the end of World War II (WWII) covering the past six decades.13 He
notes, “The fact that early trials of weapons conceptually recognizable as guided munitions
occurred so many decades ago suggest how long, uneven, and troubled an emergence many of
these weapons have had, notwithstanding some early successes in actual combat.”14 Only

7

Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, p. GL-7.
Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton and Kevin L. Pollpeter, “Entering the Dragon’s Lair:
Chinese Anti-Access Strategies and Their Implications for the United States,” Rand Corporation, 2007.
9
Maj Christopher J. McCarthy, “Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare,” U.S. Naval War
College Paper.
10
Ibid.
11
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
12
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Technology and the American Way of War since 1945,” New York:Columbia University
Press, 2008.
13
For more in depth reading on the history of precision weapons, see Barry D. Watts, “Six Decades of Guided
Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessment, March 2007.
14
Ibid.
8

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recently, starting with the successful use by the United States during Operation Desert Storm, has
the world seen the kind of impact precision guided weapons can have.
The military services have accepted the development and employment of precision-guided
weapons at both different rates and to different degrees. For example,
the U.S. Navy began employing guided torpedoes during World War II and, during the Cold
War that followed, the only unguided torpedo the USN’s submarine community accepted
into operational service had a nuclear warhead. The U.S. Army’s tank community, on the
other hand, relies to this day primarily on aimed fire from a high-velocity main gun for tankon-tank engagements. The fundamental reason for the wide variation in when different
Services and communities within those Services embraced guided munitions appears to lie in
the complexity of engagement dynamics. The more dimensions in which the delivery
platform, the target platform, or both, can maneuver, the stronger the tactical imperative to
move to guided munitions.15

In addition, the Navy historically has faced a greater number of asymmetric threats requiring
PGM technology in order to counter. Examples include the German U-boats, as well as the
Japanese kamikazes, which explains, to a certain extent, the fondness the Navy has shown over
the years for PGMs and their associated technology.
Effective PGMs took some time to “arrive.” “For the most part, the conventional guided weapons
of the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s were too few, too inaccurate, too unreliable, or too
susceptible to simple countermeasures to precipitate anything approaching a revolution of
military affairs (RMA) comparable to the rise of armored warfare (Blitzkrieg) or carrier aviation
during the interwar years 1918-1939.”16 It was not until the 1991 Gulf War that PGMs as known
today really came into their own.

U.S. Use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Desert Storm
The unparalleled accuracy of PGMs has increased the effectiveness of the air campaign
exponentially, and
the Gulf War showed how radically precision attack had transformed the traditional notion of
running a military campaign and, especially, an air campaign. On opening night of the war,
attacks by strike aircraft and cruise missiles against air defense and command and control
facilities essentially opened up Iraq for subsequent conventional attackers. Precision attacks
against the Iraqi Air Force destroyed it in its hangars, and precipitated an attempted mass
exodus of aircraft to Iran. Key precision weapon attacks against bridges served to
‘channelize’ the movement of Iraqi forces and create fatal bottlenecks, and many Iraqis, in
frustration, simply abandoned their vehicles and walked away.17

15

Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
16
Ibid.
17
Richard P. Hallion, “Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare,” Air Power Studies Centre, Royal
Australian Air Force, 1995.

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The results were striking: “this destruction had taken place in an astonishingly short time;
whereas, in previous non-precision interdiction campaigns, it often took hundreds of sorties to
destroy a bridge, in the Gulf War precision weapons destroyed 41 of 54 key Iraqi bridges, as well
as 31 pontoon bridges hastily constructed by the Iraqis in response to the anti-bridge strikes, in
approximately four weeks.”18
The Gulf War also illustrated the improved efficiency and effectiveness precision strike can yield:
the combination of the stealthy F-117 Nighthawk aircraft and PGMs gave U.S. forces
extremely high effectiveness. A typical non-stealth strike formation in the Gulf War required
thirty-eight aircraft, including electronic warfare and defense suppression aircraft, to allow
eight planes to deliver bombs on three targets. By contrast, only twenty F-117s armed with
2,000 lb LGBs were able simultaneously to attack thirty-seven targets in the face of more
challenging defenses. As a result, although F-117s flew only 2 percent of the total attack
sorties in the war, they struck nearly 40 percent of strategic targets, such as leadership and
command and control facilities.19

Additionally, “on one night alone, 46 F-111F attack aircraft dropped 184 LGBs, which destroyed
132 Iraqi armored vehicles.”20

Kosovo
Operations in Kosovo in 1999 represented a step forward in the use of precision strike.
The 1999 war over Kosovo saw the introduction of a new generation of PGMs guided by
data from the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation, most notably the
GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The weapon consists of a $20,000 kit,
including a GPS receiver, sensors, and tailfins, that converts an unguided bomb into a guided
weapon. In contrast with the laser-guided bombs used in Vietnam and the Gulf War, such
weapons allow aircraft to strike at night and through inclement weather.21

The B-2 bomber was instrumental in the successful air campaign, as it “delivered 652 2,000pound (lb) JDAMs and four 4,700-lb Global Positioning System (GPS)-Aided Munitions
(GAMs) against Serbian targets during NATO’s 78-day air campaign”22 with an accuracy rate
over 90% within 13 meters (42.7 feet).
As precise as the PGMs guided by GPS are, they are still only as good as the coordinates/data
placed into their guidance systems. An example of an error in the use of PGMs was the accidental
bombing of the Chinese Embassy on May 7, 1999. On this date, a B-2 bomber dropped two

18

Department of Defense, “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report,” Government Printing Office, 1992.
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
20
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Technology and the American Way of War since 1945,” New York:Columbia University
Press, 2008.
21
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
22
509 Bomb Wing, “Operation Allied Force,” PowerPoint presentation, August 1999, slide 22.
19

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JDAMs onto the Chinese Embassy by mistake due to faulty targeting and maps.23 The bombs
accurately struck their targets consistent with their programming; their programming was wrong.

Operations Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom
By the time the United States initiated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s, the
situation with respect to precision strike had changed dramatically.
Between 1991 and 2003, PGMs grew from a niche capability to represent a new standard of
warfare. Whereas 8 percent of the munitions employed during the Gulf War were guided, 29
percent of those used over Kosovo eight years later, 60 percent of those used in Afghanistan
ten years later, and 68 percent of those used in Iraq twelve years later were guided. In
Afghanistan, the JDAM became the weapon of choice for U.S. forces. Between October
2001 and February 2002, U.S. forces dropped 6,600 of the munitions; during just one tenminute period on October 18, 2001, the Air Force dropped a hundred of the bombs. Two
years later in Iraq, U.S. forces dropped more than 6,500 JDAMs in the march on Baghdad.24

PGMs from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
JDAMs were not the only new technology to be used during the Kosovo war. Modern UAVs,
such as the Air Force RQ-1A Predator, were used for the first time for reconnaissance and
surveillance. Today, as technology and tactics have evolved, those same UAV platforms armed
with such weapons as Hellfire missiles are being used extensively in the war on terror. Hellfire
missiles have multi-mission, multi-target precision-strike capability, and can be launched from
multiple air, sea, and ground platforms. “In November 2002, an AGM-114A Hellfire air-tosurface missile launched by a Predator destroyed a car carrying six terrorists, including Salim
Sinan al-Harethi, Al Qaeda’s chief operative in Yemen and a suspect in the October 2000
bombing of the destroyer USS Cole.”25 More recently in September 2011, armed drones
reportedly operated by the CIA successfully unleashed a barrage of Hellfire missiles at a car
carrying Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric, and other top operatives of Al
Qaeda’s branch in Yemen, killing Mr. Awlaki after a two-year manhunt.26
The use of precision strike has influenced warfare to such an extent that military forces now have
the capability of accurately targeting specific individuals. There is also the inherent ability to limit
collateral damage by picking the right-sized weapon for the respective target. A further example
of this capability is provided by a DOD press release related to U.S. operations in Afghanistan:
Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike August 21, 2010, targeting a Taliban
subcommander in charge of about 10 fighters and facilitation of foreign fighters from
23

Internal CIA inquiries concluded the intelligence officers had intended to target the Yugoslav military supply
headquarters, but wrongly identified the building housing the Chinese Embassy. Martin Kettle, “CIA Takes Rap for
Embassy Attack,” The Guardian, April 9, 2000.
24
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Technology and the American Way of War since 1945,” New York Columbia University
Press, 2008.
25
Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.
26
Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New
York Times, September 30, 2011.

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Pakistan to Nangarhar. Afghan and coalition forces tracked the commander as he met with at
least 25 insurgents armed with assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades in Deh Bala
district to plan an upcoming attack. The commander and a group of 15 insurgents eventually
broke from the group and began walking toward an insurgent camp. After positively
identifying the commander and ensuring no women or children were present, coalition forces
conducted the precision air strike against the commander.... The security force estimated the
strike killed 12 insurgents, possibly including multiple Pakistani fighters from Waziristan as
well as Taliban fighters. No civilians were wounded or killed.27

Beginnings of Global PGM Use: Non-State Actors
Hezbollah/Israel—2006
Previous examples have shown how the United States, a major state actor, has used precision
strike technology since World War II. However, these weapons are also becoming more available
to non-state actors. In the July 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, elements of both
conventional and irregular warfare were present. According to a study prepared for DOD,
During the 33-day war Hezbollah not only used unguided surface-to-surface rockets,
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), it also
employed a number of guided weapons against Israeli forces, in particular anti-tank missiles
and, in one instance, an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). With the assistance of its patrons in
Tehran and Damascus, Hezbollah was therefore able to acquire the weapons, C4ISR
capabilities, and training necessary to develop an effective, “low-end” reconnaissance-strike
complex designed to impose heavy costs on an invading ground force.28

There are also reports that Hezbollah has not only restocked its arsenal of rockets and missiles,
but that it has also expanded and improved its capabilities by acquiring systems of greater range
and accuracy. Some analysts argue that Hezbollah’s successful use of a Chinese-designed C-802
ASCM against an Israeli corvette off the coast of Lebanon should be viewed as “a warning ... for
other advanced naval forces: they cannot afford to overlook force protection and defensive
requirements against maritime armed groups or hybrid threats that possess state-like capabilities
despite their relative small size or non-state status.”29
Others note that this hybrid tactic used by Hezbollah, which included a large-scale use of laserguided anti-tank missiles, as well as mines, made it difficult for the Israeli ground troops to
maneuver their tanks and armored personnel carriers: “The Israelis were forced to move slowly
and carefully. Deprived of their traditional advantage of being able to move fast, the AntiAccess/Area Denial (A2/AD) tactics of Hezbollah, at least in the early stages of the war, was a
success.”30 They were able to show how a non-state actor could impose significant costs against a
27
U.S. Fed News, “Operations in Afghanistan Result in Insurgents Killed, Captured,” U.S. Department of Defense’s
American Forces Press Service, August 23, 2010.
28
“The Proliferation of Precision-Guided Weapons and the Future of Naval Irregular Warfare: Assessment and
Implications,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), prepared for the Office of Net Assessments,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2010.
29
F.G. Hoffman, “’Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable,” Orbis (Summer 2010), p. 447.
30
Taylor Dinerman, “America, Israel and the Next Stage of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Hudson New York
Programs, http://hudson-ny.org/2221/america-israel-revoltion-military-affairs, June 23, 2011.

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superior military force given sufficient resources and training. Some of these same costs can also
be seen with China’s emerging A2/AD network, although it has not been tested in combat, which
nevertheless highlights a number of potential vulnerabilities in the United States military’s
posture in the western Pacific such as lengthy supply lines, reliance on foreign ports and airbases
that could be held vulnerable, and as support for regional allies.

Results of U.S. Superiority/Near Monopoly of Precision Strike
Over time, the United States has come to rely on some key elements in prosecuting its global
responsibilities that are facilitated by its dominance in precision strike. The first is unfettered
access in protecting the global commons.31 An appreciation that extends back as far as Mackinder
and Mahan, “the ability to protect and control the maritime commons gives unparalleled influence
and underpins global systems of trade and commerce.”32
A second key advantage stemming from U.S. success with precision strike is air superiority.
Precision strike is not the only reason the United States has enjoyed air superiority over the years,
but it does play a key role. U.S. ground forces have enjoyed the freedom of not having to fight
under enemy attacks from the air for nearly 70 years. The Iraqi Air Force was all but destroyed by
PGMs as its planes remained in their shelters. The outcome of Desert Storm may have been
different had the United States not had air superiority/air supremacy from the beginning of the
war. The ground forces could have been left to face a battle-hardened Iraqi force that, at the time,
was the fourth-largest army in the world. U.S. casualties could have been significantly higher and
could have extended the overall length of the war.
A final key element of the U.S. monopoly of precision strike ties in with the previous two. It is
freedom of movement. Freedom of movement is an essential element to warfare, whether on the
ground as the sweeping, famed “left hook” the XVIII Airborne Corps performed during the Gulf
War showed, or on the sea as was demonstrated in 1996 when President Clinton ordered two U.S.
aircraft carrier battle groups into the waters near Taiwan in response to aggressive actions by the
Chinese.

Global Positioning Systems
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space-based satellite navigation system that provides
location and time information in all weather, anywhere on or near the Earth, where there is an
unobstructed line of sight to four or more GPS satellites. It is maintained by the U.S. government
and is freely accessible by anyone with a GPS receiver. Some civilian receivers are controlled by
the U.S. government via export controls. All GPS receivers capable of functioning above 18kms
(11 miles) and speeds in excess of 515 meters per second (1,000 nautical miles per hour)33 are
classified as weapons or munitions capable for which State Department-approved export licenses
31
Global commons are geographical areas that are outside the jurisdiction of any nation, and include the oceans outside
territorial limits and Antarctica. Global commons do not include contiguous zones and fisheries zones of foreign
nations. U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32: National Defense, Part 187 – Environmental Effects Abroad of
Major Department of Defense Actions, Section 187.3: Definitions.
32
Bryan Clark and Dan Whiteneck, “Strategic Choices at the Tipping Point,” United States Naval Institute:
Proceedings, February 2011.
33
Arms Control Association, “Missile Technology Control Regime,” viewed April 11, 2012.

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are required. The restrictions attempt to prevent use of the receiver in a ballistic missile, but the
restrictions would not prevent the use in a cruise missile, which travels at much lower altitudes
and slower speeds.

Precision Strike and GPS Equivalent Systems
Effective use of precision strike weapons goes beyond that of the weapon itself. The weapon is
one part of an elaborate system or complex. To launch a precision strike, the actor would need to
possess the weapon, some sort of guidance system (whether it is a Global Positioning System
[GPS] or something different), sensors to locate the target, command and control of the weapon
system, effective doctrine on implementation, and, finally, organization to bring all the
components together. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) plays a critical role in precision strike. Being able to
develop and successfully implement the entire spectrum of these systems has given the United
States the advantage in the precision strike arena. In addition, the United States has outspent
everyone else for decades.
However, some analysts state that
we should not be surprised by the spread of precision-strike capabilities. Some suggest it was
historically inevitable, even if the process has been accelerated by the commercial
availability of key supporting capabilities, such as imagery and command and control. Of
greatest significance, however, is the universal free access to precision navigation and timing
data, such as that from the U.S. GPS satellite constellation. Whereas the development of the
precision guidance cost the United States billions of dollars over the course of decades, both
state and non-state actors can now strike accurately with minimum investment.34

Cost of U.S. Global
Positioning System

Figure 1. GPS Satellite in Flight

One factor contributing to the long-term U.S.
dominance in precision strike capabilities
may be the cost of building and maintaining
GPS:
Rockwell
Collins
International
manufactured the original NAVSTAR
satellites that comprise the current United
States GPS system. This system was
originally developed by the U.S.
Source: http://www.thecarconnection.com/image/
Department of Defense with an estimated
1001811993_gps-satellite.
cost of over $12 billion. The U.S. Navy
and the U.S. Air Force combined to form
NAVSTAR in 1973, and they launched the first satellite in 1974. Subsequent launchings,
with satellites produced by Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have produced the current

34

Thomas G. Mahnken, “Weapons: The Growth & Spread of the Precision-Strike Regime,” Daedalus, the Journal of
the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, June 1, 2011.

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constellation of 24 operating satellites that became fully operational on December 8, 1993.
The estimated annual cost to operate and maintain the GPS satellite system is $750 million.35

Russian Global Orbiting Navigation System
Russia’s Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) is a global positioning system
like the American and European GPS networks. GLONASS is operated by the Russian Space
Forces and uses radio time signals to locate people and vehicles on and above the surface of the
Earth.
In 1982, the former USSR matched America’s NAVSTARs with a new generation of highflying navigation satellites when it launched the test satellites Cosmos-1413, Cosmos-1414
and Cosmos-1415 on one rocket to start GLONASS. The first operational satellites went into
service in December 1983. Russia continued building the GLONASS system after the old
Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s. The system was in full operation by December
1995.
A poor economic situation after the fall of the Soviet Union left Russia with only eight
GLONASS satellites in operation by 2002. Economic conditions improved and 11 satellites
were in operation in 2004. A total of 14 were in orbit at the end of 2005.... Like the U.S. and
European GPS networks, the complete GLONASS constellation was, and again in the future
is to be, 24 satellites. That would include 21 operating in three circular orbital planes, and
three satellites standing by on orbit as backup spares.36

On December 8, 2011, GLONASS regained full operational capability.

35

Information taken from James Madison University website: http://cisr.jmu.edu/sic/gps/satellite.htm on December 2,
2011.
36
Information taken from Space Today Online website: http://www.spacetoday.org/Satellites/GLONASS.html on
December 1, 2011.

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Figure 2. Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Navigation System (2007)

Source: Rian, at http://www.en15.rian.ru/img/94214238_free.html.

Today, GLONASS is still primarily a Russian military system but is being pushed more and more
into the civilian marketplace by the Russian government. “Russian Federation Presidential Decree
from 17 May 2007 granted the international community unrestricted access to GLONASS
navigation services free of charge.”37 As such, GLONASS will continue to be pushed as a dual
use (military and civilian) global navigation system.

37

Information taken from Navigation-Information-Systems GLONASS (NIS GLONASS) website at http://www.nisglonass.ru/en/glonass/technical_descript/ on January 6, 2012.

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Chinese Regional System
On December 27, 2011, China started its own regional global positioning system. A regional
system, as the name implies, focuses on a specific area or region of the globe. This differs from a
global system, which requires many more satellites for worldwide capability. The Chinese
regional system, called Beidou, or Big Dipper, is composed of “10 orbiting satellites, covers an
area from Australia in the south to Russia in the north. Signals can reach the Xinjiang Uygur
autonomous region in the west and the Pacific Ocean in the east. With six more satellites to be
launched next year, the system will cover a wider area and eventually the entire globe by 2020
with a constellation of 35 satellites.”38 This new global positioning system capability will enable
China to control its own precision strike weapons without reliance on any other country’s system
such as the U.S. GPS or Russian GLONASS.
An independent global navigation system could give China a considerable strategic military
advantage in the event hostilities should break out in the Asia Pacific Region.
Most notably, such an advantage would be useful in countering foreign naval forces and with
particularity those of the United States. Of late, China has been posturing its desire to obtain
the ability to eliminate United States’ aircraft carriers through the use of its DF-21D ballistic
missile. With an active GPS such as Beidou in place, China could theoretically use that
capability in combination with drones to accurately guide these anti-ship missiles to their
targets. Such an advantage could prove useful in deterring or hindering the ability of the
United States or even India to project air power to intervene with any military operation
China decides to take against Taiwan, the Philippines or any other interests China has in the
South China Sea.39

Some analysts say China is accelerating its military space program to target U.S. aircraft carriers.
The surge in development and launch activities has also caught the attention of the U.S. Secretary
of Defense and has begun to affect DOD planning. Little U.S. or political and media attention has
focused on this trend, which some are calling a new space race with only one participant.
During 2010, China launched 12 military satellites, more than doubling its previous rates of three
to five launches each year between 2006 and 2009. Since 2006, China has launched about 30
military-related spacecraft. Its total of 15 launches in 2010 set a new record for China and for the
first time equaled the U.S. flight rate for a given year.
At least three or four different Chinese military satellite systems are being networked to support
China’s 1,500 km plus range DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) program, say U.S.
analysts. The DF-21D is being designed to force U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and other
large U.S. allied warships to operate hundreds of miles farther away from China or North Korea
than they do today.
Yaogan spacecraft form the core of Chinese military space operations. But this designation is
a cover to maintain secrecy for at least four different military designs, including satellites
with electro-optical digital imaging cameras, a totally different spacecraft with synthetic
aperture radar imaging, a third type with signal intercept and a fourth with electronic
38

Xin Dingding, “Chinese Satellite Navigation System Beidou Begins Test Services,” China Daily Beijing, December
30, 2011.
39
Michael Listner, “China’s Beidou Global Navigation System,” Defensepolicy.org, August 3, 2011.

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eavesdropping capability. A fifth version is for formation flight and has ocean surveillance
sensors. Thirteen Yaogan satellites launched since 2006 are engaged in military space
activity and most remain operational.40

In written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 16, 2012, Defense
Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant General Ronald Burgass Jr. stated that China operates
many satellites for research, weather monitoring, communications, and reconnaissance purposes.
He continued that it is tough to know exactly what China is getting out of these spacecraft, as
Beijing rarely acknowledges direct military applications of its space program and refers to nearly
all satellite launches as scientific or civil in nature.41
Andrew S. Erickson, a Naval War College expert on China’s naval and space forces, has written a
number of articles on China’s emerging space capabilities. He opines that China appears to have
very advanced capabilities in both electro-optical and radar imaging, with very high resolution.
These are capabilities that could be used to further develop space-based information, surveillance,
and reconnaissance to support precision strike.
Some see Chinese space launches as essential to an increased ASBM capability. Ian Easton, for
example, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute,42 based in Arlington, VA, recently wrote
in the “Asia Eye” blog, that “unlike previous electro-optical and radar imagery satellites deployed
in the series, the Yaogan 9 launch positioned three satellites (A/B/C) orbiting in a highly
choreographed triangular formation, suggesting that China had deployed a dedicated Naval Ocean
Surveillance Satellite system to bolster the ASBM program. Space-based surveillance and cueing
capabilities represent an essential (and previously underdeveloped) element of the ASBM
program.” Some experts believe the September 2010 launch of the Yaogan-11A/B/C are radar
imagery satellites with all weather, day/night capability and could be used to help track carrier
strike groups.

Current/Developing Precision Strike Threats
Many experts believe the proliferation of precision strike has already begun and will continue to
accelerate as more and more countries continue to develop and purchase precision strike
weaponry. The chart below was developed by James Howe in association with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense Net Assessment Summer Study in 2010 titled “The Growth and Spread of
the Precision Strike Regime.” The chart displays a snapshot of estimated worldwide precision
strike capabilities between 2020 and 2040.
According to the study, “this map offers a first-order estimate of the geography of the mature
precision-strike regime. It shows that the growth and spread of the precision strike regime is
likely to be quite uneven.

40

Craig Covault, “China’s Military Space Surge,” Aerospace America, March 2011.
Written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Lt. Gen Ronald Burgass Jr., Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, February 16, 2012, during a hearing on the current and future worldwide threats to the
national security of the United States.
42
Project 2049 Institute is a think tank dedicated to studying Chinese national security issues.
41

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•

Category I countries are those that are capable of fielding all elements of a
precision strike system.

•

Category II countries are those that are capable of fielding some elements of a
precision strike system and purchase the rest.

•

Category III countries are those that will be forced to purchase most elements of
a precision strike system.

•

Category IV countries are those that will have commercial access to some
precision strike munitions, particularly short range systems.”43
Figure 3. Emerging Precision Strike Regime
2020-2040 Estimate

Emerging Precision Strike Regime will Likely be Very Uneven.
Countries Categorized by Capability to Develop/Purchase Precision Strike Capabilities by 2020-2040 – ROM Estimate

Category I
Capable of Building All
Elements
US
Russia
China
Japan
NATO Countries
India

Category II
Capable of Building Some
Elements, and Purchasing
the Rest
S. Korea
Taiwan
Pakistan
Australia
Iran
Turkey
Ukraine

Sweden
Norway
S. Africa
Brazil
Argentina
Chile
Israel

Category III
Primarily Purchases of
Most Elements
Indonesia
Vietnam
Thailand
Belarus
Baltics
Finland
Saudi Arabia
UAE

Egypt
Nigeria
Libya
N. Korea
Malaysia
Iraq
Syria

Category IV
Purchases of Some
Munitions
Cambodia
Burma
Afghanistan
Central Asian
Countries
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Armenia

Yemen
Oman
Algeria
Morocco
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Peru
Columbia
Venezuela
Central
America
Ecuador
Mongolia

Significant differences in technology levels will exist between Categories I-IV for munitions and
especially guidance/navigation, BM/C2, and ISR – but how much precision is “good enough”?
Source: OSD Net Assessment Summer Study 2010.

In addition, some countries are developing capabilities aimed at countering U.S. precision strike
dominance. The following is a sampling of a few countries actively developing and/or purchasing
precision strike weapons and/or countermeasures. These three countries are a sampling and by no
means a comprehensive worldwide overview.
43

“The Growth and Spread of the Precision Strike Regime,” OSD Net Assessment Summer Study, July 26-August 4,
2010, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

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China
Some analysts believe an increasing effectiveness and reach of both piracy and the proliferation
of long-range and sophisticated anti-ship weapons could alter today’s unrestricted access to the
global commons. China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy in particular may highlight
some of the potential challenges of the future.
Many defense experts argue that China’s A2/AD build-up is designed to disrupt potential U.S.
power projection in the western Pacific, as well as project power within and beyond the South
China Sea: “The PLA’s aggressive posture in the South China Sea and its increasing military edge
over Taiwan are sources of concern—as are its investments in nuclear submarines, which suggest
China is seeking to support operations well beyond Taiwan.”44 Chinese use of PGM technology
may allow China to effectively block U.S. forces from strategic areas such as the South China Sea
and the defense of Taiwan.45
Precision strike capabilities are central to Chinese military modernization, especially in
development of its anti-access doctrine. According to CRS Naval Specialist Ron O’Rourke,
DOD and other observers believe that the near-term focus of China’s military modernization
effort, including its naval modernization effort, has been to develop military options for
addressing the situation with Taiwan. Consistent with this goal, observers believe that China
wants its military to be capable of acting as a so-called anti-access force—a force that can
deter U.S. intervention in a conflict involving Taiwan, or failing that, delay the arrival or
reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. naval and air forces. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles
(ASBMs), attack submarines, and supporting C4ISR systems are viewed as key elements of
China’s emerging anti-access force, though other force elements—such as Anti-Ship Cruise
Missiles (ASCMs), Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) (for attacking U.S. air bases and
other facilities in the Western Pacific), and mines—are also of significance.46

The elements of China’s new strategy (with the exception of mines) are heavily composed of
precision guided weapons (ASBMs, ASCMs, LACMs, torpedoes). As mentioned previously, the
developing Beidou satellite positioning system will eventually help serve as the guidance enabler
for these PGMs.
Some analysts state that precision strike is part of China’s asymmetric response to U.S. air and
naval superiority. One argues, for example, that
when the cold war ended, the Pacific Ocean became, in effect, an American lake. With its air
and naval forces operating through bases in friendly countries like Japan and South Korea,
the United States could defend and reassure its allies, deter potential aggressors and insure
safe passage for commercial shipping throughout the Western Pacific and into the Indian
Ocean. Its forces could operate everywhere with impunity.47

44

Phil Stewart, “China’s Military Buildup: How Far Along Is It?”, Reuters, October 11, 2011.
For more information please see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
46
Ibid.
47
Aaron L. Friedberg, “China’s Challenge at Sea,” New York Times, September 5, 2011.
45

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China has shown, and many in the Defense Department agree, that Beijing is not trying to match
American power plane for plane or ship for ship. Rather, it is using this A2/AD strategy to
prepare asymmetrically for any future potential clash with the United States.

DF-21D
In September 2010, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of anti-access and
precision strike threats to the United States during an Air Force Association Convention. “When
considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned
less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically—fighter to fighter or ship to
ship—and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic
options,” he said.48 Gates went on to say that China’s investment in cyber and anti-satellite
warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could also threaten America’s
primary power projection instruments of forward air bases and carrier strike groups. Some
analysts believe the DF-21D is exactly this type of weapon.

48

Weapon and Technology, “DF-21D – Chinese Aircraft Carrier-Killing Missile,” accessed at
http://weapons.technology.youngester.com/2010/08/df-21d-chinese-aircraft-carrier-killing.html on August 23, 2011.

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Figure 4. Chinese DF-21D
Example Attack

Source: Pakistan Defence website at http://www.defence.pk/forums/china-defence/86471-china-missile-shiftspower-pacific-3.html.

The Chinese-designated DF-21 (East Wind-21) intermediate-range ballistic missile has the NATO
designation CSS-5, and is a variant of the CSS-N-3 (JL-1) submarine-launched ballistic missile
developed from the mid-1960s and first test launched in 1982. The road mobile DF-21 was first
successfully test flown in 1985, and the missile is a replacement tactical nuclear missile for the
liquid-fueled DF-2 (CSS-1). Continued program upgrades and versions appeared in the decades
that followed, leading to the present version known as the DF-21D. Some analysts have stated it
could be a game changer. The DF-21D version is believed to be for use against ship targets, with
a maximum range of 1,450 to 1,550 km. The Re-entry Vehicle (RV) reportedly is maneuverable,
which suggests that it could also fly at a low altitude (below 100 m). The target ship location
would presumably be supplied by other sensors such as submarines, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs), satellites, or even fishing boats, and then the target would be located by the terminal
phase sensor in the RV as it approaches the selected ship. It is assumed that the Circular Error

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Probability (CEP)49 would be below 20 m, but no figure has been reported.50 Late
maneuverability at such high speeds gives the DF-21D a very dangerous precision strike
capability.
A 2010 CRS report captured observers’
Figure 5. Chinese DF-21D
concerns about the DF-21D. Such missiles, it
argued, “in combination with broad-area
maritime surveillance and targeting systems,
would permit China to attack aircraft carriers,
other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or
partner navies operating in the Western
Pacific. The U.S. Navy has not previously
faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic
missiles capable of hitting moving ships at
sea. Due to their ability to change course, the
maneuverable re-entry vehicles on the antiSource: Generational Dynamics at
ship ballistic missile would be more difficult
http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?
to intercept than non-maneuvering ballistic
d=ww2010.weblog.
51
missile re-entry vehicles.” The DF-21D’s
1,500+ km range could result in a large and strategically important denial area that stretches into
the Western Pacific, going well beyond Taiwan and the first island chain, which “stretches from
the southern tip of Japan, south past Taiwan on the west and the Philippines and Malaysia on the
east, curving around the South China Sea. The second island chain stretches from the middle of
Japan far out in to the western Pacific curving southward to Guam and then to Indonesia.”52
Some analysts worry that
the DF-21D ... could be the definitive threat to the surface warship, which has so far survived
a century-long struggle against submarines, aircraft and more recently, cruise missiles. In the
view of some analysts, surface warships—above all, aircraft carriers—are fundamentally too
vulnerable to such a weapon, because their signatures are so large, while the missile is so
hard to intercept.
Skeptics respond that the DF-21D’s kill chain can be broken in several places—for example,
in target detection and tracking before launch or in the final homing descent. Still given the
stakes, it seems that a navy facing DF-21Ds would have to be confident of breaking that kill
chain every time.53

In addition,

49

Circular Error Probability is an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in
determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile’s projectiles are
expected to fall. Also called CEP.
50
DF-21 information taken from “Janes’ Strategic Weapons Systems: DF-21 (CSS-5)” posted June 21, 2011.
51
CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
52
Elinor Sloan, “U.S. – China Military and Security Developments,” International Journal, Spring 2011.
53
Bradley Perrett, “China: DF-21D Anti-Ship Missile Still in Development,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, July
13, 2011.

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it should be noted that the concept of using ballistic missiles to attack ships at sea has been
raised on a number of occasions ... unfortunately for the proponents of such systems, the
command loops involved and the difficulty in maintaining real-time targeting data with
sufficient accuracy to make the concept viable have always conspired to defeat the successful
implementation of the idea. There is no indication that the People’s Republic of China has
overcome these basic problems and, until more detailed data are forthcoming, these reports
must be treated with reserve.54

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapons
In addition to precision strike capabilities, China has also demonstrated an important
countermeasure to U.S. precision strike in its anti-satellite weapons development. The first
successful satellite intercept was made by China in January 2007 from the Xichang satellite
launch center,55 demonstrating to the world its ability to take down elements of systems such as
the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) or satellite communications networks without
warning. The 2007 intercept was a kinetic weapon; however, high energy-directed weapons can
also pose a threat to satellites: “Given China’s current level of interest in laser technology, Beijing
probably could develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future. Although specific
Chinese programs for laser ASAT have not been identified, press articles indicate an interest in
developing this capability and Beijing may be working on appropriate technologies.”56
U.S. military space capabilities remain
critically important to the effectiveness of its
precision strike weapons and systems.
According to analysts,

Figure 6. Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT)
Missile

Access to space—which has long been
‘militarized’ much to the advantage of the
United States—is no longer a sure thing.
And even where access might be retained,
military dominance and supremacy are
uncertain. This is a critical vulnerability for
U.S. forces, whose weapons, operations,
communications and more depend on it....
Intelligence satellites are essential in even
the smallest, most irregular operations
against the tiniest terrorist groups, but the
Source: Spy Flight at http://www.spyflight.co.uk/
loss of larger networks in a conflict against
china%20asat.htm.
a more sophisticated foe—and China is at
the forefront in developing and recently testing anti-satellite systems—would be
catastrophic.57

According to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,

54

“International Military Markets – Asia, Australia & Pacific Rim,” Forecast International, December 2011.
ASAT information taken from “Janes’ Strategic Weapons Systems: ASAT” posted December 2, 2010.
56
“Chinese Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Capabilities and ABM Capability,” Referenced on Globalsecurity.org on January
10, 2012.
57
Written testimony to the House Armed Services Committee by Thomas Donnelly, Director of Center for Defense
Studies, American Enterprise Institute, September 13, 2011.
55

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The space program, including ostensible civil projects, supports China’s growing ability to
deny or degrade the space assets of potential adversaries. China operates satellites for
communications, navigation, earth resources and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance. It has successfully tested a direct ascent ASAT and is developing jammers
and kinetic and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. Technologies from its manned
and lunar space programs enhance China’s ability to track and identify satellites, a
prerequisite for ASAT attacks. Beijing is also increasing the quantity and quality of its
satellite constellations, enabling space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
in addition to navigation and communication services. Some Chinese military commentary
heavily promotes the importance of controlling space, noting the role of space in longdistance targeting and other battlefield domains. Beijing, however, rarely acknowledges
direct military applications of its space program and refers to nearly all satellite launches as
scientific or civil in nature.58

Some analysts believe that ASAT weapons pose a substantial risk to both civilian and military
systems:
Commercial man-made satellites, for instance, offer little, if any, protection against the
growing threat of anti-satellite systems, whether ground-based lasers or direct-ascent kinetickill vehicles. The Internet was similarly constructed with a benign environment in mind, and
the progression toward potential sources of single-point system failure, in the forms of both
common software and data repositories like the “cloud,” cannot be discounted.59

In this manner, ASAT weapons could be thought of as counter precision strike in their ability to
take down satellites either by kinetic action or jamming of the guidance networks associated with
precision strike weapons.

J-20 Stealth Fighter
When they say they are going to build 300 J-20s in the next five years, they will build 300 J20s in the next five years.—Vice Chairman of the U.S. Air Force, General Breedlove,
testifying before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness—July 26, 2011

Another part of China’s ability to deliver precision strike weapons depends on its ability to
develop an effective stealth fighter aircraft. Reports note that
China conducted its first flight test of the Chengdu J-20 Black Eagle Stealth Fighter during
an official visit to Beijing by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in January 2011. The J20 is China’s first stealth fighter jet. This flight test surprised many experts as it signaled that
China was making faster-than-expected progress in developing advanced generation fighter
jet technology. While the J-20 remains in the testing phase, an effective stealth fighter could
enhance China’s capability to implement an anti-access/area denial strategy to restrict U.S.
military access to the region.”60

58

Written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Ronald Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, The Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, March 10, 2011.
59
Andrew Krepinevich, “Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction: The Way the World’s Militaries Wage
War is Going to Change—Drastically,” Foreign Policy, September 2011.
60
Randy Forbes, “Vice Chair of Air Force, General Breedlove Voiced Concerns Over China’s Military
Modernization,” China Caucus Blog, July 28, 2011.

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This capability would enable China to deliver precision strike weapons close to a wide range of
U.S. targets, even in a robust anti-aircraft environment.
The J-20 aircraft appears to share Russian technology:61
Experts say the fifth-generation J-20 fighter ... could have its origins in the Mikoyan 1.44
stealth jet that never made it to the production line.... Similarities between the new Chinese
fighter jet and a prototype Russian plane have brought suggestions that Moscow may be
quietly helping Beijing compete with the world’s military powers.... Only the United States
has an operational fifth-generation fighter, which is nearly impossible to track on radar.
Russia is working to start serial production of its prototype craft in the next five to six
years.62

Some observers believe that the appearance of the J-20 shows significant investment by the
Chinese in stealth technology, as well as a very formidable platform to employ precision strike
weapons. It is also believed that the fighter is not expected to be operational at a “significant level
until 2018, as China grapples with production hurdles, in particular engine technology.”63 In the
Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) latest annual public threat assessment of China’s military and
security developments, DOD analysts appear to have concluded that the Chengdu J-20 fighter is
optimized for air-to-ground missions. “Systems such as the J-20 stealth fighter and longer-range
conventional ballistic missiles could improve the PLA’s ability to strike regional air bases,
logistical facilities and other ground-based infrastructure,” the report says, adding that “the J-20
will eventually give the PLA Air Force a platform capable of long-range, penetrating strikes into
complex air defense environments.”64
These evolving PLAAF precision-strike
capabilities add another layer of anti-access
competencies to deter, disrupt, or deny
regional bases, as well as naval surface and
carrier operations. These include upgraded or
new fifth generation aircraft, such as the J-20,
that can employ modern precision ordnance,
including anti-radiation missiles, air-launched
land attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, and
a variety of other munitions using laser and
Global Positioning System/Global Navigation
Satellite System guidance. These last can
include “bunker buster” munitions that can be
employed in long-range attacks on hardened
targets such as aircraft shelters and command

Figure 7. Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter
5th Generation Fighter Aircraft

Source: Flight Global at http://www.flightglobal.com/
blogs/asian-skies/2011/01/j-20-blues-no-first-flighttod.html.

61

Russia and China have long been military (and other goods) trading partners. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is
working on new classes of missiles, setting up new missile units and upgrading existing weapons. That includes highly
accurate land- and sea-based cruise missiles. Several of these designs were acquired from Russia. Russia continues to
be a major supplier to China; however, the pervasive Chinese habit of back-engineering imported equipment has led to
numerous breaches between Russia and China over intellectual property rights issues.
62
Thomas Grove, “New Chinese Stealth Jet Starts Talk of Russian Help,” Reuters, August 18, 2011.
63
David A. Fulghum, Bill Sweetman, Bradley Perrett and Robert Wall, “Expanded Reach: China’s Power Projection
and Space Activities Are Steadily Increasing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 5, 2011.
64
Ibid.

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and control bunkers at regional bases beyond China’s periphery.65 These bases could include
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Yokota Air Base outside of Tokyo, Japan, and Guam Air Base,
potentially making staging, logistical supply/resupply, and force employment difficult.

Proliferation to Libya
As major state actors such as China continue to modernize and build their defensive arsenals, they
also have the potential to provide these new, modern weapons and technologies to smaller, nonstate actors. As an example, during what began as part of the Arab Spring uprising and ended
ultimately in the death of embattled Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, Chinese arms brokers held
negotiations with the Libyan government about sales of precision strike weapons:
China’s Foreign Ministry acknowledged ... that state-run arms companies had met Libyan
officials this summer to broker arms sales to Col. Moammar Gadhafi’s besieged regime,
apparently confirming information in Libyan government documents found by a Canadian
journalist in Tripoli.... Officials of Libya’s transitional government had expressed outrage
over the documents, which were first reported by The Globe and Mail of Toronto. The
records indicate that, during the meeting in Beijing in mid-July, Chinese arms merchants
sought to sell Gadhafi representatives $200 million worth of sophisticated weapons,
including portable surface-to-air missiles66 similar to the American made Stinger that
potentially could bring down certain military aircraft. Chinese arms brokers suggested that
the weapons be delivered via South Africa or Algeria, and said that Algeria’s existing stock
of Chinese arms could be immediately transferred to Libya and replenished by fresh
shipments from China.67

This “attempted” sale garnered so much attention due to the passing of United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1970, Libya Sanctions, which banned military assistance to the
Gadhafi government. Ultimately there was no evidence that the sale was completed, and Chinese
officials remain insistent that no weapons or funds changed hands.
In volatile situations such as Libya, the spread of precision weapons can take very uncertain
forms. As the Libyan rebels were making progress against pro-Gadhafi forces, reports surfaced in

65

Michael P. Flaherty, “Red Wings Ascendant: The Chinese Air Force Contribution to Anti-Access,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, issue 60, 1st Quarter 2011.
66
From U.S. Department of State website: “Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are surface-to-air
missiles that can be carried and fired by a single individual or carried by several individuals and fired by more than one
person acting as a crew. Most MANPADS consist of: 1) a missile packaged in a tube; 2) a launching mechanism
(commonly known as a “gripstock”); and 3) a battery. The tubes, which protect the missile until it has been fired, are
disposable. Rudimentary sights are mounted on the tube. A single-use battery is typically used to power the missile
prior to launch ... There are three main types of MANPADS: 1) Infrared (IR) systems that hone in on an aircraft’s heat
source, usually the engine or the engine’s exhaust plume; 2) Command Line-of-Sight (CLOS) systems whereby the
MANPADS operator visually acquires the target aircraft using a magnified optical sight, and then uses radio controls to
guide the missile into the aircraft; and 3) Laser Beam Riders in which the missile flies along the laser beam and strikes
the aircraft where the operator has aimed the laser... Although superficially similar in appearance, MANPADS should
not be confused with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). RPGs are also portable and shoulder-fired. However, RPGs
are unguided weapons designed primarily to be used against ground targets and are generally ineffective against
aircraft, except at very close range. Some RPG attacks on low-flying aircraft have been mistaken for MANPADS
attacks.”
67
Michael Wines, “Beijing in a Bind With Libyan Rebels; State Arms Firms Talked with Qaddafi Regime, But Chinese
Deny Deliveries,” The International Herald Tribune, September 6, 2011.

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the media that numerous surface-to-air missiles went missing. The Christian Science Monitor
reported that
thousands of shoulder-held surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are unaccounted for. At one
unguarded facility, empty packing crates and documents reveal that 482 sophisticated
Russian SA-24 missiles were shipped to Libya in 2004, and now are gone. With a range of
19,000 feet, the SA-24 is Moscow’s modern version of the American “Stinger,” which in the
1980s helped the U.S.-backed Afghan mujahedeen turn their war against the Soviet Union.68

This is but one example of how high tech weaponry can spread from a major state actor (Russia)
to a minor state actor (Libya) to possibly the black market and terrorist entities.

Iran
Given current tensions with Iran and its perceived intent to develop a wide range of sophisticated
weapons, Iranian precision strike and counter precision strike capabilities are of concern to the
United States. One analyst notes,
The second concern is Iran, which, like Beijing, is buying into the precision-guided weapons
revolution. Its “poor man’s” version of China’s arsenal includes long-range ballistic missiles,
supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, smart anti-ship mines and fast attack boats to “swarm”
enemy ships. The apparent goal is to turn the Persian Gulf’s constricted waters, through
which 40 percent of the world’s oil shipping passes, into an Iranian lake. This challenge is
compounded by Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear capability, which may encourage it to
become more aggressive in its efforts to undermine regional security.69

In addition, according to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Iran is making progress in developing ballistic missiles that can strike regional adversaries
and central Europe. In addition to its growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran is boosting
the lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvement, new
munitions, and salvo launches. Iran’s Simorgh space launch vehicle shows the country’s
progress toward developing an intercontinental ballistic missile.70

High Precision Anti-Tank Rockets
In August 2011, Iran’s Defense Minister, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi, reported that Iran’s
defense industry has begun producing a line of anti-tank rockets with the capacity to destroy
tanks, armor, and enemy ammunition depots. “The rocket strong warhead enables objects to be
destroyed at a distance of 1,300 meters—it is light-weight with high precision to strike. It plays
an important role in close combat and distant strikes,” he said.71 The precision strike capability of
this new anti-tank weapon sets it apart from Iran’s other anti-tank rockets, which are primarily

68
Scott Peterson, “The Deadly Dilemma of Libya’s Missing Weapons,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 7,
2011.
69
Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Panetta’s Challenge,” The Washington Post, July 15, 2011.
70
Written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Ronald Burgess, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, The Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, March 10, 2011.
71
“Iran to Begin Mass Production of Anti-Tank Rockets,” Trend Daily News (Azerbaijan), August 29, 2011.

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simple aimed projectiles. Moreover, Iran has a history of proliferating weapons to both state and
nonstate actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Iranian-Made Cruise Missile
Iran claims to have developed a precision strike cruise missile. According to the Associated Press,
Tehran ... put on display a new Iranian-made cruise missile, which it says has a range of 124
miles and is capable of destroying a warship. The cruise missile, designed for sea-based
targets, is the latest addition to Iran’s growing arsenal. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
attended a ceremony ... that showed off the weapon, dubbed “Ghader,” or “Capable” in Farsi.
Iranian state TV says it can travel at low altitudes and has a lighter weight and smaller
dimensions. Iran has an array of short and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting
targets in the region, including Israel and U.S. military bases in the Gulf. In 2010, Tehran
displayed other Iranian-made cruise missiles but with a shorter range.72

On January 2, 2012, Iran successfully test fired the new missile during a naval exercise practicing
closing the Strait of Hormuz.

Strait of Hormuz73
The strategic importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open cannot be overstated. The Strait of
Hormuz is a narrow passageway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the
Arabian Sea and separating Iran from the Arabian Peninsula. It is one of the world’s vital oil
transit chokepoints. The northern tip of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) forms the southern
shoreline of the strait. The UAE, officially created in 1971, is a constitutional federation made up
of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah. The
Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a 2mile wide buffer zone.
Two-thirds of the world’s oil is transported by ocean; straits and canals are therefore vital in
reducing the time and costs of transporting oil, as well as other goods, globally. Any political
disturbances or upheavals can cause the “choking” of the few important straits for world oil
transit and thus disrupt world oil prices. Roughly 17 million barrels, or 40% of the world’s oil,
passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily.

72
73

Associated Press, “Iran Shows Off New Cruise Missile,” NYTimes.com, August 23, 2011.
Alejandra Roman, “Strait of Hormuz,” The Encyclopedia of Earth, June 14, 2007.

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Figure 8. Strait of Hormuz

Source: Inside of Iran at http://www.insideofiran.org/en/categoryblog/1753-Iran-guards-ready-to-close-strait-ofhormuz.html.

UPI reported in February 2011 that Iran announced it is mass-producing ballistic missiles that can
travel three times the speed of sound and hit naval targets on the high seas. The head of Iran’s
elite military force, the Revolutionary Guard, said the missile has a range of 186 miles, is able to
hit targets using high precision, and cannot be tracked. “The announcement of the new missile
comes as Iran had celebrations to mark the 32nd anniversary of its Islamic revolution, which
toppled the U.S.-backed Shah ... and the announcements sound a day after the chief of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guard warned it would close the Strait of Hormuz if Iran were to be threatened.”74
U.S. defense analysts have said that Iran’s Navy does not have the size for a sustained physical
blockade of the Strait, but does have mine-laying and precision strike missile capability to
temporarily close the Strait. The U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in nearby Bahrain reportedly keeping a
close eye on Iranian activity and stated in a press conference that “any disruption will not be
tolerated.”75 Iran’s development of a precision strike guided missile could potentially increase the
difficulty of keeping the Strait open.76

74

“Iran Tests Anti-Ship Missiles,” UPI, February 9, 2011.
Tabassum Zakaria, “Closing Strait of Hormuz Not So Easy For Iran: Analysts,” Reuters, December 28, 2011.
76
For more on Iran’s threat to the Strait of Hormuz, see CRS Report R42335, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,
coordinated by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
75

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Russia
Drones
The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by the United States has demonstrated the
capabilities and battlefield advantages that can be had by the use of such technology.77 From
giving commanders aerial footage of the battlefield to launching precision strikes killing
terrorists, their role has been ever expanding. Russia joined the armed UAV capable nations on
September 2, 2011, when it introduced its first armed UAV, named “Lutch.” The aircraft can carry
over 350 pounds of “guided weapons on fuselage pylons including missiles. The pilotless aircraft
is designed for optical reconnaissance, radar, radio-relay and electronic reconnaissance
missions.”78 Based on the Sigma 5 aircraft, it has a 250-350 kms surveillance range, which can be
augmented to 500 kms. It can stay in the air for up to 18 hours and can be extended to 30 hours
with additional fuel tanks attached. Once operational, these drones could be exported to both state
and non-state actors unfriendly toward the United States and its allies. Even so, in order for these
systems to fire precision weapons they would need to be utilized as part of a much larger, more
complex informational battle space to fully exploit their capabilities.

Club K Cruise Missile
A Russian defense company is currently marketing a new cruise missile system that can be
hidden inside a standard shipping container. The housing of the system blends in with the
hundreds of thousands of shipping containers used every day in carrying the world’s commerce.
Some defense experts have expressed fear that a weapon with such camouflage capability could
give any merchant vessel the capability to wipe out an aircraft carrier. A Reuters story on the new
system reports, “Potential customers for the formidable Club-K system include Kremlin allies
Iran and Venezuela ... and countries could pass on the satellite-guided missiles, which are very
hard to detect, to terrorist groups.”79
The complete Club-K system is thought still to be primarily a marketing concept, although the
basic components of the system all exist as individual items and a full-size, articulated mock-up
was on display at the MAKS 2011 air show in Moscow.80 The system’s maker, “Concern
Morinformsystem-Agat, is clearly looking for a customer willing to pay the sums needed to
complete development and integration of the finished system.”81 It is estimated the cost for the
Club-K system is between $10 million and $20 million. For this reason, proliferation to non-state
actors “is unlikely as the manufacturer needs a serious paying customer—at state level—to
complete the Club-K.”82
In terms of the system’s elements,
77

For more on U.S. unmanned capabilities, see CRS Report R42136, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, by (name red
acted).
78
Vinay Shukla, “Russia to Unveil Armed Drones at Moscow Airshow,” The Press Trust of India, August 10, 2011.
79
Reuters, “Deadly New Russian Weapon Hides in Shipping Container,” Times of Oman, April 27, 2010.
80
Robert Hewson, “Containerized Club-K Out in the Open at MAKS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 25, 2011.
81
Robert Hewson, “Concealed Club-K Establishes a New Dimension in Cruise Missile Deployment,” Jane’s Navy
International, May 24, 2010.
82
Ibid.

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Each Club-K CMS incorporates four missile tubes, elevated as a single unit to launch
vertically from their transport container (dubbed the Universal Launching Module, ULM).
The complete system requires a combat-management module (CMM) and energy-supply and
life-support module (ES & LSM). All these components are housed in similar standardized
container modules. According to Concern Morinformsystem-Agat’s own information the
Club-K ULM can be carried by and launched from commercial ships, flatbed railway trucks
and regular articulated road haulage vehicles.83

Figure 9. Club-K
Containerized Cruise Missile System

Source: Sydney Morning Herald at http://www.smh.com.au/world/covert-cruise-missile-20100426-tn8e.html.

If true, for anyone with the money to buy one, the Club-K has the potential to give long-range
precision strike capability to ordinary vehicles that can be moved around without attracting
attention.
On the other hand, the Club-K system requires a relatively sophisticated level of targeting data to
be used effectively. A user needs precise geo-location data and/or the ability to conduct some
level of over-the-horizon targeting to fully exploit the weapon. For use against large infrastructure
targets this requirement is less demanding. For use against moving targets at sea, missiles require
accurate positional data on targets before launch and then they must rely on the radar seeker to
pick out the final target in the terminal phase. The seeker has the ability to assess target size and,
therefore, (approximate) target type. Ideally, however, the anti-ship weapon would receive some
form of mid-course guidance update support to improve its precision strike capability.

83

Ibid.

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SA-24 “Grinch” Surface to Air Missiles to Venezuela
The potential sale of up to 2,400 Russian SA-24 “Igla-S” or “Grinch” missiles to Venezuela has
created concern. The Igla-S (Igla-Super or Special) “has been designed to engage front-line
aircraft, helicopter, cruise missiles, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) under direct visibility
conditions both day and night. The system can take a target from both the head-on and tail chase
in background clutter and thermal countermeasures environments.”84
Media reports have described the Grinch:
The Igla-S system (SA-24) became available in the mid-2000s. The missile itself ... is
claimed to outperform its predecessors in effectiveness, reliability, service life and
survivability. In addition, the system retains all merits of the previous Russian Man-Portable
Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (MANPADs); shoulder firing by a single gunner, “fire-andforget” concept, high resistance to background clutter and thermal countermeasures, easy
aiming and launching, easy maintenance and training, high covertness of use, retained
operability in extreme operational environments.85

In 2010, U.S. Air Force General Douglas
Fraser expressed concern that Venezuela was
purchasing as many as 2,400 SA-24
MANPADs, which are considered to be some
of the most sophisticated systems in the world
and can down aircraft up to 19,000 feet above
the ground. “It’s the largest recorded transfer
in the U.N. arms registry database in five
years, at least. There’s no state in Latin
America of greater concern regarding leakage
that has purchased so many missiles ...
referring to reports of Venezuelan arms
flowing to Colombian guerrillas.... The
Chavez regime also has close ties with
Hezbollah and Iran.”86

Figure 10. SA-24 ‘Grinch’ Surface to Air
Missile (SAM)

Source: Cleaves Newswire at
http://cleaves.zapto.org/news/story_2803.html.

84

“KBM Kolomna 9M342 Igla-S (SA-24 ‘Grinch’) Man-Portable Anti-Aircraft Missile,” Jane’s Electro-Optic
Systems, January 20, 2011.
85
Juan Forero, “Venezuela Acquires 1,800 Anti-Aircraft Missiles From Russia,” The Washington Post, December 11,
2010.
86
Ibid.

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Potential Implications for Enemy Precision Strike
Capabilities Against U.S. Forces
Pentagon planners have considered the potential impact of the loss of U.S. precision strike
dominance on future military operations.
The observation that U.S. opponents will employ asymmetric capabilities and strategies to
counter American conventional military superiority has been made frequently over the past
decade. This phenomenon is not new, however, nor is it limited to land warfare. Throughout
the 19th and early 20th centuries rival nations sought to compete with British naval power
while conserving their own resources by developing new weapons platforms, utilizing the
inherent advantages of land-based firepower, and exploiting Britain’s dependence on
overseas resources and extended lines of communication. Although these efforts often failed
due to technological and political constraints, in several cases they are being revived today
by existing and prospective U.S. opponents, many of whom have a greater incentive to
compete asymmetrically than their predecessors given the scale of U.S. dominance, in
addition to having access to capabilities far superior in range, accuracy, and endurance than
those employed a century ago. Most importantly, however, although it appears increasingly
clear that nations such as China and Iran are pursuing these asymmetric capabilities and
strategies, they are unlikely to be the only ones.87

Many observers believe that
future adversaries are developing sophisticated new anti-access networks with long-range
targeting capabilities, as well as advanced conventional missiles of greater range and
precision that can attack both fixed land targets and ships at sea. In future crises, these
developments could put some of the U.S.’s most prized Navy and joint-force assets at risk
from far greater ranges than before. In other words, these developments threaten to eliminate
the virtual operational sanctuaries the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps and joint team has enjoyed
since the end of World War II.88

The following are a few theoretical examples of the impacts on U.S. expeditionary warfighting
that can potentially occur as precision strike capabilities grow and proliferate.

Forward Operating Bases (FOBs)
Setting up and using FOBs in Afghanistan over the past decade, coupled with the increased
proliferation in precision guided weapons, has led some military experts to contend that forwarddeployed troops could be much more vulnerable in the future to enemy munitions such as rockets
and mortars. To address this issue, in the fall of 2011, the Naval Research Advisory Committee—
which advises the Office of Naval Research on how to apply science, research, and development
to the Navy and Marine Corps—was tasked with conducting a study for countering precision
weapons. Reportedly, the draft terms of reference for the study on Marine Corps capabilities for
87
“The Proliferation of Precision-Guided Weapons and the Future of Naval Irregular Warfare: Assessment and
Implications,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) prepared for the Office of Net Assessments,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2010.
88
Robert O. Work and F. G. Hoffman, “Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century,” United States Naval Institute:
Proceedings, November 2010.

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countering precision weapon threats warns of an emerging potential for U.S. adversaries to adopt
and employ precision weapons and munitions to improve their lethality. The goal of the study is
to identify challenges for countering precision munitions and recommend opportunities to address
this potential challenge.
The Naval Research Advisory Committee continues stating,
We saw the emergence of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) during operations in
Afghanistan, from which the Marine Corps sustains, deploys from, and accomplishes
missions against the enemy with small units (squads to companies).... Should these FOBs
become subject to precision enemy fire, the Afghanistan mission risk will increase. The Intel
[sic] community is seeing greater proliferation of relatively inexpensive Guided Rockets,
Artillery, Mortars and Missiles (G-RAMM), which can pose a great threat to future Marine
operations. This threat is yet another example of cheap technologies with the potential to
have a huge impact on future missions, much like the [improvised explosive devices] have
had on recent ones.89

An example of how this could drastically affect operations occurred approximately five years
ago:
During its war with Israel in 2006, Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 relatively inaccurate
RAMM projectiles—rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles—into Israel, leading to the
evacuation of at least 300,000 Israelis from their homes and causing significant disruption to
that country’s economy. Out of these thousands of munitions, only a few drones and antiship cruise missiles were guided. But as the proliferation of guided munitions—G-RAMM
weapons—continues, irregular warfare will be transformed to the point that the roadside
bomb threats that the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars defending against in
Iraq and Afghanistan may seem trivial by comparison.90

If a greater percentage of the 4,000 projectiles had been guided, the amount of damage and
suffering they caused would have undoubtedly been significantly higher.
The same relationship holds true for U.S. forward deployed troops. Some of the larger FOBs in
Afghanistan also have airfields from which USAF, USA, and USMC aviation platforms operate.
The threat to operations would likely be much greater if the Taliban or another adversary fired a
barrage of G-RAMM toward the personnel and equipment. A trained and experienced adversary
would have the capability to target specific aircraft or troop facilities with impunity. The resulting
casualty rate has the potential to be harmful and may require counter-assets that are capable of
successfully targeting and defending against such a threat.

Carrier Operations
The growing threat to carrier operations has been mentioned earlier in this report. It is a potential
threat to U.S. Navy operations that many experts believe cannot be ignored. One main aim of
carrier operations is the U.S. ability to project power anywhere in the world:

89
90

InsideDefense.com, “Panel Plans Studies On Countering Guided Munitions and BA4 Account,” August 24, 2011.
Andrew Krepinevich, “Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction,” Foreign Policy, September 2011.

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Power projection, broadly defined to include amphibious operations, has numerous strategic
benefits. It can serve to deter many forms of aggression, because aggressors will realize that
we can respond appropriately if they try to take a preemptive action. It assures allies of U.S.
capability to intervene decisively on their behalf, with forces that can regain ground or
compel compliance. It provides the ability to gain and exploit operational access into theaters
at a time and place of U.S. choosing, regardless of political or geographical limitation.
Finally, it serves as a key element of a cost-imposing strategy to make expensive demands on
any potential adversary’s plan.91

Some experts believe that given the very clear
technology trends toward precision long-range strike and increasingly sophisticated antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, high-signature, limited-range combatants like the current
aircraft carrier will not meet the requirements of tomorrow’s Fleet. In short, the march of
technology is bringing the super carrier era to an end, just as the new long-range strike
capabilities of carrier aviation brought on the demise of the battleship era in the 1940s.
Factors both internal and external are hastening the carrier’s curtain call. Competitors abroad
have focused their attention on the United States’ ability to go anywhere on the global
maritime commons and strike targets ashore with pin-point accuracy. That focus has resulted
in the development of a series of sensors and weapons that combine range and strike profiles
to deny carrier strike groups the access necessary to launch squadrons of aircraft against
shore installations.92

Others believe carriers will not disappear so quickly, but changing enemy capabilities must still
be addressed. As such, in the future the United States may not have the luxury of being able to
position forces forward for a period of time so they can commence fighting at a time and in a
manner of their choosing. Quite possibly forces will be more vulnerable to attack, forcing U.S.
maritime forces to be positioned farther away from shore. If this is the case, then new systems
would be needed to help U.S. forces fight through a precision strike network en route to the
battlefield.

Amphibious Assault
The U.S. Marine Corps’ amphibious assault capability has been a key mission for many years.
With the advent of precision weaponry, some analysts believe this capability is in question:
For example, land-based anti-ship cruise missiles could pose a significant danger to
amphibious ships operating over-the-horizon, assuming that initial targeting data could be
gathered by UAVs, spotters on civilian vessels, or coastal radars (if amphibious ships were
operating relatively close to shore). This situation could grow even more dangerous if
advanced Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs) such as the Russian-designed Sizzler—which
is capable of supersonic closing speeds and terminal maneuvers, making point defenses
against them extremely difficult—become more widely available. Closer to shore, elements
of an amphibious assault force could be vulnerable to shorter-range precision weapons.
Landing Craft Air Cushions (LCACs), for instance, could be targeted by Anti-Tank Guided
Missiles (ATGMs) or short-range missiles located on land near the shoreline, while guided
91

Robert O. Work and F. G. Hoffman, “Hitting the Beach in the 21st Century,” United States Naval Institute:
Proceedings, November 2010.
92
Henry J. Hendrix and J Noel Williams, “Twilight of the Superfluous Carrier,” United States Naval Institute:
Proceedings, May 2011.

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mortars would present an anti-personnel threat that would be difficult to counter, particularly
if enemy units were dispersed, highly mobile, and camouflaged by complex terrain.
Airborne insertion as well as aerial reconnaissance and fire support could prove equally
difficult when adversaries possess even rudimentary reconnaissance-strike complexes.93 An
opposing force equipped with Man-Portable Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (MANPADs)
and a basic radar system could pose a major threat to rotary-wing platforms, particularly if it
employed swarming tactics to attack from multiple angles and utilized the cover of a dense
urban environment. More advanced systems, such as truck mounted medium range anti-air
missiles, could pose an even greater threat, even against low-to-medium altitude fixed-wing
aircraft.94

Adversary precision strike capability against an amphibious assault presents several challenges to
current U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operational concepts. An analysis prepared for DOD by the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment says,
First, when facing an opponent that is equipped with ATGMs and precision-guided mortars,
efforts to establish a secure beachhead may become prohibitively costly because any large
concentration of forces could be the target of extremely accurate attacks that will be difficult
to prevent. Second ... the proliferation of land-based ASCMs could enable an opponent to
target high signature amphibious assault ships at even greater distances, forcing those ships
to make a difficult choice: accept the risk of an attack or operate from beyond the maximum
range of their assault vehicles.95

For these reasons, some analysts criticize the Navy’s amphibious assault requirements against this
new precision strike challenge. However, some analysts believe that as precision-guided weapons
proliferate more widely, a very good case can be made that a forcible entry capability is more
valuable than it has been during the recent past:
For example, if staging areas for ground troops grow increasingly vulnerable to both shortand long-range guided munitions, then deploying forces over an extended period of time and
massing them at a small number of locations close to a theater of operations—both of which
are hallmarks of post-Cold War American power-projection—may no longer be tenable.
Commanders, for example, may be unable to adequately defend forward staging areas and
reluctant to put troops in harm’s way before an operation even begins, while host nations
may be unwilling to accept the possibility of retaliation against their territory. In theory,
troops could be dispersed to a greater number of locations to complicate an enemy’s
targeting problem, but this would exacerbate political problems (by relying on access from
additional countries) and introduce new operational and logistical challenges, in particular
supplying and coordinating more widely-dispersed forces. An amphibious assault force, by
contrast, could assemble quickly and would not be dependent on the consent of U.S. allies.
Alternatively, against an opponent equipped with only a modest Guided Rockets, Artillery,

93
A reconnaissance-strike complex refers to the integration of precision-guided weapons that receive information from
area sensors and/or radar systems tied together with a command and control element.
94
“The Proliferation of Precision-Guided Weapons and the Future of Naval Irregular Warfare: Assessment and
Implications,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) prepared for the Office of Net Assessments,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2010.
95
Ibid. For more information, see CRS Report RS22947, The Marines’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV):
Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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Mortars and Missiles (G-RAMM) inventory, an amphibious assault force could compel the
adversary to expand its target set, thus limiting the overall impact of its guided weapons.96

In a 2011 House Armed Services Committee joint hearing on Seapower and Projection Forces
Outlook, Lieutenant General Richard Mills, Deputy Commander for Combat Development and
Integration at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, reiterated his staunch support
for the relevance of USMC amphibious assault capabilities. Part of his testimony follows:
The Marine Corps and amphibious warfare go back, as you know, quite a while. The initial
question we had to answer was: Was amphibious warfare even feasible back in the 1930s as
we began to look at an expanding Japanese threat in the Pacific? There were many people
back there who said no, it was not a feasible military strategy and was foolish for us to
pursue and try to train and equip our forces to do so. I think the success, obviously, in World
War II as it evolved and as our tactics changed and our equipment changed, in proven fact,
that was a very feasible strategy.
In the years since World War II, time and time again, the feasibility of amphibious
operations has been questioned, whether it be in 1949 when it was General Bradley who
questioned the very idea that an amphibious attack were ever to take place again, followed
very shortly thereafter, of course, by the Inchon landing and what many people would
describe as the decisive stroke of the Korean War.
Each time, things have changed. The threat’s been more. People have questioned whether or
not that was still a feasible military operation. Each time, I think, the Navy and Marine Corps
team, backed by the entire joint community, has proven in fact not only is it feasible, but it’s
extraordinarily valuable as you pursue operations whether across the entire spectrum of
military operations, everything from humanitarian relief to full combat operations.
So, I would say that those who question the ability of amphibious forces to conduct
operations today just don’t understand the way that we constantly study, that we constantly
adapt, that we constantly change. And we face a threat and we believe that we can overcome
it.97

Issues for Congress
Congressional Oversight of Plans and Programs—Technology
This report highlights a growing number of precision strike weapons and threats that are
becoming available to both state and non-state actors, as well as the increasing potential for
proliferation. These developments pose a number of potential issues for Congress that could have
a direct impact on U.S. national security. One issue for Congress in its oversight role is whether
DOD is properly preparing for potential future conflicts by taking adversary precision strike
weapons into account. Doing so requires both acquiring the appropriate capabilities to counter

96
“The Proliferation of Precision-Guided Weapons and the Future of Naval Irregular Warfare: Assessment and
Implications,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), prepared for the Office of Net Assessments,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, September 2010.
97
Lt. Gen Richard Mills, Congressional testimony on “Seapower and Projection Forces Outlook”, Deputy Commander
for Combat Development and Integration, November 3, 2011.

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these challenges and developing effective doctrine for exploiting them. Congressional oversight
could focus on both aspects.
The following are a few potential U.S. military technologies that could be used to combat the
growing precision strike threat. This list is a sampling and not meant to be all-encompassing.

Fifth Generation Fighter
The United States is the only country that currently possesses an operational fifth generation
fighter—the F-22 Raptor. According to the F-22 Raptor Team (Boeing and Lockheed Martin)
website, the “F-22 Raptor is the world’s first stealthy air dominance fighter and is capable of
multiple missions. Deadly and unseen at long range, unmatched at close-in dogfighting and with
superb, precision-strike ground attack capabilities, the F-22 will establish absolute control.”98 The
Air Force originally planned to procure 750 F-22s to replace the aging F-15A-D fleet. Due to
budgetary constraints and cost overruns, the program eventually ended with a final production
target of 187 aircraft, well below the original 750 planned. Both China and Russia are currently
producing their version of a fifth generation fighter with precision strike capabilities, some
analysts argue, that could potentially challenge the F-22 and U.S. air superiority/supremacy
dominance.
Congress may wish to look at the costs and possibilities of restarting the production line should
these new threats bear fruit. In addition, it also may look to the Air Force to begin research and
development of a sixth generation fighter to ensure technological dominance from the air in terms
of precision strike, as well as the ability to fight in any anti-access/area denial environment. Both
of these options would be expensive. For example, a study completed in 2009 showed “the
production of an additional 75 F-22s beyond the ... 187 units would increase per-unit cost by an
estimated $70 million if the production line were ... to be re-opened.”99

98
Information taken from http://www.f22-raptor.com/about/history/html on November 17, 2011. Additional
information regarding the F-22 can be found at http://www.boeing.com and http://www.lockheedmartin.com, as well as
a CSIS report titled “America’s Self-Destroying Airpower.”
99
Joachim Hofbauer, “Defense Industrial Initiatives #5: The Cost of Cutting Defense Acquisition,” CSIS, January 30,
2009.

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Aegis Combat System
The Aegis combat system has served the
United States well for a number of years.
Many observers speculate, though, that the
current Aegis system might not be able to
protect adequately against anti-ship missiles
such as China’s DF-21D. They state the Aegis
system was not designed for this type of
threat and is vulnerable. A description of the
Aegis combat system follows:

Figure 11. F-22 Raptor
5th Generation Fighter Aircraft

Aegis, which means shield, is the Navy’s
most modern surface combat system. Aegis
was designed and developed as a complete
system, integrating state-of-the-art radar
Source: Defense Industry Daily at
and missile systems. The Aegis Combat
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/F22-raptors-toSystem is highly integrated and capable of
Japan-01909/.
simultaneous warfare on several fronts—
air, surface, subsurface, and strike. Shipboard torpedo and naval gunnery systems are also
integrated. Anti-Air Warfare elements of the Aegis Weapon System MK-7, a component of
the Aegis Combat System, include the Radar System AN/SPY-1B/D, Command and
Decision System, and Weapons Control System. This makes the Aegis system the first fully
integrated combat system built to defend against advanced air, surface, and subsurface
threats.
The Aegis Combat System (ACS), which is the center of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers
and Ticonderoga-class cruisers, relies on a separate sonar system to track undersea threats
like mines, torpedoes, and submarines. The complete package can simultaneously follow
land, air, and undersea threats and attacks. The SPY-1A and -1B radar classes are designed
for the cruisers, while the -1D class is for the destroyers. The letter “V” in SPY-1D(V)
means variant.
The complete integration of all these systems serves to enhance the capability of a ship to
engage and defeat numerous multi-warfare threats simultaneously. The computer-based
command-and-decision element is the core of the Aegis combat system. This interface makes
the Aegis combat system capable of simultaneous operation against almost all kinds of
threats. The Aegis system is being enhanced to act in a Theater Missile Defense role, to
counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles of the variety typically employed by
rogue states.100

An oversight issue for Congress is to verify with the U.S. Navy the current capabilities of the
Aegis Combat System. Does it currently allow for adequate protection against missiles such as
the DF-21D? Does this protection also include a barrage attack and how effective is the system
against this threat every time? Some experts believe that the current Aegis system will require a
significant logistical train to support kinetic action against incoming projectiles.

100

See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis.htm.

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Naval Research Advisory Committee’s Counter G-RAMM Study
As mentioned earlier, the Naval Research Advisory Committee plans to study U.S. Marine Corps
capabilities for countering precision weapons. The study is slated to characterize known and
potential precision weapons and munitions types that could be potentially exploited by hostile
governments and non-state actors, to include relatively inexpensive, home-made weapons. In
addition, according to one source,
the panel will review and assess the current and planned Marine Corps policies, strategies,
approaches (including training), and capabilities for responding to these potential precision
weapons and munitions.
Further, the panel must identify promising science and technology areas for Marine Corps
capabilities that could help detect, track, identify, and engage precision weapons while
countering damage caused by the weapons. The study would also recommend any other steps
the Marine Corps should take to address the threat posed by precision weapons.101

All services are affected by this technology, however, with the greatest impact being on the Army
and Marine Corps. An issue for Congress is whether or not the entire DOD is taking the
proliferation of G-RAMM technology and weapons into account in its programming of future
weapon systems? In addition, Congress could ask the services for a briefing detailing work that
has been, is being, or is projected to be done on countering precision G-RAMM weapons.

Strategic Precision Strike Plans and Programs
The following examples have received attention in various defense publications as well as among
think tanks. A related issue for Congress is whether DOD is adequately preparing for current and
future containment strategies, such as China’s rising anti-access/area denial efforts, which
incorporate numerous precision strike platforms and weapons.

AirSea Battle102
Appreciating the need to address the growing challenge posed by the emerging A2/AD
environment, the Secretary of Defense directed the Department of the Air Force and the
Department of the Navy to develop an AirSea Battle concept as announced in the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). (Very little in terms of specificity has been released
regarding AirSea Battle, as it still remains a highly classified program.)
In response, the services designed an operational concept, focused on the ways and means
necessary to neutralize current and anticipated A2/AD threats, to ensure our Joint force
maintains the ability to project power and protect U.S. national interests.
The AirSea Battle Concept centers on networked, integrated, attack-in-depth to disrupt,
destroy and defeat (NIA-D3) A2/AD threats. This approach exploits and improves upon the
advantage U.S. forces have across the air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace domains,
101

InsideDefense.com, “Panel Plans Studies On Countering Guided Munitions and BA4 Account,” August 24, 2011.
For additional information and Congressional issues on AirSea Battle see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval
Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).
102

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and is essential to defeat increasingly capable intelligence gathering systems and
sophisticated weapons systems used by adversaries employing A2/AD systems. Offensive
and defensive tasks in AirSea Battle are tightly coordinated in real time by networks able to
command and control air and naval forces in a contested environment. The air and naval
forces are organized by mission and networked to conduct integrated operations across all
domains.103

The concept organizes these integrated tasks into three lines of effort:
1. Air and naval forces attack-in-depth to disrupt the adversary’s intelligence
collection and command and control used to employ A2/AD weapons systems;
2. To destroy or neutralize A2/AD weapons systems within effective range of U.S.
forces;
3. To defeat an adversary’s employed weapons to preserve essential U.S. Joint
forces and their enablers.
“Through NIA-D3, air and naval forces achieve integrated effects across multiple domains, using
multiple paths to increase the resilience, agility, speed and effectiveness of the force.”104 DOD
announced at the beginning of November 2011 the establishment of a new AirSea Battle office,
which will “coordinate military and interagency efforts related to AirSea Battle; supervise how
the concept is implemented in terms of organizing, training, and equipping forces; and guide,
facilitate and monitor the execution of AirSea Battle force development.”105
Proponents of the concept say it promotes interoperability between the Services, stressing the
importance of incorporating this interoperability into the acquisition cycle of new weapon
systems, thus improving tactical results/competency and cost effectiveness. Even though a
Taiwan scenario against China is the obvious example, the concept has supposedly been
developed to work in any generic A2/AD situation. Finally, the AirSea Battle concept combined
with the effective use of high-tech weaponry should allow the United States to break the enemy
precision strike kill chain in a number of areas, helping to preserve U.S. power projection and
freedom of access capabilities.
Critics, on the other hand, raise a potential negative issue with the concept that deals with
escalation. Many question how China, a nuclear power, would react to strikes on its mainland.
AirSea Battle is intended to inject significant uncertainty into the calculations of adversaries,
ideally so that conflict doesn’t occur in the first place. This objective of deterring the enemy
from initiating acts of aggression in the first place is laudable, but it’s also worth considering
escalation control. While the AirSea Battle concept is still not presented in detail publicly
and its fu

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42539. Public record. Not legal advice.