# Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities > Briefs, arguments, decisions, and more. URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42443 ## Record - **Collection:** Congressional research report - **Document type:** CRS Report - **Published:** September 28, 2012 - **Citation:** R42443 ## Text Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities -name redacted-, Coordinator Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs -name redactedSpecialist in Middle Eastern Affairs -name redactedSpecialist in Military Aviation -name redactedSpecialist in Missile Defense September 28, 2012 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R42443 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Summary Several published reports indicate that top Israeli decisionmakers are seriously considering whether to order a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and if so, when. Twice in Israel’s history, it has conducted air strikes aimed at halting or delaying what Israeli policymakers believed to be efforts to acquire nuclear weapons by a Middle Eastern state—destroying Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and a facility the Israelis identified as a reactor under construction in Syria in 2007. Today, Israeli officials generally view the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as an unacceptable threat to Israeli security—with some describing it as an existential threat. This report analyzes key factors that may influence Israeli political decisions relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views of and relationships among Israeli leaders; the views of the Israeli public; U.S., regional, and international stances and responses as perceived and anticipated by Israel; Israeli estimates of the potential effectiveness and risks of a possible strike; and responses Israeli leaders anticipate from Iran and Iranian-allied actors—including Hezbollah and Hamas—regionally and internationally. For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. By all accounts, such an attack could have considerable regional and global security, political, and economic repercussions, not least for the United States, Israel, and their bilateral relationship. It is unclear what the ultimate effect of a strike would be on the likelihood of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. The current Israeli government, President Barack Obama, and many Members of Congress have similar concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They appear to have a range of views on how best to address those shared concerns. Iran maintains that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes, and U.S. intelligence assessments say that Iran has not made a decision to build nuclear weapons. However, Iran continues to enrich uranium in militarily hardened sites and questions remain about its nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions. Short- and long-term questions for Members of Congress to consider regarding a possible Israeli decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities militarily might include, but are not limited to, the following: • How might an Israeli strike affect options and debate regarding short-term and long-term U.S. relations and security cooperation with, and foreign assistance to, Israel and other regional countries? • Would an Israeli strike be considered self-defense? Why or why not? What would be the legal and policy implications either way? • How might a strike affect the implementation of existing sanctions legislation on Iran or options and debate over new legislation on the subject? • How might Congress consult with the Obama Administration on and provide oversight with respect to various political and military options? This report has many aspects that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim to independently confirm any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to various Israeli, U.S., or other officials. This is an update of a report dated March 28, 2012. However, the only updated material is the initial section entitled “Developments from Late March to September 2012.” Congressional Research Service Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Contents Developments From Late March to September 2012 ...................................................................... 1 Issue Status: Possible Israeli Decision and Public Debate ........................................................ 1 Possible Operational and Cost-Benefit Considerations for Israel ............................................. 4 U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking .............. 5 Potential Iranian Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking ................................ 7 Congressional Action................................................................................................................. 8 Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for Congress............................................................. 9 Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli Decision ........................................................... 17 Nature of the Threat—Differing Stated Perceptions ............................................................... 17 Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently ................................ 20 Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action ............................................................ 21 The Israeli Decisionmaking Process.............................................................................................. 24 Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions................................................................................. 24 Public Opinion and Debate in Israel........................................................................................ 28 Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and Anticipated Responses Outside Israel ........ 30 The United States..................................................................................................................... 30 Regionally and Internationally ................................................................................................ 34 Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike .......... 35 Access...................................................................................................................................... 36 Aircraft .................................................................................................................................... 38 Weapons .................................................................................................................................. 38 Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike ........................... 41 Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program ............................................................................................ 41 Effect on Iran’s Regime........................................................................................................... 44 Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Iranian Responses to a Strike........................... 45 Diplomatic Responses ............................................................................................................. 45 Hostile but Non-Military Responses ....................................................................................... 46 Military Responses .................................................................................................................. 46 Attacks on Israeli Territory................................................................................................ 47 Attacks Against Israeli Interests Abroad ........................................................................... 52 Expanded Military Responses ................................................................................................. 53 Attempted Closure of the Strait of Hormuz ...................................................................... 53 Attacks on U.S. Allies in the Persian Gulf ........................................................................ 54 Attacks on U.S. Installations and Interests in the Region or Elsewhere Abroad............... 54 Possible Attacks on the U.S. Homeland ............................................................................ 55 Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress ........................................................................... 56 Figures Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context..................................................... 15 Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel................... 16 Figure 3. Underground Nuclear Facilities and Penetrating Munitions .......................................... 40 Congressional Research Service Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Figure 4. Potential Ranges of Iranian Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles...................................... 49 Figure 5. Possible Ranges of Rockets and Missiles from Iranian-Allied Groups.......................... 51 Contacts Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 57 Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 57 Congressional Research Service Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Developments From Late March to September 2012 Many media reports in Israel, the United States, and elsewhere since late March 2012—and especially since August—have focused closely on apparent differences between the Netanyahu government in Israel and the Obama Administration on potential “red lines” for possible military action. After seemingly unsuccessful attempts by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to persuade President Barack Obama to present Iran with a time-specific ultimatum (see “U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking” below), prospects for future Israeli military action remain unclear. The complex array of information and views set forth in this section may help U.S. policymakers address relevant questions on this issue within the context of various regional and global economic, political, and security concerns. As with other parts of the report, this section has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials. Issue Status: Possible Israeli Decision and Public Debate Israeli and international media reports have continued speculating that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu may order an Israeli military attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the coming months. The rationale for a possible strike is set forth in detail below (see “Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently”). This has enlivened an already vigorous public debate in Israel (as discussed below). A wide array of current and former leaders in Israel’s political, military, and security establishments have either publicly expressed opposition or are reportedly opposed, not to an attack in principle, but to an attack without U.S. support given possible operational and political fallout.1 Seemingly heated private and public exchanges between the Obama Administration and Netanyahu government (discussed below) have occurred within the context of frequent consultations—including summer 2012 visits to Israel by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, and National Security Advisor Tom Donilon. In a September 27 speech before the United Nations General Assembly in which he stressed that the hour was getting “very late,” Netanyahu said, “I believe that faced with a clear red line, Iran will back down. This will give more time for sanctions and diplomacy to convince Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons program altogether.” He asserted that otherwise, at current rates of uranium enrichment, Iran could reach the final stage of enrichment by the spring or summer of 2013.2 Netanyahu’s remarks appear to have convinced several former Israeli officials and other international commentators that the timeline for a possible Israeli attack has been pushed back at least to early 2013.3 However, one Israeli journalist reportedly wrote, “If one takes his statements 1 See, for example, David Remnick, “The Vegetarian,” New Yorker, September 3, 2012. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-faced-with-clear-red-line-iran-will-back-down-onnuclear-program.premium-1.466987 3 Dan Margalit, “A sigh of relief at the White House,” Israel Hayom, September 28, 2012; Dan Williams, “Israelis see no Iran war this year after Netanyahu’s speech,” Reuters, September 28, 2012; Jay Solomon, “Netanyahu Demands ‘Red Line’ on Iran,” Wall Street Journal, September 28, 2012. 2 Congressional Research Service 1 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities seriously, within a short time, months at most, if Iran is not deterred and if the US does not attack, Israel will launch an attack on its own.”4 Speculation persists regarding a possible Israeli strike, even though—as discussed below (see “Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program”)—most Israeli officials and analysts agree that military action might only delay, not destroy, Iran’s nuclear program. Other efforts—diplomacy, sanctions, reported covert action, even implied threats of military action by Israel or the United States— have not led Iran’s regime either to stop expanding its uranium enrichment activities or to take steps toward assuring the international community that its nuclear program is confined to purely peaceful purposes. Israel is not a direct party to the P5+1 (see “Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action” below for a definition of this term) negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, where technical discussions that continued in the spring and summer of 2012 made no apparent progress.5 In August 2012, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon called upon the international community to acknowledge that diplomacy had failed.6 In August 2012, Congress and the President enacted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-158), an additional sanctions law aimed at Iran’s oil exports.7 Most analysts agree that these sanctions, combined with preexisting U.S. and international sanctions (see “Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action” below), are significantly affecting Iran’s economy, and reports indicate that Israeli officials may seek additional sanctions.8 The August 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program reiterated concern over continued enrichment and evidence of possible military dimensions to the program.9 For more information on U.S. and international sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and their collective impact, as well as the August IAEA report, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted); CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name redacted); and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by (name redacted). Israeli concerns regarding a potential Iranian nuclear weapons capability may be exacerbated by reports that Iran has deliberately provided faulty information about its nuclear program to international monitors.10 This may further heighten Israeli and international concerns about the reliability and comprehensiveness of current information regarding the program and its progress. Media attention to deliberations among Netanyahu and the other members of the 14-member Israeli security cabinet (see “Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions” below) has intensified. A vote of approval from the security cabinet is necessary before ordering military action. A late August New York Times report indicated that of those within the security cabinet whose views are 4 Nahum Barnea, quoted in Harriet Sherwood, “Binyamin Netanyahu's UN bomb triggers derision and admiration,” guardian.co.uk, September 28, 2012. 5 For a discussion of Israel’s reported positions regarding negotiations, see Gareth Porter, “U.S.-Israel Deal to Demand Qom Closure Threatens Nuclear Talks,” InterPress Service, April 12, 2012. 6 Jodi Rudoren, “Israeli Minister Asks Nations to Say Iran Talks Have Failed,” New York Times, August 12, 2012. 7 CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name redacted). 8 Isabel Kershner, “Israeli Foreign Ministry Calls for More Sanctions on Iran,” nytimes.com, September 27, 2012. 9 IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 2012. 10 Stuart Winer, “Iran admits it deceived the West over nuclear program,” Times of Israel, September 20, 2012. Congressional Research Service 2 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities thought to be known, approximately six members are in favor of a strike, with three or four opposed.11 The implications for Israeli decisionmaking of press articles pointing to Israeli emphasis on home front safety12 and streamlined cabinet procedures reportedly giving Netanyahu greater control over the decisionmaking process13 are unclear. In August 2012, Netanyahu appointed Avi Dichter, a former head of the Israel Security Agency (also known as the Shin Bet), as Home Front Defense Minister after his predecessor was named ambassador to China. Reports indicate that Dichter— though not a member of the security cabinet—has joined the group of eight other ministers (previously known as the “octet,” now known as the “group of nine”) that has particularly significant influence over the national security decisionmaking process.14 Netanyahu disbanded security cabinet meetings earlier than planned during the first week of September, reportedly due to leaks of disagreements over when Iran would reach a “zone of immunity” (the term is described below—see “Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently”).15 If, when, and how Netanyahu might call a vote in the security cabinet and/or the full 29-member cabinet remains unclear.16 Another possible consideration for Netanyahu is that he will face national elections sometime in 2013; he has faced a drop in approval ratings in 2012—from over 50% in March to 31% in August.17 This drop may not fundamentally undermine Netanyahu’s chances for another prime ministerial term in Israel’s coalition-based parliamentary system. However, changing electoral prospects might affect his and other actors’ decisionmaking on Iran.18 Polls continue to indicate that a majority of Israelis opposes a unilateral Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities at this time, but that a slight majority would support a joint U.S.-Israel strike.19 Ehud Olmert, Israel’s previous prime minister, who reportedly ordered Israel’s 2007 strike on a presumed Syrian 11 Rudoren and Sanger, op. cit. A September bulletin from a Washington, DC-based consulting firm asserted a slight numerical edge within the security cabinet for those opposing a strike, with four (including Defense Minister Ehud Barak) listed as “unknown” or “uncertain.” Nathaniel Kern and Matthew M. Reed, “Netanyahu’s Divided Cabinet,” Foreign Reports Bulletin, September 19, 2012. Reports have focused on possible changes in the position of Barak, one of the primary public exponents of a possible Israeli strike, as well as the views of Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Strategic Affairs Moshe Ya’alon. See Yossi Verter, “Reshuffling the deck: Barak now opposes Israeli strike on Iran, sources say,” Ha’aretz, September 7, 2012; Hagai Golan and Stella Korin-Lieber, “Barak: I see eye-to-eye with Netanyahu on Iran,” Globes, September 13, 2012; Ari Shavit, “IDF chief of staff-turned-vice premier: ‘We are not bluffing,’” Ha’aretz Magazine, June 14, 2012; Remnick, op. cit. 12 Calev Ben-David and Gwen Ackerman, “Israel to Hold Home Front Drill Amid Rise in Iran Tensions,” Bloomberg, August 12, 2012. 13 Attila Somfalvi, “Revised gov't protocol gives PM unprecedented powers,” ynetnews.com, August 12, 2012. 14 Herb Keinon, “Security cabinet remains key in deciding on war,” jpost.com, September 6, 2012. 15 “Citing leak, Netanyahu disbands security cabinet meeting,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 5, 2012. 16 Keinon, op. cit. A September 2012 New Yorker article on Israel’s 2007 strike on the presumed Al Kibar reactor in Syria discusses how security cabinet deliberations proceeded in that case. David Makovsky, “The Silent Strike,” New Yorker, September 17, 2012. 17 “Netanyahu Approval,” jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain. 18 See, for example, Yossi Verter, “In UN speech, Netanyahu pitches Iran as key selling point for early Israeli elections,” haaretz.com, September 28, 2012. 19 http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p45ejoint.html. This poll was taken on September 9-14, 2012, and has a margin of error of 4.5%. It was conducted jointly by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah. The poll was supported by the Ford Foundation Cairo office and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in Ramallah and Jerusalem. See Remnick, op. cit., for a discussion of the possible impact of polls on Netanyahu’s decisionmaking. Congressional Research Service 3 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities nuclear reactor, and whose political comeback prospects have been the subject of Israeli domestic speculation,20 was quoted as saying in September: Worse comes to worst, and all options have been tried, then, naturally it may force Israel to act to defend its existence. But it must be clear that we tried with the international community, and particularly with the United States, to act together before we resort to the last option of an Israeli military operation.21 Public debate in Israel continues to reflect disagreement over both the likelihood and the advisability of an attack. At least one analyst has asserted that Israeli leaders appear to be preparing the “Israeli home front, and international public opinion, for the inevitably messy aftermath of any such action.”22 Other commentators—who note that Israeli leaders did not provide prior warning before military attacks in 1981 and 2007, respectively, against presumed Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors—have said that “all the loose talk of a brewing strike is a signal the warnings are little more than posturing.”23 One journalist argued that Israel might strike Iran “just to prove that they’re serious” to a largely skeptical world.24 Another journalist wrote that the key question “is whether Netanyahu sees the threat of Iran building a nuclear bomb as so severe that he is willing to risk severe friction with the United States, a severe blow to the Israeli economy, the possibility of a bloody regional war, and a hail of missiles from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and perhaps Syria hitting Israel.”25 Possible Operational and Cost-Benefit Considerations for Israel Israeli censorship rules reportedly limit public discussion of operational details of a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, sources that discuss potential military capabilities, options, and outcomes, such as a 2012 book by an Israeli military correspondent and an Israeli military historian,26 could shed some light on Israeli decisionmakers’ calculations. U.S. and international sources have provided some additional information on this subject since late March 2012.27 A September report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded that although an Israeli strike was possible, “it would be complex and high risk in the operational level and would lack any assurances of a high mission success rate.” Furthermore, the report stated that Iranian retaliation will have “devastating regional consequences.”28 Some other 20 Isabel Kershner, “Former Israeli Premier Gets Suspended Sentence,” New York Times, September 24, 2012. Makovsky, op. cit. 22 Oren Kessler, “The Decider,” foreignpolicy.com, August 23, 2012, citing views attributed to Uzi Rabi, director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University. 23 Ibid., citing Israeli journalists Motti Kirshenbaum and Ben Caspit. 24 Ben Caspit, quoted in Rudoren, op. cit. 25 Yossi Melman, “Israel May Have Time Limit in Iran Attack Decision” (translated from Hebrew), israelspy.com, August 10, 2012. 26 Yaakov Katz and Yoaz Hendel, Israel vs. Iran: The Shadow War, Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012, pp. 167193. 27 For general background information, see “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Operational Aspects of an Israeli Strike” and “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Estimated Effects of a Possible Strike” below. 28 Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 10, 2012. 21 Congressional Research Service 4 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities commentators have presented what they claim to be leaked information from U.S. or Israeli sources pertaining to possible operational details of potential Israeli military action.29 In response to a question in an August Ha’aretz interview about whether the potential domestic, regional, and international costs of Israeli military action would be worth “a two-year delay in Iran’s inevitable nuclearization,” an Israeli “decisionmaker” widely assumed to be Defense Minister Barak30 said: Our objective is not to wipe out the Iranian nuclear program. But it must be understood that the real story is the contest between Iran’s nuclearization and the fall of the current regime of the ayatollahs in Iran. If we succeed in pushing off the nuclear program by six or eight or 10 years, there’s a good chance that the regime will not survive until the critical moment. So the objective is delay.31 Meir Dagan, who ended his eight-year tenure as head of Israel’s Mossad in early 2011, is one of the most outspoken opponents of an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities in the near future. When interviewed for a September New Yorker article, Dagan said: An Israeli bombing would lead to a regional war and solve the internal problems of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It would galvanize Iranian society behind the leadership and create unity around the nuclear issue. And it would justify Iran in rebuilding its nuclear project and saying, “Look, see, we were attacked by the Zionist enemy and we clearly need to have it.”32 U.S. Concerns and Possible Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking As mentioned above and discussed further below (see “The United States”), U.S. concerns and potential responses regarding the consequences of a possible Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities could significantly affect Israeli decisionmaking. Israeli differences with the Obama Administration over the Iranian nuclear issue have reportedly been the subject of intense private discussions.33 Additionally, U.S. concerns about regional and international perceptions of U.S. involvement in a potential Israeli attack and the durability of the international sanctions regime 29 For example, in August, a U.S. blogger posted what he claimed was an Israeli briefing document outlining Israel’s war plans against Iran. He claimed that the document was passed to him “by a high-level Israeli source who received it from an IDF officer.” Richard Silverstein, “Bibi’s Secret War Plan,” Tikun Olam, August 15, 2012. Passages posted from the alleged document anticipate massive Israeli cyberattacks, followed by land- and naval-based missile attacks and attacks by the Israel Air Force against a wide range of Iranian nuclear facilities, military targets, and key individual professionals and commanders. Ibid. A late September report cited unnamed U.S. military and intelligence officials discussing various Israeli attack options, including a possible special forces raid on the deep-underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordow. Mark Perry, “The Entebbe Option,” foreignpolicy.com, September 27, 2012. A late March report by the same author also cited unnamed U.S. government officials in speculating that Israel could possibly use airfields in Azerbaijan to land planes or conduct search-and-rescue missions following an attack in Iran. Mark Perry, “Israel’s Secret Staging Ground,” foreignpolicy.com, March 28, 2012. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman subsequently dismissed reports of possible Israeli use of Azeri airfields as “science fiction.” Lada Evgrashina and Margarita Antidze, “Israel denies it has access to Azerbaijan air bases,” Reuters, April 23, 2012. 30 Harriet Sherwood, “Israeli speculation over Iran strike reaches fever pitch,” guardian.co.uk, August 14, 2012. 31 Ari Shavit, “A grave warning on Iran from ‘the decision maker,’” Ha’aretz, August 11, 2012. 32 Remnick, op. cit. 33 Anne Gearan, “Rep. Mike Rogers tells of heated exchange between Netanyahu, U.S. envoy over Iran nuclear program,” washingtonpost.com, September 6, 2012. Congressional Research Service 5 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities against Iran may have at least partly motivated the following August 2012 comments by General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “I don’t want to be accused of trying to influence—nor do I want—nor do I want to be complicit if [the Israelis] choose to do it.”34 President Obama, in his September 25 address at the annual opening session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, said that time remains for diplomacy with Iran, but is “not unlimited.”35 He also said that the United States “will do what we must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.”36 Earlier in September, the Administration apparently rejected Israeli requests both for setting firm deadlines for U.S. military action, and for an Obama-Netanyahu meeting later in the month on the sidelines of the annual opening sessions of the U.N. General Assembly.37 In declining to set deadlines, Secretary of State Clinton set forth her view of U.S.-Israel differences on the issue in a September 2012 interview: They’re more anxious about a quick response because they feel that they’re right in the bull’s-eye, so to speak. But we’re convinced that we have more time to focus on these sanctions, to do everything we can to bring Iran to a good-faith negotiation.38 Responding at a news conference, Netanyahu was quoted as saying: If Iran knows that there’s no deadline, what will it do? Exactly what it’s doing: It’s continuing without any interference toward obtaining nuclear weapons capability and from there nuclear bombs. The world tells Israel: Wait. There’s still time. And I say: Wait for what? Wait until when? Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran don't have a moral right to place a red light before Israel.39 U.S. responses to Netanyahu’s statement, including by Members of Congress, have varied.40 34 Transcript of remarks by General Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Embassy in London, England, August 30, 2012, available at http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1727. 35 Matt Spetalnick and Mark Felsenthal, “U.S. will ‘do what we must’ on Iran, Ban Ki-moon opposes threats,” Reuters, September 25, 2012. 36 Ibid. 37 Netanyahu has subsequently consulted with President Obama via telephone, and ultimately met in New York on September 27 with Secretary of State Clinton. 38 Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, “U.S. ‘Not Setting Deadlines’ for Iran, Clinton Says,” Bloomberg, September 10, 2012. 39 Joshua Mitnick and Jay Solomon, “Israel Blasts U.S. Over Iran—Netanyahu Says Obama Administration Has No ‘Moral Right’ to Restrain Jewish State,” Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2012. An Israeli “decisionmaker” widely believed to be Defense Minister Barak was quoted as saying in August, “But let me remind you that Ronald Reagan did not want to see a nuclear Pakistan but Pakistan did go nuclear. Bill Clinton did not want to see a nuclear North Korea, but North Korea went nuclear.” Shavit, “A grave warning on Iran from ‘the decision maker,’” op. cit. In September, however, Barak acknowledged “impressive preparations by the Americans to counter Iran on all fronts” and asserted that some U.S. red lines for military action already existed. Barak Ravid, “Barak hints U.S. military preparations may eliminate Israel's need for Iran strike,” haaretz.com, September 7, 2012; Golan and Korin-Lieber, op. cit. 40 Senator Barbara Boxer, the sponsor of the U.S.-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-150), wrote a letter dated September 12 to Netanyahu urging Netanyahu to “step back and clarify your remarks so that the world sees that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel.” Text available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/press/releases/091212b.cfm. A group of 128 Republican Members of Congress sent a September 13 letter to President Obama calling on him to meet with Netanyahu during his planned U.S. visit later in the month. Text available at http://kingston.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=308403. In September 20 testimony before the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, former deputy national security advisor (during the George W. Bush Administration) Elliott Abrams said that no president of the United States would give Israel a pledge to attack another country “by a date certain.” Congressional Research Service 6 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Regarding levels of U.S.-Israel security cooperation focused on this issue, former Obama White House national security official Dennis Ross suggested in August that “senior American officials should ask Israeli leaders if there are military capabilities we could provide them with—like additional bunker-busting bombs, tankers for refueling aircraft and targeting information—that would extend the clock for them.”41 A U.S. source has reported that the United States has drastically reduced the scope of its planned involvement in a late October joint missile defense exercise with Israel known as Austere Challenge 12.42 The United States and more than 30 other countries reportedly conducted joint military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf in late September, possibly in preparation for potential Iranian responses to an Israeli attack.43 Potential Iranian Responses: Possible Impact on Israeli Decisionmaking As discussed below (see “Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Possible Iranian Responses to a Strike”), Israeli leaders’ calculations regarding Iran’s potential response to an attack on its nuclear facilities may affect their decisionmaking. Leading Iranian military commanders and advisors, as well as Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah, have indicated that Iran and Hezbollah would retaliate robustly against Israel, and that Iran would possibly also target U.S. positions in the Gulf.44 Reports indicate that Iran test-fired four surface-to-sea missiles near the Strait of Hormuz in late September, and that it is planning to hold major military preparedness maneuvers in the near future.45 One senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander reportedly said in September that Iran could launch a preemptive strike against Israel if it were sure Israel was preparing to attack it.46 Reports from September that Iran bears responsibility for recent cyberattacks against various U.S. banks and companies47 could presage similar attacks in retaliation for a possible Israeli military strike. Iranian or Iranian-allied terrorist plots against Israeli targets (see “Attacks Against Israeli Interests Abroad” below) also appear to remain a threat. Several reports alleged Hezbollah involvement48 in the July 2012 bus suicide bombing in Burgas, Bulgaria, that targeted an Israeli tourist group— 41 Dennis B. Ross, “How America Can Slow Israel’s March to War,” New York Times, August 17, 2012. Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, “Exclusive: U.S. Scales Back Military Exercise with Israel, Affecting Potential Iran Strike,” time.com, August 31, 2012. 43 Peter Kenyon, “U.S. Naval Exercises Send Message in the Tense Gulf,” National Public Radio, September 24, 2012. Known as the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise (IMCMEX), the maneuvers reportedly included, among other countries, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Yemen, and Jordan. Laura Sukhtian, “Massive Anti-Mine Naval Exercise Underway in Gulf,” Defense News, September 17, 2012. 44 “IRGC Commander Warns of Iran's Devastating Response to Israeli Attack,” Fars News Agency, September 17, 2012; Laila Bassam, “Iran could strike US bases if Israel attacks: Hezbollah,” Reuters, September 3, 2012; Zahra Hosseinian, “Iran: Hezbollah will defend us ‘easily’ against Israeli attack – Iran,” Reuters, September 14, 2012. 45 Nick Schifrin and Matthew McGarry, “Iran, US Flex Military Muscles in Persian Gulf,” ABC News, September 25, 2012; Robert Tait, “Iran plans military exercises in preparation for Israeli strike on nuclear facilities,” telegraph.co.uk, September 16, 2012. 46 Zahra Hosseinian and Rania El Gamal, “Iran could launch pre-emptive Israel strike-commander,” Reuters, September 23, 2012. 47 Ellen Nakashima, “Iran blamed for cyberattacks on U.S. banks and companies,” Washington Post, September 21, 2012. 48 Nicholas Kulish and Eric Schmitt, “Hezbollah Is Blamed for Attack on Israeli Tourists in Bulgaria,” New York Times, July 19, 2012. 42 Congressional Research Service 7 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities killing 6 (including the Bulgarian driver) and injuring at least 32. The broader strategic purpose of such plots—that is, whether they seek to deter or provoke possible Israeli or international action of a specific nature—is difficult to discern. Congressional Action In addition to enacting additional sanctions (as discussed above) against Iran in August 2012, Congress has taken other actions in 2012 with possible relevance to the Iranian nuclear issue. Congress and the President may have at least partly focused on bolstering Israeli capabilities visà-vis Iran in enacting the U.S.-Israel Enhanced Security Cooperation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-150) on July 27. The act contains non-binding “sense of Congress” language focusing largely on possible avenues of cooperation outside of direct bilateral aid, including expediting specific types of arms sales (such as F-35 fighter aircraft, refueling tankers, and bunker buster munitions); providing excess defense articles; boosting operational, intelligence, and political-military coordination; and providing additional aid for Israel’s Iron Dome short-range missile defense system and U.S.-Israel cooperative missile defense programs. The act also extended deadlines for Israel to access U.S. war reserves stockpiles and to draw upon existing loan guarantees. Furthermore, the House passed a measure on May 27, 2012—the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (H.R. 4310)—that would, if ultimately enacted, authorize up to $680 million in additional funding for Iron Dome from FY2012 to FY2015.49 Congress and the President made an initial $205 million appropriation for the program in FY2011. An additional $70 million in U.S. funding was reprogrammed for Iron Dome in FY2012 from prior-year Missile Defense Agency funding for various programs, and will presumably count toward the $680 million figure if H.R. 4310 is enacted. Israel has reportedly spent more than $200 million on initial stages of Iron Dome’s development, procurement, and deployment.50 One report indicates that the House Armed Services Committee may seek to condition additional U.S. funding for Iron Dome on coproduction or technology sharing because of the system’s possible application for forwarddeployed U.S. military units.51 On September 22, the Senate passed S.J.Res. 41 by a vote of 90-1. If subsequently passed by the House, this joint resolution would express the non-binding “sense of Congress” rejecting “any United States policy that would rely on efforts to contain a nuclear weapons-capable Iran”, and joining “the President in ruling out any policy that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” S.J.Res. 41 explicitly states, however, that it shall not be construed as “an authorization for the use of force or a declaration of war.” The remainder of this report is unchanged from the version published on March 28, 2012. 49 The version of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2013 (H.R. 5856) reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee would, if enacted, provide $211 million to Israel for Iron Dome in FY2013, subject to possible budget sequestration. For information on sequestration, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by (name redacted) 50 Jamie Levin, “Israel’s economy will pay heavy price for Iron Dome,” Ha’aretz, March 23, 2012. 51 Spencer Ackerman, “U.S. Funds Israel’s ‘Iron Dome,’ But Doesn’t (Quite) Know How It Works,” wired.com, August 21, 2012. Congressional Research Service 8 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Introduction, Issue Overview, and Questions for Congress52 In February 2012, a U.S. newspaper columnist reported that Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta “believes there is a strong likelihood that Israel will strike Iran in April, May or June.”53 Less than two weeks later in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 14, Secretary Panetta declined when questioned to take a position on the likelihood of a spring 2012 Israeli attack against nuclear facilities in Iran.54 Secretary Panetta’s comments were only part of the stream of statements from U.S. and Israeli officials and media reports that drew attention to a question that has periodically recurred in the national security discourse of both countries (and more broadly): Might Israel choose to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, possibly counter to U.S. advice? For decades, successive regimes in Iran have engaged in nuclear-related activities. The ultimate goal of these activities, however, has remained stubbornly ambiguous. Despite extensive examination of these activities by both government and non-government experts around the world, including on-site investigation by representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), no definitive proof has been offered to conclude with certainty the validity of • Iran’s claims that its nuclear work is entirely for peaceful purposes as allowed under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which it is a party; • concerns of some government officials and non-government experts in the United States and elsewhere that Iran is seeking a “nuclear capability” below the threshold of nuclear weapons (which entails the combination of fissile material with a nuclear warhead and an appropriate delivery vehicle) that nevertheless may allow it to rapidly cross the nuclear threshold at some time in the future; or • allegations that the Iranian regime is committed to acquiring nuclear weapons. Ongoing disagreements among analysts as to how far away Iran is from achieving a “nuclear capability” or nuclear weapons if it is committed to doing so only exacerbate this ambiguity and uncertainty regarding Iran’s nuclear-related efforts. This ambiguity and uncertainty is a major feature of the environment in which international actors decide their policies and actions vis-à-vis 52 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern irs, Affawith contributions from (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs and (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by (name redacted); CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by (name redacted). Outside reports on the issue include Anthony H. Cordesman and Alexander Wilner , Iran and the Gulf Military Balance – II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions: Working Draft, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 22, 2012. Ronen Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, New York Times Magazine, January 25, 2012; Dalia Dassa Kaye, et al., Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, RAND Corporation, 2011; Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America and the Rumors of War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 53 David Ignatius, “Of a mind to attack Iran,” Washington Post, February 3, 2012. 54 At the same hearing, Secretary Panetta acknowledged having talked with the columnist who wrote the February 2012 report “about a lot of things.” Congressional Research Service 9 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Iran. The view a state holds of the ultimate goal of Iran’s nuclear-related activities informs the approach it takes in dealing with the Iranian regime. For various reasons—including geopolitical, historical, and ideological—the prospect of an Iran with nuclear weapons arguably affects the threat perceptions of Israel more than those of the United States55 or other nations. Twice in its history, Israel has conducted air strikes aimed at preventing a regional actor from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—destroying Iraq’s Tammuz-Osirak reactor in 1981 and a presumed reactor under construction at Al Kibar near Deir al Zur in Syria in 2007. For some period of time, Israeli leaders have conveyed their view that Israel may similarly be compelled to act to prevent a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. Analysts generally agree that Israeli military action against multiple Iranian nuclear facilities would be significantly more complex operationally than these previous attacks, both of which targeted single facilities that were closer in range to Israel (see Figure 1 below). What lessons the previous strikes—particularly the one on Osirak in 1981—impart for an Israeli decision on whether to strike Iran is a subject of debate.56 For Congress, the potential impact—short- and long-term—of an Israeli decision regarding Iran and its implementation is a critical issue of concern. Since Iran’s nuclear program became a major international issue a decade ago, Israel has deferred to the United States and other actors in coordinating diplomacy and implementing economic and other sanctions aimed at convincing Iran to abandon activities that could allow it to develop nuclear weapons. In recent years, however, reports suggest that Israel has pursued covert means—including sabotage, cyberwarfare, and assassination—to intimidate Iran and delay the nuclear program, with some reported success.57 Without confirming or denying involvement, Israeli officials also generally have welcomed reports of events that might set back Iran’s nuclear program.58 Even before the reports in recent months of possible Israeli military action, at various stages of the international effort to persuade Iran to relinquish any possible nuclear weapons ambitions some Israeli officials have hinted that Israel might be compelled to take unilateral action to counter what they see as an Iranian nuclear weapons program.59 It was in the first three months of 55 Leslie Susser, “Spy vs. Spy,” Jerusalem Report, March 26, 2012, stating, “Although he too is committed to stopping the Iranians, US President Barack Obama does not see the prospect of a nuclear Iran in the same apocalyptic terms as Netanyahu does. True, a nuclear Iran would hurt vital American interests in the Middle East, but Iran is a long way from American shores.” 56 Allin and Simon, p. 53. Some analysts cite Osirak to emphasize the potential perils of an attack on Iran, pointing to Saddam Hussein’s subsequent clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons on an accelerated timetable. Some use it to emphasize the potential benefits of an attack, pointing to the U.S.-led international action from 1991-2003 that eventually squelched Hussein’s nuclear ambitions, even though the international coalition was not initially assembled in response to Iraq’s nuclear program, but its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. According to a 2010 book, many Israelis believe that buying time through a strike on Iran “might prove worthwhile in [unanticipated] ways…” Ibid. 57 See Yossi Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” Ha’aretz, December 2, 2011. Some reports state that U.S. and British intelligence agencies have aided Israel with some non-lethal covert operations. Daniel Klaidman, Eli Lake, and Dan Ephron, “Obama’s Dangerous Game with Iran,” Newsweek, February 13, 2012. 58 For example, after the January 2012 assassination of an Iranian nuclear scientist, Brig. Gen. Yoav Mordechai, an Israeli military spokesman, reportedly wrote on his Facebook page, “I don’t know who took revenge on the Iranian scientist, but I am definitely not shedding a tear.” Alan Cowell and Rick Gladstone, “Iran Reports Killing of Nuclear Scientist in ‘Terrorist’ Blast,” New York Times, January 11, 2012. 59 See, for example, Jeffrey Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” The Atlantic, September 2010. Congressional Research Service 10 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 2012, however, that the issue came into sharper relief for U.S. policymakers, including in Congress. This was in part a result of comments by senior Israeli government officials and former officials that intensified the debate within their country as to the wisdom and potential effectiveness of military action against nuclear-related targets in Iran, linked to a similar discussion in the United States and worldwide. This report assesses this issue, focusing primarily on the decision that might be made by the government of Israel. In particular, it examines the range of factors that could influence such an Israeli decision. Implementation of an Israeli decision to strike Iran’s nuclear-related facilities could have significant implications for U.S. interests and goals related both to the nuclear issue itself and to broader regional and international concerns, including U.S. relations with Israel.60 In assessing those implications and considering possible action either before or after a possible Israeli strike (see “Conclusion: Possible Implications for Congress” below), Congress and the Obama Administration might consider the following questions: Israeli Debate and Decision Regarding a Potential Attack: • What is the nature of the public and official debate in Israel over the Iranian nuclear issue and possible Israeli, U.S., and international approaches to it, including military and non-military options? How might that debate evolve? • What are the factors in Israeli thinking and who are the main actors involved in the decision? • Under what conditions is a final political decision regarding military action likely? • How does Israel assess the operational requirements of a potential strike? Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regime: • Ultimately, is an attack more likely to prevent an Iran with nuclear weapons or help bring it about? If an attack only delayed a potential nuclear weapons program in Iran, would Israel feel compelled to take additional military action later? • What effect might an attack have on a potential Iranian decision to weaponize its nuclear program? • Would an attack help or hinder the ongoing international effort to use diplomacy, monitoring, sanctions, and possible threats of further military action to persuade Iran not to pursue nuclear weapons? To what extent might the large coalition that is now working with the United States to enforce sanctions against Iran fracture in the event of a strike? • Would an attack strengthen or weaken the Iranian regime, particularly given that current trends indicate that the regime faces significant economic challenges and political divisions? 60 For more information on U.S.-Israel relations, including the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 11 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Effect on Other U.S. Interests: • What retaliation from Iran and its regional allies (including Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas or other Palestinian militants) is likely against Israeli targets? • If Iran retaliated, would it limit the targeted area to Israel, or would it also target U.S. interests and allies in the region and elsewhere? If Iran expands its response to U.S. or U.S.-allied targets, what forms might that take? • What is the likelihood and potential scope of a crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf regarding global energy prices and potential region-wide conflict? What are other possible regional consequences of an Israeli attack? This report has many elements that are the subject of vigorous debate and remain fully or partially outside public knowledge. CRS does not claim that it has confirmed independently any sources cited within this report that attribute specific positions or views to Israeli, U.S., or other officials. Congressional Research Service 12 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Iran’s Nuclear Program and Facilities of Main Concern: A Primer61 Iran’s leaders claim that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian energy and research purposes. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s leaders (including current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i) have regularly spoken in public against the development and use of nuclear weapons.62 Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and conducts its declared nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring and safeguards. For a discussion of Iran’s compliance or non-compliance with international obligations regarding its nuclear program, see Figure 2 below and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by (name redacted). Iran’s gas centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program is currently the main source of proliferation concern for the international community. Gas centrifuges enrich uranium by spinning uranium hexafluoride gas at high speeds to increase the concentration of the uranium-235 isotope. Such centrifuges can produce both low-enriched uranium (LEU), which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU).63 HEU and plutonium are the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Iran’s construction of a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water has also been a source of proliferation concern. The reactor is a proliferation concern because the reactor’s spent fuel will contain plutonium well-suited for use in nuclear weapons. To be used in nuclear weapons, however, plutonium must be separated from the spent fuel—a procedure called “reprocessing.” Iran has said that it will not engage in reprocessing, and there is no public evidence that Tehran either has constructed or is constructing a reprocessing facility. A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate said that Iran “probably would use covert facilities—rather than its declared nuclear sites— for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon,”64 at least in part because of the difficulty of diverting significant amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded facilities without detection. According to Colin Kahl, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy from 2009 until the end of 2011, “there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants.”65 For a January 31, 2012, Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, submitted written testimony stating that Iran has the “capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons” and “is keeping open the option to develop” such weapons, but added that “[w]e do not know... if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.” Some high-ranking U.S. and Israeli political decisionmakers reportedly differ on the question of how long action might remain possible to prevent a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. This relates to the question of a possible “zone of immunity” discussed below. Differences on this question reportedly persist even though U.S. and Israeli assessments are similar on the timetables for Iran to • achieve the capability to develop and produce the components for a nuclear weapon; and • if it chooses, to weaponize successfully. In a January 2012 60 Minutes interview, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, “The consensus is that, if [Iran] decided to do it, it would probably take them about a year to be able to produce a bomb and then possibly another one to two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that weapon.”66 According a February 2012 report from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano, Iran has produced 5,451 kilograms of LEU in the 61 Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation, with contributions from (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. 62 President Obama was quoted in a late February 2012 interview as saying that Iranian leaders in early 2012 have been saying that “nuclear weapons are sinful and un-Islamic.” President Barack Obama, quoted in Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President of the United States, I Don’t Bluff,’” theatlantic.com, March 2, 2012. 63 LEU typically contains less than 5% uranium-235. Weapons-grade HEU typically contains approximately 90% uranium-235. 64 Similarly, a CIA report for 2004 concluded that “inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Iran remains a party to the NPT.” Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January 1-December 31, 2004. 65 Colin H. Kahl, “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort,” Foreign Affairs, January 17, 2012. 66 Transcript of remarks by Secretary Panetta from CBS’s 60 Minutes interview, January 29, 2012, available at http://www.votesmart.org/public-statement/664274/cbs-60-minutes-transcript. Congressional Research Service 13 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Natanz commercial facility. This quantity of LEU, if further enriched, could produce enough HEU for four nuclear weapons, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.67 According to Amano’s report, Iran has enriched approximately 95 kilograms of uranium up to 20% uranium-235 at the Natanz pilot facility and approximately 14 kilograms of similarly enriched uranium at the Fordow facility. The four facilities described below are under IAEA safeguards and monitoring: Natanz Iran has both a pilot centrifuge facility and a larger commercial facility located at this site. The commercial facility is reportedly hardened by steel-reinforced concrete, buried underground, and covered by a mound of earth.68 This facility is capable of eventually holding more than 47,000 centrifuges. Iran is currently using first-generation centrifuges in the commercial facility to produce uranium enriched up to 5% uranium-235. Iran is using the pilot facility both to produce uranium enriched up to 20% uranium-235 and also to test more-advanced centrifuges. According to the IAEA Director-General’s February 2012 report, Iran has installed approximately 9,100 centrifuges in the commercial facility and is feeding uranium hexafluoride into as many as 8,808 of those centrifuges. Fordow Iran has a centrifuge facility located at this site—reportedly built into the side of a small mountain69 and specially hardened.70 The facility is eventually supposed to contain approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Tehran has told the IAEA that the facility will be configured to produce both uranium enriched to 5% uranium-235 and 20% uranium-235. Iran has installed approximately 700 first-generation centrifuges in the facility, and it is now reportedly producing 20%-enriched uranium. Esfahan Among several nuclear facilities located at this site, Iran’s above-ground uranium conversion facility converts uranium oxide into several compounds, including gaseous uranium hexafluoride that can be enriched in centrifuges. Arak Iran is constructing a nuclear reactor moderated by heavy water at this above-ground site. Tehran also has a plant at this site for producing heavy water. According to a February 2012 IAEA report, the plant appears to be operating. Iran also has other nuclear-related facilities, including a light-water nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and a research reactor in Tehran, as well as research, centrifuge production, and mining facilities. See “Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below for a textbox describing other facilities related to Iran’s nuclear program. Figure 1 below provides a map showing facilities related or possibly related to Iran’s nuclear program, the site of the two previous Israeli strikes in Iraq and Syria, and the surrounding region. Figure 2 below provides a timeline of selected events relevant to the Iranian nuclear issue and Israel’s involvement. (...continued) 67 ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report: Production of 20% Enriched Uranium Triples; Iran Increases Number of Enriching Centrifuges at Natanz FEP by Nearly 50% and Signals an Intention to Greatly Expand the Number of Centrifuges at Both Natanz and Fordow; Advanced Centrifuge Program Appears Troubled, Institute for Science and International Security, February 24, 2012. 68 Todd Lindeman and Bill Webster, “Hardened targets,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. 69 Ibid. 70 Joby Warrick, “Iran: Underground sites vulnerable, experts say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. Congressional Research Service 14 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Figure 1. Map of Major Iranian Facilities in Regional Context Sources: Economist, adapted by CRS. Notes: All locations are approximate. Parchin is an Iranian military testing facility that, according to the Washington Post, “U.S. officials believe was used a decade ago to test explosive triggers of the kind used to detonate nuclear warheads.” Thomas Erdbrink and Joby Warrick, “Iran urged to grant access to inspectors,” Washington Post, March 9, 2012. According to the IAEA Director-General’s November 2011 report, the IAEA was “permitted by Iran to visit the site twice in 2005. From satellite imagery available at that time, the Agency identified a number of areas of interest, none of which, however, included the location now believed to contain the building which houses the explosives chamber mentioned above; consequently, the Agency’s visits did not uncover anything of relevance.” In early March 2012, the “P5+1” countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, Russia) that manage international diplomacy with Iran on the nuclear issue urged Iran to grant IAEA monitors renewed access to Parchin. See Figure 3 for additional reported details on the underground facilities at Natanz and Fordow. CRS-15 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Figure 2. Timeline of Relevant Events Involving Iran’s Nuclear Program and Israel 2002-2012 Congressional Research Service 16 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Sources: Various, compiled by CRS. Preliminary Considerations Regarding an Israeli Decision71 Nature of the Threat—Differing Stated Perceptions The question of whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will or will not pose an existential threat to Israel has become an important debate among Israeli leaders. Some Israeli officials express concerns, based on Iranian leaders’ long-standing pronouncements against the existence of Israel,72 that Iran might seek to use a nuclear weapon against Israel even if faced with the prospect of near-certain retaliation73 from Israel’s presumed but officially undeclared nuclear arsenal.74 In a 2010 interview, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was quoted as saying: Iran has threatened to annihilate a state. In historical terms, this is an astounding thing. It’s a monumental outrage that goes effectively unchallenged in the court of public opinion…. 71 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern irs, Affawith contributions from (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs and (name redacted), Analyst in Nonproliferation. 72 Israeli official and public discourse regularly refers to many of these actual and alleged pronouncements. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, decreed that the elimination of a Zionist regime in Israel was a religious duty. His successor as supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has repeatedly referred to Israel as a “cancerous tumor” since his accession in 1989, including in a rare Friday sermon at a Tehran mosque in February 2012. Elected President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted Khomeini when he made a remark in October 2005 that was widely translated in Israel and Western countries as expressing the hope that Israel would eventually be “wiped off the map,” though some analysts have claimed that a more accurate translation was “this regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.” Juan Cole, “Hitchens the Hacker; And, Hitchens the Orientalist; And, ‘We don’t Want Your Stinking War!’”, Informed Comment, May 3, 2006. Ahmadinejad also has reportedly described the Holocaust as a “myth” used as a pretext to create an “artificial Zionist regime.” In a March 2012 CNN interview, an advisor to Khamene’i said that Ahmadinejad’s comments were “definitely not” meant in a military sense and that such an approach was not “a policy of Iran.” “Top Iran official calls for cooperation from West in return for ‘transparency,’” CNN, March 15, 2012. 73 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former Iranian president (1989-1997), said in a December 2001 speech, “If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality.” Translation by BBC Global Monitoring of Rafsanjani’s Jerusalem Day speech (from Farsi) in Tehran, December 14, 2001, as carried by Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2001/011214-text.html. However, Iranian officials, including Ahmadinejad, have made the case that Iran does not have a history of aggression. For example, in 2006, Javad Zarif, then Iran’s permanent representative to the United Nations, said, “Our history, in the past 250 years, we have not attacked any other country. We have been the subject of invasion; we have been the subject of aggression; we have been the subject of use of chemical weapons. But we have defended ourselves, but we never resorted to use of chemical weapons, even in retaliation. So our record is very clear. On the other hand, unfortunately, Israel has a record of aggression against its neighbors, has a known nuclear stockpile, is not a member of any international instrument.” Transcript of PBS Newshour, April 28, 2006. 74 Israel is not a party to the NPT and maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” or amimut. A consensus among media and analysts’ reports is that Israel possesses an arsenal of 80 to 200 nuclear weapons, although some suggest a higher figure. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran, May 2008, p. 133. Congressional Research Service 17 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Iranian leaders talk about Israel’s destruction or disappearance while simultaneously creating weapons to ensure its disappearance.75 Other leading Israeli officials and analysts—including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Tamir Pardo, director of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency—generally avoid characterizing the threat from Iran as existential at least partly because they claim that Israel “is a strong state and it could protect itself under any circumstances.”76 According to three Israeli analysts, including a former deputy national security advisor, whether or not Iran will behave as a “rational actor” has “become an important dimension of the Israeli debate about a nuclear Iran.”77 Yet, even some Israeli officials who generally avoid characterizing the threat of a nuclearweapons-capable Iran as existential describe it as still presenting unacceptably high risks. They express concern that a nuclear Iran would compromise traditional Israeli security doctrine and practices—based on principles of self-reliance and maintaining overwhelming military superiority—and lead to an unacceptable level of national security uncertainty. This in turn would fundamentally damage the quality of life and psychological sense of safety that Israelis deem critically important to their country’s continued viability as a Jewish national home.78 According to a March 2012 article in Israel’s Jerusalem Report, “Even if the Iranians don’t use the bomb, [Netanyahu] fears the very fact that they have it could lead to a mass exodus of Jews from an Israel under nuclear threat, weakening the state and compromising the Zionist dream.”79 Some Israelis worry that even if Iran did not attack Israel with a nuclear weapon, mere possession of a weapon or the capability to assemble one quickly would make it more difficult to deter Iran from pursuing greater regional influence and amplifying threats to Israeli security through proxies and allies—the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, Hamas and other Palestinian militants in Gaza, and possibly even the beleaguered Asad regime in Syria. Some in Israel, however, argue that Iran might be limited in its ability to use a potential nuclear weapons capability to thwart conventional Israeli military action against regional threats.80 Analysts discuss a range of other possible regional reactions that would undermine Israeli security, including less willingness of Gulf Arab states to oppose Iranian ambitions; the possibility of proliferation in countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia; and perhaps international pressure on Israel either to declare its nuclear weapons status or consider giving it up if Iran would do the same.81 75 Goldberg, “Point of No Return,” op. cit. Avner Cohen, “Israel ponders a nuclear Iran,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Web edition), August 17, 2010. See also Barak Ravid, “Mossad chief: Nuclear Iran not necessarily existential threat to Israel,” Ha’aretz, December 29, 2011. A February 2012 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report stated, “In actual practice, Israel can already deliver an ‘existential’ nuclear strike on Iran, and will have far more capability to damage Iran than Iran is likely to have against Israel for the next decade.” Cordesman and Wilner, op. cit. The Washington Post has written that President Obama “has declined to call on Israeli leaders to declare [its nuclear] program, a source of frustration and fear in the Middle East.” Scott Wilson, “Obama to urge Israel’s patience,” Washington Post, March 3, 2012. 77 Shai Feldman, Shlomo Brom, and Shimon Stein, “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,” Brandeis University, Crown Center for Middle East Studies Brief No. 59, February 2012. 78 Haim Malka, Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011, pp. 58-59; Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 37, 52-53. 79 Susser, op. cit. 80 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. 81 Kaye, et al., op. cit., pp. 27-28; Cohen, op. cit.; Shimon Stein, Shai Feldman, and Shlomo Brom, “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 310, January 31, 2012. Israel has expressed support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but has asserted that other regional countries should reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence before negotiating such a zone. Sha’ul Horev, (continued...) 76 Congressional Research Service 18 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Israelis continue to debate whether the risks of a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran outweigh the risks of a strike that most assessments doubt would definitively end Iran’s nuclear program (see “Effect on Iran’s Nuclear Program” below). According to one Israeli report, “Netanyahu faces one of the most difficult choices any Israeli prime minister has had to contemplate. A strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities could lead to regional conflagration, tens of thousands of missiles and rockets raining down on Israeli population centers and war on several fronts. But with no attack, Iran could go nuclear on his watch.”82 Unlike the wide range of views expressed among U.S. and international analysts about whether a nuclear-weapons-capable Iran might or might not be contained, based on concepts and experiences dating from the Cold War, Israeli officials— according to a 2011 RAND Corporation report—appear to be “reluctant to address futures involving a nuclear-armed Iran, as they [want] to maintain the focus on preventing such an outcome.”83 Some Israeli analysts have, however, contemplated the prospects for mutual deterrence between Israel and Iran, including some who collaborated on the subject in a 2008 memorandum published by Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), under the assumption that Iran might not be prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. One article from this memorandum questioned whether Cold War-era containment would be applicable: The fact that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki no nuclear device has been used in the course of hostilities might lead to the tentative conclusion that a third use of a nuclear weapon in war is of very low probability. This conclusion is based on the superpowers relationship during the Cold War—the only historical example of a relatively stable and long nuclear deterrence balance. But would this pattern recur in various regional nuclear conflicts?84 Despite Israelis’ general reluctance to discuss containment scenarios, some Israeli public figures are less expansive in their characterization of the inherent risks of a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. In the words of one analyst: If and when there was a clear Iranian threat to attack Israel, then Israel could launch a preemptive assault. And if no such threat ever materializes, Israel need never attack. Any (...continued) Director General of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission, explained the government’s position in September 2009, “It is our vision and policy, to establish the Middle East as a mutually verifiable zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. We have always emphasized, that such a process, through direct negotiations, should begin with confidence building measures. They should be followed by mutual recognition, reconciliation, and peaceful relations. Consequently conventional and non-conventional arms control measures will emerge ... In our view, progress towards realizing this vision cannot be made without a fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a significant transformation in the attitude of states in the region towards Israel.” Statement by Dr. Sha’ul Horev, Director General, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to the 53rd General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, September 2009, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, September 15, 2009. 82 Susser, op. cit. 83 Kaye, et al., op. cit., p. 47. 84 Yair Evron, “An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability,” Israel and a Nuclear Iran: Implications for Arms Control, Deterrence, and Defense, INSS Memorandum No. 94, July 2008. For an Israeli perspective on whether missile defense systems could effectively deter a “rational” Iran, see Uzi Rubin, “Missile Defense and Israel’s Deterrence against a Nuclear Iran,” from the same memorandum. In February 2012, Louis René Beres, a Purdue University professor with significant past involvement in assisting Israel formulate national security strategy, co-authored an essay that said, “Perhaps a nuclear Iran can still be prevented by preemption. But in the more likely absence of any remaining options for ‘anticipatory self-defense,’ Israel’s best available stance will be to effectively deter an already-nuclear Iran.” Louis René Beres and General (USAF ret.) John T. Chain, “Israel and Iran at the eleventh hour,” Oxford University Press Blog, February 23, 2012. Congressional Research Service 19 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities future Iran-Israel war will happen if Iran’s regime makes it unavoidable, not in theory but in actual practice.85 Possible “Zone of Immunity” and Israel’s Ability to Act Independently Long-standing Israeli national security doctrine emphasizes Israel’s prerogative to “defend itself, by itself.” In a January 24, 2012, speech in the Knesset, Prime Minister Netanyahu said, in reference to the Iranian nuclear issue, “In the end, with regard to threats to our very existence, we cannot abandon our future to the hands of others. With regard to our fate, our duty is to rely on ourselves alone.”86 In a November 2011 CNN interview, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak appeared to set forth parameters for Israel’s ability to act independently when he said that the window of opportunity for a preventive strike to stop or slow Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability could close within nine months. He explained that the Iranians could enter a “zone of immunity” from military action “by widening [the] redundancy of their plan, making it spread over many more [sites], with many more elements.”87 As evidence of his claim that Iran is progressing toward a zone of immunity, Barak has cited Iran’s ongoing movement of enriched uranium and/or uranium enrichment centrifuges into the supposedly difficult-to-attack Fordow facility.88 It is unclear whether Israeli leaders’ willingness to make policy decisions in line with the zone of immunity concept explained by Barak might be affected by the views of U.S. military planners who reportedly question the imminence of Iran achieving such a zone.89 According to a February 2012 New York Times article, a senior Obama Administration official who has discussed the concept with Israelis says that “‘there are many other options’ to slow Iran's march to a completed weapon, like shutting off Iran’s oil revenues, taking out facilities that supply centrifuge parts or singling out installations where the Iranians would turn the fuel into a weapon.”90 The concept Barak has articulated may anticipate that Iran would consider using IAEA-monitored and -safeguarded enrichment facilities at Fordow to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Although it is unclear how Iran may act, there is no precedent for an NPT party to use declared facilities to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.91 If weapons-grade enrichment were to 85 Barry Rubin, “Israel Isn’t Going to Attack Iran and Neither Will the United States,” PJ Media, January 26, 2012. Transcript of English translation (from Hebrew) available on Israeli Prime Minister’s Office website. 87 Transcript of remarks by Ehud Barak on CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS, November 20, 2011. According to one report, “Iran has announced plans for 10 new enrichment sites—further dispersing later-generation centrifuges in places smaller, harder to locate and easier to harden.” Karl Vick, “Can Israel Stop Iran’s Nuke Effort?”, Time, February 6, 2012. 88 “Israel and Iran: Closer to take-off,” Economist, February 11, 2012. A report dated February 24, 2012, from IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano said that Iran began using the site in December 2011 to enrich uranium up to 20% uranium-235. Iranian officials have stated that this uranium will be used as fuel in nuclear reactors to produce medical isotopes. “Iran Plans Several New Nuclear Reactors,” PressTV, April 12, 2011. 89 Joby Warrick, “Iran’s underground nuclear sites not immune to U.S. bunker-busters, experts say,” Washington Post, March 1, 2012. 90 Mark Landler and David E. Sanger, “U.S. and Israel Split on Speed of Iran Threat,” New York Times, February 8, 2012. 91 North Korea used plutonium instead of uranium-enriching centrifuges to provide fissile material for its nuclear weapons program and announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, “two years before announcing that it had the (continued...) 86 Congressional Research Service 20 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities occur at Fordow or Natanz under IAEA safeguards (assuming that Iran was cooperating with the IAEA), the international community would probably learn of it because of the difficulty in diverting significant amounts of nuclear material from safeguarded centrifuge facilities without detection.92 To put the current Israeli debate into context, one report has claimed that Barak’s “zone of immunity” warning did not mark “the first time that the Israelis have invented a phrase that suggests a hard deadline before an attack. At the end of the Bush administration, they said they could not allow Iran to go past ‘the point of no return.’ That phrase was also ill-defined, but seemed to suggest that once Iran had the know-how and the basic materials to make a bomb, it would be inevitable.”93 In that case, and in the current case as well, some observers have expressed opinions that the timetables are mainly intended to intimidate Iran and to prod the United States and other international actors into taking tougher and more urgent action.94 The issue of Israeli independent action is linked to U.S. attitudes and decisions. According to multiple sources, including the following excerpt from a February 2012 article, Israeli leaders have not been satisfied with U.S. responses to their attempts to obtain assurances that the United States would use force against Iran if non-military measures are deemed insufficient: One former Israeli official tells Newsweek he heard this explanation directly from Defense Minister Ehud Barak. “If Israel will miss its last opportunity [to attack], then we will have to lean only on the United States, and if the United States decides not to attack, then we will face an Iran with a bomb,” says the former Israeli official. This source says that Israel has asked Obama for assurances that if sanctions fail, he will use force against Iran. Obama’s refusal to provide that assurance has helped shape Israel’s posture: a refusal to promise restraint, or even to give the United States advance notice.95 It is unclear whether the Israelis might be willing to reconsider this posture in the wake of Netanyahu’s meeting with President Obama and other U.S. officials in March 2012. Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence and one of the Israel Air Force pilots who carried out the 1981 Osirak strike, has been quoted as saying, “The US has promised not to allow Iran to have the bomb, but can Israel rely on this promise? That is the key to what Israel may decide to do.”96 Military Action Versus Alternative Courses of Action It is unclear how Israeli officials might react to Obama Administration efforts to convince them to give more time for sanctions with increasingly broad multilateral support to take fuller effect before elevating military options to the fore.97 An Israeli investigative reporter quoted a “very (...continued) bomb and three years before testing one.” “Attacking Iran: Up in the air,” Economist, February 25, 2012. 92 Colin H. Kahl, “An Israeli strike on Iran would backfire,” Washington Post, March 4, 2012. 93 Landler and Sanger, op. cit. 94 Tobias Buck, “Israel debate on Iran strike gains urgency,” Financial Times, February 3, 2012. 95 Klaidman, et al., op. cit. See also “Israel wouldn't warn U.S. before Iran strike, says intelligence source,” Associated Press, February 28, 2012; Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit. 96 Susser, op. cit. 97 Klaidman, et al., op. cit. Congressional Research Service 21 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities senior Israeli security source” as saying that “Americans tell us there is time, and we tell them that they only have about six to nine months more than we do and that therefore the sanctions have to be brought to a culmination now, in order to exhaust that track.”98 In late 2011 and early 2012, the United States and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions— due to take effect in June and July, respectively—aimed directly at Iran’s export of crude oil, which accounts for around 70% of its hard currency revenue.99 Many Israeli officials acknowledge that sanctions have begun to significantly affect Iran’s economy.100 That effect could be compounded following the March 2012 expulsion by the Brussels-based SWIFT (Society for Worldwide International Financial Transfers) of all Iranian banks blacklisted by the EU from its electronic transfer system. It is not clear, however, how a sustained, intensifying economic impact on the Iranian regime and its people could affect the regime’s behavior or policy, including with regard to a possible return to international diplomacy.101 In early March, the “P5+1” (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, China, and Russia) accepted Iran’s proposal to restart negotiations in the spring of 2012 on its nuclear program. Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon was quoted as saying in March that the spring 2012 talks between Iran and the P5+1 would show “if there is a chance that the sanctions are working or that the Iranians are continuing to manoeuvre and advance toward a military nuclear capability.”102 It is also unclear to what extent Israelis believe that their alleged ongoing covert action or “secret war” against Iran’s nuclear program103 might mitigate the need for an air strike. The two most recently retired heads of the Mossad, Meir Dagan and Ephraim Halevy, have both publicly stated that an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be counterproductive, partly because they both reportedly “believe sabotage and diplomacy have done much to set back Iran’s nuclear ambitions and can do more yet.”104 Dagan has been quoted as saying, “The Iranian problem must be shaped as an international problem, and efforts to delay Iran's nuclear program should continue.”105 In March 2012, Vice Prime Minister Ya’alon was quoted as saying, when asked if Israel might be just weeks away from a strike on Iran, “No. Look, we have to see. The [Iranian nuclear] project is not static…. Sometimes there are explosions, sometimes there are 98 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit. For more information on Iran sanctions and their effects, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by (name re dacted). 100 Buck, op. cit. 101 For two U.S. perspectives on this question, see Dennis B. Ross, “Iran is Ready to Talk,” New York Times, February 14, 2012; Gerald F. Seib, “Iran Is Becoming Election Wild Card,” Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2012. 102 Dan Williams, “Israel says sabotage may stretch Iran atom timeline,” Reuters, March 27, 2012. 103 Melman, “The war against Iran’s nuclear program has already begun,” op. cit. 104 Bruce Riedel, “The Israeli Anti-Attack-Iran Brigade,” The Daily Beast, November 7, 2011. 105 Quote from Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth translated in “Former Mossad chief against Iran strike,” United Press International, May 8, 2011. An Israeli analyst has suggested a wider array of options short of a preemptive strike: “As the Iranian regime works hard to get nuclear weapons and missiles capable of carrying them, Israel uses the time to build a multi-level defensive and offensive capability. These layers include: U.S. early warning stations and antimissile missile installations in the Gulf; Israeli missile-launching submarines; Israeli long-range planes whose crews have rehearsed and planned for strikes at Iranian facilities; different types of anti-missile missiles capable of knocking down the small number of missiles Iran could fire simultaneously; covert operations, possibly including computer viruses and assassinations, to slow down Iran’s development of nuclear weapons; improved intelligence; help to the Iranian opposition (though the idea of “regime change” in the near future is a fantasy); and other measures.” Rubin, op. cit. 99 Congressional Research Service 22 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities worms there, viruses, all kinds of things like that.”106 However, according to one report from an Israeli investigative journalist, some senior Israeli military intelligence officials believe that—as was the case with Iraq’s nuclear program in the late 1970s/early 1980s—possible Mossad actions have not stopped Iran’s progress toward nuclear weapons capability.107 106 107 Ya’alon quoted and translated from Israel’s Army Radio in Williams, op. cit. Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit. Congressional Research Service 23 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities The Israeli Decisionmaking Process108 Several factors may influence any Israeli political decision relating to a possible strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. These include, but are not limited to, the views and interactions of Israeli decisionmakers; the public debate in Israel, the stances and anticipated responses of U.S., The Security Cabinet and “Octet” regional, and international actors; estimates of Israel’s security cabinet is the group of government the effects of a possible strike; and the ministers convened by the prime minister to make decisions on matters related to national security.109 The anticipated Iranian response regionally and prime minister can have outside security and military internationally. Discussion below regarding the Israeli decisionmaking process and the factors that may influence it is largely dependent on secondary sources that CRS does not claim to confirm independently. Decisionmakers: Views and Interactions According to one report, the issue of a possible Israeli strike on Iran has “sparked fierce public debate in Israel among political and military leaders, past and present, dividing cabinet ministers, generals and Mossad chiefs. Most see military action as a last resort to be contemplated only if sanctions and diplomacy fail; others insist that bombing Iran could actually stabilize the Middle East by setting back the radical cause indefinitely.”111 officials brief the group. Prime ministers also rely upon security cabinet majorities to confirm broad-based support within Israel’s coalition-based parliamentary democracy for important courses of action. During the tenure of this government, Prime Minister Netanyahu has tended to convene and rely upon the opinions of a smaller group of eight ministers within the security cabinet, known as the “octet,” perhaps partly due to concerns that larger groups are more prone to leaking information publicly.110 Current security cabinet (first eight comprise octet) Binyamin Netanyahu (Prime Minister) Ehud Barak (Defense Minister/Deputy PM) Avigdor Lieberman (Foreign Minister/Deputy PM) Moshe Ya’alon (Vice PM/Strategic Affairs Minister) Yuval Steinitz (Finance Minister) Eli Yishai (Interior Minister/Deputy PM) Dan Meridor (Intel. & Atomic Ener. Min./Dep. PM) Benny Begin (Minister without Portfolio) Silvan Shalom (Vice PM/Regional Dev. Minister) Yitzhak Aharonovitch (Internal Security Minister) Yaakov Ne’eman (Justice Minister) Gideon Sa’ar (Education Minister) Uzi Landau (National Infrastructure Minister) Ariel Atias (Housing & Construction Minister) A 2011 RAND Corporation report cited a former Israeli official as saying that “the majority of ministers currently in power (including Prime Minister Netanyahu) would support military action to avoid Iran’s acquiring a bomb under 108 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. A February 2012 report quoted Israeli Vice Prime Minister and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon as saying, “In the State of Israel, any process of a military operation, and any military move, undergoes the approval of the security cabinet and in certain cases, the full cabinet.” Jeffrey Heller and Dan Williams, “Prime Minister Netanyahu can’t fly solo in Israel to attack Iran,” Reuters, February 7, 2012. The security cabinet of Menachem Begin reportedly elected to carry out the 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor over the objections of the then Mossad director, and the security cabinet of Ehud Olmert reportedly supported the 2007 strike against Syria’s presumed nuclear reactor under construction at Al Kibar (near Deir al Zur) by a vote of 13-1. For additional information on how the decisionmaking process on Iran might proceed under Prime Minister Netanyahu, see a transcript of an interview with the former director-general of Netanyahu’s office in Dovid Efune, “On Iran and Obama, How Bibi will Decide – Exclusive Interview with Eyal Gabbai, Part 1” The Algemeiner, March 5, 2012. 110 Eli Lake, “Meet the Israeli ‘Octet’ That Would Decide an Iran Attack,” Daily Beast, March 9, 2012. 111 Susser, op. cit. 109 Congressional Research Service 24 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities their watch.”112 However, an Israeli journalist known for covering intelligence issues wrote in February 2012 that “as [former Mossad chief Meir] Dagan, the majority of Israeli Cabinet ministers, the CIA, and others have made clear, there is no need to strike in the near future since there is still time before Iran produces its first bomb.”113 In a January 2012 interview, Defense Minister Barak indicated that there were “three categories of questions, which he characterized as ‘Israel’s ability to act,’ ‘international legitimacy’ and ‘necessity,’ all of which require affirmative responses before a decision is made to attack:” 1. Does Israel have the ability to cause severe damage to Iran’s nuclear sites and bring about a major delay in the Iranian nuclear project? And can the military and the Israeli people withstand the inevitable counterattack? 2. Does Israel have overt or tacit support, particularly from America, for carrying out an attack? 3. Have all other possibilities for the containment of Iran’s nuclear threat been exhausted, bringing Israel to the point of last resort? If so, is this the last opportunity for an attack?114 Whether Israel’s leaders believe the answer is “yes” or “no” to each of these three questions is a subject of debate among U.S. and Israeli analysts. A January 2012 New York Times article stated that conversations with eight current and recent top Israeli security officials suggested several things: since Israel has been demanding the new sanctions, including an oil embargo and seizure of Iran’s Central Bank assets, it will give the sanctions some months to work; the sanctions are viewed here as probably insufficient; a military attack remains a very real option; and [post-attack] situations are considered less perilous than one in which Iran has nuclear weapons.115 In Israeli policymakers’ evaluation of post-attack situations, however, one Israeli analyst asserted in February 2012 that they are so focused on the “immediate military implications” that they are ignoring several of the potential longer-term aspects of a strike: the preparedness of Israel’s home front; the contours of an Israeli exit strategy; the impact on U.S.-Israel relations; the global diplomatic fallout; the stability of world energy markets; and the outcome within Iran itself. Should Israel fail to openly debate and account for these factors in advance of an attack, it may end up with a strategic debacle, even if it achieves its narrow military goals.116 Israeli sources indicate that top leaders are divided on the issue. One journalist asserted in February that Netanyahu’s and Barak’s apparent support for an attack in the near future is countered by many cabinet ministers and security establishment officials who supposedly share former Mossad chief Dagan’s perspective “against a strike and in favor of sanctions and covert operations.” That view is based at least partly on doubts about Israel’s military capability to set 112 Kaye et al., op. cit., p. 40. Yossi Melman, “Face Off,” Tablet, February 9, 2012. 114 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit. 115 Ethan Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” New York Times, January 26, 2012. 116 Ehud Eiran, “What Happens After Israel Attacks Iran,” foreignaffairs.com, February 23, 2012. 113 Congressional Research Service 25 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities back Iran’s nuclear program three to five years.117 According to a November 2011 article by another Israeli journalist: Benny Begin and Moshe Yaalon, two of the most hardline right-wing ministers in the “Octet Forum,” the Israeli Cabinet’s main decision-making body, are currently opposed to an attack because they believe a military strike will cause a massive backlash from Iran and its proxies and should only be a very last resort.118 According to the same article, “Netanyahu’s decision to replace Dagan [in early 2011]—coupled with Barak’s insistence on removing popular army chief [Gabi] Ashkenazi in February [2011]— was seen by many as an intentional strategy to remove opponents of a military strike on Iran from positions of influence.”119 In June 2011, the New York Times quoted Dagan as saying, “I decided to speak out because when I was in office, [former Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) director Yuval] Diskin, Ashkenazi and I could block any dangerous adventure. Now I am afraid that there is no one to stop Bibi [Netanyahu] and Barak.”120 Despite changeovers in top Israeli security positions, an Israeli military correspondent was quoted as claiming in February 2012 that the current Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz, is considered a leader of a school of thought within the security establishment that reportedly has not concluded that the time has come for military action.121 One report cited a former senior Israeli official as saying that the defense establishment “was not enthusiastic about an attack. It hoped that sanctions and diplomacy would work and that if military action were needed it would come from the United States.”122 It is unclear how influential security officials’ views would be in a decision on a strike. When an interviewer told Barak in January 2012 about top-ranking military personnel who argue that a military strike is either unnecessary or would be ineffective, Barak said, “It’s good to have diversity in thinking and for people to voice their opinions. But at the end of the day, when the military command looks up, it sees us—the minister of defense and the prime minister. When we look up, we see nothing but the sky above us.”123 In mid March 2012, one report quoted an Israeli journalist as writing that a slight majority of Israel’s security cabinet supports a strike: According to the most recent assessments, at this point eight ministers tend to support Netanyahu and Barak’s position, while six object to it. It should be noted that the security 117 Melman, “Face Off,” op. cit. Anshel Pfeffer, “Will They?”, Tablet, November 18, 2011. Israeli reports in early November 2011 about other “octet” members said that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had been convinced to support a strike on Iran, while Intelligence and Atomic Energy Minister Dan Meridor objected to an “immediate attack” and Interior Minister Eli Yishai had not made up his mind. Barak Ravid, et al., “Netanyahu trying to persuade cabinet to support attack on Iran,” Ha’aretz, November 2, 2011; Ari Shavit, “Decision to attack Iran must be made with a clear mind,” Ha’aretz, November 3, 2011. 119 Pfeffer, “Will They?”, op. cit. However, Dagan was one of the longest-serving Mossad directors (2002-2011), having had his term extended multiple times following his initial appointment, including once by Netanyahu. 120 Ethan Bronner, “A Former Spy Chief Questions the Judgment of Israeli Leaders,” New York Times, June 3, 2011. 121 Ha’aretz journalist Amir Oren, quoted in Vita Bekker, “US worries grow over Israeli strike on Iran,” The National (United Arab Emirates), February 20, 2012. 122 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit. 123 Bergman, “Will Israel Attack Iran?”, op. cit. 118 Congressional Research Service 26 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities cabinet has yet to hold a decisive meeting on the issue and the assessments are based on secret talks being held between the prime minister and his ministers, one at a time.124 Another mid March Israeli report claimed that “if Netanyahu and Minister of Defense, Ehud Barak, decide to attack, they'll be able to pass a decision through the cabinet without significant difficulty. With the exception of ministers Benny Begin and Dan Meridor, a tenacious objection against an Israeli strike on Iran is not expected.”125 Some Israeli analysts question whether Netanyahu is likely to launch a strike against Iran. He has not ordered a major military offensive during either of his stints as Israel’s prime minister (19961999 and 2009-present), possibly owing in part to what some analysts have observed to be a generally cautious approach to decisionmaking.126 In his meeting with President Obama at the White House on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu reportedly confirmed that no decision had been made to that point.127 Yet, speaking at the annual American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) conference in Washington, DC, on March 5, 2012, Netanyahu said: We’ve waited for diplomacy to work. We’ve waited for sanctions to work. None of us can afford to wait much longer. As Prime Minister of Israel, I will never let my people live under the shadow of annihilation. Some commentators would have you believe that stopping Iran from getting the bomb is more dangerous than letting Iran have the bomb. They say that a military confrontation with Iran would undermine the efforts already underway, that it would be ineffective, and that it would provoke even more vindictive action by Iran. Netanyahu then referred to correspondence in 1944 between the World Jewish Congress and the U.S. government that apparently indicated U.S. unwillingness to bomb Auschwitz because of the “doubtful efficacy” of the operation and the possibility of “even more vindictive action by the Germans.” In response to Netanyahu’s speech, the editor-in-chief of Israel’s Ha’aretz newspaper wrote: The Holocaust talk has but one meaning—forcing Israel to go to war and strike the Iranians…. No amount of missiles falling on Tel Aviv, rising oil prices and economic crises matter when compared to genocide…. Enough loopholes can be detected that would allow Netanyahu to escape an imminent decision to go to war…. Nevertheless, Netanyahu took on a public obligation on Monday that would make it very hard for him to back away from the path of war with Iran.128 124 Excerpt from article by Ben Caspit in Israel’s Hebrew-language Ma’ariv newspaper, translated and quoted in “Most of Israel security cabinet backs Iran strike,” Agence France Presse, March 15, 2012. 125 Amir Rapaport, “Who Opposes Attacking Iran,” Israel Defense, March 16, 2012. For a report detailing the relationship between Netanyahu and Barak and their interaction on this issue, see Ethan Bronner, “2 Israeli Leaders Make Iran Issue Their Own,” New York Times, March 27, 2012. 126 CRS telephone interview with former Israeli deputy national security advisor and military planning director Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom, February 21, 2012. Daniel Levy, “Netanyahu Won’t Attack Iran (Probably),” foreignpolicy.com, March 2, 2012. 127 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu tells Obama: I have yet to decide whether to attack Iran,” Ha’aretz, March 6, 2012. 128 Aluf Benn, “By conjuring the Holocaust, Netanyahu brought Israel closer to war with Iran,” haaretz.com, March 6, 2012. Congressional Research Service 27 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities In early March 2012 interviews on Israeli television following his Washington, DC, trip, Netanyahu reportedly said: This is not a matter of days or weeks. It is also not a matter of years. The result has to be that the threat of a nuclear weapon in Iran’s hands is removed…. If you don’t make the decision, and you don’t succeed in preventing it, who will you explain that [to]? To historians? To the generations that were here before us? To the generations that won’t come after us? It is forbidden to let the Iranians get nuclear arms. And I intend not to allow that to happen.129 Public Opinion and Debate in Israel A U.S.-based Israeli analyst has noted that domestic Israeli political factors might militate against Netanyahu undertaking the risks a strike would entail—including his coalition’s apparently strong prospects for reelection in 2012 or 2013, and a reported lack of pressure for military action on Iran from the public or from coalition partners seen as having generally hawkish views.130 Public opinion polls conducted in February and March 2012 indicated reluctance by a majority of Israelis to support an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in the absence of U.S. cooperation. Assuming an Israeli attack without U.S. cooperation, a mid March poll conducted jointly by Israeli and Palestinian organizations indicated that Israelis would oppose a strike by a 51%-42% margin. A sizeable majority, however, would apparently support an attack with U.S. cooperation by a 69%-26% margin.131 An Israeli political science professor involved with a late February poll on the same questions reportedly explained the Israeli views as follows: “They are not challenging the right to [attack], [they are] challenging the ability to do it effectively and with international support. People don’t want Israel to become the troublemaker of the world.”132 A public debate in which Israeli officials and non-government analysts might engage appears to be a controversial subject in its own right. According to one report, “No issue in Israel is more fraught than the debate over the wisdom and feasibility of a strike on Iran…. Security officials are increasingly kept from journalists or barred from discussing Iran. Much of the public talk is as much message delivery as actual policy.”133 In a November 2011 poll taken by Israel’s Dialog polling institute, Israelis indicated by a 51%-39% margin that they oppose public discussion of a possible attack because it could “cause damage.”134 129 Prime Minister Netanyahu quoted in Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu: Attack on Iran not immediately in offing,” jpost.com, March 8, 2012. 130 Levy, op. cit. See also Paul Pillar, “Why Israeli Public Opinion Opposes a Strike on Iran,” theatlantic.com, March 1, 2012. 131 Poll of 600 adult Israelis during the period of March 11-15, 2012, conducted by the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah, West Bank. Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2012/p43ejoint.html. A late February poll conducted by Israel’s Dahaf Institute indicated that Israelis would oppose a strike without U.S. cooperation by a 63%-31% margin, and support a strike with U.S. cooperation by a 62%-34% margin. See http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=240#anchor269. A poll taken by Israel’s Dialog polling institute in early March indicated only 26% support for an independent Israeli strike. See http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988. 132 Tel Aviv University professor Tamar Herrmann, quoted in Joshua Mitnick, “Majority of Israelis oppose a unilateral strike on Iran nuclear program,” Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 2012. 133 Bronner, “Israel Senses Bluffing in Iran’s Threats of Retaliation,” op. cit. 134 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.6%, are available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=54362. Congressional Research Service 28 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Some Israeli commentators have voiced concern that the public is resigned to the possibility of war with Iran, based on a tradition of deference to national leaders.135 According to one commentator, “The impression is that the majority of Israelis are not afraid…. The decision is left up to a handful of people who have decided that the public, as usual, trusts them blindly, obediently.”136 An early March 2012 Dialog poll indicated that by a 50%-38% margin Israelis trust Netanyahu and Barak on the Iran issue.137 Two January 2012 articles co-authored by three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) argued that “a public discussion will assist those officials who are authorized to make informed decisions on this issue.”138 Both articles acknowledged the limitations of such a discussion given the apparent centrality to decisionmakers’ considerations of classified information on Iran’s nuclear program and on the operational capacity of Israel’s air force. Yet, they still argued for a debate to proceed: Instead, the public debate must focus on the strategic dimensions of the issue—a realm in which civilian strategists have much to contribute. Indeed, airing these dimensions is an absolute imperative. Without it we are condemned to repeat the mistakes of the past or to commit worse ones. More important, without such airing we are doomed to step mindlessly closer and closer to a military confrontation with Iran or, possibly just as dangerous, to accept and accommodate its nuclear ambitions and designs.139 135 Joel Greenberg, “Sense of inevitable war grips Israel,” Washington Post, February 23, 2012; Larry Derfner, “Israel’s Silent March to War with Iran,” Jewish Daily Forward, February 10, 2012. 136 Gideon Levy, “Israelis should be afraid of their leaders, not Iran,” Ha’aretz, February 5, 2012. 137 Details of the poll, which has a margin of error of 4.5%, are available at http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=55988. 138 Stein, et al., “The Public Discussion of Israel’s Strategy Regarding a Nuclear Iran,” op. cit. See also Shlomo Brom, Shai Feldman, Shimon Stein, “A real debate about Iran,” mideast.foreignpolicy.com, January 30, 2012. 139 Brom, et al., “A real debate about Iran,” op. cit. Congressional Research Service 29 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities Potential Factors in an Israeli Decision: Stances and Anticipated Responses Outside Israel140 The United States Despite the reference by Defense Minister Barak to the possible need for “overt or tacit support, particularly from America” before approving an Israel strike, it is unclear to what extent Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by the stated positions and anticipated responses of U.S. policymakers in the Obama Administration and Congress Selected Polls of U.S.Views on regarding an attack. Not Potential Israeli Strike surprisingly, Israeli leaders are These poll results are included to provide information regarding U.S. extremely sensitive to U.S. views public opinion on the issue, which could impact U.S. policymakers’ for a variety of reasons, including views and positions and ultimately influence Israeli decisionmaking. but not limited to: Reuters/Ipsos Public Affairs (March 8-11, 2012) • Strong U.S.-Israel relations dating back to when the United States was the first country to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the de facto government of Israel upon its declaration of statehood in May 1948; • Robust ongoing military and security cooperation, including significant U.S. arms sales and other forms of support; and • Trade ties and important bilateral economic and scientific cooperation.141 Israeli leaders’ perspectives about the possible effects of a strike on U.S. political and material assistance to Israel, possible negative security consequences for the United States from a potential Iranian retaliation, and the probability of future U.S. military Do you support or oppose Israel taking military action against Iran if there is evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons? Strongly support: 40%, Somewhat support: 22%, Somewhat oppose: 11%, Strongly oppose: 19%, Neither: 4%, Unsure: 4% (Poll of 1,084 adults with 3.1% margin of error) CBS News/New York Times (March 7-11, 2012) If Israel were to attack Iran in order to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapons program, should the U.S. support Israel's military action, or should the U.S. not get involved? Support: 47%, Not get involved: 42%, Oppose (volunteered response): 1%, Unsure: 10% (Poll of 1,009 adults with 3% margin of error) ABC News/Washington Post (March 7-10, 2012) Would you support or oppose Israel bombing Iran's nuclear development sites? Support: 42%, Oppose: 51%, No opinion: 7% (Poll of 1,003 adults with 4% margin of error) Program on International Policy Attitudes/University of Maryland (March 3-7, 2012) Do you think the U.S. should… Discourage Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear program: 34% Take a neutral stance: 46% Encourage Israel to attack Iran’s nuclear program: 14% Don’t know/Refused: 6% (Poll of 727 Americans with 4.5% margin of error) The Hill/Pulse Opinion Research (March 1, 2012) Support or oppose Israel attack on Iran to destroy nuclear program? Very supportive: 28%, Somewhat supportive: 24%, Somewhat opposed: 22%, Very opposed: 19%, Not sure: 8% (Poll of 1,000 likely voters with 3% margin of error) 140 Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more details on these interactions, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (nam e redacted); and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by (name redacted). 141 Congressional Research Service 30 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities action to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran may, among other considerations, influence the Israeli decisionmaking process An Israeli journalist wrote in March 2012 that Israel did not ask permission when it acted to prevent Saddam Hussein and Bashar al Asad from obtaining nuclear weapons, but that “the [Obama] administration can credibly counter that in neither case did Israeli unilateralism threaten to draw America into an armed conflict, as it does now.”142 According to three Israeli analysts (including two former officials) mentioned above: Even after the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, the U.S. remains extremely exposed to Iranian retaliation—either directly against its forces in the area or by Iran’s attempting to ignite a broader conflict in the region—so an Israeli strike would harm U.S. interests in the region and would place many U.S. lives at risk. And while in an election year America’s political reaction to such a strike may be mitigated by domestic political considerations, the reaction of the U.S. defense community to an Israeli military strike might be extremely negative, as such an action might be seen as representing Israeli insensitivity to and disregard of U.S. priorities and concerns.143 Some reports have speculated that an Israeli decision to attack, if it occurs, could come before the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, with one Israeli report stating, “A second-term president, not constrained by electoral necessities, will be able to apply a lot more pressure on the Israeli government not to attack.”144 Separate from the question of whether the United States might support an Israeli strike on Iran, Israeli decisionmakers might be influenced by how they anticipate the United States would respond after an attack, including in the event of retaliation by Iran and its allies. Although the United States does not have a formal treaty obligation to defend Israel in the event it is attacked, successive Administrations have either stated or implied that the United States would act to protect Israel’s security if it were endangered—including by Iran—and have worked with Congress to ensure and bolster Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over regional security threats.145 142 Yossi Klein Halevi, “Can Israel Trust the United States When It Comes to Iran?”, The New Republic, March 2, 2012. 143 Feldman, et al., “What to Do About Nuclearizing Iran? The Israeli Debate,” op. cit. 144 Anshel Pfeffer, “US election hands Netanyahu giant dilemma on Iran,” Jewish Chronicle Online, February 9, 2012. See also Bret Stephens, “(How) Should Israel Bomb Iran,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2012, stating, “Jerusalem knows that Mr. Obama will be hard-pressed to oppose an Israeli strike—the way Dwight Eisenhower did during the Suez crisis—before election day. A re-elected President Obama is a different story.” 145 For more information on the level of U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel , by (name reda cted). In addition to a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (TIAS 2675) dated July 23, 1952, the United States and Israel have entered into a range of stand-alone agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other arrangements varying in their formality. In remarks at the White House on March 5, 2012, with Prime Minister Netanyahu, the President said, “As I’ve said repeatedly, the bond between our two countries is unbreakable. My personal commitment—a commitment that is consistent with the history of other occupants of this Oval Office—our commitment to the security of Israel is rock solid. And as I've said to the Prime Minister in every single one of our meetings, the United States will always have Israel’s back when it comes to Israel’s security.” In a March 2006 speech against the backdrop of Iran’s hostile rhetoric toward Israel and pursuit of a nuclear program, President George W. Bush said, “I made it clear, I’ll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally Israel.” Seymour M. Hersh, “The Iran Plans,” The New Yorker, April 17, 2006. Congressional Research Service 31 Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities It is unclear to what extent U.S. expressions of willingness to act forcefu [Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.] --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/documents/crs%3AR42443. Public record. Not legal advice.